


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History of Shah 'Abbas the Great
Volume II

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Edited by Ehsan Yarshater

Number 28

History of Shah 'Abbas the Great

(Tārīḵ-e 'Ālamārā-ye 'Abbāsī)

by

Eskandar Beg Monshi

Volume II

Translated by Roger M. Savory

Professor of Middle East and Islamic Studies, University of Toronto



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Book II

In the preamble to Book II of his History, Eskandar Beg Monšī states that he intends henceforth to use the Turkish calendar instead of the lunar *hejrī* year "in order to clear up ambiguities" caused by the non-correspondence of the two calendars.

Unfortunately, Eskandar Beg merely succeeded in compounding the problem. The resultant ambiguities have now been cleared up by Professor Robert D. McChesney, who generously made his findings available to me. Since this translation was already in galley proof, there was time only to adjust the Nowrūz date of each year, where this was necessary, in the light of his findings. The reader will therefore find occasional discrepancies between the Nowrūz date and the *hejrī* date given by Eskandar Beg at the head of each chapter.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

The only sure foundation of both temporal and spiritual authority is justice, beneficence, and compassion. All mighty monarchs are subject to God's injunction: "God enjoins justice, and the doing of good to others."¹ It is through their efforts in watching over their subjects that they have been raised on high: "And We exalted him to a lofty station;"² and it is in consideration of the dictum, "the just ruler is the Shadow of God," that monarchs are regarded as the shadow of divine power and as a part of prophethood and sainthood. God be praised, therefore, that He has chosen as ruler of Iran, which is the choicest part of the inhabited world and the most excellent region of the earth, a king who possesses these qualities to perfection.

The chronogram for the accession of Shah 'Abbas is The Shadow of God (996/1588). By a curious coincidence, his name, 'Abbas Bahādor Khan, is also a chronogram for this event. I trust that all loyal servants of the Safavid dynasty, and especially the *vazīr-e dīvān*, whose name³ appears on the title page of this history, will be the beneficiaries of the favor of Shah 'Abbas.

In the first book of my history, I gave an account of the rise of the Safavid dynasty and of the ancestors of Shah 'Abbas, who were sovereign in the world of the spirit;⁴ I described the events associated with the birth of the prince 'Abbas, and concluded with a summary of the events of the year of his accession, which is the Year of the Pig (996/1588)—using a plain, unvarnished style. Also in book I, I indicated that, if I was spared, I would rework this draft, which is too anecdotal in style, embellish it with noble phrases and elegant metaphors, and jettison the superfluous material that inevitably creeps in in the course of writing a history, but which has no place in the art of historiography.

However, I must now address myself to the task of fulfilling my other promise, namely, to give a chronological account of the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas. I reflected that, if I used the *hejri* year, as is the common practice of historians, which begins on the first of Moḥarram in Arab usage, the majority of the people of Persia would

¹Koran, 16:91.

²Koran, 19:58.

³Abū Ṭaleb Khan b. Ḥātem Beg Ordūbādī, vizier 1019-21/1610-11 to 1612-13, and 1041-43/1631-33. The eulogy of this vizier was omitted from later recensions of this history.

⁴Presumably the author has in mind the shaikhs of the Safavid *ṭarīqa*.

not understand it. The reason for this is that, in both the Turkish and the Persian calendars, the New Year begins at Nowrūz (21 March), which is the first day of spring, and the calendar year comprises four seasons commencing from that date. The month of Moḥarram occurs in the course of the Turkish year, and so the chronograms learned scholars formulate for historical events are at variance with the Turkish year; some refer to the preceding *hejri* year, and some to the following one. It was incumbent upon me to clear up ambiguities of this kind, and to use a system that will be understood by the common man and approved by persons of quality. I therefore decided to use the Turkish year, in order that students of history and those involved in the process of government might understand more clearly what events happened in which year.⁵ During the first few years of Shah 'Abbas's reign, Persian fortunes were at a low ebb, and a number of disagreeable events occurred. This time of misfortunes soon passed, however, and a new era of prosperity dawned. I am not guilty of the slightest exaggeration when I say that the actions of Shah 'Abbas were taken as a model by other mighty potentates.

But now to my theme. As I have already mentioned, Moršedqolī Khan, his mind set at rest in regard to his rivals among the emirs, continued to hold the office of *vakīl* with full powers, and Shah 'Abbas, in order to consolidate his own position and in the interests of the state, gave him absolute authority in the affairs of government. To begin with, Moršedqolī Khan had quarters in the royal palace. Morning and evening, the emirs, viziers, and principal officers of state assembled in his presence and all *dīvān* business, of whatever importance, was concluded in accordance with his judgment. After a few days, however, Moršedqolī Khan moved out of the palace and took up residence in the house formerly occupied by the late Parī Kān Kānom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, which was situated at the side of the palace. The provincial emirs began to arrive to kiss the Shah's feet: Valī Khan Afšār from Kerman; Yūsuf Khan Afšār, the son of Qolī Beg the *qūrčibāši*, from Abarqūh; Mahdīqolī Khan

⁵Unfortunately, Eskandar Beg did not succeed in removing all ambiguities in regard to the correspondences between the Turkish (or Torkī) solar calendar and the lunar *hejri* calendar. Professor Robert D. McChesney, in an article to be published shortly, has painstakingly analyzed the discrepancies between the two systems, and I am indebted to him for making a copy of his article available to me. According to his findings, the correspondences for the years 996/1587-88 to 1009/1600-01 are consistently incorrect; those for the years 1010/1601-02 to 1015/1606-07 are inconsistently incorrect; and those for the years 1015/1606-07 to 1025/1616-17 are inconsistently correct. For a full discussion of the whole complex problem, the reader is referred to Professor McChesney's article.

Zu'l-Qadar, and Mīrzā 'Abdollāh, the son of Mīrzā Salmān, from Shiraz; 'Alīqolī Sultan, the grandson of Šāhqolī Kalīfa Zu'l-Qadar, from Qom; Emir Ḥamza Khan Ṭaleš, from Āstārā; and Moḥammad Khan Torkmān, from the Ardabīl region. Every day, too, contingents of *qezelbaş* arrived to pledge their fealty to the Shah.

About this time, Shah 'Abbas contracted two marriages: the first, with the daughter of Sultan Moṣṭafā Mīrzā,⁶ who had been brought up by her grandmother; and the second, with the daughter of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bahrām Mīrzā, who was the widow of Ḥamza Mīrzā. The theologians and jurists arranged a magnificent wedding feast in the Bāḡ-e Sa'ādatabād and the Meydān-e Asp. It went on for three days and nights, and the highest and lowest in the land joined in the festivities.

At the conclusion of the wedding ceremonies, the Shah appointed each of the high-ranking emirs to an office and granted him a fief. The office of *qūrčibāši* went to Yūsuf Khan; that of keeper of the seal, to 'Alīqolī Sultan Zu'l-Qadar; the governorship of Shiraz, to Maḥdīqolī Khan; and Kūr Qūr Koms Khan, the son of Delī Būdāq, was appointed to the office of *kalīfat al-kolāfā*. Although he had promised the office of vizier to Mīrzā 'Abdollāh b. Mīrzā Salmān (the letter of appointment had actually been issued), the Shah went back on his word; it was given to Mīrzā Šāhvalī, the son of Mīrzā Aḥmad, who was the vizier of Moršedqolī Khan. The reason was that Mīrzā Šāhvalī's father, who deserved well of the Safavid house, had lost his life in the citadel at Torbat.

The richest province, Isfahan, most of which was crown land (*kāšša*) and had been the personal property first of Shah Tahmasp, then of Ḥamza Mīrzā, and finally of Abū Ṭaleb Mīrzā, was reserved by Moršedqolī Khan for his own use. This act of presumption was his first false move in Iraq. Qom was allocated to Soleymān Kalīfa Torkmān; Hamadan to Qūr Koms Khan Šāmlū; and the other provinces were allocated to the emirs as Moršedqolī Khan thought fit. With his letter of appointment, each emir received another document that listed the number of troops he was required to provide for the expedition to Khorasan against 'Abdollāh Khan Uzbek, which was planned for the spring with the object of relieving the city of Herat.

⁶The fifth son of Shah Tahmasp; he lost his life in the general massacre of Safavid princes perpetrated by Shah Esma'il II.

The Remaining Events of the Year of the Pig, the Year of Shah 'Abbas's Accession, with Details of the Revolt among the Emirs and the Execution of Some of Their Number

As I related in Book I, Shah 'Abbas had been brought up at Herat in the care of his guardian, 'Alīqolī Khan Šamlū, and the Šamlū tribe. The quarrel between his guardian and Moršedqolī Khan had finally led to his falling into the hands of the latter, but he had never liked the idea of Moršedqolī Khan being his guardian, or being among the Ostājlu tribe. However, there was nothing he could do but acquiesce in the situation. Some of those who had accompanied 'Abbas from Khorasan knew of his antipathy to Moršedqolī Khan, and they perceived his dislike of the latter's ever-increasing power. These emirs, men like Pīr Ğeyb Khan Ostājlu and his brothers, were of course also consumed with envy of the *vakīl's* power on their own account and looked for an opportunity to bring him down. At the instigation of Mīrzā Abdollāh Khan b. Mīrzā Salmān, who resented not being given the office of vizier, a conspiracy was formed against the *vakīl*. Those involved were Mahdīqolī Khan, governor of Shiraz; Yūsuf Khan the *qūrčībāšī*; 'Alīqolī Sultan Zu'l-Qadar, the keeper of the seal; and Kūr Qūr Koms Kōlafā. Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn, the son of Mīrmīrān, who was the *šadr*, was due to arrive from Isfahan, and Moršedqolī Khan was due to ride out with the emirs to greet him. The conspirators saw this as their opportunity; they planned to surround Moršedqolī Khan as he rode along, and "relieve their minds of anxiety on his score."

On the morning in question, however, several of the conspirators went to the *vakīl* and warned him of the plot. Moršedqolī Khan gathered his men together and proceeded directly to the palace to inform the Shah of the emirs' treachery. The conspirators had assembled at the house of Yūsuf Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*. When they heard that their plot was no longer a secret, and that the *vakīl* had gone to the palace and was with the Shah, they mounted and rode to the palace on the pretext of assembling to form the escort for Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn. Since most of their men were armed, the *ešīk-aqāsīs* and the gatekeepers tried to prevent them from entering. But the conspirators forced their way into the palace and tramped into the Čehel Sotūn hall with their weapons, riding boots and all. They fondly

imagined that their action was in conformity with the Shah's own desire and that, with his support, it would be an easy matter to deal with the *vakīl*. The Shah, although he was irked by the *vakīl*'s overweening power, saw that the best policy lay in supporting him on this occasion. Most of the conspirators who had burst into the palace in this rude fashion had risen to high rank during the period of revolts and civil wars, and they behaved like unruly barons. The Shah thought it would be wiser to get rid of this group, and he would never have a better chance.

Shah 'Abbas therefore sent a messenger to the conspirators asking the meaning of this disruption and the name of its author. The conspirators then lost their nerve and did not follow through with the degree of boldness the occasion demanded. Concealing their real purpose, they replied that they had come to form the escort to lead Mīrzā Moḥammad Amīn into the city. If Moršedqolī Khan wished to ride with them, well and good; otherwise, they would take their leave. Since they made no mention of any other matter, the Shah merely told them to carry on with their duties, saying that the Khan had important business with him and could not come.

Once Mīrzā Moḥammad was safely in the city, the conspirators, knowing they would not now be safe from Moršedqolī Khan, went in a body to the Bāḡ-e Sa'adatābād and—in an act of even greater stupidity—openly declared their opposition to the *vakīl*. They had made extremely difficult for themselves a task they could initially have performed with ease. This time, the Shah sent Qūr Koms Khan Šamlū to find out the cause of all the tumult, and the conspirators now said openly: "We are discontented with the amount of power and influence wielded by Moršedqolī Khan; we have observed his improper conduct toward your majesty's servants; this is unacceptable to the *qezelbāš*, and there is no possibility of our reaching a *modus vivendi* with him." In reply, the Shah said: "You are the servants of this court. If you have a genuine concern about something, or if you have a complaint against Moršedqolī Khan or any other, the rule is that you should bring your complaint to me and abide by whatever decision I make. To stir up trouble among the *qezelbāš*, and to ride around in armed bands, is tantamount to rebellion." The Shah, suspecting that they might still have some motive other than the one they had now revealed, decided to rid himself of them.

He issued an appeal to "those who love the Shah," and the *qezel-*

bāš began to assemble at the palace in the Meydān-e Asp. The conspirators' supporters began to disperse, and the ringleaders despaired of achieving their object. They sent back a message by Qūr Koms Khan to the following effect: "We are not guilty of any shortcoming in our devotion to your majesty, with whom we are perfectly content. Our grievance is only against Moršedqolī Khan, because he has treated us unfairly. Each of us holds one of the important offices under the jurisdiction of the *dīvān-e a'lā*, but we have not been given sufficient independence of action to carry out our duties properly. We expected that the *vakīl* would delegate greater authority to us, but this has not happened. We beg you to give your personal attention to this, arbitrate between us and the *vakīl* in the light of the interests of the state, and reach an agreed settlement."

When Qūr Koms Khan transmitted this message, the Shah issued orders that the ringleaders were to be lodged at the house of Qūr Koms Khan for the night. In the morning, Moršedqolī Khan would seek to conciliate them and to reassure them on all points at issue; then Qūr Koms Khan would act as intermediary and a peaceful settlement would be ratified between the conspirators and the *vakīl*. All night long, the *šāhī-sevans* kept guard. In the morning, Qūr Koms Khan went to the palace, taking with him as the spokesman for the conspirators Mahdīqolī Khan Zu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, who was the most intelligent of them. On behalf of himself and his fellow emirs Mahdīqolī Khan apologized for their unseemly behavior, and then launched into a diatribe against Moršedqolī Khan: "Moršedqolī Khan," he said, "has been taking decisions on matters of state without consulting Your Majesty. He has used the royal seals, which are affixed to administrative documents and which open the doors of the treasury, to achieve his own ends. Moršedqolī Khan must surrender control of these seals to Your Majesty, and they should be deposited for safekeeping in the harem, as was the practice in the time of Shah Tahmasp. The *vakīl* should also be required to convene the council of emirs twice a week. All the great emirs on this council hold appointments from the *dīvān*; all are senior chiefs of their tribes; they should have a say in decisions affecting their tribal fiefs and military obligations, so that the *qūrčibāšī* may be able to maintain his prestige among the *qūrčīs*, and the tribal chiefs in their respective tribes."

The Shah replied: "During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, as a result of the power of the emirs, their intervention in govern-

ment, and their feuds among themselves, sedition was rife among the *qezelbāš*. Now that I am king, we are going to forget about the practice of Sultan Moḥammad Shah; the king is going to make the decisions now. I have confidence in Moršedqolī Khan, and I have entrusted administrative matters to his sound judgment. All those who would please me must acknowledge him as their paramount chief."

In the course of the argument, Mahdīqolī Khan lost his temper and began shouting abuse at Moršedqolī Khan. The Shah, in his turn, flew into a rage, and shouted at Mahdīqolī Khan: "You seditious little man! It was I who made you governor of Shiraz, with the rank of khan. What more do you want? What gives you the right to cause trouble among the *qezelbāš*? You, and people like you, are thorns in the side of the body politic." The Shah then promised the governorship of Shiraz to Ya'qūb Beg Zu'l-Qadar, son of Ebrahim Khan Zu'l-Qadar, who had been governor of Fārs under Shah Tahmasp. Ya'qūb Beg had joined 'Abbas in Khorasan and had accompanied him to Iraq. Mahdīqolī Khan was handed over to him for disposal. Ya'qūb Khan bound Mahdīqolī Khan's hands and removed his *qezelbāš* hat, dragged him out, and slew him on the spot. Ya'qūb Khan was at once formally appointed governor of Shiraz. Aslams Khan, the sons of Šāhroḡ Khan Tātī-oḡlū Zu'l-Qadar, who had been keeper of the seal under Sultan Moḥammad Shah and had been dismissed and fined because of his association with the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction, was reinstated in office; the fate of 'Alīqolī Sultan, the incumbent, was left in his hands. Similarly, Šāhqolī Sultan Ḳolafā was appointed to the office of *kalīfat al-ḳolafā*, and the incumbent, Qūr Ḳoms Khan, was handed over to him for disposal. Badr Khan Afšār, the brother of Eskandar Khan, was appointed *qūrčībāšī* and instructed to arrest Yūsof Khan, and Adham Khan Torkmān was deputed to arrest Abu'l-Ma'sūm Khan. The Ostājīlū emirs undertook to deal with Pīr Geyb Khan and his brothers.

All those who had received orders mounted and rode off to the house of Qūrḡ Ḳoms Khan. Before they arrived, most of the conspirators fled, many unarmed, to Dāman-kūh in the Qazvin district, hoping to get to Gilān. Abu'l-Ma'sūm Khan Torkmān, and Emāmqolī Mīrzā Torkmān went in the opposite direction, to Hamadan. No one went in pursuit of Abu'l-Ma'sūm Khan, who reached Hamadan safely and fled from there to Baghdad. The main body of conspirators, however, was pursued by royal troops and overtaken almost before it had got clear of the city. Those emirs who resisted were killed on the spot; the rest were arrested, while their men fled. Yūsof Khan, the *qūrčībāšī*,

was spared on orders from Moršedqolī Khan, who was a friend of his father, now in Turkey. Emir Aşlān Khan, the brother of Pīr Ğeyb Khan, was also spared, because Shah 'Abbas had a special liking for him. These two men were imprisoned, but the rest were put to death. Emir Aşlān Khan was later put to death, but Yūsuf Khan was again spared, this time on the intercession of his cousin Valī Khan, the governor of Kerman.

Mīrzā Abdollāh, the son of Mīrzā Salmān, who was the prime mover of this plot, was arrested, together with his brother Mīrzā Neẓām al-Molk. But since they were Persians, they were fined instead of being executed; they were handed over to the collectors, who had instruction to take them to Shiraz and relieve them of large sums of money. Mīrzā Šāhvalī, the son of Mīrzā Aḥmad and the grandson of Mīrzā 'Aṭā'ollāh Eşfahānī, vizier of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān in the time of Shah Tahmasp, had been appointed as his own vizier by Moršedqolī Khan in recognition of the services of his father, who had been killed in the citadel at Torbat. Mīrzā Šāhvalī was now appointed vizier of the central *dīvān*, with the title of *e'temād al-dowla*; and at his urging Abū'l-Valī Enjū, who had held the office of *şadr* under Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, was reappointed to the *şadārat*. Finally, Seyyed Beg Kamūna was appointed keeper of the seal, known as the *mohr-e šaraf-e nafāz*.¹ After the abortive coup against him, Moršedqolī Khan held the office of *vakīl-e dīvān-e a'lā* with full powers, and devoted his attention to the affairs of government. The Shah continued to extend his favor to him and to support him.

Among the deaths which occurred this year was that of Emāmqolī Khan Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, who died at Ganja of natural causes. His governorship was given to Moḥammad Khan Qājār, the son of Kalīl Khan b. Šāhverdī Sultan Zīād-oğlū Qājār, who held the office of *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ under Shah Tahmasp. Emāmqolī Khan belonged to the Yava clan of the Qājār tribe, which had been responsible for the upbringing of Esma'il Mīrzā, and he had been rewarded with the office of *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ. During the period when Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā were in power, Emāmqolī Khan fought valiantly against the Ottomans. For ten years he held the office of *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāğ and governed with great authority along that frontier.

¹See TM, 62,202.

The Year of the Rat (997/1588-89), the Second Year of Shah 'Abbas's Reign: In this year, the Uzbegs Captured Herat, 'Alīqolī Khan Evčī Was Slain, the Šamlū Tribe was Destroyed, and Khorasan Lapsed into Chaos

In the spring of 997/1589, Moršedqolī Khan was busy with preparations for the expedition to Khorasan. For fear of a *qezelbaş* uprising after the departure of the royal army, he placed the ex-shah, Sultan Moḥammad, and his son Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā under guard at Alamūt, where Tahmasp Mīrzā was also imprisoned. On second thought, he rejected the idea of Alamūt because of its proximity to Gilān, and moved the ex-shah and Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā to the fortress at Varāmīn in the district of Rayy, which was centrally located in the province of Iraq and had suitable accommodations. He placed a trusted Ostājīlū officer, Aḥmad Beg Gerāmpā, in charge of the prisoners.

Despite all his talk of leaving for Khorasan, Moršedqolī Khan procrastinated because he was afraid of 'Alīqolī Khan, beleaguered by the Uzbegs at Herat. He knew of Shah 'Abbas's attachment to 'Alīqolī Khan, and was afraid that the latter might once again become *vakīl* and *rokn al-salṭana* and might seek revenge. Moršedqolī Khan procrastinated so long that the defenders, weakened by lack of food, the foulness of the air, and sickness, could no longer continue the siege, and the Uzbegs captured Herat.

'Alīqolī Khan was a man of such integrity and devotion to the Safavid house that, although he had heard of 'Abbas's westward march and had no hope of receiving any assistance from Moršedqolī Khan, he kept up a courageous defense of Herat and did not allow the Uzbegs to take the city. On several occasions the besiegers attacked the ditch, and two or three times, three or four hundred men succeeded in penetrating into the city. But each time the attackers were repulsed with heavy losses. Sickness, however, took its toll in the city because of lack of food, the consumption of unsuitable food, and the foulness of the air. Many people, both Turk and Tajik, died daily. There was also treachery within the walls. Mollā Mīr Bāqarzī, who was in charge of one of the towers of the fort, deserted and informed the enemy of the desperate state of the defenders.

Finally, 'Alīqolī Khan sent a delegation to ask for terms with 'Abdollāh Khan Özbek; the delegation consisted of Pīr Būdāq Sultan Šāmlū and Abū Ṭaleb Beg Ordübādī, his own comptroller of finance, who was related to 'Alīqolī Khan. 'Abdollāh Khan was at first inclined to accept the *qezelbāš* plea that they be allowed to march away from Herat unmolested, with their families and children, but he was persuaded to reject this proposal by Mollā Mīr, Mīrzā Arbāb, Abū'l-Ḥasan Ġūrānī, and other traitors. He then had the *qezelbāš* envoys blown from the mouth of cannon, an act which brought him lasting infamy, for throughout history it has been considered a crime to kill ambassadors.

His truce overtures having been rejected, 'Alīqolī Khan had no option but to struggle on, and he held out for nearly another two months. By that time, most of the towers lacked defenders. In the eleventh month of the siege, on a night when 'Alīqolī Khan, contrary to his usual practice, had retired to his house and most of the *qezelbāš*, too weak from hunger to mount guard, were also in their homes, someone shouted from the battlements, "This tower has no defenders." At once a group of Uzbeks, always on the lookout for an opportunity to launch an assault, swarmed up the tower with a rope, pulled several other men up, and captured several other turrets. 'Alīqolī Khan and the *qezelbāš*, caught by surprise and hearing the sound of trumpets from the battlements, abandoned any attempt to defend the walls, and retreated into the citadel of Eḡtīār al-Dīn, a fortress originally built by the Ġūrīd monarchs. The Uzbeks began to kill, pillage, and burn throughout the city.

'Alīqolī Khan, with a small band of Šāmlūs and others who were with him in the citadel, ran out of supplies of both food and munitions after two days. 'Abdollāh Khan did not know the true situation inside the citadel; he imagined that the defenders had adequate supplies and would make every effort to defend the citadel, and envisaged a long siege. He therefore sent a message to 'Alīqolī Khan through Moḥammad Bāqī Aṭālīq, Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, and some trusted Uzbek emirs to the effect that, if he would surrender the citadel and hand over all his possessions to the Uzbek khan as a gift, the latter would allow him to retire with his *qezelbāš* to whatever point he wished. There was only one condition, that 'Alīqolī Khan should make his obeisance to the Uzbek khan. Although 'Alīqolī Khan and his men did not trust the word of 'Abdollāh Khan or the Uzbeks, they could see no alternative but to comply. On the third day, therefore,

they left the citadel. Escorted by Uzbek emirs, they proceeded toward 'Abdollah Khan's court, which had been set up in the mosque of Sultan Huseyn Mirzā; meanwhile, the Uzbeks occupied the citadel.

'Alīqolī Khan was taken first to the Bāg-e Šahr to pay his respects to Abd al-Mo'men Khan, son of 'Abdollah Khan. The perfidious Abd al-Mo'men incited a group of Uzbek warriors, most of them the sons, brothers, and other relatives of men who had lost their life in the siege of Herat, to take their revenge on 'Alīqolī Khan and his men. (It is not clear whether this was his own idea, or whether he was acting on orders from his father—there are two differing traditions.) When 'Alīqolī Khan and his men neared 'Abdollah Khan's house, they were deprived of their swords by the Uzbek emirs, who said it was not proper to go into the Khan's presence wearing arms. Several Uzbeks then drew their swords and rushed at one of the Šāmlūs, and Shah Moḥammad Allāhčīān made a grab at 'Alīqolī Khan's turban; Gāzī Sultan Šāmlū intervened and stabbed him with his dagger, but the remaining Uzbeks drew their swords and massacred the entire garrison.

'Abdollah Khan then gave the order that any *qezelbaş* who could be found in Herat should be slaughtered. The Uzbeks were so zealous in killing and plundering that many Persians were also slain, simply because they were co-religionists of the *qezelbaş*. The Šāmlū women were sent as prisoners to Transoxania, but the wives of the Šāmlū nobles were tortured to extract from them their articles of value and their buried treasures. They were then stripped naked and turned loose, and few of them survived. A small number who managed to creep into holes and corners emerged at night and escaped into open country.

The slaughter of Shi'ites¹ at Herat went on for some time. Any citizen who had an old score to pay off would accuse that person of being a Shi'ite, get two ignorant fellows to act as witnesses, and haul him off before a Ḥanafti religious judge, who would at once condemn the poor wretch to death by burning or other means. Anyone who was suspected of having any wealth was seized by the Uzbeks and fined. The people of Herat thus endured severe hardships until 'Abdollah Khan made Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš governor of the province. The

¹In the text, Rāfeẓīs. Strictly speaking, the Rāfeẓīs were a particular Shi'ite sect which supported Zeyd b. 'Alī b. Huseyn, but the word was frequently used by Sunnis as a blanket term of abuse for Shi'ites, and I have so translated it here.

latter was from a noble family of Samarkand; he was a learned and dignified man who enjoyed the Khan's confidence and had been raised by him to the rank of emir and appointed to the office of *şadr*. He gradually took over the reins of government, curbed the oppression of the populace, and checked the activities of religious bigots.

From Herat, 'Abdollah Khan marched on Mašhad. The governor there, Ebrahim Khan the brother of Moršedqolī Khan, hoped by diplomacy to spare the inhabitants of Mašhad from harm at the hands of the Uzbegs. He opened negotiations with 'Abdollah Khan's agents and sent gifts to the Khan, together with the following message:

The Uzbek army has been away from home for a long time and has suffered considerably during the siege of Herat. If you intend to lay siege to Mašhad, you should be aware that our capacity to withstand a siege is greater than that of Herat, and that we shall fight particularly hard in defense of the holy shrine of the Imam Reżā. Furthermore, the royal army is momentarily expected in Khorasan. Our Shah is now firmly established on the throne and is free to march here with the whole *qezelbaş* army. If he should reach Mašhad, it is extremely doubtful whether your forces, which have already fought a hard campaign at Herat, could withstand him. It seems to me your best plan would be to retire this year to Transoxania and give us a breathing space. Next year, if our Shah is in Khorasan, you will be free to take whatever action you please; if he is not, there will be no need for your army to march. I will surrender Mašhad to whichever of the Uzbek emirs you care to send and take myself off.

This seemed a sensible idea to 'Abdollah Khan, because he already had reports that the royal army was on its way to Khorasan. After numerous councils of war, the decision to retire was taken; and the Khan was content with a paltry present. The Uzbek army marched to Saraqs, which they besieged, making their camp beneath the city walls. Mīr Ebn Huseyn Khan, the son of Mīr Huseyn Sultan Fīrūz-jang, was the governor of Saraqs. Enrolled in the ranks of the Čāğatāy emirs of Khorasan since the time of Shah Tahmasp, he defended

the city stoutly and drove the Uzbegs out of their camp. 'Abdollaḥ Khan continued the siege for six weeks, but achieved nothing except heavy casualties. He withdrew, uttering threats to the effect that he would be back.

After 'Abdollaḥ Khan's withdrawal, the *qezelbaş* recovered all the territory as far as Ġūrīān, but the Uzbegs held the territory between Ġūrīān and the Morġāb River, which was under the jurisdiction of Mīr Qolbābā. While the Uzbegs were in the Mašhad area they had spent their time pillaging, as was their custom. Since most of the revenue from this land went to defray the expenses of the shrine of the Imam Reżā, including the stipends of the shrine officials and the *naqībs*, the latter wrote to the Uzbek theologians and scholars asking them to use their influence to get this looting stopped. The Uzbek theologians sent the following letter in reply:

"It is, of course, clear to every Muslim that it is not permissible to take the property or the life of any person who has made the profession of the faith, provided that person has not committed any acts which are tantamount to unbelief, but has acted in the approved manner of his ancestors and the Imams.

"However, in the case of persons who, despite the fact that they have made the profession of the faith, have totally abandoned the Sunni rite and Sunni theology, and have turned believers away from their original faith to the abominable Shi'ite rite, and have permitted the ritual cursing of Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān, and of some of the chaste wives of the Prophet, an act tantamount to unbelief, Muslim rulers—nay, all believers—are under the obligation to kill and destroy them, as God has commanded, as the supreme act for the true religion. And the destruction of their homes and the seizure of their goods and property is permitted. If the ruler of the time is remiss in prosecuting a holy war against such people when he has the power to do so, and when the consensus of theologians is that holy war is mandatory and is faithful to the practice of the Prophet, how will he answer to God on the Day of Judgment? 'Fear the Day when no soul shall serve as a substitute for another soul, nor shall any intercession be accepted for it, nor shall ransom be accepted from it, nor shall they be helped.'² God has said, 'We shall surely question those to whom messengers were sent.'³

²Koran, 2:49.

³Koran, 7:7.

"Any intelligent man who cares to browse among the verses of the Koran and the traditions will clearly perceive that that group of people who were honored by being Companions of the Prophet, who pledged their allegiance to him and served him faithfully, and for years, following the commandment of God, rode at his side in wars against the infidel, is free from all suspicion of shortcoming, and is deserving of paradise: 'Surely God was well pleased with the believers when they were swearing allegiance to thee under the Tree.'⁴ 'These it is whom God has guided aright, so follow thou their guidance.'⁵

"There is no doubt that Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān fall into this category, for by virtue of their marriage ties and close association with the Prophet, they were called by God his Companions: 'When he said to his companion, 'grieve not, for God is with us.'⁶ Further, as God has also said, the Prophet 'does not speak of his own volition; it is nothing but revelation which has been revealed by God.'⁷ In other words, the words and acts of the Prophet have their origin in revelation. The Prophet showed the greatest veneration for Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān, and there are numerous traditions concerning each of them. To deny the virtue of these men, therefore, constitutes deviation and desertion and, indeed, constitutes a rejection of the Koran and imputes a fault to the Prophet, whereas he who believes in and loves them is acceptable to and a follower of the Prophet.

"The Koran says: 'If you love God, follow me; then will God love you and forgive you';⁸ by obeying his commandment, man may hope to obtain the love of God. The valor and zeal in the service of God of the Commander of the Faithful, 'Alī, are too well known to need mention. Moreover, 'Alī was a contemporary of the 'rightly-guided' caliphs, and gave his allegiance to them and followed them. So those people who impute fault to the Prophet overlook the fact that this necessarily involves the imputation of fault to 'Alī too. Again, how is it possible to allow the imputation of various shameful acts, or at least the knowledge of them, to 'Ā'eṣā, although she shared the Prophet's bed and was loved by him? As the Koran says: 'Evil women are for evil men, and evil men are for evil women; and good women are for good men, and good men are for good women.'⁹ Consider well, there-

⁴Koran, 48:19.

⁵Koran, 6:91.

⁶Koran, 9:40.

⁷Koran, 53:1-5.

⁸Koran, 3:32.

⁹Koran, 24:27.

fore whither the imputation of fault to 'Ā'eša will lead you! Even the commonest fellow in the bazaar, if his wife is accused of some shameful act, will be horrified; so how is it possible to impute to the wife of the Prophet the sort of thing which some Shi'ites impute to her? 'We take refuge with God from such thoughts! So be warned, O men of insight!'¹⁰ Some people may say, 'but we have never uttered words like these, nor ever will!' But they have heard other people utter them, and have not checked them, and are therefore as guilty as they are!

"In support of your view that the revenues and crops of Mašhad should be inviolate, you have quoted the Koranic verse: 'Do not consume your wealth among yourselves by unlawful means,'¹¹ and the tradition: 'No order issued by a Muslim makes lawful to him the property of another, unless he who gives the order has a pure heart.' The answer to this is that the Koranic verse and the tradition in question refer only to believers and Muslims, whereas it is abundantly clear that the foul sect of the Shi'ites is beyond the pale of Islam and the Muslim faith. Indeed, this very Koranic verse and this very tradition, according to the contrary interpretation of them by a number of sound theologians, and various other Koranic verses and traditions, which there is no need to mention here, prove that it is lawful to kill, plunder, burn, and destroy the crops, houses, and gardens of infidels. There is no dispute about this. It is also lawful to wage war on those who refuse to give allegiance to the ruler of Islam and the caliph; theologians are agreed that it is lawful to wage war on such persons even if they utter the profession of the Muslim faith and are Muslims. That this is so is shown by various declarations made by 'Alī himself during his caliphate, and the war which is being waged against you by our Khan falls into this category.

'As to what you say about the crops and gardens of the Mašhad region constituting a hereditary endowment of the shrine administration at Mašhad on the part of the Shah's ancestors, since the region in question is not part of the Islamic world, but part of the 'region of war,'¹² endowments have no meaning for the army of Islam. These gardens will be treated like any other gardens, and will be allocated to Muslims. In cases where the owner has not taken possession of the land, it is quite legitimate for the Muslim ruler to allow his *gazīs* and the army of Islam to plunder it.

¹⁰Koran, 28:3. The text has *albab* instead of *absār*.

¹¹Koran, 2:184: 4:33.

¹²*Dār al-harb*, i.e., non-Muslim lands, which may legitimately be ravaged by Muslims.



'As to what you say about most of the inhabitants of the region being descendants of the Prophet, do you not recall the Koranic verse: 'He is surely not of thy family, for he is a man of unrighteous conduct'?¹³

'As to your protestation that you are all righteous men, righteousness is not a central issue in Islam.

'As for what you say about your contacts with theologians at Mecca, Medina, and Damascus, 'it profits not a man to see the countenance of the Prophet, if he himself is not inclined toward good.'

'As to your argument that you have been applauded by Sunni theologians, it can only be because they did not know of your false opinions.

'As to your argument that the month of Rajab¹⁴ is one of the proscribed months, and that during this period it is unlawful to kill or make war on anyone who is not in a state of war with oneself, the proscription on the month of Rajab has been abrogated. According to the canonical traditions, the Commander of the Faithful, 'Ali, himself carried out raids and military operations against the enemy during the month of Rajab.

'As to your argument that the Koranic verse 'I have not created *jinn* and men for any purpose save that they worship Me'¹⁵ is one of the unequivocal verses of the Koran, we do not dispute this. But there is no dispute either about the fact that holy war against the infidel is one of the greatest acts of worship! Woe to that congregation which forsakes worship, and turns to reviling the Companions of the Prophet, and considers that unbelief and sin a reason for God's reward! And this despite the fact that not even the cursing of Satan—and we have clear evidence that he is to be execrated—constitutes a good worthy of reward, but rather the sin of pride.

'Although there are those among you who are capable of grasping the manifest meaning of the Koran and the traditions, and have demonstrated this in your translations of Koranic verses and tra-

¹³Koran, 11:47.

¹⁴The Uzbegs captured Herat in February 1589 (McChesney: March 1588). They were now before Mašhad, in Rajab 997/May-June 1589 (McChesney: Rajab 996/May-June 1588).

¹⁵Koran, 51:57.

ditions, you still adhere to the Shi'ite rite which is so clearly false, and persist in following the Twelve Imams and their descendants. God said: 'We have certainly made the signs plain for a people who firmly believe.'¹⁶ If those who would seduce believers from the right path have led you astray by lies, and have transmitted to you false opinions from the Imams and their descendants, or if any of you has any questions or is in doubt about anything that has been said in this letter, send your spokesman to 'Abdollah Khan, so that, having received guarantees of safe conduct, you may debate with some of his servants, in the hope that the true religion may become manifest to all. The Peace of God upon all who tread the path of salvation!"

The Reply by Mowlānā Moḥammad Moškak-e Rostamdārī

"The letter of the learned scholars of Transoxania—may God guide them on the path of salvation and preserve them from error and hardness of heart!—has been received, and I must make a few comments, as appropriate, in reply.

"It will not have escaped your notice that the Prophet of God, as is recorded in both Shi'ite and Sunni books, commended to the Muslim community the Word of God and the Prophet's family. The Imam Sultan Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Mūsā al-Rezā died as an exile in the land of Iran.¹⁷ I, Moḥammad, the author of these lines, have been chosen from among the other attendants of the shrine of the Imam to honor this Imam in exile, by virtue of various blessings which I have received from the holy spirit of the Imam but which need not be recorded here. I have no particular affection for the *qezelbāš* or grudge against the Uzbegs. I will set forth the results of my researches without partiality or bigotry, and will take my stand on the Koran, the traditions, and whatever is in conformity with God's command. If what I have to say is favorably received, I shall have achieved my goal; if not, I shall have done my duty, and you may either benefit from my counsel or be bored by it, as you please.

¹⁶Koran, 2:119. The text has *ya'qulūna* instead of *yūqenūna*—perhaps through confusion with 57:18.

¹⁷The Imam 'Alī al-Rezā was summoned from Medina to Marv in the year 200/815-16 by the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn, who wanted to make the Imam his heir-apparent. At the beginning of the year 203/818, 'Alī al-Rezā died at Tūs; Shi'ite sources allege he was poisoned by al-Ma'mūn.

"From what we have heard from students who come here from Transoxania, Abdollāh Khan is both perceptive and just, and some of his emirs, notably Gönültāš Bahādor, are scholars. However, the fact that they apparently believe the stories that the 'olamā of Transoxania tell them brings to mind the saying that if you only ask the judge his version of a case and are content with that, it cannot be relied upon. We Shi'ite theologians have not had the honor of paying a visit to the court of Abdollāh Khan, but the Sunni theologians have told their ruler that the Shi'ite rite is heretical and fraudulent and without foundation. But if, after examining the doctrinal principles and dogmatic statements of both sects, Abdollāh Khan will study the traditions of each, he will discover both sets of traditions to be compatible with God's commands.

"Now, both the Shi'ites and the Sunnis have their own collections of traditions, but there are *some* traditions which are common to both sects. Since some of the traditions are mutually incompatible, one should be careful not to throw away those which are common to both sides, because the great schism in Islam is between those who consider that the rightful successor of the Prophet was Abū Bakr (the Sunnis), and those who consider that his rightful successor was 'Alī (the Shi'ites); there is no third opinion. So any doctrine that is held by both sects must represent the consensus of all Muslims; it would be sheer folly to reject what is agreed to by all in favor of doctrines on which there are differing opinions.

"The gist of the argument of the learned doctors of Transoxania is as follows: 'Shi'ism is tantamount to unbelief, because (a) the Prophet eulogized the men who became the first three caliphs; (b) the utterances of the Prophet are inspired by divine revelation. In support of this they quote the Koranic verse: the Prophet 'does not speak of his own volition; it is nothing but revelation which has been revealed by God'; (c) Shi'ites are therefore to be condemned for being opposed to divine revelation; (d) opposition to divine revelation is equivalent to unbelief.

"The answer to this is that the same evidence demands the cursing of the first three caliphs, and the repudiation of their claims to the caliphate; for, in the *Šarḥ-e Movāfeq* of Āmedī, one of the most learned of Sunni 'olamā, it is related that, at the time of the death of the Prophet, there were a number of differences of opinion among the Muslim people. The first of these concerned the words of the

Prophet on his deathbed: 'Bring me some paper, so that I may write something which will ensure that you do not fall into error after I am dead.' 'Omar demurred, saying, 'The man is in pain. We have God's book; that is enough for us.' The Companions began to argue about it, and they made such a noise that the Prophet was distressed and said, 'Go away; it is not fitting to conduct an argument in my presence.' This tradition is contained in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bokhārī,¹⁸ and is found in various forms in most of the collections of Sunni traditions.

"The second difference of opinion among Muslims at the time of the Prophet's death concerns the instructions given by the Prophet to 'Osāma b. Zayd to lead an expedition to Syria. Some Muslims opposed the appointment of 'Osāma as commander of this expedition, whereupon the Prophet exclaimed vehemently, 'Make the preparations for 'Osāma's expedition, and may God curse any who remain behind!' The men who later became the first three caliphs were included in 'Osāma's army, but despite this, they disobeyed the Prophet's command.

"So we say that the command the Prophet gave regarding his desire for writing material was divinely inspired, and 'Omar's refusal to bring it constituted rejection of divine inspiration, and rejection of divine inspiration is equivalent to unbelief—both by your own admission, and according to God's word. 'And whoso judges not by what God has sent down, such persons are unbelievers,'¹⁹ and such a person is not worthy of the caliphate.

"Accordingly, if 'Omar's unbelief and unsuitability for the office of caliph is taken as proved, then by your own argument, the claim of Abū Bakr and 'Osmān is also invalidated, if the principle of consensus is not to be violated, for all the Sunni schools maintain that all three men were caliphs, while the Shi'ites assert that none of the three was. To say that 'Omar was a caliph, but Abū Bakr and 'Osmān were not, does not accord with the views of anyone in the Muslim world.

"Using the same line of argument, we say that the opposition to 'Osāma's assuming command of the Syrian expedition was also tantamount to unbelief, and among the men who opposed it were the first three caliphs!

¹⁸The great Sunni traditionist; died A.D. 870.

¹⁹Koran, 5:45.

"Both the above-mentioned traditions, in many places, support the Shi'ite position and make the rejection of all other positions imperative. But we cannot go into detail within the compass of this letter. Suffice it to say that the Shi'ites have abundant evidence, both in the form of received tradition and in the form of closely reasoned argument, to support the validity of their school of thought and the rejection of that of the Sunnis. Only God can compute the value of this evidence, and there is no space to set it down in these pages. Verily God establishes the truth, and guides man on the path of righteousness!

"Since you learned gentlemen stated in your letter that the acts of the Prophet are also part of the divine revelation, we are forced to say that the expulsion of Marvān from Medina was divinely inspired, and that 'Oṣmān's bringing him back to Medina and entrusting him with important affairs constituted rejection of the words of the Prophet, and therefore unbelief, on two counts: (a) the Prophet had given clear orders on the matter; (b) God has said: 'You will not find any people who believe in God and the Last Day loving those who oppose God and his Prophet.'²⁰

"There are also some cogent proofs which enable one to sift truth from falsehood in regard to the doctrine of the Imamate but, as we say in Khorasan, 'A kiss is the best message' and, if we have the honor of meeting you, we will present this evidence to you. We only agree to meet you, however, on condition that the contest is an academic one, and not one with swords, daggers, and pen sharpeners.

"In regard to the eulogizing of the first three caliphs, there is no agreement between Sunni and Shi'ite because there is nothing about this in Shi'ite works, and any evidence which shows them in a bad light, such as is contained in the two above-mentioned traditions, among others, is common to both Shi'ite and Sunni works. Furthermore, some Sunnis have allowed the fabrication of traditions on grounds of expediency, and so no reliance can be placed on a tradition whose authenticity is not generally accepted, especially if its transmitter permits the fabrication of traditions, or is not reliable, or if there is in existence a generally accepted tradition which contradicts it. We emphatically do not agree that nonacceptance of a unique tradition with the characteristics mentioned above constitutes unbelief; if that principle is accepted, 'there is no true Muslim in any

²⁰Koran, 58:23.

age,' because contradictions regarding single traditions have always occurred among the *mojtaheds*.²¹

"The veneration and respect accorded by the Prophet to the three subsequent caliphs before the appearance of any signs of opposition on their part is no indication of their future integrity and probity, because it is not right to punish a man for sedition before he comes out into the open, even though one knows he is going to rebel. For example, 'Alī made a prediction about Ebn Moljam, but did not punish him. Consequently, a tradition which only comments on the excellence of a particular action is no use, as the verse 'God was well pleased' indicates."²²

"Second, you argue that, by virtue of this same verse of the Koran, the three subsequent caliphs were promised entry to Paradise, and therefore abuse of them constitutes unbelief. In reply, we would say that we are not disputing the fact that God was pleased by this particular act of allegiance, or that they performed various acts pleasing unto God. What we are saying is that these men were subsequently guilty of shameful acts which involved the breaking of their sworn oath and pledge of fealty, so that, in the matter of the succession, they disobeyed the express designation of the Prophet, as is recorded in both Sunni and Shi'ite books, seized the succession by force, and caused pain to Fāṭema, as is stated in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Boḳārī: 'She left him, and did not speak to him again until she died'²³—and I have seen this tradition with my own eyes. There is another tradition recorded in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* in praise of Fāṭema: 'Whoever angers her, angers me.' There is also the following tradition in the *Meškāt*.²⁴ 'Whoever harms her, harms me, and whoever harms me, harms God.' The following Koranic verse is also extremely apt: 'Those who harm God and his Prophet, may God curse them in this world and the next!'²⁵

²¹*Mojtahed*: a practitioner of *ejteḥād*, i.e., a theologian who formulates answers to problems of religious law by means of analogical reasoning from the Koran, the traditions, and the consensus of the Muslim community, in accordance with rules laid down in juridical works. The Shi'ites attach much greater importance to the principle of *ejteḥād* than do the Sunnis, for whom the "gate" of *ejteḥād* was closed in about A.D. 980.

²²This verse (Koran, 48:19), refers to the Pledge of the Tree made in 6/628 between the Prophet and his followers, among whom were 'Omar and others, who were later guilty of disobeying the Prophet's commands, as we have seen above.

²³After the death of the Prophet in A.D. 632, Fāṭema, his daughter, was refused her inheritance by the first caliph, Abū Bakr.

²⁴The *Meškāt al-Maṣābīḥ* of Valī al-Dīn Maḥmūd—a reworking of the *Maṣābīḥ al-Sōḥna* of Baḡawī (d. 516/1122).

²⁵Koran, 33:58.

"In short, the first three caliphs, by committing these reprehensible acts, by denying Fātema her inheritance from her father, by opposing the appointment of 'Osāma as commander of the Syrian expedition, and various other acts which I have not mentioned, rendered themselves liable to opprobrium, since salvation depends on fidelity to one's covenant and fealty to the Prophet. If any person is judged not worthy of salvation, it is because he has broken his oath of fealty to the Prophet and opposed him. This is explicitly stated in the Koran: 'Whoever breaks his oath, breaks it to his own loss; and whoever fulfills the covenant he has made with God, He will surely give him a great reward.'²⁶

"Third, you argue that God called Abū Bakr the Companion of the Prophet, and a Companion is not susceptible of blame. Our reply is that the verse 'His companion said to him, while he was arguing with him'²⁷ refers to comradeship between Muslim and infidel. Comradeship based on kinship is accepted by both our parties—for example, fraternal relations. Every man has a fraternal relationship with his brother, whether his brother be Muslim or non-Muslim. In the same way, every brother is the companion or fellow of someone else, whether the latter be a Muslim or a non-Muslim. The Koranic verse 'O my two companions of the prison, are diverse lords preferable, or God the One, the Omnipotent?'²⁸ supports this interpretation of 'companion,' and it is so rendered by Beyzāvī and Zamaḡṣarī in their commentaries. In other words, Joseph, who was a prophet, called two idolaters his 'companions,' and so to be called the 'companion' of a prophet is not necessarily a guarantee of one's goodness! As you learned gentlemen have yourselves pointed out in your letter, 'it profits not a man to see the countenance of the Prophet, if he himself is not inclined toward good!' Incidentally, we are rather surprised that you gentlemen, who claim profound knowledge of the finer points of Koranic exegesis, should have written *har keh ū* in the above couplet instead of *har kerā*, since by so doing you destroyed the grammatical connection between the two hemistichs, and left each incomplete and suspended in midair! We are surprised you did not spot this, but made Jāmī turn in his grave by misquoting him! However, since you have plundered and pillaged all the people of Khorasan and destroyed their houses, and Jāmī, after all, was a Korāsānī, it is not sur-

²⁶Koran, 48:11.

²⁷Koran, 18:38.

²⁸Koran, 12:40.

²⁹There is a superb pun in the Persian, since *beyt* means both "house" and "couplet."

prising that you have plundered his poetry²⁹ too! As the poet says, 'If a disaster is universal, it is good,' and there are other Arabic verses too which we could quote, but it would not be proper to do so. We merely request you gentlemen not to go rushing off to do some research on the matter simply because of a verbal ambiguity!

"Your fourth argument is that 'Alī, in spite of all his bravery, was present when the people declared their allegiance to Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān, and made no protest; this, you say, proves that the declaration of allegiance was a fact. If not, it would be necessary to revile 'Alī. Our answer to this is that before 'Alī had completed the task of preparing the body of the Prophet for burial, the other three had convened the Companions at the portico of the Banū Sā'eda and had pledged their allegiance to Abū Bakr— we will not give all the details in this letter. 'Alī, because he had only a small number of followers and feared that his party might be destroyed, or for some other reason, did not march out and give battle. This fact, however, does not prove their contention, because 'Alī, as he had demonstrated in the service of the Prophet, was in no way inferior to the other three in bravery. The traditions remind us that the Prophet and his Companions did not fight the Qoreyṣ, but fled from Mecca to Medina. Later, when they returned to Mecca, they concluded the Treaty of Ḥodeybīya with the Meccans. So if there was sufficient reason for the Prophet, 'Alī, and the other Companions not to fight on these occasions, there was good and sufficient reason why 'Alī on his own should not fight! It would even have been a superfluous action, because it is inconceivable that the claim of the pagan Qoreyṣ should have been recognized as valid.

"Some scholars take this argument further. They point out that Pharaoh, despite the fact that he claimed to be God, sat on the throne of Egypt for some four hundred years, and other tyrants like Šaddād and Nemrūd were allowed to continue to make their false claims for a considerable period, and God, despite his omnipotence, did not destroy them, with the result that they led many people astray. If God can be patient in encompassing the destruction of his enemies, surely one of his servants can! As to what you say about 'Alī having pledged his allegiance to the other three, it could have happened only against his will and as an act of dissimulation,³⁰ but we have no space to investigate this question here.

"We assert that the commentator on the *Aqā'ed* of Nasa'ī, when

³⁰*Taqīya*; it is legitimate for a Shi'ite to dissemble in order to avoid persecution..

he says that the cursing of the orthodox caliphs is tantamount to unbelief, is ambiguous. The author of the *Jāme' al-Oṣūl* considers the Shi'ite sect one of the greatest of the sects of Islam, and the author of the *Movāfeq* agrees with this, and rejects the reasons you have given as justification for pinning an accusation of unbelief on the Shi'ites. Moḥammad Ġazālī does not consider the cursing of the orthodox caliphs to constitute unbelief. Consequently, the accusation of unbelief you gentlemen have leveled at the Shi'ites is contrary to the way of believers and contrary to the traditions and the Koran, even though the definition of Shi'ism is that which I gave at the beginning of this letter, which contains no mention of ritual cursing. It is right that the names of the three caliphs Abū Bakr, 'Omar, and 'Oṣmān should never pass the lips of a Shi'ite, but, if ignorant Shi'ites insist on the necessity for the ritual cursing of these men, there is no theological foundation for this, any more than there is any theological foundation for the belief of ignorant Sunnis that it is essential to slaughter Shi'ites. Such a belief had no place in the thinking of the generations that followed the Prophet.

'As for your statement that anyone who hears certain stories and does not stop the speaker from going on is an infidel, there is absolutely no support for this statement, either in logic or in canon law. Avicenna said, 'Anyone who becomes accustomed to accepting statements as true without proof has sloughed off his God-given human genius!'

'As for the vilification and abuse which you accuse Shi'ites of having directed against 'Ā'eša, God forbid that it should ever have occurred, for it is unlawful to direct abuse at any man, let alone the wife of the Prophet. However, since 'Ā'eša disobeyed God's command, 'Stay in your houses with dignity, and do not display yourselves,'³¹ and came to Baṣra and took part in the civil war against 'Alī (both Sunnis and Shi'ites attest the tradition: 'Your war is my war'), and it is obvious that no one who makes war on the Prophet is pleasing unto God, she has been reviled on this ground. The writer of this letter saw a tradition in one of the collections of Shi'ite traditions to the effect that 'Ā'eša later repented of her part in the civil war in the presence of 'Alī; this, however, is a single tradition, whereas the tradition of her participation in the war is attested to by consecutive authorities. Nevertheless, if she did repent, even after the destruction of Baṣra and the deaths of forty thousand Compan-

³¹Koran, 33:34.

ions and others,³² and if her repentance is acceptable to God, then one should not revile her for taking part in the war. But God knoweth the inner truths of affairs, and He who rules with truth, 'His will be the kingdom on the day when the trumpet shall sound.'³³ The verse of the Koran which you quoted, 'Evil women are for evil men,' and so on until the end of the verse, does not convey this spiritual truth, for pairs of contrasting spouses deserving of praise or censure are to be found throughout human history, the one deserving heaven, the other, hell; otherwise, the apparent meaning of this verse would be contradicted by Noah and his wife, Lot and his wife, Āsīya and Pharaoh, and so on. Or perhaps this verse may be interpreted in a sense which is clearer in another verse from the Koran: 'The adulterer shall not marry any save an adulteress or a polytheist, and an adulteress shall not marry any save an adulterer or a polytheist.'³⁴

"What you have said in an attempt to humiliate the *seyyeds*, who are descendants of the Prophet, has caused us much astonishment. Surely it is obvious that, if the Prophet's wife makes a journey contrary to his orders, and makes war on the man who has been acclaimed as caliph by all Muslims, and whose virtues she herself heard extolled, and has herself transmitted opinions to this effect in the form of traditions, then she, as the traditions affirm, is in effect making war on the Prophet himself. She was responsible for the deaths of forty thousand of the Companions and Followers.

"The daughter of the Prophet, on the other hand, abused one whom some Muslims consider to be caliph, but she had incontrovertible proof of that person's opposition to the Prophet, many indications having made it manifest to her that that person had acted contrary to the Prophet's wishes and broken his sworn covenant with the Prophet. Furthermore, no one was harmed either physically or financially by the words of the Prophet's daughter, and if what she said was incorrect, then the person to whom her remarks were directed will acquire heavenly reward. The conduct of which of these two, the wife of the Prophet and his daughter, is more disgraceful and more deserving of obloquy? If the conduct of the former does not even merit contumely, how can the conduct of the latter possibly be termed unbelief?

³²The Battle of the Camel (36/656), was the first occasion in which Muslim arms had been turned against Muslims. The actual casualties were very high, but probably did not exceed ten thousand on both sides.

³³Koran, 6:74.

³⁴Koran, 24:4.

"If you take your stand on the fabricated tradition, 'vilification of Abū Bakr and 'Omar constitutes unbelief,' the answer to this has already been made clear. But if we have missed any part of its significance, we shall be glad to be instructed, since it is most desirable to be fair.

"It is related in the Shi'ite books that, when Ebn Omm Maktūm, who was blind, was with the Prophet one day, a member of the Prophet's harem happened to pass by. The Prophet became upset, but the woman said, 'O Prophet of God, the man is blind.' The Prophet replied, 'But you are not blind!' The Sunni theologians relate that the Prophet on one occasion kept 'Ā'eša leaning on his shoulder while they watched a group of musicians playing in the street. After a while the Prophet said to her, 'O red-face,³⁵ not even the worst Jeremiah could impute any sin to the basest of these men for this; or if there is any harm in it, it is not serious enough to be discernible. As far as this incident is concerned, if one is a believer, then no one else is an unbeliever.' At all events, we do not consider anyone who followed the Prophet to be more noble or more perfect than he, and we do not believe in anything which militates against his dignity or bravery. But God preserve us from people like you gentlemen, who out of religious bigotry have undermined the faith and the religious law by the fabrication of traditions.

"As to what you have written about the violation of the forbidden months, the contrary of that is the truth, until such time as some trustworthy evidence shall appear which can justify violation of a Koranic interdict! The campaigns conducted by the Prophet during the forbidden months were carried out after an attack by some enemy; he did not initiate them—in fact, most of the Prophet's military operations were of this order.

"If it be not proven that Shi'ism is tantamount to unbelief, as we think has been demonstrated by earlier answers, then there is no ground for plundering and slaying the inhabitants of Mašhad. Apparently you gentlemen are informed of the innermost thoughts of people you have never seen! How did you acquire such information? For God alone has full knowledge of what is in men's hearts!³⁶

"At all events, kings have fiery tempers, and your proper course is

³⁵The Prophet's pet name for 'Ā'eša.

³⁶An oft-repeated phrase in the Koran.

to try and dampen down the flames of your monarch's wrath with the water of admonition, instead of fanning the flames in this way—an action that may lead to God's servants being destroyed root and branch. It is obvious that, by issuing these ill-considered *fatvās* (rulings on points of canon law), you are making every effort to destroy God's servants, and the destruction of the latter, even if they are unbelievers, is not agreeable to God, whose nature is forbearance—witness the tradition of Noah's remorse on the Day of Judgment for the destruction of unbelievers and others of God's people. If any army, therefore, commits such an act on the basis of a *fatvā* issued by those 'olamā, the 'olamā will have to answer for this on the Day of Judgment.

“You are aware that Ebn Ṭā'ūs was a Shi'ite *mojtahed* learned in the fundamental and derivative branches of the religious law, but he wrote no books on jurisprudence. His reason for this was that God, although the Prophet loved Him, and although He had created the world with him as an intermediary, nevertheless said about the Prophet: 'If he had forged and attributed sayings to Us, We would have seized him by the right hand, then We would have severed his life artery, and not one of you could have held Us off from him.'³⁷ Ebn Ṭā'ūs felt that, since the Prophet had been threatened in his minatory fashion, if an ordinary person got involved in some matter, how could he ever discharge it satisfactorily? So, if you gentlemen will only follow the precedent set by pious men of former generations, and be circumspect, it will be for the best; for it is an extremely difficult task to answer the complaints of the oppressed, especially children. As tradition has it, 'Spare children, so that they may grow up, and spare madmen.'

“Most of the troubles in this world are caused by aspirations for things of this world; it is incumbent upon scholars, therefore, to keep themselves aloof from worldly ambitions. Perhaps, after the lapse of a little time, you scholars of Transoxania might visit Mašhad and come to regard us as your colleagues, and (if we are prevented from leaving the city by fear of the wrath of Abdollāh Khan), show your veneration for the Imam Reżā by visiting his shrine, and make us happy by your presence. If this does not come to pass, and you issue a *fatvā* permitting our death, may God recompense you to the full, and rectify your affairs! Farewell!”

³⁷Koran, 69:45-48 inclusive.

The Shah's Expedition to Khorasan, the Assassination of Moršedqolī Khan, and Other Events on That Expedition

When the news of the fall of Herat, the death of 'Alīqolī Khan, and the massacre and enslavement of the Ostājīlū tribe reached Shah 'Abbas, he was deeply grieved. Moršedqolī Khan pretended to be grieved too, and did his best to lift the load of care from the Shah's brow by telling him old soldier's stories. The Shah, before leaving for Khorasan, appointed as governor of Qazvin, with orders to guard the capital, Moḥammad Šarīf Beg Čāušlū, the grandson of Ḥoseyn Beg who had been *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, under Shah Tahmasp. Moḥammad Šarīf Beg, himself *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, was now promoted to the rank of khan.

The royal army marched first to summer quarters at Lār, where it decided to remain until harvest time. At Lār, the Shah received the submission of the rulers of Rostamdār: Malek Bahman, the ruler of Lārījān; Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Nūr; and his namesake, Malek Jahāngīr the ruler of Kojūr. This was a great triumph for Shah 'Abbas because the forefathers of these rulers, secure in the mountains of Rostamdār, had never shown the proper degree of obedience to the *qezelbāš*. While the royal army was encamped at Lār, its numbers were daily increased by new contingents. Also while Shah 'Abbas was at Lār, his first son, Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, was born, but the child died in infancy.

The royal army then marched by way of Fīrūzkūh toward Damghan, but on arrival at Bešām, Moršedqolī Khan thought it essential to discuss peace with the Ottoman envoys, led by Valī Aqa the chief taster of the Ottoman sultan. The whole question of peace with the Ottomans had hung fire ever since the preliminary negotiations between the late Ḥamza Mīrzā and Farhād Pasha because the Persians could not bring themselves to accept the Ottoman terms. But now the impossibility of fighting simultaneously on two fronts forced the Persians to try and come to terms with the Ottomans. It was arranged, therefore, that a Persian delegation should return to Turkey with Valī Aqa.

The royal army then proceeded on its way toward Damghan but when it reached Šāhrūd, the assassination of Moršedqolī Khan occurred. Hitherto, Shah 'Abbas had put up with the overweening power of his *vakīl*, even though the latter permitted him virtually no

say in affairs of state, because of his undeniable services to the state. After the news of the death of 'Alīqolī Khan had reached Qazvin, however, Moršedqolī Khan had gone too far by the importunate way in which he pressed the Shah to satisfy his ambition to be linked by marriage with the Safavid house. What right have the Shah's servants to nurse such an ambition? In the end, the *vakīl* paid the penalty for his incivility.

Some of the *vakīl*'s close supporters among the Ostājlı tribe, especially Maḥmūd Beg Şüfīler, had told the *vakīl* quite openly that the Shah was planning to get rid of him and that his downfall would mean the ruin of the Ostājlı tribe. They implanted various seditious ideas in the *vakīl*'s mind. Shah 'Abbas knew all about this, either by means of his divinely inspired acumen or through information given to him by one of his faithful supporters. The Shah realized that to hesitate might be fatal, but on the other hand he had the Khorasan expedition and other important matters in train, and so he kept the information to himself and bided his time. But the *vakīl*'s arrogance knew no bounds, and he continued to treat the Shah as though he were still a child.

Shah 'Abbas knew that his own loyal supporters would not tolerate much longer his turning a blind eye to the *vakīl*'s behavior, and his own rage was mounting. He therefore plotted the assassination of the *vakīl*, choosing as his instrument Ostājlı officers from Iraq who had never liked Moršedqolī Khan—men like Ommat Beg Qarāsarlū Kōšek-oğlū, who had been fined and subjected to all sorts of ill-treatment by Moršedqolī Khan because of his friendship with 'Alīqolī Khan; and Qarā Ḥasan Čāušlū, *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, who had accompanied the Shah from Khorasan and was ready to do his will. Others who willingly undertook this task were Allāhverdi Beg *zargarbāši*,³⁸ and Moḥammad Beg the son of Aslams Beg the *sārūq-čībāši* (head keeper of the royal turban). From among the Persian elements in the administration and the bureaucrats, Mīrzā Moḥammad, who had been *vazīr* and *e'temād al-dowla* to Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā, joined the conspirators and urged them on.

Their opportunity came when the royal army was encamped at Šāhrūd. One night, Moršedqolī Khan had come on guard duty as usual and was sleeping in the audience tent, which was situated in front of the Shah's sleeping quarters. At midnight, when most of the

³⁸The head of the jewelers' department; he was a *moqarrab al-hāqān* (see *TM*, p. 129).

guards were asleep, the assassins stole into Moršedqolī Khan's tent and dispatched him with their swords, Ommat Beg striking the first blow. This event came about because Moršedqolī Khan's disloyal and insolent behavior had made it clear that his services to the crown had no object other than his personal aggrandizement.

The same night that Moršedqolī Khan was assassinated, Mirzā Moḥammad received his promised reward of the post of vizier of the supreme *dīvān*. Of the supporters of Moršedqolī Khan, those who had followed the lead of their chief and been guilty of improper conduct toward the Shah were arrested and called to account. Ebrahim Khan, Moršedqolī Khan's brother, was dismissed from his post as governor of Mašhad. Ommat Beg was promoted to the rank of khan, and received all Moršedqolī Khan's possessions, accoutrements, and retainers. Allāhverdi Beg *zargarbāšī* was promoted to the status of emir with rank of sultan and Jorpādeqān and its dependencies were allotted to him as a fief. Moḥammad Beg *sārūqčī* was made *dārūḡa* of Isfahan, and Qarā Ḥasan, *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān*, was promoted to the rank of khan and received other marks of the royal favor. Shah 'Abbas, who up to this moment had not intervened in affairs of state, now personally assumed the government of the realm.

The same day that the *vakīl* was assassinated, the royal army marched to Bešām. There, the Shah decided to carry out a purge of disaffected *qezelbāš* elements. The seditious acts of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and Ḥamza Mīrzā were known to all—how, because of the execution of Emir Khan, he had rebelled against Ḥamza Mīrzā, who was the Shah's eldest son and his heir-apparent, had taken into his custody Tahmasp Mīrzā, and had engaged in civil war against Ḥamza Mīrzā. Despite his past history, Moḥammad Khan thought he could take the place of Moršedqolī Khan, and take over the *dīvān* administration as he had done in the days of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. Shah 'Abbas, however, was determined to extirpate the troublemakers among the *qezelbāš* tribes, put an end to sedition among the *qezelbāš* once and for all, and recall them to their loyalty to the Shah and make them obedient to his commands. The Turkman tribe itself was ashamed of Moḥammad Khan's behavior, and he merited punishment on many counts.

Farroḡ Khan Pornāk Torkmān willingly accepted the Shah's commission to execute him. On leaving the royal tent, he found Moḥammad Khan sitting outside; he seized him, knocked his *qezelbāš*

hat off his head, and killed him on the spot. The victim's head, impaled on a spear, was paraded round the royal camp. The Ostājlu tribe had been struck with terror by the assassination of Moršedqoli Khan, but they were reassured by the execution of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān and hoped to be reinstated in the Shah's favor. The remainder of the *qezelbaş*, frightened by these demonstrations of the Shah's fearlessness and ruthlessness, hastened to toe the line.

The Shah made other administrative changes while he was in camp at Beštām. Badr Khan Afšār, the *qūrčibāši*, was transferred from this office to that of governor of Astarābād, and Aḥmad Sultan Zu'l-Qadar, the governor of Kār and Semnān, was sent to assist him. The post of *qūrčibāši*, which is the greatest of the offices of the supreme *dīvān*, was given to Vali Khan Afšār, the governor of Kerman; his son Bektāš Khan, who was at Yazd, was made governor of Kerman. At the same time, the Afšārs, who had for a number of years failed to do their duty in answering mobilization calls, were ordered to send a contingent forthwith to Khorasan, and Mahdīqoli Beg Čūpān-oḡlū Afšār was ordered to see to this. The Shah stayed in the pastures of Esfarā'in for about six weeks, awaiting the arrival of more troops, and then proceeded to Mašhad, where he visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā and launched an inquiry into the affairs of Khorasan and the situation of the Uzbegs at Herat. Mīrzā Moḥammad began his duties as vizier and wielded great power. Būdāq Khan Čeganī was appointed guardian of the infant prince, Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā, and was made governor of Mašhad. The fief of Kabūšan, which had formerly been his, was allotted to his sons, Ḥasan 'Alī Sultan, Ḥoseyn 'Alī Sultan, and so on.

Two other *qezelbaş* officers were arrested and called to account by the Shah: Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa Šāmlū, who was governor of Qāyen on behalf of his paternal uncle, Fūlād Kalīfa (it was he who had deserted 'Alīqoli Khan Šāmlū and gone over to Moršedqoli Khan at the battle of Toršīz, and by so doing, had broken the Šāmlū line and caused their defeat); and Soleyman Kalīfa Torkmān, who was the son-in-law of Moršedqoli Khan and one of his party. The downfall of these two men caused Būdāq Khan Čeganī to panic, because he was also connected by marriage to and had thrown in his lot with Moršedqoli Khan. At the urging of his sons, who had always been ambitious and intemperate men, he took his ward and fled to the castle at Kabūšan.

Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā Ostājlu, who was

governor of Tūn, worried about the Turkman emirs of the Emir Khan faction who had fiefs in the area, closed the gates of the citadel at Tūn and engaged in a number of skirmishes with the Turks; eventually he seized the opportunity to escape to Iraq.

In Fārs, the Zu'l-Qadar junior officers, who had got into the habit of mutinying against their commanding officer, behaved in the same way toward Ya'qūb Khan as they had toward previous governors; they fled from the royal camp at Mašhad, and Ya'qub Khan set out for Shiraz in pursuit. However, when the mutineers, whose leader was Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū, reached Yazd, they were arrested by Bektāš Khan and handed over for safekeeping to 'Alīqolī Šamlū, a *qūrčī* of the quiver, who was the *dārūgā* of Yazd. When Ya'qūb Khan reached Yazd in pursuit of the mutineers, Bektāš Khan went out to welcome him and escort him into the city. Ya'qūb Khan, however, had reason to suspect that Bektāš Khan, at the instigation of Mīrmīrān, was plotting to seize him, release Ḥamza Beg and make him governor of Shiraz, and make the Zu'l-Qadars his partners in rebellion. Ya'qūb Khan prudently abandoned his baggage at Yazd and fled from the city at night. Bektāš Khan sent some men in pursuit of him, but they gave up the chase.

As a result of Būdaq Khan's action, Shah 'Abbas replaced him as governor of Mašhad with Ommat Khan Ostājlu who, in addition to Moṣṣedqolī Khan's retainers, now received those of the latter's brother, Ebrahim Khan. The royal army then marched toward Herat, but bad news from Iraq frustrated the Shah's plans and forced him to return. The news was that Farhād Pasha had advanced on Qarābag from Erzerum, had wrested that province from the control of the Qajār emirs, and had garrisoned a fort at Ganja. Meanwhile Jegāl-oglu, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, was advancing on Hamadan with a second army. He had defeated Qūr Koms Khan, the governor of Hamadan (who was taken prisoner in the action), had pillaged that province, and advanced as far as Nehāvand, where he had built a fort and provisioned it. On receiving this news, the Shah hesitated to continue his march on Herat, because the siege of that city would in all probability be a lengthy one. 'Abdollāh Khan and his son 'Abd al-Mo'men would probably return to Khorasan in the spring, and the royal army, wearied by a long siege, might not be able to withstand them, which would be disastrous for the Safavid state. Another factor was that food supplies were short in Khorasan. The Shah decided to return to Iraq to meet the Ottoman threat, but before he left

Khorasan, he dismissed a number of emirs who owed their appointment to Moršedqolī Khan and whom he therefore suspected.

The Shah's plan was to march to Iraq via Yazd in order to restore order in that region on the way; the affairs of Yazd, Kerman, and Fārs were in confusion because Bektāš Khan had remained at Yazd and had not taken up his new appointment as governor of Kerman, and had supported the mutinous Zu'l-Qadar officers at Shiraz. The Shah's intention was to take possession of the Zu'l-Qadar mutineers from Bektāš Khan, put them to death, send Bektāš Khan to Kerman (if he showed satisfactory evidence of being willing to return his allegiance), and then proceed to Qazvin. With these aims in mind, the Shah marched from Band-e Farīmān in the direction of Dūḡābād in the Zāva district and Moḥavvalāt, on the road to Yazd. Since Būdāq Khan's action in fleeing to Kabūšān merely encouraged other dissidents to behave in an insolent fashion, the Shah sent Kūr Ḥasan Ostājlu, a reliable Ostājlu officer, to Būdāq Khan to try and persuade him to come to court by promises of royal favor. Būdāq Khan was too apprehensive to comply.

At this stage of the Shah's march, the vizier, Mīrzā Moḥammad, was suddenly arrested by Farhād Khan on the Shah's orders. The reasons for the downfall of the vizier are not altogether clear, but the following commend themselves to the intellect as being reasonable ones: first, the vizier had thrown in his lot with Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā after the death of Ḥamza Mīrzā and on behalf of the Iraq emirs had written various insulting letters to 'Abbas Mīrzā in Khorasan; second, like Moršedqolī Khan, he wished to make administrative decisions in accordance with his own judgment and policies and without reference to the Shah; third, he had entered into negotiations with Mīrmīrān about a marriage alliance and had expressed the wish that, on arrival at Yazd, he might become Mīrmīrān's son-in-law like Bektāš Khan and, with his support and that of the Afšār tribe, make himself a kingmaker. Būdāq Khan had also written a letter to say that he had been seduced from the path of rectitude by Mīrzā Moḥammad. At all events, the vizier was a domineering, seditious, and ambitious man, and the *moqarrabs* of the court, who disliked his wielding so much power, urged the Shah to arrest him. The vizier was put to death by Pīr 'Alī Aqa Arbaṭān, a retainer of Farhād Khan. Also at this point, Malek Bahman Lārtjānī left the royal camp and fled to Lārtjān, for no apparent reason.

The Shah then held several sessions of the council of the great

emirs to debate the relative merits of returning to Iraq via Yazd or via Toršiz and Sabzavār. Vali Khan the *qūrčibāš*, who was the father of Bektāš Khan, argued that, if the Shah marched to Yazd, Bektāš Khan and Mirmīrān would be even more afraid and would decline to present themselves before him, and they would have some difficult business ahead of them. On the other hand, if the Shah overlooked their misdemeanors, since they had hitherto been loyal subjects of the crown, and returned to Azerbaijan by the Toršiz and Sabzavār route to deal with the Ottomans, he, Vali Khan, would personally undertake to settle matters with Bektāš Khan in a manner satisfactory to the Shah, and would conduct him to court. The Shah accepted Vali Khan's suggestion.

By the time the Shah reached Damghan, winter was over, and he spent three days there celebrating the New Year festival (998/1590). On arrival at Rayy, the Shah released his father and the royal princes, who had been imprisoned in the fortress there by Moršedqolī Khan. When Sultan Moḥammad's cavalcade approached, the Shah dismounted from his horse and greeted his father affectionately. Carpets had been spread on the ground all the way from the place where they met to the Shah's camp. As the cavalcade moved forward, gold was scattered among the crowd several times, and the rest of the day was given over to festivities. After the banquet, Sultan Moḥammad was taken to the royal harem, where he met his sister, Zeynab Begom, and other women of the royal household. From Rayy, the Shah and his father proceeded together to Qazvin.

Farhād Pasha's Occupation of Qarābāg, Jeḡāl-oḡlū's Advance into the Province of Hamadan and Construction of a Fort at Nehāvand, and Subsequent Events

As previously reported, peace negotiations on the basis of the *status quo ante* were under way with the Ottomans, and the principal Ottoman negotiator, Vali Aqa, the sultan's chief taster, was on his way to the Shah's camp at Šāhrūd when the assassination of Moršedqolī Khan occurred; as a result, the negotiations were in abeyance, and Farhād Pasha profited by the Shah's absence in Khorasan to resume his offensive in Qarābāg, the area between Šīrvān and Azerbaijan.

Simon, the Georgian prince who had in recent years been loyal to the ~~Safavid~~ Safavid dynasty, was seduced by Farhād Pasha's specious

promises and gifts (actually he had little choice in the matter, since he saw no likelihood of receiving any assistance from his *qezelbaş* masters), and gave the Ottomans right of passage across his territory. Farhād Pasha marched blithely through the narrow mountain passes of Georgia without any opposition and entered Qarābāg. The newly appointed governor there, Moḥammad Khan, who had not yet consolidated his position in the province, retired in confusion. Naẓar Sultan Qazāqlar defected to the Ottomans with all his tribe, and he himself was made a pasha. The Qājār tribe and the other tribes in Qarābāg were in too much disorder to be able to put up any effective resistance against the Ottomans, and they retreated across the Aras River to Arasbār, leaving many of their possessions to be plundered.

Farhād Pasha paused a short while in the Ganja region to construct a strong fort, stock it with provisions, and garrison it with seasoned troops before he returned. Meanwhile, Ja'far Pasha, the commandant at Tabriz, thought he saw the opportunity to wrest other areas of Azerbaijan from the *qezelbaş*. He advanced as far as Sarāb, making for Ardabil, but was unable to proceed further and returned to his base. However, Šahverdi Khan, the son of Kalifa-ye Anšār, who was the governor of Qarāja-dāg, tendered his submission to Ja'far Pasha, and sent his son to Tabriz as a hostage. Ja'far Pasha extended his jurisdiction over various districts near the Aras—Ordūbād, Marand, Dezmar, Konūz, and Gargar.

At the same time, Senān Pasha, known as Jegāl-oglu, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, led the army of Arab Iraq into Hamadan province and reached the neighborhood of Hamadan before Qūr Koms Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Hamadan, had time to mobilize his troops. Abandoning all caution, Qūr Koms Khan attacked the Ottomans with the small number of men at his disposal. Šahverdi Khan 'Abbāsī, the governor of Lorestān, who was with Qūr Koms Khan, tried to dissuade him from giving battle. But Qūr Koms Khan, because he distrusted Šahverdi Khan, attributed this counsel to some plot or machination against himself. As a result, Šahverdi Khan took no part in the battle. The Ottomans made a series of attacks and surrounded the small *qezelbaş* force. Qūr Koms Khan, who at the outset of the battle had ridden forward with a few Šāmlūs to tempt the Ottoman skirmishers into becoming involved, was recognized and pointed out to the Ottomans by some renegades. He was taken prisoner, and his men fled. Šahverdi Khan beat a rapid retreat to Lorestān, and the Ottomans pillaged Hamadan.

Jegāl-oglu advanced to Nehāvand which, since it was on the borders of Lorestān, he selected as the site of a fort that would both consolidate Ottoman control of the province of Hamadan and enable them to extend their jurisdiction over Lorestān. He built one fort at Nehāvand, and another at Sa'd-e Vaqqāş, and provisioned and garrisoned them before retiring. The population of Nehāvand were mostly Shi'ites and did not mix with the Ottomans; they destroyed their homes and crops, and scattered in all directions. As a result of this campaign, the province of Hamadan suffered great devastation. Jegāl-oglu took Qūr Koms Khan with him to Baghdad and received the plaudits of the sultan for his achievements.

I got the details of this campaign from Kāja 'Abd al-Rahīm Darmanī, a secretary in Qūr Koms Khan's administration, who was with him during the battle, went with him to Baghdad, and later returned.

The Activities of the Khorasan Emirs after Shah 'Abbas Had Left That Province

After the Shah left Khorasan, Būdāq Khan Čeganī, abetted by his sons, brought out into the open his plan to make himself *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan. With the young prince Sultan Ḥasan Mīrzā in their possession, they summoned to their side some of the dismissed emirs who had remained in Khorasan. They told the people that Shah 'Abbas had returned to Iraq and that the Ottoman invasion would give him no opportunity to return to Khorasan. "We have a royal prince in our hands," they said; "let us take him to Mašhad, install him on the throne there, rally round him, restore order in Khorasan, and protect the province from the enemy. We will march against anyone who refuses to join us, take away his fief, and give it to another." They succeeded in persuading a group of emirs to accept Būdāq Khan as *amīr al-omarā* and senior chief in Khorasan. Among this group was Maḥmūd Khan Şūft-oglu, who had been dismissed from the governorship of Nishapur. He was reinstated as governor of Nishapur by the rebels. The Ostājlu *gāzis* currently in the service of the legitimate governor, Shah Naẓar Sultan Kōšek-oglu, a kinsman of Ommat Khan, had formerly been retainers of Maḥmūd Khan, and they deserted Shah Naẓar Sultan and reentered the service of Maḥmūd Khan. Shah Naẓar Sultan repaired to Ommat Khan at Mašhad.

Similarly, Emāmqolī Khan, the son of Qobād Khan Qajār, who had been dismissed from the governorship of Sabzavār for miscon-

duct and as a result of complaints from the people, and had been replaced by Moḥammad Khan Čaūšlū, the son of Eygūs Sultan, went to Sabzavār and recovered that region from Moḥammad Khan's appointees. The rebels were also joined by Abū Muslim Khan Čaūšlū, the governor of Esfarā'in. Ommat Khan, the governor of Mašhad, who had been appointed *amīr al-omarā* of the province by Shah 'Abbas, sent a messenger to the rebels calling on them to desist. But the rebels, far from complying, decided to march on Mašhad and oust Ommat Khan. They had just taken this decision when 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan appeared before Mashad and surrounded the city. The rest of this story will be related under next year's events.

Some of the Khorasan emirs who had been dismissed from their posts and fined—for instance, Sultan 'Alī Ḳalīfa Šāmlū and Soleyman Ḳalīfa Torkmān—went to Rostam Mīrzā, the son of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the governor of Bost and Zamīn-dāvar, who had fought his elder brother, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, at Kandahar, and had defeated him. Some of the emirs, especially Soleyman Ḳalīfa Šāmlū, went to Kandahar, hoping to persuade Rostam Mīrzā to come to Khorasan. Considerable numbers of *qezelbāš* troops from Khorasan found their way to Kandahar and declared their allegiance to Rostam Mīrzā. The whole story of Rostam Mīrzā, his brother Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and events in Sīstān and at Kandahar will be the subject of a separate chapter later on.

Events in the Year of the Ox (998/1589-90), the Third Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Shah 'Abbas returned to Qazvin in the spring of 1590.¹ On his arrival, he appointed to the office of vizier of the supreme *divān* Mirzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, formerly the vizier of Ḥamza Mirzā, who had been acting as vizier of the royal household.² The Shah enjoyed the spring, relaxing in the company of women, but not neglecting for a moment his administrative duties.

Although the basis for negotiating a peace settlement with the Ottomans—the sending of a royal prince as a hostage to Turkey and acceptance of annexation by the Ottomans of areas already occupied by their troops—was repugnant both to the Shah and the army, 'Abbas thought it prudent to submit to these terms. He was confronted by two powerful monarchs; the problem of *qezelbāš* disunity had not been solved; and he was faced by domestic revolts (Bektāš Khan at Yazd; the Zu'l-Qadars in Fārs, who had been incited to rebel by Bektāš Khan; some of the Arešlū emirs in Kūh Gīlūya, where Ḥasan Khan Afšār had assumed control of that province and ruled without reference to the central administration), and by rebellions on the part of the semi-independent rulers on the borders of the Safavid empire, who had taken advantage of fifteen years of weak Safavid rule since the death of Shah Tahmasp to shake off Safavid suzerainty and assert their independence. 'Abbas was thus forced to come to terms with one or other of his two principal enemies until such time as things took a turn for the better. The Shah devoted his attention to the preparation of the prince's retinue, and nominated as his ambassador Maḥdīqolī Khan Čāušlū, son of Simeon Khan, the governor of Ardebīl, who was distinguished among the other emirs by his superior intelligence, experience, and authority. The embassy set off, accompanied by the Sultan's envoy, Valī Aqa the chief taster, taking with it a friendly letter from the Shah to the Ottoman Sultan and suitable gifts.

¹The Muslim year 998 ran from 10 November 1589 to 29 October 1590. The Turkish Year of the Ox, we are told, began on New Year's Day, 20 March 1589 (3 Jomādā I, 997). But Moršedqolī Khan was assassinated in July 1589; after that, 'Abbas first marched toward Herat, then began to return to Iraq via the Yazd route, and finally retraced his steps via Toršīz. We are told that he spent New Year's Day at Damghan, and this must have been 21 March 1590. He cannot have been back at Qazvin before April-May 1590—i.e., after the end of the Year of the Ox.

²I am not sure if this is what *vezārat-e sarkār-e 'altīya-ye 'altīya* means.

Since Jegāl-oğlū had invaded Hamadan province, advanced as far as Nehāvand, and built a fort there, acting on his own authority and without orders from the Ottoman Sultan, Shah 'Abbas decided to send a force to recover that province, hoping to destroy the fort at Nehāvand before the embassy reached Istanbul. He appointed Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan Arešlū governor of Hamadan, and the latter proceeded to Nehāvand and laid siege to the fort. The *qezelbāš* had to withdraw to face a new threat from the Uzbegs in Khorasan before they had accomplished anything, and Jegāl-oğlū restocked the fort from Baghdad and changed the garrison.

After the conclusion of peace, Shah 'Abbas made no further efforts to oust the Ottomans from their fort at Nehāvand, situated though it was in the heart of the province of Iraq, because such action would have constituted an infringement of the peace treaty. The Shah's Ottoman policy came under severe criticism from those who thought he should adopt a harder line, but the Shah acted with a restraint beyond his years, and great benefits eventually redounded to the state from this policy. Once the Shah had concluded peace with the Ottomans, he was able to turn his attention to problems in other parts of the country—the disaffection among the *qezelbāš* and internal enemies. With these problems dealt with, he returned to the Ottoman problem and not only recovered lost territory but actually extended the boundaries of Iran.

'Abd al-Mo'men's Invasion of Khorasan, and His Siege and Capture of Mašhad

The fact that Shah 'Abbas had had to abandon his march on Herat and return to Iraq to meet the Ottoman threat made 'Abdollāh Khan more determined than ever to subjugate Khorasan. Accordingly, he sent his son 'Abd al-Mo'men from Balḡ, supported by his nephew Dīn Moḥammad Sultan, the son of Jānī Beg Sultan, who was known as Yatīm Sultan, and Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, the governor of Herat, with troops from Balḡ, Andekūd, Šoborgān, Jijaktū, Meymana, Fāryāb, and Hezāra-ye Qepčāq. Before the crops were ready for harvest, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan appeared on the scene. Since he had come with great rapidity and with only a small body of men, he made first for Nishapur. Maḥmūd Khan Šūfi-oğlū and the Ostājlu *gāzis* of the Nishapur garrison, without waiting to find out who was in command of the Uzbek force, marched boldly out and engaged the Uzbek advance guard, taking prisoner several Uzbegs of note. When they dis-

covered that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was in command, the Ostāj'lūs retreated hastily inside the fort. Since Maḥmūd Khan had not made preparations to resist a siege, he used his important Uzbek captives to negotiate for him with 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. He sent a present to the Uzbek Khan and said that Nishapur was a dependency of Mašhad; whenever Mašhad fell, he would surrender Nishapur to the Uzbeks. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was prevailed upon by some of his emirs who had relatives in the hands of the Ostāj'lūs to accept these terms. Maḥmūd Khan then released all his prisoners, and the Uzbeks marched off to Mašhad.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan camped at Ḥowz Tūnī, about half a *farsak* from Mašhad, and waited for the remainder of the Uzbek forces to arrive; when they did so, he began the siege. Ommat Khan strengthened the defenses to the best of his ability and stationed *qezelbāš* troops and local militia on the walls. At the same time, he sent a courier to the Shah, informing him of their shortage of provisions and generally desperate situation. The Shah at once left Qazvin and marched to the relief of Mašhad. But when he reached Tehran, sickness struck his camp, and the Shah himself became seriously ill. He sent some troops on ahead to Beštām, there to await his arrival after he recovered from his illness. However, his illness dragged on, and many of his men succumbed to the epidemic.

After four months, Ommat Khan gave up hope of being relieved, and sued for quarter through the mediation of Mīr Qolbābā. But 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, aware of the weakness of the defenders, refused their plea and executed their envoy, Kōdāverdī Khan Jalāyer, within sight of the citadel. The Uzbek emirs then redoubled their efforts and launched a general assault, storming the battlements and pouring into the city. The *qezelbāš* and inhabitants of Mašhad took refuge in the great courtyard of the shrine of the Imam Reżā, and all the *seyyeds*, 'olamā, shrine attendants, professors of theology, and the pious and holy men in Mašhad devoted themselves to prayer. The Uzbeks surrounded the courtyard and opened fire on those within with arrows and muskets. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and Dīn Moḥammad Khan rode into the city and made their way to the courtyard of the shrine.

One by one, Ommat Khan and all his men were killed, but the Uzbeks were not sated, and directed their fire on the *seyyeds*, 'olamā, and other holy men assembled there. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan took up his station in the portico of Mīr 'Alī Šīr and sent his men into the

shrine itself; they dragged their victims out of the *seyyeds'* quarters, the shrine attendants' quarters, and the Masjed-e Jame', and slew them, tearing Korans from the hands of the attendants. The story goes that a *seyyed* of Mašhad named Mīr Moḥammad Ḥoseyn, known as Mīr Bālā-ye Sar, because he always took up his position over the tomb of the Imam and spent his time at his devotions and the reading of the Koran, was on this day of terror in his usual place. An Uzbek seized him and tried to drag him outside; the *seyyed* clung to the screen round the tomb with one hand, whereupon another Uzbek severed his hand with his sword and the *seyyed* was dragged outside and cut to pieces. His hand remained affixed to the screen. That melancholy day was like a second 'Āšūrā,³ and the shrine ran with the blood of the martyrs.

The women and children were taken into captivity by the Uzbeks, who carried their looting and slaying to all parts of the city. If they found anyone in hiding, they tortured him to extract any wealth he might have, and then slew him. The holy shrine was plundered, and the jeweled chandeliers of gold and silver, the candlesticks, the rugs, and the china bowls and vessels were carried off. The shrine library, which housed a collection of books from all parts of the Islamic world, including precious copies of the Koran in the writing of the immaculate Imams and masters of the calligraphic art such as Yāqūt Mosta'ṣemī and the six masters, and other learned works of priceless value, was pillaged; and the Uzbeks sold these masterpieces to one another like so many potsherds. The sack of Mašhad went on for three days. Some people managed to escape from the city and make their way to Iraq; others, not wanting to abandon their families, found various hiding places outside. On the fourth day, the Uzbek Khan put an end to the sack, but imposed ransom money; this was even demanded of those who gradually emerged from their hiding places, and if they could not pay it, their children were taken in lieu. Many women and children were taken to Transoxania and sold as slaves.

Abd al-Mo'men Khan appointed an Uzbek governor of Mašhad. Before leaving the city, he removed the gold ornamental spike atop the dome of the shrine, which Shah Tahmasp had donated. The Khan then marched to Saraḵs and laid siege to the city and the castle. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor, and his Čaġatāy troops, who were old retainers of his, defended the city stoutly, and inflicted many casualties on the Uzbeks, who eventually marched away to Balḵ without having

³ Āšūrā, the 10th of Moḥarram, commemorates the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn.

achieved anything. Many other parts of Khorasan, however, fell into Uzbek hands: Jām, Kāf, Bākārz, Kūsūya, Ġūrīān, and Fūšanj. Maḥmūd Khan evacuated Nishapur and moved his men and their households to Bestām, and so the Uzbeks took over Nishapur too. Ganj 'Alī Khan held the fortress of Salāma in the Kāf district for a while, but eventually, despairing of help from Iraq, retreated westward.

At Tehran, the Shah was recovering, though he had not regained complete health. The news from Mašhad threw the Shah and the army into a state of gloom, but because the blows of fate must be endured patiently, the people gave thanks for the Shah's recovery. When the Shah felt a little stronger, he went to the shrine of 'Abd al-'Azīz and spent a few days there in prayer before returning to Qazvin.

The Battle Between Būdāq Khan and His Fellow Emirs and Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and the Victory of the Uzbeks

Būdāq Khan Čeganī and his fellow emirs—Abū Muslim Khan Čāušlū, Emāmqolī Khan Qājār, and Maḥmūd Khan Šūft-oghlū Ostāj-lū, had planned to wrest Mašhad from Ommat Khan and make themselves masters of Khorasan. Before they could carry out this plan, however, Mašhad was invested by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. Ommat Khan sent a message to the rebels telling them that their mobilization was most opportune, and suggesting that they deal with the external enemy first! If Būdāq Khan's force was strong enough, he said, they should march to his relief at Mašhad; if not, they should proceed to Rādekān and keep the road from Iraq clear of the enemy in case the royal army should put in an appearance. Although Būdāq Khan's forces were insufficient to engage 'Abd al-Mo'men's army, nevertheless they began to march toward Mašhad.

At this juncture, Nūr Moḥammad Khan b. Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan b. Dīn Moḥammad Khan b. Alūš Khan, of the line of Seybān b. Joči b. Genghis Khan, who was governor of Marv, Nesā, Abīvard, and Bāgbād, but was on bad terms with 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan because he suspected the latter of having designs on his territory, made an incursion into the Kabūšhān district with some six or seven thousand men, Uzbeks and men of the Šā'en-kānī Turkmans who lived in the area of Nesā and Abīvard. Būdāq Khan and his fellow emirs thought their best plan was to attack Nūr Moḥammad Khan and prevent him from joining forces with 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. They reasoned that;

if Nūr Moḥammad Khan had in fact come to join 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, if they could defeat him, this would weaken 'Abd al-Mo'men's position at Mašhad and the latter might raise the siege of that city. Nūr Moḥammad sent a message to Būdāq Khan saying that he had no quarrel with the *qezelbāš*; his only object was to protect his hereditary territory from 'Abd al-Mo'men. The *qezelbāš* emirs, thinking this was merely a trick, gave battle to Nūr Moḥammad.

The *qezelbāš* skirmishers swept aside the Uzbek skirmishers and reached the Uzbek lines, but the Uzbeks inflicted heavy casualties on them by firing volleys of arrows. The Uzbeks then charged, and the *qezelbāš*, many of whom, thinking the battle was won, had not maintained their positions, were routed, with some six or seven hundred men killed. Nūr Moḥammad did not pursue the *qezelbāš*, and Būdāq Khan and his fellow emirs, who were mounted on swift Tūbčāq horses, escaped and retired to their respective castles. Būdāq Khan wrote a humble letter to the Shah begging forgiveness for his actions, and sent it by the hand of his elder son, Ḥoseyn 'Alī Sultan. Nūr Moḥammad sent an announcement of his victory to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, thereby placing the latter under an obligation to him. Although 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan made no move against him that year, it was not long before 'Abdollāh Khan seized Marv, and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan Nesā and Abīvard and other districts, and drove him out of his ancestral lands.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year (998/1589-90)

Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oglu Qājār, who had evacuated Qarābāg the previous year, took a force of Qājār troops and miscellaneous Turkmans from Qarābāg and marched from Arasbār to lay siege to Ganja. He allocated duties regarding the digging of trenches and construction of earthworks, and set to work with a will, hoping to capture the castle before the Safavid peace mission reached Istanbul, so that Qarābāg might be in Safavid hands by the time the treaty was signed. The Ottoman garrison at Ganja sent word posthaste to Ja'far Pasha at Tabriz, and the latter sent a pained letter to the Shah protesting that it was not right to conduct military operations while peace negotiations were in progress. The Shah, fearing that this action by Moḥammad Khan Qājār might jeopardize the chances of peace, ordered the latter to raise the siege. The Qājārs, however, refused to abandon so easily the rich province of Qarābāg, which had been their

tribal territory for many years, and where they had established estates and flourishing gardens, and they disobeyed the Shah's order.

Another complaint was then directed to the Shah, this time by Farhād Pasha, who had initiated the peace talks and was commander in chief of the frontier region; the Shah then sent a Qajār officer, Šahverdi Beg, to Moḥammad Khan with the following message:

Your forefathers, as a reward for their loyal services to the Safavid house, received the province of Qarā-bāg from my forefathers. Policy now dictates that I should not at this moment contest this province with the Ottomans. If you are truly loyal to me, you will cease military operations and return, and I will give you fiefs elsewhere in the kingdom in lieu of Qarā-bāg. Qarābāg will not run away. God willing, it will easily be recovered; if not, one cannot fight against fate. I hope that, with God's help, right will shortly triumph.

Šahverdi Beg was too frightened to deliver this message, which he suspected would not be acceptable to the Qajār emirs, and so he went to the fort and showed the Shah's orders to the Ottomans. The Ottomans passed the document on to Moḥammad Khan who, being a loyal Sufi, did as the Shah wished and raised the siege. His emirs and troops at once dispersed. Most of them, the chiefs of the Qazāqlar, Šams al-Dīnlū,⁴ and Qarāmānlū tribes, renounced their allegiance, deserted and retired each to his own territory; others went to Arasbār. Of the other tribes, all those who were truly loyal, gave obedience to their Shah priority over money and property, but some defected to the Ottomans. Because of the hostile activities of the deserters, Moḥammad Khan was unable to move south, so he crossed the Kor River and, at the urging of Alexander Khan, took refuge with him. But that dishonorable prince arrested him and handed him over to the Ottomans, who sent him to Istanbul, where he spent some time in prison.

After peace was signed, prisoners on both sides were handed over, and Moḥammad Khan made his way to court via Baghdad and Šūštar, where he was with Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū for a time. On his return to Iran, he took up residence at Ardabil. The story goes that

⁴A clan of the Zu'l-Qadar tribe.

Moḥammad Khan, while he was living at Ardabil, always used to say that one day Ganja, through the power of the holy spirit of Shaikh Šaftī, would return to Safavid hands, and the Shah would make him governor of the province of Qarābag. This eventually came to pass, for in the Year of the Horse (1014/1605-06), the province of Qarābag was recovered from the Ottomans after some twenty years of Ottoman occupation, and Moḥammad Khan, in recognition of his sterling services to the crown, was reappointed governor. At that time, all those who had opposed the Shah's order twenty years previously and had been guilty of disloyalty were exiled from their ancestral lands and sent to Māzandarān. In this way the goats were separated from the sheep and punished, and the province of Māzandarān was developed.

Another event which occurred this year was the flight of Moḥammad Šarīf Khan Čaušlū to Gīlān. This man, who was the son of Kalīl Beg, the son of Ḥoseyn Beg, a *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān* at the time of Shah Tahmasp, and a grandson on his mother's side of Ma'sūm Beg Šafavī, had found favor with Shah 'Abbas and had been made *qūrčī-ye tīr-o-kamān* as his grandfather had been before him. When the Shah marched to Khorasan in 997/1589, Moršedqolī Khan had offered him the position of governor of Qazvin with the rank of Khan, and had given his hereditary office to his own nephew, Moḥammad Sultan Kūtvāl. Moḥammad Šarīf Khan, to please Moršedqolī Khan, and because he was an ambitious man, gave up his hereditary office, accepted the post of governor of Qazvin, and held that office until the Shah returned from Khorasan. At the beginning of this year (998/1589-90), although there was not the slightest indication that he had fallen from favor with the Shah, he was nervous because he had left his hereditary office against the Shah's wishes. His fears now got the better of him and he fled to Gīlān with a few companions. Moršedqolī Sultan, the brother of Esmā'īlqolī Khan Šamlū, who was also apprehensive because he was the latter's brother and had opposed 'Abbas during the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā rebellion, fled to Gīlān as well. There, they and other political refugees were given asylum by Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān. Shah 'Abbas demanded their extradition, but this was refused. Because of other preoccupations, the Shah took no action at that time.

Finally this year, the *golām* Farhād Aqa, who was the governor of Isfahan and who had forgotten all he owed to Shah Tahmasp and Ḥamza Mīrzā and in his insatiable desire for the governorship of Isfa-

han had entered the service of Moršedqoli Khan, was dismissed and called to account. The post of *dārūga* and manager of all affairs at Isfahan was given to Yoli Beg, one of Ḥamza Mīrzā's *golāms*.

The War between the Qezelbāš Emirs in Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd

As I have already mentioned, Bektāš Khan Afšār had given a specious air of loyalty to his behavior by arresting the Zu'l-Qadar officers who had rebelled against the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, Ya'qūb Khan, and had left the royal camp without permission. In reality, however, this was part of a plot by Bektāš Khan to have the Zu'l-Qadars eating out of his hand. Urged on by Mīrmīrān, his father-in-law, who was a seditious man, Bektāš Khan extended his authority over all the provinces of Fārs, Kerman, and Yazd, and paid no heed to the lawfully appointed officers of the crown.

When Ya'qub Khan reached Shiraz he proceeded to try and deal with the rebellious Zu'l-Qadars and to weaken Bektāš Khan by depriving him of their support. Since the Shah had given him full authority to settle the affairs of Fārs as he saw fit, he offered the governorship of Kerman to 'Abbas Sultan. The latter laid his hands on some *dīvān* funds and attracted to his side soldiers seeking pay or offices, and set about establishing himself as governor. When Bektāš Khan heard this, he began to have doubts about the loyalty of the Afšār emirs who were with him at Yazd. However, since he had heard nothing from his father, who was still at court, he realized that the appointment of 'Abbas Sultan must be the work of Ya'qūb Khan. He told the Afšār chiefs the truth of the situation and led a troop of about five or six hundred Afšārs to Kerman. He found himself confronted by 'Abbas Sultan and a composite force of Afšārs, local chiefs from the Kerman area, Arabs, and various tribal contingents—some three thousand men in all, both cavalry and infantry. Bektāš Khan, disconcerted by this turn of events and by the fact that he received no support either from the Afšārs at Kerman or from the local populace, and once more becoming nervous about the loyalty of even the few men he had with him, was at a loss for what to do.

Some of Bektāš Khan's supporters, who knew a lot about Safavid affairs, told him that 'Abbas Sultan's prevailing vice was avarice; he was not noted for his generosity. The Afšārs who had rallied round him, they said, had done so out of duty, because of their years of loyal

service to the Safavid dynasty. It did not necessarily follow that they were prepared to follow 'Abbas Sultan into battle against Bektāš Khan. On the other hand, if he (Bektāš Khan) hesitated too long, this would be put down to cowardice, and 'Abbas Sultan's supporters would become correspondingly bolder. Bektāš Khan was an intrepid warrior. He accepted their advice, and at once prepared for battle. It was not a moment too soon, for 'Abbas Sultan's men were advancing from the city with musketeers on both flanks. Bektāš Khan led his men in a charge at full gallop and broke the opposing lines. As his counselors had predicted, 'Abbas Sultan's men put up only feeble resistance and began to flee after this first charge. 'Abbas Sultan retired to the citadel with his sons and a few trusty men, and Bektāš Khan occupied the city and laid siege to the citadel.

Bektāš Khan's vizier, Hātem Beg the son of Malek Bahrām, thought the interests of the Safavid state would best be served if a reconciliation could be effected between uncle and nephew.⁵ With Bektāš Khan's permission, he negotiated a settlement between them, on condition that Bektāš Khan would commit no act of treachery against 'Abbas Sultan, his sons, or the men with him in the citadel, and that 'Abbas should retain his former fiefs. Bektāš swore mighty oaths to keep these conditions, but that treacherous man arrested his uncle and his cousins a few days later and, not content with that, put them to death, despite the fact that his uncle was like a father to him. However, this act of treachery portended his own end.

With affairs at Kerman settled to his satisfaction, Bektāš Khan returned to Yazd. Meanwhile, in Fārs, Ya'qūb Khan was consolidating his power and suppressing the dissident Zu'l-Qadars, putting to death any whom he suspected of opposition. He placed in bond the houses of the refugee Zu'l-Qadar officers who were at Yazd and appropriated all their lands and property. Šāhverdi Kalifa, the son of Vali Kalifa Šāmlū and the elder brother of Esmā'ilqoli Khan, who had been appointed governor of Ij and Neyriz during the *vekālat* of Moršedqoli Khan, and still had some two or three hundred old Šāmlū retainers of Vali Kalifa, was dismissed by Ya'qūb Khan, who knew the Shah's antipathy toward that family. Šāhverdi Kalifa refused to obey Ya'qūb Khan's order, so the latter, either on his own initiative or on orders from the Shah, marched out of Shiraz on the pretense of going hunting and made a surprise attack on Šāhverdi Kalifa, whom he captured and put to death, along with several of his sons and kinsmen.

⁵'Abbas Sultan was Bektāš Khan's uncle.

He plundered the area thoroughly. Hüseyn Beg, the eldest son of Şahverdi Kālifa, managed to escape to Yazd, where he was warmly received by Bektāš Khan.

Bektāš Khan then released the Zu'l-Qadar officers who were held in custody in the charge of 'Alīqolī Beg Šāmlū, *qūrčī-ye tarkaš* (*qūrčī* of the quiver). He promised Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū the governorship of Shiraz, and wrote a letter on his behalf to the Shah in which he agreed to pay a large sum as a fine if the Shah would dismiss Ya'qūb Khan from the governorship of Shiraz and appoint someone else; there was no possibility of reconciliation between the Zu'l-Qadar emirs and Ya'qūb Khan, he said, because the emirs would never accept the latter as governor of Shiraz. In this way, he hoped to achieve his secret ambition to make himself master of Fārs as well. Various people tried to dissuade him from meddling in this way. His vizier, Ḥātem Beg, reminded him that he belonged to the Afšār tribe and held a letter of appointment from the Shah appointing him governor of Kerman; affairs at Yazd and problems to do with the Zu'l-Qadar tribe had nothing whatever to do with him. His best course, continued the vizier, was to leave Yazd, take over the governorship of Kerman, and stop interfering in matters that did not concern him, because this type of behavior would only annoy the Shah and the principal officers of state. His father, Valī Khan, who was at court, kept sending him similar advice, but he refused to be guided by it, thinking only that, if his *démarche* at court was successful, he would be master of the whole of Kerman and Fārs. Bektāš Khan did not drink much wine, preferring various opium-containing compounds; under the influence of these, he would rave deliriously: "I am no less a man than Emir Moḥammad Moẓaffar," he would say, "who rose from the post of police chief (*šahna*) at Meybod in the Yazd district, to the throne!" And Mīrmīrān would nod his head in agreement.

Eventually, the Zu'l-Qadar officers from Shiraz made a pact with Bektāš Khan to mobilize their forces and drive Ya'qūb Khan out of Shiraz. Bektāš Khan named Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū governor of Shiraz and sent him off with an escort of one hundred and fifty Afšār *gāzis*. Bektāš Khan next tried to gain possession of the citadel at Yazd, but its commandant, 'Alīqolī Beg Šāmlū, resisted him. When the Shah heard all this, he decided to go in person to deal with the matter. But when the royal army reached Kashan, the Shah heard that Bektāš Khan had been killed, and so he returned.

Ḥamza Beg Jāmīllū had gone first to the Šūlestān district, which used to belong to his tribe. With the help of the Afšār detachment, he seized Qal'a-ye Safīd, and installed there one of his men, Ommat Aqa. This fort was intended to be a refuge if things went wrong. He waited there for some time, but none of the Zu'l-Qadars came from Shiraz to join him. Ya'qūb Khan sent some men against him, and most of Ḥamza Beg's men were killed; a few escaped to Yazd. Ḥamza Beg himself, with Esma'il Kalīfa, the son of Eshāq Kalīfa, and a few friends, repaired to Qal'a-ye Safīd. But to their consternation, Ommat Aqa, seeing which way the wind was blowing, shut the gates of the fort against them. They were still wondering what to do when Ya'qūb Khan was upon them, and they fled to Kūh Gīlūya. Ya'qūb Khan demanded that the governor of Kūh Gīlūya hand them over; the latter was unable to protect them further, and they scattered among the Jāmīllū tribe, where they were hunted down by Ya'qūb Khan's men and put to death. Ommat Aqa handed over Qal'a-ye Safīd to Ya'qūb Khan, and the latter, with Fārs securely under his control, moved against Bektāš Khan.

Yūsuf Khan, the son of Qolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī*, who had been governor of Abarqūh before the accession of Shah 'Abbas, had held the office of *qūrčībāšī* when 'Abbas came to the throne, and had been imprisoned for his part in the plot against Moršedqolī Khan, had eventually been released on the intercession of Valī Khan, the father of Bektāš Khan. When the royal army was in Khorasan, Yūsuf Khan had gone to Abarqūh, gathered together some old retainers of his own and his father's, and installed himself again with the help of Bektāš Khan. However, Yūsuf Khan resented Bektāš Khan's power, and secretly disliked him. Bektāš Khan, because of his close ties of kinship with him, and in memory of what he owed Yūsuf Khan's father, pretended to be on good terms with him.

When Ya'qūb Khan neared Abarqūh, he sent a message to Yūsuf Khan: It was necessary to deal with Bektāš Khan, he said, because the latter had committed acts of rebellion against the state. Yūsuf Khan should forget about tribal solidarity and join him in this enterprise. If he did so, he would make him governor of Kerman. Yūsuf Khan agreed with alacrity, and their combined forces reached Yazd while Bektāš Khan was still besieging 'Alīqolī Beg Šamlū in the citadel there. The bulk of Bektāš Khan's troops were still at Kerman, and his advisers counseled him to leave Yazd and go to Kerman, thereby stilling the tongues of those who accused him of rebellion.

Ya'qūb Khan probably would not dare to attack him at Kerman, they said, and if he did, it would be an easy matter to repulse him.

Bektāš Khan was trapped by his own sense of honor, however, and could not bear to turn his back on his enemies. Further, he was encouraged in this attitude by Mīrmīrān, who owed his own influential position to Bektāš Khan. He therefore decided to give battle to his foes with the men he had with him. To begin with, his Afšars repulsed repeated attacks by the skirmishers of the Shiraz army. Bektāš Khan, when he saw how inferior his army was in numbers to that of the enemy, realized he had no hope if he stuck to conventional tactics. He decided to use the same tactic he had employed against 'Abbas Sultan Afšar at Kerman—namely, to charge the enemy at full gallop. His charge swept aside the enemy skirmishers and threw the ranks of the Shiraz army into such confusion that Ya'qūb Khan wanted to abandon his colors. Moḥammadqolī Khan, the son of Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, one of the Fārs emirs, dissuaded him from doing so, and urged him to stand firm.

The Afšar charge on the center of the Fārs army had lost its impetus by virtue of the sheer weight of numbers of the enemy, and the Zu'l-Qadars began to rally. Some of Yūsuf Khan's Afšars recognized Bektāš Khan and reported to Yūsuf Khan that he was among the group which had made the charge. Yūsuf Khan, who had supposed that Bektāš Khan was still stationed with his own center and had a healthy respect for his prowess, now urged his Afšars to cut off his retreat. Bektāš Khan repented of his rash charge; if he fought on, the chances were that he would be taken prisoner. He tried to retreat toward his own center but failed, so he hacked his way through the enemy and fled back to the city, followed by his men. He stationed trusted men on the walls and sought Mīrmīrān's advice as to whether to try and hold Yazd, or to go to Kerman. Bektāš Khan's supporters, who had followed him into the city, criticized his action. He must ride at once to Kerman, they said; by morning, he must be ten *far-saks* along the road to Kerman. Once again, however, Bektāš Khan's sense of honor prevented him from taking the logical course of action. He could not bring himself to abandon his wife, Mīrmīrān's daughter; taking her with him, however, was fraught with difficulties, because Ya'qūb Khan was sure to station men to guard the Kerman road, and he could not rely on the loyalty of his own men.

Since it was late in the day, the victorious army of Fārs did not

pursue the enemy but camped on the spot, being unable to enter the cultivated belt round the city. Ya'qūb Khan was afraid that Bektāš Khan would elude him and slip away to Kerman during the night, so he sent a delegation to Mīrmīrān with the following message: "Bektāš Khan is the enemy of the state and the prisoner of the Shah. We have handed him over to you. If he escapes, you will answer for it to the Shah"; and he added various other threats. Mīrmīrān was an eminent and respected *seyyed*, and no emir had ever treated him with disrespect. But he knew that Ya'qūb Khan was an arrogant and shameless young man, and would probably carry out his threats and disgrace him. So he said to Ya'qūb Khan's delegates, in the presence of Bektāš Khan: "Bektāš Khan is here with me; as you see, he is not going anywhere. God willing, whatever is best will be done." He then placed a guard on Bektāš Khan to make sure he did not escape, and sent men to the city gate which was in his charge, admitted some of Ya'qūb Khan's men into the city, and posted them at the gatehouse.

Bektāš Khan realized that Mīrmīrān had betrayed him and that he could not hope to defend the city; further, he no longer had confidence in his own men, and was at a loss to know what to do. He paced restlessly in and out of his room, dreaming up one plan after another. Suddenly he noticed some strangers, fully armed, near the gatehouse, and knew at once that they were Ya'qūb Khan's men, who must have been admitted by Mīrmīrān. He grabbed his sword and started toward them. As he did so, a musketball struck his hand, with the result that he could not use it; it is not clear whether someone fired at him deliberately, or whether a musket belonging to one of his servants went off accidentally. Anyway, Ya'qūb Khan's men seized him, but Bektāš Khan's sense of honor would not permit him to be led bound before Ya'qūb. He made his captors fearful of possible rescue attempts by the Afšārs and instructed them to kill him, which they at once did. His death occurred about midnight, and the news, at once taken to Ya'qūb Khan, filled him with joy. He sent Bektāš Khan's head to court, together with a full report. Bektāš Khan's retainers, looking to their own safety, concealed themselves in various strongholds. Shortly after first light, the Zu'l-Qadars poured into Yazd and began to plunder the homes of the Afšārs. But in the ensuing confusion, friend was not distinguished from foe, and the soldiers plundered indiscriminately. The pillage went on for two or three days, and many citizens of Yazd and followers of Mīrmīrān suffered at the hands of the looters.

One of Mīrmīrān's sons, Shah Kalīlollāh, had always opposed

his father's policy of supporting Bektāš Khan, and had conducted correspondence with Ya'qūb Khan. He was now honored and received with respect by Ya'qūb. Mīrmīrān himself and his other sons were accused of being in league with Bektāš Khan and of opposition to the Shah and rebellion; they were not only not treated with respect, but were humiliated. The officers appointed by Ya'qūb Khan to take possession of Bektāš Khan's treasures and property did not omit a search of Mīrmīrān's house, though it was treated a little less roughly than others, because several women of the Safavid royal house were in his residence. In general, houses belonging to members of Mīrmīrān's family suffered less than others. However, Mīrmīrān was humiliated, and Ya'qūb Khan extracted large sums from him by way of gifts and fines. My source of information for this episode was Bektāš Khan's vizier, Hātem Beg, who was of course involved, and other reliable sources have verified his account.

Ya'qūb Khan spent some time at Yazd, royally entertained by Shah Kalīlollāh, but his avarice proved his undoing. He was so dazzled by the prospect of getting his hands on the contents of Bektāš Khan's treasuries, which the latter had accumulated over a period of twenty years, that he appropriated the whole lot to his own use, and sent the Shah only a small proportion of the items he had marked down for himself. Had he been truly loyal, he would have been content with the honor of having performed a service for his master and would not have placed the treasures of this world before his duty to his benefactor; he would not have polluted himself by touching a single coin of that money. Had he acted thus, the Shah would have bestowed on him in the form of rewards the whole of the value of Bektāš Khan's property, and quite possibly even more than its value, for in the Shah's eyes it was worthless.

Unfortunately, Ya'qūb Khan was beguiled by the baubles of this world, and the opportunities for self-aggrandizement which he found ready to hand blinded him to the enormity of his own actions. For instance, having installed Yūsuf Khan as governor of Kerman, he made him sign a sworn covenant that he would obey him in all things; he also installed his nephew, Nadr Khan, as governor of Abarqūh, and by these acts elected to remove himself from the Shah's favor. He repaired to Shiraz, where he began to behave like a king. He married Bektāš Khan's widow, Mīrmīrān's daughter, and took her off to Shiraz. He deprived some emirs of their fiefs, and considered the whole province of Fārs to be his own lawful property. He approp-

riated for his own use the estates of some of Zu'l-Qadars who had been killed in battle. He so far forgot his station as to send a robe of honor to the governor of Lār.⁶ Since he was apparently secure in the Shah's favor, everyone obeyed him, and the governor of Lār obediently donned his robe of honor. The rest of Ya'qūb Khan's story will be told later.

The Shah's Expedition to Isfahan and His Victories in This Campaign

It will be recalled that Shah 'Abbas, when he heard of Bektāš Khan's revolt, marched toward Yazd. First, he went to Isfahan, where Yoli Beg, the *golām* of the royal household, who had been appointed governor of Isfahan, had found the province in a state of turmoil, strengthened the fort at Ṭabarak,⁷ stocked it with provisions and munitions, and now thought of himself as the lord of Isfahan. When the Shah reached Kashan, he received the news, as already recorded, of the death of Bektāš Khan, and he sent robes of honor and his congratulations to Ya'qūb Khan. The Shah then sent a courier to Yoli Beg warning him that he would shortly be his guest at Isfahan. He repeatedly sent friendly letters and robes of honor to Yoli Beg in advance of his arrival, in case the latter should mistake the purpose of his visit. Yoli Beg had no choice but to obey; he entrusted the citadel of Ṭabarak to a reliable officer, rode out to meet the Shah somewhere between Kashan and Isfahan and was greeted with marks of great favor. The same day, he received permission to return to Isfahan to make the necessary preparations for the Shah's reception. Carpets were laid in the Shah's path for a distance of three *farsaks* from Dowlatābād to the city, and the Shah scattered largesse, in the form of trays of gold coins, at several points on the way.

The Shah entered Isfahan and took up residence at the palace. Yoli Beg carried out his duties as host to the Shah, but he allowed no one to have access to the fort of Ṭabarak—an action that particularly irked the Shah in view of the fact that he was a *golām*. However, the Shah said nothing to him about it, but bestowed on him some fresh mark of his favor every day. Finally, at the Shah's request, Yoli Beg was host to the Shah in his own home, and discharged his duties in a fitting manner. All the members of the court and the *moqarrābs* attended the banquet, which was followed by the drinking of wine and

⁶Southeast of Shiraz.

⁷See *Le Strange*, p. 205.

merrymaking. There is an old saying, "A traitor is always nervous," and Yoli Beg could not quiet his apprehensions despite the outward signs of the Shah's favor. A few days after the banquet, he retired into the citadel with his officers and defended the battlements with cannon and muskets. This action caused astonishment among the Shah's officers, who sent a delegation headed by Seyyed Beg Kamūna, one of the most distinguished emirs from the time of Shah Tahmasp, to talk to Yoli Beg, but the latter refused to listen to their well-meaning advice. Not only that, but he arrested the delegates and detained them in the citadel.

To be defied by a foolish *golām* when he himself was actually in residence at Isfahan was a source of acute embarrassment to the Shah, who was conscious of the fact that Yoli Beg's action might lead to all sorts of trouble. The Shah considered it politic not to subdue him by force, but by diplomacy, and he sent Farhād Khan Qarāmānlū, a most influential emir and an old friend of Yoli Beg from the time of Ḥamza Mīrzā, to bring him out of the fort. On the first day, Yoli Beg received Farhād Khan in a friendly manner and conducted himself according to protocol. On the second day, urged on by some of his supporters, he detained Farhād Khan in the citadel as well, disarmed him and his retainers, and broke off negotiations. The Shah, enraged, ordered the *qūrčīs* and the nobles of Isfahan to surround the citadel, and there were some armed clashes. This brought Yoli Beg to his senses, and he reopened talks with Farhād Khan. If the Shah would pardon him, he said, and reappoint him governor of Isfahan and call off his troops, he would come out of the citadel. Farhād Khan considered it expedient to communicate these terms to the Shah, and on his advice they were agreed to, and Yoli Beg sent a robe of honor.

Yoli Beg trusted Farhād Khan's assurances and came out of the citadel, but the Shah bore him a grudge for the way he had behaved, and why would he not? It is sheer stupidity to defy one's benefactor in such an insolent manner and expect to remain unscathed! A few days later, Yoli Beg handed over the citadel to the Shah, hoping that the latter would then fulfill his promise to reinstate him as governor of Isfahan. But the people of Isfahan, who had done their duty by the Shah during the siege of the citadel and had opposed Yoli Beg because they disliked him as governor, made representations to the Shah, and Yoli Beg had to be satisfied with his life. He gave Farhād Khan *carte-blanche* to negotiate for him with the Shah, and Farhād

Khan made every effort on his behalf because of their close friendship, but in the end Yolt Beg paid the penalty for his ingratitude.

Events During the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 999/1590-91, the Fourth Year of Shah 'Abbas's Reign

Spring came this year on Sunday 14 Jomādā I, 999/10 March 1591.¹ This year, Yādegār Sultan Rūmlū was sent as ambassador to India. Readers will recall that Moḥammad Bābar b. 'Omar Shaikh Mīrzā b. Abū Sa'īd Gūrakān had established a dynasty in India after he had been driven out of his ancestral lands in Transoxania, and Aḫsī and Andejān in the province of Farḡāna,² by Moḥammad Khan Šeybānī. At first a refugee in the Kabul and Ḥeṣār Šādmān region, he had sent his cousin, Sultan Oveys Mīrzā b. Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā, known as Mīrzā Khan, who was governor of Badaḫšān, to Shah Esma'il's court to ask the latter's aid. With *qezelbaş* assistance, he had been reinstated at Samarkand. A few years later, Bābor had been defeated by Abdollāh Khan and other Uzbek sultans near Bokhara, and had again appealed to Shah Esma'il for aid; this time, Shah Esma'il sent the *rokn al-salṭana* Mīr Najm-e Šānī Eṣfahānī, who was defeated by the Uzbeks at Ġojdovān. It was after this that Bābor had founded the Mogul dynasty in India. Bābor had been succeeded as emperor by his eldest son, Moḥammad Homāyūn, who had eventually been driven from his throne by Šīr Khan and the Afghans; he had retired first to Tatta, Sind, and Kandahar, but was hounded from that refuge by his brothers. He was given sanctuary in Iran by Shah Tahmasp, as is recorded in the *Tārīḫ-e Akbarī* and other works. With Safavid assistance, Homāyūn regained his throne, and friendly relations were maintained between the two empires for the rest of Homāyūn's reign.

After the accession of his son, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, Shah Tahmasp had sent an embassy to India under Seyyed Beg, the son of the *vakīl al-salṭana* Ma'šūm Beg Šafavī, to offer his congratulations and gifts, and to inquire about the circumstances of the death of his revered father. After Emperor Akbar became firmly established on the throne, he severed these friendly relations with Iran, and diplomatic intercourse ceased. As a result, when all sorts of disasters struck Iran after the death of Shah Tahmasp, the Mogul Emperor had not shown that solicitous concern which it is so pleasant

¹Actually, on 14 Jomādā I, 998/21 March 1590.

²See Le Strange, pp. 477-78.

to receive from one's friends when one is in trouble, and diplomatic relations had remained in abeyance.

Shah 'Abbas tried to revive the former close relationship with the Mogul empire. Yādegār Sultan Rūmlū, a Sufi of pure faith and smooth tongue, was selected to head an embassy to India. He took with him suitable gifts and friendly letters, regretting the estrangement that had occurred between the two dynasties. The Shah informed Akbar of the occupation of Khorasan by the Uzbegs and told him he intended to make every effort to expel the Uzbegs and recover his lost territory there. If the Emperor was unable to give him material support, that was understandable; but he hoped that Akbar would not begrudge him moral support. The story of Yādegār Sultan's return from India, seven years later, will be told in its proper sequence.

Also this year, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, the vizier and *e'temād al-dowla*, was given a governorship as well as his office of vizier and was honored by the Shah with the gift of a hat, a jeweled sword belt, a horse fully equipped with saddle and bridle studded with jewels, a brocade cloak, and the standards and military band normally only bestowed on emirs. Mīrmīrān and his sons came to court at Isfahan, but because of their misdemeanors and support of the rebel Bektāš Khan, they received little attention. On the other hand, his son Shah Kālīollāh, who had demonstrated his loyalty to the Shah, was rewarded by being placed in charge of affairs at Yazd. About this time, Kāneš Begom the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, who resided in the house of Shah Ne'matollāh b. Mīrmīrān, died a natural death at Isfahan.

When the Shah began to plan his expedition to Shiraz, he moved the royal princes from Varāmīn to the fortress of Ṭabarak at Isfahan. He considered Varāmīn too close to Gīlān, in view of the recent flight of political prisoners to that province. Aḥmad Beg Gerāmpā was made commandant of the fort and responsible for their safe-keeping.

The Shah's Expedition to Fārs and Kerman

At Shiraz, some *qezelbaş* who had been guilty of various acts of misconduct and were therefore apprehensive of the Shah joined Ya'qūb Khan and encouraged him in his arrogant attitude by flattering him. These men included Būdāq Qarāgūna Keñeslū; Moḳtār Sultan

Takkalū; Torābī Beg b. Delī Ektār Torkmān; and Abu'l-Faṭḥ Beg Šāmlū b. Fūlād Beg, groom of the royal stables. These men made Ya'qūb Khan fearful that the officials of the central administration might demand from him Bektāš Khan's treasures, which he had appropriated for his own use. This fear merely confirmed Ya'qūb Khan in his rebellious attitude. He forced the emirs of Fārs to obey him, and any who refused were at once replaced by his own nominees. Letters repeatedly reached him from court summoning him to an audience with the Shah in order to purge his iniquities, but he ignored them. He used to say to his assembled emirs, "Of all the provinces of Iran, the land of Fārs is mine," and he made other idle remarks of this nature, which flatterers assured him were true. Since he enjoyed royal favor to such an extent, initially none of the emirs of Fārs dreamed of opposing him, but eventually, when his rebellious posture became more evident, some of his emirs slipped away from his summer camp at Kūšk-e Zard³ and went to court, where they made a report to the Shah on Ya'qūb Khan's behavior.

Although Ya'qūb Khan's revolt did not merit action by the Shah in person, the latter decided to visit Kūšk-e Zard for some hunting, and at the same time to restore order to the affairs of Shiraz and Fārs. On the news of the Shah's approach, Ya'qūb Khan moved his baggage into the fortress of Eṣṭākr and took refuge there. The Zu'l-Qadar tribesmen rode out troop by troop to meet the Shah, who camped at the summer quarters of Kūšk-e Zard, and sent Aslams Khan, the keeper of the seal, with a force of Zu'l-Qadar centurions and *qūrātīs* and men from Fārs, to blockade the fort. When the weather cooled off a bit, the Shah moved to Shiraz, and the vizier, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh, since he was a Šīrāzī himself, devoted his energies to the administration of the province. Ebrahim Khan, the governor of Lār, sent gifts and tendered his submission. Despite Ya'qūb Khan's foolish behavior, the Shah still had considerable regard for him. However, in order to reassure the Zu'l-Qadars, who feared Ya'qūb Khan, he replaced him as governor of Shiraz and *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs with Bonyād Khan, a Zu'l-Qadar centurion.

While the Shah was at Shiraz, he had a riding accident, falling from his horse and severely bruising his leg. Fortunately, he recovered. About this time, the Shah received the news that Yūsuf Khan Afšār had rebelled at Kerman and announced his support for Ya'qūb Khan, and had expelled from Kerman various officials who were

³See Le Strange, p. 282.

there on government business and put the citadel in a state of defense. The Shah dispatched Farhād Khan to Kerman, and appointed Valī Khan Afšār governor of part of Kerman province, and Esma'il Khan Alplū Afšār governor of the remainder; both men, together with Yoli Beg the *golām*, accompanied Farhād Khan. Valī Khan Afšār was appointed because many of the Afšār troops in the Kerman area were the former retainers either of himself or of his son Bektāš Khan, whose misdeeds he had never ceased to condemn.

At Shiraz, Šāhqolī Khan, the son of Kalīl Khan Afšār, was killed by Ḥasan Khan the son of 'Abd al-Laṭīf Beg, both of whom were supposedly related to the Afšārs. It will be recalled that, in the period of confusion in the province of Kūh Gilūya which followed the revolts of Qalandar and Eskandar Khan's officers, no governor was appointed by the central *dīvān*, and Šāhqolī Beg, the younger son of Kalīl Khan, named himself governor of Kūh Gilūya with the rank of khan. But Ḥasan Beg the son of 'Abd al-Laṭīf thought himself better fitted for the post, and opposed Šāhqolī Khan with a force of Afšārs and Lors. Both men occupied parts of the province. There was an uneasy peace between them, each being wary of the other. The two rivals presented themselves at court when the Shah was at Shiraz, each pressing his claim to the governorship, although neither was really suited for the office because they had grown accustomed to being their own master. Šāhqolī Khan in particular, making much of the fact that he was the son of Kalīl Khan Afšār, was fundamentally unwilling to brook authority. Ḥasan Khan, on the other hand, gave the impression of being more ingenuous and willing to submit to authority. Ḥasan Khan murdered Šāhqolī Khan, and was rewarded by being made governor of Kūh Gilūya.

Another event which occurred this year was the execution of Ḥoseyn 'Alī Čegani, the son of Būdāq Khan, who had been given a place among the *moqarrabs* and dining companions of the Shah. The apparent reasons for this were first, he was a seditious man, whose words did not correspond with his deeds; second, he had been involved in the acts of rebellion committed by his father in Khorasan, and was therefore considered unreliable; finally, even after he had come to court and had been admitted to circles close to the Shah, he showed signs of ingratitude and therefore merited death. He was executed by Kūr Ḥasan Ostājilū and some of the *moqarrabs* in the Shah's private apartments. Ḥoseyn Khan Šamlū, the governor of Qom, on orders from the Shah, sent a posse of men to Būdāq Khan's camp

at Rayy and arrested him and brought him to Qom; his camp and possessions were pillaged. Eventually, since Būdāq Khan was a man with great knowledge of affairs in Khorasan, he and his surviving sons were restored to favor. One of his younger sons, Ḥasan 'Alī, was appointed governor of Hamadan, and he himself and his other sons were given employment at court.

The fortress of Eṣṭaḡr was a hard nut to crack, and the Shah still wished to treat Ya'qūb Khan leniently. He decided to try and win him back by diplomacy, and so he set off on a hunting expedition with some members of the court in the direction of Kerman, at the same time sending Ya'qūb Khan the following message: "I am anxious that you should recover from your sickness; your name is constantly being mentioned at court, and it is your own folly which had caused this estrangement between us. Any time you decide to put these foolish thoughts out of your head and present yourself before me, you will be the recipient of my favor as your loyal service merits." Ya'qūb Khan was overjoyed at receiving this message because he was hard pressed by the siege, and decided that the expedient course was to abandon his rebellious behavior. So he replied to the Shah in submissive terms.

But his disloyal and corrupt nature led him first to send a delegation to court consisting of his vizier, Mīrzā Khan Beg; Torābī Beg, the son of Delī Eḡtīār Torkmān; and his own nephew Morteẓāqolī Beg, to inform the Shah that, as soon as he was confirmed as governor of the whole of Fārs, with full powers, he would leave the fort and come to kiss the Shah's feet. It is surely the height of folly to make your benefactor detest you, and at the same time to hope to prosper! Mīrzā Khan Beg was deputed to return to the fort and fetch Ya'qūb Khan; it was clear from what the vizier said, and from what Ya'qūb Khan had demanded, that his conduct was a long way from being that of a loyal servant.

Mīrzā Khan Beg and Torābī Beg returned to the fort and persuaded Ya'qūb Khan to proceed toward the city of Shiraz with his retainers. He was received by the Shah, but he did not display any signs of contrition or intention to serve the Shah loyally in the future. On the contrary, it was clear that his head was still filled with the same vain ambitions. The inhabitants and nobility of Fārs, and members of the Zu'l-Qadar tribe presented themselves to him, and for three days an impressive number of people visited him in the

royal audience hall. On the third day, Ya'qūb began criticizing the officials of the supreme *dīvān* and demanding an inquiry into certain actions taken by them in Fārs during his absence. Not only this, but he did not hand over the fort at Eṣṭākr. On the fourth day, the Shah stationed Bāyazīd Beg Ostājlu, the head doorkeeper, at the entrance to his private apartments, with instructions not to admit anyone without his orders, and not to let anyone out.

Ya'qūb Khan arrived as usual, sat down arrogantly in the royal assembly, and in the Shah's presence addressed Mīrzā Loṭfollāh, the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, in a sharp and angry manner: "I demand a reckoning of all the transactions which you have carried on in my domains," he said. The vizier replied: "Upon my head and eyes!⁴ Whenever the Shah gives the word, your account will be presented to you in the twinkling of an eye!" At that moment, the Shah gave the signal to Ḥoseyn Khān Zīad-oḡlū Qājār, one of the emirs whom he trusted, and Ḥoseyn Khan grasped Ya'qūb Khan by the belt, picked him up, and threw him on the ground. At first, Ya'qūb Khan thought the whole thing was a joke, an example of the sort of waggish behavior that went on at court among the Shah's close friends. But, since he thought the action was too rude, he exclaimed, "I was in the middle of speaking! This is no time for jocularities!" Ḥoseyn Khan rounded on him; "Oh ingratel!" he said, "with a record like yours, what do you expect to happen to you?" Ya'qūb Khan then realized what his situation was and began to supplicate the Shah. Ḥoseyn Khan tied his hands, beat him over the head, and left him standing outside in the full sun, bareheaded, opposite the audience hall.

Ya'qūb Khan's men were then summoned into the private apartments one at a time; as each entered, he was cut to pieces by the *golāms*. Outside, no one knew what was going on, and people thought the Shah was having a private party. The slaughter went on till late afternoon. Ya'qūb Khan's close supporters—Torābi Beg, Moḡtār Sultan, Būdāq Qarāḡūna, Abu'l-Faṭḥ Beg Šāmlū, and several others—met a similar end. Toward the end of the day, their bodies were suspended from a gibbet, as a warning to the others, and people then realized what had happened.

Ya'qūb Khan himself was not put to death immediately because he was needed to enable the Shah to take possession of the fort of Eṣṭākr. He was imprisoned that night in a dungeon he himself had con-

⁴A formula indicating compliance.

structed and in which he had incarcerated a number of innocent Zu'l-Qadars. He was forced to write a letter instructing his officers to hand over the fort to the Shah's officers, but his men refused to act on the authority of this letter, and it was clear that Ya'qūb Khan had anticipated this move. Every day the heirs of those Zu'l-Qadars who had been slain by Ya'qūb Khan took him out and suspended him upside down over a well, and his groans and cries rose to the heavens. After a few days of this, when Ya'qūb Khan remained intransigent and his men stubbornly continued to defend the fort, some elders of the Zu'l-Qadar tribe came forward and undertook to put Ya'qūb Khan to death in retribution for the innocent men killed by him. After Ya'qūb Khan had been killed, Ḥoseynqolī Sultan Siāh-manṣūr scaled the walls of the fort with a band of other desperadoes. The fort was occupied, and those evil men received their just deserts.

A courier arrived from Farhād Khan at Kerman bringing the news that he had settled affairs there in accordance with the Shah's wishes, and that the fortress had been taken. Farhād Khan, on his arrival at Kerman, had written to the Afšārs calling on them to return to their former allegiance to Valī Khan. The Afšārs decided prudence dictated that they should abandon Yūsuf Khan, declare themselves to be among "those who love the Shah," and go out to welcome Farhād Khan and his fellow khans.

Yūsuf Khan, who had imagined himself firmly established as governor of Kerman, now saw most of his men go over to Farhād Khan. He shut himself up in the citadel with some two or three hundred old retainers, and Farhād Khan entered the city and blockaded the citadel. After some negotiation, Yūsuf Khan agreed to hand over the citadel and renounce all claim to the governorship of Kerman, being satisfied if his life were spared. Farhād Khan undertook to plead his case with the Shah.

Farhād Khan installed Valī Khan and Esma'il Khan at Kerman and, after everything was settled to his satisfaction there, returned to Shiraz. He joined forces with the royal army as it was marching back to Isfahan via Yazd. Yūsuf Khan, throwing himself on the Shah's mercy and entering his presence with his sword slung round his neck and carrying a winding sheet, was granted his life. Yoli Beg, however, was executed, because he had plotted treachery against Farhād Khan at Kerman and had tried to ally himself with Yūsuf Khan in further rebellion.

At this point, a courier arrived from Mahdīqolī Khan Čaušlū, who had accompanied Sultan Heydar Mīrzā on the embassy to Turkey, with the news that the prince had been well received by the Ottoman sultan, that peace had been concluded as desired, and that a friendly letter from the Ottoman sultan was being brought by the hand of Mahdīqolī Khan, who had received permission to leave Istanbul.

The court and the bulk of the army went on to Isfahan, but the Shah, accompanied by Farhād Khan, went to Yazd, where they were the guests of Shah Kālīlollāh, the son of Mīrmīrān, at the Bāg-e Golšan. Hātem Beg, the former vizier of Valī Khan, was rewarded for his services at Kerman by being appointed *mostowfi al-mamālek* (comptroller of finance) of the Safavid empire. The Shah spent several days receiving and dealing with petitions from the people before returning to Isfahan, where he spent a month similarly occupied.

While he was at Isfahan, the Shah acceded to the petition of the citizens that the fortress of Ṭabarak be razed on the ground that it constituted a potential source of revolt and sedition. The immediate cause of the petition was the charge made against Aḥmad Beg Gerāmpā, the commandant of the fort of Ṭabarak, who had been left by the Shah to guard his father and the royal princes, that he was contemplating revolt. This charge was made because the commandant had taken into the fort large quantities of provisions. The Shah's officials knew that the charge had no basis in fact, but the Shah wished to gratify the people of Isfahan, and so he gave orders that the fort be razed. He then had the problem of what to do with his father and the royal princes. His advisers urged him to do away with them, but the Shah refused to do this. Eventually, he agreed under pressure to have them blinded and sent to the fortress of Alamūt to join Tahmasp Mīrzā.

The Shah returned to the capital, Qazvin, via Kashan, where he had Ḥasan Beg, *qūrčī* of the parasol (*qūrčī-ye čatr*), execute Kūr Ḥasan Ostājīlū, because he owed his rise to Moršedqolī Khan and it was therefore not wise to trust him. When he reached Qazvin, he received Moḥammadī Khan Toḡmāq, a trusted emir of Shah Tahmasp, and former *amīr al-omarā* of the province of Čokūr-e Sa'd, who had been driven out by the Ottomans and had been wandering around in the Ardabīl and Moḡān region. The Shah spent the winter at Qazvin.

Events of the Year of the Hare (1000/1591-92), the Fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's day occurred on Wednesday 25 Jomāda I,¹ 999/21 March 1591, and the New Year's festivities were held in the Bag-e Sa'adatābād at Qazvin. Mīrzā Loṭfollāh had fallen from favor because of the misdeeds of his son, and he was dismissed from the office of vizier. He was succeeded by Ḥātem Beg Ordūbādī, the comptroller of finance, who assumed the title of *e'temād al-dowla*. Allāhqolī Beg Qapāma-oglu Qājār, who had been enrolled in the royal bodyguard before the accession of Shah 'Abbas, and after that had been promoted to the rank of *yūzbāshī* (centurion), was appointed to the high office of *qūrčibāshī*.

Embassies arrived from the pashas who were wardens of the marches to strengthen the bonds of peace, and hard on their heels came Mahdīqolī Khan, the head of the Persian peace delegation, who reached Qazvin via Ardabīl, which was his seat of government, and was welcomed by the Shah. He presented gifts and letters of friendship from the Ottoman sultan. After Mahdīqolī Khan had been at court for about six weeks, he was arrested by the Shah and put to death. Mahdīqolī Khan belonged to the Čāušlū clan and was a kinsman of Moršedqolī Khan and of Moḥammad Šarīf Khan; the latter had committed various misdemeanors and had fled to Gīlān, and the Shah was fed up with the Čāušlūs in general. After the execution of Mahdīqolī Khan, his brother, Morād Khan Beg, who was keeper of the inkhorn, fled to Anatolia. As a result of this, his other brother, Aḥmad Beg, had both his feet cut off.

After these two men had been punished, the Shah sent Moršed-qolī Sultan Qūčīlū Ostājīlū, who was nicknamed Čahārgāv, to Gīlān to bring back the political refugees who had been given sanctuary there by Khan Aḥmad. If the latter refused to give them up, Moršed-qolī Sultan was to report back to the Shah Khan Aḥmad, knowing the Shah was determined to get the refugees back, surrendered them to Moršedqolī Sultan. When the prisoners reached court, they were at once executed. Khan Aḥmad's compliance with the Shah's wishes in this matter, plus the fact that he was a kinsman of the Shah's mother and was himself related by marriage with the Safavid royal house, led the Shah to overlook his previous actions and show him great favor.

¹March 21 was a Thursday.

The prince Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā² was appointed governor of Hamadan and *amīr al-omarā* of that province up to the borders of Baghdad province. He was placed in the care of the Bayāt tribe, and Ogūrlū Sultan Bayāt was appointed his *vakīl*.

One of the articles of the peace treaty with the Ottoman empire called for an exchange of prisoners, and so several pashas, including Morād Pasha who had been captured at Tabriz and was held prisoner at Qahqaha, were released and returned to Anatolia. Among the Persian prisoners returned were Šāhroḡ Khan, the keeper of the seal; Maḥdīqolī Khan Šāmlū; and Qūr Ḳoms Khan Šāmlū. Šāhroḡ Khan died en route. Qūr Ḳoms Khan was killed by Shah 'Abbas himself the moment he set foot inside the Čehel Sotūn hall because of his past record: his complicity in the murder of Maḥd-e 'Olyā; his complicity in the murder of Ḥoseynqolī Khan Šāmlū, the father of Maḥdīqolī Khan, at Tabriz, at the instigation of Emir Khan; and his killing of Sultan Ḥoseyn Khan, the father of that 'Alīqolī Khan who had been Shah 'Abbas's guardian. Maḥdīqolī Khan, on the other hand, was loaded with favors and reappointed to his hereditary post of *eštīk-āqāsībāšī*.

Another emir punished this year was Dowlat Yār Khan Stāh-man-šūr, who had been in the service of Shah Tahmasp and Ḥamza Mīrzā and had rendered loyal service during the Turkman-Takkalū rebellion, been promoted to the rank of emir, and granted a fief in the Solṭānīya and Sojās³ districts. After the assassination of Ḥamza Mīrzā, he had made himself the independent governor of these districts, and the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction was in no position to take action against him. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Moršedqolī Khan was too preoccupied with preparations for the Khorasan expedition to take action against him, and later, Shah 'Abbas sent Ḥoseyn 'Alī Sultan against him without effect. It was not until after the Shah had settled the more important affairs of Iraq, Fārs, and Kerman that he had leisure to turn his attention again to Dowlat Yār Khan. By that time, the Kurds were ravaging the neighboring districts of Solṭānīya, Abhar, Zenjān, Ṭārom, and Dargozīn, and molesting travelers and indulging in highway robbery. The Shah sent against him Maḥdīqolī Khan Šāmlū, reinforced by Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, *qūrčī-ye šamšīr* (*qūrčī* of the sword), the governor of Qom. After a further siege, Dowlat Yār sent word to Ḥoseyn Khan that he

²Shah 'Abbas's son.

³See Le Strange, p. 223.

was unable to leave the fort because the *qezelbaş*, especially the *Şamlūs*, were out for his blood. If the Shah marched in this direction, however, he would present himself before him and submit himself to his judgment. Hoseyn Khan reported to the Shah, who decided on a hunting expedition to Gözel Darra, and afterward rode near Dowlat Yār Khan's fortress. Dowlat Yār Khan came out of the fort and was taken to Qazvin for execution.

Continuing his policy of consolidating his rule within the boundaries of the Safavid empire, the Shah sent an army against Emir *Ḥamza* Khan, the son of *Bāyandor* Khan *Ṭāleš*, whose father had been a loyal servant of the Safavid family during the time of Shah *Tahmasp*. Emir *Ḥamza*, considering himself cleverer than his father, pushed his father aside in his own ancestral dominions during the troubles in Azerbaijan and the rebellion of the *Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā* faction, and interfered in the districts of *Gīlānāt* and *Gaskar*, which bordered on his territories. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Emir *Ḥamza* was one of the first emirs from the *Ṭāleš* region to present himself at court, and *Moršedqolī* Khan dealt with his affairs in accordance with his wishes and sent him back to his domains. In this year 999/1590-91, however, when Shah 'Abbas was subduing one by one those who defied his authority, Emir *Ḥamza* failed to present himself at court.

The Shah had given *Zu'l-Faqār* Khan, brother of *Farhād* Khan, full authority to restore law and order in Azerbaijan. The district of *Langar Konān*, which had been expropriated by Emir *Ḥamza*, had been allotted to *Farhād* Khan's brother *Alvand* Sultan. But *Alvand* Sultan was defied by Emir *Ḥamza* and was unable to take up his post. The Shah then ordered *Moḥammadī* Khan *Toḡmāq*, stationed in the the *Ardabīl* area, to go to the assistance of *Alvand* Sultan with *Šadr al-Dīn* Khan *Šafavī* and men of the *Šeyḡāvand* and *Šāh-sevan* tribes, and to install him in his office. Emir *Ḥamza* attacked the Safavid force with an army of three to four thousand men, but was defeated and retired again to the fortress of *Sendān*. *Ḥasan* Khan *Čaūšlu*, *qūrčī* of bow and arrow, was sent by the Shah to call on Emir *Ḥamza* to demonstrate his fealty, but Emir *Ḥamza* refused to meet him.

The fort at *Sendān* is situated in a position of great natural strength on the side of a mountain, surrounded by forests, and approachable by only one road. The emirs camped nearby, sealing off this approach road, and the people of *Ṭavāleš* demonstrated their

fealty by presenting themselves before the emirs. Emir Ḥamza sent a submissive message to the Shah, protesting that he could not leave the fort because there was a feud between his family and the sons of Ḥosām Beg Qarāmānlū, who held full authority in Azerbaijan; blood had been shed, and they were out for revenge. Emir Ḥamza requested that one of the Šamlū emirs be sent so that he might hand over the fort to him and, after deriving strength from a visit to the holy Safavid shrines, present himself at court. This request was granted; Ḥoseyn Khan Šamlū, the governor of Qom, was sent to Sendān. Ḥoseyn Khan, in order to set Emir Ḥamza's mind at rest, ordered Zu'l-Faqār Khan and the Qarāmānlūs to retreat some distance from the walls of the fort. Emir Ḥamza then emerged, sent his sons to serve as *golāms* of the Shah, and left by the Šīrvān road with his women and daughters. Ḥoseyn Khan placed the fort in the charge of Zu'l-Faqār Khan and returned to court.

Emir Ḥamza, after visiting the shrines at Ardabil, returned to Šīrvān, not daring to go to Qazvin because of his fear of the Qarāmānlūs. He was eventually slain in Šīrvān by a Sufi from Ṭaleš because he had stayed in Šīrvān among the Ottomans and had become their friend; the Sufi took his head to court. In consideration of Emir Ḥamza's earlier services to the Safavid dynasty, his sons were treated with kindness by the Shah and enrolled in the ranks of the *golāms*.

The Shah ordered Ḥasan Khan Čāušlū and Beṣām Aqa Torkmān, the *dārūga* of the *daftarhāna*, a wise and experienced officer, to demarcate the Azerbaijan border and settle problems connected with the frontier, in conjunction with the Ottoman officer appointed for the same purpose, Kezr Pasha, governor of Nağčevān.

The last rebel to submit to the Shah this year was Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī, the son of Moḥammadī Khan, the governor of Lor-e Kūček. Of recent years, he had kicked over the traces, had forcibly transferred to Lorestān many of the tribes living in the province of Hama-dan, and had considered himself an Ottoman vassal. With the signing of the peace treaty between the *qezelbāš* and the Ottomans, he told the Shah that he would return to his allegiance to Iran if his past sins were pardoned. Since the Lors and the 'Abbāsī family of Lors had for long been Shi'ites and devoted to the family of the Prophet, the Shah agreed to this and dispatched Maqšūd Beg the *nāẓer* to Lorestān to assure Šāhverdī Khan that all was forgiven.

Farhād Khan's Expedition to Khorasan, and 'Abd al-Mo'men's Occupation of Esfarā'in and Other Places after His Return

Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, ruler of Kārazm, had long been a friend of the Safavid dynasty. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, he had sent his son, Moḥammadqoli Sultan, to Qazvin, and friendly diplomatic relations were carried on between the two states. When 'Abdollah Khan and his son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan invaded Khorasan, Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan renewed confirmation of his allegiance to the Safavid dynasty by sending an embassy to Shah 'Abbas, and the Shah sent a return embassy under Moḥammadqoli Beg 'Arabgīrlū.⁴ Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan declared that if a Safavid army were sent to Khorasan he would cooperate with it, because he realized that the Uzbeks, if they were allowed to annex Khorasan, would next covet Urganj and Kārazm.

In the spring of 1591, therefore, the Shah decided to send Farhād Khan to Khorasan, accompanied by Moḥammadi Khan Tokmāq, Aslams Khan the keeper of the seal and other emirs. The emirs of Khorasan were ordered to rendezvous with Farhād Khan. Farhād Khan's orders were not to engage the Uzbeks if they were commanded by 'Abdollah Khan and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan in person, because it was contrary to protocol for emirs to give battle to kings; if that were not the case, he was to strive to recover as many of the places occupied by the Uzbeks as possible, and to protect those areas still in Safavid hands.

Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan was involved in a quarrel with Nūr Moḥammad Khan b. Abu'l-Moḥammad b. Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and had marched against the latter to the Nesā and Bāgbād region. But when he heard of Farhād Khan's arrival he marched back to meet him at Beštām, where Farhād Khan entertained him royally. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan presented gifts, renewed his allegiance to the Safavid cause, and pledged his cooperation in operations against the Uzbeks. Farhād Khan then marched on to Nishapur, where he was joined by Abū Muslim Khan Čaušlū, the brother of Ḥasan Khan, *qūr'ī* of bow and arrow and governor of Esfarā'in, and by the Bayāt emirs and others.

Farhād Khan laid siege to Nishapur, but when the news reached

⁴The 'Arabgīrlūs were a clan of the Šamlū tribe (see *TM*, p. 16).

Balk, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan marched on Khorasan with troops from Balk, Badaḡšān, Heṣār Šadmān, Andekūd and Šoborgān, and he spread the rumor that 'Abdollah Khan was marching on Kārazm with troops from Transoxania and Turkestan. This report led Ḥajjī Moḥammad Khan to return to Kārazm, and Farhād Khan held a council of war to decide what to do. Some of the emirs were for giving battle; others were opposed. While they were still dithering, their spies reported that 'Abd al-Mo'men had already reached Mašhad and was advancing with all speed on Nishapur. Farhād Khan, not daring to contravene the Shah's orders, disbanded the Khorasan emirs, each of whom went to his own castle and prepared to defend it. He himself retired to Beṣṭām and reported to the Shah, who ordered him to return to Qazvin.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan reached Nishapur and was delighted to find that the *qezelbāš* had retreated, since he had come by forced marches and had only a small band with him. When the rest of his troops caught up with him, he marched against the Bayāt tribe living in the Nishapur and Ma'dan area. The chiefs of the Bayāt tribe thought it expedient to submit to him, and they came to meet him at Rādekān. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan put them all to death, including Maḥmūd Sultan the son of Bābā Elyās; he had an ancient grudge against the Bayāt tribe which, only the year before, had slain a considerable number of Uzbegs. Maḥmūd Sultan's brother, Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan, went to Qazvin and was given employment at court.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then laid siege to Esfarā'īn, held by Abū Muslim Khan and a group of Ostājlūs, Kurds, and others. The Uzbegs had siege guns, but even so the siege dragged on for four months, and the defenders repulsed a number of assaults and inflicted some four thousand casualties on the Uzbegs, the ditch being filled with the bodies of the slain. Finally, the Uzbegs stormed the walls and massacred the garrison; even then, Abū Muslim Khan held out in one of the towers, and as long as his handful of men had a bullet for their guns and an arrow for their bows, they held the Uzbegs at bay. When the sound of firing ceased, the Uzbegs rushed the tower, and the gallant defenders fought to the last with swords and daggers. Kačal Qobād Kalhor,⁵ one of this valiant band, was recognized by one of the Uzbegs who, out of respect for his bravery, spirited him safely out of the Uzbek camp. He reached Iraq safely and gave me this personal

⁵A Kurdish tribe.

account of the siege. Since Abū Muslim Khan had been guilty of misconduct at the battle of Toršīz, Shah 'Abbas did not grieve overmuch at the news of his death.

After his capture of Esfarā'in, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan overran the districts of Sabzavār, Mazīnān, Jājarm, Šogān, and Jūrbod. After installing governors at these places, he returned to Balk. As the season was now far advanced, Shah 'Abbas decided to lead an army to Khorasan in the spring. He spent the winter of 1591-92 at Isfahan and Yazd and returned to Qazvin at the end of the winter.

Events of the Year of the Dragon (1001/1592-93), the Sixth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day occurred this year on 3 Jomādā II, 1000/17 March 1592.¹ Because of the troubles in Azerbaijan, Shah 'Abbas had not been able to visit the shrine of Shaikh Şaft and his other ancestors at Ardabīl. With the signing of peace with the Ottomans, he was able to remedy this situation. He bestowed alms on the inhabitants of Ardabīl and, after invoking the aid of his ancestors, set out for Khorasan. Before he left, however, he sent Allāhverdī Khan and a force of *gōlāms* to bring to court Šāhverdī Khan, the son of Kalīfaye Anşār and governor of Qarāja-dāğ. Šāhverdī Khan, during the two or three years that Azerbaijan had been without any effective Safavid rule, had taken advantage of the situation to increase his own power, and had been guilty of various disloyal acts. Even before this, he had made overtures to the Ottomans, had sent his son to Ja'far Pasha at Tabriz, and had declared himself to be the servant of the Ottomans.

With the conclusion of peace with the Ottomans and the demarcation of the frontier of Azerbaijan, Šāhverdī Khan should have petitioned his spiritual director to be allowed to return to his allegiance to the Shah, because Qarāja-dāğ was allotted to Iran and Šāhverdī Khan's ancestors had a long history of loyal and devoted service to the Safavid house. He failed to do so, and he failed to avail himself of the Shah's presence at Ardabīl to make his peace with him; on the contrary, on the approach of Allāhverdī Khan, he fled across the border on to Ottoman territory, and Shah 'Abbas appointed another as governor of Qarāja-dāğ.

The Conquest of Gīlān

"If a man's destiny is dark, he constantly commits acts which contribute to his downfall." Thus it was that Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān, despite all the favors he had received from the Safavids, and despite the fact that Shah 'Abbas had overlooked his giving asylum to a number of political refugees, committed further acts which provoked the Shah's anger against him. First, while he was still harboring the political refugees, he sent his *vakil*, Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn, to

¹Qazī Aḥmad gives the correct date 6 Jomādā-II, 1000/20 March 1592. I am indebted to Robert S. McChesney for this correction.

Istanbul to make overtures to the Ottoman sultan. Gīlān was his ancestral domain, he said, and he now offered it freely to the Ottoman sultan. If the sultan were to send a contingent of Ottoman troops by sea from Šīrvān, he would surrender to them the fortress of Lāhījān. It was only a short distance from Lāhījān to Qazvin, and the conquest of Iraq could easily be effected from Gīlān.

Shah 'Abbas was astonished when he heard this report, and sent one of his courtiers to tell Khan Aḥmad that, if he admitted his fault and disavowed his action, and asserted that he had behaved in this way because of his fear of the Shah and the suspicion that he had fallen from his favor, his conduct would be overlooked. Khan Aḥmad departed from the path of truth. He vehemently denied that there was any truth in the report; Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn, he said, had been given leave to go on pilgrimage to Mecca; he had not sent him to Istanbul and knew nothing about the matter. At this point, a reliable man arrived in Qazvin from Istanbul and told the Shah that Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn was in fact in Istanbul, and had delivered a message to the Sultan along the lines mentioned above.

The Shah, enraged at this treachery, decided that the only course was to take punitive action against Khan Aḥmad, who had repeatedly employed guile and deceit in his dealings with the Safavid dynasty; further, the existence of an enemy on the border of his territory was a danger to the state. He therefore ordered Farhād Khan and his brother Zu'l-Faqār Khan to proceed to Gīlān via Qezel Āgaj and the Caspian coast with troops from Azerbaijan and Ṭavāleš. Orders were issued to Amīra Siāvoš, the governor of Gaskar, and 'Alī Khan, the governor of western Gīlān, to assist Farhād Khan. In addition, Jam-šīd Beg, a *golām* of the royal household and governor of Qazvin, was dispatched via Deylamān. The Shah was still prepared to give Khan Aḥmad a chance, and he wrote the following letter to him:

I am about to leave for Khorasan, and it may be that I shall be away two or three years. The ties of kinship between us, and the benefits which you have received from the Safavid house, led me to expect that I could ask various services of you in return—that you would give your allegiance to my father and those officers whom I am leaving behind at Qazvin. I had complete confidence in you; but now that you have declared your friendship with the Ottoman

enemy and your willingness to hand over the province of Gīlān to them, how can I rely on you? Your best course is try and make amends for your past sins by throwing yourself on my mercy, by presenting yourself at court, so that the Ottomans may hear that you have returned to your allegiance to the Safavids. If you are too nervous to come in person, send the mother of your son, who is related to the Safavid house,² and the brother of Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn, whom you sent as ambassador to Istanbul, to intercede for you. I shall expect to see you in person after my return from Khorasan.

Khan Aḥmad was in no mood to listen to this advice, but he was so terrified that he could not make up his mind whether to stand and fight or not. The story goes that he consulted his astrological tables (he had some skill in this science) to obtain his horoscope. His horoscope told him that that year his territory would be transferred to other hands and that he would be exiled from his ancestral domains. He therefore decided to take ship to Šīrvān and travel by that route to Istanbul. However, because the people of Gīlān were naturally inclined to support Shah 'Abbās, Khan Aḥmad could not reveal his secret plans to anyone, and he was afraid that the Gīlān emirs might force him to go to Qazvin. He made overt preparations for war and assembled a force of twenty thousand men, cavalry and infantry, under Emir 'Abbās Lešta-nešā'i, a member of the Jīk family and one of the great emirs of Gīlān; Kār Kiā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad, the son of Kiā Rostam and marshal (*sepahsālār*) of Deylamān; and Ṭaleša Kūlti, marshal of Lahījān.

After his army had marched to meet the *qezelbaş* on the Saftd-rūd, Khan Aḥmad gathered up all his cash, jewels, and contents of his treasuries, his articles of gold and silver, and anything he could lay his hands on, and sent them to Langarūd and Rūdsar to be placed on board ship and await his arrival. He sent away the women of his harem in the custody of Kiā Farīdūn, a distinguished Gīlānī emir who was the court chamberlain in charge of the harem, and himself awaited the outcome of the battle.

Farhād Khan spent several days reconnoitering the fords across the river, and finally selected one that appeared passable. He ordered

²Khan Aḥmad had married a daughter of Shah Tahmasp.

his army across the Safīd-rūd. The fire from the musketeers of the household *golāms* was so effective and the morale of the Gīlānī forces was so poor that the Gīlān emirs soon abandoned the struggle. Emir 'Abbas, one of the commanders, was the first to leave the battlefield, followed by Ṭāleša Kūlī and the rest. When Khan Aḥmad received the news of the rout, he rode off to the shore of the Caspian, where he had arranged that Kīā Farīdūn should have his wife and daughter waiting, so that they might take ship together to Šīrvān. But Kīā Farīdūn considered it shameful that Shah Tahmasp's daughter and granddaughter should flee to Ottoman territory, and so he turned off the coastal road and took the women by little-known routes to Somām and thence to the Shah. Khan Aḥmad waited by the shore of the Caspian for a long while. Finally he despaired of their coming and took ship with Moḥammad Amīn Khan, the son of Jamšīd Khan, who was himself the grandson of Shah Tahmasp, and had joined him because of a quarrel with his brother and a revolt on the part of the inhabitants of western Gīlān.

After his victory, Farhād Khan proceeded to Lāhījān, to which Shah 'Abbas himself was making his way. The Gīlān emirs presented themselves to the Shah at Lāhījān and kissed his feet. To comfort the hearts of the people of Gīlān, the Shah greeted them all graciously and bestowed on them robes of honor; Kīā Farīdūn was singled out for special favors for his signal service in bringing the royal princess and her daughter. Those nobles of Gīlān who were considered fit for service in the Safavid army were signed on and allotted pay and allowances commensurate with their rank. The rank and file of the Gīlānī forces, consisting of daytime soldiers only, who were not capable of sustaining a prolonged campaign away from home, were disbanded; they returned thankfully to their agricultural pursuits.

The Shah spent some days at Lāhījān, dealing with local affairs and granting tax exemptions (*mo'āfiyāt*)³ to *seyyeds*, *'olamā*, ascetics, and wardens of shrines. Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū was appointed governor and *amīr al-omarā* of Gīlān, with Kāja Masīḥ Gīlānī as his vizier. Emir 'Abbas was confirmed in his fief at Lešta-nešā'i, and Ṭāleša Kūlī in his post of commander in chief at Lāhījān. Kīā Farīdūn was made senior chief for the province of Gīlān. Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad was given the tribal district of Deylamān, and Rānekūh was allotted to Valī Sultan Šūfī. All other districts were placed

³See *TM*, index, s.v.

under *qezelbāš* governors and *dārūgas*. 'Alī Khan was appointed governor of western Gīlān and contracted to pay the sum of one thousand *tomān* annually to the treasury. The district of Kalkāl, a dependency of Azerbaijan and adjacent to Gaskar, was given to Amīra Siāvoš in recognition of his services. After making all these arrangements, the Shah marched toward Khorasan.

The Shah's Expedition to Khorasan

Orders had been issued for the *qezelbāš* forces to rendezvous at Beštām. Some of the emirs of Gīlān, including Mīr 'Abbās, Ṭaleša Kūlī, and Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad, elected to accompany the Shah on this expedition. The Shah marched to Beštām via Lār and Fīrūzkūh and waited a month for his forces to assemble.

The quarrel between Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Kārazm, and Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, has been mentioned before. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan had wrested from Nūr Moḥammad Khan's control the districts of Nesā, Darūn, and Bāḡbād, and Nūr Moḥammad had appealed to 'Abdollāh Khan, promising to give him Marv, which is not far from Bokhara and Čahārjū, if 'Abdollāh Khan recovered for him Nesā and Darūn. 'Abdollāh Khan, who had always had his eyes on Marv, agreed with alacrity. He crossed the Oxus and marched to Marv, which Nūr Moḥammad stupidly handed over to his officers before 'Abdollāh Khan had fulfilled his part of the bargain. 'Abdollāh Khan marched a few stages toward Nesā, but on hearing that Shah 'Abbas was on his way to Khorasan and that Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan was also advancing toward him, made this the excuse to retire to Bokhara, promising to return the following year to recover Nesā and Darūn for Nūr Moḥammad. 'Abd al-Mo'men had tried to seize Nūr Moḥammad, and so the latter, becoming apprehensive, left 'Abdollāh Khan's camp without permission and went to Abīvard. 'Abd al-Mo'men then separated from his father, and marched to Khorasan by way of Qarāpālčaq. On arrival in Khorasan, he heard that the Shah was massing his forces at Beštām, and he addressed an insulting letter to him:

Between two kings there is either peace or war; I am ready for either. If you want peace, relinquish Khorasan to me and return to Iraq. We can then conclude peace on the same basis as existed between Ḥasan Padešāh Torkmān, who was ruler of Iraq and

Azerbaijan, and Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bāyqarā, who was ruler of Balḵ and Khorasan.⁴ But if you want war then advance further, for victory is given by God and does not depend on the size of armies.

Before he received this letter, the Shah, who had heard of 'Abd al-Mo'men's arrival at Nishapur, had marched from Beṣṭām via Ḥang, Mağz, and Jājarm;⁵ there he received the letter from the Uzbek Khan, to which he made the following reply, couched in the courteous terms normally used between kings:

We trust in the grace of God, and we will do our best to recover Khorasan, which has belonged to this dynasty for a hundred years. The peace concluded between Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bāyqarā, a Čağatāy prince, and Ḥasan Pādešāh, a Turkman king, has no relevance to our situation. If you wish to make peace on the same basis as it was concluded between Kesken Qarā Sultan Uzbek, ruler of Balḵ, and Shah Tahmasp, my grandfather—in other words, if you hand over Khorasan to my officers—then I am ready to make peace too. If not, I am ready to fight, and have come from Iraq eager for such a fray; wherever we meet, God will decide between us.

At Jājarm, the Shah found a second letter from 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan awaiting him, the contents of which completely contradicted those of his first missive. The gist of the second letter was a challenge to the Shah to fight a pitched battle at Jām, where 'Abd al-Mo'men alleged he was waiting for him, but the Shah subsequently learned that the Uzbek Khan, instead of remaining at Jām, had retreated to Balḵ.

About this time, the senior *seyyeds* and the nobles of Mazīnān in the district of Sabzavār banded together and killed the Uzbek governor, Qovāydaš Bahādor. They took his head to the Shah and were rewarded by the grant of tax immunities and other favors. The Uzbek governor of Jājarm abandoned his post, and his example was followed by those of Esfarā'īn, Šoğān, Jūrbod, Jahān in the district of Arğīān,

⁴See Savory, *Struggle*, *passim*.

⁵This is the northerly of the two routes from Beṣṭām to Nishapur; see Mostowfi, p. 169.

and Sabzavār. The Shah advanced to Sabzavār and sent Allāhverdi Khan ahead to Nishapur with a detachment of *golāms*. The Uzbek governor abandoned the city, which Allāhverdi Khan entered without opposition. The Shah stayed a month at Esfarā'in.

Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū was appointed governor of Nishapur (he had been governor there in the time of Shah Tahmasp); he was an officer experienced in siege warfare. A detachment of three hundred crack Eṣfahānī musketeers, under the command of Mīr Fattāḥ, the *mīnbāšī*⁶ of the Isfahan regiment of musketeers, was stationed in the citadel. The district of Esfarā'in was given to Moḥammad Sultan, the son of Bābā Elyās Bayāt, and the Bayāt tribe was granted a variety of tax immunities in consideration of the fact that its lands had been ravaged by the Uzbeks. The post of governor of Sabzavār was given to Moḥammad Sultan, the grandson of Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Alī Sultan Moktār al-Ḥoseynī, and governors were appointed to each of the other reoccupied cities. Those local residents of these districts who had distinguished themselves by their services to the crown during the Uzbek occupation were rewarded by grants of money or tax immunities, and robes of honor were bestowed on them.

The Shah then marched back from Esfarā'in via Jahān in the district of Arḡlān to Sultan Meydānī, which is near Rādekān in the district of Mašhad. There he learned from some Uzbek prisoners taken by Ganj 'Alī Khan that the Uzbeks remaining in the area were concentrating at Mašhad, where they had accumulated large stocks of provisions and were prepared to resist a siege. As it was now late autumn and the ravages of the Uzbeks had stripped the countryside bare of food supplies, the Shah thought a winter siege of Mašhad would only dissipate his forces. In addition, he was reluctant either to bombard the holy city with artillery fire, or to expose its inhabitants to the depredations of Uzbeks rendered desperate by the hardships of a siege. The Shah therefore decided to return to Qazvin. Before he left Sultan Meydānī, he handed over to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan at Nishapur all the food supplies remaining in his camp.

During this campaign, one of the Gīlān emirs, Kīā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad, suddenly fled from the royal camp, for no apparent reason, and the rest of the Gīlān emirs were rather ashamed of his behavior. However, the Shah graciously overlooked this misdemean-

⁶Lit.: commander of a thousand. The Safavid troops were divided into thousands (battalions), hundreds (companies) and tens (sections).

or and allowed the other emirs, Mīr 'Abbas and Ṭāleša Kūlī, to return to their governorates. Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad died shortly afterward.

This year, Farhād Khan was appointed *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan and warden of the shrine of Shaikh Ṣafī at Ardabīl. The vizier, Hātem Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*, and various other officers were ordered to look into the affairs of the army, and to see that they received their pay, allowances, and fodder allowance. They were also ordered to scrutinize the rolls of the *qezelbāš* tribes and other tribes liable for military service, and if they found any soldier drawing pay, in possession of a horse, and capable of bearing arms who had not reported for duty in Khorasan, he was to be charged with failing to report for duty. This time, delinquents were to be fined, and the money distributed as bounty to those retainers of the court and *qūrčīs* who had been the first to answer the call to arms and had endured the hardships of the campaign. This was to be both a punishment for and a warning to the guilty parties. In future, anyone failing to answer a mobilization call would be subject to a variety of penalties.

The result of these measures was that, whenever a levy was made, the *qezelbāš* and other tribesmen, for fear of being punished by the Shah, would set off to court without even waiting for their own mobilization orders, each contingent trying to outstrip the other. As I mentioned in book I, in my chapters on the qualities and behavior of Shah 'Abbas, this practice was maintained throughout his reign, and in future, no one was delinquent in this regard.

Leaving his officers to get on with this task, the Shah rode off to Isfahan with a few of his close companions, *moqarrabs*, and retainers of the royal household, and spent the winter there. This year, I was given a position at court and enrolled among the royal secretaries. When the Shah's officers remained at Qazvin, therefore, I accompanied the Shah to Isfahan and busied myself with secretarial duties. The period during which I was in the Shah's personal service therefore dates from this time (1001/1592-93).

The Battle between the Afšār Emirs from Kerman and the Uzbek Emirs at Tūn, Which Resulted in a Qezelbāš Victory

Valī Khan, Esma'il Khan, and the Kerman emirs, together with the whole Afšār tribe, had been ordered to join the royal army in

Khorasan by way of Yazd and Ṭabas. On arrival at Ṭabas, they heard that Moṣṭafā Beg Kangarlū, the governor of Tūn and Ṭabas, was hard pressed by the Uzbegs. The Uzbegs had occupied the district of Tūn and its fort. Hearing that royal army was on its way to Khorasan, Moṣṭafā Beg had led his two hundred and fifty Ostājilūs and others from Ṭabas in a valiant attempt to recover control of the Tūn district. He occupied the outer walls of the fort and penned the Uzbek governor, Qūzī Mīrzā, in the citadel. The Uzbek garrison sent to Herat for help, and Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, governor of Herat, and Dīn Moḥammad Sultan, nicknamed Yatīm Sultan, 'Abdollāh Khan's nephew, sent a thousand men under Nājūlī Bahādor to the relief of Qūzī Mīrzā. Moṣṭafā Beg, a brave and headstrong officer who had on several occasions given battle to the Uzbegs with only small bodies of men at his disposal, gave battle to the relief force. Realizing that he was in a tight spot, he ordered his men to dismount and use their horses as cover to protect them from the Uzbek arrows and musket fire. In this way, he conducted a fighting retreat on foot for about four *farsaks*. Toward night, he reached a village called Āyesk and took refuge behind its walls. Both sides mounted guard that night.

The Afšār emirs pressed on at full speed to rescue Moṣṭafā Beg, and reached Āyesk with six or seven thousand men on the second day of Moṣṭafā Beg's being blockaded there. The Uzbek cavalry, driving their baggage train before them, tried to retreat, but Moṣṭafā Beg emerged from behind the walls of the village. With the support of the Afšār advance guard, he attacked the enemy. When the Afšār center arrived, it shattered the Uzbegs at the first charge, and most of the enemy were slain. Jān Moḥammad, the *divānbeḡī* of Yatīm Sultan and a distinguished Uzbek noble, was taken prisoner, together with a number of other notables. After the defeat of the relief force, the Uzbek garrison at Tūn evacuated the citadel. The Afšār emirs, hearing that the Shah had returned to Qazvin, marched back to Iraq via Toršīz and Sabzavār, leaving Moṣṭafā Beg in control of Tūn and Jonābād.⁷ When they reached Isfahan, they kissed the Shah's feet and presented their prisoners and the heads of the slain Uzbegs. Jān Moḥammad was placed in the custody of Bījan Beg, a *ḡolām* of the royal household, but there is no record of the fate of the other prisoners.

The Afšār victory at Tūn also caused Yatīm Sultan and his brothers to raise the siege of Deraḡš. It will be recalled that, when Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa Šamlū fell from favor, he went to Qā'en without the Shah's

⁷Northeast of Tūn; see Le Strange, p. 359.

permission and found that the official governor, 'Alīqolī Khan Ostājīlū, had been driven out by the Uzbeks and blockaded in the fortress of Jūr. Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa rallied around him a number of Šāmlū tribesmen, old retainers of his family, who were living in the area. When he heard that the Shah had arrived in Khorasan, 'Alīqolī Khan Ostājīlū, although he was unwell, left his baggage in the fort and set off in a litter to meet the Shah. Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa, still lusting after the governorship of Qā'en and hoping to get his hands on his possessions, waylaid him. The Ostājīlūs defeated Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa, but a bullet struck 'Alīqolī Khan's litter and wounded him, and he died toward the end of the same day. Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa then usurped the governorship of Qā'en. When Yatīm Sultan attacked Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa this year, the latter received little support from the local inhabitants, who were aware that he had usurped his position at Qā'en. He managed to get together about a thousand men, regular troops and militia, and fought a battle with Yatīm Sultan at Deraḡš, a dependency of Qā'en. Yatīm Sultan was victorious, and some four or five hundred *qezelbāš* were killed. The survivors were beleaguered in the fort at Deraḡš by Yatīm Sultan, but the latter called off the siege, as already stated, and Sultan 'Alī Kalīfa returned to Qā'en.

Miscellaneous Events That Occurred This Year

Šāhverdī Khan Qarādāglū, who had defected to the Ottomans, received a cool reception from the frontier pashas, who did not approve of his defection so soon after the conclusion of peace. Despairing of receiving help from the Ottomans, Šāhverdī Khan saw no course but to throw himself on the Shah's mercy. He declared that he had been too afraid of the Shah's wrath to make his obeisance to him when he had the opportunity, but swore he would now do so if the Shah would pardon him. The Shah agreed to do so, and Šāhverdī Khan presented himself at Bešām. However, he was still the same unreliable Šāhverdī Khan, and he conspired with some of the disgruntled emirs in Khorasan who had been dismissed from their governorships for various misdemeanors—men like Šāhqolī Sultan Piāda Torkmān, Nadr Khan Afšār, and Emāmverdī Khan Atlāndīllū. Their plot was reported to the Shah, and the conspirators tried to escape by hanging behind when the royal army marched. They were seized; Emāmverdī Khan Atlāndīllū managed to prove his innocence, but the other three were put to death.

Also this year the Afšār tribe fell under a cloud for being slow in

answering the call to join the royal army in Khorasan. The Shah thought the tribe had returned to its old, arrogantly independent ways, and so he deprived the tribe of the governorship of Kerman and gave that post to Ḥasan Khan Ostājilū, *qūrčī* of bow and arrow. Ḥasan Khan was on the point of leaving for Kerman when the Afšār emirs arrived at court, and the Shah was gradually persuaded to overlook their slowness in answering the mobilization call in view of their gallantry in the battle at Tūn. In gratitude for this act of clemency, and in view of the fact that Ḥasan Khan had after all been appointed, the Afšār emirs undertook to pay a large sum as a gift to the Shah, who distributed the money among those personal attendants who had shared the burdens of the Khorasan campaign.

The Zu'l-Qadar tribe of Fārs was also penalized for not having sent enough troops to Khorasan, and the governorship of Shiraz was taken away from Bonyād Khan and the Zu'l-Qadars and given to Ḥoseyn Khan Moṣāḥeb Qājār. When the Zu'l-Qadar tribe petitioned for pardon, the Shah made it clear that, if they received a royal pardon this time and the governorship of Fārs was restored to them, in future they would have to make amends for their past shortcomings whenever there was a call to arms. Since Ḥoseyn Khan had actually been appointed, they had to wait a year before being reinstated in Fārs. Their rule there lasted only one more year, because their oppressive government caused complaints from the populace. The following year both tribes, the Afšārs and the Zu'l-Qadars, were deprived of their tribal districts, Kerman and Fārs, respectively.

This year there was an outbreak of plague and cholera at Qazvin, and many of the inhabitants fled into the country. Cholera carried off many of the people of Qazvin, the most notable victim being the seal of the *mojtaheds* Emir Seyyed Ḥoseyn al-Ḥoseynī Karakī 'Āmeli, about whom I gave some particulars in the biographical section on *seyyeds* and '*olamā* of the time of Shah Tahmasp, in book I. He was the maternal grandson of the *mojtahed* Shaikh 'Alī 'Abd al-'Āl, and was renowned among both Persian and Arab '*olamā* for the elegance of his speech and the eloquence of his expression. In Iran, he was renowned as a *mojtahed*, and wrote treatises on the fundamentals and branches of Eṣnā 'Ašārī Shi'ite doctrine. Shah Tahmasp's court was the meeting place of both Arab and Persian theologians and scholars, and Shaikh 'Alī 'Abd al-'Āl's son, Shaikh 'Alī, was also recognized as a *mojtahed* by all his peers.

Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn, however, aspired to even greater heights; he

called himself "master of those who affirm the truth," "lord of those who devote themselves to the minutiae of scholarship," "heir of the knowledge of the prophets," and "seal of the *mojtaheds*," and had these titles stamped on his judicial decrees and other documents to which he affixed his seal. Although in private the *'olamā* did not recognize this claim of his, not one of them dared to dispute it openly, nor could any of them hold his own with him in debate, and so until the end of his life they called him "the seal of the *mojtaheds*." The Shah had his body sent to the holy places in Iraq for burial.

Events of the Year of the Serpent, Corresponding to the Year 1002/1593-94, the Seventh Year of The Reign of Shah 'Abbas

For the New Year festival, 1593, Shah 'Abbas returned from Isfahan to Qazvin. Shortly afterward, he set off for Qarā Āgāj to hunt. But when he reached Tārom, he received complaints from the people of Gīlān about the conduct of Mahdīqolī Khan. To satisfy the people, he dismissed Mahdīqolī Khan and appointed Aḥmad Beg Begdelū *dārūga* of Lāhījān, and sent the latter on his way with a detachment of Šāmlūs. On his heels the Shah sent the vizier with accountants and other bureaucrats, and Beštām Aqa the *dārūga* of the royal secretariat, to Gīlān to fix the *divān* taxes and dues in an equitable manner. If they found that Khan Aḥmad and his predecessors had been in the habit of levying an unreasonable sum in taxes, they were to cancel this legislation and seek to alleviate the tax burden on the people. The Shah himself went to Ardabīl and invited Farhād Khan, who had come to welcome him, and 'Alī Khan from western Gīlān and Amīra Sīāvoš from Gaskar, to join him for hunting in Qezel Āgāj. The team of bureaucrats headed by the vizier went to Gīlān, and the fiscal system they set up in that province is still in force and is used as a model. The Shah summoned the vizier to join him in Qezel Āgāj. I was sent to fetch him from Gīlān, and I accompanied him to court and kissed the feet of the Shah.

The Shah wanted gradually to bring the whole of Gīlān and Ṭabar-eštān under his control, because the whole area was in a state of turmoil as the old, hereditary rulers died off and their places were taken by ambitious upstarts. A case in point was the western part of Gīlān province, the hereditary domain of Jamšīd Khan, the son-in-law of Shah Tahmasp. Jamšīd Khan's son, Moḥammad Amīn, went with Khan Aḥmad to Šīrvān, as I have mentioned before, and died there of smallpox. 'Alī Khan, the son of Kār Kiā Aḥmad, a retainer of that family, had behaved treacherously toward Jamšīd Khan's sons and had expelled them from the province, and he had no previous record of service to the Safavid house. The Shah therefore determined to annex western Gīlān as well and unite the whole province under Safavid rule. However, he thought it best to delay action for a while, because Farhād Khan had made certain contractual promises to 'Alī Khan when he took over eastern Gīlān. Further-

more, 'Alī Khan had popular support, and to remove him at this stage might provoke a revolt that, in turn, might spread to eastern Gilān.

As regards Gaskar, the Shah planned to remove Emir Sīāvoš, who was considered unreliable because of his alliance with Emir Ḥamza Ṭāleš, and to unite Gaskar with the districts of Ṭavāleš and Āstārā. After extensive discussion, the Shah decided to go ahead with his plan to bring the whole of Gilān under his control despite the risks involved. He had both rulers arrested and appointed a certain Emir Shah Malek marshal of the whole of western Gilān. Emir Shah Malek was a kinsman of 'Alī Khan. Although he had no previous history of service to the Safavid dynasty and it was not wise to trust him, the Shah made this appointment in order to test the loyalty of the Gilānīs. At the same time, a number of men of standing in Gilān were enrolled among the retainers of the royal household and granted salaries and fiefs that exceeded anything they hoped for. *Dārūḡas* were appointed to Rašt and Fūmen and dispatched to Gilān with these Gilānī notables.

The Revolt in Gilān and the Triumph of the Punitive Expedition Dispatched to the Province

Shortly after his appointment, Emir Shah Malek revealed the base metal of his character, which is universal among Gilānīs, and rebelled. He marched against the *dārūḡa* of Fūmen and killed him; the *dārūḡa* of Rašt fled. The people of eastern Gilān, ungrateful for the favors they had received from the Shah, joined the rebellion. Among the military classes in eastern Gilān, two factions have traditionally filled the offices of *vakīl al-salṭana* and *šāḥeb-eḡtīār* under the princes of that region: the Aẓdar and the Čapak. These two factions were old rivals for the offices of marshal and vicegerent of the ruler, and no quarter was given on either side. Emir 'Abbas, the governor of Lešta-Nešā, belonged to the Čapak faction. A certain Bū Sa'īd, who belonged to the Aẓdar faction, had hidden himself away in the forests and never proffered his allegiance to the *qezelbāš*. Consequently he lived in fear of Emir 'Abbas. He joined the rebel Emir Shah Malek and swore that he would recognize him as the senior chief in the whole of Gilān until such time as Khan Aḥmad and Moḥammad Amīn Khan, the heir to the principality of western Gilān (the reports of the latter's death in Šīrvān had not been verified in Gilān), should return. At that time, the ancient rivalry between the

two halves of Gīlān would cease: Khan Aḥmad would be the ruler of eastern Gīlān and Moḥammad Amīn of western Gīlān, and the *qezelbāš* would not get in.

On learning of the revolt, Aḥmad Beg, the *dārūga*, and the *qezelbāš* governors, together with Ṭāleša Kūlī and Kīā Farīdūn and the Gīlānī militia, marched to the Saḥīd-rūd to give battle to the rebels. Aḥmad Beg perceived signs of disaffection on the part of Ṭāleša Kūlī, and prudently led his *qezelbāš* troops aside. The two men regarded each other with mutual suspicion. When the rebels and the *qezelbāš* came face to face, Kīā Farīdūn, a man of great integrity, warned Aḥmad Beg that Ṭāleša was plotting treachery and was in league with the rebels. He advised the *dārūga* not to give battle at that time, since the *qezelbāš* contingent was outnumbered a hundred to one, and he guided the *qezelbāš* to Deylamān. Ṭāleša Kūlī informed the rebels of the departure of the *qezelbāš*, and the rebels advanced to Mazār-e Seyyed Ašraf, where they renewed their pledges to each other and confirmed their opposition to the *qezelbāš*. Emir Shah Malek then returned to western Gīlān, and Ṭāleša Kūlī and Bū Sa'īd to Lāhījān, whence they sent a courier to Šīrvān to summon Khan Aḥmad. They appointed administrative officers and met daily in Khan Aḥmad's residence to discharge the business of the realm. They made the most of their brief period of power, and took no thought for the future.

The revolt in Gīlān enraged the Shah. His first thought was to go to Gīlān in person and visit condign punishment on the rebels, so that there would be no further talk of rebellion among any who survived the sword. Since the revolt did not merit the Shah's going there in person, wisdom dissuaded him from this course of action. Farhād Khan was ordered to advance via Kūhdom, located between the two portions of Gīlān, and Allāhqolī Beg the *qūrčībāšī* was ordered to Deylamān with a detachment of *qūrčīs*, to link up with Aḥmad Beg and Kīā Farīdūn and advance into Gīlān by way of Šīma-rūd. Farhād Khan reported that the people of eastern Gīlān had been incited to rebel by those of western Gīlān; if the Shah would overlook the sins of 'Alī Khan, reinstate him in his domains, and order him to accompany Farhād Khan, this would divide the rebels and make the reconquest of western Gīlān an easier matter. He, Farhād Khan, would take responsibility for the outcome, and if 'Alī Khan did do anything untoward, it would be an easy matter to deal with him. Farhād Khan urged this point of view vigorously, and the Shah finally

capitulated. 'Alī Khan was released from jail, given a robe of honor, and entrusted to Farhād Khan, now appointed governor and *amīr al-omarā* of eastern Gīlān, and exalted above his peers by the title of "son" bestowed on him by the Shah. Farhād Khan then advanced along the Kūhdom road, and the *qūrčībāšī* via Deylamān.

Bū Sa'īd sent Ṭāleša Kūlī and Maṣṣūr Menkāl to meet the army from Deylamān, with orders to bar the Šīma-rūd road, which runs from Deylamān to Lāhījān and is an extremely difficult route, marshy and through forest so dense that the track is wide enough only for a single horseman. He himself planned to link up with Emir Shah Malek, to hold the Kūhdom road with the assistance of the people of western Gīlān, and to prevent Farhād Khan from entering that province. The *qūrčīs* learned that Ṭāleša Kūlī had moved to Šīma-rūd and had blocked the roads with trenches and barricades of tree trunks (the local term for these barricades is *bona-bor*). The advance guard of the *qūrčīs*, not waiting for Farhād Khan, who was still in Kūhdom, stormed the first of these barricades they came across, scattering the musketeers stationed behind it. The *qūrčībāšī*, following up with the main body, completed the rout of the rebels. Maṣṣūr Menkāl was killed, and Ṭāleša Kūlī escaped into the forests. The *qūrčīs* occupied Lāhījān, and Bū Sa'īd also fled. The *qūrčībāšī* sent a courier to Farhād Khan to tell him of the victory and prevented his men from looting in Lāhījān, his object being to conciliate the inhabitants.

Farhād Khan was piqued because the *qūrčīs* had stolen a march on him and won a victory for which he had hoped to gain the credit himself, but he pretended to be pleased at the news. He dispatched 'Alī Khan with a force to western Gīlān. Since he had made himself responsible to the Shah for the success of his policy, he admonished him soundly before he left. The *qūrčīs* remained in Lāhījān for a time, hunting down rebels and performing various other duties, and then returned to Qazvin, leaving Farhād Khan to devote himself to restoring order and sound government in eastern Gīlān.

When 'Alī Khan reached western Gīlān, the people deserted Emir Shah Malek and rallied round him. Emir Shah Malek, since his revolt had meant the release of 'Alī Khan from prison, thought the latter would be grateful to him for this, and confidently went to meet 'Alī Khan. But 'Alī Khan had no option but to put him to death, because failure to do so would have been construed as disloyalty and breach

of faith. He therefore sent Emir Shah Malek's head to Farhād Khan at Lāhtjān. Until the end of the year, he maintained good relations with Farhād Khan, although he did not see him more than once. At the end of the year, however, he felt his position was strong enough to enable him to return to his old rebellious ways. His fate, and that of Ṭaleša Kūlī and Bū Sa'īd, will be related under the events of next year.

The Invasion of K̲ārazm by 'Abdollāh Khan and of Khorasan by his Son, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan

Although Uzbek affairs may be thought to have no place in a history of Iran, since they are relevant to my theme I have no choice but to record them. I have already described the dispute over Nesā between Nūr Moḥammad Khan b. Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Ūrganj, and Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of K̲ārazm; the two men were cousins and were both descended from Jočī b. Genghis Khan. Nūr Moḥammad Khan had handed Marv over to 'Abdollāh Khan in the hope that the latter would in return assist him in regaining Nesā. The dispute between the two khans suited 'Abdollāh Khan admirably, and he did nothing for Nūr Moḥammad Khan.

'Abdollāh Khan's ambition had always been to annex K̲ārazm and Khorasan, and he had always resented the fact that the khans of Ūrganj gave their allegiance to the Shah. This year, therefore, he launched a two-pronged attack, himself going to K̲ārazm and sending 'Abd al-Mo'men to Khorasan. When the latter reached Marv, the Nāīman Uzbeks deserted him and joined 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. On the advice of Ḥāfeẓak Sultan Kabūšānī, Nūr Moḥammad Khan left Marv and took refuge at the court of Shah 'Abbas. The Shah sent his son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, together with the vizier, and a number of emirs, *moqarrabs*, and personal retainers, for a distance of one *farsak* to welcome him. Nūr Moḥammad Khan dismounted from his horse, embraced the prince, and was led into an audience with the Shah in the Čehel Sotūn hall. All his needs were taken care of, and he became the Shah's companion at private banquets and social gatherings.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, having consolidated his hold on the districts of Abīvard, Čahčaha, Mahna, Nesā, Bāgbād, and Darūn, marched on Nishapūr. He arrived there before the crops had been harvested and blockaded the citadel before the defenders had had a

chance to stock it with food. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, with the Rūmlū ḡāzīs and Eṣfahānī musketeers, looked to its defense and reported the Uzbek attack to the Shah, who was forced to delay marching to the relief of Nishapur because Farhād Khan was still in Gīlān.

The Uzbeks made several assaults on the citadel, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Sappers then dug a mine beneath one of the towers and filled the mine with gunpowder. One evening, they exploded the mine and caused a breach in the walls, through which some three or four hundred Uzbeks poured. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his Rūmlūs, and Mīr Fattāḥ and his Eṣfahānī musketeers, lit torches and rushed to the breach, pouring a heavy fire on the Uzbeks that prevented others from entering. Those Uzbeks who had already rushed through the breach, finding themselves without support, scattered throughout the city, where they were picked off one by one by the Rūmlū ḡāzīs, the musketeers, and the townspeople. Fighting went on until midnight, and some ten or twenty members of the Uzbek nobility were taken prisoner and put to death. The defenders worked all night to repair the breach.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was disconcerted by this setback, and friend and foe alike applauded Darvīš Moḥammad Khan and his men on their valiant defense. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then had a proclamation made beneath the walls to the effect that if such-and-such an officer had not already been killed, the defenders should spare his life, since the lives of these officers might be a basis for negotiation. A number of Rūmlū ḡāzīs, one of them a kinsman of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, had been taken prisoner early in the siege and had been held in custody. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan had similarly spared any Uzbek prisoners who might be useful.

At this juncture, Šahverdī Khan 'Abbāsī suddenly descended on Oḡurlū Sultan Bayāt at Borūjerd and killed him. The Shah was forced to march to Lorestān to deal with this domestic enemy, and he dictated a message to be taken to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan by the hand of his brother, Šahqolī Kolafā. The Shah explained his preoccupations and told Darvīš Moḥammad Khan that he could not lead the royal army to Khorasan that year. He advised Darvīš Moḥammad Khan to negotiate with 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and try and find some way of bringing his men and their families safely back to Iraq. Nishapur would not run away, he said, and could easily be retaken when opportunity offered.

Šahqolī Kolafā refused to take this message. "We deem it our duty as loyal Sufis," he said, "to lay down our lives for our benefactor and our spiritual director (*moršed-e kāmēl*), and we do so with pride in the knowledge that we shall thereby gain renown. My brother will defend that castle as long as there is breath in his body, and, when he is no longer able to continue the defense and is killed, he will win glorious renown down the ages." The Shah replied gently, "Since this self-sacrifice will be for my sake, it is better to seek to please me even when I give an order like this. Herat, the seat of government of the province of Khorasan, and the holy city of Mašhad, the burial place of the eighth Imam, and many other places, are in Uzbek hands. What will be achieved by sacrificing so many men and their wives and families in the defense of Nishapur? God willing, the whole of Khorasan will one day again be ours; until that time, it is useless to kick against fate."

The Shah's message was eventually taken to Sabzavār by one of his attendants, and from there to Nishapur by an unknown hand. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan decided to fight on as long as his food supplies lasted. When they ran short, he opened negotiations with 'Abd al-Mo'men, who was glad to consider terms because his men had suffered during the long siege. He gave his word that Darvīš Moḥammad Khan would be allowed to march away to Iraq unmolested, with his possessions and the families of his men; there was to be a mutual exchange of prisoners. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan did not trust his word, because about two thousand Uzbeks had been slain in the course of the siege, and the Uzbeks wanted revenge. However, the terms were agreed to and cemented by solemn oaths.

Darvīš Moḥammad Khan marched out of Nishapur by the Iraq gate, and found 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan himself and all his men drawn up in battle array. When they saw this, the *qezelbaş* prepared to sell their lives dearly. The three hundred survivors of the Ešfahānī musketeers lit their fuses and stood ready. Opposite them stood the Uzbeks, most of whom had lost relatives in the siege, eager to break their oaths and attack. 'Abd al-Mo'men took counsel with his chiefs. His chiefs said: "The enemy number altogether some thousand men; they are desperate, and will fight to the end. In addition, they have a body of musketeers who are incomparable marksmen. We would lose two or three thousand men. A further consideration is that it is not wise for kings to incur ill-repute by breaking their sworn oath."¹

¹Eskandar Beg, quite rightly, attaches least weight to the argument about breaking a sworn oath. 'Abd al-Mo'men's father, 'Abdollah Khan, had massacred the *qezelbaş* garrison at Herat in 1589, after having guaranteed that their lives would be spared.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan thought their advice sound, and gave up any idea of treachery. He sent a herald to Darvīš Moḥammad Khan calling on him to come and salute him before he went on his way. The Rūmlūs and musketeers begged him not to go, but Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, afraid of being called a coward, rode toward the Uzbek Khan with a few of his men. The Uzbek Khan praised him and said, "May your master reward you, for your fidelity and gallantry are above reproach." 'Abd al-Mo'men coveted Darvīš Moḥammad Khan's horse and jeweled bridle, so he gave him in exchange one of his lead horses, a poor nag, and let him go. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan rode without stopping until nightfall, and reached Sabzavār. He reached Qazvin just as the Shah was returning from his expedition to Lorestān. As a reward for his services, he was made governor of Gilān and *amīr al-omarā* of that province.

After the departure of Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan sent a group of his emirs against Sabzavār and himself retired to Mašhad for the winter. Sabzavār was defended by Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan, the grandson of Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Alī Sultan Sabzavārī. After a while, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan grew tired of Khorasan and retired to Balḵ. He sent a courier to the emirs at Sabzavār telling them to redouble their efforts to take the city. But the Uzbek emirs, when they learned that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had retired to Balḵ, opened negotiations with Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan and sent the following message to the people of Sabzavār: "The king of the *qezel-bāš* has not come to Khorasan this year, and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who is a fearless and bloodthirsty chief, is sitting at Mašhad. If Sabzavār continues to resist, he may have to take charge of operations here in person. Your best course is to conciliate him." After some negotiation, it was agreed that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan would appoint an Uzbek governor to Sabzavār, who would reside there for six months as the guest of the Sabzavārīs and would not interfere in the internal administration of the city. If, at the end of that time, a *qezel-bāš* army appeared, the Uzbek governor would retire. If not, the temporary governor would be replaced by an Uzbek *dārūga* who would take charge of the administration. Nadr Bahādor, an Uzbek noble, was appointed governor and *dārūga* of Sabzavār, with Mūsa Mīrzā and a retinue of fifty men, and the Uzbek army at Sabzavār withdrew, overtaking 'Abd al-Mo'men near Jām. The Uzbek Khan is reported to have criticized the emirs for making this settlement and to have refused to ratify it.

Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan provided accommodation for the Uzbek detachment and every month sent them gifts; he also met Nadr Bahādor on several occasions. Because of these gifts, Nadr Bahādor's men did not molest the townspeople much. However, they wanted to make it clear who was master, and if anyone annoyed them, they threatened him and reminded him what would happen at the end of the six-month truce period. The Sabzavārīs, who were militant Shi'ites, used to curse the Sunni Uzbegs in the streets and in the bazaar. Some of the more ignorant Sabzavārīs went so far as to curse the first three caliphs. The Uzbegs would return their curses, and draw their swords and daggers and go for the townspeople. Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan complained several times to Nadr Bahādor about the behavior of his men and asked him not to allow them to wander in the streets. Nadr Bahādor expressed his apologies for the incidents, but laid the blame for them on the townspeople.

Relations between the two sides continued to deteriorate. On several occasions, the Uzbegs left the city and camped out at an inn some four *farsaks* away, between the city and Sang-e Kelīdar, and made this a sort of stronghold. Every time this happened, Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan and the Sabzavārīs, who thought it inadvisable to let them stay there, coaxed them into coming back into the city, and sometimes had to promise them considerable sums of money to persuade them to return. Every time they went back, they again began to bully and threaten the people, while their officers tried to conciliate them. Finally, the Sabzavārīs decided to get rid of them. They launched a sudden attack on the Uzbegs, overpowered Mūsa Mīrzā, and began to seize the other Uzbegs. Some tried to resist, but they were helpless against such a mob and allowed themselves to be taken prisoner.

Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan reported what had happened to the Shah, to whom he sent Mūsa Mīrzā and all the prisoners except Nadr Bahādor, whom he detained at Sabzavār. The Shah did not approve of this breach of faith. He declared that, if the Sabzavārīs and the Uzbegs could not live together, the Sabzavārīs should have apologized to the Uzbegs and let them return to their own territory. The Shah loaded Mūsa Mīrzā with favors and sent him on his way with a *qūrčī* as escort, with instructions to procure for the Uzbegs accommodation and fodder as they crossed Safavid territory. The *qūrčī* duly delivered his charges to the Uzbek governor of Mašhad, Kodāy Naẓar Bahādor, and obtained a receipt for them. This incident

merely increased 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan's hatred of the people of Sabzavār.

Meanwhile, 'Abdollah Khan had triumphed over Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan (it is not necessary in a history of Iran to give the details). Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan's men had not fought with much spirit—either for fear that their possessions would be plundered or because they were inferior in strength. At all events, most of them transferred their allegiance to 'Abdollah Khan. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan was forced to take refuge among the Šā'en-kāni Turkmans in the district of Astarābād, with his eldest son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan; his younger son, Sevīnj Moḥammad Sultan; his grandson Barandaq Sultan; his nephew Bābā Jān Sultan; and some fifty retainers. From there, he sought sanctuary with Shah 'Abbas, and reached Qazvin while the Shah was on campaign in Lorestān. The Shah was informed of his arrival and gave orders that he should be suitably entertained. On his return to Qazvin, the Shah went straight to visit Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan. He pledged himself to restore him and Nūr Moḥammad Khan to the thrones of Kārazm and Ūrganj, God willing.

The Shah's Expedition to Lorestān

The Lor tribes, which live in the districts of Korramābād, Kāva, Aleštar, Šadmara, and Hazameyn, have been Shi'ites since ancient times. The author of the *Nozhat al-Qolūb* has not given the names of the small towns and other localities of Lor-e Kūček in sufficient detail. As far as I have been able to determine, this province lies to the south of Iraq, and is bounded on one side by the province of Hamadan and on the other by that of Kūzestān. East-west, it stretches from the town of Borūjerd to the environs of Baghdad—a distance of some one hundred *farsaks*. The author of the *Tārīk-e Jahān-ārā* has stated that the tribes of Lor-e Kūček are a mixture of different tribes which settled in that area and paid their taxes to the seat of the caliphate, Baghdad. In the year 580/1184–85, because of this lack of uniformity among the tribes, they chose as their governor and emir Šojā' al-Dīn Kūršīd b. Abū Bakr b. Moḥammad b. Kūršīd, of the Jangravī tribe, who established a ruling dynasty among them. The descendants of Šojā' al-Dīn were known as 'Abbāsī, but the reason for this is not known. The Lors themselves say it is because they are descended from 'Abbās b. 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb, but it could be that they were called 'Abbāsī because their taxes were earmarked for Baghdad, the seat of the Abbāsid caliphate.

At the beginning of the reign of Shah Esma'il I, the reigning member of this dynasty, Shah Rostam, was confirmed by the Shah in his ancestral domains. He had a long beard, which the Shah decorated with pearls. After the time of Shah Esma'il I, some of the Shah Rostam's descendants were loyal to the Safavid house; others who were not ravaged the neighboring province of Hamadan. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, Shah Rostam's son, Emir Jahāngīr, made more than the usual amount of trouble, and the Shah sent a punitive expedition against him under 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājilū, the *amīr al-omarā* in charge of that frontier. Emir Jahāngīr was killed, and Lorestān ravaged. His sons, Shah Rostam and Moḥammadi, fled to Baghdad and eventually won their way back into the Shah's favor as the result of the intercession of an eminent *seyyed* of Lorestān, Emir Shah Qāsem, who had married the daughter of Emir Jahāngīr. They were restored to their hereditary province of Lorestān, which was divided between them.

Moḥammadi later rebelled, and Emir Khan Mowşellū was sent to deal with the revolt. Moḥammadi was captured and imprisoned at Alamūt; he was released toward the end of Shah Tahmasp's reign. The Shah intended to restore him as governor of Lorestān, but Moḥammadi, apprehensive about the Shah's intentions, took it upon himself to flee Lorestān without permission. His apologies for this action were accepted by Shah Tahmasp. After the Shah's death, when the Ottomans broke the peace and invaded Iran, he tried to protect the Lor tribes by keeping on good terms with the Ottomans.

About the time that Shah 'Abbas succeeded Sultan Moḥammad Shah, Moḥammadi's son Šāhverdi succeeded him as governor of Lorestān. When Jeḡal-oḡlū penetrated as far as Nehāvand and built a fort there, many of the Qarā Olūs tribes moved from Hamadan to Lorestān and sought sanctuary with Šāhverdi, who allotted them lands in Lorestān. Šāhverdi then became the vassal of the Ottoman governor of Baghdad. When peace returned it was difficult for Šāhverdi, who had become accustomed to independence, to think of submitting to anyone, and he continued to play the Ottomans and the Safavids against each other. As the occasion demanded, he would wear the *qezelbāš tāj*² or the large Ottoman turban.

In the year 1000/1591-92, however, which Shah 'Abbas devoted to suppressing various domestic revolts, Šāhverdi was forced to declare

²The distinctive scarlet headgear of the *qezelbāš*.

his allegiance to the Safavid crown. He sent his cousin, Hōseyn Beg Solvīzī, as a hostage to Shah 'Abbas, who pardoned him, promoted him to the rank of khan, and took his sister into the harem; all of which gave him greater power in Lorestān than any of his ancestors. He kept the members of the Qarā Olūs tribe in Lorestān and did not hand them over to the *qezelbāš* authorities. From time to time he sent an unimpressive gift to court, but the Shah, having regard for the patronage he had extended to him, overlooked the inadequacy of the gifts and did not send them back.

Šāhverdī, however, had grown up with the idea of being his own master and giving full rein to his ambition, and was habitually devious in his dealings with others, so eventually the Shah realized he was basically an evil man. Šāhverdī began to molest the governors of Hamadan and to make raids on Borūjerd and the surrounding area. The Shah continued to treat him leniently until this year (1002/1593-94), when 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, the son of 'Abdollāh Khan, invaded Khorasan and laid siege to Nishapur, and the Shah, freed from his preoccupations in Gīlān, made the decision to march to Khorasan. Oğūrlū Sultan Bayāt, who had been ordered to mobilize the Bayāt contingent for this expedition, had gone to Borūjerd for this purpose. Before he had a chance to mobilize any men, Šāhverdī Khan suddenly appeared with an army and made as if to give battle to him.

Oğūrlū Sultan, who had refrained from taking punitive measures against Šāhverdī Khan for the past two or three years because that seemed to be what the Shah wanted, was thrown into confusion. He was not strong enough to advance against Šāhverdī, and he was too proud to retreat. He gathered around him his small band of Bayāts, and it was agreed that one of the elders of the tribe should be sent to meet Šāhverdī to inquire what his purpose was and to dissuade him from making the dastardly attack on which he appeared to be set and which could only have serious consequences. But before this plan could be put into effect, Šāhverdī's advance guard came in sight, and Oğūrlū Sultan had no option but to fight. He did not fight with determination, however, and since the Lōrs attacked with great élan and greatly outnumbered his own men, they were victorious. Oğūrlū Sultan was slain, and his men scattered to their homes.

Although Šāhverdī Khan had been victorious, on reflection he was somewhat apprehensive of the outcome. He went to Kōrramābād and again sent his cousin, Hōseyn Beg, to court to plead his case, but this

time he had gone too far. An enraged Shah 'Abbas postponed his departure to Khorasan in order to deal personally with Šāhverdī. The result was that the Uzbeks advanced even beyond Nishapur, and Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, as we have seen, was ordered to negotiate a truce on whatever terms he could and retire to Iraq. As soon as Šāhverdī Khan heard that the Shah was on his way, he fled from Korramābād, which was his seat of government, toward Šadmara. Some of the emirs of Lorestān and the tribal cavalry deserted him and joined the Shah, who occupied Korramābād and made Maḥdīqolī Khan Šamlū governor of the city. The Shah pressed on to Šadmara, which is the winter quarters of the Lor tribes, arriving there in the intense heat of summer.

Šāhverdī Khan continued his flight, first to Kūr-kūh, on the border between Lorestān and Baghdad province, and then to Baghdad. At this point, Mīr Qeyšar Kāma Bidel, a leading Lor emir who commanded two thousand households, deserted him and joined the Shah. The Shah, leaving most of his men and his baggage at Šadmara, made a lightning dash to Kūr-kūh, some twenty *farsaks* away, with a small troop, hoping either to capture Šāhverdī Khan or drive him out of Lorestān for good. The Shah's troop covered the distance, through mountainous country, in twenty-four hours, but discovered that their prey had fled to Ottoman territory. Since to follow him there would constitute a violation of the peace treaty, the Shah returned.

The Shah detailed a number of *qūrčīs* and aides-de-camp to round up the Qarā Olūs tribes and send them back to Hamadan province. Sultan Ḥoseyn the son of Shah Rostam, who had fled in fear from Šāhverdī Khan and had been living among the Kalhor,³ now presented himself to the Shah. He was favorably received and was made governor of Lorestān with the exception of Korramābād and its dependencies, which had already been given to Maḥdīqolī Khan. The Shah graciously received the elders of the Lor tribes, enjoining them to serve Sultan Ḥoseyn. The chiefs brought some hundred thousand sheep as a gift to the Shah, and the officers of the *dīvān*, at his orders, distributed them among the troops. The Shah then departed, intending to march to Khorasan via Dargozīn, without returning to Qazvin. When he reached Borūjerd, however, he received the news that Nishapur had fallen, that Darvīš Moḥammad Khan was on his way back to Iraq, and that Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Kārazm, had arrived at Qazvin as a fugitive. The Shah therefore changed his plans and

³A Kurdish tribe (see *TM*, p. 34).

returned to the capital, stopping en route in Bayāt territory to impose fines on that tribe for its poor showing in the clash with Šahverdi Khan. Šahqoli Sultan, Ogürlü Sultan's brother, who had succeeded him as head of the tribe, sought the Shah's forgiveness and received the royal pardon. In gratitude, the Bayāt tribe sent as gifts to the *dīvān-e a'lā* about three thousand stallion colts and Bayātī mares, highly prized among the *qezelbaş*, and in addition paid three thousand *tomān* in gold as a fine.

The Shah entered Qazvin on 10 Moḥarram 1002/6 October 1593, and as already reported, went straight to the house where Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan was lodged to make gracious inquiries about his affairs. Nūr Moḥammad Khan, who had accompanied the Shah on his expedition to Lorestān, presented himself before Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan, and having obtained permission, prostrated himself before him according to the manners and customs of the Genghizid sultans. In return, Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan embraced him.

The Shah remained for some time at Qazvin, entertaining the Uzbek sultans at royal assemblies and talking informally to them. Whenever he summoned Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan to one of these assemblies, the Shah asked Sultan Moḥammad Kodābanda to be present too; the ex-shah and the sultan were seated on the same throne, so that they could converse with each other. The Shah informally and good-naturedly served them himself, and it was a rare sight to see two monarchs sitting amicably on the same throne.

Having seen to all their needs, the Shah left for Isfahan in the autumn of 1593. Nūr Moḥammad Khan, who was his constant companion at private gatherings and banquets, went with him. To prevent Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan from being jealous, the Shah took with him Ḥājjī Moḥammad Khan's son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan. However, since the latter was a descendant of the Prophet, the informal behavior which was innate in the Shah was foreign to him, and so he was not often invited to the Shah's private parties. The Shah spent the winter (1593-94) at Isfahan and returned to Qazvin in March 1594.

The Suppression of a Group of Heretics by the Authority of the Religious Law

One of the events that took place this year was the execution of Darvīš Kosrow Qazvinī and a number of his disciples. Darvīš Kos-

row was a member of the lower classes from the Darb-e Kūšk ward of Qazvin, and came from a line of well-diggers and refuse collectors. Abandoning his ancestral calling, he donned the robes of a wandering dervish and traveled around for a while in this guise. He spent some time in the company of a group of Noqtavīs⁴ and became so well informed about their doctrines that he acquired the reputation of one who furthered their cause. He then came to Qazvin and took up residence in one of the mosques. A number of dervishes gathered around him, and he began actively to expound to them the mysteries of gnosis. The 'olamā and the *mohtasebs*⁵ placed a ban on his activities and forbade him to sit in the mosque.

Eventually, all this came to the ears of the then Shah, Shah Tahmasp, who instituted an inquiry. Darvīš Kosrow made public avowal, in the presence of the Shah, of the tenets of Islam and the basic doctrines of the Imami rite. He denied what was alleged against him, and since it could not be proved that he had done anything contrary to the religious law, the Shah observed the letter of the law and took no action against him, although he did order him not to take up his station at the mosque and not to allow members of the ignorant masses to come to him.

After this incident, Darvīš Kosrow began to frequent the 'olamā in order to allay their suspicions, to study jurisprudence, and to attend the congregational prayers at the mosque on Fridays. He kept himself strictly aloof from everyone else. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, however, he resumed his former practice; he once again took up his station in the mosque adjoining his house, and displayed his mystical wares.⁶ A number of luckless people and idlers, both Turks and Persians, began to frequent him, and he continued in this manner until the accession of Shah 'Abbas, deriving an easy livelihood from the dervishes to whom he ministered. Soon the mosque became too small to house the throng that followed him, and he began to build a hospice nearby. The people of the ward, both Turks and Persians, aided him in the construction and laid out a pleasant garden around the hospice. Every day, all kinds of dishes were prepared in its kitchens.

Shah 'Abbas, who spent a great deal of his time touring the side

⁴See Browne, IV, p. 8.

⁵The *mohtaseb* had a variety of functions. Among other things, he was the guardian of public morals (see article *HISBA* in *ET*).

⁶Lit.: spread the tablecloth of committing oneself to God (*tavakkol*); *tavakkol* is an advanced mystical station.

streets and city wards and making the acquaintance of all sorts and conditions of men, went to have a look at Darvīš Kosrow, and engaged in conversation with him. Gradually, the Shah took to frequenting his hospice. In order to understand his beliefs and to get to know how he behaved, he adopted the manner of speech used by travelers on the mystical way, and unfolded his own personal knowledge of God to him after the fashion of dervishes. Darvīš Kosrow, being an extremely cautious man, did not show his hand; he uttered no words that contravened the religious law. But some of the dervishes who frequented the hospice, especially Ostād Yūsuf the quiver maker and Darvīš Kūček Qalandar, uttered extravagant claims and, with a complete lack of caution, revealed Darvīš Kosrow's corrupt beliefs to the Shah. The Shah became convinced of the heresy of the group and determined, as the upholder of the religious law, to deal with them. On departing for Lorestān he gave orders for the arrest of Darvīš Kosrow and his followers, and entrusted a group of Tājī-büyük tribesmen with this task. All the suspects were placed in chains.

Astrologers had declared that the stars predicted the death this year of an eminent personage, probably in Iran, and the signs further indicated that this personage would be a royal one. In addition, their examination of the Shah's horoscope had revealed the quadrature of the two inauspicious planets (Mars and Saturn) in the ascendant, whereas the Shah's predominant star was at its nadir. Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Yazdī, who was the outstanding astrologer of his age, suggested to the Shah the following plan: during the three days when the influence of the conjunction and quadrature of the two inauspicious planets was at its height, the Shah should divest himself of his kingly status and raise to the throne some criminal under sentence of death. During those three days both military and civilians would give their allegiance to that man, so that the essential business of kingship might be discharged by him. At the end of the three days, the temporary monarch should be executed.

This plan was approved, and the lot fell on Ostād Yūsuf the quiver maker, whose heresy was more heinous than that of his fellows. Ostād Yūsuf was given the title of king, the crown was placed on his head, and he was clothed in gorgeous robes. On the day of his installation, he was seated on a Barda'ī mule, with saddle and bridle studded with jewels, and the royal regalia were placed on his head. All the emirs, *moqarrabs*, and other officers of the court attended

him with their troops and escorted him to his residence, where they brought him food and drink in abundance. At night, *qūrčīs* mounted guard over him. The poor wretch realized what his fate was to be and decided to make the most of the three days: "Kingship, however ephemeral, is an enjoyable experience."

Shah 'Abbas spent these three days in the company of a handful of grooms and servants, and kept completely aloof from state affairs. Ostād Yūsufi, when he was out riding, caught sight of Mowlānā Jalāl the astrologer and called out to him, "Why have you decided to kill me?" One of the wags at court said jokingly to Mowlānā Jalāl, "One of the functions of a king is to issue orders, and so far this artificial king has issued no orders. Now that he knows you are out to kill him, if he decides to forestall you by issuing an order for your execution, the order must inevitably be carried out. You had better be careful for the next three days!" Mowlānā Jalāl, who was a simple fellow, was filled with panic, and spent the rest of the three-day period in a state of terror.

At the end of the three days, Ostād Yūsufi was put to death, and by this stratagem the Shah avoided calamity. Men of insight, however, realized that calamity was averted only because it was God's will.

Darvīš Kūček Qalandar, who was always making grandiose boasts, buried his head in his dervish robe and said to his guard, "I am going, but only to reappear in another age." He went, anyway! After the Shah's return from Lorestān, he summoned Darvīš Kosrow, convened the *'olamā*, and instituted an inquiry. Wine vats found in his hospice were produced as evidence that his beliefs were latitudinarian to the point that he did not observe the religious law. It became clear to the Shah that he was a Noḡṭavī, and he ordered his execution in order to uphold the religious law. Darvīš was tied by his throat to the saddle of a camel and dragged around the city. Mowlānā Ṭabīb Sāvajī, also rumored to belong to this heretical group, and indeed to be one of the most learned members of it, was handed over to the *'olamā* for sentence. In order to strike fear into the ignorant and misguided he was placed in jail, but shortly afterward the Shah decided to put him to death too.

Another important member of the Noḡṭavī sect was Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad Kāšī, who led many ignorant people astray. He was executed

by the Shah with his own hands in the Naṣrābād district of Kashan, where he was cut in two by the Shah's sword. Among his books was a treatise he had written on the Noḡṭavī science, and it became clear from this that the members of the sect, like the philosophers, believed that the world is pre-eternal, and that they did not believe in the resurrection and the day of judgment. They believed that one received the reward or punishment for one's actions in this world, and that this was the meaning of heaven and hell. God preserve us from such false beliefs!

Darvīš Kamāl Eqlīdī and Darvīš Beryānī, who were both leaders of a branch of this sect, together with several of their disciples, were put to death as they traveled to Khorasan. In the Eṣṭāḥbānāt district of Fārs, a few members of this sect were sent to join their fellows; no one suspected of this heresy was spared. Even some of the *qezelbāš* were members of this sect. Būdāq Beg Dīn-oḡlū Ostājīlū, who was a disciple of Darvīš Ḳosrow, was put to death. It became clear that the heresy was widespread throughout the Safavid empire.

Travelers to India reported that it existed there too, and that Shaikh Abu'l-Faẓl, the son of Shaikh Mobārak, a learned man in the service of the Mogul emperor Jalal al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar and esteemed by him, was a member of it. He had converted the Emperor to his latitudinarian ideas and seduced him from the path of the religious law. A document which had been signed by Shaikh Abu'l-Faẓl and sent to Mīr Seyyed Aḥmad Kāšī, and had been found among his papers, corroborated this. Knowledge belongs to God, and He knoweth the inner truth of things! Šarīf Āmolī, who was one of the leading intellectuals of the Noḡṭavī sect, fled to India to escape retribution at the hands of the judges. He was honored by the Mogul emperor, emirs, and nobles, who treated him as their spiritual adviser. As a result of this purge, all the followers of this sect in Iran either left the country or concealed themselves in some remote corner, and the heresy of transmigration of souls was eradicated from Iran.

Miscellaneous Events in Khorasan

This year there occurred a battle between Soleyman Kalīfa and the *qezelbāš* emirs, and Yatīm Sultan and the Uzbek army, in the Ozḡand district of Toršīz in Khorasan. As is well known, the *qezelbāš* tribes are the servants of the Safavid house, and if they fall from the

favor of their benefactor and incur the wrath of their supreme spiritual director, they are expected to regard this loss of favor as due to their own shortcomings and to consider it as purifying their souls. They are expected to endure patiently a thousand physical and spiritual hurts and to remain loyal to their supreme spiritual director until they have cleansed the stain of their sins with the sweat of remorse and humility and rendered themselves worthy of again being received into favor. But Soleyman Kālifa, the son of Sohrāb Kālifa Torkmān, and Sultan 'Alī Kālifa, the nephew of Fūlād Kālifa Šamlū, *kālifas*⁷ and descendants of *kālifas* who had to their credit years of service under Shah Tahmasp, rebelled and became traitors. They did this because they were kept waiting for a few days as a punishment for certain misdemeanors and did not obtain the rank they expected.

They planned to bring to Khorasan Rostam Mīrzā b. Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā b. Bahrām Mīrzā, and Soleyman Kālifa went to Kandahar with a few men for this purpose. They hoped by installing Rostam Mīrzā in Khorasan to satisfy their own ambitions. Since they were misguided they did not succeed in their object, but met their ends in battle against the Uzbegs. I said earlier that the later history of the sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and of events in Sīstān, would require a separate section, so I will deal with this now.

The Rule of the Sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā in Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar from the Time of Their Father's Death, an Account of Their Going to India, of Their Subsequent History, and of Events in Sīstān

Readers will recall that Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was appointed by Shah Tahmasp governor of Kandahar, Zamīn Dāvar, and the districts of Garmsīrāt along the banks of the Hīrmand, that he governed those provinces successfully, that he died during the reign of Shah Esma'il II, and that he left five sons: first, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who came to court with his sister while Shah Tahmasp was still alive, and was murdered by Shah Esma'il II along with the other Safavid princes; second, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā; third, Rostam Mīrzā; fourth, Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā; fifth, Sanjar Mīrzā.

At the time of Shah Esma'il II's death, it was well known that the Shah had given orders for the murder of the surviving Safavid princes.

⁷See Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Šafawids," *JOAS*, 85/4, October-December, 1965, pp. 497-502.

One of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's retainers, a certain Qarā'ī of the Gūrkānī tribe, rode like the wind to Kandahar with the news of the Shah's death, and saved the lives of the princes there. When Sultan Moḥammad Shah came to the throne, he entrusted Kandahar to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the eldest surviving son of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and gave Garmsīrāt and Zamīn Dāvar to Rostam Mīrzā; he further ordained that Sultan Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā and Sanjar Mīrzā, who were brothers of Rostam Mīrzā, should reside in Zamīn Dāvar with the latter. Ḥamza Beg Zu'l-Qadar, known as Kūr Ḥamza, who had been the *vakīl* of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and had accompanied Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to court, was again made the *vakīl* and guardian of the princes. Ḥamza Beg sent Rostam Mīrzā and his brothers to Zamīn Dāvar and, acting on his own authority, appointed *vakīls* and guardians for them. He left Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā at Kandahar and himself took up the reins of government in both provinces to such effect that the princes were governors only in name. However, none of them thought of trying to increase his power, and they were obedient to the Shah's orders.

In the neighboring province of Sīstān, however, Malek Maḥmūd, who was descended from the ancient rulers of Sīstān and traced his lineage back to the Saffarid dynasty, took advantage of the absence of *qezelbāš* in Sīstān after the death of Shah Esma'īl II to declare his independence. He defeated Ja'far Sultan Afšār, who was governor of Sīstān on behalf of the Shah, and imposed his rule on the province. No voice of opposition was heard. Since it was the policy of Sultan Moḥammad Shah to resurrect former ruling houses, and for various other considerations of state, Malek Maḥmūd was confirmed as governor of Sīstān through the good offices of Moḥammad Khan Torkmān.

When the news of Malek Maḥmūd's appointment reached Kandahar—actually before the letter of appointment had been issued by the court—Ḥamza Beg and the princes invaded Sīstān. The princes were indignant at seeing Sīstān, the former seat of government of their uncle Badī' al-Zamān Mīrzā, in the hands of rulers who had never served the Safavid cause. When the army from Kandahar reached the old city of Sīstān and camped two *farsaks* from the island of Pošt-e Zarah, the stronghold and seat of justice and government of Malek Maḥmūd and the princes and emirs of Sīstān, they saw the natural strength of the site and the size of the Sīstān forces. Ḥamza Beg opened negotiations; from the other side, Ġiāš al-Dīn

Moḥammad, Malek Maḥmūd's uncle, hastened to visit the Safavid princes. After much discussion, it was agreed that Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā should marry a princess of the house of Malek Maḥmūd, and that Malek Jalāl al-Dīn, the son of Malek Maḥmūd, should marry Ḥamza Beg's daughter. Sīstān would be left in the hands of Malek Maḥmūd, who pledged the maintenance of friendly relations with the Safavid princes.

This settlement aroused the resentment of Rostam Mīrzā, whose governorship was inferior to that of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and was not adequate to provide a livelihood for himself and his brothers. He thought Sīstān should have been annexed and added to his territories.

At this juncture, a group of *qezelbāš* and Kurdish tribesmen began to poison Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's mind against Ḥamza Beg; the prince, already jealous of Ḥamza Beg's power and his own impotence in matters of government, listened to their words and gave them permission to kill Ḥamza Beg. Ḥamza Beg got wind of their intention, went to Zamīn Dāvar, collected Rostam Mīrzā, and marched on Kandahar. The two brothers fought a battle on the banks of the river Oẓgand. During the battle, some of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn's men who sided with Ḥamza Beg deserted after the first determined charge by Rostam Mīrzā's men, and this led to the defeat of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn, although his force still far outnumbered that of Rostam Mīrzā. Moẓaffar retreated within the walls of Kandahar, and Rostam Mīrzā and Ḥamza Beg camped outside, at Darvāza-ye Māšūr.

A group of elders from the tribes tried to heal the breach, and a settlement was reached. Rostam Mīrzā, willing or not, was obliged to return to Zamīn Dāvar. Ḥamza Beg resumed his former post as *vakīl* to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and continued to hold this position with full authority for three years. Then, once more, a group of ignorant *qezelbāš* and troublemakers in Kandahar went secretly to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and once more planned to assassinate Ḥamza Beg. Ḥamza Beg, also in secret, sent a courier to summon Rostam Mīrzā, who entered the city one morning unheralded. All the emirs and people of Kandahar went with Ḥamza Beg to greet Rostam Mīrzā and offered him the governorship of Kandahar, which he accepted. Moḥammad Beg Bayāt, Ḥamza Beg's son-in-law, was appointed guardian of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and the latter was sent to the immensely strong fortress of Qalāt, in the Hezārājāt district of Kan-

dahar, and placed in the custody of five hundred Bayāt soldiers.

Within six months, however, the prince and Moḥammad Beg were in league with each other, and the Bayāt troops pledged their support to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. It was decided that two hundred men should be left to garrison the fortress of Qalāt, and the remaining three hundred should march across the desert to Sīstān with the prince. Malek Maḥmūd received the prince graciously and lavished hospitality on him. Malek Maḥmūd's daughter, who had been promised in marriage to the prince, was handed over to him, and the prince spent six months with Malek Maḥmūd on terms of the closest friendship. But Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was a fickle man, easily swayed, and a group of Sīstānī emirs, habitual troublemakers, succeeded in turning him against Malek Maḥmūd. The prince rode out, as if on a hunting expedition, to the island of Pošt-e Zarah, to the fort of Trāḡūn,⁸ which was the residence of the great emirs of Sīstān and of those who were envious of Malek Maḥmūd. Within a week, all the emirs and *naqībs* of Zarah and Ramrūd⁹ and the chiefs of the Sīstānī tribes had gathered around him, and the prince set out, with his personal retainers and a number of *qezelbāš* who had joined him from Farāh, with the intention of destroying the house of the *maleks* of Sīstān. First, he marched against Malek Maḥmūd's uncle, Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, who with his sons held the fort of Jārūnak, and laid siege to the fort for a month.

Meanwhile Malek Maḥmūd, who had found himself bereft of men when the prince marched, at a place called Dāsalak on the banks of the Hīrmand, managed to levy an army by means of gifts of money, weapons, horses, and equipment, and marched to Jārūnak to the aid of his relatives. He sent on ahead his son Malek Jalāl al-Dīn, and his cousins Malek Maḥmūdī and Malek Shah Ḥoseyn, and himself arrived before the walls of the fort on 10 Šafar 990/6 March 1582. After fighting had gone on all day, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and his men broke off the engagement at nightfall and retired toward the forests and the island.

A week later, Malek Maḥmūd sent a group of *seyyeds* and other men of integrity and good will to the prince, asking that bygones be

⁸The text has Tāgrūn. I think it must be the town referred to as Trākūn by G. P. Tate, *The Frontiers of Baluchistan*, London 1909, pp. 96-99. "Trākūn [Trāḡūn] was situated on the Rud-e Biābān, east of the Hāmūn and north of the Gowd-e Zereh."

⁹P. Sykes, *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia*, London 1902, p. 372, refers to the "immense ruins of Ramrud."

bygones, that they terminate their conflict, and that they meet without fear in a spirit of friendship. The prince agreed to this, and a few days later both princes took part in renewed festivities. Malek Maḥmūd sent a reliable man to Ḥamza Beg and advised him to desist from any course of action calculated to annoy Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. Meanwhile, envoys had also arrived from Ḥamza Beg, and a new covenant was arrived at between Ḥamza Beg and the prince. A group of *qezelbaş* emirs arrived in Sīstān from Kandahar to request the prince to return to Kandahar, and Malek Maḥmūd sent him off with a force of three thousand men, composed of Sīstānī troops and relatives of his. Rostam Mīrzā was unable to take any course of action other than that ordained by Ḥamza Beg, and so, faced with the return of his elder brother and with the policy decision by the senior emirs, he had no alternative but to retire once more to Kandahar.

Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā entered Kandahar and dismissed his Sīstānī troops. Six months later, still irked by the power of Ḥamza Beg and his own dependence on him, he incited Moḥammad Beg Bayāt to murder him, and gave him the office of *vakīl* as a reward. The death of Ḥamza Beg emboldened Rostam Mīrzā to attack Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, and he appeared before Kandahar with an army. Although his forces far outnumbered his opponent's, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn declined to give battle and prepared to resist a siege. Rostam Mīrzā camped at Darvāza-ye Māšūr, and daily skirmishing between the two sides went on for two months. Malek Maḥmūd sent assistance to Kandahar in the form of three thousand men led by his cousin, Malek Ğarīb. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā then sallied forth, joined forces with the Sīstānīs, and gave battle. Rostam Mīrzā's horse was killed under him, and the prince fought on on foot until evening, when, realizing that the combined forces of the enemy were too strong for him, he retreated to Zamīn Dāvar.

At Kandahar, the *vakīl* Moḥammad Beg soon acquired even greater power than his predecessor in office, Ḥamza Beg. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was vexed by his dominance, but was not strong enough to do away with him as he had with Ḥamza Beg. He therefore left Kandahar with a few personal retainers and went again to Sīstān, where he was again given a royal welcome by Malek Maḥmūd, who begrudged him neither money nor land. Moḥammad Beg was left in full control of the government of Kandahar. In the end, mischief-makers in Sīstān once more incited Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to turn against the Sīstānī *maleks* and to commence hostilities.

The prince had changed sides so many times that he was no longer in control of the situation. Once again, he turned to the people of Pošt-e Zarah for support, and marched against the same fort he had invested before (Jārūnak). Malek Maḥmūd sent against him his son Jalāl al-Dīn, and a battle was fought near the village of Deh 'Alī. To begin with, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was victorious, and Jalāl al-Dīn's men fell back and took cover in the houses of the village. About midday, Malek Maḥmūd arrived with a large force, and his cousin, Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, sent a thousand men from inside the fort to assist him. The Safavid prince and his Sīstānī supporters were surrounded; in heavy fighting that ensued, Malek Maḥmūd lost about three hundred men killed, and his opponents some thousand men.

In the end, the Sīstānī emirs lost their stomach for the fight and deserted Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and retreated into the forests. Malek Maḥmūd sent a courier to Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā with the following message: "The mischief-makers who stirred up strife between us have fled. You are the master of both armies, and I am that same loyal friend I always was. It will be better if you terminate the struggle and return to your friends." The Safavid prince was ashamed of his behavior, and went over to Malek Maḥmūd with a few of his personal retainers. He spent that night in Malek Maḥmūd's house and visited his own bride. He spent two months in Sīstān. At the end of that time, Moḥammad Beg Bayāt sent all the *qezelbāš* chiefs and nobles of Kandahar who genuinely supported Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's cause to Sīstān to crave pardon and beg the prince to return. The prince agreed, and made his preparations to return to Kandahar with his bride. Malek Maḥmūd distributed largesse, both in cash and in kind, with such generosity that Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was embarrassed. Not only that, but Malek Maḥmūd escorted him to Kandahar with all his troops.

Moḥammad Beg Bayāt, with his sword suspended from his neck, rode out from Kandahar to Garmsīr to greet the prince, and Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā was reinstalled in the seat of government which his father had had before him. Moḥammad Beg Bayāt did his best to please the prince, and the latter spent his time agreeably in sensual pleasures, hunting, and the society of congenial companions, but he still had no part in the business of governing. The problem of how to get rid of Moḥammad Beg was consequently always on his mind. Finally, he suborned some of the *qezelbāš* nobles to assassinate him; in this way the prince achieved freedom of action in administrative and financial affairs.

In Zamīn Dāvar, Rostam Mīrzā, frustrated in his hopes regarding Kandahar and angered by the friendly relations between Moẓaffar Hoseyn Mīrzā and the ruler of Sīstān, bided his time. About the time of the accession of Shah 'Abbas, the Uzbegs, as already related, overran most of Khorasan, and the people of Farāh, which is not far from Herat, were hard pressed by repeated Uzbek raids. The Afšār troops stationed at Farāh were not strong enough to maintain their control of the area and repulse the Uzbegs, and their chief, Yakān Khan, in order to protect the lives and property of his men, with the approval of his officers invited Rostam Mīrzā to come to Farāh. Rostam Mīrzā, who was informed of 'Abbas Mīrzā's departure to Iraq, and of the divisions among the *qezelbāš*, accepted the invitation with alacrity. Yakān Khan, who was a simple-minded Turk, was overjoyed to see him and tendered the allegiance of the Afšār tribe to him.

The day after his arrival, however, Rostam Mīrzā, in his greed for money, arrested Yakān Khan, and two days later he put him to death. He followed this up by imposing fines on all the Afšār nobles and expropriating their possessions. The Afšārs were filled with horror and indignation by his behavior but, confronted by the Uzbegs, they had no alternative but to support him. Indeed, shortly after this, an Uzbek force made for Farāh, and Rostam Mīrzā fought a number of engagements against them. In one of them, his force of three hundred *qezelbāš* routed a thousand crack Uzbek troops from Samarkand, and reliable informants have told me that the *qezelbāš* performed such prodigies of valor in this action that eight hundred Uzbegs were slain.

After Rostam Mīrzā had been at Farāh for a while, some of the *qezelbāš* officers who had incurred the wrath of Shah 'Abbas, the most important of whom were Soleymān Kalīfa Torkmān and Eslām Beg Šāmlū, together with a number of other ignorant fellows from Khorasan, came to Farāh and dazzled Rostam Mīrzā's eyes with the prospect of the governorship of Khorasan. Malek Maḥmūd, who was well aware of Rostam Mīrzā's hostility toward himself, viewed these developments with anxiety; he moved from his house to the courthouse known as The Vacillating and began to levy the troops of Nīmruz. About ten thousand men rallied round him. They remained in a state of mobilization for seven months, until the unhealthiness of the climate caused an outbreak of plague and they disbanded.

Rostam Mīrzā had always wanted to govern Sīstān, and he now

sent there as his agent Malek 'Abdollah Farāhī, who was connected to the *maleks* of Sīstān and was very close to the prince. He was to try and wean some of Malek Maḥmūd's relatives away from their allegiance and persuade them to support Rostam Mīrzā. His first success was with Malek Ṣarīf, the son of Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, Malek Maḥmūd's cousin, who was both a stupid and an ambitious man. Malek Ṣarīf plotted treachery against Malek Maḥmūd. When plague broke out among Malek Maḥmūd's men, Malek Ṣarīf invited him to his seat at Jārūnak for a change of air. Malek Maḥmūd accepted, but his son Malek Jalāl al-Dīn distrusted Malek Ṣarīf and refused to accompany his father. He went instead to the fortress of Fath.

Malek Maḥmūd, with his nephew Malek 'Alī and with Malek Maḥmūdī and Malek Shah Ḥoseyn, went to Jārūnak. At the beginning of spring, the visitors were happily walking in the gardens at Jārūnak when Rostam Mīrzā, who had been informed by Malek Ṣarīf and other trusted retainers of Malek Maḥmūd, suddenly made his appearance only a few miles from the fort, having come by forced marches from Farāh with a band of Afšārs and others. Malek Ṣarīf was frightened by the arrival of Rostam Mīrzā and his men; regretting his treachery, he turned his mind to the defense of the fortress. Malek Maḥmūd, who had failed to follow the good advice of his son and other kinsfolk, awoke to the dangers of the situation.

Rostam Mīrzā invested the fort, and Malek Ṣarīf, contrary to his agreement with the prince, defended it for sixteen days. Rostam Mīrzā sent Soleymān Kalīfa Torkmān as his envoy to the fort, and he and Malek 'Abdollah Farāhī again outwitted Malek Ṣarīf. The next day Malek Ṣarīf and his brothers left the fort without telling Malek Maḥmūd and went to see Rostam Mīrzā. When he heard what had happened, Malek Maḥmūd left his men in charge of the defenses. With the greatest reluctance, he went with Malek Shah Ḥoseyn to visit Rostam Mīrzā. Outwardly, Rostam Mīrzā received Malek Maḥmūd with deference and respect; in order to allay his fears, he treated coldly Malek Ṣarīf and his brothers. The same day, Rostam Mīrzā entered the fort, and Malek Maḥmūd extended suitable hospitality to him.

However, a number of ignorant and arrogant *qezelbaş* who were the close companions of Rostam Mīrzā agreed in the course of their drinking bouts with the prince to get rid of Malek Maḥmūd and

several others of the royal house of Sīstān; these men, they said, had tasted the delights of governing and had been wrongly brought up to aspire to independence. Even though they professed friendship, they could not be trusted; once they were out of the way, Rostam Mīrzā could annex the province. On the second day, therefore, Malek Maḥmūd, Malek Nāṣer al-Dīn, Malek Ẓarīf, and a number of other *maleks* and their sons were arrested. A few days later, all were put to death with the exception of Malek Maḥmūd and one or two of his kinsmen, who remained in custody. Rostam Mīrzā then sent a detachment of troops against Malek Jalāl al-Dīn at the fortress of Faṭḥ.

One night, Malek Shah Ḥoseyn and his brother Malek 'Alī broke their chains and escaped from prison, and by good fortune made contact with a group of Sīstānīs who had come to try and rescue them. They made for the Sīstān islands, and took refuge among the Zarahī clan. Rostam Mīrzā had thus frightened off the wild Sīstānīs, who have to be tamed by offering them kindness and generosity. Some ten thousand men gathered around Malek Shah Ḥoseyn, and he sent a thousand men to Faṭḥ to the assistance of Malek Jalāl al-Dīn. Rostam Mīrzā's men were defeated and fled. On receiving this news, Rostam Mīrzā put that fine man Malek Maḥmūd to death. The next day, Malek Jalāl al-Dīn and the other Sīstānī *maleks* arrived with the army from Zarah. They drove Rostam Mīrzā across the Hīrmand in the direction of Sarāyān, where he was again defeated and pushed back to Zamīn Dāvar. His troops straggled back across the Hīrmand and rejoined him near Pošta-zāda. Malek Jalāl al-Dīn and the other *maleks* took up the reins of government in Sīstān without opposition from their kinsmen who shared the government of that province with them.

Rostam Mīrzā's failure in Sīstān lost him the support of those *qezelbāš* from Khorasan who had urged him to make a bid for the governorship of that province. They found him lacking in the wisdom, magnanimity, and ambition necessary in a ruler. Rostam Mīrzā, cut down to size, lost all prestige. In Zamīn Dāvar, he was subjected to repeated attacks by the Uzbegs, and no help reached him from Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. He withdrew to Qalāt and Hezārajāt, and stayed six months at Qalāt.

While he was absent from the fort on a hunting expedition, the Bayāt *gāzīs* who formed the garrison wanted to seize control of the fort on behalf of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, but they were foiled by

Rostam Mīrzā's mother, who closed the gates of the citadel and set the eunuchs and workers of the royal workshops to mount guard there. At this juncture, one of the Bayāt soldiers fired his musket at Rostam Mīrzā's mother and killed her. Rostam Mīrzā returned from his hunting expedition and managed to slip into the citadel. The Bayāts abandoned their attempt to seize the citadel and expressed their contrition at the death of the prince's mother, but Rostam Mīrzā executed most of them in revenge for her death and because they had rebelled against him.

Rostam Mīrzā then took stock of his situation, and did not like what he saw. His supporters had dispersed; the Uzbegs were in the ascendant in the area; and he was frightened of his brother. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā. He decided to go to India, and went first to the province of Bhakkar, where he found the governor, Mīrzā Jānī Beg Argūn, in revolt against the emperor and threatened by a punitive expedition sent against him by the latter. Rostam Mīrzā urged the governor to return to his allegiance, and together they set off toward the capital. There, Rostam Mīrzā was received in audience by the Emperor, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, who allotted to him initially as a fief the district of Moltān, and subsequently appointed him to a variety of governorships within the Mogul empire.

That wise and astute monarch, in order to win over Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and get his hands on Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, loaded Rostam Mīrzā with such honors that eventually Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā thought it would be a good idea if he went to India too. The Uzbegs were in full control of Khorasan, where Dīn Moḥammad Sultan and Bāqī Sultan, the sons of Jānī Beg Sultan the nephew of 'Abdollāh Khan the ruler of Turkestan, had orders to subjugate that province. On numerous occasions Uzbek raiders made incursions into the regions of Kandahar and Sīstān, and Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn fought many engagements against them. In most of these engagements the *qezelbāš* were victorious, but nevertheless the borders of his realm were exposed to the constant attacks of these raiders, and many of the *qezelbāš* chiefs and seasoned troops formerly in the employ of his father, Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, had been killed in battle.

Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā therefore thought he had little choice but to follow his brother to India. It was true that, after Rostam Mīrzā had left, 'Abdollāh Khan, the ruler of Turkestan, had sent an ambassador with gifts and a conciliatory letter to the effect that, although

hostilities between the Uzbeks and the *qezelbaş*, between the people of Tūrān and the people of Iran, were traditional, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn had no need to fear him, for he felt nothing but love and friendship toward him. He should give up his plan to go to India, for it was not proper for him to abandon his father's seat of government to the house of Čaġatāy.¹⁰ In view of the constantly hostile relations between the Uzbeks and himself, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā distrusted 'Abdollaḥ Khan's words, and he was filled with alarm. The avarice of the Turkish mercantile elements in Kandahar, who could think of nothing but profits from Indian cloth and the accumulation of gold, finally disillusioned Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and destroyed his interest in governing the province of Kandahar.

At this point, Qarā Beg Kūrčā'ī, an old retainer of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, who had fled to India before the time of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā and had been made an emir and master of the royal falcons,¹¹ arrived at Kandahar. Qarā Beg had made a commitment to his master, the Mogul emperor, to bring Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā to the Mogul court and to secure the annexation to the Mogul empire of the province of Kandahar. He dangled before Moẓaffar the emperor's promises and, in the guise of a well-wisher and loyal servant of the family, enlisted the support of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā's mother and others who had influence with the prince. His wily stratagems increased the force of the arguments already presented, and the prince resolved to go to India. First, he sent his mother and eldest son; subsequently, after the exchange of further letters and covenants, he set out for India.

Emperor Akbar appointed as governor of Kandahar Šāhī Beg Khan Kābolī, the governor of Bangeš, a leading emir who held the rank of commander of five thousand, who at that moment was at Moltān. As soon as he heard that Qarā Beg had successfully discharged his mission at Kandahar, he went there by forced marches with ten thousand men and lavished even more compliments on Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā on behalf of the emperor, and made him splendid promises. The Safavid prince evacuated the fort, and Šāhī Beg Khan entered Kandahar in the year 1000/1591-92.

After Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā had pitched his tent outside the city,

¹⁰By "the house of Čaġatay" is meant the Moguls; 'Abdollaḥ Khan was descended from the house of Jočī.

¹¹*Qūshāna* in Safavid parlance was the royal falconry. The office of *qūshbegīgarī* is therefore equivalent to master of the royal falcons.

he reviewed his *qezelbāš* troops. Although in the twelve years or so which had elapsed since the death of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā¹² these troops had experienced all sorts of vicissitudes, and few emirs and veterans had survived, the Safavid prince saw before him a numerous and well-turned-out body of men, and he was overcome with remorse at his action. At one stroke he had deprived himself of a fair province, the envy of Tibet and China, where he had been born and raised, and had fallen from the position of ruler and governor to that of servant. But the die was cast, and remorse was of no avail.

A prey to melancholy and vain thoughts, Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā devoted his energies to entertaining Šāhī Beg and the Čaġatāy emirs and to showing them the usual courtesies. He sent a messenger to them inviting them to come out of the city and be his guests for a day, so that they might discuss certain necessary matters face to face. The prince had the crazy notion that, on some pretext or other, he might be able to get himself back into the citadel. But Šāhī Beg was an old soldier, and was not about to jeopardize an operation he had handled successfully so far. He paid no attention to the prince's message, and excused himself from coming. He had entered the citadel at an auspicious hour, he said, and so it would be inappropriate for him to leave it again. If the prince had urgent matters to discuss, the discussion could be carried on by correspondence. Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā knew that the game was up; after a formal exchange of gifts, he marched away to India. On arrival at the Mogul court, he was loaded with favors, styled "my son" by the emperor, and given splendid fiefs. In return, he presented the emperor with gifts—precious gems and jewelry, whatever he had.

The situation in India, however, was not at all congenial to the prince, and his relations with the emperor deteriorated. He did not perform the required ritual of obeisance and prostration like the other princes, and he began to neglect his fiefs. The emperor noticed his disaffection, was angered by it, and resolved to humble him. The prince hankered more and more after Iran and the service of the Safavid crown. He applied for permission to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, but this was refused. Finally, he fell sick and died in India, in the year 1008/1599–1600. He left three sons there: Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā; Esma'il Mīrzā; Bahrām Mīrzā.

Rostam Mīrzā, who was more worldly, was able to come to terms

¹²Actually 16 (lunar) or 14 (solar). Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā died in 984/1576.

with his fate, and adapted himself well to his subservient role. He cultivated close relations with Kān-e Kānān, the son of Beyrām Khan Torkmān, who had a number of kinsmen among the *qezelbāš*, and from time to time he was appointed to some office through the good offices of the latter. After the death of Emperor Akbar and the accession of his son Salīm Shah, he continued to be in favor. Of his younger brothers, Abū Sa'īd Mīrzā died in 1005/1596-97, and Sanjar Mīrzā died at the end of the same year. He had a son named Morād Mīrzā, who became the son-in-law of Kān-e Kānān, and several other sons. Today, in the year 1025/1616-17, Rostam Mīrzā, his sons, and the sons of Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, with several of their children, both male and female, are still in India, but at this point their history ceases to be relevant to the history of Iran.

To return to events in Sīstān and Malek Jalāl al-Dīn. After Rostam Mīrzā's departure, the Uzbegs harassed Sīstān more than before, and there were frequent conflicts between them and the people of Sīstān. For a time, the *maleks*, the kinsmen of Malek Jalāl al-Dīn, put up a stout defense of their forts and cities, but the Uzbegs gained control of part of the province and strove to capture Malek Jalāl al-Dīn's own fortress. After resisting them for a while, Malek Jalāl al-Dīn left a garrison in the fort and marched away via Kerman to present himself to Shah 'Abbas at Isfahan, where he was made a guest at the Shah's private banquets. After a time, he wanted to return to Sīstān and see his children. When he got there, he found that the sons of Jānī Beg Sultan, who had been sent by 'Abdollāh Khan to subjugate Sīstān, had complete control of the province, and he was powerless to do anything. He was too impatient to wait for the Shah to march to Khorasan, so he took his sons and went to Kandahar. He was thinking of going to India and entering the service of Emperor Akbar when he heard that the Shah was marching to Khorasan.

After the Shah had recovered Khorasan and was encamped at Herat, Malek Jalāl al-Dīn visited him there from Kandahar. He was given the rank of khan and made governor of Sīstān, a post he still holds. The author obtained these details from reliable local sources, but the responsibility for them rests with the transmitter.

The Battle of Ozgand in the District of Toršīz between the Qezelbāš Emirs and Yatīm Sultan Uzbek and His Brothers, and the Rout of the Qezelbāš

As previously related, some of the emirs of Khorasan had fallen

from the Shah's favor. Of these, Sultan 'Alī Kālifa went to Qā'en, fought with and killed the lawful governor, 'Alīqolī Khan Ostājlı, and took over the governorship, declaring himself to be a supporter of Rostam Mīrzā. Another, Soleyman Kālifa, went to Kandahar and Zamīn Dāvar, and Eslām Beg Šāmlū, and *qezelbāš* of every rank who found themselves in difficulties as a result of the Uzbek onslaughts on Khorasan, followed him to those parts, thinking to find a safe retreat there. Until these emirs arrived, relations were peaceful between the two brothers; Moẓaffar Hōseyn Mīrzā held Kandahar, and Rostam Mīrzā only Zamīn Dāvar. The emirs incited Rostam Mīrzā to think of governing Khorasan, with the results already described.

Soleyman Kālifa obtained from Rostam Mīrzā letters of appointment and documents designed to win over the emirs concerned, making appointments throughout Khorasan. Armed with these, he set off for Khorasan. He went to the district of Tūn and Jonābod, which was his tribal district. Meanwhile Sultan 'Alī Kālifa had seized Qā'en. Both men gathered around them an army from among the *qezelbāš* who were drifting around in Khorasan. They summoned Moštāfā Khan, the lawfully appointed governor of Ṭabas, and aimed at recovering some of the areas of Khorasan over which the Uzbeks had not yet established firm control—areas in which the forts were still in the hands of the local population and nobles. They marched to Toršīz, where they were joined by various Šāmlū, Ostājlı, Turkman, and Qājār emirs (these last being the sons of Qobād Khan) and their men—some four thousand troops in all—and by local militia drawn from the supporters of the *qezelbāš* in Khorasan. This force marched against the fort of Karāt near Toršīz, which was held by Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan Uzbek. After about six weeks, the commandant surrendered on terms. But after he and his men had left the fort, the *qezelbāš* broke their covenant, pursued the Uzbeks, and slew many of them. Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan escaped and joined Yatīm Sultan and his brothers, who were in Khorasan on orders from 'Abdolāh Khan.

The *qezelbāš* emirs next marched against Ozgand, held by Mīr Moḥammad Qāsem Ozgandī, but Yatīm Sultan, having summoned assistance from Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš at Herat, went to its relief with a large force. There was some disagreement among the *qezelbāš*, some of whom questioned the wisdom of campaigning in an area on which the Uzbeks had set covetous eyes and in which the Uzbeks were lying in wait for them. However, when they realized that Yatīm

Sultan's force numbered no more than two thousand men, they were encouraged to fight a pitched battle. The Uzbek charge drove back the *qezelbāš* skirmishers, and then routed the *qezelbāš* right wing and drove it back against the center, which wavered and then broke and fled. The *qezelbāš* left wing, which had held firm, was unable to fight on alone, and joined in the general flight. Soleymān Kālifa, who was a large and heavy man, was unseated from his horse during the retreat and slain by the Uzbegs.

Sultan 'Alī Kālifa escaped to Qā'en, but feeling insecure there, he decided to make for his base, which was in the Ṭabas district. He was overtaken by the Uzbegs at the fort of Āvīz, about halfway between Qā'en and Ṭabas, and was defeated and slain. Būdāq Sultan Torkmān survived this battle and fled to Yazd. Since he had been guilty of various misdemeanors in Khorasan, he was afraid of the wrath of Shah 'Abbas. He decided to return to Khorasan with the intention of offering his services to the Uzbegs, but he too was intercepted and killed by the Uzbegs. Maḥdīqolī Sultan Qādemlū Ostājilū and Moḥammad Sultan the brother of Soleymān Kālifa were killed in the battle at Ozḡand. 'Alīqolī Sultan Āsāyeš-oḡlū went to India, and Moṣṭafā Khan succeeded in making his way to Ṭabas with most of his men. He defended that district for a time, and then moved to Tūn.

Since the Uzbegs considered him an adversary to be reckoned with, Yatīm Sultan marched against him with four thousand men and blockaded him in the town. Moṣṭafā Khan had with him some skilled Korāsānī musketeers, and the Uzbegs wanted to lure him out of his fortifications into the open plain. A feinted withdrawal achieved their purpose; Moṣṭafā Khan went in pursuit, and the Uzbegs suddenly wheeled and attacked. Moṣṭafā Khan put up a stout defense, but was overwhelmed by the main Uzbek force under Yatīm Sultan, taken prisoner, and put to death at the order of the latter. Many *qezelbāš* lost their lives, and the disloyal emirs met a fitting end.

Because of their disloyalty, they had received no support from the Shah. But the Shah was grieved at the death of Moṣṭafā Khan, a valiant and loyal officer who, because of his courage and devotion to duty, had shared the fate of the others. The Shah therefore gave the post of governor of Ṭabas to one of his kinsmen, Tīmūr Sultan. But he was unable to assert his authority over the Ṭabas district, and so he was replaced by Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, a wise and courageous officer, who succeeded in bringing the region under his control and adminis-

tering it until the Shah's victorious campaign in Khorasan. The author obtained the details of these events from persons who took part in these various battles.

This year, Kadam 'Alī Sultan Kānom died at Qazvin; she was well into her seventies. She was the sister¹³ of Mūsa Sultan Mowşellū, the wife of Shah Tahmasp, and the mother of Sultan Moḥammad Shah. Shah 'Abbas had always treated his grandmother with great respect. Shortly before Shah Tahmasp's death, she had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. One of her monuments was the hospice at Koşk-rūd, which was completed during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah.

¹³TAAA, i, 125 describes Sultan Moḥammad Shah's mother as the daughter of Mūsa Sultan. She was also the mother of Shah Esma'il II.

The Events of the Year of the Horse, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1003/1594-95, the Eighth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

With the arrival of spring, the Shah's thoughts turned to a hunting expedition in Gilān, the most pleasant part of Iran at that time of year. Farhād Khan, the governor of Gilān, was sent on ahead to make the necessary preparations for the reception of the royal party. The Shah made a leisurely journey to Gilān, stopping for several days en route near Manjīl and Kārzavīl, two villages in the Tārom district. These villages are situated on the slopes of the mountains, the houses being built on top of one another. Around the villages are numerous gardens, and springs of clear, sweet water, emanating from the upper slopes of the mountains, come together in a single channel. In the springtime, the abundance of blossom and the scent of herbs make this a delightful place. For several days the Shah made merry, and high and low joined in the conviviality; the air resounded with the strains of music and song. The Shah went on to Kūhdom, where he was welcomed by Farhād Khan and the people of Gilān. Hōseyn Khan, the governor of Kūhdom, was received in audience; he exerted himself to the utmost in his role as host, and distributed generous allowances and bonuses among the royal troops. The next day, the Shah went on through the Gūka district to Lāhi-jān, where Farhād Khan acted as host and presented gifts to the Shah, the emirs, and the principal officers of state.

Before the royal cavalcade arrived, 'Alī Khan, the governor of western Gilān, who had been reinstated in his post at the request of Farhād Khan, again revealed that tendency to rebellion that was inherent in his nature. Breaking his covenant with Farhād Khan, he collected armed men and sent the Safavid tax collectors back empty-handed. When the Shah arrived, he maintained his rebellious attitude and did not present himself. In Gaskar also, Amīra Moẓaffar, the brother of Emir Sīāvoš, adopted a hostile stance. The Shah ordered some contingents of the royal army to deal with the rebels, and Farhād Khan, who felt responsible for the situation since he had recommended the appointment of 'Alī Khan, at his own request was placed in charge of the expedition. A contingent of one thousand foot musketeers, who had arrived from Isfahan, was placed at his disposal under the command of Alpān Beg Qājār, an aide-de-camp. Zu'l-

Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, the *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, was ordered to march with his auxiliary troops via Āstārā and Tavāleš to Gaskar, to sweep that region clean of rebels, to arrest Amīra Moẓaffar, their ringleader, and then to proceed against 'Alī Khan. The Shah himself remained at Lāhijān, enjoying the hunting.

Mīr 'Abbas, the governor of Lešta Nešā, and Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Kūhdom, accompanied Farhād Khan to western Gīlān, and Klā Farīdūn, that loyal servitor, went with the Shah on a boar-hunting expedition. The governors of Gīlān used to go every year to a certain spot in the forests to hunt boar, this occasion being known as the bell hunt. It is an astonishing sight, as the author can testify, since he accompanied the expedition. The Shah slew with his arrows some ten or fifteen boar, each the size of an ox, and displayed a degree of daring and courage that amazed the onlookers.

As everyone knows the people of Gīlān are dim-witted, ignorant, and improvident. They are treacherous and disloyal by nature, and are totally lacking in generosity and magnanimity. The common people are seditious to such a degree that, even when they are ruled by an independent sultan, some farmer's son has only to take to the forests in revolt for everyone to flock to his standard. On the first day, an enormous group gathers round him, but, on the very same day, either because there is some simple matter to be attended to, or because they hear a rumor from some ignorant fellow who does not even know what he is supposed to be doing himself, they disperse and pay the penalty for their folly. The next day, they are capable of repeating the whole performance. Even though they know they will pay the penalty for their actions the next day, they live for today and simply do not take thought for the morrow. For the sake of being king for a day, they are ready to destroy themselves. Two friends, though they be aware of the obligations which derive from having eaten each other's salt, are constantly at loggerheads, each imagining that the other has inflicted some injury on him. There are innumerable instances of this sort of behavior in the history of Gīlān—perhaps it is something to do with the climate! Every few days some governor aspires to be an independent ruler; if he succeeds in slaying the local chiefs by treachery, the flames of rebellion sweep the province from end to end. Prudence dictates that one should avoid having dealings with such a people.

Anyway, for the purposes of this hunting expedition, it was ar-

ranged that some ten thousand Gīlānīs (about whose characteristics I have just said a few words), should proceed on foot into the mountains and organize a *battue*; some of the men were to act as beaters, to drive the game into an area around which barricades had been erected to prevent the animals from escaping; others were sent off into the densely forested valleys to rouse the game by sounding their horns and firing their muskets.

When all was ready, the Shah set off with a small group of *moqarrabs* from the court and Gīlānī nobles, and spent the night at a place called Malāt, the site of a former Zoroastrian burial ground in the days of the ancient rulers of Gīlān. It is in the foothills, oranges are plentiful there, and it is one of the most pleasant spots in Gīlān. The next day, the Shah proceeded to the hunting site; when the royal party entered the valleys, the musketeers were ordered to go about their business. The whole area rang with the sound of horns, and smoke from the muskets drifted across the trees. The Shah charged fearlessly to and fro, with a disregard for his personal safety that alarmed more prudent souls, for caution is an important quality in kings. However, God had inspired in both friend and foe alike such awe of the Shah that no one dared plan any act of treachery against him, and he, placing his trust in God, felt anxiety on the score of the throng around him. On another occasion, the Shah and two companions seated themselves in a sailing boat, at the mercy of some improvident Gīlānī fishermen, and crossed the Saḡīd-rūd¹ near its mouth. Once across the other side, the Shah had no one to help him in an emergency, but he walked around for a long time, until eventually a group of *moqarrabs* and personal retainers commandeered some skiffs from other Gīlānī fishermen and crossed the river to join him.

After several days spent in hunting and pleasure trips along the shore of the Caspian Sea, the Shah returned to Lāhījān. At this juncture, one of the officers of Amīra Sīāvoš, the governor of Gaskar, who was still in jail, came to the Shah and reported that his master thought he could escape by inciting his brother and sons to rebel against the Shah, and was in secret correspondence with his brother to this end. The informant brought one of the letters to prove his case. The Shah at once gave orders for the execution of Amīra Sīāvoš, and also of the informant, because the latter, although he professed to be motivated by loyalty to the Shah, doubtless had some secret motive (being a Gīlānī), and in any case had betrayed his master.

¹The Saḡīd-rūd rises in Kurdestan, flows north into Azerbaijan, then turns east into Gīlān, and finally empties into the Caspian Sea west of Lāhījān.

Since two months had elapsed since New Year's Day and the weather was becoming uncomfortably hot, the Shah returned to Qazvin. Before he left, he bestowed tokens of his favor on loyal Gīlānī nobles, in particular Kīā Farīdūn, who received magnificent robes of honor, and a bejeweled hat and belt.

The Rebellion of 'Alī Khan in Gīlān, the Dispatch of a Punitive Expedition against Him, and the Capture of That Misguided Man and a Number of Other Troublemakers

After 'Alī Khan, through the good offices of Farhād Khan, had been reappointed governor of western Gīlān, the soldiers of that region, who are distinguished by their bravery above men from other parts of Gīlān, soon succeeded in persuading him to depart from the path of obedience. Relying on the fact that he possessed large quantities of money and property, and on the shaky promises of Gīlānīs, he broke his covenant with Farhād Khan. When the Shah came to Gīlān he did not present himself before him, but mobilized his troops, vainly thinking he could oppose the royal army. He blocked all the forest paths and river crossings with barricades, heedless of the fact that a sparrow cannot elude the falcon's grasp.

Hardly had Farhād Khan's punitive force crossed the Safīd-rūd when panic struck 'Alī Khan's men and commanders. They began to desert and present themselves to Farhād Khan. As the royal army proceeded on its way, anyone who was slow in coming forward had his money confiscated and his property plundered. 'Alī Khan himself fled to Fūmen, the ancestral home of his family, but the people there refused to help him. He despaired of receiving assistance from Amīra Moẓaffar, who had his own problems, since the army of Azerbaijan was in hot pursuit of him. So, he planned to gather up his cash, his jewels, and his precious stuffs, and take ship and flee from Gīlān. But this plan was thwarted because Farhād Khan had stationed guards along the seashore. 'Alī Khan retired to his birthplace, a place called Zarmok in the district of Fūmen.

Most of the inhabitants were for giving him sanctuary, and he retired with a few companions to a mountainous region so densely forested that the rays of the sun could hardly penetrate between the trees. But the unrelenting search for him went on, and Farhād Khan, having received a report of his whereabouts, surrounded the area with troops who proceeded to comb the difficult terrain on foot. Periodi-

cally, there were clashes between his men and those of 'Alī Khan, who changed his hiding place every night. This went on for two months. On several occasions, the *gāzīs* actually caught up with 'Alī Khan and slew many of his companions, but each time he succeeded in escaping.

Meanwhile, Zu'l-Faqār Khan was advancing from Azerbaijan and Amīra Moẓaffar, together with the sons of Amīra Sīavoš and the men of Gaskar, prepared for battle. Zu'l-Faqār Khan routed them with heavy losses and plundered their possessions. Amīra Moẓaffar and his companions tried to escape but found every road barred to them; they too took to the forests. Many women and children in Gaskar were taken prisoner. Those men who survived the battle joined Zu'l-Faqār Khan in order to save their families. Amīra Moẓaffar and his nephews were eventually surrounded and taken prisoner, and Zu'l-Faqār Khan made contact with Farhād Khan.

Farhād Khan's men, closing in on 'Alī Khan, made his position in the forests untenable. One night, 'Alī Khan slipped out of the forests with a few of his close companions like Kāmrān, made his way to a village, and took refuge in a house belonging to an ordinary citizen who, with a magnanimity foreign to most Gīlānīs, agreed to shelter him. Meanwhile, the *gāzīs* went on fruitlessly searching the forests. It never entered their heads that their quarry was hiding in a house because Safavid troops were billeted in most of the houses; furthermore, they did not think the villagers would dare to shelter him.

After a long and weary search, the *gāzīs* ferreted him out, and 'Alī Khan was forced to leave the house and once again take to the forests. The *gāzīs* were ready for him, but 'Alī Khan's men wounded several *gāzīs* and killed others with their volleys of arrows. The *gāzīs* pressed their attack, and one of the Turkman *qūrčīs*, Heydar Beg Delt-oglu, fought his way through to 'Alī Khan on foot and clung to the bridle of his horse, even though mortally wounded by two arrows from 'Alī Khan's companion, Kāmrān. Kāmrān rushed at him and slashed him several times with his sword, but Heydar Beg still held on. Finally, his grip slackened as death claimed him, and 'Alī Khan was released. But Heydar Beg's action had given other *gāzīs* time to come up behind 'Alī Khan and Kāmrān and pinion their arms, and one by one their other companions were also taken prisoner.

When Farhād Khan sent the prisoners, together with Amīra

Mozaffar and his nephews, to the Shah, he was loaded with favors. The man who seized 'Alī Khan received a robe of honor, a jeweled sword belt, a turban jewel, and fifty thousand Köpekī *dīnārs*, the equivalent of fifty Iraqi *tomān*. In recognition of Heydar Beg's heroism, his dependents were singled out for special favor. Abdāl Sultan Qājār was made governor of Gaskar.

Farhād Khan and Zu'l-Faqār Khan returned with the Shah in triumph to Qazvin, where the royal army was welcomed, on the Shah's orders, by the whole populace. All the riffraff of the city turned out, including clowns and circus performers with their drums, and a great throng gathered in front of the Čehel Sotūn portico of the palace. The prisoners were censured by the Shah and placed in the custody of the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa, who took them to the fortress-prison of Alamūt a few days later. The Shah spared the life of Kām-rān, in view of the fact that his crimes were attributable to his loyalty to his master 'Alī Khan, removed his fetters, dressed him in a robe of honor, and enrolled him in the ranks of his personal retainers. Glory be to God! What an extraordinary change of fortune! Everyone expected that, since Kām-rān was the prime mover behind 'Alī Khan's rebellion, the Shah would make an example of him!

The Capture of the Rest of the Gīlānī Rebels

In eastern Gīlān, the arch-rebels Bū Sa'īd and 'Tāleša Kūlī were still at large. From time to time the Shah sent letters to them offering pardon and restoration of royal favor if they would submit and present themselves to him. After some time had elapsed, Bū Sa'īd visited Kīā Farīdūn at Lāhijān and tried to persuade him to act as intermediary for him. Kīā Farīdūn at once reported this to the Shah, who warned him to be on his guard against treachery on the part of Bū Sa'īd, and instructed him to send his guest to Qazvin as soon as possible. Kīā Farīdūn prepared what Bū Sa'īd needed for the journey and, in order to reassure him, said he himself would take him to Qazvin. However, as the Shah had predicted, Bū Sa'īd was plotting treachery; awaiting his chance, he slew Kīā Farīdūn and retreated again into the forests with a few companions.

Shah 'Abbas sent the *dārūğa* of Qazvin, Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa, to Gīlān to enlist the support of the people in tracing Bū Sa'īd and 'Tāleša Kūlī. Recognisances were taken from property owners, district by district, that they would not give the rebels a night's shelter but

would seize them wherever they might be found and hand them over to the local governor. A detachment of troops under the command of Qanbar Beg Gözü-büyükklü was also dispatched via Kūhdom to search for Ṭāleša Kūlī. After an intensive search, Bū Sa'īd was arrested by the Sufi *gāzīs* and the retainers of Valī Sultan, the governor of Rānekūh. Ṭāleša Kūlī and several of his nephews and other kinsmen were caught by the people of Kūhdom, retainers of Ḥoseyn Khan Kūhdomī. The prisoners were then sent to Qazvin. Bū Sa'īd was put to death for his treacherous murder of Kīā Farīdūn and because he could not be trusted, but Ṭāleša Kūlī and his kinsmen were pardoned.

Later, Ṭāleša Kūlī wrote to some of his supporters who had escaped arrest, urging them to be steadfast in their rebellion and not to submit to the *qezelbāš*. After this act of treachery, his supporters were hunted down and put to death by Mīr 'Abbas, who now found himself the only surviving Gīlānī emir and, in his folly, had pretensions to being the military governor of Lāhījān. This aspiration led to his death. One night, when the Shah was walking in the Meydān-e Sa'adatābād at Qazvin, admiring the lights, one of the *moqarrabs*, Malek Jahāngīrī Kojūrī, got drunk, drew his sword, and made passes at spectators, sometimes in jest, sometimes in all seriousness. Coming upon Mīr 'Abbas, he inflicted several wounds on him and killed him. After that, he dispatched Kāja Sultan Maḥmūd, the brother of Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn the *vakīl* of Khan Aḥmad, who had originally gone to Istanbul and had stirred up revolt in Gīlān. These attacks were generally attributed to the *moqarrab's* drunkenness and craziness, but thinking men saw the hand of the Shah in this. After the death of Mīr 'Abbas, no one of stature remained in Gīlān.

Some Events That Occurred after the Capture of 'Alī Khan and the Other Gīlān Rebels

After his return to Qazvin, the Shah ordered the Meydān-e Sa'adatābād to be decorated with lights, and the aide-de-camp, Alpān Beg Qājār, was detailed to see to this. The shops fronting on the Meydān were divided up among the emirs, principal officers of state, centurions, *qūrčīs*, attendants at court, townspeople, and the merchants who provided supplies to the royal army. The Shah ordered every man to construct, in front of the shop allotted to him, a portico twelve meters deep, supported on wooden pillars, and to hang lights and lanterns on these, so that every store would be decorated with upward of one thousand lamps and lanterns. All around the Meydān-e

Sa'adatābād were placed lamps and candles, and the Shah spent several nights in the residences he had built in the southwest corner of Meydān so that he could enjoy the scene and take part in polo matches, shooting contests, and other pastimes. Then, refreshed by the celebrations and by his contact with the crowds in the Meydān, he returned to deal with matters of state.

When the posts of governor of Lāhījān and *amīr al-omarā* of Gilān were conferred on Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū, Farhād Khan was given instead the governorship of Fārs. In most of the provinces under the jurisdiction of the officers of the Safavid state, matters had now been settled in accordance with the Shah's intent; headstrong governors had been removed from office and replaced by the Shah's own protégés. But the provinces of Kūh Gīlūya and Kūzestān, which had been governed by Afšār emirs, had been in a fairly constant state of disorder. During the troubles that attended the accession of Shah 'Abbas, local chiefs had taken advantage of the situation to reassert their authority there. Although they had declared their allegiance to the Shah, the latter was not certain of their loyalty, particularly in the case of the commandants of the extremely strong fortress of Salāsel near Šūštar, because they did not obey the Shah's commands in a manner that was altogether satisfactory. In addition, Mīr Mobārak, the independent governor of 'Arabestān, had been guilty of various acts of impropriety.

The Shah therefore decided to take an expedition to Kūzestān and Kūh Gīlūya to restore order there. The Afšārs, who were fully conscious of their sins, took stock of their position and established contacts with Mīr Mobārak as being a person with whom they could take refuge in case of need. The Shah sent Morād Beg Šāmlū, the *jelowdārbāšt*,² to take the good news to Kūzestān of the Shah's impending expedition, to ascertain the situation on that frontier, and to capture the citadel of Šūštar. Šāhverdī Khan Afšār, the governor of Šūštar, against the advice of his officers, came forward loyally, welcomed Morād Beg, handed over to him the keys of the citadel, and expressed his willingness to leave the fort. Morād Beg kept him within the fort, encouraging him to entertain hopes of royal favor, and expelled the rest of his men. But eventually, nervous of Afšār strength, he put Šāhverdī Khan to death.

²An officer under the orders of the *amīr-āḡorbāšt*, the master of the king's stables. See *TM*, p. 120, which renders *jelowdārbāšt* as "first equerry in permanent attendance on the king."

The Afšārs reacted violently to the execution of their leader. They sought assistance from Mīr Mobārak, while Morād Beg stationed his musketeers on the walls of the citadel and prepared to defend himself. Although Mīr Mobārak had professed his allegiance to the Safavid dynasty and had sent his son, Nāṣer, to court as an earnest of his good faith, he marched from 'Arabestān to Kūzestān,³ occupied Dezful, and laid siege to Šūstar.

In the meantime, Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī had made a sudden raid against Sultan Ḥoseyn, his cousin, who was the governor of Lorestān, and had killed him, with the object of once again making himself master of Lorestān. For fear of the Shah's wrath he had not dared to reveal this purpose openly, but was making rather convulsive movements along the borders of Lorestān. The Shah therefore decided to lead an expedition there to restore order in the area. His advisers submitted that it was not necessary for him to go in person. The Shah accepted their advice and appointed to command the expedition Ḥātem Beg and Farhād Khan, with orders to pacify the whole area from Borūjerd to the farthest reaches of 'Arabestān. A number of the great emirs were detailed to go on this expedition: Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, Nadr Khan the keeper of the seal, and others, and various centurions and *qūrčīs* were also ordered to join. The Shah paid a visit to Kashan and Isfahan, and returned to Qazvin for the winter.

The Successful Expedition to Kūzestān and 'Arabestān, under the Command of the E'temād al-dowla and Farhād Khan

When the *e'temād al-dowla* and Farhād Khan marched from Qazvin to Korramābād, Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī hastened to send an envoy to them assuring them of his allegiance to the throne, expressing regret for his past actions, and asking them to intercede with the Shah for a royal pardon. The emirs, in order not unduly to alarm the independent governor of 'Arabestān and the governors of Kūh Gilūya, thought it best to offer him the hope of pardon, so that again he might be appointed to the governorship of Lorestān. They therefore issued a conciliatory order, gave him assurances of receiving royal favor, and asked for a meeting with him. But Šāhverdī Khan was too frightened

³'Arabestān, in common usage, is synonymous with Kūzestān. The author is acknowledging here a *de facto* division between the area ruled by the Moša'ša' *seyyeds*, whose seat of government was Ḥavīza on the Karğa River, and the eastern part of the province, the region along the Kārūn River, which was nominally under direct Safavid control.

to meet them. After further negotiation, Farhād Khan and the *e'temād al-dowla*, accompanied by a number of unarmed men, met the Khan at the tomb of a celebrated local holy man; the Khan, who brought two hundred men with him, pledged his fealty to the Shah with binding oaths. If the Shah forgave his acts of rebellion, he said, he would not depart from the path of loyal service for the rest of his life. The *e'temād al-dowla* and Farhād Khan, although they knew his pledges were worthless, for reasons of policy accepted them at their face value, encouraged him to hope for royal favor, and reappointed him governor of Lorestān. They evacuated the fortress at Korramābād and handed it over to him. In gratitude for these marks of royal favor, the Khan agreed to send a gift of one thousand *tomān* to the supreme *dīvān*, and suitable gifts to the principal officers of state.

After settling the affairs of Lorestān in this fashion, the emirs marched to Šūštar via Kūtal Klālān, a route which they chose, despite its difficulty, because of its shortness; few armies traveled this route. When the emirs entered Kūzestān, a group of Seyyed Mobārak's men who were at Dezful fell back on Šūštar, but the *seyyed* evacuated that city and retired to Ḥavīza and Kamālābād, his seats of government. The Safavid army camped near Šūštar, and Mahdīqolī Khan Šamlū, on orders from the Shah, took over the government of that province. It was now the turn of Seyyed Mobārak to send an ambassador to the emirs to open negotiations with them and to pledge his fealty to the Safavid house. As evidence of his loyalty, he pointed to the fact that, a few years previously, he had sent his son Nāṣer to the Safavid court as a hostage. He said that the evil actions and injustices of Morād Aqā the *jelowdār* had been the cause of his coming to Šūštar, and he asked for pardon.

The emirs had orders from the Shah that, if the *seyyed* asked for pardon and pledged his allegiance, he was to receive pardon, partly because he was a *seyyed*, partly because he was a natural Shi'ite, and partly because policy dictated that he should not be unmasked at this time, since the Shah had enemies enough already. So the *seyyed's* sins too were forgiven, and Seyyed Mobārak also was offered a royal pardon. He was told that his willingness to meet the emirs would be a test of his sincerity. Seyyed Mobārak was extremely apprehensive, but after a further exchange of ambassadors, the emirs, confident in their ability to deal with the Arabs in case of trouble went with a small detachment of *qezelbāš* a few *farsaks* in the direction of Ḥavīza. Such was the degree of his fear that Seyyed Mobārak met them with his whole army.

The emirs pointed out to the *seyyed* his misdemeanors and told him that the Shah had agreed to pardon him only because he was a *seyyed* and descended from the house of the Prophet and of 'Alī, and because of his own innate predilection for Shi'ism. "If you mend your ways," they said, "and demonstrate your loyalty and devotion, the governorship of 'Arabestān will be conferred on you on the same terms as before. But if you swerve from this path by so much as a hair's breadth, be assured that your house will be wiped out without trace." Seyyed Mobārak confessed his sins and gratefully accepted pardon for his shortcomings. Henceforth, he said, he would be a faithful servant, and ever seek to do the Shah's will. The Shah's friends, he said, would be his friends, and the Shah's enemies, his enemies. A covenant on these lines was duly drawn up and sworn. He was invested with the royal robe of honor which had been sent for him, and went home rejoicing.

When they had finished dealing with the affairs of that province, the emirs marched from Šūštar toward Kūh Gīlūya, but, because of excessive rainfall and flash floods, they were unable to cross the Šūštar River for about a month. The troops suffered considerably from a shortage of food supplies for themselves and their animals. When the rain finally abated, some of the emirs took their leave, but Farhād Khan and the *e'temād al-dowla* pressed on with a force composed of emirs, *qūrčīs*, and retainers of the court. When they reached Kūh Gīlūya, Ḥasan Khan, the governor, came out to welcome them with his Afšārs.

Ḥasan Khan had made himself master of the province by force, and had behaved in a very independent manner during the confused situation obtaining there. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he had been guilty of certain improprieties, and his attitude to the Shah was not all that it might have been. He was accordingly now dismissed from his post and, together with a number of his followers who were suspected of seditious activities, arrested, handed over to guards, and sent to court. Emir Khan Afšār, the governor of Kāzerūn, was made governor of Kūh Gīlūya, and the tribal district of Kāzerūn was given to Esma'il Alplū⁴ Afšār. Fines amounting to ten thousand *tomān* were imposed on various of the Baḳtārī Lōrs, the Jākī, Javānakī⁵, Bandānī, Fahband, Mamasenī, and others because of their rebellious

⁴Alplū (or Ālplū), a clan of the Afšār tribe (*TM*, p. 16).

⁵See 'A Curious Episode of Safavid History,' in *Iran and Islam*, in memory of the late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C. E. Bosworth, Edinburgh, 1971, p. 471, n.5.

behavior of recent years, and this sum was used to defray the pay and allowances of the *qūrčīs* and court retainers. Having discharged their duties in that province too, the emirs marched to Shiraz and dealt with affairs in Fārs before returning to Qazvin, where they were received in audience by the Shah.

Miscellaneous Events This Year

One of the events which occurred this year was the flight of Malek Jahāngīr Rostamdārī, the son of Malek Sultan Moḥammad⁶ and ruler of Kojūr and Rostamdār. The religious faith of Malek Sultan Moḥammad, his father, had been extremely weak; in fact, as time went on, he had inclined more and more toward heresy, and during the reign of Shah Tahmasp had committed various actions contrary to the canon law of Islam. For instance, he had coveted and married his own niece, who had been promised to his son (after his death, his son Malek Jahāngīr married the companion of his father's bed), and he and his people committed many obscene acts of this kind. The observance of ritual fasts and the performance of the ritual prayers were in abeyance throughout his territories. For this reason, he had fallen from favor with Shah Tahmasp, who sent a punitive force against him under Emāmqolī Khan Ostājīlū, the son of Nadr Khan.

Malek Sultan Moḥammad had deceived Emāmqolī Khan, made false protestations of fealty, and asked for a private interview with him. The simple-minded Turk had gone to the rendezvous and had been murdered by Malek Sultan Moḥammad's men. Shah Tahmasp had wanted to send a second expedition against him, but had fallen seriously ill before this could be arranged. Owing to other preoccupations, it was nearly two years before the Shah sent a second punitive expedition under the command of Morād Khan Ostājīlū, the most powerful chief in the pro-Sultan Heydar faction. Morād Khan blockaded Malek Sultan Moḥammad in the fortress of Kojūr. After a four-month siege, the fort was on the point of surrendering, when Shah Tahmasp died and Morād Khan raised the siege and joined Pīrā Moḥammad Khan in Gīlān, where he was blinded at the order of Esma'īl II.

⁶Malek Sultan Moḥammad reigned from 975-984/1567/8-1576/7, according to Rabino, 146, but the *TAAA* states that Malek Jahāngīr had already succeeded him by the time of Shah Tahmasp's severe illness, which occurred in 982/1574. Shah Tahmasp died two years later, in 984/1576.

During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, things were so chaotic that no one paid any attention to the affairs of Malek Sultan Moḥammad. The latter died early in the reign of Shah 'Abbas, and his son, Malek Jahāngīr, together with the son of Malek 'Azīz the governor of Nūr, who was also named Jahāngīr, presented themselves to the Shah in his summer quarters at Lār and accompanied him to Iraq. When Shah 'Abbas determined on the subjugation of Gīlān, the prince from Nūr, seeing how matters stood, relinquished his hereditary territory and asked the Shah to grant him some place of residence in Iraq, together with a pension, and a place was allotted to him at Sāva. The prince of Kojūr was headstrong and refractory; nevertheless the Shah, for policy reasons, extended his favor to him, made him his companion at banquets and private assemblies, and granted the province of Kojūr to him on the former basis.

At the time when Farhād Khan and the *e'temād al-dowla* returned to Qazvin from 'Arabestān, Malek Jahāngīr, instead of going out to meet them with the rest of the court, turned the head of his Arabian horse (a gift from the Shah!) in the direction of Kojūr and Rostamdār—whether because he had become apprehensive of the Shah's intentions toward him or because he had the deliberate intention of rebelling is not clear. The Shah sent a body of men in pursuit, but they failed to catch up with him. Eventually, a force of *qūrčīs* under the command of the *qūrčībāši* was sent to Kojūr. Malek Jahāngīr was taken prisoner and his territory incorporated into the Safavid empire, as will be related in detail in the appropriate place.

Another event this year was the arrival of an embassy from Russia, bearing suitable gifts. The ambassador was a trusted Russian emir who brought a letter from the Tsar couched in the friendliest terms. The court, acting in accordance with the dictum, "entertain your guest, even though he be an infidel," welcomed him ceremoniously and with respect.

Also this year there occurred the death of the Ottoman Sultan Morād III, on 4 Jomādā I, 1003/15 January 1595. He had come to the throne in 982/1574. During his reign of twenty-one years, the Ottomans subjugated many provinces of Iran, and Morād III was distinguished among the Ottoman sultans by the strength and vigor of his rule. However, he committed a number of unseemly acts: (1) He violated the peace treaty concluded between Sultan Sūlaymān and Shah Tahmasp, a treaty which had been sealed with the most solemn

oaths, and disturbed the peaceful existence of Muslims by letting slip the hounds of war. (2) He was guilty of a dastardly act that had never been permitted by any previous Islamic sovereign, namely, the carrying off into captivity of Muslim women and children. Many Muslim women and children from Azerbaijan and Šīrvān were taken prisoner during his reign and sold as slaves to Jews and Christians and other infidels. Even some members of the families of *seyyeds* were sold in this way. This vile practice spread from the Ottoman empire to Transoxania and Khorasan, where 'Abdollāh Khan and his son behaved in the same way. In the end, Shah 'Abbas visited his vengeance on the descendants of Morād III and on the Uzbek khans, and extended his just rule over all the territories which had been ravaged by them—God be praised for that!

Sultan Morād left twenty sons and a number of daughters. At the time of his death, his eldest son, Sultan Moḥammad Khan, was at his provincial seat of government. The rest of his sons were in Istanbul in the royal palace. After Sultan Morād's death, his corpse was placed in snow and kept for ten days within the palace. On the eleventh day, Sultan Moḥammad Khan reached Istanbul. His mother had been a highly respected member of the harem of the dead sultan, and he acceded to the throne through the efforts of the chief gardener.⁷ The following day he saw to his father's burial, and the same night he had Sultan Morād's other nineteen sons strangled. They were buried alongside their father on 17 Jomādā I, 1003/28 January 1595.

⁷The chief gardener (*bostānjībāšt*), "though raised late to Stirrup rank, always remaining inferior to the Standard Bearer, enjoyed in fact greater influence in the palace than any of his fellows, partly because it was under his direction that delinquent officials were put to the question or executed, partly because over two thousand men, employed in many different ways, came under his control" (Gibb and Bowen, i, 84).

Events of the Year of the Sheep, Equivalent to the Muslim Year 1004/1595-96, the Ninth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day occurred this year on Sunday, 10 Rajab 1003/21 March 1595. Shah 'Abbas gave a great banquet in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the palace to celebrate the New Year festival, and this was attended by the foreign rulers and princes who were present at court: Hājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Kārazm; Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān; the son of Seyyed Mobārak, the ruler of 'Arabestān; a number of Georgian princes; and the ambassadors from Russia and other foreign parts. The celebrations went on for several days. The bazaars were decorated, and in the Sa'adatābād Square, there were polo matches and archery contests. For ten or twelve days, there was a public holiday.

At the conclusion of the holiday, Shah 'Abbas was finally able to turn his attention to Khorasan, the greater part of which had been overrun by the Uzbegs, who were plundering the province from end to end and had even made inroads into Iraq. Because of his pre-occupation with other matters, the Shah had hitherto not been able to deal with the Uzbeg infiltration. This year, the Shah decided to send Farhād Khan, who was one of the high-ranking emirs of the Safavid state and had become powerful through the Shah's favor, to the borders of Khorasan. The Shah's intention was that Farhād Khan should constitute a strong bulwark against those who sought to undermine the realm, and should suppress any rebellious activities on the part of the Uzbegs. At the time of his appointment, the districts of Kār, Semnān, Damghan, Beštām, Fīrūzkūh, Bīārjomand, and Hazārjarīb were added to his existing fiefs. Farroḡ Khan Pornāk, the governor of Damghan and Beštām, was dismissed from office because he had failed to put up adequate resistance against the Uzbegs the preceding year. His troops were placed at the disposal of Farhād Khan, who was given sweeping powers to order the affairs of Khorasan in whatever manner he considered in the best interest of the state and the faith.

After Farhād Khan had left for Khorasan, the Russian embassy took its leave, loaded with robes of honor and gifts. The Russians were accompanied by an Iranian ambassador, Emāmqolī Beg Pākīza, a Turkman *qūrčī*. They traveled to Russia by ship from Gilān.

About June 1595, when Farhād Khan was in summer quarters at

Fīrūzkūh, he received reports that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had laid siege to the fortress at Esfarā'in, which was defended by Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan and a detachment of Bayāt troops. When he heard the news, the Shah ordered a general mobilization.

The Royal Army's March to Khorasan and the Flight of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan from Esfarā'in and Sabzavār

The Shah allowed one month for his troops to mobilize, and then the royal campaign tents were sent on ahead from Qazvin. Meanwhile, Zu'l-Faqār Khan arrived at Qazvin with the Azerbaijan contingent, about four thousand men. Reports kept coming in that Esfarā'in would fall if the royal army delayed any longer. The Shah therefore marched with such troops as had arrived from the provinces, plus *qūrčīs* and *gōlāms*. He went first to Fīrūzkūh to join Farhād Khan, and together they marched to the pastures of Beštām via 'Alī Bolāḡī in the district of Damghan. Their combined forces numbered about twenty thousand men.

In an effort to prevent 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan from following his usual practice of retreating at the approach of the royal army, thus denying to the latter an opportunity for a pitched battle, the Shah sent a letter to the Uzbek Khan. On several occasions, said the Shah, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had plundered Khorasan with the object of annexing it, but had retreated abjectly whenever the royal army had marched to Khorasan. He had heard, the Shah went on, that this year the Khan had laid siege to Esfarā'in, and he (the Shah) had marched to Beštām with such men as he had with him, without waiting for the mobilization of his troops, so eager was he to meet the Khan in battle. This time, declared the Shah, the Khan's reputation for valor demanded that he stand and fight like a man, so that God's will might be fulfilled and God's people spared the injury resulting from the ceaseless passage of armies. Qoṭb al-Dīn Čeganī took the letter to the Uzbek Khan, and the Shah set his forces in motion, planning to reach Esfarā'in within seven days. He sent a message to the beleaguered Moḥammad Sultan exhorting him to hold on for another week.

The Shah's letter provoked a furious response from 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who uttered empty boasts. His men were considerably disturbed, but since they had not yet received any reports of the Shah's approach, they were inclined to attribute the letter brought by Qoṭb al-Dīn to a ruse on the part of Farhād Khan to get them to raise the

siege of Esfarā'In. On the pretext that Qoṭb al-Dīn Aqa was lying, they put him to death. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was in a quandary. Suppose the envoy's message were true? In that case, should he prepare for battle, or should he abandon the siege and withdraw? His emirs and elders, especially Shah Moḥammad Īla, who was the most senior of the emirs and whose advice was relied on by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, plumped for the second alternative, for fear they might suffer some reverse. He was supported by the emirs, who were not prepared to fight. The upshot was that the Khan decided to send a patrol to ascertain the truth of the report, to continue meanwhile the siege of Esfarā'In, and to postpone a decision until he had heard from his patrols.

He therefore sent a number of the great emirs, such as Moḥammad-qolī Dürmen; Jān Moḥammad Qarāvöl, the governor of Badaḡšān; and Sevenj Moḥammad Bī, known as Sevenj Torkmān, the governor of Nesā and Abīvard, with three hundred veterans on reconnaissance in the direction of Beštām. They had orders to go right up to the outskirts of the *qezelbāš* camp and to take prisoners in order to get information. In the meantime, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan urged on his men to capture the fortress, and the defense began to weaken. When Moḥammad Sultan got the news that the Shah was at Beštām and would be at Esfarā'In within seven days, he proposed a seven-day ceasefire period to the Uzbegs so that the garrison could put its affairs in order before handing the fortress over at the end of that period. The Uzbegs, agreeing to this, counted the days.

After spending three days reviewing his troops at Beštām, the Shah marched via Ḥang and Maḡz, sending Farḥād Khan and Zu'l-Faqār Khan half a *farsak* ahead of the main force. On the third day, the Shah's baggage train reached Jājarm, and the servants were busy erecting the royal tents. The Uzbeg reconnaissance force reached the Jājarm River at nightfall and camped there. At dawn, leaving the usual route, they rode cautiously forward for two *farsaks*, skirting the foothills, until the black mass of the Safavid army came into view. They then retired hastily to Jājarm by the usual route and, as they passed by, saw the royal tents being erected. Galloping forward, they carried off a number of the servants for questioning. As they made off with their prisoners, a group of the emirs' men who had been sent on ahead of their fellows as skirmishers came into view behind the fort and the gardens around it. Without considering the odds against them, the Safavid troops charged the Uzbegs who, when they realized

how few the enemy were, turned to face them. As the minutes passed, more and more Safavid skirmishers arrived on the scene and joined in the fighting. The Uzbegs wanted to break off the engagement, but the *qezelbāš gāzīs* and the camp servants who were pitching the royal tents plucked up their courage and engaged them in hand-to-hand fighting, with the result that the Uzbegs were routed. They fled toward the mountains, and in the confusion their prisoners made their escape, their captors being too exhausted even to kill or wound them.

The *qezelbāš* kept up their pursuit of the Uzbegs, and the Uzbek chiefs Moḥammadqolī Dürmen and Sevenj Torkmān were taken alive. Jān Moḥammad Qarāvōl, the governor of Badaḡšān, was captured by Oloḡ Khan, a celebrated Turkman chief known as the scourge, and put to death. Most of the Uzbegs were slain; those who were taken prisoner were paraded before the Shah, who considered this success a happy augury of future victory. He gave orders that one of the Uzbek prisoners should be released and escorted through the Safavid lines that night to the neighborhood of Esfarā'īn, to inform 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan of the Shah's arrival and to bid him prepare for battle. The escort took the prisoners as far as the village of Sanḡāst, eight *farsaks* from Jājarm. The Shah marched the same night and reached Sanḡāst; he planned to reach Īra and Farīmān, four *farsaks* from Esfarā'īn, the next night, and be ready for battle at Esfarā'īn on the morning of the third day. On arrival at Īra and Farīmān, the camp was busy until midnight preparing for the battle on the following day. The men were still seeing to their horses, weapons, and equipment when Moḥammad Sultan Bayāt, the Safavid commandant at Esfarā'īn who had been besieged by the Uzbegs, was brought in by Safavid patrols and informed the Shah that the Uzbegs had fled.

Apparently, some Uzbek fugitives from the battle at Jājarm had made their way to Esfarā'īn on foot, traveling by night and lying in caves during the day; they arrived in tatters and with blistered feet. When they reported to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan the news of the defeat at Jājarm and the capture of the Uzbek emirs, the Uzbek leaders were filled with consternation. Six days of the seven-day truce had elapsed. They sent an envoy, Shah Moḥammad Īlačīān, to Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan to remind the Safavid prince that he was due to hand over the fort to them the following day. It would be a good idea, they said, for him to hand it over a day earlier and thus win royal favors from the Khan. Mīrzā Moḥammad Sultan sent back the following message: "Tomorrow, I hope that the splendor of the Shah's cavalcade will

appear over the horizon. If the Khan is still here, I will keep my promise and hand the fort over to him!" The Uzbegs then realized that the prince had requested the seven-day truce in order to give the Shah time to come to his assistance. They despaired of capturing the fort and advised the Khan to strike camp that day and withdraw to Mašhad via Rādekān. The Khan followed their advice; the following day, the Shah reached Esfarā'īn and camped there.

Some of the Shah's advisers counseled him to pursue the Uzbek Khan to Mašhad. Had the latter felt strong enough, they argued, he would have stood and fought at Esfarā'īn. The Uzbegs had apparently decided to retreat, and since it was not likely that they had adequate provisions at Mašhad to enable them to withstand a siege, they would probably evacuate that city too if pressed. Farhād Khan opposed this suggestion on two grounds: first, the object of this expedition had been to succor the garrison at Esfarā'īn, and this had been done. In addition, a serious defeat had been inflicted on the Uzbegs, some of their leading chiefs had been taken prisoner, and their Khan had incurred the ignominy of flight. His proposal was that they should stay a few days at Esfarā'īn to settle affairs there, and then return to Qazvin. Second, to advance to Mašhad might be to invite a reversal of fortune. Supposing 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan evacuated the city; he would not leave the place in flourishing condition for the benefit of the *qezelbāš* but would sack it before withdrawing, and thus the Shi'ite population would in fact suffer more as a result of the Shah's advance. On the other hand, argued Farhād Khan, neither religion nor the state would suffer any harm from their *not* going to Mašhad. Both sides continued to bring forward arguments to support their point of view. Finally, Farhād Khan won the day, and the pursuit of the Uzbegs was abandoned.

The Shah remained at Esfarā'īn for several days to deal with affairs there. Moḥammad Sultan and his Bayāts, who had endured the rigors of the Uzbek siege, were in no state to continue to act as garrison of the fortress, and so Būdāq Khan Čeganī was made governor of Esfarā'īn. After ten days, during which the royal army put in much hard work repairing the fortifications and excavating the ditches, the Shah marched. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Kārazm, who was with the royal army, obtained permission to visit the Šā'en Turkmans, who lived in the Astarābād area and were dependents of his, in order to try and gain support. Since he insisted, the Safavid officials allowed him to go, even though they considered his hope a forlorn one, in

view of the fact that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan controlled the area. He was allowed to draw an appropriate quota of horses and equipment from the royal stables and armory, and he set off with his son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, and Bābā Khan. Details of his journey and eventual return to court will be given under the events of next year.

Because 'Alī Khan Gerāyli¹ had ignored the royal expedition and failed to present himself at court, the Shah planned to visit his tribe. If 'Alī Khan sought pardon and appeared to be loyal, he would take him along with him to Astarābād, a province that had slipped from *qezelbāš* control a considerable time ago, with the intention of dividing the province between the Šā'en-kānī, Īmūr, and Sīāh-pūš tribes. If 'Alī Khan showed himself to be rebellious, he would deal with him first and then march to Astarābād. When the royal army reached the plain of Baḥrīān, the Shah gave orders to the great emirs to return to Iraq and take with them all the baggage and any men whose horses were not up to par; he kept with him all his battleworthy troops. At this juncture, some Gerāyli elders arrived to say that 'Alī Khan was at the fort of Pā-ye Heṣār and that he was too frightened to present himself at court; in short, he took refuge in useless excuses. The Shah sent Ḥoseyn Khan and his Šāmlūs to subjugate the fortress of Pā-ye Heṣār, and 'Alī Khan fled to the fortress of Rūḡad.

The Shah planned to send another force against him there, because he wanted to take him prisoner and make himself secure in that quarter before he advanced on Astarābād. But at this point he received news that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had returned and laid siege to Sabzavār. Since most of the troops of the royal army had been dismissed to Iraq and since 'Abd al-Mo'men had been emboldened to take this action by the receipt of reinforcements from Balḵ and Transoxania, the Shah's advisers considered it inexpedient for him to march to Sabzavār. Then the news arrived that the city of Sabzavār had fallen to the Uzbeks, that 'Abd al-Mo'men had perpetrated a general massacre there, and that Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan, the governor of Sabzavār, was blockaded in the citadel and had little chance of being able to hold out.

The Shah divided authority over the Gerāyli tribe between Man-šūr Khan Gerāyli and Tavakkol Khan, and ordered them to deal with 'Alī Khan. Then, taking with him Valī Ġāzī and some men of the Gerāyli tribe, he marched to Sabzavār—hoping, despite the paucity

¹The Gerāyli were another eastern Turkman tribe living in the Astarābād area.

of his forces, to save the besieged garrison. 'Abd al-Mo'men had been informed of all the Shah's actions and was aware of his plans. He knew Esfarā'īn was now too well garrisoned and provisioned for him to have any hope of success there, so he decided to attack Sabzavār. He bore a grudge against the people of Sabzavār because of their attachment to Shi'ism, and because they had had the temerity to seize Mūsā Mīrzā and his friends. He was further incited to attack Sabzavār by Mīr 'Alī Aṣḡar, the son of Mīr Moḥammad Keskenī. He was an Uzbek noble from Sabzavār in the service of the Khan who had a hereditary feud with Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan, the governor of Sabzavār, and with the other sons of Mīr Šams al-Dīn 'Alī Sultan.

Hearing that the Shah had marched toward Astārābād, and assuming that he would not return to Khorasan, 'Abd al-Mo'men dispatched an advance force to Sabzavār by forced marches, under the command of Mīr 'Alī Aṣḡar. Raising their war cry, the Uzbeks assaulted the city. The Sabzavārīs, caught completely by surprise, could not offer any resistance, and Mīrzā Moḥammad Mo'men Sultan with great difficulty succeeded in reaching the citadel with a number of other nobles. He prepared to defend the fort and safeguard his family. The rest of the city was abandoned to the Uzbeks, who poured in and began the slaughter of the Muslim population. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan thought to erase the memory of his shameful flight from Esfarā'īn by slaughtering numbers of poor wretches in Sabzavār, where he perpetrated a general massacre in which not even suckling infants were spared. The author, who entered Sabzavār with the royal cavalcade, saw the corpses of mothers with the bodies of their suckling infants, cut in two by Uzbek swords, lying across their breasts.

After sacking the city, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan laid siege to the citadel, carrying forward breastworks on all sides. He dispatched a force of some three or four thousand Uzbeks against the fort of Šadqarv, but Kāja Moḥammad Šadqarvī, a loyal supporter of the Safavid house, put up a stout defense and sent a courier to inform the Shah. As the Shah neared Sabzavār, the Uzbeks abandoned the siege of Šadqarv and rejoined 'Abd al-Mo'men. He, when the Shah reached the village of Āzādvār in the district of Farfūmad, evacuated Sabzavār and fled in his customary manner (not worrying now about the shamefulness of his action!) to Balḡ via Toršīz; he left Shah Moḥammad Īlačīān to hold the fort at Nishapur. The Shah entered Sabzavār, cared for the survivors of the massacre, saw to the burial of the dead,

and left vengeance to the Lord. The laments of the people of Sabzavār were answered, and the Uzbek tyrant was not destined long to enjoy life and prosperity, as will be related in the proper place.

The Shah appointed Būdāq Sultan Qājār, commandant of the fortress of Estegnā, governor of Sabzavār. This officer was a veteran experienced in siege warfare; he had fought several engagements against the Uzbeks, and had successfully defended the fort of Estegnā. The Shah then marched toward Nishapur and encamped at Baḥrābād. There, he learned that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had retreated by forced marches. It seemed to the Shah that nothing would be gained by pursuing him; as winter was coming on and there was a shortage of provisions in Khorasan, he decided against staying in that province either to lay siege to Nishapur or to complete his business in Astarābād. As it was, on the return march to Qazvin the royal army suffered the loss of many horses, mules, and camels because of the lack of fodder.

Zu'l-Faqār Khan's Embassy to the Ottomans

Before the Shah left for Khorasan, he had nominated as ambassador to the Ottomans Darvīš Moḥammad Khan Rūmlū, who was to bear a letter expressing the Shah's condolences on the death of Sultan Morād III and offering his felicitations to his successor, Sultan Moḥammad III.² The Shah's sudden departure for Khorasan had delayed the dispatch of this embassy. When the Shah returned to Qazvin, Farhād Khan put forward the claims of his own brother Zu'l-Faqār as ambassador, on the ground that, in the time of Shah Tahmasp, the governors-general of the frontier marches had traditionally been employed as ambassadors to the Ottomans.

Farhād Khan's petition was accepted, and Zu'l-Faqār Khan was appointed and set off for Anatolia. He discharged his mission in fine style. He took with him some three hundred of his own retainers, all picked men, in full panoply. On this mission, he bestowed gifts with such liberality that certain mean-spirited Ottomans accused him of foolishness and extravagance. The Ottoman Sultan, his viziers and pashas, received him with greater honor than had been the lot of Persian ambassadors during Shah Tahmasp's reign. When Zu'l-Faqār Khan arrived in Istanbul, the Ottoman Sultan was actually absent on campaign, and the ambassador had to await his return. That year, the

²Reigned 1003/1595 to 1012/1603.

Frankish monarchs had launched an attack aimed at recovering certain territory and fortresses they had lost during the reign of Sultan Morād III, and Sultan Moḥammad III had taken the field against them in person.

In the ensuing battle, the Franks initially gained the upper hand, and their troops broke into the Ottoman camp and started plundering it. However, a quarrel broke out over the Sultan's treasury between the troops of the pope (the pope is the caliph of the Christian nation—peace be upon our Prophet and upon Christ!— and is obeyed by the Frankish kings) and the troops of the King of Hungary, each party considering that it had the better claim to it. While this was going on, victory smiled on the standards of Islam, and the banners of darkness and unbelief were overthrown. The camp servants drove out their attackers with blows from blacksmiths' hammers and clubs, and the Frankish kings were routed. Their coalition fell apart, and each retired to his own country. Sultan Moḥammad III returned in triumph to Istanbul, and Zu'l-Faqār Khan was received in audience. Before the ambassador's arrival, the Sultan had already sent Shah 'Abbas a letter announcing his victory,⁵ and the Shah had returned a most friendly reply. Zu'l-Faqār Khan was given permission to depart, and arrived back in Iran the following year bearing appropriate gifts. These he delivered to the Shah along with a courteous letter from the Ottoman Sultan in which he addressed the Shah by fitting titles.

Further Troubles in Eastern Gīlān, the Revolt of Ḥamza and His Death, along with That of Other Miscreants

This year was also marked by another revolt in Gīlān, where a group of rebels, in their folly and stupidity, brought about their own destruction. Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr, who had rebelled against the Safavid state only the previous year, took advantage of the Shah's absence in Khorāsān to lead a band of marauders to Tona-kābon. Darvīš Moḥammad Khan, the governor of Lāhījān, marched against him to Rostamdār. No sooner had the governor left Lāhījān than a certain Ḥamza of the Čapak tribe, a relative of Mir 'Abbas, rebelled simply because he saw Lāhījān, the seat of government, empty, and heard reports that things were not going too well in Khorāsān for the royal army.

⁵The reference is to the Ottoman victory at the battle of Hačova (Mező-Keresztes), over a Christian coalition of 40,000 men under the command of the Emperor Maximilian. The battle was fought between 2-4 Rabi' I, 1005/24-26 October 1596.

Looking only to the short-term gains and not to the long-term consequences, he dubbed himself Sultan Ḥamza, gathered some ill-starred men from Lešta-Neša and from some of the larger villages near Lāhtjān such as Āstāna and Kamāčāl, and entered Lāhtjān. First, his men poured into the caravanserai and started looting the property of merchants and others. They plundered the homes of the retainers of Darviš Moḥammad Khan, caused a lot of damage in the city generally, and then made for the citadel in a body. The handful of Darviš Moḥammad Khan's men who had been left behind hastily barricaded the gates and sent a courier to the Khan in Tonakābon. Despite their lack of skill in siege warfare, they managed to prevent the besiegers from penetrating their defenses. The latter, perceiving the inexperience of their opponents, redoubled their efforts.

When the news of Ḥamza's revolt reached western Gīlān, Kosrow Beg Čahār-yār, a *golām-e kāšša-ye šarīfa*, who was *dārūga* of Rašt, and Oğurlū Sultan Čapnī,⁴ the governor of Fūmen, marched at full speed to Lāhtjān. The rebels were defeated, Ḥamza and a number of others were killed, and the rest of his supporters scattered. Two days later, Darviš Moḥammad Khan arrived, having come by forced marches from Rostamdār. Finding that the revolt was all over, he initiated an investigation and a search for the rebels who had fled; if any were found, they were put to death. Ḥamza's head was presented to the Shah in Sāuj Bolāg, and the Shah praised Kosrow Beg Čahār-yār for his conduct. The Shah's wrath was visited on Lešta-Neša, that hotbed of revolt, and he ordered a general massacre there. Darviš Moḥammad Khan and his Rūmlūs carried out this mission, and many innocent persons suffered for the sins of the guilty. Darviš Moḥammad Khan, who was a God-fearing and provident man, tried to prevent the slaughter from getting out of hand, but many people lost their lives. However, this punitive action did have an effect: no one from that district had the temerity to rebel in the future.

Miscellaneous Events During the Year 1004/1595-96

After the suppression of Ḥamza's revolt and the punitive action against Lešta-Neša, Oğurlū Sultan Čapnī was made governor of the latter province. The whole of western Gīlān was given to Farhād Khan, who was relieved of the governorship of Shiraz. The post of governor of Fārs was given to the *qollar-āqāsī*⁵ Allāhverdi Khan, who

⁴The text has Čnī, but I think Čapnī must be the correct reading.

⁵The office of *qollar-āqāsī*, or commander of the *qollar* (*golāmān*) was created by Shah 'Abbas. The commander of these non-*qezelbaş* forces took his place among the six principal officers of state under Shah 'Abbas.

took charge of all administrative affairs in that province. It was decreed that every year Allāhverdi Khan should take to Fārs three hundred *golāms* and appoint them to major and minor administrative positions throughout every district of the province. The revenue accruing from the province should be used to defray the cost of arms and equipment.

This year, a group of Sa'd-e Vaqqāš from the Nehāvand area descended on a fort the Ottomans had built on their land and destroyed it. Then, together with a band of Lurs and Kurds, they attacked the fort at Nehāvand. The Ottoman garrison, which promptly complained to the Shah, laid the blame for stirring up this trouble on Huseyn 'Alī Khan Čeganī, the governor of Hamadan. Shah 'Abbās, always concerned with observing the conditions of the peace treaty, sent a force of *qūrčīs* to Nehāvand and dismissed Huseyn 'Alī Khan from the governorship of Hamadan. The *qūrčīs* chastised the troublemakers and cut off a few heads, which they sent to Baghdad.

Also this year, Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, the governor of Herat and a *protégé* and devoted supporter of 'Abdollah Khan, made overtures to Shah 'Abbās, and sent ambassadors to the Shah bearing gifts. It is not clear whether this was his own idea, or whether he did it at the prompting of Khan 'Alī. As a result of the constant warfare between the Safavid and Uzbek states, said Mīr Qolbābā, the inhabitants of Transoxania had for years been unable to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, because Iran lay across the road to the Ḥeǰāz. He, Mīr Qolbābā, therefore requested that parties of Uzbeks from Transoxania should be allowed to cross Safavid territory without hindrance for the purpose of performing the pilgrimage; if he allowed this, the Shah would acquire merit. The Uzbek ambassadors reached Qazvin, where they made their salutations to the Shah. They returned to Herat laden with gifts and accompanied by Eslām Beg Šāmlū, a centurion, who delivered letters to Mīr Qolbābā granting the privilege he had requested.

Also this year, the poet Mowlānā Ša'nī, who enjoyed great fame in Iran and was a boon companion of the Shah and attended his convivial gatherings, composed a few verses in *mašnavī* form in praise of the Shah and submitted them to His Majesty. When the Shah reached the verse:

Whether it be friend or foe who quaffs the cup,
He drinks to the arch of the Shah's manly eyebrows

he was visibly affected and ordered that the Mowlānā be weighed against gold and the equivalent of his weight in gold be given him as a reward for this verse. This act encouraged all the poets in the land to send in poems eulogizing the Shah. Poets excel all others in their envy of one another, and so they were all profoundly envious of Mowlānā Ša'nī and went on talking about this incident at court for ages. One of them, Mowlānā Ḥasan Vahm al-Dīn, a satirist, inserted this verse in a poem he had written for the vizier of Qom:

Ḥasan Vahm-e Dīn, indigent though he is,
is weighed by the king with the gold of loathing.⁶

Fortunately, the Shah did not get to hear of this. Another jealous rival was Mowlānā 'Ajzī Tabrizī, a tall, stout man who considered himself an incomparable composer of lyrics. On the strength of a few verses of love poetry, and through the good offices of Mowlānā 'Alī Reżā Kōšnevīs (the elegant penman), Mowlānā 'Ajzī found himself admitted to court for a few days. But he was soon out of favor because he had the impertinence to utter various insolent remarks which he confidently believed would be taken to be witty or facetious. Finding himself one day in the presence of the Shah in the royal stables at Qazvin, although it was an inappropriate moment, he had the nerve to bring up the matter of Mowlānā Ša'nī's being weighed against gold. He boldly asked the Shah why he had not been treated the same way. The Shah said jokingly, "since we find ourselves in the stables, if you like I will have you weighed against dung!" The courtiers standing around roared with laughter, and the tale was embroidered by poets and wits, with the result that everyone forgot about Mowlānā Ša'nī and plagued the life out of Mowlānā 'Ajzī.

An unhappy event that occurred this year was the death of the Shah's father, Sultan Moḥammad Kōdābanda, in the palace at Qazvin. The ex-Shah fell ill, became afflicted by dysentery, and died. He was buried in the Imāmzāda-ye Ḥoseyn at Qazvin, but his remains were later transferred to Ardabīl. Since I have already said something about the virtues of this king in the appendix to Book I, I will not add anything here.

⁶There is a word play, impossible to reproduce in translation, between *ša'nī*, the nom de plume of the favored poet, and *šāne'*, meaning "hating."

The Events of the Year of the Monkey, Corresponding to the Year 1005/1596-97, the Tenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Monday,¹ 21 Rajab 1004/21 March 1596. The Shah's servants gathered as usual in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the royal palace at Qazvin to greet him and to take part in the celebration of the New Year festival; the festivities continued for several days. At their conclusion, the Shah felt the urge to go hunting in Gīlān and Qezel Āgāč. He traveled first to Rašt by way of Kūhdom, and from there to Fūmen and Gaskar. At 'Olyābād in the district of Fūmen, the Shah took part in a bell-hunt—a most unusual and pleasant type of sport which I have described before;² then the Shah moved to Qezel Āgāč, where he spent a few days by the sea before going to Ardabīl. After visiting the Safavid shrine there, he returned to Qazvin.

The Conquest of Māzandarān and the Appointment of Farhād Khan as Governor of That Province

The province of Ṭabarestān, or Māzandarān, was the legal inheritance of the descendants of Mīr 'Abdollāh Khan, the maternal grandfather of Shah 'Abbas, who traced his lineage back to Seyyed Qavām al-Dīn, known as Mīr Bozorg, who took possession of that province by the sword, as I related at the beginning of Book I. At the present time (1005/1596-97), however, there was no male descendant of that line fit to govern his ancestral domains, and so the province came under the control of the Shah, both by right of inheritance and by right of conquest. Previously, the province had been subject to the authority of a number of different emirs and chiefs, men like Seyyed Moẓaffar Mortaẓā'ī, Alvand Dīv, and Malek Bahman Lārījānī. They had repeatedly been guilty of hostility and treachery toward the house of Mīr Bozorg, and each had seized a portion of the province and treated it as though it were his own property. From time to time, they were delinquent in the payment of the instalments of tax and tribute due to the supreme *divān*, and their behavior was generally fraudulent, deceitful, and seditious. The Shah had for long intended to wrest the province of Māzandarān from the hands of these usurpers. This year he took action; he instructed Farhād Khan to subjugate the province and to assume the governorship.

¹21 Rajab 1004 fell on a Thursday.

²See page 668-9.

Farhād Khan assembled his troops and sent letters to the various emirs and chiefs of Māzandarān, calling on them to tender their submission. Seyyed Moẓaffar, whose head was filled with delusions of grandeur, tendered his submission *in absentia*. Like a wild animal, he shied away from presenting himself before the Khan in person, and refused to be tamed. After a further exchange of correspondence and of smooth-tongued ambassadors, Seyyed Moẓaffar agreed to meet the Khan. He and a number of other Māzandarānī chiefs and nobles visited the Khan and were received with honor, although Farhād Khan would not allow Seyyed Moẓaffar to return to Māzandarān but insisted that he present himself to the Shah. Seyyed Moẓaffar agreed to this on condition that Farhād Khan accompany him and mediate on his behalf with the Shah. He further agreed that he would participate in whatever settlement the Shah might personally decree in regard to Māzandarān. His object was to get himself reinstated in Māzandarān on the same basis as before, namely, he would retain control and pay tribute and taxes to the supreme *dīvān*.

Farhād Khan considered it expedient to let Seyyed Moẓaffar think he was going to get his own way. He took him to Qazvin, where the Shah also considered it politic to receive him with outward marks of favor. Privately, however, the Shah frowned on him, because he had rebelled against his benefactor and been guilty of various misdemeanors against the house of Mīr Bozorg. Seyyed Moẓaffar, lodged at the house of Farhād Khan, became more and more apprehensive; as the saying goes, "the traitor is always nervous." He heard a rumor that the Shah intended to purge Māzandarān of headstrong chiefs like himself. Despairing of regaining his position of authority there, he agreed to return to Māzandarān with Farhād Khan and secure the submission of the inhabitants to the Khan. This done, he agreed to leave Māzandarān with his family and personal retainers and retire to a peaceful life in Iraq. But the demon ambition had possessed him, and his heart was not in what he said.

Taking his leave of the Shah, Seyyed Moẓaffar returned to Māzandarān with Farhād Khan, who treated him civilly in order to reassure him and the other frightened chiefs in the province. When they reached Āmol, one of the ancient districts of Māzandarān currently under the control of Malek Bahman, the latter's retainers prepared to defend the citadel there, and Farhād Khan commenced the siege. Malek Bahman was at Lārtjān. With the cunning and guile that were second nature to him, he pretended to submit to Farhād Khan. He

sent a message saying that the situation at Āmol was not under his control; a group of Āmolī rebels to whom *qezelbāš* rule was distasteful had taken matters into its own hands and was defending the castle. In secret, however, Malek Bahman behaved like a rebel and encouraged the defenders of the fort, most of whom were his own trusted retainers, to put up a stout resistance and to keep the *qezelbāš* out. In particular, a number of Takkalūs who were retainers of his urged the garrison to redouble its efforts.

At this juncture, Seyyed Moẓaffar showed his hand. He fled from Farhād Khan's camp to the district of Sārī, which was in the hands of his men, took refuge at the fort of Azdāra Kalā, and defied the Khan. His example was followed by a number of other Māzandarānī nobles who had accompanied Farhād Khan; each went to his own territory, and communication between the Māzandarānīs and the *qezelbāš* broke down. Farhād Khan's morale was not in the least shaken by these events. He pressed his attack on the fort at Āmol and tried to win over the people by his exemplary conduct and by financial inducements. Finally, he succeeded in capturing the fort and annihilating its garrison. Installing a *qezelbāš* governor at Āmol, he turned his attention to subjugating other areas. One by one, the Māzandarānī nobles who had fled from his camp returned and begged forgiveness, which the Khan graciously accorded them.

When the Khan marched against Sārī, Seyyed Moẓaffar abandoned Azdāra Kalā and took refuge in the forests. Seyyed Moẓaffar was an opium addict; every day, he consumed one and a half *mesqāls* of pure opium. In the confusion that attended his flight, his servants failed to bring him his usual pipe of opium, and for several nights in the forest he suffered agonies as a result of being deprived of his narcotic. Finally, he became ill. It was impossible for him to go on existing in the forest in this condition; he was forced to repair to the Khan, in the sorriest of states. He took to his bed, but treatment proved of no avail; he was afflicted by a more and more severe diarrhea, and finally he died. After his death, Farhād Khan's lieutenants were able to take control of most areas of Māzandarān. The Khan left his brother, Alvand Sultan, as his deputy in the province, and himself returned to court to report to the Shah.

Alvand Div, the governor of Savād-kūh, did not believe Seyyed Moẓaffar had died a natural death, and consequently distrusted Farhād Khan. Malek Bahman, a born intriguer, whipped up opposition

to Alvand Dīv among the Māzandarānīs, his object being to prevent the development of friendly relations between Alvand Dīv and the nobles of Māzandarān on the one hand, and the *qezelbāš* on the other. And Alvand Dīv, once having tasted the delights of independent government, found it difficult to contemplate giving it up; at the instigation of Malek Bahman, he rebelled. The Shah, realizing that until Malek Bahman was removed from the scene Māzandarān would never be firmly under Safavid control, therefore ordered Farhād Khan to move against him.

Farhād Khan's Expedition to Lārījān and Capture of Malek Bahman

Malek Bahman b. Malek Kayūmarš b. Kā'ūs was descended from Kayūmarš b. Bīsotūn b. Gostaham,³ who in the time of Tīmūr was ruler of the whole of Rostamdār and commandant of the fortress of Nūr. After the death of the latter,⁴ Rostamdār was divided between his two sons, Jahāngīr,⁵ who took Nūr and its dependencies, and Eskandar, who received Kojūr and its appendages. Their descendants continued to observe this division of the province.

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, however, three families, all cousins of one another, laid claim to power: Malek 'Aẓīz, the ruler of Nūr; Malek Sultan Moḥammad b. Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr; and the above-mentioned Malek Bahman, ruler of Lārījān, which had formerly been a dependency of Kojūr. The history of the rulers of Nūr and Kojūr will be given in the section on the subjugation of Rostamdār. Although Malek Bahman was inferior to the rulers of Nūr and Kojūr in terms of territory, he was superior to them in terms of intelligence, maturity, experience, and length of reign. To begin with, Shah 'Abbas regarded him with favor, because Malek Bahman had gone to welcome him as he marched westward to Iraq to claim the throne, and had tendered his submission to him on several other occasions at the Shah's summer quarters at Lār.

But Malek Bahman, as we have said, was an intriguer, and was distinguished among his peers by his craftiness and deceitfulness.

³See Rabino, pp. 144ff.

⁴In 875/1453.

⁵According to Rabino, p. 146, Jahāngīr was the *grandson* of Kayūmarš and became ruler of Nūr in 871/1467. Kā'ūs was the son of Kayūmarš who became ruler of Nūr in 857/1453.

Every time the Shah tested his loyalty and sincerity, Malek Bahman was found wanting. He was constantly stirring up trouble in Ṭabarestān, and he tried to destroy anyone who entered into relations with the Safavid court. Take, for example, the case of Sultan Ḥoseyn Lavasānī, who was a relative of his: Merely because Sultan Ḥoseyn Lavasānī had turned to the Shah and declared his loyalty to him, and his brother Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn had acquired honor in the Shah's service, Malek Bahman had attacked the latter, taken him prisoner, and put him to death. Moreover, he had carried off Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn's wives and children to Lārtjān, and ill-treated his subjects in all sorts of ways. But divine vengeance was shortly to be visited upon him.

Shah 'Abbas had repeatedly sent couriers to Lārtjān requesting that Malek Bahman hand over the dependents of Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn, but Malek Bahman kept procrastinating. The people of Māzandarān, who had adopted the system of dividing up the province into small feudal principalities, each man making some district his own bailiwick, considered Malek Bahman their overlord because of his proximity. They handed over to him the district of Āmol, one of the most celebrated regions of Ṭabarestān, which was adjacent to his own domains. When Shah 'Abbas decided to annex the province of Māzandarān, Malek Bahman, in his desire to hold on to Āmol, resisted the Safavid officers sent by the Shah in the manner already described.

Farhād Khan, provided with musketeers and siege guns, commenced the siege of the fortress of Lārtjān. The Amīrī clan, the foremost military group in Lārtjān, opened negotiations with Farhād Khan, and Malek Bahman lost confidence in them. He seized a certain Vardān Emir, who was their leader, flung him into a dungeon, and later killed him. The Amīrī clan then came out in open opposition to Malek Bahman and showed Farhād Khan secret ways into the fortress. Within a short time, the Safavid breastworks reached the walls of the fort, and Malek Bahman declared his readiness to submit. Farhād Khan encouraged him to hope for royal clemency and demanded a meeting. After sworn covenants had been entered into, Malek Bahman came out of the fort, hoping to save his skin by a lot of smooth talk, and by uttering empty compliments and making promises he had not the slightest intention of keeping, to persuade the *qezelbāš* to raise the siege. He tried to persuade Farhād Khan to enter the fort and be his guest. Farhād Khan refused and did not relinquish the bird he had trapped in his net; he insisted Malek Bahman accompany him

to court. At this point, Malek Bahman bitterly regretted having come out of the fort. Since nothing he said had any effect on Farhād Khan, he resigned himself, extremely unwillingly, to going to court. Farhād Khan considered it politic to leave Malek Bahman's men in charge of the fort, and did not force them to evacuate it.

Farhād Khan took Malek Bahman to Isfahan and presented him to the Shah at a public assembly at which people from hither and yon were present. The Shah upbraided Malek Bahman, and enumerated his sins and acts of disloyalty one by one. Malek Bahman hung his head in shame, and gave up hope of saving his life. Because of the pledges Farhād Khan had made to Malek Bahman, the Shah took no immediate action against him, and he remained in Farhād Khan's house. At the beginning of the Year of the Fowl (1006/1597-98), when the Shah left Isfahan for Qazvin, he summoned Malek Bahman into his presence in the new palace building at Isfahan and, after upbraiding him further, handed him over to Malek Sultan Hoseyn Lava-sānī, who put him to death in revenge for the death of his brother, Malek Sultan Hoseyn. The subsequent history of Malek Bahman's sons, and of the capture of his fortresses, will be given later, God willing!

The Adventures of Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the Ruler of Kārazm and His Relatives, and His Turning a Second Time to the Shah's Court for Assistance

The reader will recall that, at the time of the Shah's expedition to Khorasan against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan had obtained permission to leave the royal camp and travel to Kārazm with his son 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan and his nephew Bābā Khan. First, they visited the Šā'en-kānī Yaqqa Turkmans, groups of whom had migrated to Kārazm, where they were welcomed by the people and entered the service of Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan. 'Abdollah Khan's officials and *dārūgas* left their posts in Kārazm and retired to Transoxania. Kārazm was left free from foreign troops, and Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan regained his position there as independent ruler. But the majority of those who rallied around Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan were peasants and household servants, because 'Abdollah Khan, when he overran Kārazm, had transferred to other areas most of the Uzbeks who constituted Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan's regular troops. The latter was therefore left without any substantial support.

When he heard of the return of Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, 'Abdollah Khan sent some trusted emirs to Kārazm with a large force. Not satisfied with that, he himself followed on behind. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan mobilized his men, marched against the Uzbegs, and engaged them in a major battle. The approach of 'Abdollah Khan caused panic among the Kārazmians, who were routed. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan did not wish to take refuge in some fortress and endure a siege by the Uzbegs, so he left Kārazm with his son 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, traveled through Astarābād with the assistance of the Šā'en-kānī Yaqqa Turkmans, and reached Safavid territory. The Shah sent an envoy to escort him to Qazvin, where he was again received with great kindness.

Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan's nephew, Bābā Khan, remained behind in the fort at Šāhr-e Vazīr.⁶ Although he was well aware that he would be besieged, that he could not expect help from any quarter, and that in the end he would fall into the hands of the enemy, nevertheless he considered an honorable death preferable to life with disgrace. For four months he defended the fort, but at the end of that time his troops and the inhabitants of the town, fearful that continued resistance would lead to even more savage reprisals, betrayed him and opened negotiations with the Uzbegs. Bābā Khan, followed by a few faithful men, opened the gates of the fort and flung himself in suicidal fashion upon the enemy. Engulfed by the mass of Uzbegs, he fell fighting; those few of his followers who survived scattered. Bābā Khan's heroism is still talked of today in Kārazm. 'Abdollah Khan thus once more became the master of Kārazm. He eliminated anyone he thought might cause trouble anywhere in the province, and having strengthened the forts, returned to Transoxania.

The Conflict Between Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the Governor of Šūstar, and the Afšār Tribe, Supported by Mīr Mobārak, Ruler of the Ḥavīza District of 'Arabestān; the Dispatch of Allāhverdī Khan to Kūh Gīlūya and the Fate of the Ill-starred Afšārs

A group of seditious Afšārs, especially the Arešlū and Kondūzlū clans, rebelled against the governor of Kūh Gīlūya, Emir Khan. The rebels gathered at Rāmhormoz, a town in Kūh Gīlūya,⁷ and pro-

⁶North-northwest of Ūrganj.

⁷Rāmhormoz lies east of Ahvāz, and is usually reckoned to be part of the province of Kūzestān.

claimed Abu'l-Faṭḥ Beg, the grandson of Kalīl Khan, their khan. Maḥdīqolī Khan Šamlū, the governor of Šūštar, and a loyal Sufi, refused to countenance this action. Since he was the *qezelbaş* officer nearest the scene, he marched against the rebels with a small band of Šamlū *gāzis*. They met between Šūštar and Rāmhormoz and, despite the paucity of his forces, Maḥdīqolī Khan routed the Afšārs, who took refuge with Seyyed Mobārak, the ruler of 'Arabestān.

Maḥdīqolī Khan had always regarded Seyyed Mobārak as an enemy of the Safavid state; consequently, he frequently interfered in the affairs of the Arabs of Ḥavīza and treated Seyyed Mobārak as a vassal. Seyyed Mobārak had lodged repeated complaints with the Shah against Maḥdīqolī Khan's behavior and had tried to get the Khan chastised and brought to his senses, but he had no wish to incur the Shah's displeasure. However, the Afšār refugees fanned the flame of the Seyyed's discontent and urged him to take the field against Maḥdīqolī Khan. He agreed to assist the Afšārs. At the head of a force of Arabs, he intercepted Maḥdīqolī Khan as the latter was returning to Šūštar from the direction of Rāmhormoz. The Khan, finding himself heavily outnumbered, decided against a pitched battle in the plain and retreated to a nearby fort, where he was besieged by the Arabs and eventually obliged to treat for terms because of the weakness of the fortifications and lack of provisions.

For his part, Seyyed Mobārak was also ready to negotiate, since he stood in considerable awe of the Shah, and so a sort of truce was patched up between them: Seyyed Mobārak agreed to retire to Ḥavīza on condition that Maḥdīqolī Khan leave the fort and return to Šūštar. Rumor has it that Seyyed Mobārak plotted treachery against Maḥdīqolī Khan and planned to attack him when he emerged from the fort, but the plot was revealed to the Khan by Seyyed Mobārak's son, Seyyed Badr, who was loyal to the Safavids. As a result of this warning, the Khan remained on the defensive within the fort until Seyyed Mobārak, realizing that he had smelled a rat and was acting with caution, decamped and returned to Ḥavīza.

In Lorestān, Šahverdi Khan 'Abbāsī had heard the news. To demonstrate his loyalty to the Shah, he had marched to the relief of Maḥdīqolī Khan, but the affair had been settled by the time he got there.

As soon as Maḥdīqolī Khan felt safe from any treacherous act on

the part of Seyyed Mobārak, he marched out of the fort, returned to Šūštar, and sent a report to the Shah. Since the Shah did not wish to make a confirmed enemy of Seyyed Mobārak, and had in the past overlooked his misdemeanors for this reason, he enjoined Mahdīqolī Khan to keep the peace, not to make incursions on to Seyyed Mobārak's territory, and to have nothing to do with the Arab tribes subject to Seyyed Mobārak's jurisdiction.

However, the Shah's wrath was vented on the Afšars who had caused all the trouble; the governorship of Kūh Gilūya was taken away from them and given to Allāhverdi Khan in addition to that of Fārs. Allāhverdi Khan marched to Kūh Gilūya and put to death many of the troublemakers among the Arešlū and Kondūzlū clans, and also many Lors from the Jākī, Javānakī, Bāndānī and other clans, who were a perpetual source of sedition in that province. Heavy fines were imposed on others. In short, the Afšars and Lors received such a drubbing that the mere thought of revolt never again entered their heads. Having carried out his orders in regard to Kūh Gilūya, Allāhverdi Khan installed members of the *golāms* as local governors throughout the province, and returned to court to report to the Shah. The Shah, praising him for his services, showed him high favor.

The Raid on Yazd by Uzbegs from Khorasan and Their Repulse by 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and His Qezelbāš

This year, the Uzbegs disturbed the equilibrium on the eastern front by raiding Yazd, which they reached via Ṭabas and the way stations of Maḥāza and Kāndaq. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, a *qūrčī* of the quiver who was the governor of Yazd, had been warned of the approach of the Uzbegs by Mehrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Ṭabas. He placed the city in a state of defense and marched out against the Uzbegs with some four or five hundred *qezelbāš* and local contingents of musketeers, only to discover that the Uzbegs were approaching the city by another route. After riding eight *farsaks* along the road to Ṭabas, 'Alīqolī Khan turned back and reached Yazd. The next day, the Uzbek advance guard, consisting of about twelve hundred seasoned veterans, followed by the main body of two or three thousand men, came in sight and camped outside the city, and the Uzbegs began plundering everything within sight.

The Yazdīs counseled caution, and at first 'Alīqolī Khan followed

their advice; he saw to the defense of the walls and gates of the city and of the citadel, while the inhabitants of Yazd continued to advise against a sortie. However, the Khan, though fully aware of the dangers of the situation and of the paucity of his forces, sallied forth with a small band of Šamlū gāzīs, musketeers, and the other men he had to hand, and boldly attacked the Uzbegs. The Uzbegs had come only for loot, and they wanted to get back with the booty they had amassed. They were therefore caught unprepared when 'Alīqolī Khan and his men charged them at full gallop, shattered their ranks, and slew some three hundred of their number, others being taken prisoner. The rest fled, concerned more about their survival than about their loot. The Šamlū gāzīs pursued the Uzbegs for several *farsaks*, capturing some of the enemy complete with their booty. The troubles of the Uzbegs were not yet over, for Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, who was on his way from Ṭabas with a force of seasoned young troops, intercepted the refugees at Rabāṭ-e Ḳarāneq and inflicted another severe defeat on them. Those Uzbegs who survived fled into the waterless wastes of the desert and the mountains. Even there, they were pursued by contingents of local musketeers from Bāfq and Behābād⁸ under the command of Mowlānā Faqr al-Dīn Aḥmad Bāfqī. Many more were taken prisoner; others perished from thirst. Few of the original Uzbeg army made their way back to Khorasan.

Also this year a contingent of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan's troops made a sudden attack on 'Alī Khan Gerāyī and slew many of his men; 'Alī Khan took refuge in the fort of Rūḡad, but later became a traitor.

The Transfer of the Remains of Shah Tahmasp from Mašhad to Isfahan, and from there to Ardabīl

At the beginning of Book I, I stated that Shah Esma'il II had transferred the remains of Shah Tahmasp to Mašhad for reburial there. The officers entrusted with this task were Morteżāqolī Khan Pornāk, the governor of Mašhad, and 'Alīqolī Khan Šamlū, the *beglerbeg* of Herat. Three or four graves were dug within the precincts of the shrine of the Imam Reżā, so that the warden and attendants of the shrine might choose whichever site they thought most suitable and most likely to protect the body of the Shah from desecration by enemies. These sites were on display to the general public for several days.

⁸Southeast of Yazd, on the edge of the Great Desert.

On the night the governor had decided upon for the burial, he went to the shrine in the company of Mīr Seyyed 'Alī Mofaṣṣal Astarā-bādī or Mīr Seyyed 'Alī Šūštārī the *ṣadr*⁹ (authorities differ on this point) and Shaikh Ḥasan *ḥaffār* (the gravedigger) Mašhadī, and closed the gates of the sanctuary. Another grave was then dug adjacent to the sepulcher of the Imam, and the remains of Shah Tahmasp were buried there. The other graves were also filled in. The grave emblems were placed on the dais below the Imam's tomb. The Koran reciters on duty at the tomb of the Imam used to recite verses from the Koran at that spot, and the attendant appointed to be on duty at the Shah's grave lit his candles there, so it came to be generally accepted as the site of the Shah's grave.

When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan captured Mašhad and the shrine fell into Uzbek hands, the religious fanaticism of that ignorant miscreant made him resolve to desecrate the grave of Shah Tahmasp and those of the Safavid princes who were also buried within the shrine precincts. He therefore had the graves excavated, but found only a few putrefying old bones. Some years later, some misguided fellow told the 'Abdollah Khan and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan that Shah Tahmasp's grave was elsewhere, and that he knew its location. Urged on by certain bigots, they sent an officer named Dūstom Bahādor to excavate the site so that the Shah's remains might be taken to Bokhara and subjected to every form of ignominy that their minds could devise.

Dūstom Bahādor carried out his orders, and the Shah's remains were placed in a sack which was then sealed by Qodāy Nāzar Bī, the Uzbek governor of Mašhad. Dūstom Bahādor, before departing for Transoxania, spent a few days in a place near Mašhad called Jonābodak as the guest of Reżāqolī Beg, the son of Pahlavān Shah 'Alī, who was the storekeeper at the shrine of Imam Reżā. He was an Eṣfahānī by birth. When he heard of Dūstom Bahādor's mission, Reżāqolā Beg put himself out to detain his guest for a few days by making himself an agreeable host. One day, he said jokingly to Dūstom Bahādor, "If you take these remains via Tūn and Ṭabas and deliver them into the hands of the *qezelbaş*, you will get ten times as much as you hope to get for this service from 'Abdollah Khan and

⁹The son of Mīr Asadollah Šūštārī, appointed *ṣadr* by Shah Tahmasp in 943/1536-37 or 944/1537-38 (see Savory, *Tahmāsp*, pp. 82-83). When Mīr Asadollah reached a great age, his son acted as his *nāyeb* (deputy) and, in 970/1563, Mīr Seyyed 'Alī was made *ṣadr* of Azerbaijan and Khorasan when the office of *ṣadr* was divided on a territorial basis (*idem*, p. 79). Mīr Seyyed 'Alī apparently continued to hold the position of *ṣadr* after the accession of Shah Esmā'il II in 984/1576.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan!" Dūstom Bahādor pricked up his ears when he heard this mention of a possible reward and said, "I do not have any family in Transoxania, nor do I have any particular ties with that region. If you are telling me the truth, and are willing to make a covenant that what you are telling me will happen, I will do as you wish." Reżāqolī Beg entered into the necessary covenants, and together the two men took the Shah's remains and rode by forced marches to Ṭabas.

In later years, Dūstom Bahādor used to say that he had had a dream in which he had been forbidden to take the Shah's remains to Transoxania and instructed to leave them in Iran, that he had revealed this dream to Reżāqolī Beg and asked his assistance, and that as a result the two of them had taken the remains to Ṭabas. At all events, when the two men reached Ṭabas, they were received with great honor by the governor, Meḥrab Khan Qājār; the governor immediately reported the situation to the Shah, who was overjoyed at the news. He ordered that Shah Tahmasp's remains should be escorted all the way from Ṭabas to Isfahan. At every stage on the journey, the populace turned out on the Shah's orders to carry the bier on their shoulders to the next stage and to proffer suitable hospitality to Dūstom Bahādor and Reżāqolī Beg, who had been responsible for bringing these blessed remains back into Iranian custody. When the cortège reached Isfahan, Shah 'Abbas, accompanied by all his emirs and the principal officers of state, came out on foot to meet it; themselves acting as pallbearers, they bore the bier into the city and set it down in the shrine ascribed to the Imam 'Alī Zeyn al-'Ābedīn,¹⁰ which is the burial place of two eminent descendants of that Imam. As the news spread throughout the Safavid empire, this shrine became a place of pilgrimage for those who wished to pay their respects to the memory of Shah Tahmasp.

Although there are some doubts regarding the genuineness of this whole affair, nevertheless Shah 'Abbas considered it to be in his political interest to certify it as true and thus confound his enemies, the Uzbeks. But even if we suppose for the sake of argument that events did not happen in this way, there is no argument about the fact that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, when he first occupied Mašhad, disinterred some moldy bones belonging to persons buried beneath the dais below the Imam's tomb, removed these bones in the belief that

¹⁰The fourth Eṣnā 'Ašārī Imam, who died in 94/712-13 or 95/713-14, and was buried at Medina.

they were those of Shah Tahmasp and the Safavid princes, and treated them with ignominy. The eternal divine will therefore turned its attention to removing this dishonor against the holy remains of Shah Tahmasp, because any act designed to bring dishonor upon that pious king and *seyyed* of pure faith could not be regarded with approval in God's court, and the eternal magician devised a stratagem designed to make it clear to all that the holy remains of Shah Tahmasp did not deserve to be treated with insults and dishonor.

Both Reżāqolī Beg and Dūstom Bahādor were enrolled among the Shah's attendants at court and received gifts that exceeded their expectations. The *qezelbaş* emirs and nobles, and all supporters of the Safavid house, were ordered not to be derelict in their duty to see to their welfare.

Eventually, the remains of Shah Tahmasp were moved to Ardabil and were reinterred within the shrine complex, but for security reasons I shall not describe the location of the burial place.

After the reconquest of Khorasan by Shah 'Abbas, I talked to Shaikh Ḥasan *ḥaffār*, and he declared that no alien hand had desecrated the grave of Shah Tahmasp. He further asserted that the remains in question were those of one of the *seyyeds* of the shrine establishment, who had been thus blessed by the spirit of Shah Tahmasp in that his remains had been saved from the mischief of the enemy and reinterred in such a holy place.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

Ambassadors came from all parts of the world to the court of Shah 'Abbas this year: some were received at Qazvin, others at Isfahan, and there was such a throng of envoys, bearing countless gifts, as had rarely been seen in previous years. Among them were Mirzā Zīā al-Dīn Kašī and Abū Naṣr Kāfi, ambassadors on behalf of the Mogul emperor Akbar; with them was Yādegār Sultan Rūmlū, who had been sent as an ambassador to India seven years before. Mirzā Zīā al-Dīn, the son of Mīr Raḥī' al-Dīn the *qāzī* of Kashan, had emigrated to India some twenty-five years previously and had acquired an honored position at the Mogul court; Abū Naṣr was from Kāf. They had traveled to Iran via Kīj, Makrān, and Kerman. They were received by the Shah at Qazvin. The Meydān-e Sa'adatābād was illuminated and the bazaars decorated in their honor, and for several

days they were guests at special banquets given in the Meydān.

After the usual formalities, the ambassadors delivered letters of friendship from Emperor Akbar, letters written by Shaikh Abu'l-Faẓl, the son of Shaikh Mobārak, and replete with elegant conceits. Camels bearing the emperor's gifts were paraded before the Shah in the Meydān.

After these festivities, the Shah felt in the mood to visit Isfahan and enjoy the delights of the Naqš-e Jahān palace there. While he was in residence at Isfahan, various other Persian ambassadors returned from their missions. Among them was Asad Beg Tabrīzī the *gerekyarāq* (purveyor of essential supplies),¹¹ who had been sent on an embassy to the rulers of the Deccan several years previously; he arrived with a whole camel train laden with the products and stuffs of India. Another returning ambassador was Eslām Beg Šamlū the centurion, who had been sent on a mission to Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, the governor of Herat; he was accompanied by another embassy from the latter. Since it was clear that Mīr Qolbābā could not have sent these embassies without the knowledge, and therefore the consent, of 'Abdollāh Khan himself, Shah 'Abbas considered it sound policy to open correspondence with 'Abdollāh Khan. He therefore sent Mīr Qolbābā's ambassadors back in the company of Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū,¹² an *ešīk-āqāsī*. Ambassadors also arrived from Georgia and, like the other envoys, were received with honor.

Ambassadors arrived this year as well from the *beglerbeg* of Baghdad. They brought the news that Aḥmad Khan, the former ruler of Gīlān, had died a natural death in Istanbul. Emir Tājmir Baḳtārī, whose family had been emirs of the Baḳtārī Lōrs for generations, appeared in person at court; until now he had refused to be tamed, but at this point he declared his loyalty to the Shah and pleaded for forgiveness for his past misdemeanors, in return for which he undertook to express his gratitude in material terms. The Shah received him graciously, granted his requests, and sent him back with robes of honor.

Another visitor at court this year was Malek Jalāl al-Dīn Khan, the son of Malek Maḥmūd and ruler of Sīstān, who had been driven out of his territory by the Uzbegs. Mindful of the traditional loyalty

¹¹See *TM*, pp. 177-78 and 178n.

¹²A clan of the Šamlū tribe.

of his house to the Safavids, he traveled to court at Isfahan by way of Kerman. The Shah was delighted to see him, and made him his companion at private assemblies and banquets.

This year, the Takkalū tribe felt the full weight of the Shah's wrath, and were subjected to a systematic purge. The Shah had not forgotten that Ūlama and Ġazī Khan had deserted to the Ottomans during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, had fought their own chief, Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oġlū, and had handed over to the Ottoman sultan, Sūlāymān, the provinces of Arab Iraq and Baghdad. More recently, they had fallen still more from favor because of their opposition to Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā.¹³ This year, when Farḥād Khan subjugated Māzandarān, he reported to the Shah that a number of Takkalūs had been supporting the rebel Mālek Bahman and had formed the garrison of the fort at Āmol. This news caused the Shah's rage to flare up, and he gave orders that Takkalūs be put to death, wherever they might be, and their property impounded. Since the bulk of the Takkalūs were in the province of Hamadan, Ḥasan 'Alī Khan Čeganī was ordered to deal with them. Among the Takkalū chiefs who perished in this purge were Moṣṭafā Khan, the son of Moṣṭb Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oġlū, and Valī Beg. After the fires of the Shah's wrath had been quenched, those Takkalūs who had escaped the sword were pardoned, and the Takkalū contingent of the royal bodyguard was allowed to resume its duties on the same basis as before.

Among the deaths this year was that of Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, the son of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, whom Shah 'Abbas had been forced to send as a hostage to Istanbul. Since he was the Shah's nephew and it was not fitting that a Safavid prince, a *seyyed's* son and a Shi'ite of pure faith, should sire children while he was in Ottoman hands, among the enemies of his faith, it was a merciful providence that decreed he should die a natural death of the plague at Istanbul, before he had had any children. Supporters of the Safavid house, nay, all the people of Iran, considered this yet another manifestation of the good fortune that attended this dynasty, since there was no longer any need to worry about this prince's future.¹⁴

¹³See my chapter "Safavid Persia," in *Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. I, pp. 412ff.

¹⁴The source of the worry, of course, was that the Ottomans might employ Sultan Ḥeydar Mīrzā, or his sons if he were to have any, as pretenders to the Safavid throne, as they had done in 1548 in the case of Alqāš Mīrzā.

Another event this year was the death of 'Alyār Khan Īmūr in the region of Astarābād. His son, Moḥammad Yār, a handsome young man, was fearful of the Göklen, Üklü, and Sīāh-pūš tribes living in the Astarābād region, and took refuge at the Safavid court at Isfahan through the mediation of Mīrzā Beg Fendereskī, the son of Mīrzā al-Dīn, an eminent *seyyed* of Astarābād whose loyalty to the Safavid house was unquestioned. I mentioned in book I, under the history of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, that a group of Šā'en-kānī Turkmans, who were subject to the ruler of Kārazm, had taken up residence in the Astarābād area, between the Atrak and Gorgān rivers, and that the Īmūr tribe formed part of this group. Although the Īmūr tribe's ties with the other Šā'en-kānī tribes were relatively weak, 'Alyār Khan achieved prominence among them by virtue of his intelligence, wisdom, maturity, and experience, and his leadership was accepted. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, some of these tribesmen migrated to the banks of the Gorgān River and engaged in agriculture on an extensive scale. At times they were obedient to the governors of Astarābād and paid agricultural taxes; at other times they were in a state of rebellion, and the more unruly elements among them carried out raids along the frontier of that province.

After the death of Shah Tahmasp, *qezelbāš* affairs fell into such a state of chaos that no *qezelbāš* governor was able to maintain his position at Astarābād. In every district, some noble would follow the practice of the Sīāh-pūš tribe and build a castle to defend himself against the raids of the Šā'en-kānī Yaqqa Turkmans; he would stock his castle with musketeers and archers and assert his independence in his own particular district. 'Alyār Khan followed a prudent policy in regard to these upstart lords: He kept them happy with a minimum of blandishment and gifts, and got in their way as little as possible.

After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, the Uzbegs swept across Khorasan and subjugated the province of Kārazm and the districts of Nesā and Darūn, which are adjacent to Astarābād. Shah 'Abbas adopted a cautious policy toward the Yaqqa Turkmans, being afraid that, because they were coreligionists of the Uzbegs, they might make common cause with the latter and overrun the province of Astarābād. Therefore, when 'Alyār Khan made overtures to him through the good offices of Mīrzā Beg, the Shah was most gracious toward him, issued an order appointing him governor of Astarābād, and in general treated him with great civility.

Alyār Khan was delighted by his appointment, and sent a *dārūga* to administer the city on his behalf. He himself remained near the Gorgān River and continued to cultivate friendly relations with the Sīāh-pūš tribe. Through his efforts, the inhabitants of Astarābād, most of whom were pious and God-fearing men, were protected from molestation by the other Ša'en-kānī tribes. Things went on in this way for a considerable time, but when 'Alyār Khan died, his son repaired to the Safavid court, as I have already stated. Since Shah 'Abbas was still obliged to act with great circumspection in this area, he issued an order appointing Moḥammad Yār Khan governor of Astarābād on the same basis as his father.

Another death this year was that of Aqa Shah 'Alī Dowlatābādī Eṣfahānī, the comptroller of the realm (*mostowfi al-mamālek*); he died of pleurisy and pneumonia during the Shah's stay at Isfahan. He was a self-controlled and upright man who treated the people well. His skill in bookkeeping and clerical work was unequaled, and he was a master accountant. The chronogram of his death is "The standard of accountancy has departed" (1005/1596-97).

Events of the Year of the Fowl, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1006/1597-98, the Eleventh Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day occurred this year on Friday, 2 Ša'bān 1005/21 March 1597. The Shah was at Qazvin, and the weather, for once, was unseasonable, with an overcast sky and steady rain. Winter had not relaxed its grip, and the New Year's festivities had to be postponed for several days because of persistent snow and rain. When the weather at last improved, the Shah held his customary New Year's audience in the Čehel Sotūn hall of the royal palace. Monarchs and princes from many parts and foreign ambassadors were received by the Shah, and offered their felicitations on the occasion of the New Year.

An auspicious event which occurred this year was the birth of the Shah's son, Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā. Messengers were sent to all parts of the empire to announce the glad news; kettledrums were beaten for several days, and high and low, young and old made the prince's birth an occasion for further merrymaking. Every day the Shah played polo in the Meydān-e Sa'ādātābād, and took part in archery contests. Then, his holiday over, he turned his attention once more to urgent affairs of state.

This year, the Uzbeks returned to the attack, this time from two different directions; their plundering raids extended from Khorasan to Iraq, and a number of skirmishers reached Damghan and Beštām. Some of these scattered in pursuit of plunder; others stood on guard in case their assistance was required. Ḥoseyn Khan Čeganī, after being dismissed from his post as governor of Hamadan, had been made governor of Beštām; he and Mīrzā 'Alī Beg 'Arab 'Āmerī, the guardian of the roads (*mostahfez-e šavāre'*), who happened to be at Beštām, abandoned all caution and attacked the Uzbeks without waiting for their troops to mobilize. The Uzbek reserves emerged from their place of ambush and charged the Safavid forces, which were routed with heavy casualties; Ḥoseyn Khan and Mīrzā 'Alī 'Arab, after putting up a hard fight, were both killed.

Another group of Uzbek raiders, starting from Toršīz, took the road to Kūharz, a dependency of Damghan. Going beyond the con-

finest of Khorasan, they made their presence felt as far as Ārān and Bīd-e Gol in the Kashan district, on the edge of the desert. The *dārūga* of Semnān, like Ḥoseyn Khan Čeganī, made the mistake of underestimating the opposition and pursued the Uzbeks with a force of local Persian levies from Semnān. They were attacked by the Uzbeks, the *dārūga* was unable to hold his ground, and his men fled.

Shah 'Alī Khan Mīr Čamešgezek marched against the enemy from his fief at Kār, with a body of Čamešgezek *gāzīs*, and caught up with them in the desert near Bojnūd; in the battle, several Uzbek leaders were killed. Their men fled, abandoning their booty, which was later collected by Shah 'Alī Khan, who sent the heads of the slain, together with the prisoners, to court. This victory checked further Uzbek raids for the moment, but prudence dictated that the Safavid forces remain on the alert. Steps also had to be taken to deal with the revolt of 'Alī Khan Gerāyli. A detachment of *qezelbāš* was therefore dispatched in the direction of Beštām, with the object both of getting warning of Uzbek movements in Khorasan and of suppressing the revolt of 'Alī Khan. Beyrām 'Alī Sultan, the brother of Ḥasan 'Alī Khan Čeganī, was appointed governor of Beštām, and Darviš 'Alī Kālifa was made chief of the Gerāyli tribe; he was the son of Mīrzā 'Alī Kālifa, whose family had been emirs of that tribe for generations.

Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Qom; Valī Khan Mīrzā, the grandson of Dürmiš Khan Šāmlū; and Ḥoseyn Khan Mošāḥeb Qājār were sent to Beštām. Their orders were to camp in the Beštām plain until the crop had been harvested and, if the Uzbeks launched any raids, to march against them; they were also to collect military intelligence from all parts of Khorasan. After the crops had been harvested and stored safely in the forts, Ḥoseyn Khan Qājār was to return to his fief, and Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Qom, was to march into Gerāyli territory with his Šāmlū troops, capture the fort held by the rebel 'Alī Khan Gerāyli, and install Darviš 'Alī Kālifa as governor of that region.

The emirs carried out their orders to the letter, and Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū returned to court and was received with honor by the Shah. 'Alī Khan Gerāyli had been deserted by most of the *begs* and elders of the Gerāyli tribes, who had elected to demonstrate their loyalty to the Shah and had transferred their allegiance to 'Alī Khan Gerāyli. 'Alī Khan Gerāyli sought some means of making amends for

his rebellion and of reinstating himself in royal favor, but without avail, and he eventually paid the penalty for his disloyalty.

Although Shah 'Abbas, from the time of his accession, had been under the protection of providence and, with God's aid, his officers had won many victories, this year the divine favor was vouchsafed in the form of several notable successes that surpassed any which had preceded them. The whole of the province of Ṭabarestān, including all the forts in Māzandarān and Rostamdār, was brought under the control of Safavid officers, as was the province of Lorestān, and Šahverdi Khan, the governor of Lorestān, was taken prisoner.

*The Subjugation of Rostamdār and the Capture of the
Forts and Rulers of That Region, by God's Grace*

The province of Rostamdār is situated between Gīlān and Māzandarān. It consists of plains and the mountains of Ṭavaleš from Āmol and Māzandarān on the east, to Tonakābon in Gīlān on the west; in width, Rostamdār consists of the strip between Mount Damāvand and the Caspian Sea. During the 'Abbasid caliphate, the whole of the province of Rostamdār, together with its dependencies, was in the hands of the ancestors of Malek Kayūmarš b. Bīsotūn b. Gos-taham, who traced their descent from Jāmāsb b. Fīrūz, the paternal uncle of Nūšīrvān b. Qobād, the Sasanid monarch.

In the course of time, the power of the rulers of Rostamdār declined; Rūyān, formerly the administrative center and seat of the rulers of Rostamdār, slipped from their control, and other parts of the province were annexed by the rulers of Iran and incorporated in the province of Iraq. The portions left to the rulers of Rostamdār were Lārījān, Nūr, and Kojūr, which were divided among the various princes of this house in the manner already described.

In the time of Shah Tahmasp, the house of Rostamdār had three branches: Lārījān, formerly a dependency of Kojūr, ruled by Malek Bahman; Nūr, ruled by Malek 'Azīz; and Kojūr, ruled by Malek Sultan Moḥammad. By the time Shah 'Abbas came to the throne, Malek Sultan Moḥammad and Malek 'Azīz had both died, and their respective sons (both named Jahāngīr), had inherited their patrimony. Both Jahāngīrs had presented themselves to the Shah at Lār and had indicated their willingness to serve him. The ruler of Nūr, a man of ascetic temperament, made a gift of his territory to the Shah,

and accepted a fief at Sāva, where he lived out the remainder of his days. Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr, was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* and officers in attendance at the Shah's private assemblies, so that he became the envy of his peers. He retained possession of his ancestral dominions, and his subsequent history will be given later, God willing.

When Malek Bahman, as already related, met his just deserts, his eldest son, Key Kosrow, then seventeen years of age, was at the castle of Došmankūr, together with his brothers and the rest of the family. He moved his father's treasury to the fort, thinking that as long as he remained there, no harm could come to him. However, he did not have the necessary support to enable him to maintain his opposition to the Shah. The former retainers and supporters of Malek Bahman were so disgusted by his improper actions and tyrannical behavior that his removal from the scene was a relief to them, and they refused to do their duty in regard to the defense of the fort and the protection of his family.

In this situation, Malek Key Kosrow had no choice but to throw himself on the mercy of the Shah, whom he visited with a number of the chiefs of his house. He agreed to hand over the fort of Došmankūr to the agents of the supreme *dīvān*, and the Shah ordered Moḥammad Beg Begdlū, a senior Šāmlū chief and a *moqarrab*, to expropriate Malek Bahman's assets and take possession of his forts and his sons. Moḥammad Beg took possession of the forts at Lārījān and Došmankūr and expropriated all Malek Bahman's assets, comprising cash, precious items, handguns and other weapons, the provisions of the forts, and the trappings of a ruler, and sent it to Qazvin along with Malek Bahman's servants, family, and sons.

Since the Shah had promised Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn that, if Malek Bahman and his sons ever fell into his hands, he would turn them over to him, he now surrendered them all to him, both males and females, and Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn wreaked his vengeance on them for the sins of Malek Bahman (and in so doing he was merely acting as the agent of the divine will). The district of Lavāsān was allotted to Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn; Lārījān was made a fief of the *qezelbaş* governor; and this house became extinct. Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn was a ruthless man who thought nothing of shedding blood; he would impose severe penalties for minor offenses, and in his prisons languished persons who had been incarcerated for twenty or thirty years for

some minor offense. One source informed me (the responsibility for the accuracy of this statement rests with its source) that one woman, who had been thrown into jail because of Malek Sultan Ḥoseyn's enmity toward her father and her brother, spent her whole life in prison and finally died there.

The Subjugation of the Province of Kojūr and the Capture of Malek Jahāngīr

As already mentioned, Malek Jahāngīr had initially obtained a position of honor in the Shah's service. The Shah, finding him a slightly mad, simple-minded fellow, treated him kindly, but eventually either his folly or his madness led him to throw away his honored position at court by returning to Kojūr, strengthening his forts, and becoming a rebel. The Shah sent a detachment of *qūrčīs* against him, under the command of Allāhqolī Beg, the *qūrčībāšī*. The *qūrčīs* laid siege to the fortress of Kojūr, known as Mārānkūh,¹ and gunners from the special *gōlām* artillery regiment cast large cannon and bombarded the fort. The siege dragged on for four months. During this time a group of Rostamdārī *maleks* plotted treachery against the Safavid commander; if they could slay Allāhqolī Beg, they thought, the siege of Mārānkūh would be raised. They therefore tendered their submission to the Shah, declared themselves to be his loyal and devoted servants, went to Allāhqolī Beg with some fifty men, and bound themselves to help him capture the fort. The *qūrčībāšī* reported all this to the Shah; meanwhile, he bestowed on the Rostamdārī chiefs robes of honor, and they bathed in royal favor.

The Shah, however, relying on his intuition, warned him against possible treachery on the part of the Rostamdārīs, and urged him to be on his guard. The conspirators, apparently loyal, kept coming into the *qezelbāš* camp and entering the *qūrčībāšī's* tent, ostensibly to discuss with him details regarding the progress of the siege, but in reality waiting for their opportunity to murder him. The *qūrčībāšī*, wise as he was, was completely taken in by them. One day, when the *qūrčībāšī* had gone to the bathhouse, the conspirators, pretending they had to speak with him urgently, came armed and waited outside. One of the conspirators warned the *qūrčībāšī* of his danger, and the latter, before coming out, sent a servant to summon the centurions, who seized the conspirators. Upon interrogation, they all confessed and were put to death by the *gūzīs*.

¹See Rabino, pp. 83, 106, 128, and 162, n. 104.

Soon afterward, the fortress fell to the Safavids. Before this happened, Malek Jahāngīr, despairing of success, had left his brothers at Mārānkūh and taken refuge in another fort. But he found his position there too untenable, and fled into the forests, constantly moving his quarters. A few days after he had left, the *qūrčīs* learned he was no longer in the fort. In the course of the bombardment, a considerable portion of the sun-dried brick of the towers had been smashed, and some of the interior timbers had been exposed. At dead of night, a small patrol of *qūrčīs* crept up to the walls and set fire to these timbers. The defenders cried for quarter and opened the gates of the fort. When the *qūrčīs* entered, they took prisoner Malek Jahāngīr's brother Malek Kā'ūs; another brother, Malek Ašraf, who was in the castle at Harsīn, was taken prisoner by Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjāng, the governor of Tonakābon, and sent to Allāhqolī Beg. The greater part of the Kojūr troops were put to death; the survivors were enrolled among the Shah's servants.

After the capture of the castle of Mārānkūh, the *gāzīs* fanned out in the forests, searching for Malek Jahāngīr. As luck would have it, a group of Sufis, retainers of Valī Sultan the governor of Rānekūh in Gilān, who in obedience to the Shah's orders were on their way to assist the *qūrčībāšī*, stumbled across Malek Jahāngīr on their way. When he caught sight of the Sufis, Malek Jahāngīr ordered the small group of picked men who were with him to engage the enemy and hold them off while he made his escape. The Sufis overcame the opposition; one of their number chancing to recognize Malek Jahāngīr, they did not call off the pursuit, but overtaking him in a defile, they dismounted from their horses and fell upon him.

Malek Jahāngīr and his companions were taken prisoner. The Sufis, taking their prisoners through the *qūrčībāšī's* camp during the night, took Malek Jahāngīr direct to court, and the *qūrčībāšī* sent in a full report. The Shah received the news of this triumph on his return from the campaign against Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī in Lorestān, and he returned thanks to God for this success. Since Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan and his men had performed notable services during the campaign in Kojūr, that province was initially allotted to him as a reward; after the reconquest of Khorasan, Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan was appointed governor of Saraḡs, and the *qūrčībāšī* was made governor of Kojūr. Malek Jahāngīr's brothers and the other prisoners were taken to court by the *qūrčībāšī* and put to death on the Shah's order at Saūj Bolāg. This terminated the line of the third of the three

maleks of Rostamdār (Nūr, Kojūr, and Lārtjān), and the whole of the province was now under the jurisdiction of Safavid officers.

The Shah's Campaign against Šāhverdī Khan 'Abbāsī, the Governor of Lorestān; the Capture of the Latter; and the Transfer of the Province to his Cousin, Ḥoseyn Khan

As already related, Farhad Khan and the *e'temād al-dowla* had made a settlement in Lorestān with Šāhverdī Khan.² Although the Shah intended to punish Šāhverdī Khan for his behavior, including his temerity in murdering Oğūrlū Sultan Bayāt, and was unable to condone acts of this sort, he did not repudiate the settlement made by Farhād Khan and the vizier and took no action against Šāhverdī Khan for a while. The loyalty of the latter, however, despite his assurances, continued to be in doubt; like so many people, he tried to keep in with both sides, the Ottomans and the Safavids. He continued to correspond with the Ottomans, in particular with the governor of Baghdad, to exchange envoys with them, and to engage in all kinds of intrigue, and this behavior continued to stoke the fires of the Shah's anger.

Šāhverdī Khan, conscious of his past misdeeds and afraid the Shah would march against him, avoided going to Korramābād because it was too close to Borūjerd and Silākor. This year, however, because of the excessive heat, and on the advice of his senior chiefs, he had come to Korramābād. While he was there, Seyyed Badr, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, who had left court without leave and was making for 'Arabestān, was brought in. The Shah dispatched a *qūrčī*, Abu'l Qāsem Ev-oğlū, to bring Seyyed Badr back, but Šāhverdī Khan procrastinated for several days, fobbing the envoy off with words, until Abu'l-Qāsem Beg was forced to use some strong language to get him to comply with the Shah's orders. The *qūrčī* reported Šāhverdī's Khan's obstructive and disloyal behavior to the Shah, and this finally tipped the balance and made the Shah determined to march against him.

Šāhverdī Khan never slept peacefully at night, because he knew it was only a matter of time before the Shah moved against him. He had stationed spies to send him word the moment the Shah left Qazvin. In order to put him off guard, the Shah informed only his personal retainers and *moqarrabs* of his real intention, and pretended to

²See pp. 675-6.

the rest of his troops that his destination was Isfahan. He marched to Sāva and then to Āva, and then swung west toward Lorestān, marching at full speed, and reaching Borūjerd, a distance of twenty *farsaks*, in a day and a night. He had ridden without pause, his men dropping out in large numbers as their horses foundered, so that by the time he reached the Borūjerd area barely five hundred were still with him. He waited a short time at Borūjerd to let some of his men catch up. Then he mounted again and covered another eight *farsaks* by morning; by breakfast time he was within sight of Korramābād, but no more than forty or fifty *qūrčīs*, *golāms*, and *moqarrabs* had stayed with him. They circled the town and surrounded Šahverdi Khan's residence, hoping with God's help to succeed in taking him prisoner.

Šahverdi Khan's spies had sent him daily reports of the Shah's departure for Isfahan, but the Khan had placed no reliance in them, saying that as far as Sāva the Shah could still turn in the direction of Lorestān, and caution was therefore necessary. He ordered a group of Lors from the Lāymardān tribe to camp on the banks of the river across the road to Šadmara, and he had several horses, recently broken in, kept saddled and bridled for a quick getaway. Then another courier arrived to say he had accompanied the Shah as far as Āva, and that he was bound for Isfahan. At this point, Šahverdi Khan relaxed.

On the day the Shah reached Korramābād, a courier had arrived early in the morning to inform the Khan that he had seen a posse of horsemen near Borūjerd, riding at full speed. The Khan, thinking the Lors had betrayed him in order to save their own necks, decided to be prudent and prepared for an immediate departure, without informing his troops. He saw that his women and children were mounted, and that his cash, jewels, and precious articles were sent in the direction of Šadmara in the charge of a few trusted servants. The Khan himself was still standing irresolutely at the Lāymardān Gate when he saw a group of *golāms* of the royal household (*golāmān-e kāšša-ye šarīfa*), who had lost their way among the orchards, making their way along by the river, where his quarters were located. He galloped away, pursued by the *golāms*, but the latter had to abandon the pursuit after half a *farsak*, since no one came to their assistance.

The Shah meanwhile had discovered that Šahverdi Khan was not in his house, but camped down by the river. By the time the Shah and

his party made their way through the orchards and reached his tents, he was half a *farsaḡ* away. The Shah waited a while for some of his men to catch up with him, but they were slow in arriving; and when they did come, their horses were exhausted and unfit for a pursuit. The Shah therefore waited in Kōrramābād for three days, during which the majority of the Lor tribes came to him and tendered their obeisance. The Shah placed in charge of the tribes Hōseyn Khan b. Maṇṣūr Beg Solvīzī, whose father was the uncle of Šāhverdī Khan.

This year, the Shah had already subdued two rebels: 'Alī Khan Gerāylī and Malek Jahāngīr, the ruler of Kojūr; he was determined to make Šāhverdī Khan the third. He marched to Šadmara to discover that the Khan had not tarried there either, but had left Lores-tān. The Shah placed a garrison at Šadmara and sent two patrols to seek him out: The first, under the command of the *qollar-āqāsī*, Allāhverdī Khan, consisted of *golāms* of the royal household; the second was under the command of Qanbar Beg Ostājlu, the chief sword bearer.³

Šāhverdī Khan had taken refuge with one of his relatives, a certain Šāhrokh who was commandant for the Ottomans of a fort named Jan-gala, which was under the jurisdiction of Baghdad. Šāhverdī Khan was confident that the Safavids would not pursue him into Ottoman territory, but the hunt went on remorselessly. One morning Allāhverdī Khan and his *golāms* happened to pass by this fort and to learn from a cowherd that Šāhverdī Khan and his family were within. The *golāms* at once galloped up to the fort, and a group of them swarmed over the drawbridge and reached the gates under a hail of arrows and bullets from the defenders. The *golāms* returned their fire; those who had reached the gates knew they could not retreat without having to answer to the Shah and their commander.

They therefore set fire to the gates and stood there with their shields over their heads, hoping a gap would appear through which they could pour into the fort. The heat from the flames was so great it prevented the defenders from getting near the fire to extinguish it. The gates were soon half-consumed, and a crack appeared through which the *golāms*, with their shields over their heads and their chain mail and jerkins protecting their chests, charged into the fort. Some

³*Salṭhdār-bāšī*; this office is not mentioned by TM. In the Ottoman administrative system, the office of *saliḥdār-aga* was largely ceremonial, but its holder was nevertheless an important official with a large entourage (see Gibb and Bowen, pp. i, 339-40).

of the defenders rushed to the battlements; others took their stations on rooftops; and the fight went on.

Šāhverdī Khan appeared, gun in hand, on the roof of his house, but every time he aimed it at the *golāms*, it misfired. He hurled the weapon away in a rage and took up his bow. A reliable witness reports him as saying: "The first time I fired an arrow, my bowstring snapped. I knew that my luck had run out. I hurled my bow away too, and gave up the struggle; I shouted to both sides to lay down their arms, and I sent a messenger to Allāhverdī Khan to beg him to order his men not to molest any of the people in the fort." Since the Lōrs had laid down their arms, the *golāms*, on orders from Allāhverdī Khan, molested no one. Šāhverdī Khan was brought before Allāhverdī Khan, who treated him with due courtesy, and placed a guard on the women of his harem and his children. Šāhrokh, the Ottoman governor and commandant of the fort, who had received a mortal wound in the fighting, was taken to the Safavid camp for surgery, but died on arrival there; some of Šāhverdī Khan's men were also killed in the engagement.

Allāhverdī Khan took Šāhverdī Khan, his children, and his dependents to the Shah. When they reached the Šadmara River, chains were placed around Šāhverdī Khan's neck. Allāhverdī Khan held the other end of the chain and led the prisoner into the presence of the Shah. Šāhverdī Khan was a handsome young man; had he but dissembled and shown some humility, in all probability even now he would have escaped injury. But he adopted a proud and haughty demeanor, most unsuitable for a person who was in a bad position and in the presence of the Shah, and the Shah had the Khan and several of his supporters put to death immediately.

The second search party, led by Qanbar Beg Ostājilū, returned to Korramābād; it had gone in the direction of Bādārāyā⁴ and had carried out a raid in that area, taking many animals as plunder. The Shah disapproved of the property of the peasants being looted in this way, and he had all the booty gathered together and returned to the governor of Baghdad in the charge of a *qūrčī*, with the request that it be given back to its owners. Hōseyn Khan Solvizi, the son of Man-šūr Beg, was appointed governor of Lorestān, except for Šadmara, Hendemīn, and other districts nearer Baghdad, which were allotted

⁴A district east of the Tigris bordering on the provinces of Kūzestān and Jebāl (see *Le Strange, Lands*, p. 80).

to Tahmaspqlı Sultan İnānlū. Since the Kāma-bidel tribe were enemies of the Solvīzīs and supporters of Šāhverdī Khan and the sons of Šojā' al-Dīn, they refused to accept Huseyn Khan Solvīzī as their governor. The tribe thus incurred the wrath of the Shah, who had the ringleaders executed at Korramābād, together with a number of other Lōrs whom he suspected of causing trouble. He had Jahāngīr, one of the sons of Šojā' al-Dīn, who was living among the Bayāt tribe, blinded, and two of the sons of Šāhverdī Khan sent to Alamūt. They were never heard of again.

Thus the rule of the so-called 'Abbasids of Lorestān came to an end, and the province was transferred to the true 'Abbasids, namely, the followers of Shah 'Abbas. The rest of the Lōrs submitted to Huseyn Khan Solvīzī, whose power in Lorestān steadily increased and far surpassed that of any of the sons of Šojā' al-Dīn. At the time of writing (1025/1616), Huseyn Khan is still governor of Lorestān.

The Capture of 'Alī Khan Gerāylī and His Paying the Penalty for His Treachery

As previously related, 'Alī Khan Gerāylī had rebelled and as a result had been deprived of his fief; Jājarm and some other districts had been allotted to Tavakkol Khan Gerāylī, and the forts at Pā-ye Hešār and Rūgād, with some other places, had been allotted to Darvīš Kalīfa, who was duly installed at Pā-ye Hešār by Huseyn Khan Šāmlū after he had captured that fort from 'Alī Khan. The majority of the Gerāylī chiefs transferred their allegiance to Darvīš 'Alī Kalīfa and Tavakkol Khan, and 'Alī Khan was at a loss where to find sanctuary. He had on a previous occasion taken refuge among the Uzbegs, but not trusting 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, had fled and thrown himself on the mercy of the Shah; he could not appeal to the Uzbegs a second time. Finally, he sent a messenger to Manšūr Khan Beg Gerāylī, who was a relative of his and a loyal servant of the Shah and with whom he was on bad terms, and requested a meeting. Manšūr Khan Beg having indicated his willingness to meet him, 'Alī Khan went to his house with a few men and tried by means of guile to persuade him to join him in fomenting rebellion.

Manšūr Khan Beg, who always avoided getting involved in anything of this sort, would have nothing to do with the idea; not only that, but mindful of the Shah's wrath, he placed 'Alī Khan in custody and sent a report to the Shah. The Shah sent Huseyn Beg Amākaš to

fetch 'Alī Khan to court. Hoseyn Beg placed his prisoner in stocks and pillory and presented him to the Shah at Borūjerd when the Shah was on his way back from the expedition to Lorestān. The Shah condemned him to death, which indeed he deserved, for there is no worse sin than ingratitude toward one's benefactor. First, his eyes were plucked out; then, some of his limbs and members were cut off; finally, his body was left where it lay, as a warning to others, and the army marched. No one, soldier or civilian, dared go to his assistance, for fear of the royal wrath.

The Subjugation of the Castle of Owlād in Māzandarān, Which Is One of the World's Famous Castles

Another event which occurred this year was the capture of the fortress of Owlād in Māzandarān. The previous year, Farhād Khan had subjugated most of Māzandarān and installed his brother Alvand Khan there as governor, but the fortress of Owlād had remained in the hands of Alvand Div. Owlād was a legacy from the ancient kings of Iran, and was the strongest fortress in Ṭabarestān. Alvand Div became the focal point for dissidents in the province. Alvand Khan went out of his way to try and keep the peace with Alvand Div, to such an extent that some people accused him of being in opposition to his brother and on the side of the Māzandarānī rebels. Although Alvand Khan was a bit crazy and his actions were frequently irrational, he was not guilty of this, which would have been pure madness.

After the Shah had returned from Lorestān, he sent Farhād Khan to deal with the situation in Māzandarān by capturing Owlād. To begin with, Farhād Khan sent his brother Alvand to court to give an account of himself. The Shah soon realized that the charges of collaboration that had been leveled against him were completely without foundation, and that if Alvand Khan had committed certain actions which smacked of collaboration, he was guilty of nothing more than folly, stupidity, and mental aberration. At the worst, he had been forced by circumstances to behave in a conciliatory manner for a while toward the enemy, and the Shah therefore released him.

Farhād Khan first entered into correspondence with Alvand Div, but the latter, with the fate of Malek Bahman vividly before him, refused categorically to meet the Khan. Farhād Khan therefore proceeded to lay siege to Owlād. Prior to his arrival, Alvand Div,

leaving his children and supporters in the fort, had taken to the forests with a small band of men. He was a man of action, and he saw no hope of salvation if he allowed himself to be besieged by the *qezelbaş*. Things began to get difficult for the defenders of the fort, and after Farhād Khan had suborned some of their number by means of bribes, the remainder saw no alternative but to surrender to the Khan. He took possession of all Alvand Div's property both in cash and kind, took prisoner his children and supporters, and reported the victory to the Shah. The latter received the news at Kashan, as he was on his way from Qazvin to Isfahan; he loaded Farhād Khan with robes of honor and rewards of all kinds. Alvand Div continued to roam the forests, constantly changing his abode. The rest of his story will be given, God willing, under the events of next year.

Miscellaneous Events That Occurred This Year

Early this year, Zu'l-Faqār Khan, who had been on an embassy to Istanbul, returned with a letter of friendship from the Ottoman sultan which urged the strengthening of the peace between the two empires. Also this year, the ambassadors from the Mogul emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, Mīrzā Ẓiā al-Dīn Qazvīnī and Kāja Abū Naṣr Kāfi, were dismissed with robes of honor and gifts.

Manūčehr Beg, a *golām* of the royal household and *ešik-aqāsi-bāši*, was appointed ambassador to India, and took his departure with Mīrzā Ẓiā al-Dīn. Among the gifts he took for the Mogul emperor were one hundred thoroughbred horses, all sired by pedigreed Arabian, Georgian, and Bayātī stallions; Arabian mares, each worth a fortune; and other gifts and products of Iran without number. The Iranian ambassador also took a letter of friendship addressed to Emperor Akbar. In the course of this letter, the Shah announced his firm intention to recover the province of Khorasan from the Uzbeks. On several occasions since his accession, said the Shah, he had marched against the Uzbeks, but each time circumstances had prevented him from wresting Khorasan from the hands of the enemy. He had also been much preoccupied with enemies at home. He was now free from these preoccupations, he said, and Iran was currently at peace with the Ottomans. He had sworn not to return to Qazvin until Khorasan was once more in Safavid hands. The ambassadors traveled to India by way of Kerman, Kij, and Makrān.

Up till now, Qazvin had been Shah 'Abbas's capital, and Isfahan had been the place to which he had gone for recreation, especially hunting. The natural advantages of Isfahan, such as its favorable location and the abundance of water from the Zāyanda-rūd and other streams which fed it, had made a great impression on the Shah, and he had long planned to spend some time there, laying out and developing the city. This was the year in which he decided to implement these plans.

The Shah spent the winter of 1597-98 at Isfahan, residing at the Naqš-e Jahān palace and spending most of his days in hunting and his nights in feasting. In the spring of 1598, he approved plans for the construction of magnificent buildings in the Naqš-e Jahān district, and architects and engineers strove to complete them. From the Darb-e Dowlat, which is the name for the city gate located within the Naqš-e Jahān precincts, he constructed an avenue to the Zāyanda-rūd. Four parks⁵ were laid out on each side of the avenue, and fine buildings adorned each. The avenue was continued across the river as far as the mountains bounding Isfahan to the south. The emirs and officers of state were charged with the creation of the parks and the construction of lodges on a royal scale within the parks, each to consist of reception rooms, covered ways, porticos, balconies, finely adorned belvederes, and murals in gold and lapis lazuli.

At the southern end of the avenue, there was to be a vast garden, terraced on nine levels, for the pleasure of the king's guests; it was to be known as the 'Abbāsābād garden. The river was to be spanned by a bridge of special design: it was to have forty arches and, when the river was in spate, water would flow through all of them. The southern and northern portions of the avenue met at this bridge, and the total length of the avenue, as far as the 'Abbāsābād, was about one *farsakh*. On each side of the avenue, water flowed through channels, and trees were planted along them—planes, pines, and junipers. A stone conduit was also constructed down the center of the avenue to form another channel for water. In front of the buildings in the parks, ponds were to be constructed of the size of small lakes.

The emirs, nobles, and superintendents of buildings put the architects and engineers to work, and many magnificent buildings and splendid gardens have been completed in the last eighteen years, the whole scheme being the product of the Shah's fertile imagination.

⁵This feature gave the avenue its name, Čahār Bāg, which it still bears today.

The gardens were planted with both shade and fruit trees, and the buildings were decorated with novel designs in gilt and embellished with the works of artists. Perhaps Sadr and Kavarnaq⁶ were their equal; otherwise it is hard to imagine that their peer exists anywhere in the world. Later on, the suburb of 'Abbāsābād was built to the west of the Čahār Bāg to afford lodging to the Tabrīzīs, as will be related in due course. Shah 'Abbas spent many hours beautifying Isfahan with buildings, parks, attractive residences with porticos and belvederes, the Qeşarīya and Čahār Bāzār markets, mosques, bath-houses, and the magnificent Meşr-e Jāme' *caravanserais*. The chronogram for the commencement of work on the Čahār Bāg is: "The sapling bore fruit in accordance with the Shah's wishes."

Another event that occurred this year was the arrival of ambassadors from the Georgian princes Alexander Khan and Samā'un (Simon) Khan, who sent a number of Georgian girls and youths of noble birth for service in the royal harem. The ambassadors were loaded with gifts and sent on their way.

Also this year there occurred the murder of Moḥammad Yār Khan, the son of 'Alyār Khan Imūr, at the hands of the Ūklū tribe; Moḥammad Yār Khan, after the death of his father, had been raised to the rank of khan and allotted the governorship of Astarābād on the same terms as his father before him. After the murder of Moḥammad Yār Khan, his younger brother, Qelīj Beg, presented himself at the Safavid court, and Shah 'Abbas made him governor of Astarābād.

Shah 'Abbas spent the winter of 1006/1597-98 at Isfahan, taking his ease, but never for one moment neglecting the affairs of state. The spring of 1598 ushered in the Year of the Dog, the year in which the Shah's prayers to the Imam Reżā to assist him in the recovery of the province of Khorasan were finally answered.

⁶Two celebrated palaces built by No'mān b. Monzer for the Sasanid monarch Bahram Gūr.

The Events of the Year of the Dog, Corresponding to the Year 1007/1598-99, the Twelfth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Monday¹ 11 Ša'bān 1006/20 March 1598. Early in the year, Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū, the *esīk-āqāšī*, who had gone on an embassy to the Uzbegs and had met 'Abdollāh Khan at Herat, returned to Iran in the company of an Uzbek ambassador, Tātloq Bahādor. Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš sent by the hand of the latter a letter of friendship. Also, since his son had recently become a married man, a portion of the wedding feast was sent as a gift to the Shah. With Tātloq Bahādor there also came Mīrzā Beg, an eminent *naqīb*² of Transoxania and a *ḫāja* of the Naqšbandī Order. Mīrzā Beg had with him his whole household (his wife was a daughter of the ruling house at Kāšgar), and was on his way to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage. After being received with great respect by the Shah, he went on his way but died en route before reaching Mecca.

It seemed to Shah 'Abbas that he could take advantage of the estrangement between 'Abdollāh Khan and his son, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, to recover Khorasan—a province praised by poets, in which were situated the shrine of the Imam Reżā and his own birthplace, the city of Herat, where he spent his early years. In view of the fact the Mīr Qolbābā, who was the protégé and trusted officer of 'Abdollāh Khan, had seen fit to make overtures to the Shah because of his fear of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and the fact that 'Abdollāh Khan himself had used this *démarche* by Mīr Qolbābā to put his own relations with the Shah on a more friendly basis, and had sent an ambassador to the Safavid court as an earnest of this desire, it seemed to Shah 'Abbas to be sound policy to accept 'Abdollāh Khan's overtures, to send a return embassy to the Uzbek ruler, and at the same time to march against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who had had the temerity to rebel against his father. In the first place, argued the Shah, father and son would be preoccupied with their own quarrel, which had now reached the stage of open conflict; in the second place, 'Abdollāh Khan, because of his son's lack of filial piety and

¹The eleventh of Ša'bān fell on a Thursday.

²The *naqīb* was an official in charge of guild affairs. In Safavid Iran, he was subordinate to the *kalāntar* (see *TM*, pp. 81, 83).

his rebelliousness, was striving to break his power, and consequently would be unlikely to come to his son's assistance in Khorasan. "With God's help," said the Shah, "we will reconquer Khorasan; in any case, there is no harm in sending an embassy to 'Abdollah Khan."

Moḥammadqolī Beg, a smooth-tongued man, was again chosen as ambassador to 'Abdollah Khan, and the Shah began to make his preparations for the expedition to Khorasan. He gave orders that ten thousand musketeers be mustered from all parts of the Safavid dominions. After the departure of the embassy to 'Abdollah Khan, his intention was to inform Mīr Qolbābā of his plan to recover Mašhad. At this moment couriers brought the news that 'Abdollah Khan had died, and that most of the Uzbek emirs (for instance, Moḥammad Bāqī Bī, who was 'Abdollah Khan's *divānbeḡī* and chief officer of state), had given their allegiance, willingly or otherwise, to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. However, 'Abdollah Khan's nephew, Hezāra Sultan, with Dūstom Sultan and Uzbek Sultan, his cousins, had formed a coalition against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and thought they saw the chance to make themselves independent. Those emirs who were dominated by their fear of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had rallied around him and marched against the rebel coalition. This news strengthened the resolve of the Shah to march to Khorasan.

In book I, I stated that I would give as much historical background pertaining to the Uzbeks and the Ottomans as was relevant to the history of Iran under Shah 'Abbas. At this point, therefore, I must digress to give the reader some details regarding the estrangement between 'Abdollah Khan and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, the death of the former and the accession and subsequent death of the latter—details indispensable for a proper understanding of the Khorasan campaign.

Events in Transoxania and the History of 'Abdollah Khan and the Other Uzbek Princes

'Abdollah Khan was extremely fond of 'Abd al-Mo'men, who was his only son, and used to call him Bābā. It is the tradition of the rulers descended from the house of Genghis Khan to style themselves khan. Princes of the blood royal, until they come to the throne, are styled sultan. But 'Abd al-Mo'men received the appellation of khan during his father's lifetime, with the result that the people of Transoxania and the Uzbeks used to call 'Abdollah "the old Khan" and 'Abd al-Mo'men "the young Khan." 'Abd al-Mo'men was made gov-

ernor of Balk, and, with his father's assistance, annexed the province of Badakṣān, wresting it from the control of the princes of the house of Čaġatāy.

In the Year of the Pig (994/1585-86), when 'Abdollaḥ Khan captured Herat after an eleven-month siege, 'Abd al-Mo'men had expected to be rewarded for the outstanding services he had performed in the siege and slaughter of *qezelbaş* by having Herat added to his territories, particularly since it was close to his fief at Balk. But 'Abdollaḥ Khan considered him too young and inexperienced, and made Mīr Qolbābā, one of his own protégés and a man of sound judgment, governor of Herat. He distributed among the emirs those areas of Khorasan which came under Uzbek control: Dīn Moḥammad Khan, the son of Jānī Beg Sultan, known as Yatīm Sultan, who was his own nephew, was given a fief in Khorasan, as were his brothers, whereas 'Abd al-Mo'men was not allotted a fief in Uzbek-occupied territory in Khorasan. He used to console 'Abd al-Mo'men by saying, "since you are my heir, you will get all my possessions in the end." 'Abd al-Mo'men resented being treated in this way, but at the time was unable to show his resentment.

Two years later, he asked his father that any part of Khorasan which might subsequently be conquered through his efforts should be allotted to him. The request was granted. In the Year of the Ox (996/1587-88), 'Abd al-Mo'men led an army from Balk to Mašhad, which he besieged, and Yatīm Sultan and other emirs who were in Khorasan, on the orders of 'Abdollaḥ Khan, went to his aid. After capturing Mašhad, 'Abd al-Mo'men installed his own governor there. He did the same at Nishapur, Toršīz, and other places in Khorasan that gradually fell into his hands. After that, he picked a quarrel with Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the son of Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, the son of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and annexed the regions of Nesā, Abīvard, Darūn, Bāġbād, and so on, which were the ancestral territories of Nūr Moḥammad's family and of the Naīmān Uzbek tribe.

Since 'Abdollaḥ Khan had only one son, he supported this steady acquisition of power by 'Abd al-Mo'men because he wanted his son to be powerful enough to deal with any challenge to his succession by one of his cousins or one of the other Uzbek princes. In the end, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had an army of twenty thousand seasoned troops under his command. At this point, he began to show signs of rebellion against his father. When 'Abdollaḥ Khan had seized power

at Bokhara, his father, Eskandar Khan, was still alive; in accordance with Genghizid precedent and customary law, he allowed his father to keep the title of ruler in the *koṭba* and on the coinage, but the real power lay in his own hands. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan began to cite this as a precedent: "My father is getting old," he said, "he should retire and let me take charge of affairs." 'Abd al-Mo'men by this time controlled most of Khorasan, but he wanted complete control over the whole province, as far as Balk and the Oxus River. He repeatedly asked his father for Herat and was refused. In his resentment he would say, "If my father will not give me Herat, I will march against Mīr Qolbābā and take it by force."

Such words, reported to 'Abdollah Khan, were responsible for a change in the Khan's attitude toward his son. Although 'Abd al-Mo'men was his only son and his heir, he was now on his guard lest that son should, in his impatience, oust him from the throne, and he set about seeking means of reducing his power. He forbade 'Abd al-Mo'men to engage in further military adventures designed to increase the size of his territory, and gave orders to his emirs in Khorasan not to obey 'Abd al-Mo'men's commands and not to accompany him on any expedition.

The result was that when 'Abd al-Mo'men marched against Sabzavār and Shah 'Abbas led a counterattack against him from Iraq he received no help from Yatīm Sultan or from 'Abdollah Khan's brothers in Khorasan. Since his father was not in favor of his expedition, he could achieve nothing further. 'Abdollah Khan sent him a message: "Do not be greedy! Look after your affairs at Balk, and be satisfied with the fief you have! Act in a civilized way, and do not compare our situation with the case of myself and my father Eskandar, because you will never be the man that I am, and I am not as senile as Eskandar Khan was!" Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan refused to give up his dream of ruling Herat, and he kept on registering complaints against Mīr Qolbābā. His father, knowing his motive, disregarded them. Relations between father and son deteriorated, but neither side did anything to provoke open conflict.

In the Year of the Fowl (1006/1597-98), 'Abdollah Khan came to Marv via Čahār-jū on a hunting expedition, with a few of his favorite emirs and close companions. Mīr Qolbābā begged him to visit Herat. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, with several thousand men, was on his way from Balk to meet his father. 'Abdollah Khan's emirs pointed out

that he had only a few men with him, that 'Abd al-Mo'men was not to be trusted, and that they should retire within the walls of the citadel at Marv and deny 'Abd al-Mo'men's men entry. 'Abdollah Khan, refusing to be intimidated, received his son at his camp in the Šahom Bī park. 'Abd al-Mo'men considered it politic on this occasion to treat his father with respect, and to ask forgiveness for his past shortcomings. Father and son spent several days hunting together in the Marv and Sarak districts. Mīr Qolbābā then extended his invitation to visit Herat to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan too, and father and son went to Herat together as the guests of Mīr Qolbābā, who offered suitable gifts to both "the old Khan" and "the young Khan."

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, however, still bore a grudge against Mīr Qolbābā and spoke to him harshly, accusing him of embezzling *dīvān* revenue. 'Abd al-Mo'men incited Moḥammad Bāqī, the *dīvān-begī*, and others who had the ear of 'Abdollah Khan to tell the latter about Mīr Qolbābā's friendly relations with the *qezelbāš*. But 'Abdollah Khan had complete trust in Mīr Qolbābā and refused to listen to anything they said.

'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then urged his father to break his return journey at Balḵ and be his guest for a few days; 'Abdollah Khan agreed and gave his son permission to precede him and make preparations for a feast at Balḵ. He himself would be close behind. Reliable informants have told me that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had had a jeweled throne constructed from the gold and jewels obtained in Badaḵšān and Khorasan, and a short stepladder, fashioned of silver, to enable him to mount the throne. He had given it out that he was having it made for his father and would present it to him when the latter came to Balḵ; he would stand at the foot of this throne, he said, and would offer all his other possessions as a gift to his father.

Those who were afraid of 'Abd al-Mo'men, particularly Mīr Qolbābā, urged 'Abdollah Khan not to go to Balḵ. "'Abd al-Mo'men is lying," they said; "he is up to some trickery. He aims to confine his father in the citadel at Balḵ and make himself ruler of Transoxania, Turkestan, Kārazm, Balḵ, and Badaḵšān." The upshot was that 'Abdollah Khan, despite the preparations which had been made, did not go to Balḵ; he rode back to Bokhara at top speed, by the same route by which he had come. When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan heard the news, he considered this proof positive that his father did not trust him, and he blamed it all on Mīr Qolbābā. He brought a large army to Khorasan,

first going to Mašhad on the pretext of visiting the shrines there, and returning by way of Herat. As he neared the city, he sent a courier to summon Mīr Qolbābā, hoping to get him into his power by means of a ruse and thus take possession of the city. Mīr Qolbābā, who was not born yesterday, saw through his scheme and refused to go to meet him; he sent the Khan a trifling gift and barricaded the gates of the city. 'Abd al-Mo'men tried everything he knew to attain his object by guile; one day, accompanied only by five or six *moqarrabs*, he rode up to the walls of the fort and asked to speak with Mīr Qolbābā in private, hoping to deceive him, but to no avail.

Considering it inadvisable to lay siege to Herat, 'Abd al-Mo'men returned frustrated to Balk, and Mīr Qolbābā reported what had happened to 'Abdollah Khan at Bokhara. 'Abdollah Khan applauded his action and sent him gifts. The story goes that he also sent him a bow and set of arrows with instructions that, should 'Abd al-Mo'men appear before Herat again with hostile intent, he should go up on the walls, wait until he could see 'Abd al-Mo'men's eyes, and then fire off all the arrows at him.

This incident caused the rift between father and son to widen still further. Finally, 'Abd al-Mo'men heard that his father had left Bokhara and gone hunting, taking with him only a small group of gamekeepers, falconers, boon companions, *moqarrabs*, and entertainers. He had camped in a large park near Qaršī³ and was busy celebrating. After hunting, he would return to this park and take his ease. 'Abd al-Mo'men decided to take a body of troops, ride like the wind from Balk, surround the park, surprise his father and his companions at their merrymaking, and thus achieve his ambition. 'Abd al-Mo'men made privy to the plot one of his most trusted emirs and close advisers, Shah Moḥammad Īlajīān, mobilized his men on the pretext of an expedition in the direction of Badaḡšān, and set off with five thousand seasoned troops. Crossing the Oxus at Termez, he rode at full speed toward Qaršī.

Shah Moḥammad Īlajīān had long been suspected by 'Abdollah Khan of being an evil influence on his son and of being responsible for his hostility toward himself. At this juncture, Shah Moḥammad

³Southeast of Bokhara; in former times it was called Naḡšab by the Persians, and Nasaf by the Arabs. It was the scene of the massacre perpetrated by the Persian *vakil* Emir Yār Aḥmad Eṣṭahānī (Najm-e Šānī) in 918/1512 (see Savory, *Consolidation*, pp. 80-81).

Ilajīān, wishing to absolve himself from any charge of treachery toward "the old Khan," sent a messenger to 'Abdollāh Khan warning him of his son's intentions. The messenger found the Khan in the midst of a feast. Since the Khan had only a small number of retainers with him and no regular troops, he abandoned his tents and everything as it stood and retreated toward Bokhara.

Before he had gone more than three *farsaks*, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan reached the park and rode on in pursuit of his father without so much as a glance at all 'Abdollāh Khan's paraphernalia. But 'Abdollāh Khan reached Bokhara before him and barred the gates of the city. Once he knew that he had no hope of overtaking his father, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan slackened his pace and rode the rest of the way to Bokhara at normal speed. Camping outside the city, he sent word to his father that he had been overcome by the desire to see him. Hearing that his father had come to Qaršī, which was nearer to Balk than Bokhara, he had taken the liberty of coming to visit him without permission; he now sought permission to enter the city and make his obeisance. Every day, 'Abd al-Mo'men sent someone new to intercede with his father, but 'Abdollāh Khan did not trust him and refused to grant him permission.

I heard from a reliable source that 'Abdollāh Khan's anger against his son was such that he kept saying, "Oh 'Abd al-Mo'men! If God spares me, I will force you to saddle your horse and fight, or else I am not a man." And he would pound his head with his fist and say to himself, "Oh 'Abdollāh! After sixty-five years of being unchallenged ruler, you are scared of your own shadow,⁴ and have lost face throughout the world." He sent mobilization orders to his troops at Samarkand, Tashkent, and elsewhere, and paid no attention to the protestations of his son, backed up by written oaths, that his suspicions were without foundation.

When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan discovered that Shah Moḥammad Ilajīān had revealed his plans to 'Abdollāh Khan, he at once put him to death. And hearing that his father's armies were mobilizing, he withdrew toward Balk. His father marched after him, and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was on the point of crossing the Oxus when he was joined by Šāhom Bī, the governor of Marv, who had a grudge against 'Abdollāh Khan. Šāhom Bī urged 'Abd al-Mo'men not to retire to Balk, but to stand and fight. 'Abdollāh Khan, when he heard that his

⁴Lit.: "You run away from your own urine."

son was preparing for battle, slowed his advance, and the elders and shaikhs of Transoxania began to mediate between father and son. 'Abd al-Mo'men sacrificed Šahom BI and a few others whom 'Abdollah Khan considered troublemakers; he handed them over to his father for execution, and 'Abdollah Khan then retired to Bokhara. I have heard, again from a reliable source, that after this incident 'Abdollah Khan kept on saying, "All my life I have been victorious, in many mighty battles, and have never turned my back on the enemy. Now, in my old age, my son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan (may he not enjoy life or prosperity!) has tarnished my reputation by forcing me to flee in a shameful manner." 'Abdollah Khan's curse took effect, as will shortly be related.

The dispute between 'Abdollah Khan and his son encouraged the Cossacks to revolt. Tavakkol Sultan Qazāq declared himself khan and marched on Tashkent with a large army. 'Abdollah Khan, considering it beneath his dignity to take the field himself, dispatched several allied princes and the frontier emirs. A battle was fought between Tashkent and Samarkand, and 'Abdollah Khan suffered the first defeat of his career. Great numbers of his emirs and notable men in his army, together with several of the allied princes, lost their lives. This defeat increased 'Abdollah Khan's resentment against his son for his conduct, and he tried to repair this reverse. He sent a courier to summon Mīr Qolbābā Gönültaš from Herat, and set off toward Samarkand with all his forces to avenge his defeat at the hands of Tavakkol Khan. But all this worry over his son's hostility and his defeat by the Cossacks caused him to fall ill. He took to his bed, and died.

The Death of 'Abdollah Khan, the Succession of His Son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and the Uzbek Sultans Who Succeeded 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan

Toward the end of the Year of the Fowl (1006/1598), when 'Abdollah Khan fell ill and died on the road to Samarkand, Moḥammad Bāqī *atāliq*, the *dīvānbeḡī* and the most powerful of 'Abdollah Khan's emirs, saw no alternative but to agree to the succession of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. He did not trust him, but he realized that, as long as the son was alive, no one would acquiesce in the succession of any of 'Abdollah Khan's nephews. Moḥammad Bāqī therefore sent a confidential courier to tell 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan that his father was dying, and to invite him to come to Samarkand.

Mīr Qolbābā happened to be at Samarkand at this time. Since his name has frequently been mentioned in connection with events in Transoxania and Khorasan, it seems appropriate at his point to give an account of his fall from power, an account given to me by reliable sources in that region. He was a Samarkandī by birth, and his mother had been a wet nurse to the infant ‘Abdollāh Khan. According to Uzbek and Čaġatāy customary law, a foster brother is called *gönül-taš*,⁵ and so Mīr Qolbābā became the *gönültāš* of ‘Abdollāh Khan. He devoted himself to a variety of studies, and began to compose poetry. When ‘Abdollāh Khan first became ruler of Transoxania, Mīr Qolbābā served him well and faithfully and rose rapidly through the Khan’s patronage. He was appointed *šadr* with the rank of emir,⁶ and for a number of years was governor of Herat; he was a firm but just governor. Because he stood high in the Khan’s favor, he was regarded with envy by the other emirs and principal officers of state.

During ‘Abdollāh Khan’s last illness, the Khan, who was sincerely attached to Mīr Qolbābā, gave him leave to depart because he knew of ‘Abd al-Mo’men Khan’s implacable hostility toward him. “While I am still alive,” he said, “return to Herat and take refuge in the fortress there, so that ‘Abd al-Mo’men Khan may not be able to harm you. Once you are at Herat, follow whatever course seems to be in your best interests.” Mīr Qolbābā took his leave of ‘Abdollāh Khan, and he, his sons, and his retainers mounted their horses. Mīr Qolbābā told people that the Khan had sent him on a mission, but he was prevented from leaving by Moḥammad Baqī Atālīq, the *dīvānbegī*, who was afraid ‘Abd al-Mo’men Khan would punish him if he let Mīr Qolbābā slip out of his grasp.

Mīr Qolbābā realized he could not quarrel with Moḥammad Bāqī when the Khan’s life was in the balance, and he went back to the room where the Khan lay, hoping to obtain assistance from him. When he reached the Khan’s bedside, he saw him much changed and noticed that the doctors had given up trying to save him, and that the Khan no longer understood what was going on.

Mīr Qolbābā was therefore forced to try and conciliate Moḥammad Bāqī *atālīq*, and by means of smooth words and logical arguments, to persuade him to let him go. “It will be better for both of us,” he

⁵“United in mind and feelings.”

⁶Under the early Safavids too, “the *šads* and other members of the religious classes held military command, or at least military rank, as had formerly been the case under the Timurids.” (Savory, *Principal Offices I*, p. 103). The Uzbek practice was in all probability a continuation of Timūrid practice.

said, "if I go. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan is hostile not only to me but to you also. It does not make sense for both of us to remain here and put our heads in a trap. As long as I am in the fort at Herat, he will not be able to reveal openly what he has in mind for you or any of the other loyal servants of 'Abdollah Khan." Since this scheme was sound common sense, Moḥammad Bāqī *atāliq* agreed to let him go, after they had made certain covenants with each other. Just as Mīr Qolbābā was leaving Samarkand, 'Abdollah Khan died. But Mīr Qolbābā told no one outside the palace, and none of his retainers except Mowlānā Qarā, one of his emirs and a protégé of his in whom he had full confidence.

When his party reached the Oxus, he paused to procure boats for the crossing. Several of the boatmen greeted him and enquired after the Khan, and Mīr Qolbābā began to weep uncontrollably. Everyone now knew the truth, and Mowlānā Qarā formed a conspiracy with some of his retainers. "This man," he said, "is running away from his sovereign, and will seek refuge either among the *qezelbaş* or the Čaġatāy. Where do we think we are going by accompanying him?" When Mīr Qolbābā was about to step into the boat, Mowlānā Qarā said: "'Abdollah Khan is dead, and his son, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, is now ruler of the Uzbeks. Unless you tender your services to him, obtain an appointment as governor from him, and have his letter of appointment in your hand, he will not allow you to remain in the fortress at Herat. It would be better for us to go to Balḵ and make our obeisance to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan." Mīr Qolbābā tried to reason with him on the grounds that this was not an opportune moment to visit the new ruler, but Mowlānā Qarā told him all his retainers were of one mind and united. Mowlānā Qarā said bluntly that, if Mīr Qolbābā refused to go to Balḵ, they would bind him and take him there. Mīr Qolbābā saw that they were determined and that all his entreaties had no effect. He set off to 'Abd al-Mo'men's court at Balḵ, resigned to losing his position and property, and probably his life.

When 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan moved from Balḵ to Samarkand, he took Mīr Qolbābā with him, apparently delighted to see him. Mīr Qolbābā declared that any shortcomings of which he had been guilty hitherto were attributable to his loyalty to his benefactor. "Now you," he said, "are my benefactor, and I shall not be remiss in my devotion to you." But Mowlānā Qarā told 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan about his own bit of loyal service. Mīr Qolbābā, he said, had intended to go to Herat, strengthen the fortifications there, and defy the Khan. "I was respon-

sible for bring him here," he said, "by force and against his will." 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then seized Mīr Qolbābā. First he instituted an investigation designed to mulct Mīr Qolbābā of all his money and property. He had been told by the people of Khorasan that Mīr Qolbābā's fortune in Khorasan and Transoxania amounted to fifty thousand *tomān*. After obtaining full particulars of his assets, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan turned to the question of punishment. First, he had Mīr Qolbābā's two sons slaughtered like sheep in front of him, and asked, "Is the death of his sons bitter to a father, or not? So why did you stir up trouble between me and my father, in the hope that my father might destroy me?" My informants state that, after the sons had been killed, 'Abd al-Mo'men fired an arrow which struck Mīr Qolbābā in the chest, and his retainers finished him off. The Khan then sent Soleymān, an aide-de-camp, to guard Herat. Subsequently he appointed Ḥājjī Bī, one of his loyal retainers, governor of that city, and the latter proceeded to Herat with all speed.

To return now to the narration of 'Abd al-Mo'men's actions after receiving Moḥammad Bāqī's messages from Samarkand. Although the latter urged him to come to Samarkand as soon as possible, 'Abd al-Mo'men procrastinated because he did not trust Moḥammad Bāqī, remembering his hostility to him in the past. When all his troops were assembled, he proceeded slowly toward Samarkand, sending messengers ahead at every stage of the journey to obtain news of what was happening in the city. These messengers were instructed to say that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had heard that his father was ill and was coming to visit him. The day on which 'Abdollah Khan died, several couriers left Samarkand to take the good news to 'Abd al-Mo'men. He refused to believe the first one to arrive, arrested him, and threatened to cut out his tongue, but the threat was not carried out. When the second courier arrived, he realized the news must be true, but he rounded on the courier, saying, "The news of their father's death should not be so lightly reported to their sons. Why were you in such a hurry to tell me, and bring grief to my heart?" But he wept tears of joy, and was nearly bursting with happiness. When the third courier arrived, bearing the additional news that Moḥammad Bāqī the *dīvānbegī* and the rest of the emirs had agreed to support his succession, he abandoned his caution, convened a royal audience, sat on the royal throne, and had the kettledrums beaten to celebrate his accession.

As 'Abd al-Mo'men continued to advance slowly toward Samar-

kand, he was joined daily by emirs and contingents of Uzbek troops from all parts, come to welcome him and make obeisance. En route, he heard that Hezāra Sultan, 'Abdollah Khan's nephew, who was in the Samarkand-Tashkent area, had styled himself khan and declared his opposition, and that Dūstom Sultan and Uzbek Sultan, his relatives, had rallied to his support. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan was a blood-thirsty and hard-hearted man, to whom relatives meant nothing; to him, they were merely obstacles in his path. Hezāra Sultan and his allies, knowing how he had treated his father and not rating their own chances very highly as a result, decided to come out in open opposition, in the hope of thereby saving their own lives and those of their families.

After entering Samarkand, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan marched against the rebels with forces from Balḵ, Bokhara, Qaršī and Samarkand. Since most of the troops were inclined toward 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, the rebels were routed. Their leaders were taken prisoner, and all put to death by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, along with their male offspring. The Khan showed no compunction in breaking the bonds of kinship. After his victory, 'Abd al-Mo'men appointed Moḥammad Bāqī, the *dīvānbeḡī*, governor of Samarkand. After appointing governors at all the towns under his jurisdiction, he returned in triumph to Bokhara. The Cossack princes and the governors of outlying areas hastened to send envoys signifying their allegiance to him. At Bokhara, 'Abd al-Mo'men continued his purge of any relative he suspected of being mature and capable enough to govern. The only exceptions he made were Pīr Moḥammad Sultan, who was an addict and spent all his time in opium dens in abject poverty ('Abd al-Mo'men Khan did not consider him worth killing), and two or three infants. No other relatives of 'Abdollah Khan remained alive. 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan then marched to Balḵ to make preparations for the invasion of Khorasan.

The Death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and the Accession of Pīr Moḥammad Khan at Bokhara and of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan at Balḵ

After 'Abd al-Mo'men had eliminated all his rivals, he began to censure and indulge in veiled threats against some of his officers, usually emirs who had served under 'Abdollah Khan, and those whom he threatened feared he would implement his threats on arrival at Balḵ. As a result, 'Abd al-Šamad Bahādor, formerly master of the horse to 'Abdollah Khan, and Moḥammadqolī Bahādor, known as

Strongbow, who was a valiant young champion, conspired to assassinate him.

Because of the extreme heat, 'Abd al-Mo'men was marching at night; his order of march was such that the *ešik-aqāsīs* and *jeqāvols* (escorts) and other servants rode a bowshot ahead of the Khan, while the emirs, pages, and other troops rode a bowshot behind. The Khan himself was surrounded by his grooms, a number of servant boys, and a group of boon companions and musicians. One night, as the cavalcade was passing a village, 'Abd al-Šamad Bahādor and Moḥammadqolī Bahādor secreted themselves behind a wall at the side of the road, their bows at the ready. As the Khan drew abreast of the ambush, both assassins fired their arrows, aiming by torchlight. The arrows hit their mark, and the Khan fell from his horse as the assassins leapt forward with drawn swords, scattered the torchbearers (his boon companions and the minstrels, being Persians, were afraid of cold steel, and fled), and decapitated 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. One of the pages who tried to resist them was cut to pieces. The assassins then leapt on their horses and made for Bokhara.

A few minutes later, the rear guard came up and saw 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan lying dead on the road. Some of the emirs, like 'Abd al-Samī' Bahādor, master of the horse, and others who were privy to the plot, rode that night to Bokhara. The bulk of the troops did not realize what had happened, and when day broke and there was no sign of the Khan, thought he had gone out early hunting. When they heard the news, panic spread throughout the troops, who formed into two factions: the first consisted of former retainers of 'Abdollaḥ Khan, and the second of the Balḵ emirs. The latter grabbed whatever they could from the Khan's treasuries and baggage and galloped off to Balḵ. The 'Abdollaḥ Khan emirs and the troops from Bokhara plundered most of the Khan's workshops before returning home.

Since there was no one left at Bokhara fit to rule, the emirs were forced to acknowledge as their sovereign Pīr Moḥammad Khan, the man who had been saved from 'Abd al-Mo'men's wrath by his addition to opium. He was made ruler, with the style of khan. The *koṭba* and coinage were embellished with his name, and Moḥammad Bāqī, the *dīvānbeḡī*, who was at Samarkand, was informed. As for the Balḵ emirs, opinion among them was divided: Some wanted to make 'Abd al-Mo'men's infant son their ruler, to take possession of 'Abd al-Mo'men's territories from the Oxus to the boundaries of *qezelbaş*

territory, and to punish his murderers; others were of the opinion that a two-year-old infant was not suitable to be their ruler. They wanted a young, seasoned leader who would stand up to their enemies.

Jānī Beg Sultan, 'Abdollah Khan's nephew and the father of both Dīn Moḥammad Khan and Bāqī Khan, had been imprisoned by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. His sons, who held various governorships in Khorasan, wanted to free him and make him ruler of Balḵ and Khorasan. By chance, Bānū-ye 'Ozmā, the wife of 'Ebādollah Sultan, the brother of 'Abdollah Khan, who had married 'Abdollah Khan after her husband's death, came to Balḵ at this juncture. She had one daughter by 'Ebādollah Sultan, who had been married to 'Abd al-Mo'men and had died in his house. A certain 'Ādel, together with Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and some of the other elders, went to see her and told her of their plans, but she rejected them. The elders said they had been driven to consider Jānī Beg Sultan, who was 'Abdollah Khan's sister's son, as their ruler because of the dearth of other candidates from the ruling house. Bānū-ye 'Ozmā said that, on the contrary, there was a scion of the royal house who was fit to rule. "Who is he?" they asked. "My husband, 'Ebādollah Sultan, had a son by a concubine," she replied; "his name is 'Abd al-Amīn. After both my husband and his mother had died, I looked after him, and brought him up dressed as a girl for fear that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, who was busy murdering all his relations, would kill him to." The elders were amazed, because they had never heard that 'Ebādollah Sultan had had a son.

After 'Ebādollah's widow had taken from them several sworn oaths that they would not betray her, she produced 'Abd al-Amīn, dressed as a girl. The elders thought her story was a pack of lies, but the boy seemed to be presentable, and the fact that he was alleged to be 'Abdollah Khan's nephew on the male side would carry great weight as regards his candidacy for the throne.⁷ The same day, therefore, they had him taken to the bathhouse; his long hair was cut off, and he was dressed in male attire. He was styled khan and placed on the throne, and all the Balḵ emirs made obeisance to him. He appropriated for his own use all 'Abd al-Mo'men treasuries and other property in Balḵ. Bānū-ye 'Ozmā took over control of the administration; the emirs and elders took no decision without consulting her. This was surely one of the extraordinary tricks of fate!

⁷'Abd al-Amīn was alleged to be the son of 'Abdollah Khan's *brother*, 'Ebādollah Sultan, whereas their other candidate, Jānī Beg Sultan, was the son of 'Abdollah Khan's *sister*.

When the Balḵ emirs received the news from Bokhara of the accession of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, on the advice of Bānū-ye 'Ozmā they did not oppose his accession but sent a friendly letter on behalf of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, congratulating him on it. They entreated him to consider 'Abd al-Amīn as his own son, and expressed the hope that the two khans could reign secure, each in his own seat of government, and assist each other in furthering the prosperity of the realm and rendering it secure against its enemies, as had been the case with 'Abdollāh Khan and 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan.⁸

The Bokhara emirs consulted the women in the royal harem there, and they were adamant in their conviction that 'Ebādollāh Sultan had never had a son, that this was a plot on the part of 'Ebādollāh Sultan's widow. However, as a matter of policy, in order to keep the people subservient to them, the elders accepted the veracity of this claim and did not refute it. On behalf of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, they sent letters of appointment to 'Abd al-Amīn in which the latter was addressed as "my son" and confirmed in the governorship of 'Abd al-Mo'men's former territories; the only condition they made was that the coinage minted at Balḵ should bear the name of Pīr Moḥammad Khan and that Pīr Moḥammad Khan's name should be mentioned in the *koḷba* before his own name. Since the rule of neither prince was in conformity with God's will, both were short.

Events in Khorāsān, the Accession of Dīn Moḥammad Khan at Herat, and the Rise to Power of His Brother, Bāqī Khan, in Transoxania

It will be recalled that Yatīm Sultan, the son of Jānī Beg Sultan, nephew of 'Abdollāh Khan, and his brothers governed part of Khorasan under mandate from 'Abdollāh Khan. On the orders of the latter, they had refused to heed the dictates of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. After the death of 'Abdollāh Khan, 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan came to power and imprisoned their father. In their anxiety about their own future, they sent an envoy, Yūsuf Bahādor the *qūšbegī* (officer in charge of the aviary), to Shah 'Abbas, through Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman. They were assured of Safavid support, and thus encouraged, declared against 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and tried to seize possession of Herat by a ruse. With this object in mind, they appeared before Herat with a small band of men. But the Uzbek emirs in Herat, de-

⁸An unfortunate precedent to cite!

spite their great superiority in numbers, remained inside the fort. The attackers, seeing no hope of taking the fort, plundered the surrounding area and returned.

About the same time, however, they made other forays, with about two thousand men, to Farāh, where they captured the fort, and to Esfezār, which they also occupied. Again they appeared before Herat. This time the Uzbek governor, Ḥājjī Bī, remained within the fort but sent a detachment of two thousand men, under Mollā Qarā and Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, to chase them as far as Pol-e Mālān. An envoy was then sent from Herat to Yatīm Sultan at Esfezār, calling on him to cease this meddling and retire or prepare for battle. Yatīm Sultan's response was to march to Herat, and Mollā Qarā and Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan drew up their men for battle.

Before fighting had actually started, couriers arrived both from Balk and Bokhara bringing the news of the assassination of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. Ḥājjī Bī, who had heard of the Shah's impending expedition to Khorasan and saw no one from the ruling house of Transoxania capable of succeeding 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, decided to admit Yatīm Sultan to Herat and raise him to the position of khan. All the emirs of Khorasan rallied to him, seeing in this action their only hope of salvation. Mollā Qarā and Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan fled, fearing for their lives, and their troops joined Yatīm Sultan. Ḥājjī Bī, with the nobles and notables of Herat, met their new ruler, henceforth to be known as Dīn Moḥammad Khan, at Pol-e Mālān, knelt before him, and escorted him into the city.

Although the hour was inauspicious and the moon was darkened, Dīn Moḥammad decided to enter Herat forthwith lest something untoward should occur. He camped in the Bāg-e Šahr (city park), the seat of the rulers of Herat, and issued letters of appointment designed to win the support of *seyyeds* and notables throughout Khorasan, and of officers in command of forts and administrative districts. Since his grandfather, Yār Moḥammad Khan, was with him, having recently returned from the pilgrimage, Dīn Moḥammad recognized his seniority, according to Genghizid law, and had the *koṭba* recited in his grandfather's name and his grandfather's name stamped on the coinage. After his election as khan, Dīn Moḥammad Khan forgot about the friendly overtures he had made to Shah 'Abbas and aspired to subjugate the whole of Khorasan. He appointed all the Uzbek emirs and nobles to offices appropriate to their rank.

The news of the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and the approach of the royal army had initially thrown the Uzbegs in Khorasan into a panic, and each had looked to his own interests. One of them, Soley-mān *yasāvol*, governor of Marv-e Šāhijān on behalf of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, set up as puppet ruler a certain Qāsem Sultan, alleged to be the offspring of Janī Beg Khan and a kinsman of 'Abdol-lāh Khan, who was living in obscurity as a dervish. In his name, Soley-mān *yasāvol* laid claim to the regions of Marv-e Šāhijān, Čahār-jū, Nesā, and Bāvard. When he heard that Dīn Moḥammad Khan had been proclaimed ruler at Herat, he regretted his action, pledged his allegiance to Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and forced Qāsem Sultan to do the same. Qāsem Sultan, who had been granted the name but not the substance of power, planned to get rid of Soley-mān *yasāvol* and declare his independence. Dīn Moḥammad Khan sent his younger brother, Valī Moḥammad Sultan, to Marv-e Šāhijān with a letter to conciliate Soley-mān *yasāvol* and full authority to settle the affairs of that region as he thought fit. He also had instructions to have the *koṭba* at Marv-e Šāhijān recited in the name of his grandfather, Yār Moḥammad Khan.

When Valī Moḥammad Sultan neared Marv-e Šāhijān, Soley-mān *yasāvol* went out to welcome him and forced Qāsem Sultan, against his will, to do the same. When they reached the bridge outside the city gates, however, Soley-mān *yasāvol* executed that innocent wretch, Qāsem Sultan, and escorted Valī Moḥammad Sultan into the city with every mark of deference. The latter had hardly set foot inside the city when he received the news that the Shah's arrival was imminent, and also that Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the hereditary ruler of Marv-e Šāhijān, was on his way as well. Valī Moḥammad Sultan and Soley-mān *yasāvol* decided they could not hold Marv-e Šāhijān and retreated to Transoxania by way of Čahār-jū.

The governor of Mašhad, Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī, hearing that the royal army had captured Nishapur, decided to defend Mašhad. The same night, he received the news of the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and he thrashed around like a fish in a net. He hoped that, if the local notables and populace would support him, he could hold Mašhad until it became clear who had taken command of the Uzbek armies. The next news he heard was that Farhād Khan, with a force of twelve thousand *qezelbaş*, had appeared before the fort of Dastjerd in the district of Rādekān. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī, stupefied by the news, abandoned his idea of defending Mašhad. His Uzbegs were

equally disconcerted, and declared that their luck had turned; since they had no paramount chief, it would be sheer folly to continue to try and retain possession of Khorasan, a province which had been in *qezelbaş* hands for a hundred years.

"Let us get out," they said, "while we have the chance." But some stupid fellows said, "Why should we leave the city in such a flourishing condition for the *qezelbaş*? Before we leave, let us sack the city and carry off the gold railing round the tomb of the Imam Reżā, the jeweled spike on top of the dome of the shrine, and anything else we can see in the way of ornaments." Mercifully, those *seyyeds* and scholars who were in Mašhad at the time succeeded in dissuading Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī from this course of action by instilling in him the fear of an uprising by the mob; by making him dread the ill repute he would incur; and by making him afraid of being subjected to an investigation by other Uzbeks greedy for a share of the loot. The Uzbek emir in his turn managed to check the hotheads among his officers by well-considered arguments: they should not abuse the hospitality they had enjoyed for ten years from the people of Mašhad, he said, by molesting them and destroying their property.

As a *quid pro quo*, the Uzbek emir charged the *seyyeds* and leading men of Mašhad to instruct the elders of the city wards to see that none of the urban mob molested any of his men or their families. He further charged them not to inform the *qezelbaş* of the impending Uzbek evacuation until three days had elapsed, so that his men could withdraw without harassment. The same night, Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī sounded the stand-to, and all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, marched out of the Mīr 'Alī Āmū Gate and took the road to Saraḡs.

The moment the Uzbeks had left, the *seyyeds* and leading men of Mašhad sent a courier to Farhād Khan at Dastjerd. Farhād Khan marched the same hour to Mašhad, entered the city, visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā, and reported to the Shah, who had reached the region of Asbāḡī, in the district of Šoqān, and Jūrbānd. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī and his men, who by this time had passed Saraḡs and reached Qūrābād, were summoned to Herat by Dīn Moḥammad Khan, who reprimanded them severely for having evacuated Mašhad. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī defended himself, but Dīn Moḥammad Khan refused to listen and for three days denied him audience, until finally the Khan's principal officers interceded for him. Meanwhile, the Khan appointed as governor of Mašhad one of his own cousins, Seyyed

Moḥammad Sultan, and sent him posthaste with four hundred veterans in the hope of taking possession of the city before the *qezelbāš* got there. Dīn Moḥammad Khan also dispatched Šāhom Kūltā to garrison the fort at Ġūrān.

Meanwhile, Seyyed Moḥammad Khan and his men had reached Torbat-e Jām, unaware that the *qezelbāš* had reoccupied Mašhad. The *kalāntar*⁹ of Torbat at once informed Farhād Khan of the arrival of the Uzbegs, and the latter dispatched a contingent under the command of his brother, Zu'l-Faqr Khan. The *qezelbāš* caught the Uzbegs in the act of mounting their horses; the Uzbegs, having no time to form up for battle, fled, pursued by the *qezelbāš*, who slew the majority of them and returned to Mašhad with about eighty prisoners. Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan returned crestfallen to Herat.

The Uzbegs still did not realize that the Shah had taken the field in person. They thought that Farhād Khan, and Ganj 'Alī Khan the governor of Kerman, had taken advantage of the death of 'Abdollāh Khan and the murder of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan to campaign in Khorasan and to try and link up with the *qezelbāš* emirs, such as Būdāq Khan, who still remained in that province. This misapprehension encouraged Dīn Moḥammad Khan to take the field against the *qezelbāš*. He marched out of Herat and camped in the Kāja Nūr gardens. But the Uzbek emirs, chiefs, and elders were doubtful about the wisdom of giving battle to the *qezelbāš*, and held repeated councils of war.

Experienced Uzbek commanders—men like Mīrzā 'Abdollāh Manqaṭ, who was descended from the royal house of Manqaṭ; Ḥājjī Bī; and Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī—said to Dīn Moḥammad Khan:

Khorasan has been *qezelbāš* territory for a century, and at no time have the Uzbegs established themselves firmly there. Our territory has traditionally been Transoxania. It is not sound policy to leave our ancestral lands and expend great effort over Khorasan. Since we have no prince in Transoxania worthy of the name, it would be better for you to return there and devote your energies to the administration of that province. If you wish to retain some foothold in Khorasan, we suggest you leave in the citadel at

⁹The *kalāntar* in many ways corresponded to the mayor of a town. One of his chief functions was to supervise the financial and other affairs of the guilds.

Herat your brother, Bāqī Moḥammad, with a garrison of several thousand men and provisions for a year; garrisons should also be maintained at Tūn, Qa'en, in Sistān, and at other places west of Herat.

Since you have made friendly overtures to Shah 'Abbas and have repeatedly sent letters to him assuring him of your devotion, you should inform him that the Uzbegs have now been delivered from the tyranny of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and have pledged their allegiance to you. You should tell him that we are now prepared to hand over to his officers the province of Khorasan and to withdraw to Transoxania, which is the seat of this dynasty. We have already handed over to his officers the cities of Mašhad, Nishapur, and Toršīz, and have evacuated a number of forts. It has not been possible so far to remove our families and dependents from Khorasan, and so you have left your own family, and the families of the Uzbeg emirs and nobles, in the care of your brother Bāqī Moḥammad at Herat. We have entrusted their honor to the Shah's officers; let them not fail in their duty.

You should continue: 'After we, God willing, have consolidated our position in our original territory and ancestral lands, and our kingdom has been placed on a surer foundation, we will not refuse to hand over Herat as well, and the other places in Khorasan occupied by us, if the Shah so orders. But we are persuaded that the king of the *qezelbaş*, when he receives this offer of friendship, will demonstrate his chivalry and magnanimity by being satisfied with the recapture of Mašhad and the other places evacuated by the Uzbegs, and will not lay hands on Herat. After we have settled all our affairs in Transoxania, Turkestan, Balk, and Badakšān in conformity with our wishes, and order has been restored to government, if the Shah would like to come to Khorasan, we can settle all these matters together; if not, we will act as the occasion demands.

The majority of the Uzbek elders supported these views and the idea of sending a letter along these lines to the Shah, and they undertook to stock the citadel at Herat with the necessary provisions. They arrested a number of the inhabitants of Herat and troop commanders whom they suspected of possible opposition. But some ignorant hot-heads disagreed with this plan. "There is no sign of the Shah," they said, "and so far the *qezelbaş* forces that have appeared amount to no more than ten or twelve thousand men. Even so, they have advanced deep into Khorasan. To turn our backs on them would be a sign of weakness, and would not augur well for your reign. If we abandon Khorasan and retire to Transoxania as is suggested, valiant warriors will scorn us and accuse us of cowardice. In that event, you can easily imagine what the result will be. We do not know what is going on in Transoxania, or what the attitude of the emirs there is. Giving up Khorasan is like throwing away cash for the sake of credit; it is neither sensible nor courageous. Let us gird up our loins like men and go forth to fight the *qezelbaş*. If we are victorious, the prestige of the Khan will be enhanced, and everything will be arranged in accordance with our wishes. If we are defeated (which God forbid!), no one will reproach us."

Dīn Moḥammad Khan preferred the second proposal, which was supported by most of the hotheads who had held administrative posts in Khorasan and were loath to give up these delightful jobs. Dīn Moḥammad himself thought it an easy matter to defeat the *qezelbaş*, since during the lifetime of 'Abdollah Khan he had fought several engagements against incautious *qezelbaş* emirs and had been victorious. The supporters of the first proposal were forced to keep their peace or risk being accused of cowardice. Abu'l-Moḥammad Bī, who had no intention of fighting the *qezelbaş* and who disliked the way things were shaping up, slipped away one night with his men from Dīn Moḥammad's camp, and put so much distance between himself and the Khan that the latter was powerless to do anything about it.

At this juncture, reports came in that the *qezelbaş* were retiring toward Iraq following the receipt of bad news from that direction. The Uzbeks forgot all their plans for the defense of the citadel at Herat and set out from the Kāja Nūr gardens in hot pursuit. The further they advanced, the more confident they became of their ability to fight the *qezelbaş*, until Dīn Moḥammad Khan came face to face with Shah 'Abbas at the battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān and was defeated.

The Beginning of the Tale¹⁰ of the Reconquest of Khorasan

The Shah had marched from Isfahan on 3 Ramaẓān 1006/9 April 1598. He had stopped for a while at Kashan in order to arrange payment for the troops and to complete his preparations for the campaign. He had sent the army on ahead via K̄ār and Firūzkūh to Beštām, with orders to await him there. He himself had gone to Māzandarān by the Siāh-kūh¹¹ road for some hunting, taking advantage of the presence there of Farhād Khan. He had never seen this province, his hereditary domain, which had only recently been brought under the jurisdiction of his officers. Mobilization orders were sent out to all parts of the empire: The *qūrčibāši* and his men were ordered to accompany the royal camp; Allāhverdi Khan and Ganj 'Alī Khan, with the *golāms* and troops from Fārs and the contingents from Kerman, respectively, were ordered to march via Yazd and Biābānak¹² and to join the royal camp in Khorasan.

After his hunting expedition, the Shah had marched to Beštām with Farhād Khan by way of Sāvar and Čahār Deh¹³ in the Astarābād district. To the rendezvous at Beštām came also Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of K̄ārazm, with his son 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, and Nūr Moḥammad Khan the son of Abu'l-Moḥammad, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhijān, Nesā, and Abīvard, who, as previously reported, had been forced to flee from their territories by 'Abdollāh Khan and had taken refuge with the Shah. On his arrival at Beštām, the Shah reviewed his troops, with the exception of the contingents from Fārs and Kerman, which had not yet arrived. When news arrived that 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan had executed Mīr Qolbābā Gönültāš, had crushed his rivals at Samarkand and Tashkent, had systematically put to death all the princes he thought might cause him trouble, and was marching on Khorasan with a large army, the more faint-hearted of the Shah's advisers urged him not to proceed to Khorasan, but to spend this year settling affairs in Astarābād. He should wait and see what 'Abd al-Mo'men's intentions were before proceeding further.

The Shah, whose heart was set on the reconquest of Khorasan, scorned this pusillanimous advice, but he did turn his attention to the affairs of Astarābād. Since Astarābād was adjacent to Māzandarān,

¹⁰A conscious echo of the style of the *Šāhnāma*.

¹¹See Le Strange, p. 208.

¹²An oasis halfway across the Great Desert; see Le Strange, p. 325, and also article in *EF*².

¹³See Rabino, index *s.vv.*

of which Farhād Khan was governor, the Shah made the latter governor of Astarābād too. The Shah also wrote conciliatory letters to the nobles and leaders of the Siāhpūš tribe of Astarābād, each of whom was the master of some small district. Qarāmān Beg, a relative of Farhād Khan, was appointed *dārūga* of Astarābād, and sent thither with three hundred Qarāmānlū and other troops. The Siāhpūš chiefs, since they were at loggerheads with one another and since the royal army was encamped at Bešām, saw no alternative but to accept the authority of the *dārūga*.

At this juncture, the *qūšbegī*, the envoy of Yatīm Sultan, arrived at Bešām. His master's message was as follows:

My brothers and I were the protégés of 'Abdollāh Khan. To please him, we declined to give our support to his sons, and the latter has borne us a grudge for this reason and has declared his hostility toward us. Now that 'Abd al-Mo'men has succeeded his father on the throne, he is seeking to have his revenge on those who withheld their allegiance from him during his father's lifetime. This being so, I have no refuge save Your Majesty. Whenever Your Majesty's armies reach Khorasan, I will tender my submission to you.

The Shah was delighted by this message, and sent a friendly reply by the hand of Moḥammad Beg 'Arabgīrlū the *ešīk-āqāsī*, who had been on a mission to Herat the previous year. Moḥammad Beg set off in the company of the *qūšbegī*, and took with him a number of Arabian horses and other gifts for Yatīm Sultan.

The Shah sent Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan to Kārazm via the Astarābād road, and sent letters to the Šā'en-kānī Yaqqa Turkmans, who lived in the regions around the Gorgān and Atrek rivers and had traditionally been the subjects of the ruler of Kārazm, calling on them to give their support to Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan. The latter left his grandsons, Barandaq Sultan and Oloḡ Mīrzā, in the royal camp, and set off with his eldest son, 'Arab Moḥammad Sultan, and his other sons.

The Shah then marched from Bešām toward Jājarm, sending ahead as an advance guard, one day's march in front of the main body, Farhād Khan, Zu'l-Faqār Khan the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, and a number of other emirs with about ten thousand men. At this

point, the Shah decided to send a letter to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and Rūḥollah Beg Zu'l-Qadar, an aide-de-camp,¹⁴ volunteered to take it. The letter, a mixture of exhortation and threats, read as follows:

For a number of years you have annually invaded Khorasan, and since I was preoccupied with problems in Iraq and Gīlān, you seized the opportunity to occupy Mašhad and various other cities, and aspired to occupy still others. Every time I have made the long journey from Iraq in the hopes of meeting you in battle, you have run away, giving as your excuse that your father, the ruler of the Uzbegs, would not allow you to give battle to the ruler of the *qezelbaş*. As a result of this constant passage of armies, the people of Khorasan have suffered greatly. Now, you are the ruler of Transoxania, Turkestan, Balḡ, and Badaḡšān, and have disposed of all possible rivals. All the Uzbegs armies are under your control. This time, I have come to Khorasan with the intention of reconquering it, and I shall not return until I have accomplished this end.

If you are prepared to listen to our words of advice, you will relinquish Khorasan, which from ancient times has been part of Iran and has been part of the realm of the Safavid house for a century. If you do this, declare your friendship toward men, and ask forgiveness for your past misdemeanors, I am prepared, for the sake of the displaced and suffering people of Khorasan, to abandon my desire for vengeance, to declare a truce, and to assist you, with money and troops, in consolidating your power.

If, on the other hand, your ears are deaf to our exhortations,¹⁵ if you close the door of friendship and persist in your hostility toward us, then do not employ cunning and guile and run away as you have in previous years; think of the effect on your prestige now that you are undisputed ruler of the Uzbegs. So

¹⁴*Yasāvul-e sohbat*. There were several grades of *yasāvul*: the *yasāvulān-e sohbat* were highest in rank, and these offices were prestigious positions usually reserved for the sons of emirs (TM, p. 133).

¹⁵Lit.: "Stuffed with the cotton wool of heedlessness."

stride on to the battlefield like a man; there is no room for more excuses. Choose your own site for the battle for which everyone has been waiting for years, so that God's will may be done and the ordinary people may be delivered from the passage of both our armies. Should you refuse, then, without caring what destruction may result to Khorasan, I shall pursue you to Balk and shall not draw rein until I reach Bokhara. In that case, God alone knows what havoc will be wrought by my armies in those regions.

This message was borne by Rūḥollāh Beg Zu'l-Qadar, the aide-de-camp, and the Shah proceeded on his way to Mašhad. Deciding to take no risks, he sent his son and heir, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, back to Isfahan in the charge of Shaikh Aḥmad Beg, an *esik-āqāsī* of the harem.¹⁶ The army marched after the 'Eyd-e Azhā,¹⁷ and after camping at Kālpūš, began its victorious campaign. Its first success was the recapture of Nishapur.

When Shah 'Abbas approached Nishapur, the Uzbek governor of the region, Sultan Aḥmad (a scion of the Uzbek royal house), perceived clear indications that the local populace were on the side of the Shah, and realized that this made it impossible for him to hold Nishapur. On the other hand, he dared not retreat for fear of what 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan would do to him; he foresaw in addition that, if he withdrew, he and his men would be harassed and plundered by the scum of Nishapur. He therefore decided that his best plan would be to go on pilgrimage and to throw in his lot with the Shah. He left Nishapur with a handful of men, and the rest of his men dispersed, some going to Mašhad, others to Herat.

Hardly was Aḥmad Sultan clear of the city gates when the people of Nishapur beat the kettledrums in the name of Shah 'Abbas. As soon as the news reached Kālpūš, Emir Abu'l-Ma'ālī Nīšāpūrī was dispatched to take over the civil administration of the province; he was an eminent *seyyed*, a former *kalāntar*, and a power in the land in that region who had gone to Iraq after the Uzbek occupation of Nishapur and had been constantly at the Shah's side. Moḥammad Sultan

¹⁶On the *esik-āqāsibāstī-ye ḥaram*, the officer in charge of the *esik-āqāsīs* of the harem. See *TM*, p. 133.

¹⁷The sacrificial feast performed by pilgrims in the valley of Mīnā on the tenth of Zu'l-Ḥejja.

Bayāt, then governor of Sabzavār, was made governor of Nishapur. Aḥmad Sultan Uzbek was given permission to perform the pilgrimage, but I have no information about what happened to him subsequently. The Shah then marched in the footsteps of Farhād Khan's advance guard, via Šoqān and Jūrband, to Mašhad. When he reached Asbāḥī, in the district of Šoqān, couriers arrived from Farhād Khan bringing news of the death of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan and the recapture of Mašhad.

The Shah prostrated himself in gratitude for God's mercies toward him (his primary reason for wishing to recover Mašhad had been the desire to visit the shrine of the Imam Rezā), and his troops threw their caps in the air and cheered lustily. The Shah marched from Nishapur, and on 24 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1006/28 July 1598 camped on the banks of the river at Ṭūs.

Farhād Khan and his emirs, together with the notables of Mašhad, went out to welcome the Shah and prostrated themselves before him. Farhād Khan and the emirs of the vanguard were ordered to march on Herat and recapture that city (reports of the accession of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, the mobilization of his forces, and his intentions, had not yet been verified).

The following day, 25 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1006/29 July 1598, Shah 'Abbas left Ṭūs to perform the pilgrimage to the shrine of the Eighth Imam. When the dome of the shrine came in sight, the Shah dismounted, prostrated himself with his forehead on the ground, and wept tears of joy. He then proceeded, barefooted and bareheaded, to the shrine. After he had completed the formalities of the pilgrimage, the Shah took stock of the shrine. He found it in bad condition, stripped of its gold and silver chandeliers. Nothing remained of the ornaments donated to the shrine during the Safavid period except the gold railing around the tomb itself. On the spot, the Shah appointed Budāq Khan Čeganī governor of Mašhad. He then retired to Čahār Bāg, where the Uzbek prisoners captured at Jām were brought before him and interrogated. From what they said, and from the report made by Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, it was confirmed that Dīn Moḥammad Khan had come to the throne at Herat and intended to hold Khorasan. The size of his army was reported as twenty thousand men, but the local inhabitants denied this and said it did not amount to more than six or seven thousand. His experienced advisers thought the latter estimate more probable.

The Shah hoped that, by sending Farhād Khan and the vanguard to Herat immediately, he would catch the Uzbegs before they were fully organized and had had time to complete their preparations to defend the city. The Shah left at Mašhad a few of Dīn Moḥammad Khan's retainers. "Your Khan," he said, "has professed his loyalty to me, and has sent an envoy to me; if he is sincere in his professions, I will bestow on you robes of honor and equipment and send you to him wherever he may be." The remainder of the prisoners he put to death.

The Shah spent three days in Mašhad seeing to the affairs of the shrine. He appointed Qāzī Sultan Torbatī, an eminent *seyyed* from Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya, warden of the shrine; the latter had retired to Iraq when Mašhad fell into the hands of the Uzbegs, and was currently *dārūga* of Isfahan. He was given Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya as his fief. The Shah detached a body of five hundred *qūrčīs* under the command of Būdāq Khan Čeganī and Šahqolī Sultan Bayāt, and ordered them to proceed with Nūr Moḥammad Khan in the direction of Nesā, Abīvard, and Marv, his hereditary domains, to subjugate those territories and hand them over to him.

On 28 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1006/1 August 1598, the Shah marched from Mašhad. At Farhādjerd in the district of Jām, he was joined by Maḥmūd Beg Šāmlū, the brother of Eslām Beg the centurion. Maḥmūd Beg had fled to India when Herat was occupied by the Uzbegs, and had recently returned via Herat. He brought detailed information about the situation there. He reported that Dīn Moḥammad Khan had now set his heart on retaining control of Khorasan, and would not easily abandon this ambition; he further reported that some twelve thousand Uzbeg troops, plus two or three thousand men from the Hazāra tribes, had assembled at Herat. He said the Uzbegs were unaware that the Shah was present in person; they thought he was still at Beštām, and were busily making their preparations to give battle to Farhād Khan and the advance guard. Dīn Moḥammad Khan's intention, if the Shah marched against him and if he did not have sufficient force to withstand him, was to leave his brother Baqī Sultan to hold the citadel at Herat and retreat to Transoxania to levy more troops. He had no intention of relinquishing Khorasan. The Shah had great confidence in the reliability of Maḥmūd Beg's report, and pondered deeply on his best course of action in these circumstances.

The Shah then summoned a council of the principal officers of state, and addressed them as follows:

The Uzbegs have a considerable force at Herat. It is not in our interests to allow them to fight a pitched battle with Farhād Khan and our vanguard, because their sovereign is with them, and there will therefore be no comparison between them and our emirs as regards tenacity and stubbornness of resistance; consequently, they may suffer a reverse that will raise the morale of the enemy. On the other hand, if I order Farhād Khan not to advance farther until we catch up with him, the Uzbegs will be able to complete the defenses at Herat at their leisure and then retire to Transoxania. If we are obliged to lay siege to the citadel, it will be a long business, since the fortifications are strong. My plan, therefore, is to send a courier to Farhād Khan, ordering him to retire a distance of one day's march and to spread the rumor that a crisis has arisen in Iraq and Azerbaijan and that the Ottomans have profited by my absence to invade our territory. He is to say that, on receipt of this news, I marched precipitately back to Iraq. When the Uzbegs hear this, I do not doubt that they will abandon their plan to defend Herat and march forth confidently to give battle to our emirs and reoccupy Mašhad. At this point I, having left behind all baggage and anyone who does not have a good horse, will take a body of troops, each man having a second mount, and ride by forced marches to join Farhād Khan without waiting for the arrival of the Fārs and Kerman contingents. If this plan succeeds, the enemy will not have time to put the citadel at Herat in proper shape to withstand a siege and, God willing, victory will be ours.

This plan was approved by all the Shah's advisers, and orders were immediately dispatched to Farhād Khan. Orders were also sent to Allāhverdi Khan and Ganj 'Alī Khan telling them not to wait for the full mobilization of their troops, but to bring such men as they had who had swift horses, and to join the royal camp in the vicinity of Gūrīān. Finally, orders were given to the vizier, Hātem Beg, and to

Shah 'Alī Sultan Mīr Čamešgezek to remain behind to guard the baggage train and to come on slowly toward Herat. Then, on 1 Moḥarram 1007/4 August 1598, in the forenoon, the Shah marched from Farhādjerd toward Jām, joining forces first with Farhād Khan who, following orders, had retired one day's march from the fort at Bāg-and. Then, at Sar-e Pol on the Herat River, he joined Allāhverdi Khan and Ganj 'Alī Khan. The Shah covered ten days' journey in four and a half days and came upon the enemy on Wednesday, 5 Moḥarram 1007/8 August 1598, at the Sālār Bridge, four *farsaḡs* from the city of Herat. On the morning of 6 Moḥarram/9 August, a pitched battle was fought between the two armies at Rabāṭ-e Parīān.

The Shah's Victory over Dīn Moḥammad Khan

As already related, Dīn Moḥammad Khan had been deceived by the Shah's ruse and had advanced from Herat as far as the Sālār Bridge. There, an Arab of the Miš-e mast¹⁸ tribe, who knew what the Shah looked like, came into the Uzbek camp one night and said he had recognized the Shah at Sar-e Pol. When questioned about the size and composition of the Shah's army, he replied that the Shah had only a few men with him, but the main army was close behind. The Uzbek emirs held a council of war. They were opposed to fighting a battle with the *qezelbāš*, and were in favor of retiring to Herat, negotiating with the Shah along the lines already agreed to, and then withdrawing to Transoxania while negotiations were in progress, leaving Bāqī Khan at Herat. It was absolutely not in their interests, they said, to give battle to the *qezelbāš*. Dīn Moḥammad Khan said that their views made sense, but time was short. "The *qezelbāš* are already here," he said, "and if we march back to Herat during the night, half our men will become scattered; there will be very little time in which to put the citadel in a state to withstand a siege before we have to leave and incur the ignominy of flight. It is better for us to fight like men. If we win, that is what we want; if we lose, there is no disgrace in being defeated by a powerful monarch." The Uzbek emirs, not wishing to be accused of cowardice, prepared for battle.

The truth was that Dīn Moḥammad Khan's arrogance had increased to the point that his ambitions could not be driven from his head save by the sword, and on the morning of Friday, 6 Moḥarram 1007/9 August 1598, he drew up his men in battle array: On the right wing, he stationed his brother Bāqī Sultan, with Mīrzā 'Abdollāh Manqaṭ

¹⁸"Rutting ram."

and Hājji Bī the governor of Herat. To the left of his center, he stationed a number of emirs with orders to make a general charge, in conjunction with the center, whenever they saw the *qezelbaş* attack faltering, and to do their utmost to rout the enemy. Dīn Moḥammad Khan stationed himself on the left with one thousand picked men. His plan was that, irrespective of whether the Uzbeks were victorious or defeated, this body of one thousand men should keep together and stand by him.

By the time the Shah reached Sar-e Pol, many of his men's horses were tired, both as a result of the speed of their march from Farhād-jerd and because of the great heat. The Shah had only some three or four thousand men with him, and the total number of men at his disposal, including those of Farhād Khan, did not amount to more than ten thousand. Nevertheless, placing his trust in divine favor and in his royal good fortune, he disposed his men in the following manner: Farhād Khan, Zu'l-Faqār Khan, and the other emirs of the vanguard were stationed in front with four or five thousand men; the Shah adorned the center by the kingly glory¹⁹ of his presence, and the remaining emirs, *qūrčīs* and *gōlāms* were placed to right and left of the center.

The battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān opened when the skirmishers of both armies met. The Safavid van charged in a compact body and routed the Uzbek advance guard, and then the whole of the van pursued the enemy in their desire to demonstrate their prowess and bring back enemy heads and weapons. Farhād Khan was left exposed with only a handful of men around him. Bāqī Sultan, with the troops of the Uzbek left,²⁰ at once led a countercharge that forced back the Safavid van, now scattered. Since Farhād Khan did not have with him his corps commander's standard, which would have provided a rallying point for the Safavid skirmishers, their retreat became a rout that threatened to throw the center into confusion as well. Farhād Khan entered the fray himself with the few men remaining with him, only to be wounded and retreat, and later to be accused by his peers of having fled from the field.

Shah 'Abbas, seeing the army of Azerbaijan routed, ordered the center and the right and left wings to advance, and a general en-

¹⁹Farr; see my article "Iran, a 2500-year Historical and Cultural Tradition," in *Iranian Civilization and Culture* (ed. C. J. Adams), Montreal, 1972, pp. 78-79.

²⁰The author previously stated that Bāqī Sultan was stationed on the right wing.

gement ensued with the Uzbek left and right. Despite the presence of the Shah in the Safavid ranks, the Uzbeks fought stubbornly, but were eventually routed by repeated determined charges by the Safavid center led by the Shah. At this point, Dīn Moḥammad Khan led his one thousand picked men in a flanking movement around the Safavid right, intending to charge the Safavid center. Because of the clouds of dust in the air, this movement was not observed by the Safavids until Sultan 'Alī Čeganī, the son of Būdāq Khan, who was stationed slightly in front of where the Shah was standing with no more than two hundred *moqarrabs* and personal retainers, saw the gleam of the helmets, chain mail, and breastplates of riders advancing through a reedbed. He at once reported to the Shah, and a wave of panic went through the Shah's retainers. The Shah intuitively guessed that these men were led by Dīn Moḥammad Khan himself, and he shouted to his men, "Why are you just standing there? Think of the disgrace if you turn and run! Attack like men, for a valiant death is preferable to a life of shame!"

The first *qezelbāš* to spur his horse forward and cut down one of the Uzbek warriors was 'Alī Beg, the master of the hunt, the son of Aḥmad Aqa Gerāmpa Ostājīlū. He was followed by the other devoted youths stationed in front of the Shah. Each of them hurled from the saddle one of the enemy, so that forty or fifty of the Uzbeks were quickly slain. Dīn Moḥammad Khan kept his horse reined in, not daring to attack, and his men lost heart and turned to flee. The Shah wanted to pursue Dīn Moḥammad Khan and engage him in personal combat, but one of Ganj 'Alī Khan's retainers came up and told him that Dīn Moḥammad's center was close behind. The Shah therefore abandoned the idea, and allowed the Uzbek Khan to rejoin his center. The *gāzīs*, however, continued to pursue the enemy from the field, inflicting further casualties on them, and Dīn Moḥammad Khan himself was wounded by a spear thrust.

Kalūl Beg the Georgian, one of the *gōlāms* of the royal household, claimed the credit for this: "I thrust at him with my spear," he said, "and his hat²¹ fell off. One of the other Uzbeks took off his own hat and placed it on the head of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, which made me realize it was indeed the Khan whom I had wounded." The hat had been picked up and brought in by a *gāzī*, and several Uzbek prisoners

²¹*Tāqḥya*: a tall round hat, used either on its own or as a base around which to wind a turban. See R. P. A. Dozy, *Dictionnaire détaillé des Noms des Vêtements chez les Arabes*, Amsterdam, 1843, pp. 280ff.

affirmed that it was the Khan's, but others denied it. The result was that Kalūl Beg's claim was disallowed. To complicate matters, Pīrzāda Ṭāleš Abdāl Beg alleged that he himself had wounded the Khan. The author turned for information to Mowlānā Ebrahim Mašhadī, a former employee of Mirzā Abū Ṭāleb Režavī who, after the Uzbek invasion of Khorasan, had gone to Herat and become the secretary of Mir Qolbābā Gönültāš; later, he had become secretary to Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and had been admitted to the Khan's council meetings. I asked him if he could give me personal details about Dīn Moḥammad Khan, and a description of the battle of Rabāṭ-e Parīān. This was his reply:

"I was with the Khan," he said, "when he made his flanking maneuver with the intention of attacking the Safavid center. We emerged from the screen of reeds to find only a small force confronting us, although we could see another body of troops in the distance. The Uzbek warriors all thought that this latter group was the Shah's corps; they stood in considerable awe of the élan of the Shah's corps, and so the Uzbek elders laid restraining hands on the Khan's reins. 'Our forces have been defeated,' they said, 'and are streaming back toward the city. *Qezelbāš* block our path, both in front and in our rear. If we attack this small group ahead of us, the Shah's corps, the dense mass of which you can see in the distance, will advance and surround us, and not one of us will escape alive. The game is over. We should retire while you are still unharmed and before the situation gets any worse.' The Khan saw that his men had no stomach for further fighting, and was forced to leave the field."

"The Khan's men had not gone more than ten paces," continued Mowlānā Ebrahim Mašhadī, "before they lost discipline and scattered all over the place. Barely twenty men stayed at the Khan's side. Several times, *qezelbāš* charges penetrated our ranks, and in one of these the Khan received a spearthrust, but he concealed it from his companions. When we reached Čehel Doktarān, we saw blood pouring from his sleeve and down his side. He gave me leave to depart: 'You have a family in Herat,' he said; 'where do you think you are going? Turn back.' So I turned back, entered the city, and hid myself until things had quieted down a bit. Bāqī Sultan came galloping through the city with about thirty or forty men and took the road to Kohdastān, the way to Andekūd and Šoborgān. They crossed the Oxus by the ford at Karkī and reached Bokhara, where Bāqī Sultan's fortunes later prospered."

In short, many men of note lost their lives in this battle. On the Uzbek side, emirs like Hājji Bī, the governor of Herat; Nājūlī Bahādor; Mirzā ‘Abdollah Manqat; Moḥammad Morād Bī; and Moḥammad Yār-oghlān; of the other emirs, some were killed, others taken prisoner. Of the commanders of note, none escaped. The *gāzis* pursued the enemy to Gāzor-gāh and Kohdastān, slaying large numbers of them; the number of Uzbek dead totaled four thousand. The Safavid pursuit could not be carried farther. Most of the horses had foundered as a result of the forced marches, the strenuous action, and the heat, and the onset of darkness also prevented pursuit. Those Uzbeks who survived the battle and had families in Herat removed their families and possessions from the city and retreated in the direction of Meymana and Fāryāb; those who had no encumbrances of this kind fled directly from the field.

The Shah entered the caravanserai of Parīān on the outskirts of Herat and, in gratitude for God's favor toward him, spared those he found there, mostly wounded, women, and children. The royal army camped across the main road into Herat. On the Safavid side, the only casualties among officers of note were Valī Beg Ostājlu the centurion and Qāsem Beg Šāmlū the groom; the total Safavid killed amounted to one hundred. The Safavid baggage train and the rest of the army, in the charge of the vizier, Hātem Beg, had reached Kārīz in the district of Bākārz when the aide-de-camp, Šahverdi Beg Bāybordlū, brought them the good news of the victory at Rabāt-e Parīān. They then hastened to join the Shah. The people of Herat and the emirs of the tribes (Hazārajāt,²² Qepčāq,²³ Teymūri,²⁴ Tāheri, and Jamšīdi),²⁵ came forth to tender their allegiance to the Shah.

Before the Shah had reached Herat, Kāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar, an inhabitant of Gūrīān, had taken a body of retainers and blockaded Šāhom Kūltā, the Uzbek commandant, in the citadel there, and the Shah had ordered some of Ganj ‘Alī Khan's *qezelbaş* troops to assist him. When Šāhom Kūltā heard that Herat had fallen, he made a sortie, cut his way through a weak point in the besiegers' lines, and made good his escape. He was pursued and many of his Uzbeks slain, but he himself again escaped. However, he was out of luck;

²²Mongol tribes living in what is now the northwest corner of Afghanistan. See *TM*, p. 188, n.1.

²³See *TM*, p. 187, n.3.

²⁴See *TM*, p. 169. The Teymūri tribes lived in the region of Gūr and along the present Afghan-Iranian frontier.

²⁵See *TM*, p. 17.

near Zūrābād, he stopped by a melon field to refresh himself with the fruit. The watchman²⁶ came up and dealt him such a blow with his cudgel that Šāhom Kūlta rolled from his horse. While he was lying on the ground, temporarily stunned, some of the watchman's companions came up, recognized him, arrested him, and took him before the Shah.

At this juncture, the Shah received the news of the death of Dīn Moḥammad Khan. The manner in which he met his death remained obscure. Some say he was killed in the actual battle at Rabāṭ-e Parlān, and his body was among those found in the reedbed. But this version is contradicted by Mowlānā Ebrahim Monšī's account (which I have already given), to the effect that he (Mowlānā Ebrahim) accompanied Dīn Moḥammad Khan as far as Čehel Doḡtarān. As far as I can make out, what actually happened was that by the time the Khan reached Mārūčāq,²⁷ in the territory of the Qāqčī tribe, he was faint with loss of blood. His companions laid him down to rest while they went among the tribesmen to fetch him some food. The tribesmen, when they heard of the Khan's condition, fell on him and murdered him. He was buried on the spot by his companions. Another version of the story says that the Qāqčī tribesmen threw his corpse into the Morḡāb river.

Shah 'Abbas spent several days outside Herat, making a count of the enemy dead and of the captured weapons and equipment and investigating everybody's battle claims. Since he had promised before he left Iraq to make Farhād Khan governor of Herat, he kept his promise, although he felt considerable resentment against Farhād Khan for having fled from the field at Rabāṭ-e Parlān. Farhād Khan was also made *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, and his agents began their task of ordering the administrative affairs of the province. Most of his men found billets in the city. Suddenly, through an astonishing twist of fate, Farhād Khan was executed and Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, a *qūrčī* of the sword, was made governor of Herat and *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan.

²⁶*Daštībān*; a watchman posted to keep guard over cultivated fields, to drive off animals and other marauders.

²⁷A village on the Morḡāb River, a few miles north of Marv al-Rūd. See Le Strange, p. 405.

him to death, and charged Allāhverdi Khan and a number of the emirs and *gōlāms* with this task. These men went to Farhād Khan's house and carried out their mission. When Allāhverdi Khan removed Farhād Khan's dagger from his waist belt, the latter realized what the situation was. He just had time to exclaim, in Turkish, "Have things come to this pass?" His brother, Zu'l-Faqār Khan, the *amīr-al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, went in a panic to the royal palace and waited for execution, since he did not imagine he would be spared. But the Shah, mindful of the Koranic statement: "No one who bears a burden bears the burden of another,"²⁸ treated him with nothing but kindness. The same day, the Shah sent him a robe of honor, in order to set his mind at rest.

Zu'l-Faqār Khan demonstrated the purity of his devotion to his spiritual adviser and to the conduct expected of a Sufi by seeking to please the Shah. "Since my brother was judged deserving of punishment," he said to the Shah, "why did you not ask me to do the deed?" The Shah regretted the execution of Farhād Khan on two grounds: first, he regretted all the favors he had lavished on Farhād Khan over such a long period of time; second, he was afraid that people who were remote from the scene of power, and were ill-informed about the behavior of those close to it, might attribute his action to other motives.

As already reported, Hōseyn Khan Šāmlū was appointed governor of Herat. From among the junior officers, Bektāš Sultan Ostājlu was promoted to the status of emir and was sent to take possession of the citadel at Mārūčāq and the area of the Morgāb generally. Bektāš Sultan repaired the citadel at Mārūčāq, brought the province of the upper Morgāb under control, and exerted himself to restore its prosperity.

Further administrative appointments, covering the whole of Khorasan, were also made. Malek Jalāl al-Dīn Sīstānī appeared at court and was granted the province of Sīstān, which had been allotted to Ganj 'Alī Khan. Malek Jalāl al-Dīn Sīstānī, driven out of Sīstān by the Uzbegs, had taken refuge at the Shah's court; lately he had been residing at Kandahar. Mehrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Ṭabas, also appeared at court and was loaded with tokens of royal favor and appointed governor of Kāf and Bāqarz. On his way to court, he had laid siege to the Uzbek garrison at Tūn, commanded by Allāh-

²⁸Koran, 6:164, and several other places.

yār-oġlān. In the heat of the day, when the *gāzīs* had returned from patrol and were resting, the Uzbek commander made a sortie from the fort and galloped off. Mehṛab Khan pursued him, slew most of his men, and brought Allāhyār a prisoner to the Shah.

The Installation of Nūr Moḥammad Khan and Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan in Their Hereditary Territories by Qezelbāš Troops, the Capture of Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, and the Return of the Shah to Iraq

The detachment of *qūrčīs* under the command of Būdāq Khan, which, as already reported, had been instructed to escort Nūr Moḥammad Khan to Marv-e Šāhījān, reached Bāġbād. Bāġbād was held by Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, who was the son of Tarsūn Moḥammad Sultan, a cousin of ‘Abdollāh Khan through a paternal uncle and of ‘Abd al-Mo’men Khan through a maternal uncle; he was a handsome youth of eighteen years. When he learned of the confusion reigning in Khorasan and of the approach of Nūr Moḥammad Khan with a *qezelbāš* army, his first thought was to make his way to Marv and retire to Bokhara via Čahār-jū. The *qūrčīs* and Čeganī *gāzīs* were upon him like lightning, and surrounded him; after a brief resistance, his Uzbegs fled, and he was taken prisoner. Having brought under their control the districts of Nesā and Abīvard, the *gāzīs* proceeded toward Marv-e Šāhījān, where Soleyman *yasāvol* and Valī Moḥammad Sultan, the brother of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, scattered at their approach. Most of the tribes resident in the Marv region, and indeed the whole population of the area, demonstrated their support for Nūr Moḥammad Khan, their hereditary ruler.

Hearing that the Shah had already passed Mašhad and was advancing on Herat, the Uzbek officers decided they could not go to Herat to join Dīn Moḥammad Khan; they therefore retreated to Bokhara via Čahār-jū. The people of Marv came out to welcome Nūr Moḥammad Khan, including the leaders of the Jalā’er tribe and of other Turkman tribes in the area. The news of the victory at Herat was celebrated by the sounding of kettledrums. At Marv, the name of Shah ‘Abbas was included in the *koṭba* and stamped on the coinage. Būdāq Khan duly installed Nūr Moḥammad Khan on the throne of his ancestors and sent the captive Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan to the Shah with an escort of *qezelbāš*. At Herat, he was treated with kindness by the Shah, who encouraged him to hope for marks of royal favor. He was placed in the custody of one of the

golāms of the royal household, the Georgian Ṭahmāspqolī Beg. Reports came in that Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan had resumed full control of Kārazm, and the Khan expressed his unbounded gratitude to the Shah for his support.

The Shah spent several days in camp in the city park at Herat, dealing with administrative matters and answering petitions. He rewarded with grants, immunities, and robes of honor those inhabitants of Khorasan who, during the Uzbek occupation, had demonstrated their loyalty, had striven mightily in defense of the faith and the realm, and had defended their forts; he also rewarded those who had abandoned their homes and traveled to Iraq.

After disposing of all civil and military administrative matters at Herat, the Shah left for Mašhad, where he spent a month dealing with the affairs of that region and particularly of the shrine of the Imam Reżā. He saw to it that the establishment of shrine attendants, teachers of theology, Koran reciters, and other employees and servants of the shrine was brought up to strength on the basis laid down by Shah Tahmasp. He also saw to it that food was provided for the poor and stipends for the pensioners, on the proper basis. The Shah supplied the shrine with jeweled chandeliers of gold and silver, candlesticks, magnificent Kerman and Jowšaqān carpets, and essential pots and utensils. During his stay, the Shah visited the shrine every morning and evening; usually he performed in person the various duties of the shrine, such as sweeping the carpets in the holy sanctuary, and acquired merit by so doing. When there was nothing further to detain him at Mašhad, he marched via Rādekān and Kābūšān toward Astarābād, making for the Baḥrīān plain.

The Shah's Hunting Trip in the Plain of Rādekān

When the Shah reached Rādekān, beaters were sent forth to drive into the appointed hunting circle all the game within a distance of several days' journey on all sides. The circle was still one *farsaḵ* in diameter when the Shah moved into it, his eye caught by a number of onagers, and he eventually dispatched them all with his bow and arrow and his sword. The Shah hunted from morning till noon, while there was still plenty of space within the circle; he had a few *moqarrabs* in attendance, but they were not allowed to hunt themselves. The grooms kept the Shah well supplied with arrows, and he bagged gazelle and other animals, the *moqarrabs* keeping a tally of the

total bag, which amounted to one hundred and sixty-two. As the hunting circle had now become considerably smaller in circumference, the Shah gave permission to some of the emirs and *moqarrabs* to take their turn at hunting. A short time later, all the royal retainers, and the *qūrčī* and *gōlām* officers, were allowed to take their turn. Finally, the common soldiers got their chance. In the end, the gazelle were run to a standstill, and the infantry entered the circle and caught them on foot. No one was left without something to his credit.

Some two or three thousand gazelle were still within the circle, running around looking vainly for a way of escape. Then an astonishing thing happened. Some instinct guided the animals toward the place where the Shah was standing, and, after circling around him several times like pilgrims circumambulating the Kaaba, they all sought refuge near him and lay down around him, giving the Shah the appearance of a shepherd watching over his flock. When he saw this, the Shah gave orders that the animals should not be molested further.

When the sun set, the two or three thousand surviving animals were released and allowed to make their way across the open plain, no one daring to lay a hand on them. The next day, the Shah ordered that all the game should be brought before him for inspection, and a division was then made among the troops. The Shah then continued on his way, hunting as he went, by the *Ḳabūšān* and *Samalqān* road, and camped in the *Baḥrīān* plain. From there he proceeded toward *Astarābād*, intending to set the affairs of that province in order and to chastise the rebellious *Ūklū*, *Göklēn*, and other tribes of the *Şā'en-ḳānī* group, who were constantly causing trouble in that region.

The Shah's Expedition to Astarābād, His Punitive Action against the Rebels, and His Restoration of the Fortress of Mobārakābād

Although I have already given some details of events in *Astarābād* in the course of my chronological narrative, at the risk of wearying my readers I will give a brief summary of the history of this province for the benefit of students of history and of the lives of great men.

The province of *Astarābād* is one of the fairest in Iran. It is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea, and this produces a moderate

climate both in spring and autumn. It is like part of the gardens of paradise, and its inhabitants are God-fearing men, second to none in their piety and self-denial. Nevertheless, this province, like other parts of Māzandarān,²⁹ is not without its rogues and scoundrels, in whose heads ideas of revolt from time to time arise. These people are known as the wearers of black (*stāh-pūš*).

During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, when the realm of Iran was secure and well established, the firm administration of the provincial governors caused these people to put out of their heads the idea of "the wearing of the black" and to conduct themselves like well-behaved subjects. During this period, some of the Šā'en-kānī tribes, such as the Ūklū, the Göklen, the İlūr, and the Sālūr, who lived in the region of the river Atrek, which forms the border between Gorgān and Kārazm, and who were subjects of the ruler of Kārazm and were known collectively as Yaqqa Turkmans, migrated to the banks of the Gorgān River. They engaged in extensive cultivation there and paid cultivation tax to the Safavid governors of Gorgān. The latter, glad to have the land under cultivation, did not discourage them. In the course of time, however, these tribes began to show signs of revolt, and began carrying out raids into Astarābād province. The governors of Astarābād conducted punitive expeditions against them, and the border was usually in a state of turmoil. In order to pacify the region, Shah Tahmasp built the fort of Mobārakābād on the banks of the Gorgān River, and the governors of Gorgān took up their residence there instead of in the city so that they could keep more effective watch on this area.

After the death of Shah Tahmasp, Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the armies of Azerbaijan and Iraq were fully occupied with the Ottoman threat in the West, and the Khorasan emirs split into two opposing factions. As a result, for several years the *qezelbāš* were too pre-occupied to tend to the administration of Astarābād, and the province was left without a governor possessing full authority. A group of Yaqqa Turkmans, in particular those led by 'Alīyār Beg Imūr, had the temerity to occupy the mint and the fort of Mobārakābād, only three *farsaks* from the city. They destroyed the fort, and camped there as calmly as you please. The contagion of their seditious behavior gradually spread throughout the province of Astarābād. In every district some ringleader would stir up revolt and keep alive the tra-

²⁹The term Ṭabarestān, or Māzandarān, was sometimes used to include the neighboring province of Gorgān.

dition of the wearing of the black. Each rebel would construct a fort in his own district and stock it with musketeers and archers, and would recognize no outside authority.

As time passed, these local rebels and usurpers asserted their complete independence from the *qezelbaş*, assisted in this by the difficulty of road communications in the area and by the sanctuary afforded by the forests. They left the region along the banks of the Gorgān River and the neighboring plain under the control of the Yaqqa Turkmans. The latter, satisfied with this arrangement, spent both summer and winter on the Gorgān plain. They did not penetrate into the city, the forests, or other places which were difficult of access for fear of the wearers of black, and for a while they managed to live at peace with one another.

Toward the end of the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, about the time of the accession of Shah 'Abbas, first Morteżāqolī Khan Por-nāk and then Badr Khan Afšār, the brother of Eskandar Khan, was appointed governor of Astarābād. But the wearers of black, relying on the support of the Yaqqa Turkmans, refused to submit to the authority of the *qezelbaş* governors. The governors' retainers were unable to approach within a mile of the city, the produce of the province was denied to them, and in the end the *qezelbaş* were obliged to withdraw in the most humiliating fashion. One of the boldest leaders of the wearers of black was Kāja Šaraf al-Dīn Sāvārī, who plundered all Morteżāqolī Khan's baggage, took from the *gāzīs* their horses and equipment, and sent them away naked. Not long afterward, the Uzbegs invaded Khorasan, overran the districts of Nesā, Abīvard, Darūn, and Bāgbād, adjacent to the Kabūd Jāma district of Astarābād. 'Abdollāh Khan Uzbeg subjugated Kārazm and expelled its ruler, Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan.

Shah 'Abbas tried to conciliate the Šā'en-kānī chiefs because he was afraid they might make common cause with the Uzbegs and encourage them to invade Astarābād, with the result that revolt might spread to Māzandarān. As a policy of expediency at the time, he selected one of the Šā'en-kānī chiefs who seemed more reliable than the others, 'Alyār Beg Imūr, raised him to the rank of khan, and appointed him governor of Astarābād. 'Alyār Beg had declared his willingness to tender his allegiance to the Shah, through the mediation of Mīrzā Beg, the son of Mīr Zīā al-Dīn Fendereski, a loyal subject of the crown. However, the Sīāh-pūš leaders refused to

accept his authority either; the most they would agree to was that his lieutenant should take up residence in the city and style himself governor, while 'Alẓār Beg himself remained on the banks of the Gorgān River.

After the death of 'Alẓār Beg,³⁰ his son Moḥammad Yār Khan visited the Safavid court and was appointed governor of Astarābād in his father's place, but he was opposed by the Ūklū tribe and eventually slain by them. His younger brother, Qeltj Khan, then went to court and received a letter of appointment in his turn, but he could make no headway either because of the hostility of the Ūklū tribe. Finally, in 1007/1598, Shah 'Abbas subjugated the province and, as already reported, made Farhād Khan governor of Astarābād. The latter appointed a *dārūga* to administer the province for him, and the Siāh-pūš had no option but to submit. They repaired to court to tender their submission, and accompanied the Shah on his victorious expedition to Herat. After the execution of Farhād Khan, Ḥoseyn Khan Ziād-oḡlū Qājār was appointed governor of Astarābād.

When Shah 'Abbas decided to move against the Ūklū rebels and the Yaqqa Turkman insurgents, and to settle the affairs of Astarābād, he sent back to Iraq from his camp in the Baḥrīān plain all his baggage and the bulk of his forces, via the Bestām road. He himself, with a body of picked retainers and great emirs, marched toward Astarābād. In order to allay the fears of the Ūklūs, he sent an envoy, Moḥammad-qolī Beg Čaḡatāy, the master of the horse, to Qārī Khan, the Ūklū chief, with letters designed to conciliate the Turkman tribes. The gist of his message was that, since these tribes had from ancient times been subject to the ruler of Kārazm, and since the ruler of Kārazm, Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, had taken refuge with the Shah, together with his sons, and had now been restored by him to his hereditary domains, they too should acknowledge themselves to be dependents of the Shah, for it was only logical that dependents of Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan should be dependents of the Shah too. Qārī Khan should therefore now accompany Moḥammadqolī Beg without fear and tender his allegiance to the Shah. If they returned to their former good behavior, they would receive nothing but kindness from the Shah. Meanwhile, the royal army, guided by the Siāh-pūš chiefs, began to advance by the Kabūd Jāma valley road.

At first, Qārī Khan Ūklū treated Moḥammadqolī Beg with honor

³⁰1005/1596-97.

and promised to convene a meeting of the chiefs and elders of the tribe and urge them to tender their allegiance to the Shah; he also agreed to accompany him to prostrate himself before the Shah. Unfortunately, the more foolish elements among the tribe, because it was a long time since they had left Kārazm and had grown used to independence and were no longer loyal to their own ruler, were terrified by the approach of the royal army and too frightened to go to meet the Shah. They fled toward the Atrek River. In addition, a group of hotheads attacked Moḥammadqolī Beg's tent, inflicted several mortal wounds on him, killed several of his retainers, and looted his baggage before following the rest of the tribe.

On receipt of this news, the Shah marched at top speed in pursuit of the rebels. He caught up with them at night, and they abandoned all their tents and fled. It was a night dark as the pit of hell, and raining heavily. The Shah wanted to continue his pursuit of Qārī Khan and not to draw rein until he had overtaken him, but his advisers demurred. The Shah should not risk his life chasing this rebel in the darkness, they said; they advised camping overnight in the rebels' deserted camp. After all, they said, their primary object in coming to Astarābād was to purge the province of rebellious elements. The Shah took their advice. He left his supplies at the rebel camp in the charge of Barḡordār Beg Anīs, the commander in chief of artillery, and a detachment of musketeers. At first light, although it was still pouring with rain, the Shah rode off and overtook the retreating Ūklūs near the Atrek River. Qārī Khan fled across the river in a panic with a few of his men, leaving the rest of the tribe at the mercy of the *gāzīs*, who slaughtered the men, took the women and children prisoner, and plundered their flocks. Since they had no clue as to where Qārī Khan had fled in the trackless waste across the Atrek, they marched to the Gorgān River, near the mausoleum of Šams al-Ma'ālī Qābūs b. Wašmgīr,³¹ and then to the fort of Mo-bārakābād.

The chiefs of the other Ša'en-kānī tribes, the Imūr, Göklen, Sālūr, and others, hastened to present themselves to the Shah and were graciously received. The Shah decided to repair the fortifications of the Mo-bārakābād castle. The work was divided among the emirs and their men, and completed within twelve days. The Shah realized there was no one left among the Sāh-pūš chiefs who remembered the days when the province was firmly under the jurisdiction of *qezelbāš*

³¹Ziārīd prince who reigned in Ṭabarestān and Gorgān 367-402/978-1012.

governors. The young men who had now come upon the scene as the leaders of the *Siāh-pūš* had not seen a Safavid governor for twenty-five years, and considered themselves the governors of the province.

The Shah considered it expedient to awaken them to reality and so, after the castle had been completed, he summoned them into his presence and admonished them as follows:

For some years this province has been without a ruling hand and has been devoid of law and order. Each of you, in the pursuit of your own interests, has ceased to behave like a subject and has formed a private army. Out of fear of one another and of the Turkman tribes, you have mobilized the *Siāh-pūš* and have also been guilty of improper actions against various *qezelbaş* emirs. Now that you have repented of your past sins, and have sought forgiveness and have submitted yourselves to me, I shall overlook the crimes you committed during the period of the troubles. As far as I am concerned, they never happened. Now, by virtue of God's favor and my own power, the whole of this frontier, comprising the provinces of *Ṭabarestān*, *Gorgān*, and *Khorasan* as far as the *Morgāb* River, has been brought again under the jurisdiction of the officers of the Safavid state; the princes of *Kārazm* and *Ūrganj* are my vassals; and the *Ša'en-kānī* rebels have met their just deserts. Those who survived the sword have submitted to me, and a governor has been appointed to administer the affairs of that region. From now on, it is my hope that this region will be free from the oppression of such tyrants. This being so, there is no longer any need for you to have castles to protect your property. You must raze your castles, hand over to your local governor your weapons and equipment, to be stored at *Mobārakābād* in case of need, and bring your families to *Mobārakābād* to reside there and, as in former times, engage in the cultivation of the land. Let the practice of the wearing of the black be abandoned forever, so that the governor of the province may feel secure from you and you from him, and trust may exist between you.

The Sīāh-pūš chiefs had no choice but to do as the Shah said. The Shah entrusted a reliable *qezelbāš* officer with the task of collecting their weapons. He devoted himself to the task with zeal, letting it be known that if in the future so much as a sword or a spear were found in a person's house, his life would be forfeit. And so the Sīāh-pūš, who still today maintain an air of independence in the various districts of Astarābād, found themselves in an unforeseen situation and tendered their submission with the greatest unwillingness. In their folly, they started reproaching one another for this apparent act of submission, and dissension soon broke out among them. However, as agreed, they razed their forts and took several thousand muskets, pieces of chain mail, quivers, and bows, to the castle of Mobārā-kābād; the chiefs took their families to the fort.

One day, as the Shah was riding through the city, he heard the clamor of women and other defenseless persons who were raising their cries to heaven against the oppression and injustices of the Sīāh-pūš. During the time of the troubles, the Sīāh-pūš had committed many crimes against the people of Astarābād, who were mainly pious, ascetic, God-fearing folk. If the Sīāh-pūš suspected anyone of having any wealth, they took a band of thugs to his house at night, threatened him with death if he did not hand over everything he possessed, and raped his womenfolk. Kāja Šaraf al-Dīn Sāvarī was particularly notorious. On two occasions he had taken a large group of Sīāh-pūš to the women's bathhouse, dragged the women naked outdoors, and carried them off to Sāvar as though they were infidel or Frankish prisoners, selling them off individually to some master or other. Although these crimes were committed in anarchical times, it would not be consonant with the justice of kings, who are the shadows of God upon earth, not to demand retribution for them, nor would the minds of the poor and the oppressed be set at rest unless the malefactors were punished and the kingdom purged of such audacious men.

Shah 'Abbas therefore decided to visit retribution upon these evil-doers. He summoned the Sīāh-pūš chiefs to an audience at which he was reviewing the cases of *seyyeds*, theologians, members of the religious classes generally, and holders of benefices; the Shah pretended he needed the chiefs to help him determine which members of these classes and their offspring had adhered faithfully to their calling, and which had joined the ranks of the Sīāh-pūš riffraff.

After the investigation was completed, the Shah innocently asked Kāja Šaraf al-Dīn Šavārī for details concerning Mortezaqolī Khan Pornāk. In the course of his narrative the Kāja, stupidly relying on the Shah's declaration that all his past crimes had been forgiven, related all the acts of injustice, humiliation, and ignominy he had inflicted on the *qezelbāš*, and he flattered the Shah, hoping thus to turn away his wrath. However, his soft words were not as effective as the sighs and supplications of the oppressed, and the Shah had all the Šāh-pūš chiefs executed. Kāja Šaraf al-Dīn Šavārī was cut into pieces; pieces were hung up in all the wards of the city, and a piece was suspended over the door of the women's bathhouse. Others were executed with the full rigor of the law, and their corpses were suspended upside-down over the city gates as a warning to all who beheld them. Still others had their eyes put out and were released to show themselves as examples to the people.

The people rejoiced at the punishment inflicted on these malefactors and prayed for the prosperity of the Safavid dynasty. After the Shah had left for Iraq, the governor of Astarābād, Ḥoseyn Khan, continued to ferret out rebels and to put to death anyone suspected of disloyalty. Moreover, he was so zealous in impounding all items of military equipment and offensive weapons that, if anyone was found wearing a drawing ring,³² he would have his thumb cut off and the drawing ring confiscated. As a result, the Šāh-pūš lost their desire for the wearing of the black, and the province of Astarābād became as quiet and peaceful as the other province of Iran.

The Capture of Alvand Dīv Māzandarānī and the Shah's Expedition to Māzandarān to Deal with Affairs in That Province

The Shah thought it might be necessary for him to spend the winter of 1598-99 in Māzandarān in order to deal with the rebel Alvand Dīv; at a season when the trees were bare of leaves, it might be easier to find him and his fellow rebels among the forests of Māzandarān. He swore not to leave the province until every rebel had been run to earth; he charged the nobles of Māzandarān to cooperate in finding Alvand Dīv, and he sent a detachment of troops on ahead to commence the search.

³²A ring of leather or bone worn on the finger to prevent the bowstring from cutting into it.

When Alvand Dīv heard of the Shah's intentions, he considered his only chance of salvation lay in asking for quarter and in presenting himself before the Shah. He accordingly sent an envoy to the Shah's paternal aunt, asking her to intercede for him. If she could obtain a promise of pardon for him, he would set out for the Shah's court. The Shah told Alvand that, if he came to court, his life, property and honor were safe; "but," said the Shah, "I shall not leave Māzandarān until all rebellion is at an end." On the basis of this assurance, Alvand Dīv came to court and was well received by the Shah. The Shah told him his past sins would be forgiven if he would renounce all claim to the government of Savād-kūh and live quietly in Iraq with his family. Overwhelmed by the Shah's generosity, Alvand Dīv accepted these terms and took up residence at Shiraz with his family and dependents. The Shah, his worries in regard to Alvand Dīv now over, spent a few days hunting in Māzandarān; he put to death some persons suspected of sedition, and moved others to Iraq.

This completed the pacification of the whole Caspian littoral, from Gorgān in the northeast, through Māzandarān, Rostamdār, Gīlān, Gaskar, and Ṭāleš, as far as the borders of Šīrvān in the northwest, an area that in previous generations had been divided among many princes and governors and as a result had never been free from turmoil and strife. The Shah led his army back to Iraq, skirting the slopes of Mount Damāvand, a difficult route at the best of times. At this season the snow was more than one spear's length in depth, and the men suffered great hardships. At one point the Shah dismounted, and for a distance of more than one *farsak* himself led his horse forward ahead of his men, who followed single file in his tracks. They reached the small town of Damāvand safely and from there marched to Qazvin, where the people came out to give the Shah a great welcome; kettledrums were sounded to celebrate the victory in Khorasan. The Shah disbanded his troops and went to Isfahan, where he spent the rest of the winter.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred during the Year of the Shah's Campaign in Khorasan

Mīrzā 'Alī Beg Garāmīllū, a Šāmlū centurion, was sent to India to bear the tidings of the victory over the Uzbeks to the Mogul emperor Akbar, and a similar letter was sent to the Ottoman emperor Moḥammad III. A signal event this year was the remission by the Shah, in gratitude to God for his victory, of taxes to the amount of approxi-

mately one hundred thousand Iraqi *tomān*, which were levied on the populace in the form of perpetual drafts assigned on the revenue.³³ The taxes remitted were as follows:

(1) The levy on flocks (*čūpānbegī*). This tax, levied on sheep, brought in about twenty thousand Iraqi *tomān* annually. In consideration of the fact that the people of Khorasan, throughout the period of Uzbek occupation, had assisted with their property and their lives the troops of the royal army, their fellow *Ḳorāsānīs*, and all manner of official guests, and had suffered great hardship in so doing, the Shah remitted the tax on flocks and decreed that henceforth not one *dīnār* should be levied under this head.

(2) A reduction of five *dīnārs* for every *dīnār* of the commission levied by governors as their fee for collecting the taxes. Over the years, it had become customary in Iraq for governors to levy from the people five times the basic fee, payable in cash, in addition to the emoluments of fiefholders and the perquisites of *dārūḡas*.³⁴ Since this practice was contrary to the old tax assessment and also to the tax regulations of Shah Tahmasp, it was abolished. It was decreed that the governors should levy only the stipulated cash fee, plus the additional fees connected with it, and should not countenance the new fee-structure which had become customary. This meant a tax reduction of some fifty to sixty thousand *tomān*.

(3) A remission of all taxes levied on Isfahan for one year, amounting to about twenty thousand *tomān*, as a reward for the loyal services of the people of Isfahan.

These tax reductions were indeed magnificent gifts to the people. May God protect the Shah from all harm, so that he may continue to extend his justice to the poor and weak.

³³*Hama-sāla* was a form of draft (*barāt*) permanently assigned on the same source of revenue. Obviously, they were preferable to the *yak-sāla* type of draft, which was valid for one year only.

³⁴Minorsky (*TM*, p. 176 and note 3) assumes that the governors had been in the habit of levying *five times the total basic tax* in their area of jurisdiction. "Grammatically," he says, "this is the only possible meaning of *yakī-rā pañj*, but the proportion of the additional levy (500 per cent) sounds exorbitant; no depreciation of money would account for it." I agree. We therefore have to look for an alternative possible meaning. I think the phrase *aṣṭ-e māl-e naqdī* refers not to the *total basic tax*, but to the *basic tax fee* levied by the governors for their services—in other words, the '*amalkard*'. This interpretation ties in with the opening statement (not translated by Minorsky) that Shah 'Abbas reduced this fee in the amount of "five dinars for every dinar"; in other words, 'Abbas was returning to the *status quo ante*.

Another event that occurred during the Shah's expedition to Khorasan was the murder of Mīrzā Valī Khan, the son of 'Alīqolī Khan and the grandson of Dürmīš Khan Šāmlū, who had been granted the signal honor of a marriage alliance with the Safavid house. He was murdered by a young Tabrizī named Šāleḥ, a servant at court. Men of discretion are aware that there is an unwritten rule for persons who are in attendance at court in the service of kings—namely, that they should treat the other servants of their master as their brothers and sons, and be jealous of their honor. Anyone who looks disloyally upon another is, in the view of jealous persons, deserving of punishment.

Valī Khan Mīrzā had on several occasions, in his folly and indiscretion, declared to Šāleḥ his love and special attachment for him. One night, when the royal army was in camp near Jājarm, Valī Khan Mīrzā left a royal assembly stupefied by drink. Šāleḥ came up behind him and slew him with his sword. Šāleḥ at once went in to the Shah and confessed what he had done, and the Shah applauded him for defending his honor in this manner. The corpse of the murdered man lay where it had fallen until morning, none daring to move it for burial. In the morning, Valī Khan Mīrzā's servants were permitted to bury the body. His troops were transferred to his younger brother Ḥoseyn Khan Mīrzā, who, like his elder brother, was also a son-in-law of the Shah.

At the beginning of the year Moḥammad Yār Khan, the son of 'Alīyār Khan Īmūr, who had been appointed governor of Astarābād in succession to his father, was treacherously murdered by a group of Üklū and Yaqqa Turkmans; he was not yet twenty. His younger brother, Qelīj Beg, was appointed by Shah 'Abbas governor of Astarābād, but he was unable to establish himself firmly in his governorship. On the Shah's return from Khorasan, as already related, the province was brought firmly under Safavid rule and the Üklū tribe was crushed. Qelīj Khan, together with his family and the dependents of his father and brother, moved to Iraq on the Shah's orders, and the rest of the Īmūr and Sālūr chiefs, such as Naẓār Beg, known as Naẓār Kūr, were ordered to support Ḥoseyn Khan, the new governor of Astarābād, and to install their families in the fortress there.

While the Shah was at Astarābād, he reappointed Zu'l-Faqār Khan governor of Azerbaijan, and gave him leave to depart to his post.

History of Shah 'Abbas: Book II

I trust that the continuing support of good fortune and of the scholars of the age will give me strength to record the events of the coming year also without flagging.

The Events of the Year of the Pig, Corresponding to the Year 1008/1599-1600, the Thirteenth Year of Shah 'Abbas's Reign

New Year's Day this year fell on Sunday, 23 Ša'bān 1007/21 March 1599. Shah 'Abbas gave a huge feast in the Naqš-e Jahān gardens at Isfahan and invited to it the emirs, *moqarrabs*, principal officers of state, people of Isfahan, and the various classes of persons present at court at that time. Cunningly fashioned pavilions, hung with lights, were erected in the garden, and the feasting went on for three days and nights.

This year, the Shah again planned to visit Khorasan. His object was twofold: first, he wished to make the pilgrimage again to the shrine of the Imam Reżā and to glean the latest information on the situation in Transoxania and the activities of the Uzbegs; second, he wished to go to the assistance of Nūr Moḥammad Khan, who was his protégé. After Shah 'Abbas had reinstalled Nūr Moḥammad Khan in his hereditary domains, the latter and the Nāīmān tribe regarded each other with mutual suspicion; the Khan had not forgotten that it was the Nāīmāns who had rebelled against 'Abdollāh Khan, gone over to 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, and expelled him from his territories. The Nāīmāns, for their part, saw too much of *qezelbāš* ways in his style of administration and remained hostile to him.

When the crops were ready for harvest, the Shah left Isfahan for Khorasan, not taking with him any of the emirs or troops from the provinces, but only those retainers who were always at his side. As he was leaving, an ambassador arrived from Pīr Moḥammad Khan and the emirs at Bokhara, escorted by one of Nūr Moḥammad Khan's men. He bore a letter pledging the sincere friendship of the Uzbek chiefs and asking for the return of Moḥammad Ebrahim, a grandson of 'Abdollāh Khan and cousin of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, who had been captured at Bāgbād. The Uzbek chief said he had heard that the Shah, with that innate magnanimity he had inherited from his immaculate ancestors,¹ had treated his captive with the greatest kindness. "Now that the throne of Transoxania has devolved upon me," concluded Pīr Moḥammad Khan, "I would deem it a personal favor if you would return Moḥammad Ebrahim, who is like a son to me."

¹An allusion to the Safavid claim to descent from the Seventh Shi'ite Imam, Mūsā al-Kāẓem.

However, the emirs at Bokhara had sent word to Nūr Moḥammad Khan that they had had to consent to the khanship of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, *faute de mieux*. Although the latter was of royal blood and in this sense fit to rule, they said, he was a dervish who preferred a quiet life of meditation to the hurlyburly of government and the cares of state. As a result, they said, the state already was in trouble; Bāqī Sultan had seized control of Samarkand and set himself up in opposition to Pīr Moḥammad Khan, while at Balk other problems had arisen. In this situation, they said, no one was more fitted to take charge of things in Transoxania and act as the lieutenant of the ruler whom they had chosen than Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, both by virtue of hereditary right and capability. They therefore besought Nūr Moḥammad Khan to act as intermediary in putting their plea for the return of Moḥammad Ebrahim before Shah 'Abbas. In return, they pledged peace in their time between themselves and the dependent vassals of the Safavid king, and peace between the Uzbeqs and the *qezelbaş*. The Shah agreed to these terms, and to sending Moḥammad Ebrahim, escorted by one of the great emirs, to Nūr Moḥammad Khan at Marv. If the Bokhara emirs were sincere in what they said, they should come to Čahār-jū and Marv to welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim, who would be handed over to them by Nūr Moḥammad Khan on receipt of satisfactory guarantees.

When the Shah reached Semnān, he received fresh news from Nūr Moḥammad Khan to the effect that war had broken out between Pīr Moḥammad Khan and Bāqī Sultan, and that Pīr Moḥammad Khan and most of his emirs had been killed by the latter. Kōdāy Nāzar Bī, who had acted as kingmaker and placed Pīr Moḥammad Khan on the throne, had escaped from the battlefield and made his way to Marv; Bāqī Sultan had taken charge at Bokhara. The Shah ordered Kōdāy Nāzar Bī to be sent to him so that he might question him in person about the situation in Transoxania, and he further ordered Nūr Moḥammad Khan to take whatever action seemed most expedient in regard to Moḥammad Ebrahim.

Events in Transoxania and the Accession of Bāqī Sultan

After Pīr Moḥammad Khan had been installed as ruler at Bokhara, Tavakkol Khan Qazāq, finding Transoxania without a strong hand at the helm, raised a huge army from the tribes of Turkestan and the Uzbeqs of the steppes and invaded. He rapidly overran the provinces of Aḡsikaş, Andejān, Tashkent, and Samarkand, as far as Mian

Kal. He left his brother, Īsom Sultan, at Samarkand with twenty thousand men, and marched on Bokhara with between seventy and eighty thousand men. Pīr Moḥammad Khan, who had no more than ten to fifteen thousand men at his disposal, ruled out the possibility of a pitched battle and prepared to resist a siege. Every day the defenders made sorties and inflicted casualties on the besiegers. Eleven days passed in this manner.

On the twelfth day, the defenders marched out of the city *en masse* and gave battle. Fighting raged all day, and in the end the Bokharan forces were victorious. Tavakkol Khan fell back on his camp, his men scattered in all directions. The Bokharans reentered the city and beat the kettledrums in triumph. Tavakkol Khan considered his position to be untenable; he lit large numbers of fires in his camp, and retreated under cover of darkness to Samarkand, where he was scornfully reproached by his brother for having fled from an enemy numerically far inferior; his action, said Īsom Sultan, might well provoke a revolt against them at Samarkand. Their best plan was to join forces and make a united attack on Bokhara.

When Tavakkol Khan fell back from Bokhara, Pīr Moḥammad Khan came out of the city to pursue him and to recover those places which had been occupied by the enemy. Reinforcements reached him from all parts of Transoxania, and a second battle was fought at Ūzūn Saql in the Mīān-kāl district. Prior to the battle, Pīr Moḥammad Khan was joined by Bāqī Sultan, who had been routed by the *qezelbāš* at Pol-e Sālār; he, like his brother Dīn Moḥammad Khan, had left the field with a few of his men and crossed the Oxus at the Karkī ford and made his way to Bokhara, arriving there shortly after Pīr Moḥammad Khan had left in pursuit of Tavakkol Khan. In default of instructions from Pīr Moḥammad Khan, the townspeople of Bokhara refused him admittance to the city, and Bāqī Sultan marched on past Mazār-e Kāja Bahā al-Dīn and joined Pīr Moḥammad Khan at his camp at Ūzūn Saql. There, following the practice of the princes of the house of Genghis, he prostrated himself before his brother.

Pīr Moḥammad Khan's emirs welcomed Bāqī Sultan with open arms and placed him in charge of operations against Tavakkol Khan. Bāqī Sultan fought a number of minor engagements against Tavakkol Khan, in most of which he was victorious. He executed 'Abd al-Vāse' Bī, formerly a trusted officer of 'Abdollah Khan who had been

party to the assassination of 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan, because 'Abd al-Vāse' Bī had turned traitor, joined Tavakkol Khan, and incited him to invade Transoxania. Skirmishes went on for about a month, and the whole of this time Bāqī Sultan fought courageously as the loyal supporter of Pīr Moḥammad Khan. Finally, Tavakkol Khan got tired of this indecisive fighting and launched a surprise attack on Pīr Moḥammad Khan. Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, a relative of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, and Moḥammad Bāqī *atāliq*, the *divānbeḡī*, were both killed in this action. Tavakkol Khan was wounded and retired to Tashkent, where he fell ill and died.

Pīr Moḥammad appointed Bāqī Sultan governor of Samarkand as a reward for his services, and he was welcomed there as a liberator by the people. Through the good offices of the Naqšbandī shaikhs, a truce of sorts was concluded between Bāqī Sultan and the Cossacks, a condition being that the Cossacks be left unmolested at Tashkent. At Samarkand, Bāqī Sultan included in the *koṭba* the name of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, and embellished his coinage with it. He established himself firmly at Samarkand, and also brought under his control various peripheral areas. This year, he remained loyal to Pīr Moḥammad Khan.

Gradually, however, he became intoxicated with the idea of still greater power, particularly since he considered himself more fitted to be supreme khan than Pīr Moḥammad, and was encouraged in this ambition by the ease with which he had assumed control of the extensive province of Samarkand. He began to hand out largesse with a lavish hand, and he distributed all the revenues of the province to his troops in the form of grants. As a result, large numbers of Uzbegs flocked to him, including Raḥmānqolī Sultan and 'Abbas Sultan, his cousins, his brother Tarsūn Moḥammad Sultan, and other relatives. He adopted the style of khan, and his men began to raid across the borders of his territory.

Several warnings were sent to Bāqī Khan by Pīr Moḥammad Khan's emirs and principal officers of state. When these had no effect, they decided on a punitive expedition against Samarkand. Bāqī Khan sent smooth-talking envoys to Pīr Moḥammad Khan, adducing as evidence of his loyalty the fact that no changes had been made in the *koṭba* or on the coinage. He promised better behavior in the future, and said that his troops would not go beyond the confines of the province of Samarkand. The Bokharan emirs agreed to

peaceful negotiation, and an insincere truce was concluded between the two parties. However, Bāqī Khan continued to give clear proof of his seditious activities. When some secret letters which he had written to various Uzbek nobles, calling on them to transfer their allegiance to him, came to light, Pīr Moḥammad Khan's principal officers of state realized there was no hope of recalling Bāqī Khan to his allegiance.

At this point, Bāqī Khan abandoned all pretense and openly rebelled, since the revenues of the province of Samarkand no longer sufficed to provide fodder allowances and cash allowances for such a large army. With the intention of subjugating the province of Mīān-kāl, he marched first against the fortress of Dabūs and laid siege to it. Shah Kūček Dürmen, the governor of Mīān-kāl, emerged from the Old Fort and submitted to Bāqī Khan, and together they captured the fort at Dabūs and put to death there Moḥammad Šarīf Sultan, a relative of Pīr Moḥammad Khan.

On receipt of this news, Pīr Moḥammad Khan mobilized his army and sent a courier to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan at Balḵ to ask for help. The elders at Balḵ, since they knew the triumph of Bāqī Khan would mean the end of their own power, and since they were opposed to Bāqī Khan's assuming the office of supreme khan, decided to assist Pīr Moḥammad Khan. They sent a force of ten thousand men under the command of Shah Kāja Naqīb, an eminent *seyyed* of that province, and also other reliable emirs. On receiving these reinforcements, Pīr Moḥammad Khan marched on Samarkand with forty thousand men. When Pīr Moḥammad Khan neared the city, Bāqī Khan repeated his earlier performance—abasing himself, begging for forgiveness, and so on—but Pīr Moḥammad Khan and his principal officers of state, having found his word to be false on the previous occasion, refused to trust him again. Bāqī Khan did not consider himself strong enough to risk a battle in the open field, and prepared to resist a siege. Pīr Moḥammad Khan's men camped around the city, but the Balḵ contingent, although it had come to the assistance of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, felt a little apprehensive of the Bokharans and kept itself apart.

The defenders sallied forth. With their rear protected by the fort, they engaged their attackers, and heavy fighting went on all day. The following day, Bāqī Khan led a strong force out of the Bokhara Gate, which was opposite the camp of the Balḵ contingent, and made

fierce sorties against the latter. Pīr Moḥammad Khan sent most of his men to the Bokhara Gate to drive the Samarqandīs back, but at this juncture Dūstom Arġūn, formerly one of 'Abdollāh Khan's great emirs, deserted Pīr Moḥammad Khan and went over to the enemy. Encouraged by this addition to their strength, Bāqī Khan's men stood their ground, and gradually the whole of the Balḵ contingent, and more and more Bokharans joined in the fray, leaving Pīr Moḥammad Khan's center depleted.

At this point, Bāqī Khan, sending his uncle Raḥmānqolī Sultan ahead with some skirmishers, suddenly emerged from the north gate with a picked body of about one thousand (certainly not more than fifteen hundred) men, and charged full tilt at Pīr Moḥammad Khan's center. The Bokharans, their morale already shaken by the desertion of Dūstom Arġūn, broke at Raḥmānqolī Sultan's first charge. An unknown rider inflicted a severe wound on Pīr Moḥammad Khan and then, recognizing him, led him to Bāqī Khan, who at once had him put to death. When the news reached the rest of Pīr Moḥammad Khan's men, their rout became general. But the Balḵ contingent preserved some sort of order and kept together as they retreated from the field and went to Qaršī. There, they picked up Pīr Moḥammad Khan's infant son, Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, and proceeded to Balḵ.

After his victory, Bāqī Khan marched immediately on Bokhara. Some of Pīr Moḥammad Khan's emirs who had escaped unscathed from the battle, such as Ḳodāy Naẓār Bī, reached Bokhara ahead of him. But Ḳodāy Naẓār Bī saw no possibility of holding the city against him and fled the same night across the Oxus to Marv, to Nūr Moḥammad Khan. On the third day after the battle, Bāqī Khan entered Bokhara in triumph, and was welcomed with due ceremony by the notables of the city. He ascended the throne of 'Abdollāh Khan, and the Uzbek tribes tendered their allegiance to him.

Of Pīr Moḥammad Khan's men who fell into their hands, any who were suspected of harboring opposition to Bāqī Khan were put to death, for instance, Gönültāš and his brother, Dūst Čohra-aqāsī, and others; the rest were granted amnesty. The newel posts of the pulpits and the face of the *dīnārs* were embellished with his name and titles. The neighboring princes, from Tashkent, Turkestan, Balḵ, Ḥešār-e Šādmān, and Badaḡšān, sent ambassadors to congratulate Bāqī Khan on his accession. Bāqī Khan was a brave and intrepid youth, and a man of resolution and sound judgment in affairs of state—quali-

ties which had raised him from vassal status to the position of supreme khan. Eventually, he extended his dominion also over the provinces of Balḵ, Badaḵšān, and Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, as I shall describe for my readers in due course.

The Shah's Visit to Mašhad and Events There

As previously related, the Shah received the news about Bāqī Khan when he reached Semnān. He accordingly postponed his plan to send Moḥammad Ebrahim to Transoxania and marched back to Mašhad via Kālpūš. When he reached Darra-e Mowze' Kabās in the district of Kālpūš, he fell ill with a high fever and was forced to keep to his bed for a month. The physicians put forth all their efforts to cure him, and all persons in the royal camp, whatever their degree, vowed alms to the needy if the Shah recovered. Every man brought what he most cherished as a sacrificial offering to the Shah. In the end, through God's mercy, the Shah was restored to health and, after a period of convalescence, marched to Esfarā'īn via Šaqān and Jorbod. He spent twenty days there, purging himself on the doctors' orders.

While the Shah was ill at Mowze' Kabās, Kodāy Nazar Bī arrived from Marv. When the Shah recovered, he gave him a full report on affairs in Transoxania. From his account and that of other Uzbegs, it appeared that 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, the putative son of 'Ebādollāh Sultan, who had been placed on the throne at Balḵ through the efforts of 'Ebādollāh Sultan's widow, Bānū-ye 'Ozmā, was an unknown who had been used as a pawn by the latter. This was widely rumored among the Uzbegs, and the Shah sought urgent confirmation of this report.

Meanwhile, since the Uzbegs had doubts about the legitimacy of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and Balḵ was in reality ruled by Bānū-ye 'Ozmā, he decided to send Moḥammad Ebrahim, her nephew, to Balḵ. The Shah hoped everyone would flock to the support of Moḥammad Ebrahim, who might then proceed to the conquest of Transoxania. On the other hand, if Bānū-ye 'Ozmā remained firm in her support of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, there was a possibility that they might form an alliance and launch a joint invasion of Transoxania to wrest their hereditary domains from alien hands. Kodāy Nazar Bī approved this plan.

By a lucky coincidence, ambassadors arrived from Balḵ at this point, on behalf of Bānū-ye 'Ozmā and the emirs there. Apparently, when Bāqī Khan extended his sway over Transoxania, they had become nervous and had made overtures to the Shah, asking that Moḥammad Ebrahim be sent to Balḵ. The Shah waited no longer; having conferred on Moḥammad Ebrahim the rank of khan and the title of son, he sent him in the care of Ḳodāy Naẓār Bī, who was appointed his guardian and *dīvānbeḡī*. With Ḳodāy Naẓār Bī, the Shah sent a letter designed to mollify 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, whom he also addressed as "my son." The kingdom of Transoxania, said the Shah, had from time immemorial been the domain of the sons of Jānī Beg Khan.² At the present time, there remained of the descendants of Jānī Beg Khan only himself ('Abd al-Amīn) and Moḥammad Ebrahim, both of whom he (the Shah) had honored with the style of "son." Since the Safavid house was noted for its beneficence and munificence, and since Moḥammad Ebrahim had actually been living at the Shah's court and 'Abd al-Amīn Khan had made overtures to him, he (the Shah), purely for the sake of acquiring a good name, had decided to forget past enmities and spare no effort to restore their house to its rightful place. The two khans should form a fraternal alliance for the purpose of reconquering their hereditary territories.

The Shah also issued orders and letters addressed to the Uzbek emirs at Balḵ, urging them to recall the past benefits conferred on them by the house of Jānī Begī Khan and exhorting them to give their loyal support to these two scions of the house, and not to support any alien ruler, on pain of incurring dishonor. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan besought the Shah to grant him a royal diploma conferring on him the right to rule the whole of Transoxania, and the Shah complied. The author of this history drafted the royal diploma, with a suitable preamble, had it sealed with the *mehr-āṣār* seal,³ and delivered it to the Khan. The Khan took his leave of the Shah at Esfarā'īn, and Būdāq Khan, the governor of Mašhad, was ordered to accompany him. At the last moment, the Shah had second thoughts. He decided it was more prudent to sound out Uzbek opinion at Balḵ before letting Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan go; once he was satisfied that the Uzbeks were not contemplating any treachery against the Khan, he could send the latter to Balḵ when the royal army reached Herat, which was closer to Balḵ and therefore preferable in case of trouble.

²The grandfather of 'Abdollah Khan. The Uzbeks had wrested Ḳārazm from the Tīmūrīds in 1447, and Transoxania in 1500.

³See *TM*, pp. 63, 202-03.

The Shah therefore decided to keep Moḥammad Ebrahim at Mašhad. He sent an aide-de-camp, Rūḥollah Beg Zu'l-Qadar, to Balk with the Uzbek ambassadors and all the letters of appointment. The royal army then marched from Esfarā'in to Mašhad, and the Shah visited the shrine of the Imam Reżā. The Shah spent the winter at Mašhad. During his stay, he attended the shrine for prayer on the eve of saints' days and on other holy occasions, and himself performed the duties of chief attendant at the shrine, an office that was the personal prerogative of the Shah.

Events of the Year of the Rat, Corresponding to the Year 1009/1600-01, the Fourteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Wednesday, 5 Ramaẓān 1008/20 March 1600.¹ The Shah celebrated the occasion by indulging in games of polo and archery competitions in the *meydān* at Mašhad. After the Nowrūz festivities, the Shah marched to Herat and camped in the city park. The governor of Herat, Hoseyn Khan Šamlū, came out with the nobles of the city to welcome him. The Shah sent orders to Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Kārazm, and Nūr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Marv-e Šāhījān, bidding them to come to Herat so that he might consult them about policy in regard to Transoxania. Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan answered the call, but fell ill on the way; for several stages on the journey, he had himself carried in a litter, but finally had to admit defeat and send his apologies to the Shah. Nūr Moḥammad Khan, however, made specious excuses for not coming.

At this juncture, Rūḥollah Beg returned from Balk and reported that people there were divided in their loyalties, some supporting Moḥammad Ebrahim and others 'Abd al-Amīn, their de facto governor; the latter faction was opposed to the Shah's idea of sending Moḥammad Ebrahim to Balk, seeing this as a threat to 'Abd al-Amīn's position. 'Abd al-Amīn Khan's supporters had held several meetings to decide on their response. Eventually, because they feared the Shah, they had unwillingly agreed to his plan, but only on the following conditions: Moḥammad Ebrahim was to recognize 'Abd al-Amīn as an elder brother, and was to prostrate himself before him; Moḥammad Ebrahim was to be subject to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan's orders; until such time as Transoxania should be reconquered, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was to be satisfied with whatever territories 'Abd al-Amīn Khan conferred on him by letters of appointment; after the reconquest of Transoxania, one of them would reside at Bokhara, and the other at Balk. 'Abd al-Amīn Khan sent a conciliatory letter to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, addressing him as "brother." Although the Shah did not like these terms, in the circumstances he decided it was expedient to accept them.

Since the Shah had full confidence in Kodāy Naẓar Bī, he coun-

¹The 5th of Ramaẓān was on a Monday.

seled Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan always to follow the advice of that emir. He further counseled him to maintain cordial relations with 'Abd al-Amīn Khan for the time being, and to conduct himself in a sensible manner. The Shah then equipped him in regal fashion and sent him off escorted by Būdāq Khan, the governor of Mašhad, and Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan Firūzjang. The Shah sent Emāmqoli Beg Pakizā Torkmān ahead to Balḵ with conciliatory letters to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and the Uzbek nobles; if they wanted *qezelbāš* assistance in the reconquest of Transoxania, he said, they had only to ask for it. So Emāmqoli Beg rode off to Balḵ to bring the good news of Moḥammad Ebrahim's impending arrival to his paternal aunt, and to urge the people of Balḵ to go out and welcome him.

The nobles at Balḵ could not comply with this request without offending 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, who after all was the *de facto* ruler. But in the end, since Bānū-ye 'Ozmā thought it expedient, a few nobles obtained permission to go out and welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan. They met the Khan at Meymana and held long discussions with him. From the Khan's manner they soon realized he was not going to bend the knee to a youth of unknown parentage. Those of the Balḵ nobles who owed their rise to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, and therefore wished him to remain the ruler, declared their hostility to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and returned to the city. Others declared there was no need for the *qezelbāš* army to march to Balḵ. "Hand over our prince," they said, "and we Uzbegs will do whatever is in the best interests of the state." Būdāq Khan and Kodāy Nazar Bī refused to accept these terms, and so it was agreed that representatives of both parties should lay the facts before the Shah and implement whatever decision he might make. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and his supporters, not trusting the Uzbegs, fell back about two days' march in order to be nearer to the main *qezelbāš* army. The rest of the Uzbek elders returned to Balḵ.

The two delegations met the Shah at Herat. Shah 'Abbas declared his ambition was that Moḥammad Ebrahim should lead an army against Bokhara and wrest Transoxania from the hands of the usurper, and he expected 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and the emirs at Balḵ to cooperate and participate in this operation. The Shah declared he had no designs whatever on Balḵ or any territory under the control of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan. If the Uzbegs were agreeable, both sides could enter into a sworn covenant; Būdāq Khan and Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan would then return and, with an escort of Uzbek troops, deliver Mo-

hammad Ebrahim safely at Balḡ. Once more, Emāmqolī Beg set off for Balḡ to convey these new terms. Outwardly, in order to satisfy 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, the Balḡ nobles agreed to these terms, but they made a secret covenant with Emāmqolī Beg Pākīza. When Moḥammad Ebrahim reached Balḡ, they said, they would certainly prefer him to the man of unknown origin who had been foisted upon them.

Emāmqolī Beg, assured of their support, returned to Herat with sworn oaths to this effect in his pocket. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was escorted to Balḡ with Ḳodāy Naḡar Bī, his escort this time not fearing any attack and marching without normal military precautions. When they neared Balḡ, the *qezelbāš* escort left him, and 'Abd al-Amīn sent a delegation to welcome him. The Uzbegs made obeisance to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan in the traditional manner, and when they noticed in him signs of breeding and observed his regal bearing, they agreed to serve him.

On the day on which Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was due to enter the city, the Uzbek nobles who remained there urged 'Abd al-Amīn Khan to go out and welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim, but the former, jealous of his dignity and superior status, refused. In the end, the nobles appealed to Bānū-ye 'Ozmā: "If 'Abd al-Amīn Khan does not go out to welcome Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan," they said, "and does not greet him as a brother, all the Uzbegs will suspect you of ill-will toward your nephew." At this, Bānū-ye 'Ozmā gave in, and 'Abd al-Amīn Khan, whether he liked it or not, rode out of the city with his nobles to greet Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan. He had been preceded by most of the population of Balḡ, who wanted to see Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and make their obeisance to him, and few people were left in the city.

The Uzbek nobles had instructed 'Abd al-Amīn Khan that, when Moḥammad Ebrahim dismounted, he should dismount in his turn, go forward, and embrace Moḥammad Ebrahim warmly and greet him cordially. However, when the two men met, that poor ignorant simpleton 'Abd al-Amīn dismounted first. When he saw this, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan retained his seat, and ordered his men to bring 'Abd al-Amīn before him to make obeisance to him. It was a critical moment but, because most of the people of Balḡ wanted a change of regime, none of 'Abd al-Amīn Khan's supporters uttered a word in protest. 'Abd al-Amīn, thoroughly bemused, was led forward to make his obeisance. Moḥammad Ebrahim signed to his men

to take charge of the horse 'Abd al-Amīn had been riding and his spare horses, and the poor wretch, after prostrating himself before Moḥammad Ebrahim, looked round in vain for a mount, and stood there bewildered, hemmed in by the horses of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's men. Finally, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan handed him over to one of his men, who took charge of him while the cavalcade proceeded toward the city.

Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan dismounted in front of the royal palace, where he was greeted by his aunt. Since matters had now passed out of her control, she greeted him affectionately and begged him to treat 'Abd al-Amīn well and not harm him. The same night, however, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, to show his loyalty to the new regime, murdered 'Abd al-Amīn Khan. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan thus secured the allegiance of all the Uzbek tribes in the area, and the governors of Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān also indicated their willingness to submit to him.

After the murder of 'Abd al-Amīn, it was rumored that Bānū-ye 'Ozmā went to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and said she had devised the plan of putting 'Abd al-Amīn on the throne only as a means of keeping the throne for him (Moḥammad Ebrahim), because the people of Balḵ had always been united in their support of Jānī Beg Sultan, the father of Bāqī Khan, and Jānī Beg's line had ceased to exist.² But Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan held his aunt in no great esteem, because of certain opinions she was alleged to hold and remarks she was alleged to have made (though God knows where the truth lies), and he equipped a retinue for her and gave her permission to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. She died on the way.

Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan sent a full report on events at Balḵ to Shah 'Abbas and affirmed his loyalty to him. The Shah reciprocated with a delegation bearing congratulations and gifts to the Khan. Bāqī Khan in Transoxania was disconcerted at the news. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's sway extended over Meymand, Fāryāb, Andekūd, Šoborgān, and Balḵ and its dependencies, as far as the border of Badaḵšān. As long as the Shah remained in Khorasan, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan kept sending couriers to apprise him of daily events at Balḵ. Qodāy Naẓār Bī became *dīvānbeḡī* and took charge of the administration.

²No doubt the lack of logic in this argument was as apparent to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan as it is to the translator! Since Bāqī Khan was still alive, Jānī Beg Sultan's line was emphatically not extinct; in fact, Bānū-ye 'Ozmā's line of argument merely supported Bāqī Khan's claim to be ruler of Balḵ as well as of Bokhara and the other regions he had already brought under his control.

The Shah's Expedition to Abīvard and Marv-e Šāhījān and the Capture of Nūr Moḥammad Khan

As previously related, Nūr Moḥammad Khan had made some rather insipid excuses for not coming to Herat as requested by the Shah, and the Shah had been vexed by this. Nevertheless, the Shah sent an aide-de-camp, Ƙosrow Beg, known as Čāryār, who was one of the *moqarrabs* at court, to assure Nūr Moḥammad Khan of continuing royal favor. Outwardly he gave the impression that he had accepted Nūr Moḥammad's excuses for failing to come to Herat. Secretly, however, he sent the following message to Nūr Moḥammad Khan:

My sole purpose in making this expedition to Khorasan was to assist you, my brother. We have enjoyed each other's society night and day for so many years, and the desire to renew our acquaintance should have brought you to meet me at Damghan or Semnān without any urging on my part. Granted, until recently you had to keep a close eye on the revolt of Bāqī Khan. If, however, you neglect to visit me while I am still in Khorasan, now that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan is safely installed at Balḵ and no trouble is anticipated from that quarter, people will think that we have broken off relations with each other and will imagine that you have become hostile to me. Those who, under the guise of loyalty to you, are preventing you from visiting me are in reality not acting in your best interests; quite the contrary. You should ignore their advice, come and spend a few days with me so that we may renew our mutual pledges to each other, and return with honor. In short, there is no way in which I shall be satisfied unless I see you. If you will not come, then act as host to me. I will come to Marv on the pretext of hunting, and will meet you there. Choose which alternative you will.

Ƙosrow Beg delivered these messages to Nūr Moḥammad Khan and urged the Khan to visit the Shah. The Khan repeatedly agreed to go, but on each occasion he was persuaded to change his mind by his principal adviser, Qāzī Nadr, and by his vizier, Mīr Ġiās, and

he kept making futile excuses. Finally, he sent Kosrow Beg back without the latter's having achieved his object. Sycophantic courtiers gave him the sort of advice that could only bring ruin on his house: "The Shah," they said, "wants to seize your territories. If you visit him, he will take you back with him to Iraq and hand over your domains to *qezelbāš* emirs." Hāfeżak Sultan Kabūšanī, an old retainer, who had accompanied Nūr Moḥammad Khan to Iraq, urged him not to go against the Shah's wishes. "If the Shah had wanted to place this miserable province under the administration of *qezelbāš* emirs," he kept saying, "he would have done so when he first reconquered Khorasan, and he would not have given it to you. Put these mistaken ideas from your mind." Nūr Moḥammad Khan refused to listen to him, and finally put him to death.

At this point, Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan forwarded to the Shah some letters Nūr Moḥammad Khan had written to 'Abd al-Amīn Khan. These letters showed that Nūr Moḥammad Khan had entered into a pact with 'Abd al-Amīn Khan and had urged the latter not to agree to Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's coming to Balḵ and not to admit the *qezelbāš* into the city. The Shah's purpose in sending Moḥammad Ebrahim to Balḵ, he said, was to get control of Balḵ himself. This evidence that Nūr Moḥammad Khan had encouraged 'Abd al-Amīn Khan to adopt a hostile attitude further inflamed the Shah's anger, but still he bridled his wrath and outwardly maintained friendly relations with Nūr Moḥammad Khan.

The turning point came when Nūr Moḥammad Khan became mistrustful of his governor of Abīvard, Mīrzā Kāja Kalān Čaġatāy, who had never made any secret of his loyalty to the Shah, and decided to march against him. In a panic, Mīrzā Kāja Kalān summoned Moršed-qolī Sultan Jalāyer, the son of Kodāyverdi Khan, who was stationed at Pasākūh in the Mašhad district, not far from Abīvard, to take charge of the fort at Abīvard while he repaired to the Shah's court. Moršedqolī Sultan, who thought that the Shah and Nūr Moḥammad Khan were still on the best of terms, at first did not dare to make a move without orders from the Shah. But when Mīrzā Kāja Kalān kept bombarding him with letters, and when he began to hear rumors about Nūr Moḥammad Khan's misdemeanors and the Shah's anger against him, he plucked up courage and took charge of the fort.

Mīrzā Kāja Kalān rushed to Herat, where he prostrated himself before the Shah, poured out his story of Nūr Moḥammad Khan's

revolt, and urged the Shah to march against him. Nūr Moḥammad Khan meanwhile had marched against Abīvard and had sent a courier to Moršedqolī Sultan to inquire why he had had the temerity to encroach upon his territory; "If you have an order from the Shah," he said, "show it to me. Otherwise, get out of this fort!" Moršedqolī Sultan replied, "I have no order from the Shah. I have come on my own authority. I have sent a report to the Shah, and will not leave the fort until I receive a reply. Just be patient for a few days!"

Unfortunately, a few days before Mīrzā Kāja Kalān reached Herat, a supply train had arrived there from Shiraz with a consignment of items for the royal household administration, and the Shah, following his usual practice, had sent Nūr Moḥammad Khan a string of mules as his share. Still more unfortunately, this gift, in the charge of Valī Beg Ev-oḡlū, a *qūrčī*, had arrived in the midst of the argument between the Khan and Moršedqolī Sultan. Nūr Moḥammad Khan rejoiced at this unexpected piece of good fortune and easily persuaded Valī Beg, who was a naive Turk, to go to Moršedqolī Sultan, tell him about the Shah's gift, and persuade him to leave the fort. Moršedqolī Sultan, partly through stupidity and partly through fear of the Shah's wrath if he did the wrong thing, left the fort and retired to Paśākūh. Nūr Moḥammad Khan entrusted the fort at Abīvard to Moḥammad Šādeq Beg Čapnī Čaḡatāy and Qāsem Beg Kabūtar-Bāz,³ two of his most trusted officers. He himself, apprehensive of the Shah's power, moved a bit farther away from danger, to the Nesā and Bāḡbād region, taking with him seven or eight thousand men.

Meanwhile the Shah, in the hope of a meeting with Nūr Moḥammad Khan, left Herat as he had said he would, and moved along the road to Saraḡs. When he reached the small town of Čāhja, he learned that Nūr Moḥammad Khan had left the forts at Marv and Abīvard prepared to resist a siege, and had retired to the Nesā and Bāḡbād area, where there were a number of strong forts. Shah 'Abbas had made this move to test the Khan. Had he demonstrated his loyalty by presenting himself, he and the Shah could have spent a few days hunting together before the Shah returned to Iraq. Since he had proved to be rebellious, the Shah planned to bring him to his senses, and he decided that a punitive expedition was now essential. He dispatched a force to lay siege to the fortress at Marv: It consisted of Huseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan; Bektāš Sultan, the

³Lit.: "He who places bets on racing pigeons."

governor of Mārūčāq; Qanbar Khan Šamlū, the governor of Ġūrīān; Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Saraḡs; and the chiefs of the tribes subject to the authority of the governor of Herat. The Shah himself marched to Abīvard, with no more than the four hundred and sixty men he had with him in his hunting party, and laid siege to the fort there.

When the news reached Nūr Moḥammad Khan, awe of the Shah struck fear in him and his men, despite their superiority in numbers, and some five thousand of his men, from the Jalā'er, 'Alī-III, and Šā'en-kānī tribes, promptly deserted him and went home. Nūr Moḥammad Khan returned to Marv via Čul by forced marches, more men deserting along the way. He slipped into the city by night by the Ūrganj gate, and his arrival was reported to the great emirs who had already occupied the city. Bektāš Sultan Ostājilū and Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, with a detachment of *gāzīs*, had gone out to try and intercept him, but Nūr Moḥammad Khan had bypassed them by using the Čāl road. The emirs marched rapidly back to the city, but Nūr Moḥammad Khan managed to take refuge in the citadel, although the emirs succeeded in seizing his livery⁴ and some of his equipment.

When the Shah began the siege of Abīvard, he issued mobilization orders for reinforcements from Iraq, Fārs, and Khorasan. Būdāq Khan, the governor of Mašhad, and Mirzā Moḥammad Sultan Bayāt, the governor of Nishapur, were ordered to Marv to support Ḥoseyn Khan. Ḥoseyn Khan Qājār, the governor of Astarābād, was ordered to besiege Nesā, with the support of the governor of Esfarā'īn and others. Almost daily, the Shah received reinforcements at Abīvard, and pressed ahead with the breastworks and mines. Finally, the garrison, hearing of the dispersal of Nūr Moḥammad Khan's forces, sued for quarter. On the twenty-fourth day of the siege, the defenders handed over the fort on promise of quarter. Its commanders, Moḥammad Šādeq Beg and Qāsem Beg, entered the service of the Shah. Ebrahim Beg, brother of Ḥāfeżak Sultan, was received in audience by the Shah and raised to the rank of emir, and then made governor of Jahān, in the district of Arġīān in Khorasan.

After the surrender of Abīvard, the Shah marched to Marv to join his officers in the siege of the citadel there. Nūr Moḥammad Khan

⁴*Rekabkhāna*; this term covers not only spare clothes, boots, etc., needed by a prince when traveling, but also blankets, cushions, prayer rugs and other accessories (see TM, p. 68).

saw no course open to him save repentance. He asked permission to negotiate with the vizier, Hâtem Beg, and Beštām Aqa Torkmān, and this was granted. The negotiators entered the citadel and censured Nūr Moḥammad Khan for the actions that had forced the Shah to move against him; they undertook to intercede with the Shah on his behalf, and encouraged him to hope for some employment in the service of the Shah. The troublemakers in his army, especially his vizier Mīr Ġiāš and another of his principal officers, Qāzī Nadr, were opposed to his leaving the citadel, because they feared for their own lives. However, they had no choice but to allow him to leave, and the same day Nūr Moḥammad Khan was conducted into the Shah's presence by Hâtem Beg and Beštām Aqa. Despite all the crimes he had committed, the Shah pardoned him, assured him he had nothing to fear from the royal wrath, and that night conversed with him openly as he had formerly been accustomed to do. When it was time to sleep, the Shah proposed that the Khan return to the citadel, but the Khan wisely refused to do so.

The next morning, which was Friday morning, the Shah went to the Masjed-e Jāme' at Marv, and the *koṭba* of the twelve Eṣnā 'Aṣarī Imams was recited in the Shah's name. This was the first occasion on which the *koṭba* in those regions contained the names of the Shi'ite Imams since the death of Shah Esma'il I, eighty years before.⁵ The people of Marv, because of their difference of religion,⁶ were nervous of the *qezelbāš*, but the Shah allayed their fears by forbidding his men to molest any of the local population on the ground of religious differences. Bektāš Khan Ostājlu, governor of Mārūčāq, was made governor of Marv, and amnesty and security of property were guaranteed to the garrison of the citadel and to the townspeople. All soldiers on the payroll were allowed to go wherever they wished, on condition that they handed in their weapons and equipment and left the citadel. The civilian population was allowed to go about its business without interference.

Turning his attention to the strengthening of the defenses of the fort, the Shah divided among the emirs and the men the work of digging a deep ditch around it, and of strengthening the towers and battlements. Orders were given that the fort be properly stocked and provisioned. Nūr Moḥammad Khan and his family were sent to Iraq and the Shah decreed that they take up residence in Fārs. The Khan

⁵Shah Esma'il I died in 930/1524, i.e., 79 lunar or 76 solar years previously.

⁶The area still contained many Sunnis.

was allotted a pension of ten thousand Iraqi *dīnārs* a day, the equivalent of one Tabrizī *tomān* in the current coin of Iran. Generous treatment indeed considering the evil deeds he had committed! Hoseyn Khan Ziād-oglu Qājār, the governor of Astarābād, captured the fort at Nesā. The governorship of Nesā, Abivard, and Bāgbād was given to Melkiš Sultan, the son of Bektāš Khan.

Having set the affairs of the region in order, the Shah returned to Mašhad via Pasākūh. After visiting the shrine of the Imam Rezā, he returned to Iraq and spent a month at Qazvin. He then went to Isfahan for the winter. While he was there, he received the news of the death of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan and the annexation by Bāqī Khan of Balḵ and its dependencies.

Events at Balḵ; the Death of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, the Occupation of That Region by Bāqī Khan, and the Flight of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and Other Uzbek Princes to the Shah's Court

After the installation of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan at Balḵ, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and some of the other Uzbek nobles who had played a large part in placing him on the throne began a slander campaign against Kodāy Nāzar Bī, of whose power they were jealous. They succeeded in poisoning the Khan's mind against his chief administrator; if Kodāy Nāzar Bī were got rid of, they said, the Khan's power would be increased. The Khan sent a number of letters to the Shah asking permission to dismiss him, but permission was refused. Finally, the Khan told the Shah it was impossible for Kodāy Nāzar Bī and the Uzbek nobles to get on together, and that, if the former were not removed from office, there was a possibility of foul play. In his reply, the Shah said his primary concern was that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's regime might increase in renown; to enable this to happen, he needed experienced advisers, and that was why men like Kodāy Nāzar Bī were essential to him. The Shah said he had pondered deeply on the matter, and that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan was free to take whatever steps he judged best for the state.

Although this was in fact an interdict against taking action against Kodāy Nāzar Bī, Moḥammad Ebrahim gleefully interpreted it as license to kill him, which he did; in so doing, however, he laid the axe at the root of his own realm. By destroying this wise, prudent, and brave man, who would have stood by him in good times and bad, he

fell into the clutches of ignorant fools. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā succeeded as *dīvānbeḡī* and principal administrator. Factionalism became rife. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan spent his time in carousing and merrymaking, and devoted little time to the affairs of state. He became ill from excessive drinking, went down with a raging fever, developed symptoms of measles and smallpox, and died.

Bāqī Khan, at that time engaged in laying siege to Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, took advantage of the situation and marched like the wind to Balḵ, sending his brother Valī Moḥammad Khan on ahead. Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's death had thrown the nobles at Balḵ into confusion. Some distrusted Bāqī Khan; these included Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, Šīr-afkan Mīrzā, and Shah Kāja Naqīb. After Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan established himself at Balḵ, these men gave their allegiance to a certain 'Obeydollāh Sultan, a descendant of the princes of the house of Jānī Beg, who was at Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān. This 'Obeydollāh Khan now came to Balḵ, and the group of nobles attached themselves to him and marched out against Bāqī Khan. The majority of the troops, however, and the senior officers of the army, who had been disturbed by Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan's behavior, saw no point in offering opposition to Bāqī Khan. Secretly, they favored him, and they withheld their support from 'Obeydollāh Sultan, whose small force was easily routed by Bāqī Khan; 'Obeydollāh Sultan was probably killed on the battlefield.

Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and his friends now had no choice but to flee to Khorasan and seek refuge with the Shah. They were joined by various relatives of Moḥammad Ebrahim Sultan, including Jahāngīr Mīrzā, the son of Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan, who was at Šoborḡān; Moḥammad Salīm the son of Pīr Moḥammad Khan, who was at Andekūd; and Arab Moḥammad *atālīq*. Valī Moḥammad Khan reported his victory to his brother, and Bāqī Khan came to Balḵ in triumph. He promised that there would be no retaliation against the Uzbek troops at Balḵ; on the contrary, he led them to hope for royal favors. All the Uzbeks in that region then pledged their allegiance to him, and he thus annexed to his empire Balḵ, Andekūd, Šoborḡān, Meymana, Fāryāb and their dependencies, as far as the Morḡāb River. In addition, also as a result of this victory, he brought under his jurisdiction the regions of Qondoḡ, Baqlān, Kottalān, and Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān, as far as the border of Badaḡšān—all this, of course, in addition to the central province of Transoxania.

The refugee princes (Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, Šīr-afkan Mīrzā, 'Arab Moḥammad *atāliq*, and their companions), reached Herat safely. After a few days rest, they proceeded to Isfahan, where they were received with great kindness by the Shah. Their subsequent history will be related at the appropriate place.

The Events of the Year of the Ox, Corresponding to the Year 1009-10/1601-02, the Fifteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Saturday 16 Ramaẓān 1009/21 March 1601, and the Shah celebrated the holiday in the usual fashion. Shortly after the festival, the refugee Uzbek princes reached Isfahan, their retinue numbering about three hundred in all. At the Shah's order, they were welcomed to the capital by all the emirs, principal officers of state, and the general populace; they were given a reception at the Naqš-e Jahān palace, and afterward allotted pleasant accommodations in the capital. The Shah also made them a cash grant of one thousand Iraqi *tomān* in gold, to cover their living expenses. On top of this, they were supplied with gifts in kind: sheep, cooking oil, rice, grain, and the like.

The following day, the Uzbek princes presented their modest gifts to the Shah. Among them was a valuable diamond which had formerly been a votive offering donated to the shrine of the Imam Reẓā at Mašhad. When the Uzbeks occupied Mašhad and looted some of the shrine ornaments, this diamond had been appropriated by 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan; after the death of the latter, it had found its way into the possession of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, who now handed it back to the Shah. The Shah, recognizing that it was a votive offering, gave it to the *ṣadrs* and the *'olamā* to hold in trust for the shrine. The *'olamā* sanctioned the sale of the diamond, so that with the proceeds good lands might be bought and the revenue from these lands used for the benefit of the shrine. The diamond was therefore taken to Istanbul, priced by expert diamond merchants, and sold.

The Shah arranged for the Uzbek princes to take up residence at Qazvin, and assigned them certain desirable properties in that area so that they might have some income to defray their expenses. The Shah hoped that, if it was the will of God, they might one day be restored to their territories with the assistance of Safavid officers.

An auspicious event which occurred this year was the birth of the Shah's second son, Esma'il Mīrzā.

The Shah's Solemn Pilgrimage to Mašhad

The Shah had vowed to make the pilgrimage to Mašhad from Isfahan, and this year he set out from the Naqš-e Jahān palace to fulfill his vow. The first day, he went as far as the village of Masjed-e Tūqčī, and from there to Dowlatābād-e Barğār, a distance of three *farsaks* from the city. The Shah decreed that any of the emirs, principal officers of state, court attendants, and *moqarrabs* who wished to make the pilgrimage with him could ride; no one was compelled to walk, because the vow the Shah had made applied to himself alone. So the court attendants, *moqarrabs*, and footmen accompanied the Shah, organizing regular spells of guard duty for themselves. When they got tired of walking, they mounted their horses, but two or three of them walked the whole distance.

Two court attendants, Moḥammad Zamān Sultan Bāyandor Torkmān, known as Kāvoli, and Mehtar Salmān, the master of the royal wardrobe, and a group of Eṣfahānīs consisting of Mīrzā Hedāyat-ollāh, the grandson of Najm-e Šānī,¹ and three friends, measured out the road using a rope twelve thousand cubits, or one regulation *farsak*, in length.² The chief astrologer attached to the royal household, Mowlānā Jalāl Yazdī, kept a tally of the distance traveled each day, so that the total distance from Isfahan to Mašhad might be accurately computed in regulation *farsaks*.

The procession then set off, the Shah going on foot. Pausing only for short rests, he reached Mašhad in twenty-eight days and performed the rites of pilgrimage. This done, he repaired to the royal palace in the Čahār Bāg. The chronogram of this event, composed by the author, is: "On foot from Isfahan to Mašhad."³

Since the advent of Islam, no prince has achieved such a feat—a feat that would be difficult for anybody to accomplish. The *Rowzat al-Šafā* tells the story of the pilgrimage on foot made by the Byzantine emperor Heraclius from his capital, Constantinople, to Jerusalem.⁴ Heraclius was a Christian emperor who took no cogni-

¹*Vakīl* under Shah Esmā'il I. Killed at battle of Gōjdovān in 1512/1512 (see Savory, "The Significance of the Political Murder of Mīrzā Salmān," pp. 181-191).

²The length of the *farsak* (Old Persian *parasang*; Greek Παράσαγγος) varied widely depending on time and place. It is reckoned today to be approximately equivalent to 4 miles.

³*Ze eṣfahān plāda tā be-mašhad*, which gives 1009/1600-01, the correct date.

⁴In the year 7/628. Heraclius was celebrating his victory over the Persians the previous year at Nineveh.

zance of the mission of the Prophet Moḥammad. He walked barefoot, but servants spread brilliantly colored carpets beneath his feet as he walked, and strewed flowers and aromatic herbs in his path. The emperor treated the journey as a pleasure trip. He was accompanied by his boon companions and walked only a short distance each day, so that it took him two months to cover a distance normally traversed in twenty days. The Shah, on the other hand, carried on with blistered feet, enduring all sorts of hardships, and did not depart from the customary stages along the way. What a difference between the two!

The Shah spent that winter at Mašhad, devoting himself to religious observances during the sacred months of Rajab, Ša'bān, and Ramaẓān 1010/December-March 1602. On the most holy days of these holy months, namely, on Thursday nights, the night on which Moḥammad received the call to his prophetic mission,⁵ the Day of Opening,⁶ the Day of Assignment,⁷ and the Night of Power,⁸ the Shah kept vigil from early evening until sunrise, performing various menial tasks at the shrine such as snuffing the candles.

Various Events Which Took Place in the Winter Quarters at Mašhad

Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, the Shah's vassal at Balḵ, had died, and Bāqī Khan had seized control there without the Shah's having had any say in the matter. Since then, the Shah had secretly hoped he would be able to some extent to bring Bāqī Khan to his senses, and to install there the two Uzbek princes who had taken refuge with him. At this point, Bektāš Khan, the governor of Marv, reported that Bāqī Khan had made friendly overtures to him, had declared his friendship for the Shah, and had asked for two Tūbčāq horses. Although the Shah was highly annoyed by Bāqī Khan's coup at Balḵ, he instructed Bektāš Khan to respond in a friendly manner, and he sent Bāqī Khan several fine horses and other gifts. Bektāš Khan, after getting the Shah's approval, named Beyrām 'Alī Ostājlu, an intelligent and eloquent young man, as ambassador to Bāqī Khan. Beyrām 'Alī Beg was received with great honor by Bāqī Khan at

⁵27 Rajab.

⁶15 Rajab, on which day the gates of heaven, or the gates of the Kaaba, are said to be open.

⁷15 Ša'bān. So called because it was the day on which assignments were made for subsistence allowances.

⁸Ramaẓān, the night on which the Koran is said to have descended from heaven.

Bokhara and sent back with suitable presents for the Shah.

The Shah decided to tell Bāqī Khan frankly what he had in mind, and he chose as his ambassador Jān Moḥammad Beg, the former *dīvānbeḡī* of Bāqī Khan's brother, Dīn Moḥammad Khan, who had been taken prisoner by Safavid forces at the battle of Tūn in 1001/1592-93, and had been an honored guest at the Safavid court ever since. The Shah instructed Jān Moḥammad Beg to talk to Bāqī Khan along the following lines:

Everyone is aware that there has never been anything but conflict between the Uzbek house of Jānī Beg and the Safavid house. When fortune willed that Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan should fall into our hands, we took no advantage of this but, in order to acquire a good name, changed our policy from enmity to one of friendship. We assisted the survivors of the house of Jānī Beg and installed Moḥammad Ebrahim at Balḡ; in return, he agreed to be our vassal. When Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan unfortunately died, you acted improperly in occupying Balḡ without consulting us. We emphasize that we have no territorial ambitions in Balḡ. But two scions of the house of 'Abdollāh Khan, kinsmen of Moḥammad Khan, survive and have taken sanctuary with us. I earnestly desire that Balḡ and its dependencies, the former domains of Moḥammad Ebrahim Khan, be placed in their hands. You, your father, and your brothers owe much to the patronage of 'Abdollāh Khan. God has willed that the fortunes of 'Abdollāh Khan's house should be in disarray, and that the supreme power in Turkestan and Transoxania should devolve upon you. In consideration of the favors you have received from your former patron, 'Abdollāh Khan, and as an act of generosity and justice, you should extend your sympathy and clemency toward these scions of his house, should call them your sons and your brothers, should bestow upon them Balḡ and all districts this side of the Oxus, and should yourself be satisfied with Transoxania and Turkestan, which God has given you, and should thank God for this gift. You should not begrudge these princes your paternal and

fraternal affection, so that they may regard you as their father or elder brother and may obey you accordingly.

If you comply with my wishes in this regard, your action will be pleasing unto God and will bring you renown on earth. In addition, we shall regard you as our brother, and shall render you whatever assistance may be required in any particular circumstances. On the other hand, if you reject my friendly and well-intentioned advice, refuse to accede to this plan, and insist on opposing it, the matter is in God's hands, because I am resolved to assist these princes.

Jān Moḥammad Beg was well received at Bokhara by Bāqī Khan and was enrolled in the ranks of his trusted emirs. He wrote a letter to the Shah in which, after the usual formalities, he quoted Bāqī Khan's reply on the subject of the princes:

Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and a group of nobles who were afraid of me laid hold of those princes and carried them off to Iran against their will. I have nothing but the most paternal feelings toward them. Whenever you care to send them to Transoxania, I will take them under my royal wing and will allot them fiefs in whatever place may be appropriate, as I have done in the case of my own brothers and sons.

Privately, Jān Moḥammad Beg reported to Bektāš Khan's retainers, who had accompanied him to Bokhara, that Bāqī Khan had no intention of handing over Balḵ to the princes. Bāqī Khan hoped the Shah would send the princes to Transoxania, so that he could provide for their subsistence and deal with them in whatever manner seemed in the best interests of his realm. Jān Moḥammad Beg further advised the Shah that Bāqī Khan was not to be trusted, and that it would be neither generous nor chivalrous to send the princes to Transoxania. The Shah decided to attack Balḵ; he issued mobilization orders, and summoned Shah Kāja, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, and their companions from Qazvin.

The Conquest of Bahrain by Allāhverdī Khan

In former times, the kingdom of Qaṭīf⁹ and Bahrain was ruled by

⁹The maritime district west of the promontory Al-Qaṭar.

independent Arab governors. Ḥamdollāh Mostowfī, the author of the *Nozhat al-Qolūb*,¹⁰ wrote that Bahrain was a Persian island, a center of the pearl-fishing and coral industry, ten *farsaks* in length by five in width. The pearls gathered at Bahrain are said by experts to be superior to those fished in other oceans.¹¹ In the course of the centuries, this rich area fell into the hands of Tūrānšāh b. Salḡor Shāh, the ruler of Hormūz, and from that time the rulers of Hormūz always maintained a governor at Bahrain. In the reign of Salḡor Shah b. Tūrānšāh Šānī, in 922/1516-17, thirty-one years after the birth of Shah Esma'il I,¹² a force of Portuguese occupied the islands dependent on Hormūz. Hoodwinking the agents of the ruler of Hormūz, they got a foothold on the island of Hormūz itself and fortified the citadel at Kūt.

In the course of time, they strengthened their hold on this region and gained control of most of the trade in the area; the Frankish captain, who was the commandant and governor of this fort, became more powerful than the governor of Hormūz himself. As a result, the Portuguese intervened in Bahrain also, at a time when Farroḡšāh, the governor of Hormūz, had just died, and his son Fīrūzšāh was acting in his stead. Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd was governing Bahrain on behalf of his brother, Ra'īs Šaraf al-Dīn Loṭfollāh, who was the vizier of Hormūz and held the real power there. With the assistance of his brother, who was a trusted official of both the former and the new ruler of Hormūz, Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd had become virtually independent governor of Bahrain; afraid of the power of the Portuguese, he sought help from a relative of his in Fārs, Ḳāja Mo'In al-Dīn Fālī. The latter sent a report to Allāhverdi Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, who, since Bahrain was a dependency of Fārs and its present rulers were usurpers, decided to seize the opportunity to conquer the island. He therefore sent to Bahrain under the command of the Ḳāja a force of Fālī musketeers renowned for their bravery and marksmanship, ostensibly to aid Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd but in reality to take possession of the island.

One night, just before daybreak, Ḳāja Mo'In al-Dīn Fālī and his cousin Ra'īs Maṣṣūr, with a group of men, burst without ceremony into the women's quarters of Rokn al-Dīn Mas'ūd's house and slew

¹⁰See Le Strange's translation, p. 135.

¹¹Curzon, ii, p. 457, states: "Generally speaking, the Bahrein pearls are not so white as Ceylon pearls, but are larger and more regular in shape; while they are said to retain their lustre for a longer period.

¹²Deducting 31 (lunar) years from 922 gives 891. Shah Esma'il I was born in 892/1487.

him and several of his relatives and retainers in one of the bedrooms. His men rushed to his defense but, finding the governor dead, did not press their attack, and Kāja Mo'In al-Dīn and his men were able to stand their ground. At this point they received unexpected reinforcements. Emir Yūsof Shāh, the brother of Emir Kamāl Barāngar, had been returning from the pilgrimage to Mecca when he had been set upon by brigands and robbed. Allāhverdi Khan had instructed him to take a detachment of Barāngar musketeers to Bahrain with the object of seizing the robbers and recovering his property and, incidentally, assisting Kāja Mo'In al-Dīn if the latter had managed to carry out a coup at Bahrain.

Emir Yūsof Shah, making the search for his stolen property the pretext, set off for Bahrain with a group of Barāngar troops noted for their valor. He reached Bahrain at the critical moment when Kāja Mo'In al-Dīn and his cousin had killed the governor and were standing at bay against his troops, and he succeeded by various stratagems in getting inside the city and joining forces with Kāja Mo'In al-Dīn. With the help of these reinforcements, the men from Fāl and Asīr gained the upper hand over their adversaries. They slew a few of their leaders, but the rest were treated in a conciliatory manner and returned to their daily tasks. Thus this fair region, which exemplified the Koranic verses, "He had made the two bodies of water flow; they will meet . . . there came forth from them pearls and coral,"¹³ became another jewel in the Shah's crown.

The news of the capture of Bahrain caused both the governor of Hormūz and the Frankish captain to send troops to recover the island, and several engagements were fought on land and on sea. Although both Kāja Mo'In al-Dīn and Mīr Yūsof Shah were wounded in these encounters and subsequently died, the troops of Fārs were eventually victorious, and the attackers abandoned their attempts. Allāhverdi Khan sent a governor to Bahrain to take charge of the administration and strengthen the citadel.

The Conquest of Lār This Same Year

As readers will know from the detailed histories of the kings of Iran, the governors of Lār are descended from a certain Gorgīn Mīlād, who was appointed governor of Lār in the time of the Kayānīd monarchs; his descendants have held hereditary sway over that

¹³Koran, 55:20, 23.

region since that time. At times when there was no effective central government, the governors of Lār increased their power and exacted tribute from neighboring regions. During periods of strong central government in both pre-Islamic and post-Islamic times, particularly during the Sasanid period, they were subject, after a fashion, to the central government; at other times, they did as they pleased.

The first Muslim governor of the area was Jalāl al-Dīn Īraj b. Key-Qobād, who became a convert to Islam in the caliphate of 'Omar b. 'Abd al-Azīz.¹⁴ Since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, the governors of Lār have been tributaries of the Safavid shahs, with the title of *amīr-dīvān*. When Shah Tahmasp came to the throne, Nūr al-Dahr b. Ebrāhīm Kān b. Anūšīrvān, known as Shah 'Adel, was governor of Lār. He died during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and was succeeded by his son, Mīrzā 'Alā al-Molk, whom Sultan Moḥammad Shah entitled Ebrahim Khan the Second. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, when the Shah marched to Fārs to deal with the rebellion of Ya'qūb Khan, Ebrahim Khan should have taken advantage of the proximity of the Shah to visit him, congratulate him on his accession, and pledge his allegiance to him. But, allowing himself to be persuaded by his *mīr-e dargāh* (minister of court), he failed to do so. The Shah was angered, and his anger was increased by Ebrahim Khan's subsequent procrastination and promises that were never fulfilled.

Finally, the ill-treatment meted out to the Shah's officials who had gone to Lār to collect the tribute, and the discovery that the Khan was levying extraordinary taxes on merchants and travelers passing through his territory, gave the Shah the excuse he needed. He ordered Allāhverdi Khan to lead a punitive expedition against Lār. When this force neared Lār, Ebrahim Khan hastened to apologize for his past sins and promise better conduct in the future. The Shah considered it expedient to recall Allāhverdi Khan. Ebrahim Khan behaved himself for the rest of the year, but the following year he resumed his former activities, making extraordinary levies on merchants and travelers, who protested strongly against the actions of his officials and agents and against his inability to check them.

The Shah sent Allāhverdi Khan a second time to punish those responsible and to return the money to the merchants. This time, on the approach of Allāhverdi Khan, Ebrahim Khan hastily gave the

¹⁴The caliph 'Omar II, 99-101/717-720.

merchants their money back, and again begged for forgiveness. Allāhverdī Khan ordered him to demonstrate the sincerity of his profession of loyalty by coming to meet him; without this, he said, he could not return. Ebrahim Khan, not daring to come, looked to his defenses. Allāhverdī marched to Lār and blockaded the city. Qāzī Abu'l-Qāsem, a man of noble family at Lār, demonstrated his love of the Shah by coming over to Allāhverdī Khan with his brother. Ebrahim Khan, frightened by their defection, sent his commander in chief, Nowšād, with a few men to Allāhverdī Khan's camp to try and prevent the defectors from carrying out their plan. Allāhverdī Khan discovered that the envoys from Ebrahim Khan were wearing mail under their robes, and this evidence of treachery led him to arrest them. Ebrahim Khan's panic now increased. When Allāhverdī Khan succeeded in bribing many of his troops and the townspeople of Lār, he retreated from the city to a nearby fort built against the mountainside. Allāhverdī Khan occupied the city, and his men began to push forward breastworks up to the walls of the fort.

Ebrahim Khan then sued for quarter, which was granted, and he and a number of dignitaries of Lār emerged from the fort and submitted to Allāhverdī Khan, who treated them hospitably and sent them on to the Shah. Allāhverdī Khan put to death a few ringleaders at Lār, but treated the rest of the populace with kindness. The garrison of the fort had no choice but to surrender. Allāhverdī Khan left the citadel and the city in the hands of his officers, and entrusted the civil administration to Qāzī Abu'l-Qāsem. Ebrahim Khan, his dependents, and the rest of his house were taken to Shiraz and relieved of their money and property.

The news of these two conquests, both in the same year, reached the Shah at Mašhad as he was preparing to make preparations for his attack on Balḡ. Allāhverdī Khan was richly rewarded and summoned to join the Shah at Mašhad with the army of Fārs. He joined the royal army early the following year at its mobilization area at Bādġīs near Herat, bringing with him his prisoner Ebrahim Khan and the contents of the treasuries of Lār. One of the most valuable items was a crown, studded with pearls and rubies, known as the "crown of Key-košrow," which was an heirloom of the rulers of Lār.

Lār originally had another name. The story goes that, when the Kayānid monarch Key-košrow appointed Gorgīn Milād governor of Lār, he renamed the city Lār after his son and heir, and gave Gor-

gIn the "crown of Key-kosrow," which was handed down by the rulers of Lār from that time onward. The story is also told that Gorgīn Mīlād, when he reached Lār, consulted the astrologers, both local experts and those with a national reputation, regarding an auspicious hour for him to enter the city. It is said that he waited seven years before the astrologers found a day which was compatible with his horoscope and free from all sinister astral implications. After waiting outside the city walls for seven years, Gorgīn Mīlād entered the city at the appropriately auspicious moment. Since then his line has ruled there for nearly four thousand years in unbroken succession. Lār has never been subjugated by foreign rulers, who have always been satisfied with tribute.

Yet another story alleges that some ancient Persian philosopher cast a spell on the place which has protected its soil from the tramp of alien armies. At all events, by divine decree this spell was now broken, and Lār became a province of the Safavid empire. Since the histories of the ancient kings of Iran are full of fabulous tales of this sort, I thought I would include the stories of the crown, the forecasting of the auspicious hour, and the spell, but I will not be answerable for the truth of any of them!

The Shah decreed that Ebrahim Khan should accompany him on the expedition to Balk, in the custody of Allāhverdi Khan. In the course of this expedition, Ebrahim Khan died of a sickness that affected many of the troops. He was an able youth of simple habits, a lover of poetry, well versed in all the customary sciences, an expert musician; but he lacked statecraft. In his early adolescence, he became an opium addict. He was thirty-five years old when he died, and with him died his ancient line.

The Beginning of the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding to 1011/1602-03, the Sixteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday, 26 Ramaẓān 1010/20 March 1602.

Jān Moḥammad Beg had reported from Bokhara that Bāqī Khan would not surrender Balḵ without a fight, and this was confirmed by other persons arriving from Transoxania. Bāqī Khan had sent a force of Qepčāq and other tribes subject to the Uzbegs to the Jījaktū and Meymana region, and it was reported to the Shah that the Khan, in his assemblies, had uttered vain boasts about his intention to avenge his brother's death. These reports enraged the Shah and reinforced his resolve to attack Balḵ. He sent *qūrčīs* to deliver the mobilization orders, and gave orders that three hundred cannon and mortar, and ten thousand musketeers, were to accompany this expedition.

One army corps, under the command of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and Qarčaḡāy Beg, a *golām* of the royal household, was directed to the Meymana and Jījaktū region, an area in which the Uzbeg tribes traditionally spent their summers, with orders to ravage the area. After their departure, the Shah, after invoking the aid of the Imam Reẓā and spending a few days hunting in the Mašhad area, marched to Herat. There he was met by 'Alīqolī Khan and Qarčaḡāy Beg, who had carried out their raid in the Jījaktū region, slaughtering any persons among the Uzbeg and other tribes who resisted them, and carrying off their women and children as captives. These officers presented the heads of the slain, the captured weapons, and several thousand prisoners to the Shah. After promenading in the gardens at Herat for a few days, the Shah moved to summer quarters at Bādḡīs, where for two months he waited on the mobilization of his army and the organization of the artillery. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, Shah Kāja, and their companions arrived from Qazvin, and the Shah gave them whatever equipment they required. Jahāngīr Sultan was honored with the title of khan, and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā was named as his guardian (*atāltq*). Jahāngīr Khan was equipped with royal letters of appointment conferring on him the governorship of Balḵ, and Yār Moḥammad Khan was instructed to send orders to the tribal chiefs in the area and arouse their expectations of receiving royal favors.

Finally, everything was ready: Three hundred cannon, with gun carriages, chains, and other equipment, were available, and the Shah marched from Bādġis toward Mārūčāq. He camped for a few days on the banks of the Morġāb River, and then continued his march in the direction of Jījaktū. Qarčāqāy Beg was placed in command of the artillery and the musketeers; a regiment of *golāms* of the royal household was placed at his disposal, and he was charged with the supervision of the artillery whenever the army pitched camp and struck camp. The vanguard was placed under the command of Hōseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Herat, and of other Khorasan emirs such as Bektāš Khan, governor of Marv; Meḥrāb Khan, governor of Kāf and Bākārz; Esma'il Khan Ālplū, governor of Farāh; Najaf-qolī Khan Šāmlū, governor of Qā'en; and so on. The vanguard (cavalry, infantry, and musketeers) numbered twelve thousand men, and it marched half a *farsak* in front of the main body.

According to a daily roster, one of the emirs of the van led his men out on patrol. Immediately behind the vanguard came the artillery, with ten musketeers stationed between every pair of gun carriages, making in all a force of three thousand musketeers, who marched on foot behind the chains of the gun carriages. Behind the artillery again came its officer in charge, Qarčāqāy Beg, with the rest of the musketeers, ten thousand in all, marching in good order behind the guns. A number of *qezelbāš* emirs, such as Mahdīqolī Khan Šāmlū the *ešik-āqāsībāšī*, were also detailed to support the artillery. Behind the regiments of musketeers came the Shah and the main body; it was composed of high-ranking emirs such as Allāhverdi Khan; the *qūrčībāšī*; Ālīqolī Khan Šāmlū; Nadr Khan, the keeper of the seal; and Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, with the troops of the royal bodyguard and the *golāms* of the royal household forming the right and left wings. The whole army amounted to forty thousand regular troops and ten thousand musketeers—a total of fifty thousand men. In addition, the number of servants, camel drivers, commissariat personnel, and other hangers-on from all over the place was legion.

Because of its size and the abundance of horses and pack animals, so much dust was raised by the army on the march that each man could scarcely see his neighbor. Twelve trumpets sounded constantly from the rear, so that the troops of the royal bodyguard and the *golāms* of the royal household could maintain station and not get separated from the center, where the Shah was positioned. A number

of emirs guarded the rear from surprise attack. Since it was not prudent to march by night in hostile country, the army marched by day. But because of the extreme heat, neither men nor animals could travel more than two or three *farsaks* a day; the size of the supply train accompanying the army also precluded rapid movement.

When the army reached Qotleš territory near Andekūd, Mehrāb Khan and his patrols brought in a number of Uzbek prisoners, including the distinguished officer Qarāja Qīgan. Upon interrogation, they revealed that Bāqī Khan was encamped at Qaršī¹ with twenty thousand men, and that the Khan had called on his brother, Valī Moḥammad Khan, to evacuate Balḵ rather than risk being besieged by such a large army. Valī Moḥammad Khan, they said, had challenged his brother's orders on the grounds that it was not yet certain that the Safavid army was making for Balḵ. "In any case," said Valī Moḥammad Khan, "why should we abandon a province like this as soon as we hear a few rumors about the size of the enemy force?" After this exchange, reported the prisoners, Bāqī Khan had sent Qarāja Qīgan to Mo'men Bī, the governor of Andekūd, with orders to reconnoiter in the direction of Jijaktū and obtain information on the movements, size, and composition of the enemy army. While engaged in this reconnaissance, they had been taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš*.

The Capture of Andekūd and the Shah's March on Balḵ

The Shah marched from Qotleš to Andekūd, where Mo'men Bī, governor of the city on behalf of Bāqī Khan, strengthened the defenses and prepared to resist a siege. Some of the Shah's advisers counseled him not to allow himself to be diverted by the siege of Andekūd and other fortresses on the route, but to proceed at top speed to Balḵ; once Balḵ was in their hands, they argued, the rest of the forts would surrender. The Shah, however, disagreed; Andekūd, if it remained in enemy hands, would interrupt communications between Khorasan and Iraq. It was therefore better to take it. A majority of his advisers agreed with him, and the royal army camped before the fortress of Andekūd. The same day, the Shah divided among his emirs responsibility for the various aspects of the siege operations. Trenches were dug on all sides of the fort; mining proceeded apace; and ditches were dug to drain off the water from the moat. That night, the besiegers uttered their war cry, and three

¹Across the Oxus.

hundred cannon and ten thousand muskets opened fire. The next day, the besiegers went in to the attack and stormed across the moat to the foot of the walls. The defenders reported to Mo'men Bī their inability to resist the assault, and the Uzbek commander sued for quarter. He begged his spiritual adviser and guide, a man known as 'Azīzān, to act as go-between. It is said that this moral exemplar, who numbered himself among the Men of God, had been made aware, in a revelation vouchsafed to him in the course of his wrestlings with his carnal soul, that the *qezelbāš* were destined to capture the fort.

Mindful of the Koranic injunction, "Do not cast yourselves into destruction with your own hands,"² he decided it would be suicide to continue to resist this powerful enemy. First, he sent two of his trusted disciples to the Shah offering to surrender the fort in return for royal clemency toward Mo'men Bī and the garrison. The Shah promised the defenders quarter and wrote a conciliatory letter to Mo'men Bī, assuring him that his sole purpose in coming to Khorasan was to assist the Jānī Beg princes, that he had no territorial ambitions in the Balḵ area, nor had he any intention of interfering with anyone's faith or creed. The sincerity of this declaration, said the Shah, could be tested by reference to the people of the Nesā, Abīvard and Marv region. Since the day this area had come under Safavid control, declared the Shah, Sunnis and Shi'ites had been able to worship in the mosques and other places of worship without let or hindrance, each sect following its own rite; not one person had been molested, nor would he be. As far as Mo'men Bī and his men were concerned, wrote the Shah, they were free to stay and enter the service of the Jānī Beg princes, or to depart, as they pleased. The civilian population could return to its everyday tasks without fear of being molested by Safavid troops.

The envoys returned to report this joyful news to Mo'men Bī, and 'Azīzān, with a group of some thirty or forty nobles and Sufi disciples, then went as a delegation to the Shah. The Uzbek princes were accustomed to treat the spiritual director of the tribe with the deference of disciples, and the Shah treated 'Azīzān in the same manner. 'Azīzān besought the Shah to stop the bombardment of the fort that night, and promised that the following day Mo'men Bī and other notables, bearing gifts, would come out of the fort. The Shah had given orders that night sappers would breach the walls in several

²Koran, 2:191.

places and this should be followed at first light by a general assault; these plans were far advanced. Since he did not trust the Uzbegs, he replied to 'Azīzān: "If Mo'men Bī is sincere, let him come out of the fort immediately; I do not need his presents. If he fails to comply, I shall attack in the morning."

The delegation rushed back to the fort in a panic, and Mo'men Bī immediately emerged from the fort with his Uzbek nobles and prostrated himself before the Shah. The Shah greeted them kindly, set their hearts at rest, and bestowed on them robes of honor as tokens of amnesty. Mo'men Bī was permitted to return to the fort and spend the night there, on condition that he present himself to the Shah in the morning. The Uzbegs returned to the fort, happy that the bloodshed, plundering of their property, and violation of their womenfolk had been avoided. In the morning, the gates of the fort were flung open, and Mo'men Bī emerged with all the *seyyeds*, *qāzīs*, *'olamā*, and notables of the city, and was received in audience by the Shah. Since the Andekūd region had belonged to Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, he was made governor of it, with 'Arab Bahādor as his guardian. The Shah delegated Moḥammadqolī Beg 'Arabgīrlū, as *ešīk-āqāšī*, with one hundred and fifty cavalry and musketeers, to accompany 'Arab Bahādor and garrison the citadel.

Mo'men Bī petitioned the Shah for permission to join Bāqī Khan, and the Shah granted this, praising him for his loyalty and bestowing upon him a special robe of honor, a turban jewel, and a jeweled belt. The rest of the Uzbegs were given the choice of staying with Moḥammad Salīm Sultan or of leaving. The same day, Mo'men Bī's men loaded all his baggage and set off toward the Oxus by the Karkī road. Mo'men Bī himself remained at court until midday. After the conclusion of the public audience, the Shah convened a private gathering, at which bumpers of wine were drunk and a convivial atmosphere was generated. Conversation ranged over many topics, and the Shah took the opportunity to impress various points on Mo'men Bī.

"Convey to Bāqī Khan," he said, "my good wishes for his welfare. Remind him that I previously conveyed friendly greetings to him by the hand of Jān Moḥammad the *diwānbegī*, but my exhortations fell on deaf ears, with the result that I was forced to bring an army to Khorasan. My terms are still the same. In brief, everyone knows that the realm and throne of 'Abdollāh Khan today belong to

these two young princes, the only survivors of his house. It is neither generous nor chivalrous that Bāqī Khan, the recipient of so many favors from the late 'Abdollāh Khan, should drive his descendants from their hereditary possessions and occupy their territories by force. The earlier history of the relations between the Safavids and the Uzbeks has been one of constant warfare. Today, because these two princes have sought sanctuary with me and have appealed to me for aid, I am prepared to overlook a century of conflict in order to assist them and thus acquire a good name with posterity. It is better that Bāqī Khan should give up his ambition to rule Balḵ and its dependencies, should hand this territory over to these princes, and should be satisfied with Transoxania and Turkestan, thanking God for His munificence and not perpetrating an injustice. These princes have inherited wide dominions. If, to provide them with a livelihood, they are prepared to be satisfied with such a meager portion of the whole, to deprive them even of that is rank injustice. If the Khan intends to deprive them permanently of their patrimony, then neither God nor man will approve of this act, and he will ultimately suffer the consequences of this act of injustice, which is tantamount to ingratitude toward the house of his patron. If, on the other hand, the Khan harkens to my good advice and treats these princes like sons, I will treat him like a brother, and will not be guilty of any shortcomings in this regard."

After communicating these home truths to Mo'men Bī, he loaded him with favors and sent him on his way intoxicated by the attention paid him by the Shah. After him, the Shah sent a silver wine flask filled with aromatic herbs beneficial in cases of a hangover, together with a goblet of gold and a brocade napkin. By this gift, the Shah made delicate allusion to the fact that it was designed to arouse from the stupor of negligence him who was drunk with power, and to make him who was alert even more clearheaded.

The people of Andekūd and the Uzbeks of the surrounding region contracted to pay to the supreme *dīvān* a large sum in consideration of their having been granted quarter.

Events After the Capture of Andekūd

The day after Mo'men Bī's departure, the royal army left Andekūd and camped at Kāja Dakka, one day's march from the city. After spending a day dealing with the petitions of the people of Andekūd, the

Shah continued his march, and camped two *farsaks* from Kāja Dukka. There he heard that Bāqī Khan had crossed the Oxus with twenty thousand men and was making for Balḵ. The Shah, thinking that Bāqī Khan intended to give battle, ordered the call to arms. He then placed the troops—patrols and skirmishers, the left and right wings, the flankers (*bōgrekčī*), the reserve, the artillery, and the musketeers. The Shah's plan was to advance in battle order to be ready for action whenever the enemy forces might appear. It was reported to the Shah that on some stages of the journey water would be scarce, and that a force the size of the royal army, with so many horses, would suffer hardship while crossing this region. The Shah therefore sent on ahead Yār Moḥammad Mirzā and his companions, who were familiar with the terrain, to reconnoiter and report which route had the best supplies of water.

Yār Moḥammad Mirzā and the Uzbek chiefs were of the opinion that it was not advisable to rush into battle. On the contrary, they considered that, in view of the size of the royal army and the excessive heat of the season, the Shah should advance slowly and postpone his plans for a pitched battle. The plan of the Uzbek chiefs was as follows: Those Uzbek tribes which had for years been loyal to the house of 'Abdollāh Khan had only joined Bāqī Khan to save their skins. If these tribes thought that the Shah had come to conquer Transoxania, they would rally to Bāqī Khan. But if they realized that the Shah had no territorial ambitions in Transoxania, that his sole purpose was to rehabilitate the house of 'Abdollāh Khan, and that the Uzbek emirs would remain in control of these territories, they would desert Bāqī Khan and his army would gradually dwindle away. "With every day that passes, and every *farsak* that we advance," they said, "groups of Uzbeks will join us, and you will achieve your objective without fighting."

Although the Shah did not like this plan, he acquiesced in it, partly because the Uzbek chiefs urged it strongly, partly because some of the *qezelbāš* chiefs also supported it, and partly because he had received a report that Bāqī Khan was going to Balḵ not to give battle but to rescue his brother. The army accordingly advanced by easy stages. As luck would have it, the argument put forward by the Uzbek chiefs was strengthened by the arrival of Mirzā Moḥammad Beg, an Uzbek noble and a relative of Yār Moḥammad Mirzā, who came from Balḵ with ten to fifteen thousand men and joined the Uzbek princes. Everyone now thought that the decision had been the right one and

that further contingents would arrive daily. On behalf of Jahāngīr Khan, Yār Moḥammad Mīrẓā sent letters designed to win over various emirs to their cause, and everybody daily expected some development that would enable them to achieve their goal. Unfortunately, there were two serious drawbacks to this plan.

The first was that the slow rate of advance of the royal army (which was contrary to the Shah's wishes) caused the Uzbegs to lose their fear of the *qezelbāš* force. The second was that the army suffered from the oppressive heat and the brackish water; many men fell sick, and dysentery broke out. Despite everything, the army reached Balḵ in twenty days, but so many of his men were sick that the Shah was apprehensive about giving battle—and rightly so. The Shah always exercised the greatest caution even in trivial matters. It was only natural, therefore, that he would act with the great circumspection when it was a matter of a battle between the armies of Iran and Tūrān,³ whose wars had since ancient times been the most celebrated events in history.

When Bāqī Khan crossed the Oxus and turned toward Balḵ, he was met by Mo'men Bī, who told him of events at Andekūd. Publicly, Bāqī Khan censured him for failing in his duty, but after questioning him privately, he realized that there was no way in which the Uzbegs could have held Andekūd against such a large Persian army. Bāqī Khan did not know whether to advance or retreat. But as the days passed and the royal army continued its snail-like advance, Uzbek morale rose a little, and the Khan began to receive reinforcements from all sides. Despite this, he was afraid to try a pitched battle. He approached Balḵ and camped near a suitable fort in the cultivated area around the city, with the fort and walled areas protecting his rear. He had a ditch dug in front of his army, and behind it he stationed artillery and musketeers, intending by this means to defend the city. On one occasion there was a clash between Safavid and Uzbek patrols; some twenty-four Uzbek warriors of note were taken prisoner, and the remainder took refuge behind their defenses.

For about a month, the armies of Iran and Tūrān sat face to face, without any battle being fought. It became clear that Bāqī Khan had no intention of emerging from his defenses and fighting a pitched

³Iran, the land of the Aryans, and Tūrān, the land of the Turks, were traditional enemies, and their legendary struggles are enshrined in the Persian national epic. The Oxus River was traditionally the boundary between the two lands.

battle in the plain; it was equally obvious that it would be folly for the *qezelbaş* to get bogged down in fighting in the ditch or in the cultivated fields. On the other hand, a siege would probably take a long time, the incidence of sickness among the Safavid troops would increase, and food supplies would begin to run short. Such a situation could only ruin Safavid morale and boost that of the enemy.

The Shah held repeated councils of war with his emirs in which he reiterated that his purpose in bringing this expedition to Khorasan was to assist the Uzbek princes and thereby acquire merit. If Bāqī Khan had come out to fight, as he had always boasted he would do, he would have engaged him. "Now that Bāqī Khan has refused battle," said the Shah, "and is acting with caution, why should we not also be sensible and move our men up, in the face of the enemy artillery and muskets, into the area of walled gardens and cultivated fields? However, sickness is on the increase among our troops; every day, a number die. If, driven by ambition and considerations of worldly honor, we stay where we are, our army will be destroyed, to the ruin of the state. The prudent course is for us to retreat; if Bāqī Khan pursues us, we will turn and fight; if not, we will continue on our way and get the sick to a place where they can recover their health, if God wills it."

On 9 Moḥarram 1011/29 June 1602, the royal army crossed the Kaṭab River and began its retreat from Balḵ. As the march began, it became evident that one-third of the men were sick, and another third were barely able to tend the sick, let alone fight. The Shah, surveying the sorry scene, realized that, had he delayed the return march for another week, it would have been too late. On 10 Moḥarram ('Āšūrā)/30 June, the army camped on the banks of the Kaṭab to celebrate the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn at Karbala, and the retreat was resumed on the 11 Moḥarram/1 July. The emirs who normally constituted the vanguard were ordered to the rear, with instructions to maintain constant guard and at night to camp half a *farsak* from the main camp. They were not to relax their vigilance for a moment as long as they were in enemy territory. After the army had traveled three *farsaks* in this manner, the rear guard reported sighting a slowly approaching enemy force. The Shah gave orders that, if the enemy gave battle, they should engage them and report to the Shah. If the Uzbeks kept their distance, the rear guard should gradually close on the main body.

Shortly afterward, a further report came in to the effect that the

Uzbeks had come up at full gallop and that fighting was in progress with the Safavid rear guard. The Shah at once left the camp in charge of Ebn Hüseyn Khan and a number of the Çagatāy emirs, sent forward his artillery and musketeers, stationed seasoned troops to right and left of the center, unfurled his standards, and hastened to meet the foe, sending some emirs on ahead to the assistance of the rear guard. As the Shah neared the scene of the fighting, about one and a half *farsaks* from his camp, the *gāzīs* brought in an Uzbek prisoner who reported that, when the *qezelbaş* army began its retreat, opinions were divided in the Uzbek army as to the best course of action. Some, attributing the retreat to shortage of supplies, urged Bāqī Khan to seize the opportunity and pursue the enemy. Others with longer memories recalled the fate of Šāhī Beg Khan Özbek at Marv, when the Uzbek leader had been lured by a feigned retreat on the part of Shah Esmā'il I into pursuing the *qezelbaş* and had been killed in the ensuing battle. "Perhaps Shah 'Abbas," they said, "intends to treat you in the same way." In the end, at the insistence of the more impetuous officers, a detachment had been sent in pursuit of the Safavid army.

Meanwhile, Bektāš Khan Ostājlū, at the head of the Safavid van, had made repeated charges against the Uzbeks and had driven them back across the river. Hearing of the Shah's approach, Bektāš Khan and Najafqolī Khan Šāmlū recrossed the river and joined the Shah. Fighting went on on the other side of the river until sunset. By then, the Safavid victory was complete. Just as the last light was fading, the *gāzīs* brought in the heads of the enemy dead and their prisoners. News of the victory was received when the torches were being lit in the Shah's camp. He at once sent orders to his emirs forbidding them to continue the fight on the other side of the river in the dark, and ordering them to recall their men to this side of the river. The Shah returned to camp, and spent two-thirds of the night inspecting the heads of the enemy and the captured weapons.

One of the Uzbek prisoners was an emir of note, 'Abd al-Raḥman Bī. When he was brought before the Shah, he declared his name and lineage. It was a pleasant custom of Shah 'Abbas to treat as his guest any prisoner of note,⁴ particularly those whose identity was not initially known. Accordingly, the moment the emir's identity was known, the Shah ordered his shackles to be struck off and his blood-stained

⁴I have added these words, which the sense seemed to require in view of the fate of the rank and file!

clothing to be replaced. The rest of the prisoners were executed that night. The only *qezelbaş* officer of note killed in this action was Šarīf Khan Beg, the brother of Meḥrāb Khan Qājār. Some people aver that, had the Shah marched back to Balḵ after this victory, Bāqī Khan would not have dared to give battle again and would not have been able to hold the city. However, in view of the sickness in his army, the Shah decided to hold to his original plan. His strategic expertise and natural caution prevented him from being deflected from his course by the unwise advice of some of his officers, despite the decisive nature of the victory just won—and indeed no victory could have been more opportune. It was about midnight before all the emirs returned to camp from the battlefield and reported to the Shah, and were congratulated by him.

The Shah resumed his retreat, maintaining the same order of march as before, and continuing to observe extreme caution. If any foot-soldier or any of the sick fell behind, they were collected up by the rear guard. Any who died were buried in unmarked graves. The Shah, not satisfied with the protection against surprise attack afforded by the rear guard alone, ordered groups of centurions and *qūrčīs* to act as flankers to right and to left of the main body, at a distance of about half a *farsaḵ*.

When the royal army reached Andekūd, the Shah rescinded his earlier strict orders against looting and taking prisoners. Raiding parties were sent in all directions, especially in the direction of Šoborgān, and brought back to camp anything they could find. The Shah stopped at Andekūd only one day, but during that time he registered the names of all nobles, *qāzīs*, *moftīs*, and principal inhabitants of the town and ordered them to be transferred to Iraq. Each family was placed in the charge of a soldier, to be transported to Iraq along with their own baggage camels. In the twinkling of an eye, the flourishing town of Andekūd was transformed into a deserted place. The majority of the women and children were carried off, and few soldiers were without at least one captive.

I should comment here on a point I have mentioned before, but which can bear repetition. In earlier periods, when the Uzbek rulers invaded Khorasan and the Ottoman sultans invaded Azerbaijan, either with the object of annexing territory or of plunder, they did not take captives from Shi'ite lands, nor did *qezelbaş* armies commit this heinous crime in Sunni territory. However, in the reign of the Otto-

man Sultan Morād,⁵ an Ottoman and Tartar army invaded Azerbaijan and Šīrvān and was guilty of this practice. When the Ottomans occupied Tabriz, many children of *seyyeds*, who were descendants of the Prophet himself, were carried off into captivity and sold to Frankish infidels in Istanbul. The Uzbegs adopted this practice during their invasions of Khorasan under 'Abdollāh Khan and his son 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan. For instance, at Mašhad, they took captive many descendants of the Imam Reżā, and many children of the nobility, of the '*olamā*', of ascetics and other honorable men, and of the military and civilians in general—several thousand altogether. These captives were sold in Turkestan and Transoxania, and even as far away as Kabul and India.

Because the heavens so decreed, the Shah was forced to overlook these crimes at the time; this world is a vale of woe, and revenge for these heinous acts could safely be left to the Lord of vengeance. At the urging of his commanders, however, the Shah allowed several thousand prisoners to be taken on this campaign and exiled from their homelands. Subsequently too, the Safavid governors of Astarābād on several occasions led punitive expeditions against rebel groups of the Ūklū and Göklen tribes, which were Muslim only in name, and many prisoners were taken on these occasions. But if impartial critics will take a searching look at the Shah's actions in this regard, they will discover that he has earned the approval of the religious authorities, because these prisoners were not taken into slavery but were treated as prisoners of war. Several thousand women and children were brought up in Shi'ite and God-fearing homes, and adopted the Shi'ite faith.

To return to my narrative. The homeward march was resumed from Andekūd, the army not relaxing its guard for an instant despite the heat. When the Safavid forces neared Qotleš, a group of Uzbek raiders clashed with the Ostājlū *qūrčīs* who were the outriders on the left flank. The Ostājlūs, pursuing the enemy carelessly and in loose order, were suddenly attacked by another group of Uzbegs who had been detailed to guard the Šoborgān region. Before the Ostājlūs had time to form up in proper order, several of their number were struck down by Uzbek arrows. The Shah severely reprimanded the Ostājlū centurions and dismissed them from his service, together with their families and tribal dependents. For several years they re-

⁵Morād III (982-1003/1574-95). He broke the truce concluded with Sultan Moḥammad Shah in 1582 by invading Iran in 1584.

mained under the cloud of the Shah's displeasure, until they eventually worked their way back into favor by their valorous exploits in the campaigns against the Ottomans in Azerbaijan and were reenrolled among the centurions. Nevertheless, these *Ostāj'lūs* are still blamed by their fellow officers for this breach of discipline.

The army reached Jijaktū and razed the fort there, and then marched to Mārūčāq, where the fortifications were strengthened. Nazar 'Alī Sultan Šāmlū, who had proved to be a failure as governor of Mārūčāq, was replaced by Yūsuf 'Alī Khan, the governor of Mašhad. His brother, Beyrām 'Alī Sultan, was also given a fief in that district and instructed to support Yūsuf 'Alī. The fort at Mārūčāq was stocked with weapons, equipment, provisions, and gold to pay the troops. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār was appointed governor of Mašhad. At Panjdeh, Bektāš Khan and his son, Melkīš Sultan, received permission to leave camp and return to Marv and their fiefs there. When the royal army reached Herat, the Shah heard that Bāqī Khan had sent a force to Jijaktū with orders to make incursions into Khorasan. The Shah at once dispatched a contingent to deal with this threat; it proceeded by forced marches, and the enemy force melted away at the mere sight of it.

The Shah himself had endured many hardships during this campaign, and his army had suffered greatly. Dysentery had carried off many men from every tribe. Ordinary soldiers, unable to transport their sick to the end of the day's march so that they might receive proper burial, buried them hastily, without the ritual washing and shrouding of the corpse, and sometimes before the man had drawn his last breath, in their fear that the Uzbegs might come upon the corpses and sever their heads. Those whose devotion to their benefactor was pure and without blemish accounted such an end to be the gateway to everlasting life. The effects of this campaign were not dispelled during the two or three weeks the Shah spent at Herat.

The Safavid casualty list in this campaign included the following well-known names: One was Seyyed Beg Kamūna, a *naqīb* from Najaf, who had been enrolled among the great emirs since the time of Shah Tahmasp, and was currently the keeper of the seal known as *šaraf-nafāz*.⁶ His grandfather, Seyyed Moḥammad, had declared his "love for the Shah" at Baghdad in the presence of Shah Esma'il I and had been appointed governor of Ḥella. He had fought at Shah

⁶See *TM*, p. 202, for a description of this seal.

Esma'il's side at the battle of Ālderān and had been killed. Seyyed Beg Kamūna, although he had been stripped of some of his fiefs and trappings of rank by Shah 'Abbas at the time of his accession, nevertheless still held the post of keeper of the seal and was apparently still close to the Shah. Ebrahim Khan, the governor of Lār, who was like an honored guest in the house of Allāhverdi Khan, died of dysentery. Qāsem Beg Šāmlū, the officer in command of the *yasāvulān-e qūr*,⁷ who was a trusted officer of that tribe and held the rank of *mo-qarrab*, also died, as did Mīrzā Ya'qūb Dast-e Ğeyb, a *seyyed* from Shiraz who held the office of *moḥtaseb* in that province. He died from dysentery after his return to Herat. Mowlānā Qowsī Šūštārī, an eminent scholar, was buried at Andekūd. God have mercy upon their souls and upon the souls of all true believers!

The Shah's Return from Khorasan to Iraq and His Safe Arrival at the Capital

After completing his business at Herat, the Shah marched to Mašhad, where he spent several days dealing with petitions from the governors and notables of Khorasan. All were granted robes of honor and dismissed. The Shah also spent several days seeing to the affairs of the shrine of the Imam Reżā and dealing with petitions from the *seyyeds*, shrine attendants, and pensioners. He then continued his march to Iraq, stopping in the plain of Olang-e Rādekān for a few days' hunting and to review the *qūrčīs* and troops of the royal household. Here he rewarded with special grants those who had performed distinguished service in the recent campaign. He continued his march via Kabūšān, hunting as he went, and sent the baggage ahead to Heng-e Mağz in the district of Beštām. He himself, with a few personal attendants, rode off to inspect the fort at Darūn. Šāhqolī Sultan, emir of the Čamešgezек tribe,⁸ was promoted to the rank of khan and made commandant of the fort and governor of Darūn.

The Shah rejoined the main body at Kār, at which point the Uzbek princes were given permission to leave camp and return to Qazvin. From Kār, the Shah turned southwest via Siāh-kūh to Kashan, which the inhabitants illuminated to celebrate his arrival. After enjoying the lights and taking part in celebrations there for three nights, the

⁷Officers who were "agents of the executive power" and had a variety of duties (see *TM*, p. 117).

⁸The Čamešgezек were a Shi'ite Kurdish tribe from eastern Anatolia, many of whom had entered Safavid service (see *TM*, p. 167). It is noteworthy that their own tribal chief had already been replaced by a *golām* of the royal household.

Shah went on to the capital, Isfahan, where he spent the autumn and winter.

While he was at Isfahan, he received an embassy from the governor of Kandahar, Šāhī Beg Khan, who belonged to the house of the Mogul emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar. The ambassadors brought with them precious stuffs and other gifts; they were graciously received by the Shah and given gifts in return.

The Subsequent History of Bāqī Khan

When Bāqī Khan received the news of the Uzbek defeat at the Kaṭab, his first thought was to flee that night to Transoxania. His senior advisers dissuaded him from taking action, and the following morning reports came in that the Shah was continuing his retreat because of the high incidence of sickness in his army. Bāqī Khan was overjoyed. Since his troops were mobilized, he decided to lead them on an expedition to Badaḵšān, where a revolt had broken out after the death of ‘Abd al-Mo’men Khan. The Čaġatāys and people of Badaḵšān had crept out of their caves in the mountains, nominated as their leader a certain Badī’ al-Zamān, and driven the Uzbeks out of the province. This Badī’ al-Zamān was descended from the Aḥ-rār Kājas,⁹ whose grandson in the female line, Shah Soleyman, had been independent governor of Badaḵšān. For several years Badī’ al-Zamān and his Čaġatāy supporters had been unmolested because of the schisms among the Uzbeks. When Bāqī Khan marched against him, Badī’ al-Zamān shut himself up in a fort. But most of the people of Badaḵšān deserted him, and Bāqī Khan eventually took possession of the fort, put Badī’ al-Zamān to death, and left the province in charge of one of his officers.

During this campaign, Bāqī Khan executed a number of emirs accused of having plotted against him at Balḵ when the Safavid army drew near to that city; their plan had been to murder him and place Jahāngīr Khan on the throne. The conspirators had canceled their plan when the Shah retreated from Balḵ, but one of their number had revealed it to Bāqī Khan. Having subjugated Badaḵšān, the latter summoned his emirs to a council after stationing a number of reliable men to seize the conspirators. In the course of the council meeting, he suddenly turned on the guilty men and accused them of

⁹Kāja ‘Obeydollāh, known as Kāja Aḥrār, was a shaikh of the Naqšbandī Sufi Order founded in the 14th century A.D.

the plot. They denied his accusation. The renegade who had revealed the plot then confronted them with it face to face, and Bāqī Khan ordered them to be seized. They were executed on the spot, some thirty or forty emirs of considerable standing in all. Bāqī Khan replaced them by his own protégés, and returned to Bokhara pleased with the turn of events.

Once again, Bāqī Khan's affairs prospered. Kelert Moḥammad Jān Qazāq, who had raised the banner of independence at Tashkent, made friendly overtures to him, urged on by his *'olamā* and counselors on the ground that an alliance between them would strengthen the Sunni faith. Ambassadors from Tashkent visited Bāqī Khan, who had always had his eye on that area and had pondered how he might wrest it from the Cossacks. Since he had seen with his own eyes the strength of the royal army at Balḵ and feared that the Shah might at any moment return to conquer Transoxania, he stopped uttering the empty boasts he had been wont to utter and decided that peace with the Cossacks was expedient. He also sent orders to his frontier emirs that they should make contact with the Safavid emirs at Marv, Mārūčāq, and Herat and develop friendly relations with them with a view to preventing incidents in the frontier regions and interference with trade caravans.

The Safavid frontier emirs reported these developments to the Shah, who issued similar orders to his officers forbidding them to molest merchants or other travelers, and exhorting them to strive for peace on the frontier until such time as he visited the area again. There was peace for several years, and neither side made incursions on the other's territory. The Shah, however, fully intended to lead a second expedition to Balḵ when his troops were rested and rehabilitated, in the hope of achieving his objective on the second try. Bāqī Khan was quite aware of this intention. But preoccupations with the Ottomans at Baghdad and in Azerbaijan diverted the Shah's attention, and Bāqī Khan was able to relax and live a life of pleasure until his death in 1013/1604-05.

Events of the Year of the Hare, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1011/1602-03 and Part of the Muslim Year 1012/1603-04, the Seventeenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on 7 Šavvāl 1011/20 March 1603. The Shah held the customary celebrations in the Naqš-e Jahān gardens at Isfahan, and the gardens were brilliantly lit. Military and civilians alike celebrated the festival for three days and nights. An event which added to the Shah's joy this year was the birth of his third son, named Emāmqolī Mīrzā in honor of the immaculate Imams. It is to be hoped that he will flourish under his father's tutelage and, by seeking to do his father's will, share in his felicity.

The Capture of the Fortress at Nehāvand

The fort at Nehāvand had been built by the Ottoman commander Jeğāl-oğlū early in the reign of Shah 'Abbas I. Nehāvand is a dependency of Hamadan, a province in which many of the *qezelbāš* tribes live. Jeğāl-oğlū installed a garrison at Nehāvand, and sent their pay and allowances from Baghdad. When peace was concluded between 'Abbas I and Sultan Morād, one condition was that each side should retain those regions which it occupied and not encroach on the territory of the other. The fort at Nehāvand had been in Ottoman hands for fifteen years, and there had been no truce violations. The *qezelbāš* governors, however, strongly resented the fact that about every ten days the Ottomans would march through their tribal territory and come and go freely to the fort, for Nehāvand was located at the heart of the province of Hamadan and, some might say, of the whole of Persian Iraq.

The *qezelbāš* emirs had made frequent representations to the viziers and principal officers of state. They had argued that the continued existence of this structure was, in the end, going to cause a violation of the peace, because some incident was bound to occur as a result of the action of one side or the other. If the Ottomans were sincere in their desire for peace, they should raze the fort; but the perfidious Ottomans refused to do this. After the death of Sultan Morād and the accession of his son, Sultan Moḥammad,¹ revolts broke

¹Moḥammad III, reg. 1003-12/1595-1603.

out in many parts of the Ottoman empire, the rebel bands calling themselves Jalālīs. The frontier wardens and their troops also began to behave like the Jalālīs. For instance, at Baghdad the troops expelled the governor who had been duly appointed by the Ottoman Sultan and made a junior officer named Ūzūn Aḥmad their governor. The pay and allowances of the Ottoman garrison at Nehāvand were interrupted, and many of the garrison deserted in consequence. The rest remained in the fort but adopted a rebellious attitude and began to interfere more and more with the local populace.

The Safavid emirs informed the governor of Baghdad of these violations of the peace, and the Ottomans sent Moḥammad Aqa Qaba Soqol to Nehāvand to take command. But the mutineers there refused to recognize him; not only that, but they plundered his baggage, and the unfortunate officer appealed to the Shah for help! The Shah sent letters to the mutineers bidding them desist, and at the same time ordered the governor of Hamadan, Ḥasan Khan, and the emirs in that area to go to the assistance of Moḥammad Aqa. Before the Shah's order arrived, some of the local people, fed up with the iniquitous behavior of the mutineers, had taken matters into their own hands and tried to drive the Ottoman garrison out of the fort. Ḥasan Khan hastened to Nehāvand to deal with the situation and assist Moḥammad Aqa, but before he got there, the latter lost heart and left the scene. One of the garrison, a certain Valī Beg Vermez-iār, had demonstrated his "love for the Shah" and his loyalty to the Safavid dynasty by admitting the attackers to the tower which was in his charge. After the leader of the mutineers and some of his men had been killed in the ensuing struggle, the fort fell into the hands of the attackers.

At this juncture, Ḥasan Khan arrived and gave quarter to the remainder of the garrison, who promptly scattered in all directions. On orders from the Shah, Ḥasan Khan razed the fort. The Shah, surmising that this incident would shortly lead to a renewal of hostilities with the Ottomans, abandoned his plan for a second expedition to Balḵ and prepared to march to Azerbaijan.

The Shah's Campaign in Azerbaijan and His Notable Victories There This Year

Once Shah 'Abbas had restored internal security in Iran, his thoughts turned to the recovery of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, two of the

most important provinces in Iran which had been conquered by the Ottomans. The city of Tabriz had been the capital of rulers of Iran, and its recovery was of prime importance to the Shah. Whenever he talked of this ambition, however, his advisers reminded him of the power of the Ottoman sultans and the numerical superiority of their armies; they deemed it not in the interest of the state to try the majesty of the Ottoman empire. The Shah still nursed this ambition, but mindful of the injunction "Do not break your oaths after you have affirmed them,"² he did not break the peace, but bided his time.

The lawless activities of the Kurds and Ottomans in the frontier regions, where the Ottoman frontier pashas and governors had begun to behave like rebellious Jalālīs, gave the Shah his opportunity. Among the incidents which had angered the Shah was the action of Aḥmad Pasha, the governor of Vān, who, moved by greed, seized and executed a merchant in the employ of the royal household,³ and expropriated a large sum of money belonging to the royal exchequer. In addition, the Shah's agents who had been sent to Dāğestān to purchase mules and hunting animals had been seized by the Ottomans in Šīrvān and their belongings plundered. The Shah, though he had overlooked these incidents, made repeated protests to the Ottoman Sultan about the actions of his officers—but to no avail, since the latter ignored the orders they received from their sultan. Eventually these incidents became so serious that the Shah could no longer tolerate them.

At this point Ġāzī Beg Kord, a descendant of Šāhqolī Balīlān, rebelled against the Ottoman *beglerbeg* of Tabriz and strengthened the fort at Qarnī-yarūq near Salmās. 'Alī Pasha, *beglerbeg* of Tabriz on behalf of Ja'far Pasha, mobilized the Ottoman troops in Tabriz, Erīvān, and Naḳčevān, and led a punitive expedition against him. Ġāzī Beg sent his son, Khan Abdāl, to seek aid from the Shah. The Ottomans, he said, were suspicious of the *qezelbāš*, especially since the razing of the fort at Nehāvand; when they had the opportunity, they would turn on the *qezelbāš* and not accept any excuses for this action. It did not make sense, he said, for the Shah to leave Šīrvān and Azerbaijan in the hands of Jalālīs who were in revolt against their own ruler; the Shah had a golden opportunity to attack Tabriz while the Ottoman commander was absent from the city campaigning against the Kurds.

²Koran, 16:93.

³*Tojjār-e kāsṣa-ye šarīfa*. I am not sure of the meaning of this term. Perhaps it denotes merchants involved in some crown monopoly such as the silk trade.

The Shah consulted his loyal supporters and confidants.⁴ Since the Shah's intuition told him that now was the time to strike, and since his intuition in affairs of state had always proved reliable, his advisers concurred. Mowlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Monajjem Yazdī was bidden to select an auspicious moment for this operation. To throw the Ottomans off guard, a rumor was spread that the Franks were attacking Bahrain and that the royal army was about to march south to meet this threat. Some four or five days later, a courier arrived from Allāhverdī Khan in Fārs to say that the Franks had abandoned their plans and there was no need for the royal army to come to his assistance! The Shah then announced that he intended to take those retainers who had assembled on a hunting expedition to Māzandarān. The only officers who knew his real plans were the vizier, Hātem Beg; 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū; Mahdīqolī⁵ Qājār the *qūrčībāšī*; and Bešām Aqa.

Strangely enough, on the very day the Shah was making his preparations for departure from Isfahan, Vakīl Pasha, who had been left as commandant of the citadel at Tabriz, was having an interview with the astrologer Mowlānā Šabūrī Tabrizī. In the course of the interview, the Ottoman commander enquired what was the source of the rumor, current in Tabriz, that the Shah was marching on the city. The astrologer denied all knowledge of such a rumor and asked the commandant who had told him about it. Vakīl Pasha said he did not know its author. The two men discussed the matter for a few minutes, and then referred to a copy of the poems of Hāfez, which happened to be lying there, for an augury. According to Mowlānā Šabūrī, at the top of the right-hand page was the following line (the last line of the poem):

Oh Hāfez! You have captured Iraq and Fārs
by your poetry;
Now it is the turn of Baghdad and Tabriz!

At all events, the Shah, having resolved on the reconquest of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, left Isfahan on 7 Rabī' II, 1012/14 September 1603, at an auspicious hour. He spent the first night at the village of Dowlatabād, and the second at Kashan; from Kashan, he

⁴Lit.: those who had the privilege of access to the harem.

⁵I think this is a mistake for Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, who was appointed *qūrčībāšī* in 1000/1591-92, and apparently continued to hold this office until his downfall in 1021/1612-13.

reached the Qazvin area by forced marches in three days. There, he revealed to his officers his intention to invade Azerbaijan, and sent orders to the *dārūga* of Qazvin, Emir Gūna Beg Qajār, to join him with his *golāms* and *qūrčīs*. Orders were sent to the governor of Ardabil, Zu'l-Faqār Khan, to march at full speed to join the Shah at Mīāna. The Shah entered Tabriz on the twelfth day after leaving Isfahan, having marched from Qazvin to Tabriz in six days. 'Alī Pasha had negotiated the surrender by Ġāzī Beg of the fortress of Qarnt-yarūq but was still absent. The surprise of the Safavid entry into Tabriz was so complete that a few Ottoman *rāhdārs*⁶ on duty at the Šebli caravanserai were cut down before they realized what was happening.

When the Shah's troops were still three *fārsaks* from the city, at the village of Fahvasfanj, the local people, as soon as they saw the *qezelbāš*, rushed to demonstrate their "love of the Shah" by donning their *tāj-e Heydarī*,⁷ which for fear of the Ottomans they had kept hidden in basements and other places during the Ottoman occupation. They slew any Ottoman soldiers they came across and rushed to greet the royal army, chanting the distinctive *qezelbāš* war cry of Allāh! Allāh!

From Fahvasfanj, the Shah sent a detachment ahead with orders to try and seize the citadel. Some of the garrison had already left the citadel and were busy making purchases in the market. When they heard the cheering of the people of Tabriz, they thought that a band of marauders from the frontier region, hearing of the absence of 'Alī Pasha, had come to the city in hope of plunder. Just as the Safavid vanguard was entering the city, the garrison rushed back within the walls of the citadel and closed the gates. The people of Tabriz swarmed into the streets to kiss the Shah's stirrup.

The city presented a desolate sight, because the populace had initially fled from the city at the time of the Ottoman occupation and the Ottomans had caused much damage to buildings and houses. During the twenty years⁸ of Ottoman occupation, people had gradually trickled back into the city, many of them having lost all their posses-

⁶The *rāhdārs* were officials charged with the maintenance of security on the highways who levied tolls on travelers for this service.

⁷The distinctive headgear of the *qezelbāš*, devised by Shaikh Heydar, leader of the Safavid Order of Sufis from 1460 to 1488.

⁸Lunar years; Tabriz was occupied by the Ottomans in 993/1585.

sions. But although the population had to some extent returned, the physical destruction remained; of every hundred houses, scarcely a single house was in even a third as good condition as formerly. No house could be found that was fit for occupation by the Shah, and so the latter retired to Šanb-e Ġāzān, where he was visited by people from the city and surrounding areas. Any Ottoman who was picked up anywhere around the city was taken before the Shah and executed. Some were killed on the spot by their captors because they feared that the Shah might spare their lives, and their heads were sent to the Shah. The Tabrizis were so implacable in their reprisals that, even in cases where an Ottoman soldier had taken a Tabrizi girl into his house and had had children by her, the father, brothers, and other relatives of the girl would make no allowances but would drag the Ottoman off and kill him. Devotees of the Prophet's family and friends of the Safavid house, who had for years been forced to practice "prudent dissimulation,"⁹ now openly revealed their affiliation.

The Shah's Victory over 'Alī Pasha and the Ottoman Forces at Tabriz

As already reported, the Ottoman garrison at Tabriz thought the city had been attacked by a band of marauders out for plunder, and they had sent a courier to 'Alī Pasha with a report to this effect. 'Alī Pasha, thinking the problem was a minor one, had allowed the Nağ-čevān and Erivān contingents to return to base when he reached Marand. One day's march from Marand, a second courier reached 'Alī Pasha with the news that Zu'l-Faqār Khan, the governor of Ardabil, was in the vicinity with his army, and 'Alī Pasha was therefore urged to proceed with all due caution. 'Alī Pasha consulted his principal officers, Kalīl Pasha and Maḥmūd Pasha, as to whether they should halt or proceed on their way to Tabriz. Since most of the Ottoman troops had wives and children and possessions in the citadel at Tabriz, and since they had little confidence in the ability of the garrison there to resist a siege, the consensus was that they should proceed to Tabriz; they did not attach great importance to the report about Zu'l-Faqār Khan.

'Alī Pasha had five thousand men with him. On the third day of their return march, a third courier arrived from Tabriz to say that the Shah was there in person, but 'Alī Pasha concealed this fact from his men and boldly and foolishly continued on his way, camping at

⁹*Taqīya*; the doctrine by which a Shi'ite was allowed to conceal his religious beliefs in order to escape persecution.

Mowze'-e Şūfiān, six *farsaks* from Tabriz. This fact, together with details of the size and composition of the Ottoman army, was reported to the Shah by his efficient intelligence service. The Shah was astonished at the Pasha's temerity, for even though the Shah's own army did not exceed five or six thousand men, it was the height of folly to take on the king of Iran and the inheritor of the throne of Jamšīd with only equal forces.

When he received the report of 'Alī Pasha's arrival at Mowze'-e Şūfiān, he marched the same night from Šanb-e Ġāzān and camped at Hājjī Hārāmī, two *farsaks* from the city. The following morning, he made Zu'l-Faqār Khan leader of the vanguard and sent him on ahead. Although one of the great emirs would probably have been sufficient for the task in hand, the Shah, showing that prudence characteristic of men of wisdom, followed up with the main body, with himself stationed in the center. The air rang with the sound of trumpets, fifes, tympani, and kettledrums. The Ottomans, as was their custom, formed a circle with their gun carriages and stationed their gunners and musketeers in front. 'Alī Pasha stationed himself in the center with Maḥmūd Pasha. The Ottomans then made contact with the Safavid van and launched repeated charges against it. Zu'l-Faqār Khan sought to avoid getting too heavily engaged before the Shah arrived with the main body, but Eyūba Sultan, the son of Ūlāma, was killed in this initial fighting.

When the main body hove in sight, Zu'l-Faqār Khan launched a general attack on the Ottoman positions. The sight of the royal standards caused the Ottoman resistance to weaken, and many turned to flee. The Shah ordered some of his men to engage the enemy. Both Kalīl Pasha and Maḥmūd Pasha were killed, and 'Alī Pasha himself was taken prisoner by Sārū Beg Begdīlī, the brother of the *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat* Moḥammad Beg, and led before the Shah, who treated him with magnanimity. The Pasha was extremely worried about his son, Moḥammad Amīn, thinking that he might have been killed in the fighting. But at that moment his son was brought in alive, and the Pasha praised the Shah for his generosity, which was not what he had expected. The routed Ottomans were pursued as far as Marand, few of them escaping the sword apart from a small number who hid in caves during the night and succeeded in getting away to Vān in the morning. Large quantities of booty fell into the hands of the Sāfavids.

The Shah's Recapture of the Citadel at Tabriz and Recovery of the Province of Azerbaijan

After this victory, the Shah marched back to Tabriz and called on the Ottoman garrison to surrender the citadel. Anyone who had any reason to stay in Azerbaijan, said the Shah, was welcome to enter his service at double the pay and allowances he had received in the Ottoman army. Anyone who wished to leave with his family and belongings was free to do so without molestation. Ali Pasha was sent to talk with the garrison and urge them to abandon their resistance. At first the defenders spoke up like soldiers and returned an abusive reply to Ali Pasha, showing no inclination to surrender. When the Safavids commenced the siege, digging trenches and constructing breastworks, the defenders had second thoughts about the advisability of continuing their resistance, since no relief could be expected from any quarter. They summoned a council of war, and consulted their *moftī* and *qāzī*. The latter reminded them of the Koranic injunction "Do not cast yourselves into destruction by your own hand,"¹⁰ and urged them to save their life and property. The defenders then sent envoys to the Shah, offering to hand over the citadel on a firm promise of quarter.

The Shah, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodletting, had letters of amnesty written and sealed with the *mehr-āṣār* seal,¹¹ and delivered to the defenders. Thereupon the defenders opened the gates and emerged with their possessions. Some of them took advantage of the Shah's offer of double pay upon entering his service, and the rest departed. Maqṣūd Beg, the superintendent (*nāẓer*), was ordered to make an inventory of the property of the Ottoman dead and of all the supplies and equipment in the citadel. Qarṣaqāy Beg, left in charge of the citadel with a detachment of *ḡolāms* of the royal household, was ordered to take charge and to guard the houses of Ottomans who had fallen in battle.

The Shah sent to all parts a letter announcing this victory. He received visits from various Kurdish emirs, including Ġāzī Beg, his brother Qūrčī Beg and the latter's sons, and Shaikh Ḥeydar b. Amīra Mokrī, who had operated against the Ottomans for years. The provincial governors sent envoys to offer their congratulations. Zu'l-Faqār Khan was appointed governor of Azerbaijan; Jamšīd Sultan

¹⁰Koran, 2:191.

¹¹See *TM*, p. 202.

Donboli,¹² who had been at court for some time and had served in the Balḵ expedition, was made governor of Marand; Ġāzī Beg was given Kōy and Salmās; and Marāḡa was given to Shaikh Heydar. Ćerāḡ Sultan Gerāmpā Ostājlū was sent to the Aras River with a detachment of troops to guard Jolfā and to gather intelligence regarding the Ottoman forces at Naḡčevān. Emir Gūna Beg Qājār, who had not yet been promoted to the status of emir but was trusted by the Shah, was dispatched in the direction of Arasbār with a group of Söklen and Tavāleš tribesmen. His orders were to mobilize the tribes living in that area and to camp near the Aras to serve as a rallying point for any Qājār tribesmen or other Turkmans who might still be left in Qarābāḡ; he was further instructed to be on his guard against incursions on the part of the Ottoman forces in Šīrvān and at Ganja. 'Alī Pasha was entrusted to Emir Gūna Beg's son Beštām Aqa, who was instructed to treat the Pasha as his house guest. The Shah regarded him with favor because of his courage in opposing the royal army, and he allowed him to retain all his belongings from the citadel at Tabriz. Since the Pasha was sociable and an extremely witty man, he was admitted to the Shah's private gatherings and became his companion at private banquets.

The Shah's Capture of the Forts at Naḡčevān and Erīvān

After the recapture of Tabriz, the Shah, having resolved to recover the whole of Azerbaijan, marched in the direction of Naḡčevān and Erīvān. The Ottoman *beglerbeg* in that area was Moḡammad Pasha, known as Šarīf Pasha, and he had at his disposal twelve thousand men. These troops, who had left 'Alī Pasha at Marand to return to their base at Naḡčevān, had hardly settled down there when they received news of the fate of the Ottoman forces at Tabriz and of the capture of 'Alī Pasha. Since the fort at Erīvān was stronger than that at Naḡčevān, Šarīf Pasha marched to Erīvān, placing one of his junior officers, with one hundred and fifty men, in command of Naḡčevān. The fort at Erīvān was not large enough to house all Šarīf Pasha's men, who numbered some ten thousand, and so the Pasha gave orders for the construction of a second fort just south of the old one. All the troops, and the local inhabitants of Čoḡūr-e Sa'd, were set to work, and the new fort was completed and stocked with provisions for two or three years during the three weeks that the Shah was at Tabriz dealing with important matters there.

¹²A Turkicized Kurdish tribe.

The Shah sent ahead toward Nağčevān Zu'l-Faqār Khan and other emirs, and dispatched Sardār Maḥmūd Čamešgezekī with three hundred desperadoes in the direction of Erīvān. Sardār Maḥmūd had for some time been engaged in brigandage, and had acquired a tremendous reputation among the Ottomans for valor; he had recently entered the Shah's service. However, while he was engaged in a drunken carousal not far from Erīvān, having neglected to post guards, a detachment of a thousand Ottomans fell on his camp, seized and killed him, and killed or captured a number of his companions. Zu'l-Faqār Khan and his men received a tumultuous welcome at Nağčevān, and the Ottoman commandant of the fort sued for quarter. This was granted by Zu'l-Faqār Khan, and the fort, which with its dependent territories is one of the most important in Azerbaijan, was handed over to Safavid officers.

The surrender of Nağčevān caused all the other Ottoman garrisons south of the Aras to withdraw and congregate at Erīvān. Čerāğ Sultan Ostājlū was appointed governor of Nağčevān, and the Ottoman prisoners from the fort there, most of whom had families at Erīvān, were left in the custody of Zu'l-Faqār Khan until the fate of Erīvān was settled. Moṣṭafā Beg Maḥmūdī, a leading Kurdish chief and governor of Mākū, visited the Shah's camp and was received with favor. The Shah continued his march toward Erīvān. When he reached Dīdī a mass of Sa'dlū and Pāzūkī tribesmen and others, who had lived in the Čoḡūr-e Sa'd area during Safavid times, demonstrated their "love of the Shah" by joining him, and all the local chiefs submitted to him.

The Shah camped one *farsak* from Erīvān. There, he issued orders for the recruitment of twelve thousand infantry from the Erīvān and Nağčevān areas to construct breastworks beneath the castle walls. The same day, a group of *gāzīs* made a demonstration in front of the fort; the defenders made a sortie against them, there was a brief skirmish, and several men were wounded on each side. The next day the Shah advanced close to the fort; the Ottomans opened fire with cannon, mortars, and heavy siege guns, and the Safavid troops took up positions among the cultivated areas and walled gardens around the fort. Each group erected palisades on the side of their tents which faced the fort to protect them from this Ottoman fire.

The fortifications at Erīvān consisted of three forts: the oldest was the fort built by Farhād Pasha when he invaded the area in 991/

1583-84 during Sultan Moḥammad Shah's absence in Khorasan. This fort, built on the bank of the Zengī-čay River, was immensely strong, with a rampart and a deep ditch; the second fort was a small construction known as Gözçü (observation post). This was located southwest of the old fort, at a distance of several bowshots. The duty of the garrison of the Gözçü was to make sorties to assist the garrison of the old fort. The men in the Gözçü obtained their water supplies from the river and their provisions from the old fort. The third fort was the new one which had been thrown up at such speed after the fall of Tabriz, situated south of the old fort. There had been no time to construct a rampart or to excavate a ditch. The three forts, supporting each other and well-garrisoned with seasoned troops and amply stocked with provisions and supplies, constituted a formidable problem, especially as the Safavids, during their wars with the Ottomans, had rarely succeeded in taking a fortress by storm; in fact, to capture a fort from the Ottomans was usually reckoned to be an impossible task.

Nevertheless, the Shah applied himself to the task. The emirs, *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, and the rest of the troops were allotted specific areas of responsibility: Zu'l-Faqār Khan was given the task of capturing the Gözçü, and Qarčaḡay Beg and the *ḡolāms* of the royal household, and all the various emirs, were assigned to their different stations. On several occasions the Ottomans made large-scale sorties from the forts, and battles were fought in an open space south of the new fort, casualties being inflicted on both sides. In one of these engagements, Shaikh Heydar Mokri hurled himself fearlessly against the Ottomans and was slain by a musketball. The Ottomans did not advance beyond the protection of the castle walls and their other defenses, whereas numbers of young and inexperienced *qezelbaş* galloped up to the walls and were shot down by Ottoman musketeers lying in ambush.

Seeing that he was losing men fruitlessly, the Shah ordered a narrow trench to be dug across the open space mentioned above, and he stationed there a detachment of troops, including musketeers of the royal stirrup,¹³ with the object of preventing anyone from emerging from the gates of the fort. This move was completely successful. Meanwhile, the construction of breastworks proceeded apace, and Barḡordār Beg, the commander in chief of artillery, proceeded with the casting of cannon, using as his base the town of Erīvān, one *farsaḡ* from the fort. In addition, the Shah sent to Tabriz for a long-range siege gun and some other cannon which had fallen into Safavid hands at the capture of the citadel at Tabriz.

¹³Presumably a regiment of musketeers forming part of the royal bodyguard.

The Shah allocated the cannon and the gunners to Zu'l-Faqār Khan for use in bombarding the Gözçü fort, because until that fort was taken it was impossible to advance the breastworks in that direction. Moreover, protected by the Gözçü fort, the Ottoman troops from the old fort and new forts could come and go freely to the river bank and the gardens along the bank, whereas it was extremely difficult for the *qezelbaş* to establish a bridgehead between these two forts or to construct any breastworks there. After the bombardment had been in progress for several days, a lucky shot struck the tower in which the water storage jars were kept; the tower was destroyed and the water jars smashed. The same night, Zu'l-Faqār Khan, with great daring, led his men into the declivity between the forts, thus preventing the garrison of the Gözçü fort from replenishing their water supplies from the river. In the middle of the night, the garrison rushed out with drawn swords and cut its way through to the new fort.

This success led the attackers to redouble their efforts, but the weather had now become so cold that the men lost the effective use of their hands, and the ground became so hard that shovels would no longer penetrate it. The *ğāzis* were forced to content themselves with strengthening their breastworks and mounting guard on them night and day. The Ottomans launched attack after attack on these breastworks. Their assaults on those held by the Pāzūkī tribe and by the workmen of the royal household achieved a measure of success; but in their assault on the breastwork held by Qarčağāy Beg and the *golāms*, an Ottoman officer of note, Hüseyn Aqa 'Alī, was wounded twice by musketballs, and some fifty or sixty of his men were killed or wounded. Throughout the cold weather of the month of Dey,¹⁴ this was the general pattern of operations. Artillery and muskets were in action on both sides; the Ottomans in particular kept up such a hot fire that every tent in the royal camp had been hit by ten or twelve thousand musketballs (*sic!*). Some men were hit by musketballs or by shots from heavy siege guns and killed as they walked to or from the commissariat.

I will digress at this point to describe some events which occurred this winter during the siege of Erivān.

¹⁴The tenth month of the Iranian year and the first month of winter.

Events Which Occurred during the Siege of Erīvān, in the Winter of 1012/1603-04

While the siege of Erīvān was in progress, the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad III died, after having had his eldest son, who was twenty-one years of age, strangled in the harem by the eunuchs at the instigation of some of the inmates of the harem who were hostile to the boy's mother. His son's death grieved him, and the news of the loss of Tabriz and of the troubles throughout the empire grieved him still more, and shortly afterward he died. As the Koran says: "For every people there is an appointed term; they cannot remain behind even for a single moment, nor can they get ahead of it."¹⁵ Although the affairs of this world are at the disposition of the Eternal King, and in reality no earthly king can achieve any power without God's help, nevertheless the rulers of surrounding countries, and men everywhere, with their eye on mundane considerations, interpreted even this as an auspicious sign in regard to the fortunes of Shah 'Abbas, and as a sign of disturbance in Ottoman affairs. In particular, these events weakened the resolve of Ottoman garrisons everywhere. The viziers and principal officers of the Ottoman state sought feverishly for a successor to the dead Sultan. One of the Sultan's other sons, Moṣṭafā Sultan, was said to be insane, and so they put on the throne his other son, Aḥmad, who was sixteen years old.

The second important event which occurred that winter was the arrival of an embassy from the Mogul Emperor Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, in the person of Mīr Moḥammad Ma'sūm Khan Mokorī, the governor of the province of Moker; with him came Manūčehr Beg the *ešīk-āqāsī*, a *golām* of the royal household who had been sent as ambassador to India seven years previously. Among the gifts brought by the Indian ambassador were a scabbard and coat of mail wrought of gold and studded with small diamonds and other costly jewels. The gift of a sword, coming at this particular time from a descendant of Tīmūr, who had always triumphed over his Indian and Afghan enemies, was hailed as a happy augury of the Shah's ultimate victory in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān. The Shah received the Indian ambassador and Manūčehr Beg in his camp beneath the walls of Erīvān. The gifts sent by the Emperor were piled on top of one another at the entrance to the royal pavilion, waiting for the Shah to have time to inspect them, but the Shah was too busy with the prosecution of the siege to look at anything except the sword, that

¹⁵Koran, 7:32, etc.

portent of good fortune. The Indian embassy waited four months in the bitter cold of the Erīvān winter, keeping constant guard on their gifts in the royal pavilion. Finally, after the fall of Erīvān, when Šarīf Pasha and the other high-ranking Ottoman and Kurdish officers were brought to the Shah's camp, the presents from the Mogul emperor were finally presented to him, and the Shah distributed them among his officers and governors according to their rank.

The third event of importance to occur that winter was the arrival of Alexander Khan b. Lavand Khan, the ruler of Kakhetia, who was a Safavid vassal. He, following his father and elder brother, had become ruler of Kakhetia in the time of Shah Tahmasp, and had remained a loyal subject up to the time of Tahmasp's death, faithfully remitting his instalments of tribute and tax. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and the Ottoman invasion of Šīrvān, an invasion that necessitated the passage of Ottoman troops across Georgia, Alexander Khan, who was a man of sound judgment and as wily as a fox, decided to throw in his lot with the Ottomans. Simon Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, remained loyal to the Shah. Alexander Khan therefore adopted a policy of noninvolvement with the various Ottoman commanders and pashas who passed through his territory, and sent them gifts. After the Ottomans subjugated Šīrvān and Azerbaijan, he agreed to pay tribute to them and declared his loyalty to the Sultan. When Sultan Moḥammad Shah suddenly sent a *qezelbaş* force against him, Alexander hastily sent his son, Kūstandīl (Constantine) Mīrzā, to Ḥamza Mīrzā as a pledge of his renewed loyalty to the Shah. Kūstandīl had been brought up among the *qezelbaş* and had become a close friend and companion of Ḥamza Mīrzā. Alexander Khan, while maintaining his allegiance to the Ottomans, kept an eye to the future by every now and then sending gifts to the Shah with protestations of loyalty, and received in return grants and other marks of royal favor.

When he reached Erīvān, Shah 'Abbas had sent Kūstandīl to bring his father to the Safavid camp, so that his father might ask forgiveness for his past sins and promise henceforth not to depart from the path of loyalty to the Shah which he had trodden in the time of Shah Tahmasp. Kūstandīl convinced his father that his best interest lay in allegiance to Shah 'Abbas, and brought him willy-nilly to Erīvān. At the Shah's orders, a group of emirs and principal officers of state went out to greet him. He was brought before the Shah, still travel-stained from the journey, and prostrated himself at the Shah's

feet. The Georgian ruler picked up a gold tray, which had been engraved with the royal titles in his own country, and showered money from it over the Shah's head, a custom Georgians observe in regard to their own kings. The Shah greeted him informally, embraced him, and treated him with special favor in consideration of his great age; and he became a companion of the Shah at private banquets and gatherings.

The Shah sent a *golām* of the royal household, Ṭahmāspqolī Beg the son of Malek Mozmen Somketī, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* of the court, to fetch Gorgīn Khan the son of Simon Khan, who had inherited his patrimonial lands in Kartlia after the arrest of his father. He also obeyed the summons and was honored by the Shah.

About this time, some two thousand families of the Sīl-süpür (clean sweepers) Turkman tribes of Asia Minor demonstrated their "love for the Shah" and pledged their allegiance to him. On their march through eastern Anatolia, they had lived up to their name and made a clean sweep of everything in their path. They were presented to the Shah before the walls of Erīvān. The Shah allotted them summer and winter quarters in the districts of Rayy, Sāva, Kār, and Fīrūzkūh, and sent them on to Iraq. Šamsī Pasha Qazāqlar, with a group of his tribesmen, former *qezelbaş* who had gone over to the Ottomans during the interregnum in Qarābāg, now presented himself to the Shah; while he was in Ottoman service, he had acquired the status of emir and pasha. Some other tribal groups that renewed their pledge of allegiance to Shah 'Abbas were the Šams al-Dīnlū and Hājji'lār.¹⁶ Once again, they donned the twelve-gored hat of the Eṣnā 'Ašārīs. Šamsī Pasha was raised to the rank of khan. Thus, with every day that passed, the Shah's strength increased and that of the defenders declined.

Allāhverdī Khan's Expedition to Baghdad

The previous year, an Ottoman officer at Baghdad named Ozūn Aḥmad Pasha had declared his opposition to the governor appointed by the Porte and had made himself governor of Arab Iraq. He had informed the Shah that he was ready to hand over to his officers the city and the fortress at Baghdad. When the Shah left for Azerbaijan, he had instructed Allāhverdī Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, to march to Baghdad via Šūštar and Hāvīza. If he found Ozūn Aḥmad

¹⁶Both clans of the Zu'l-Qadar tribe.

Pasha willing to keep his word, Allāhverdi's instructions were to take over the defense of that province; if not, he was to take whatever action circumstances might require.

Following orders, Allāhverdi Khan marched toward Baghdad by way of Ārabestān and Lorestān with the armies of Fārs, Kūh Gilūya, and Kūzestān. He was joined by Ḥasan Khan Ostājlu, the governor of Hamadan, and Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, with troops from the province of Hamadan. His total forces then amounted to twelve thousand men. Allāhverdi Khan sent on ahead as an envoy to Ozūn Aḥmad a certain Ebrahim Beg from Baghdad, who had declared his "love for the Shah" some time previously and been enrolled among the *golāms* of the royal household. The envoy informed Ozūn Aḥmad that Allāhverdi Khan was on his way to Baghdad at the Shah's command and hoped Ozūn Aḥmad would carry out his promises. If he did, he would be well rewarded in the Shah's service; if not, whatever God willed would transpire.

Ozūn Aḥmad had made himself independent governor of Baghdad, and the Ottoman authorities, making the best of a bad job, had left him in the posts of governor of Baghdad and *amīr al-omarā* of Arab Iraq. Ozūn Aḥmad chose to hold on to the cash in hand rather than hope for future credit. He now decided to show himself to be a loyal servant of the Ottomans by displaying hostility toward the *qezelbāš* in the hope of strengthening his hold on the governorship of Baghdad. He violated the protocol concerning ambassadors by putting to death Ebrahim Beg, who was no more than a message bearer, and adopted a hostile attitude toward Allāhverdi Khan.

On the day the Safavid army arrived at Baghdad, Safavid skirmishers under Ḥasan Khan and Ḥoseyn Khan drove the Ottomans back on to the city with heavy casualties; the pursuit continued right up to the city walls, and some of the defenders were slain around the drawbridge itself. At this juncture the following letter arrived from the Shah: "If Ozūn Aḥmad has repented of his promises, and is hostile to you and preparing to resist a siege, do not get involved, but join me in Azerbaijan, where I am presently laying siege to Erīvān. I am determined to reconquer my hereditary provinces of Azerbaijan, Šīrvān, and Georgia, and it is quite possible that the Ottoman Sultan will send a large army to the relief of Erīvān; consequently, it is not wise to fight on two fronts at once." The Khan obediently beat the retreat and marched away from Baghdad.

On his march, he detached a contingent of troops to chastise the sons of Qobād, the son of Mīr 'Omar Kalhor,¹⁷ who were provincial governors on behalf of the Ottomans. From their base at the fort of Zanjīr, they had molested groups of men who had been making their way to join Allāhverdī Khan. The punitive force overran Kalhor territory, plundering their property, and Mīr 'Omar, the son of 'Emād, who was the Kalhor leader, retreated to the fort at Zanjīr with Ḥasan Khan in hot pursuit. Ḥasan Khan was so close behind him that Mīr 'Omar had no chance to organize a defense; he continued his flight, but was captured almost immediately by Safavid forces. All his forts and territory fell into Safavid hands. The other Kalhor chiefs hastened to submit to Allāhverdī Khan and were enrolled in the ranks of his army; subsequently, however, they deserted.

Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, was granted permission to return to his seat of government, but Ḥasan Khan accompanied Allāhverdī Khan to Azerbaijan. Ḥasan Khan reached Erivān while the siege was still in progress; Allāhverdī Khan arrived the day the fortress fell. Ḥasan Khan was ordered to ravage Ākesqa, a district of the Meskhia province of Georgia, which was the fief of Manūčehr Khan, the son-in-law of Simon Khan. He carried out this commission in an exemplary manner, and brought back as prisoners many Georgian women and children.

Finally, this year the Shah gave orders that the citadel at Tabriz and the ancillary buildings which the Ottomans had constructed during their twenty years¹⁸ of occupation be razed. These ancillary buildings consisted of bathhouses, shops, and rentable property of all kinds; although the Ottoman owners had mostly perished, their relatives were still strongly attached (in the way in which human beings become attached to worldly things) to the properties from which they had derived so much profit over the years. The Shah wished to wipe out all traces of the Ottoman occupation, and in a short time everything was pulled down—castle, hostelrys, shops, bathhouses, and the like.

Mīrzā 'Alī Dowlatābādī was dismissed from his office of comptroller of finance (*mostowfī al-mamālek*) and was replaced by Mo'ez-zā Ebrāhīmā Šīrāzī, who the previous year had accused the royal secretariat of certain malpractices.

¹⁷The Kalhors were a Kurdish tribe (see *TM*, p. 171).

¹⁸The text has "thirty" wrongly.

Events of the Year of the Dragon, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1012/1603-04 and Part of the Year 1013/1604-05, the Eighteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Sunday, 19 Šavvāl 1012/21 March 1604. The Shah was still before the walls of Erīvān, the siege making little progress because of the extreme cold. With the first harbingers of spring, the siege was prosecuted with renewed vigor. Two huge siege guns, each firing shot weighing thirty Tabriz *man*,¹ were made ready, and the Shah gave orders that their fire be directed first against the new fort; if that could be taken, breastworks could then be advanced toward the old fort. Qarčaqāy Beg, with *ḡolāms* of the royal household and a detachment of Kōrāsānī musketeers, was ordered to push forward breastworks on the south side of the new fort, while Zu'l-Faqār Khan and the Azerbaijan troops took over Qarčaqāy Beg's former duty of covering the north side of the old fort. One of these guns was placed in position to the east of the old fort, where breastworks had been erected by Maqšūd Beg, the superintendent, and workmen from the royal workshops, and by Moḥammad Taqī Beg the *menbāšī*² of the Tabriz musketeers, with a detachment of musketeers from Bāfq.

Emir Gūna Khan, who had just arrived from Qarābāḡ and had been appointed governor of Erīvān, was ordered to take up his position to the southeast, between the old and the new forts, opposite the White Tower, the tallest of the towers. Qanbar Beg Gözü-büyüklü, the chief swordbearer, was stationed east of the new fort. The sector between the large tower which was the key point of the southern side of the new fort and the gates of the fort was allotted to the *qūrčībāšī* and his men, and the other siege gun was placed there. Responsibility for all the areas surrounding both forts was allotted to various emirs, the only exception being the area to the west, where the Zengī-čay River made it impossible to push forward breastworks. All the Safavid commanders strengthened their positions by digging trenches. The soil excavated in this process was piled into mounds that were gradually pushed forward and piled up against the walls of the fort. Sappers

¹1 Tabriz *man* equals 2.97 kg. or 6.547 lbs. 30 Tabriz *man* would therefore equal 89.1 kg. or 196.4 lbs.

²"Commander of 1000 men, a 'chiliarch.'"

were busy constructing mines beneath the base of the towers. The Janissaries and other troops in the forts suffered considerable numbers of casualties, and their position grew steadily more desperate.

Finally, all was ready for an assault on the new fort, but still the Shah hesitated. Some of his principal officers of state, such as the *qūrčibaşı*, Beşām Aqa, and others, were in favor of an assault; others were opposed. For ten days the debate went on. The Shah was worried about the casualties he would incur and the serious situation that would obtain if the assault were repulsed. During this time the Ottoman garrison of the new fort succeeded in moving inside the fort most of the earth the attackers had piled up against the walls. Eventually, the Shah decided to make a personal reconnaissance of the breastworks, to see the breaches for himself and then make a decision whether to order an assault or not. Although it is not prudent for kings to expose themselves to danger in this way, the Shah, secure in his belief that nothing occurred but by the will of God, took the risk. Clothed in the armor of God, he entered the trenches and saw for himself the results of the strenuous efforts made by his men. Satisfied with what he saw, he decided on an assault.

By Thursday 27 Zu'l-Hejja 1012/27 May 1604, the assault troops were in position in the trenches, which were filled to overflowing with men. The Shah gave orders that, when the assault on the new fort commenced, the men in the trenches facing the old fort should make as much noise as they could and fire off their muskets and cannon, but should not stir from their trenches, so that they would be in a position to cut off any attempt by the Ottomans in the old fort to come to the assistance of their fellows in the new fort. Orders were issued for an assault at dawn. That night, the Ottomans kept vigil even more closely than usual because of the activity and din going on in the Safavid camp.

About midnight, clouds gathered, and heavy rain began to fall. The Safavid trenches were rapidly transformed into a sea of mud, and movement became impossible. The Shah decided to postpone the assault for one day, and the following night, Friday 28 Zu'l-Hejja/28 May, the assault troops were once again in position. The Ottomans stood guard until midnight, but then there was every indication that most of the guards had left the towers and battlements and were asleep. At first light, the *qezelbaş* commanders readied themselves for action. First, trumpets sounded from the breastworks manned by

the *qūrčīs*; then, with the war cry sounding on all sides, the assault began. In the direction of the old fort too, the war cry was raised and the kettledrums were beaten. In the new fort, the Ottomans rushed to their defenses; the crash of cannon, the crack of musket shots, and the sound of trumpets was deafening. The garrison was unable to withstand the impetuosity of the assault, and in a short time the *qezelbaş* had penetrated to the heart of the defenses. Many of the defenders abandoned the struggle and fled toward the old fort. Two thousand Ottomans were killed or taken prisoner, and their possessions plundered.

After the storming of the new fort, the Safavids began to push their breastworks forward toward the old fort. In three days, Zu'l-Faqār Khan on the north side pushed his breastworks forward as far as the rampart, to which he set fire. On the east, the retainers of the royal household, the personnel of the royal workshops, the contingents of musketeers from Tabriz and Bāfq, and others also fought their way up to the rampart, the defenders of which fled within the fort. Emir Gūna stormed the White Tower and, after repeated assaults carried out with great bravery by the Qājār *ḡāzis*, captured it. The Ottoman commandant, Šarīf Pasha, decided to send the *çavuşbaşī*,³ Ḥasan Aqa, to beg for quarter. He stressed that the Ottoman resistance had only been consonant with their duty to their Sultan. If their lives were spared, they would surrender the fort. The Shah granted Šarīf Pasha's request and sent Mīrzā 'Alī Pornāk Torkmān, a centurion, to the fort with the necessary letter of amnesty.

Some of Šarīf Pasha's men, however, who had heard rumors that a relief force was on its way, gathered around Moḥammad Pasha the son of Keẓr Pasha, and prepared to fight. They detained Mīrzā 'Alī Beg in the fort for two days, and only released him on the third day to ask the Shah to grant a ten-day ceasefire so that the truth of the rumors might be determined. Since time is of the essence in siege warfare, the Shah rejected this request; his troops prosecuted the siege with even greater zeal than before, and the situation began to get desperate for the garrison. Safavid artillery succeeded in breaching the towers, and every day groups of Ottomans slipped out of the fort; declaring their "love of the Shah," they made their way to the Safavid lines. The trickle of deserters soon became a flood, until there were not enough men left to defend the fort properly.

³Gibb and Bowen, p. 83, call this official the "Chief Pursuivant." For his duties, see Gibb and Bowen, index s.v. *çavuş-başı*.

On the eve of 'Āšūrā, 9 Moḥarram 1013/7 June 1604, performances of passion plays celebrating the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn were held in the Safavid camp. The men in the camp commissariat who were watching these performances created such a din that the Ottomans thought an assault was imminent. Those who had previously opposed negotiations now changed their minds; on the feast of 'Āšūrā, 10 Moḥarram 1013/8 June 1604, when the Shah, as was his custom, was wearing mourning and taking part in the 'Āšūrā ceremonies, Šarīf Pasha sent his envoy, Ḥasan Aqa the *čavošbāšī*, to the Safavid camp a second time. Invoking the holy names of Ḥoseyn and the other martyrs of Karbala, the Ottoman envoy pledged the surrender of the fort that very day. Although the Shah was reluctant, in view of the defenders' improper behavior, to grant their request, he decided to do so, since they had made the holy Imams their intercessors.

Qarčaqāy Beg, a *gōlām* of the royal household, was detailed to take charge of the 'citadel and of all stores and equipment that were the property of the Sultan. Šarīf Pasha was ordered to leave the fort and camp with his men in the plain outside. His men would have the option of remaining in Iran and entering Safavid service, or of returning to Anatolia. Ḥasan Aqa communicated these terms to Šarīf Pasha, and the garrison carried them out to the letter: The Ottoman officers, fiefholders,⁴ *čavošes*, Janissaries, and other troops, most of them still in good battle order, left the fort and camped in the plain. Qarčaqāy Beg took possession of the fort, which is the key to the other forts in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān. The Ottoman troops, happy to escape with their lives, had resigned themselves to losing their possessions, but the Shah generously allowed them to retain these. In gratitude for this magnanimous gesture, which they had not expected, the Ottomans voluntarily donated to the Shah the sum of twelve thousand Iraqi *tomān*. The Shah, since he had guaranteed their lives and property, would not accept this thank offering. The Ottoman officers thought he had refused it because it was too little, and they began to talk of raising the amount. But the Shah refused to accept any money.

Šarīf Pasha and Moḥammad Pasha the son of Kezr Pasha brought before the Shah some horses, weapons, and other gifts, and the Shah, in order to gratify the Ottomans, accepted a few horses, several coats of mail, two Frankish swords, and a few other items. Šarīf Pasha was an Ešfahānī by birth. As a young man, he had found himself in Ottoman territory, and had risen steadily in Ottoman service to the rank of

⁴*Ze'āmā*; holders of the type of fief known as *ze'āma*; see Gibb and Bowen, index.

pasha. He now professed his innate Shi'ism and declared his wish to end his days at Mašhad, near the shrine of the Eighth Imam. To achieve this, he was prepared to cut himself off from his family and property in Anatolia. The Shah granted his wish, and he set off for Mašhad with about one hundred men. Such was the Shah's magnanimity that he granted him an annual pension of three hundred Iraqi *tomān* in cash, and an allowance of five hundred camel *ḡarvārs*⁵ of grain. On holy days, he was to perform duties at the shrine similar to those of the other attendants.

Moḡammad Pasha assumed command of the remaining Ottoman troops and departed for Anatolia. To prevent their being attacked and plundered by brigands en route, they were escorted as far as the fortress of Qārş, which was in Ottoman hands, by Şafarqolī Beg Ćeganī and a detachment of *qūrĉīs*, and by 'Alī Khan Beg Rūmlū, an *eşik-āqāsī*. Şafarqolī Beg and his *qūrĉīs* returned safely from this mission, but 'Alī Khan Beg was seized by the Ottomans at Qārş and held in custody there until Jeḡāl-oḡlū, the commander in chief, arrived.

Emir Gūna Khan was appointed governor of Erīvān, Maḡsūd Sultan Kangarlū was awarded the fief of Naḡĉevān, and Nafas Sultan Sa'dlū that of Qāqezmān. Those Kurdish chiefs who had demonstrated their "love of the Shah" by coming to his assistance were awarded suitable fiefs. They included Ćāzī Beg and his brother Qūĉī Beg, the sons of Şāhqolī Balīlān Ḥakkārī; Qeliĉ Beg Donbolī; Jamšīd Sultan Donbolī; and Maṣşūr Beg Maḡmūdī and his sons. Of the Georgian princes, Gorgīn Khan the son of Simon Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, was allowed to return home to deal with any possible incursions against his territory on the part of the Ottoman garrisons at Tiflis and Āḡesqa, and he departed, loaded with honors. Alexander Khan remained in the Safavid camp. After thus dealing with the affairs of Ćoḡūr-e Sa'd, the Shah marched from Erīvān and camped at Qerġ Bolāḡ.

Hoseyn Khan Moşāḡeb Qājār's Campaign against the Ottomans in Qarābāḡ

The offices of governor of Ganja and *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāḡ had been held by the Zīād-oḡlū clan of the Qājār tribe in the time of Shah Tahmasp. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Hoseyn Khan of

⁵The standard *ḡarvār* (lit., donkey load) equals 100 *man-e Tabriz* equals 654.7 lbs. Presumably the camel *ḡarvār* was larger.

this clan rose in royal favor and was dubbed Qarābagī by the Shah. At the time he held the office of governor of Azerbaijan, Hoseyn Khan was dispatched in the direction of the Aras River to bring that region under Safavid control; he had orders to join the Shah whenever the latter reached the area. Before Hoseyn Khan went to Qarābag, Emir Gūna Khan had gone there with a detachment of troops. After Hoseyn Khan's arrival, Emir Gūna Khan handed over to him and rejoined the Shah's camp.

Emir Gūna Khan had boldly crossed the Kodā-āfarīn bridge and entered Qarābag, where numbers of Qājars, Otūz-īkī Turkmans,⁶ and others, professing their "love of the Shah," flocked to his standards. Emir Gūna established a bridgehead across the Aras and sent out patrols. In clashes with the Ottomans, his men were uniformly successful. After Hoseyn Khan took over the military and civil administration of the region, he established his camp at Qūzlū-čāy. Hoseyn Khan was an exceedingly brave man, but arrogant and self-willed, given to acting without orders; he was also a man of changeable moods, sometimes adopting a proper and even humble manner toward his emirs, at other times treating them superciliously. Because he was arrogant, he underestimated the Ottomans and neglected proper military precautions, until events brought him to his senses to some extent.

On the Ottoman side, Da'ūd Pasha was *beglerbeg* of Qarābag and governor of Ganja. While Shah 'Abbas was conducting the siege of Erīvān, in the winter of 1012/1604, Da'ūd Pasha mobilized the Ottoman troops in Qarābag and marched from Ganja against Hoseyn Khan's camp at Qūzlū-čāy with seven thousand men, including a contingent from Šīrvān. When Hoseyn Khan's patrols reported the approach of the Ottoman force, the Khan left his women and children and baggage in camp and marched against Da'ūd Pasha without bothering to make a proper appraisal of the situation. Such a course of action required resolution and strong resolve. When he drew close to the Ottoman force, Hoseyn Khan, realizing he was outnumbered, modified his plans to the extent of calling a council of war. Some of his emirs said he should not take the risk of giving battle to the Ottomans without orders from the Shah. Others said it would have been a good idea to hold a council of war earlier; if they avoided battle now, it would look like a retreat. Their tribal allies would disappear, and their camp would be plundered. Nevertheless, Hoseyn Khan went back

⁶See *TM*, p. 167.

on his previous resolution and decided not to give battle; he gave his tribal auxiliaries permission to recross the river by the Koda-afarın bridge and settle in a safe area. Anyone who had a poor horse should go on ahead; he himself, with his unencumbered troops, would retire slowly toward the Aras.

At this juncture, Hüseyn Khan discovered that a group of deserters from Qarabāğ had treacherously guided the Ottomans, who were almost upon the *qezelbaş*. Since most of Hüseyn Khan's men had already begun to retire, panic broke out in his camp as they fled. Many of his auxiliary troops were unreliable. Thinking that the Ottomans would shortly plunder the Safavid camp, they decided to anticipate them, and in short order they looted the entire camp, including the possessions of the emirs. Hüseyn Khan, left with only a few men, saw the vanguard of the Ottoman army coming into view, marching in perfect order and drawn up in battle array.

Rostam Sultan Söklen said, "We should put our trust in God and the Shah, and stand and fight like men; to run away would bring upon us disgrace and the wrath of the Shah. If you agree, let us make one concerted charge against the enemy, inflict as much damage on them as we can, and then make a fighting retreat. In this way, we will not be charged with cowardice by the Shah or by our fellow *qezelbaş*." Hüseyn Khan's blood stirred in his veins, and he gave his consent. He dismissed from the battlefield, with orders to take themselves off to some safe refuge, all those who had doubtful mounts, and he prepared to charge seven thousand Ottomans with the four or five hundred men remaining to him. Rostam Sultan Söklen, a valiant young man, was engulfed by the enemy, and taken alive after suffering several severe wounds. By firing repeated volleys of arrows, Hüseyn Khan held off the Ottoman pursuit long enough to give his fleeing men time to escape; only then did he and his companions leave the field.

In this action, the *qezelbaş* lost only a handful of men. Their valor had made such an impression on the Ottomans that Da'ūd Pasha decided to return to Ganja rather than advance farther into Qarabāğ. He treated Rostam Sultan with honor and instructed surgeons to see to his wounds. Hüseyn Khan reached the Aras River having lost all his baggage and supplies. The following day, when the Ottoman withdrawal was confirmed, his spirits rose, and he set about regrouping his scattered forces and searching for his plundered baggage. He

gradually recovered most of the horses, camels, and tents, including his own personal headquarters tent and the tents of the emirs, but anything that could be hidden, such as money, gold and silver vessels, and the like, disappeared forever.

Hoseyn Khan sent a contrite report to the Shah and asked permission to attack Ganja in order to make amends. The Shah, who had had reports of Hoseyn Khan's intrepid conduct, wrote off the incident as an act of God and consoled Hoseyn on his defeat. In warfare, mistakes are frequently made, and God's disposition of affairs is often contrary to the best-laid plans of the wisest counselors. In battle, one is sometimes victorious, sometimes not; the outcome is ultimately not under human control. Since the royal army was still preoccupied with the siege of Erivān, the Shah ordered Hoseyn Khan not to take any action until after the capture of the fort; in the meantime, he was to busy himself with the regrouping and reequipping of his forces.

The Expedition to Qarābāg Commanded by Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, the Qūrčibāšī

By the time Erivān fell, the climate in Qarābāg had become very hot, and it was not suitable for the Shah to march there in person. Moreover, several small forts there were still held by the Ottomans, such as Šūra-gel and Mağāzberd⁷ which required the Shah's attention. There was also the possibility of a further Ottoman invasion. The Shah therefore decided to send an expeditionary force to Ganja with orders to give battle to the Ottomans if they emerged from the fort. If the enemy declined battle, the force was ordered to ravage the territory and destroy the crops of the tribes that had deserted and assisted the Ottomans, and to return to base. The Shah himself planned to subjugate the province in the autumn, after he had pacified the Erivān frontier and was sure that an Ottoman invasion was not imminent.

The command of the expeditionary force to Qarābāg was given to the *qūrčibāšī*, Allāhqolī Beg Qājār; the force was to consist of a number of emirs, *qūrčīs*, and other troops, some fifteen thousand men in all. The *qūrčibāšī* marched to Ganja. The Ottomans made as if to give battle, and some fighting occurred with Safavid skirmishers.

⁷"A fortress on the western Arpa-çay, near the ruins of Anī, the farthest north-western point of Persian territory mentioned in the Turco-Persian treaty of A.D. 1639." (TM, p. 166).

When the Ottomans saw the size of the Safavid center, however, they retreated within their walls. The *qezelbaş* pursued them as far as the ditch around the fort, slew considerable numbers of them, and took some prisoners. One of the prisoners was Küçük Hasan, a man of some note, who had fled to Ganja from Tabriz.

Since the *qūrçibāši* had no orders to lay siege to the fort, he pitched camp in a suitable place. For three days his men ravaged the surrounding countryside, bringing in quantities of horses, camels, sheep, and household articles. Many women and children were taken prisoner. The *qūrçibāši* then marched back to the royal camp at Qerğ Bolāğ, which he reached while the Shah was still there. The heads of the slain, the captured weapons, and the prisoners were paraded before the Shah, who expressed his approval. However, since the carrying of Muslims into captivity constituted a reprehensible act according to the religious law of Islam, the Shah released all the captives. A few Safavid troops who had concealed the fact that they had captives were executed. When the news of the Shah's magnanimity reached Qarābāğ, people who had had a relative taken captive streamed to the royal camp to claim their kinfolk. The rest of the booty was distributed among the troops according to principles of strict equity. Küçük Hasan was entrusted to the care of Nadr Khan, the keeper of the seal, who treated him like a guest. When Jeğāl-oğlū, the Ottoman commander in chief, marched toward Iran, Küçük Hasan escaped from the royal camp in the region of Qārş and rejoined the Ottomans.

The Invasion of the Province of Hamadan by Ozün Aḥmad and Ottoman Troops from Baghdad and His Defeat at the Hands of the Qezelbaş Emirs in That Area

While still in summer quarters at Qerğ Bolāğ, the Shah received the news that Ozün Aḥmad had invaded Hamadan with an Ottoman army from Baghdad, but this was followed by the good news that the Safavid forces stationed on that sector of the frontier had defeated the enemy and captured Ozün Aḥmad.

Apparently when Allāhverdi Khan and the other emirs returned from Baghdad, they subjugated en route the territory governed by Mīr Qobād b. Mīr 'Omar Kalhor, who was a provincial governor under the governor of Baghdad, and rejoined the royal camp. Since the governor of Hamadan, Hasan Khan, was absent at court, Ozün

Aḥmad resolved to profit from his absence to ravage the province of Hamadan, intending by this means to get his revenge on the *qezelbāš* and hoping that he might draw off some of the Safavid forces presently engaged in operations in Azerbaijan. In this way, he hoped to gain some credit with the Ottoman Sultan to compensate for his past misdemeanors. Accordingly, he left in charge at Baghdad his son Moḥammad Beg, who had recently been promoted to the rank of pasha, and marched toward Hamadan with a force of ten thousand men, composed partly of Ottoman regulars and partly of Lors and Kurds, whose object was plunder. The *qezelbāš* emirs in the area were Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār and Shah 'Alī Sultan Ḳodābandalū, the governor of Harsīn.⁸ They reported the approach of the Ottomans to Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, who immediately marched to their aid at top speed with a force of one thousand Lors. Together, the emirs marched to Māhīdāšt,⁹ sending out summons as they went for every man among the tribes who had a serviceable horse to join them. About three thousand men, Lors, Afšārs, and others, answered this call.

The emirs held a council of war in which the decision was taken to give battle, despite the Ottoman superiority in numbers. The two armies met at Zohāb. The emirs' plan was to attack at once, without waiting to form in proper battle order, to prevent the enemy from forming an accurate estimate of the size of their force. The Safavid force advanced in two squadrons, one composed of *qezelbāš* under the command of Qāsem Sultan with Shah 'Alī Sultan in the van, and the other of Lors under the command of Ḥoseyn Khan. The Ottomans, formed up with infantry, cavalry, musketeers, and archers in their proper stations, stood ready to meet them. When the Sīāh-Manšūr tribesmen in the Safavid ranks caught sight of the enemy, they charged them at full gallop, as had been agreed. This first charge shattered the Ottoman ranks, and the enemy turned to flee. Ozūn Aḥmad tried in vain to rally them. Since Ozūn Aḥmad was a tall, strongly built man, he was unable to leave the field unobserved and was taken prisoner. Some two thousand of his men were slain, and the Lors had a field day with the Ottoman supply trains.

As a result of this victory, peace returned to the area, and the emirs sent Ozūn Aḥmad, the heads of the enemy dead, their prisoners, and the choicest items of the booty to the Shah, who received them at his

⁸20 miles southeast of Kermānšāh; see Le Strange, p. 192.

⁹The plain west of Kermānšāh (see Le Strange, p. 192).

camp at Qerķ Bolāg, a summer station in the neighborhood of Gökča Deñiz.¹⁰ Ozūn Aḥmad was paraded before the Shah with a few choice gifts, including several stallions and Arabian mares of Bedouin stock, each of them handsome and swift. The Shah at once gave orders for Ozūn Aḥmad's hands, which had been lashed together with a bow-string in a painful manner, to be freed. He then addressed the Ottoman officer as follows:

You claimed you had seized possession of Baghdad for me, and you promised to hand the city over to whomever I might delegate; in return, I promised that, if you demonstrated the sincerity of your avowal, you would bask in my favor. You changed your mind and failed to carry out your part of the bargain. Nevertheless, I am still prepared to carry out my promises, despite your insolence and temerity, and to reinstate you as governor of Baghdad.

Ozūn Ḥasan replied, "In return for such clemency and generosity, for the rest of my life I will be your faithful servant. I will hand over Baghdad to whomever you command, and I and my sons will come to court to be in attendance upon you." The Shah conferred on him signal marks of royal favor, and placed him in the care of Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, Qāsem Sultan, and others who had distinguished themselves at the battle of Zohāb, and conferred on them robes of honor. Ozūn Aḥmad, however, fell ill and died at Zenjān, and the Shah gave orders that he be buried in consecrated ground there. The Shah sent a letter of consolation to his son, Moḥammad Beg, and offered him some degree of favor he had lavished on his father.

After the battle of Zohāb, the Ottoman fugitives reached Baghdad, made Moḥammad Beg governor of the province with the rank of pasha, and reported the capture of Ozūn Aḥmad to the Sublime Porte. The Porte deemed it expedient to accept the *fait-accompli*, and provided Moḥammad Pasha with official letters of appointment. As the latter consolidated his rule at Baghdad he began to adopt a hostile attitude toward officers of the Safavid crown; in addition, he was apprehensive in regard to the Porte, as both he and his father had been guilty of taking matters into their own hands. Moḥammad Pasha imposed heavy taxes on the wealthy of Arab Iraq and took great precautions to protect his life, surrounding himself with a bodyguard of

¹⁰Lit.: blue lake. The northeastern boundary of greater Armenia.

royal household troops, Ottoman regulars from the Baghdad army, and troops of the special corps known as *Seğmen*,¹¹ but he did not live long.

Various Events Which Took Place in the Summer of 1013/1614

The Shah spent the summer at the beautiful summer station of *Gökča Deñiz*, a region renowned for the pleasantness of its climate, its abundance of springs, and its verdant countryside, which is the result of the adequate rainfall in the area. The Shah spent much of his time hunting. While at this summer camp, he received an embassy from the Emperor of India led by *Moḥammad Ma'şūm Khan Bakrī*. He granted permission to the various Kurdish chiefs such as *Ġāzī Beg Ḥakkārī* and *Moşţafā Beg Maḥmūdī*, who had assisted him in the Azerbaijan campaign, to return to their own lands. The Shah was also visited by the sons of *Da'ūd Khan*, the son of *Alexander Khan*. *Da'ūd Khan* had deprived his father of power and had taken his place, but after only a short reign he had died a natural death, leaving two sons. These boys, the elder named *Ṭahmūraş* and the younger *Kaşīs*, were brought to court by some of the women of this royal Georgian house, and they entered the service of the Shah.

This year, too, the Shah sent *Allāhverdī Khan* with an expeditionary force against *Aḥmad Pasha Jalālī*. The latter had been an officer in the service of *Ja'far Pasha*, the governor of *Tabriz*; *Ja'far Pasha* had furthered his career and had gotten him appointed governor of *Vān*. When Shah 'Abbas opened his campaign in Azerbaijan, *Aḥmad Pasha* had been dismissed from his post. But he refused to obey his Sultan's order to relinquish the governorship of *Vān*. He began to make incursions on neighboring areas, and seized control of *Aklāt*, *Ādeljavāz*, and *Albestān*. He had gathered together a large army, with which he ravaged areas over which he could not establish permanent control. The loot he acquired he distributed among his soldiers and freebooters, and travelers through the area reported that he had as many as twelve thousand men under his command.

After the death of Sultan *Moḥammad III* and the accession of Sultan *Aḥmad I* (1603), *Aḥmad Pasha* had pretended to tender his allegiance to the new Sultan. The principal officers of the Ottoman state had

¹¹Originally a district corps; though amalgamated with the Janissaries by the time of Sultan *Moḥammad II* (1451-81), they retained their own regimental names (see *Gibb and Bowen*, I/1, pp. 59; 314-15; etc.).

considered it expedient at that time to ignore his misconduct and to encourage him to hope for royal favors. This had merely increased his already overweening conceit and insolence, and he had begun, in his greed for money, to molest subjects of the Shah and to lay hands on Persian merchants passing through his territories. The Shah had made a mental note to mete out suitable punishment to him whenever opportunity offered.

While the Shah was still in summer quarters at Gökça Deñiz, he received a report that Aḥmad Pasha was laying siege at Arjīš to Moḥammad Pasha the son of Zāl Pasha, who had not tendered him the degree of obedience he considered fitting. It is six or seven days' journey from Erīvān to Arjīš,¹² but it is possible to cover the distance in three days by forced marches. The Shah decided to send a detachment of troops against him; even if they failed to capture Aḥmad Pasha himself, at least they could scatter his supporters, who had caused so much mischief. Allāhverdī Khan was detailed for the job and succeeded in reaching Arjīš in three days, only to find that Aḥmad Pasha had fled. Since the Shah's ability to make forced marches was celebrated, Aḥmad Pasha had taken the precaution of posting guards on the Erīvān road. When these reported seeing a cloud of dust which heralded the approach of the Safavid force, Aḥmad Pasha had fled precipitately, not drawing rein until he reached the plain of Mūš,¹³ and his men had scattered. He remained in that area until the arrival of Jeḡāl-oḡlū. Allāhverdī Khan did not have orders to advance beyond Arjīš, and so returned to camp. Although he was passing through enemy territory, his men did not pillage the countryside either on the outward march or the return journey, and no peasant was molested.

Another event which occurred this summer was the capture of the fort of Šūra-gel in Çoḡūr-e Sa'd, which had been occupied by the Ottomans. The Shah pitched his camp on the lush grass of the plain, which was dotted with poppies, and sent forward a detachment of Eşfahānī musketeers. The latter reached the walls of the fort the first night and refused to be dislodged. The attackers made several breaches in the walls, and the defenders retreated to a church, constructed of black rock, which was located within the fort and, because of its strength, used as a citadel. This refuge too was breached by the attackers and stormed. All the defenders who were taken alive had their stomachs

¹²On the northern shore of Lake Van.

¹³West of Lake Van.

slit open and were then suspended from the battlements as an example to others. At the Shah's orders, members of the service corps razed the fort, but they did not succeed in totally destroying the church, which was built of blocks of stone so cunningly fitted together by the masons that the walls appeared to be one solid piece of stone. The Shah then marched to Qārş.

A further incident which occurred this year was the arrival at the royal camp of Soleyman Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Kōsāb and Qarā Hēşār, a provincial governor subject to the Ottoman *beglerbeg* of Vān. He now transferred his allegiance to the Shah, in the customary manner of Kurdish emirs, who always give their allegiance to whichever party is in the ascendant. But the expressions of fealty he uttered did not derive from any loyalty of heart. The Shah, although he had no illusions as to the worth of professions of loyalty by Kurds, accepted Soleyman Beg's protestations at their face value (it is usually advisable for rulers to do this), loaded him with robes of honor, and raised him to the rank of khan before giving him permission to return to his own territory.

Yet another occurrence this year was the arrival of ambassadors from Spain and Portugal, accompanied by about fifty armed retainers. They were received by the Shah near Qārş, presented their gifts, and were given leave to depart soon afterward.

At this point, the spies whom the Shah had sent to Istanbul reported that Jeḡāl-oḡlū, who had a great reputation among the Ottomāns both for valor and statesmanship, and who had held in Europe the position of *qaptan*, the term used by the Ottomans to denote their lord high admiral, had been recalled to the capital and appointed grand vizier and commander in chief. He had organized an army of *qapı-qolūs* (slaves of the Porte)¹⁴ and Janissaries for the invasion of Iran. Messengers were dispatched to mobilize additional troops in Anatolia, from the provinces of Borsā (Brusa) and Qarāmān, and also from Syria, Aleppo, Tripoli, Trebizond, Diār Bakr, Erzerum, Vān, and Kurdistan. Jeḡāl-oḡlū had then marched from Istanbul and camped in the plain of Mūş.

After verifying this report, Shah 'Abbas sent troops to the Qārş

¹⁴See Gibb and Bowen, index. The *qapı-qolları* were non-Muslims drafted into Ottoman service who embraced Islam as a means of rising to high office in either the civil or military branches of the administration.

and Zarnešād districts to burn the crops and pastures, with the object of denying supplies to the Ottomans for a period of several days as they marched through that region. The inhabitants of the area, who were non-Muslims, were forcibly evacuated to other regions; any who showed support for the Ottomans, or who were unwilling to leave, were attacked and plundered. The Safavid troops ravaged the countryside as far as Ḥasan Qal'a, between Qārş and Erzerum, and did a thorough job of burning the crops. Between two and three thousand Armenian families and tribesmen who traditionally spent the summer in the area were transferred to Iraq; large numbers of animals of all kinds were seized by the Safavids. In all, some twenty thousand non-Muslims were taken captive and embraced Islam in *qezelbaş* custody.

It is well known that it is the custom of the Ottomans to terminate their campaigns in the field on the 13th of Esfand/8th November, a day the Turks call *Qāsim-günü*,¹⁵ that is, the day on which the rams are allowed to join the flocks of ewes. On this day, Ottoman armies traditionally begin their march back to base, so that they may reach the latter by the time the sun enters the sign of Capricorn, which marks the beginning of winter and onset of severe cold and snow. So that no changes have to be made in the plan of march, Ottoman troops never depart from this practice. If the Sultan is present on *Qāsim-günü*, the Janissaries, who are infantry and therefore cannot march as fast as the other troops, remove their standard, which is planted in front of the Sultan's pavilion, and reerect it to the rear of his tent. This gives notice to the Sultan that the appointed day for departure has arrived, and the following day the army marches; this custom is invariable. If this custom is enforced on the Sultan, the reader will readily see that it is even less possible for any commander in chief to defy it! If a commander wishes to halt for a few days to achieve a certain military objective, the Janissaries refuse to allow it; they cut his tent ropes with their swords so that the tent collapses about his ears! In short, no one can prevent them from continuing their march.

The purpose of this digression was to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the Safavid army was still in camp in the open plain long after the usual season; the Ottoman *Qāsim-günü* was near and there was still no sign of *Jeğāl-oğlū*, still encamped on the plain of *Müş*. The Shah decided to winter at some suitable spot and mobilize his forces again in the spring at some summer station of his choice. He

¹⁵8th November. "Popularly reckoned the beginning of the winter period ending on the 5th of May" (Sir James Redhouse, *Yeni Türkçe-İngilizce Sözlük*, 1968, p. 614).

therefore sent on leave all his troops except a number of emirs, *qūrčīs*, *golāms*, musketeers, and others. No sooner had the Shah disbanded his troops than he received persistent reports that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was on the march.

Jeḡāl-oḡlū's March on Azerbaijan, and His Retreat from Nakčevān without Accomplishing His Objective

Senān Pasha (or Jeḡāl-oḡlū as he was known, since his father's name was Jeḡāl), was of the Frankish race; he had made a name for himself in Ottoman service by his bravery and wisdom. His knowledge and the excellence of his counsel were proverbial and, if a crisis occurred, he was invariably called upon to handle it. To repel the onslaught of the Franks, he had been appointed *qaptan* and sent to guard the frontier between the Ottoman empire and the European Powers. Since Sultan Aḥmad attached prime importance to the struggle against the *qezelbāš* and to the recovery of the territory and forts lost to Shah 'Abbas, he appointed Jeḡāl-oḡlū grand vizier and commander in chief of the Ottoman forces in the east. As already mentioned, Jeḡāl-oḡlū had lost no time in mobilizing and equipping an army, and marching to Erzerum. From there, he sent conciliatory letters to Aḥmad Pasha encouraging him to hope for the governorship of Azerbaijan, and ordering him to report to his camp. Aḥmad Pasha, who had been extremely apprehensive of his reception in view of his misdeameanors, was reassured and hastened to join Jeḡāl-oḡlū with a band of soldiers of fortune. Jeḡāl-oḡlū was also joined at Erzerum by troops from the provinces of Erzerum and Āḡesqa. He then marched without pause from Erzerum to Qārş.

The Shah called a council of war and received all kinds of advice. He pointed out that the Ottomans had been making their preparations for a long while and had brought a large army, while he had just disbanded the greater part of the *qezelbāš* army. This fact, he said, ruled out the possibility of a pitched battle. But the emirs continued to breathe fire. Finally, the Shah decided to move aside from the Ottoman line of march and wait for a few days to see if Jeḡāl-oḡlū crossed the Aras. If he did, the situation would be reviewed. In any case, it would be beneath the Shah personally to engage in battle with the Sultan's officers. The Shah therefore marched to Ağča Qal'a and sent out patrols to find out which point Jeḡāl-oḡlū was aiming at.

A few days later, reports came in that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was marching in

the direction of Erīvān and Naḵčevān. The Shah gave orders that all the inhabitants of those regions should be moved to safer areas where they would not be molested by the Ottomans. The *qezelbāš* were ordered to remove all supplies of food they could transport, and to burn the rest. The Shah then sent his baggage off to Alanjaq, and the *qezelbāš* took up positions flanking the Ottoman line of march, ready to fall on the enemy if they crossed the Aras and got into difficulties because of lack of provisions for men and horses. Emir Gūna Khan was placed in charge of moving the civilians from the Erīvān region; he sent them toward Qarāja-dāğ. Not many people escaped his net except those lurking in mountain defiles and remote spots. The Shah moved from Ağča Qal'a to Üç Kalısā.

Meanwhile, Jeğāl-oğlū had reached Qārş, where he interviewed 'Alī Khan Beg, the *eşik-âqāsī* who had escorted back to Ottoman territory those troops who had been granted quarter at Erīvān, and who was now seeking leave to depart. In the course of his conversation with him Jeğāl-oğlū had inquired, "Why did the Shah bring an army to Azerbaijan and disturb the peace?" The Safavid envoy had made a suitable reply, at the end of which he said, "Why did Sultan Morād, after the death of Shah Tahmasp, break a treaty of peace which had been cemented by the sworn covenants of his forebears, throw out of the window a peace of such long duration, cast the land into confusion, and lay his hands on territories which are the hereditary domains of the Safavid dynasty?" Jeğāl-oğlū vastly enjoyed this unanswerable rejoinder, and sent 'Alī Khan Beg on his way with a somewhat arrogant letter addressed to the Shah. Back came the reply: "Be resolute! The *qezelbāš* will not run away from you, but will give battle whenever they consider the moment ripe."

When Jeğāl-oğlū reached Erīvān, the Shah was camped near the Dādī River. From there he dispatched Maqşūd Sultan Kangarlū, the governor of Naḵčevān, to move the civilian population of the Naḵčevān area to Qarāja-dāğ and Dezmār. Tahmāspqolī Beg, a *golām* of the royal household, were sent to transfer the population of Jolfā to Isfahan. The inhabitants of Jolfā had long resided there, but now, to protect their lives and property, they were willy-nilly moved to Isfahan.¹⁶ There they were allotted land along the banks of the Zāyandarūd, and houses with small gardens gradually grew up there; the

¹⁶This is not the real reason. The inhabitants of Jolfā were Armenians, many of them skilled craftsmen, and Shah 'Abbas wished to make use of their skills in his new capital.

properties were exempt from extraordinary taxes. Today, there are three thousand families living there, safe from the vicissitudes of fortune; the beauty of their new home has caused them to forget their former one.

The Shah stationed squadrons of cavalry in front and on each side of the advancing Ottomans to furnish him with up-to-date information on their movements; his men were also instructed to wipe out any groups of Ottomans who went foraging. When the Shah reached Naḳṣevān, hoping to stay there one day, he sent men out to look for provisions. But the city itself had lost its former prosperity, and the neighboring hamlets and fields had fallen out of cultivation, with the result that there was nowhere suitable for the Shah to camp. Persons skilled in astrology, especially Mollā Moḥyī al-Dīn Anār-o-pīāzī of Kerman, had interpreted a conjunction of planets which occurred this year to mean that it would be a year of turmoil and wars; Azerbaijan had been particularly affected, and Naḳṣevān and certain other places had been ruined.

The next day, the Shah crossed the Aras at the Jolfā ford and found a suitable spot to camp in the valley beyond. If the Ottomans crossed the Aras, the Shah planned to attack them at the entrance to a narrow defile. Meanwhile, the patrols he had sent out to gather information and booty returned, bringing with them some Ottoman horses whose thinness was evidence that they were already suffering from lack of fodder. A few days later, the Shah received reports that Jeḡāl-oḡlū had been forced by lack of provisions to retire toward Vān. Apparently the Janissaries and "slaves of the Porte" had invaded his tent and shouted, "You have broken the rule by marching against the enemy after Qāsim-günü. Our horses are exhausted, and the Safavid king is ready for battle the other side of the Aras. We are in no fit state either to fight or to stay where we are."

After holding consultations with his officers Jeḡāl-oḡlū decided to retire to Vān the nearest stronghold, for the winter (1013/1604-06). Due to the lateness of the season, many of the passes were already blocked by snow, and he lost many men and animals on the way. After arriving at Vān, Jeḡāl-oḡlū quartered himself and the "slaves of the Porte" in the city and neighboring townships, and his other troops dispersed in all directions. The Kurdish emirs, following their usual reprehensible habit of keeping in with both sides, kept coming to Jeḡāl-oḡlū at Vān and tendering their allegiance, even though it was

obvious to any person of intelligence that the Ottoman commander had suffered a setback and that it was not wise for him to remain at Vān, only six days' march from Tabriz, with such a small force. Because the Shah had acted with caution and had prudently retired a few stages before the Ottoman advance, Jeḡāl-oḡlū, failing to understand the Shah's tactics, arrogantly held the *qezelbāš* army in low esteem.

The Shah marched back to Tabriz for the winter. He saw to the needs of those who had been transferred from the frontier regions, using funds from the state treasury to furnish them with supplies of food and whatever else they needed for the winter. But since it was God's will to destroy the Armenians of Eṛīvān, many of the latter died in exile this winter. The survivors were moved to Isfahan in the spring and allotted plots of cultivable land and seed (or money was advanced to them to enable them to buy seed); about two or three thousand *tomān* from the state revenue were spent in this way.

Emir Gūna Khan, the governor of Eṛīvān, with Maqşūd Sultan, the governor of Naḵčevān, and the other officers under his command, wintered at Alanjaq. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, was ordered to winter at Marāḡa, and the rest of the emirs were given leave to depart to their fiefs on the understanding that they would report for duty again in the spring. The elders of each tribe were ordered to make detailed lists of the families in their tribe resident in Azerbaijan and Iraq so that, as required by religious zeal, every group might have ready for service the number of *yaşāqī*¹⁷ troops compatible with its means, whether they were actually called to the colors or not. All these men were to report for duty early in the spring, and the *qūrčīs* were instructed to see that these orders were carried out.

Kūstandīl Mīrzā, the son of Alexander Khan, had been designated *amīr al-omarā* and governor-elect of Šīrvān. This winter, Alexander Khan petitioned the Shah to send his son to him so that they might together attack Šīrvān, taking advantage of the fact that no help could reach the Ottoman garrisons in Šīrvān during the winter; once the province was conquered, he said he would deliver it to the Shah as an earnest of his good faith. Although the Shah knew Alexander Khan was lying, he considered it politic to believe him. He allocated to Kūstandīl, who had been designated *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān with the rank of khan, a number of officers who merited promotion to the

¹⁷*Yāsāqī*: levies providing their own arms and equipment.

rank of emir, and fiefs in Šīrvān were allotted to these men. Kūstandīl was sent to Ardabīl with orders to organize his force there and then proceed toward his objective. The Shah issued orders calling on the tribes in the Ardabīl, Aršaq, and Ṭavāleš areas to join Kūstandīl. Alexander Khan was summoned to the Shah's presence and granted an expensive robe of honor, a *qezelbāš tāj*, a turban jewel, a jeweled sword belt, and other items. His grandson Ṭahmūraš was kept at court, but his other sons and the women of the Georgian royal house who were at the Shah's court were allowed to accompany Alexander and Kūstandīl.

The emirs detailed to serve Kūstandīl Khan on this campaign included Šāhmīr Khan, who was descended from the former rulers of the province of Šakkī. He had demonstrated his loyalty in Safavid service and as a reward was designated governor-elect of his native province. Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar was another. He had remained in Qarābāḡ with his followers and attained the rank of pasha in Ottoman service, had visited the Shah when the latter was encamped before Erīvān and pledged his allegiance. He had been granted royal favor and raised to the rank of khan. In addition, there was 'Alī Khan Movāfeq, an Ottoman subject from Qarābāḡ, who had met Kūstandīl in Qarābāḡ when the latter was on his way from the Safavid court on a visit to his father and rendered him all sorts of assistance. 'Alī Khan Movāfeq, who was dubbed 'Alī Khān Monāfeq (the hypocrite) by the Ottomans, had also visited the Shah at Erīvān, had been made an emir with the rank of khan, and had been enrolled among the Šāmlūs. He was now allotted a fief in Šīrvān and was sent with Kūstandīl Khan. (Although some of these events have been referred to before, I have not shrunk from mentioning them again here, since this is the more appropriate place.) The fourth emir designated for service in Šīrvān was Bektāš Sultan, the son of Moḥammad Khan Moṣṣellū Torkmān, who was connected by marriage to Kūstandīl Khan; at the instance of the latter, he had been made an emir with the rank of soltan. Other emirs ordered to Šīrvān were Tīzrow Sultan Moqaddam; Aḳī Sultan Jāḡīr; 'Alī Khan Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū; the son of Sardār Maḥmūd; and 'Alī Sultan Arešī.

A detachment of royal musketeers were also placed at Kūstandīl's disposal. This force had to cross the Kor near Ganja, by the Qūmīn Ūlamī ford, and the Shah ordered two *qezelbāš* emirs to cover the crossing against possible Ottoman attack: Zu'l-Faqār Khan Qarā-mānlū, from Ardabīl, and Ḥoseyn Khan Zīād-oḡlū, from Arasbār. The

crossing went off without incident, and the Šīrvān force marched first to Ardabīl, where the leaders made the pilgrimage to the tombs of the Safavid shaikhs and invoked their aid. At Ardabīl their escort was dismissed, and they continued on their way from there with some two or three thousand men. Kūstandīl's plan was to proceed to his father's domains in Georgia and then, reinforced by Georgian troops, invade Šīrvān.

When the Shah was not preoccupied with the cares of state affairs, the planning of the Šīrvān operation, and the administration of justice, he passed his time in various forms of amusement. He also gave orders for some of the troops of the Khorasan army to report to Azerbaijan in the spring to take part in the coming campaign.

Since Jeḡāl-oḡlū had failed to achieve anything the previous autumn and had sent some rather untruthful reports of his activities to the Ottoman Sultan, he thought it worthwhile to see if the Shah were minded to talk of peace. He chose as his go-between Soleyman Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Kōsāb, who had presented himself at the Safavid court and been promoted to the rank of khan. Soleyman Beg wrote letters to the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and to other principal officers of the Safavid state, suggesting that peace be arranged on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya (1555). Shah 'Abbas would return to Iraq, and there would be no reprisals on either side for actions committed during the present hostilities.

This was a thoroughly unrealistic suggestion, but it was taken up with enthusiasm by a number of short-sighted, mean-spirited fellows who were willing to do anything for a quiet life. They suggested that Tabriz and all places south of the Aras River, should remain in Safavid hands; everything north of the Aras would remain Ottoman. Alas! The passionate advances of the lover are often rebuffed by the beloved! And so it turned out in this case, for the Shah was determined to recover all those territories which had formed part of the realm of Shah Tahmasp, within the boundaries agreed upon by Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Sūlaymān; not one half-meter of that territory would he leave in foreign hands. A reply in these terms was sent to Jeḡāl-oḡlū. The Ottoman commander ordered Soleyman Beg to make a second attempt, and this time the reply came back that none of the Shah's officers or those close to him would dare to even broach the matter with him. These overtures on the part of Jeḡāl-oḡlū led the Shah's advisers to think that Jeḡāl-oḡlū's reputation for sound judgment and

diplomatic skill was undeserved. It was childish to make a suggestion like this to a powerful prince who had set his heart on recovering his hereditary dominions. Thus the Ottoman peace feelers came to nought, and the outcome was left in God's hands.

The Acquisition of the Fort of Bost in the Zamīn Dāvar, Garmsīr, and Kandahār Region

As previously reported, the Safavid princes at Kandahar, the sons of Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, had left their post because of the Uzbek threat and taken refuge with the Mogul Emperor, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar, who had appointed Šāhī Beg Khan Čaġatāy governor of Kandahar. Up to now Shah 'Abbas, because of the strong ties of friendship between the Safavid dynasty and the house of Tīmūr, and in particular the house of Bābor, had taken no steps to recover the province of Kandahar, even though prior to 1591 it had been in Safavid hands for a century.

In the year in which the Shah led his expedition to Balk, he was met at Herat on his return journey by Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn the grandson of Mīr 'Abd al-Ḥoseyn, who held a position of eminence in the Garmsīr district of Kandahar. Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn had become weary of the excesses of the fiefholders in that province, and abandoning his children and dependents, had left his ancestral home and sought refuge with Shah 'Abbas. The Shah had placed him in the care of Ḥoseyn Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, and had chosen a place of residence for him in the province of Farāh. Šāhī Beg Khan, the Mogul governor of Kandahar, had seized his family and held them as hostages in the fort at Kandahar, where they had languished for ten years.

Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn was much troubled in his mind in regard to his sons. Kosrow Beg, a *ġolām* in the service of Ḥoseyn Khan, was in Farāh to collect road taxes. Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn whispered in his ear and incited him to attack Zamīn Dāvar and seize the fortress of Bost. At the same time, some old retainers of the Mīr 'Abd al-Ḥeyy dynasty sent word from Zamīn Dāvar that the custodians of the fort at Bost, Ḥasan Beg and Ḥoseyn Beg, sons of Kānom Bahādor Moġal, were extremely slack in their duties; if he brought a force to Bost, he could seize the fort. Kosrow Beg, giving a headstrong and stupid action the name of valor, gathered together some subordinates and marched on Bost with Mīr Zeyn al-'Ābedīn, without any orders from Ḥoseyn

Khan. After marching for forty *farsaks*, they arrived before the gates. Finding the guards asleep, they placed ladders against the walls and entered the fort.

The garrison, awaking from its sleep, put up some resistance; Huseyn Beg was cut down and Hasan Beg fled. With such ease fell the famous fortress of Bost, which in Ġaznavīd times had been held by Nāṣer al-Dīn¹⁸ Sebükteġīn. As soon as Šāhī Beg heard the news, he dispatched an army under Zala Khan the governor of Qalāt, Orūs Bahādor the governor of Zamīn Dāvar, and a number of fiefholders from the area to Bost; the army was equipped with war elephants and siege equipment. Huseyn Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, was furious when he heard of Kosrow Beg's action; he was pondering how he could reprimand him and hand Bost back to the officers of the Mogul Emperor. Before he had reached a decision, he received a report that Šāhī Beg Khan had sent an army against Bost. Huseyn Khan grew even angrier because he had expected Šāhī Beg Khan to send an envoy to him to ask him to deal with the matter in a friendly way. Instead, Šāhī Beg had launched an army against Bost without even a word to him.

Huseyn Khan's pride and sense of honor as a *qezelbāš* now caused him to abandon his earlier thoughts concerning Kosrow Beg and decide to help him. He sent a force of Šāmlū *ġāzīs* and tribal emirs, together with Malek Shah Sīstānī, who happened to be at Herat. He also ordered Esmā'il Khan Ālplū, the governor of Farāh, to assist them. The latter marched at full speed from Farāh, hoping to secure the crossing of the Hīrmand River for the rest of the *qezelbāš* forces. They pressed on, although barely three hundred of their number had crossed the river before the seasoned Čaġatāy army of more than five thousand men was upon them. The first *qezelbāš* charge routed the enemy; Zala Khan and many of his officers were taken prisoner and Orūs Bahādor was killed, together with more than five hundred men of the Čaġatāy army. The triumphant *qezelbāš* installed as commandant at Bost Moḥammad Zamān Sultan Šāmlū, one of Moẓaffar Huseyn Mīrzā's retainers who had returned from India a long while ago and entered Huseyn Khan's service; he was selected because he was familiar with the area. Before leaving, the *qezelbāš* made sure he had adequate supplies of food and munitions.

After the *qezelbāš* had left, Šāhī Beg in person organized another

¹⁸His correct *laqab* was Nāṣer al-Dowla.

army, again equipped with war elephants and siege weapons, and led it against Bost. He attempted to storm the fort, his men driving the largest elephant against the walls. At the height of the struggle, when the elephant, its trunk raised, was battering itself against the gates and wall of the fort, a shot from one of the defenders' cannons struck it in the mouth and killed it. This broke the morale of the attackers, many of whom were killed by musket fire from the fort. Šāhī Beg Khan abandoned the attempt and returned to Kandahar.

The province of Garmsīr thus came under the control of officers of the Safavid state, and the *seyyeds* and inhabitants returned to cultivating the land and restoring the prosperity of the area. Hoseyn Khan sent a full report to the Shah, along with the captive Zala Khan. The Shah, however, refused to take advantage of this unexpected windfall. If his men were going to rupture the friendly relations with the Mogul empire, he considered, they might as well have gone for Kandahar as sully their hands with the capture of Bost. At all events, since the Shah had important matters on hand in Azerbaijan, he handed Zala Khan over to 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Rayy, for safe custody, intending to return him and the other prisoners to their native land as soon as the campaign in Azerbaijan was over.

Toward the end of this year, Mo'ezzā Ebrāhīmā Šīrāzī, the chief comptroller, either from negligence or the arrogance of office, allowed certain errors to creep into the accounts from Gīlān, with the result that large sums were lost to the state treasury. This incompetence was reported to the Shah by the vizier of Gīlān, Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān, and the Shah dismissed the comptroller. At the beginning of the Year of the Serpent (1014/1605-06) the office of chief comptroller was given to Mīrzā Qavāmā, the son of Mīrzā Ḥasan Kafrānī Eṣfahānī, who came from a family with a distinguished record of public service extending over several generations. At the time of his appointment, Mīrzā Qavāmā was vizier at Herat. He was a skilled accountant, having been a pupil of a former comptroller, Aqa Shah 'Alī Dowlatābādī, who was a master accountant.

Events of the Year of the Serpent, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1014/1605-06, the Nineteenth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Monday, 1 Zu'l-Qa'da 1013/21 March 1605. The usual festivities were held. At the New Year's levée the emirs, *şadrs*, viziers, *moqarrabs* of the court, and senior army officers presented to the Shah gifts appropriate to their rank. The frontier emirs and governors were paraded before the Shah and received marks of royal favor. The same day, there arrived at Tabriz some retainers of Emir Gūna Khan Qājār, who was stationed at Alanjaq in the district of Naḳčevān. They brought some choice samples, a few horses and several muskets, such as were fit for a king, of the booty taken in their battle with the Ottoman provincial governor Moḥammad Takkalū.

Moḥammad Takkalū considered himself to be one of the bravest men of the age. He had been promoted to the status of emir by the commander in chief; he had under his command troops from Erīvān and Gökč'a, and he had instructions to harass the *qezelbaş* forces in the area whenever opportunity offered. Qajer Pasha and Moştafā Pasha, meanwhile, had moved into the Naḳčevān area with a force of Kurds from Vān, with the intention of attacking Emir Gūna Khan. Emir Gūna Khan led his Qājārs and the emirs under his command to the banks of the Aras River, and his determined stand dissuaded the Ottomans from attacking. While he was away, however, Moḥammad Takkalū thought it a good moment to ravage the Alanjaq area, and he came to Naḳčevān with a band of freebooters and soldiers of fortune.

Emir Gūna Khan was on his return march to Alanjaq; his main force, encumbered with baggage, had gone on ahead, and he was bringing up the rear with a small group of men. However, since he knew Moḥammad Takkalū, who was not to be trusted, was in the area, he had patrols out toward Erīvān to look for a sign of the enemy. The Ottomans clashed with one of his patrols, and although it is contrary to the accepted rules of warfare to engage enemy patrols in strength, Moḥammad Takkalū did so. The Safavid patrols cunningly kept the enemy engaged as they fell back, until the Ottomans surrounded them and overwhelmed them. Some were slain; others, though wounded and exhausted, made their way back and reported to Emir Gūna Khan, with the Ottomans hard on their heels. Although

Emir Gūna Khan had no wish to give battle at the moment, since most of his men had gone on ahead, taking with them all the spare mounts, honor demanded that he do so. When the battle was joined, Moḥammad Takkalū's first charge scattered the Safavid skirmishers. Emir Gūna Khan then led his men in a countercharge, but the Ottomans fought hard and many *qezelbāš* were wounded, including Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū. Emir Gūna Khan's horse was wounded several times, and things looked serious for the Safavids.

At this juncture, the Safavid troops were attended by a manifestation of that royal good fortune which is always at hand to assist the servants of the dynasty. Some of Emir Gūna Khan's men who had gone on ahead, worried at the nonappearance of their leader, had turned back to see if he was in trouble. Hearing that he had moved toward Erīvān, they pressed on, and arrived when the battle was at its height. Just as Emir Gūna Khan's horse was on the point of collapse, a groom reached his side with a fresh horse, and the Qājār chief promptly led the new arrivals in a charge which routed the enemy, most of whom were hunted down in the subsequent pursuit and slain, though Moḥammad Takkalū himself escaped. This was the hardest-fought battle in which Emir Gūna Khan had been involved, and his name became a watchword for valor among both friend and foe alike.

The Incursion of a Combined Ottoman and Kurdish Force in the Direction of Kōy and Marand and the Shah's Countermoves against This Attack

Early in the year, a combined Ottoman and Kurdish force invaded the Kōy and Marand area. The attack had been ordered by the Ottoman commander in chief, Jegał-oḡlū, and the force consisted of Kurdish provincial governors under the command of Moṣṭafā Pasha. Moṣṭafā Pasha, having very much in mind the Shah's reputation for making forced marches, and conscious of the fact that Marand, normally three days' march from Tabriz, could be reached by the Shah in one day, prudently stayed behind at Kōy himself and sent the Kurds on ahead to Marand under the command of Soleyman Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Kōṣāb. Jamšīd Sultan Donbolī, the governor of Marand, reported the approach of the enemy to the Shah, who immediately dispatched Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, the *qūrčibašī*, with a force of *qūrčīs*, to meet this threat. The Kurds reached the outskirts of Marand, carried off a few cattle and other animals, took a few peasants prisoner, and retired.

Thinking he could easily deal with this situation himself, and not stopping to reflect whether the enemy might have forces in reserve, Jamšīd Sultan sallied forth from Marand with three hundred men and pursued the Kurds for six *farsaks*. When he caught up with them, the Kurds abandoned their booty and fled. Jamšīd Sultan, failing to exercise that caution which is an essential part of successful generalship, and with the rashness of youth not yet tempered by the buffetings of fortune, pursued them for another three *farsaks*. At that point, he ran into Moṣṭafā Pasha and Soleyman Beg, who were waiting for him. Despite the huge discrepancy in the size of the two forces, he still proposed to give battle. It was only when he was told that the enemy were not only in front of him but on both flanks as well that he decided to make a fighting withdrawal. His brother was taken prisoner, and some of his men were killed and wounded. The rest succeeded in making their way back in disorder to Marand, where their arrival coincided with that of the *qūrčībāšī*. The *qūrčībāšī* reprimanded him, and not seeing that there was anything he could usefully do at Marand, returned to Tabriz.

While the Shah was playing polo in the Meydān-e Šāhebābād, a letter from Emir Gūna Khan was handed to him informing him that Qajer Pasha and Moṣṭafā Pasha, who earlier had made an abortive feint in the direction of the Aras River, were once again marching against him. It occurred to the Shah that, if he proceeded at once by forced marches to cut off the Ottomans, he might catch them in a trap between his army and that of Emir Gūna Khan and win a signal victory. His only hesitation concerned the truth of the report, but since in military matters delay is fatal, he decided to take it at face value and marched like the wind to Ṭasūj and Salmās. There he learned that the pashas had emerged from Vān, but after marching only one stage had changed their minds and returned to Vān, being apprehensive of the Shah's ability to make rapid marches and considering it unwise to go so far away from their base and commander in chief.

Since the Safavid army was now in the field, the Shah decided to send a detachment under the *qūrčībāšī* against the province of Albāq, held by an Ottoman provincial governor. He himself spent several days in the area hunting before returning to Tabriz. The *qūrčībāšī*'s men succeeded in crossing high mountain ranges which, two months after Nowrūz, were still covered with snow, and pillaged the Albāq region. They took captive about a thousand women and children belonging to Christian infidels who had fought the Muslim

forces and who had therefore forfeited their right to protection as non-Muslim peoples under Muslim rule; their being taken as prisoners of war was consequently quite legal. The Safavid troops returned in triumph to the Shah with their booty.

Events in Georgia and Šīrvān and the Victory of Kūstandīl Khan over the Ottomans

It will be recalled that, the previous year, Kūstandīl Khan had been designated governor of Šīrvān and had been sent to Georgia with his father, Alexander Khan, and a force of Safavid troops, with the object of reconquering the province of Šīrvān. But whenever Kūstandīl raised the matter of invading Šīrvān, his father procrastinated. His brother, Gorgīn Mīrzā, who had been made heir-apparent, also tried to prevent their father from taking any action in Šīrvān. Gorgīn Mīrzā did not like the idea of having Kūstandīl Khan as a powerful neighbor, in view of the fact that he had become a Muslim. Eventually, the delay exceeded all reasonable bounds, and the *qezelbāš* contingents became impatient and despaired of being able to render any assistance. They suspected that Alexander Khan and Gorgīn Mīrzā were not going to commit themselves to any action in Šīrvān until they knew the outcome of this year's campaign between the Ottoman commander in chief and the Safavid forces.

Finally, Kustandīl Khan, in the company of the *qezelbāš* emirs, descended on his father's residence one day, demanded that his brother be present too, and in strong language insisted that they should march on Šīrvān. His father repeated his previous excuses for inaction, and got up, left the room, and went to his private apartments. Gorgīn Mīrzā, following his father's example, left the room and went toward his own residence. Kūstandīl, his patience exhausted by his behavior, chased after his brother and started to abuse him in Georgian. His brother stopped and answered him back in kind. When Kūstandīl caught up with him, he drew his sword, struck his brother, and killed him. Kūstandīl then went storming back to his father's private apartments, accompanied by Sāhmīr Khan and 'Alī Movāfeq Khan; Bektāš Sultan Mowşellū Torkmān waited outside with a group of *qezelbāš*. Kūstandīl spoke to his father in Georgian, and his father unwisely began to abuse him.

At this juncture, he was informed of the murder of Gorgīn Mīrzā; he uttered a cry, and gave the signal to his Georgian nobles to kill the

qezelbaş emirs. 'Alī Khan Movāfeq drew his sword and struck Alexander Khan, and Šāhmīr Khan finished him off; several Georgian nobles who went to his assistance were also killed. The *qezelbaş* troops rallied to Kūstandīl Khan and the emirs, and the Georgian nobles, realizing that the four or five hundred Georgians who were present were not enough to deal with Kūstandīl Khan, submitted to him. Kūstandīl took possession of his father's and brother's treasures and commenced to rule in Georgia. Issuing pay and allowances to his troops, he made preparations for the invasion of Šīrvān. He entered Šīrvān with a combined *qezelbaş* and Georgian force of some ten thousand men, and most of the inhabitants of Šīrvān submitted to him.

Šāhmīr Khan, the governor of Šakkī, who was in the van with some of the other emirs, clashed with Moḥammad Amīn Pasha near Qabala (of which the latter was governor), and defeated him. The Ottomans who survived the battle shut themselves up in the fort, where they were besieged by Kūstandīl's forces. Meanwhile, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, Maḥmūd Pasha, who was Jeḡāl-oḡlū's son, had mobilized his forces and marched from Šamākī with his artillery. Kūstandīl left a small force to continue the siege of Qabala and marched to meet him.

The battle was fought near the Āq-sū River. The Ottomans attacked with a fine nonchalance, driving back Kūstandīl's skirmishers and both his left and right wings and reaching his center. The day was almost lost when the *qezelbaş* staked all on a desperate charge. As they galloped past the men of the left and right wings, which were in full retreat, these men swung their horses around and joined in the charge, with the result that Maḥmūd Pasha was defeated, his men routed, and many of them slain in the pursuit. In the course of the fighting, Kūstandīl and Maḥmūd Pasha came face to face; Kūstandīl guessed the identity of his adversary and came close to giving him a spear thrust. But Kūstandīl himself was weak from an arrow wound and his horse was tired, so Maḥmūd Pasha escaped unscathed from the battlefield. Seeing that Kūstandīl was wounded, the *qezelbaş* abandoned their pursuit of the enemy and fell to gathering up the booty. The defeated Ottomans retreated within the fort at Šamākī and hastily began strengthening the defenses.

The *qezelbaş* detachment which had been left at Qabala had abandoned the siege and marched to the battlefield at Āq-sū, arriving just as the Ottomans were in full flight. Some two thousand Ottoman

troops were killed in this engagement. The Ottoman garrison at Qabala evacuated the fort and fled when they heard of the *qezelbaş* victory, and the commandants of the other Ottoman-held forts in the area also left their posts and retreated to Šamāķī. Thus, the only forts remaining in Ottoman hands were Šamāķī, Bākū, and Darband.

After his victory, Kūstandīl allotted fiefs to his emirs in the manner laid down by the Shah and brought the whole of Šīrvān under his control. He sent a full report on events in Georgia and Šīrvān to the Shah, and on the heels of this report, a group of retainers bearing the heads of the slain, twelve Ottoman standards, and several prisoners. Kettledrums were beaten at Tabriz in celebration of this victory. At the Shah's order, a detachment of Georgian and Circassian *golāms* went out to meet Kūstandīl's men and escorted them to the Meydān-e Šāhebābād at Tabriz, where the spoils of victory were reviewed by the Shah. The Shah sent gifts and presents for Kūstandīl and his emirs, including jeweled *qezelbaş* hats, jeweled dagger belts, jeweled swords, and Arabian horses.

After resting for a few days until his wound was healed, Kūstandīl laid siege to Šamāķī. Since he did not have adequate equipment for this purpose, he asked the Shah to send him materials for casting cannon, lead, gunpowder, and a number of gunners. In response, the Shah sent a gunner named Abū Torāb Beg, with a team of workmen and the necessary materials.

The Construction of the New Fort at Tabriz and the Shah's Visit to the Shrine of Shaikh Šafī at Ardabīl

My learned readers will be aware that it was the common practice of the Ottoman sultans to secure their conquered territories by means of fortresses. In every city and town of any size in all the provinces that came under their sway, they built a fort and provided it with a commandant and a garrison. In Ottoman eyes, the construction and maintenance of forts constitute an important part of government; until a region possesses a fort, they do not count it as Ottoman territory. Readers will recall that when Shah 'Abbas recovered Tabriz, he gave orders for the fort which had been built there by the Ottomans to be razed, together with its ancillary buildings; his reasons for doing this were in part the fact that no fort had existed at Tabriz in Shah Tahmasp's time, and in part the desire to erase all traces of Ottoman occupation.

Shah 'Abbas now heard there was a rumor going around among the Kurds and Ottomans to the effect that, had the *qezelbaş* intended a permanent reoccupation of Tabriz, they would not have razed the fort. The destruction of Erīvān and Naḳčevān, and the return of the Shah to Iraq, were seen as corroboration of this viewpoint. Such rumors lowered the morale of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan and shook the confidence of the people of Tabriz. The Shah accordingly decided to rebuild the fort at Tabriz, to give the lie to these rumor-mongers. On 28 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1013/17 May 1605,¹ a date picked by the astrologers as being auspicious, the Shah personally superintended the beginning of the work, and laid down the dimensions of the fort and the height and thickness of the walls. The walls were measured off in cubits, and work on specific sections was allotted to various emirs and other senior officers, *golāms*, *qūrčīs*, and other ranks and civilians. While the work was in progress, the Shah decided to make the pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Šaft al-Dīn at Ardabīl, and he left Tabriz the following day, 29 Zu'l-Ḥejja/18 May.

On arrival at Ardabīl he gladdened the hearts of the shrine officials by many marks of royal favor, and bestowed gifts and alms on deserving persons. Returning to Tabriz via Ahar and Meškīn, he visited the shrine of Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī and reached Tabriz on 22 Moḥorram 1014/9 June 1605. During the three weeks he had been away, the emirs and principal officers of state had labored mightily and had completed the fort. A ditch as deep as the subtle thought of intellectuals had been dug around it, and it had been stocked with two years' supply of provisions and munitions, including cannon, muskets, lead, gunpowder, firewood, naphtha, wheat, and the like. The construction of this fort served notice on the Ottomans and Kurds, and people both near and far, that the *qezelbaş* had a firm commitment to Azerbaijan and would not relinquish it without a struggle.

Many ingenious chronograms were fashioned to mark the date of this event. One, "Tabriz was made secure,"² was devised by the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, himself. The author of this history stayed awake all night trying to think of a better chronogram and finally came to the conclusion that the vizier's effort could not be improved upon. The only thing that did occur to me was that if the words "Tabriz was made secure" came at the end of the hemistich, rather than at the beginning, it would be better stylistically—at least, this is the opinion of masters of

¹The author gives 1014, incorrectly.

²The Persian words, *Amn shod tabriz*, yield the correct date, 1014/1605.

this art. So I composed an occasional poem in praise of Shah 'Abbas, in the course of which I included these words at the end of a hemistich. Whether 'Tabriz' is recognized or not as a legitimate rhyme, this practice has been allowed in the occasional poems and odes of many master poets; for instance, there are many examples of it in the collected works of Kamāl al-Dīn Esma'il.³

The Dispatch to the Vān Region of a Qezelbāš Army under the Command of Allāhverdī Khan and His Campaign against the Ottoman Commander in chief, Jeḡāl-oḡlū

The Shah was dissatisfied with the inconclusive nature of the campaigns of the previous year. Jeḡāl-oḡlū was still encamped at Vān, only six days' journey from Tabriz. The Shah therefore decided to send an army against Vān to lay siege to the city or to force Jeḡāl-oḡlū to retire. Either way, the prestige of the Ottoman commander in chief would be damaged. Allāhverdī Khan was placed in command of his force, and Zu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan; Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman; and Ḥasan Khan the governor of Hamadan were placed under his orders. The whole army, *qūrčīs* and *ḡolāms*, numbered some thirty thousand men.

Jeḡāl-oḡlū ignored the departure from Tabriz of the Safavid army and remained at Vān, intending to resume operations in Azerbaijan as soon as he had received the reinforcements that were on their way to him. He neglected ordinary military precautions to such an extent that, although the Safavid army took twenty days to march from Tabriz to Vān, it was within a day's march of Vān before the Ottoman commander in chief was aware of its approach. In fact, Zu'l-Faqār Khan and his men, who were in the Safavid van, captured a number of Ottoman stableboys and seized some of their horses, which were grazing in the meadows along the road. Allāhverdī Khan was joined at this point by a Kurdish emir, Šīrāzī Sultan Maḥmūdī, and several of his nephews and other relatives. The rest of the Kurdish emirs, however, as usual played a waiting game and contented themselves with sending messages to the Safavid commander. The latter decided to overlook this and not to insist on their presenting themselves before him.

The following day, Allāhverdī Khan drew his men up for battle and

³Kamāl al-Dīn Esma'il of Isfahan, a panegyrist at the court of the Ḳārazmšāhs, killed by the Mongols ca. A.D. 1237.

waited to see if the Ottomans would come out and fight. At that moment, Jeğāl-oğlū only had some ten or fifteen thousand men at his disposal, so he decided to prepare to withstand a siege. But some of his pashas determined to engage the Safavid army, their rear protected by the city walls. A brisk engagement was fought not more than two miles from the city. The Ottomans fought vigorously until they heard the trumpets and fifes of the Safavid center, which now came into view; they then lost courage, and the Safavid vanguard broke their ranks with a charge at full gallop. Caring nought for the Ottoman muskets and cannon, the *qezelbāš* pursued the enemy right up to the walls of the fort and actually took some prisoners on the drawbridge itself and on the edge of the ditch. The Ottomans lost some two thousand men killed in this engagement, and some officers of note were taken prisoner, such as Kāndān Aqa, the *motaferreqabāšī*,⁴ with one of his sons.

After their victory, Allāhverdī Khan and his emirs pitched their tents around the city. The next day, they received reports that Moḥammad Pasha Šešgāh was marching from Sīvās with two thousand men to aid Jeğāl-oğlū. Allāhverdī Khan sent Qarčaḡāy Beg, with a force of *gōlāms* and *gāzīs*, to intercept him, and Qarčaḡāy Beg overwhelmed Moḥammad Pasha's force about six *farsaks* from Vān. Some Ottomans were killed, but the majority were taken prisoner. Moḥammad Pasha himself was mortally wounded.

The Ottomans at Vān, seeing Qarčaḡāy Beg march away, had thought that the bulk of the Safavid army had gone out to look for plunder, leaving Allāhverdī Khan relatively unattended. They therefore issued forth from the fort and stationed Janissaries behind the walls of the gardens which lay in front of the city walls, so that they could fire volleys at any Safavid troops who dared to advance. Allāhverdī Khan, whose men had maintained ceaseless patrol activity, sent a detachment of *qezelbāš* against the Ottomans which drove the enemy back again against the city walls and the fort. Since not all the Ottoman troops could get through one gate at the same time, some of them ran along the edge of the ditch, seeking entry at another gate. The *qezelbāš*, despite a hail of fire from the towers of the fort and the walls, took their chance and annihilated a large part of this group. Members of the Safavid commissariat hunted down some forty or fifty Ottomans among the gardens and ruins where they had taken refuge and brought them in to camp, where they were put to

⁴See Gibb and Bowen, p. 362.

death. No Safavid officer of note was lost in this action, and Safavid casualties were light.

The Ottomans were now penned within the fort at Vān, and Jegāl-oğlū debated what to do. He realized that it had been a mistake to stay at Vān. He did not want to find himself besieged by the Safavids, so he slipped away secretly across Lake Vān with a few men. Allāhverdi Khan sent a full report on all these events to the Shah.

Various Events Which Took Place While the Shah Was in Summer Quarters at Koy

When they learned that Jegāl-oğlū had escaped across Lake Vān, Allāhverdi Khan and the emirs went in pursuit of him and scoured the 'Adeljavāz and Arjīš region north of the lake, but without success. They then joined the Shah at his summer quarters at Sokman-ābād in the district of Koy. Shah 'Abbas, after spending a few days hunting, decided to visit Čalderān, the site of the famous battle between Shah Esma'il I and Sultan Selīm. There, the heads of the Ottomans slain at Vān and the weapons captured there, were paraded before him. He spared the life of Kandān Aqa the *motaferreqabāši* and his son and, because of the close friendship between Kandān Aqa and the ruler of the Crimea, Ġāzī Gerāy Khan, he placed them in the custody of the governor of Qarābāğ with instructions that they be treated as honored guests and sent to Ġāzī Gerāy Khan.

The Shah decided to build a fort at Koy to protect the inhabitants of the region from the depredations they had suffered because they lived on the frontier. Koy, by virtue of its climate, the purity of its water, and the greenness of its pastures and gardens, is one of the most pleasant towns in Azerbaijan. Qanbar 'Alī Beg Ostājlu, the *salḥdārbaši*, was placed in charge of the construction of the fort, and Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, and a number of others were detailed to assist him. The fort was completed within a short time and stocked with provisions and munitions. Seyyedi Sultan Kabūšlu was appointed its commandant and granted the district of Koy as a fief.

A cautionary event which occurred at this time was the execution of Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa, a member of the Šaraflū clan of the Ostājlu tribe. A man of modest background, Shaikh Aḥmad Aqa had come to court just after the accession of Shah 'Abbas and had brought him-

self to the Shah's notice by his faithful attendance there twenty-four hours a day. First, he was placed in charge of the palace gates; because he discharged these duties well, he was later made *dārūga* of Qazvin, the capital. He was a hard-hearted man and, as *dārūga* acquired a reputation for harshness and bloodthirstiness. He formed a private army of two or three hundred cutthroats and extended his authority well beyond the confines of Qazvin. His men, who sported scarlet turbans, soon became a sight familiar to the *qezelbāš*. For fear of the king's anger, not even the great emirs dared to disobey orders brought by one of Shaikh Aḥmad's retainers. His punishments were so severe that he had a number of thieves impaled on iron spits and roasted over a fire in the Meydān-e Sa'adatābād at Qazvin. In short, it had pleased God to place in authority over evildoers a man who was even more evil than they. His actions were not compatible with justice, but they terrified the criminal elements at Qazvin, and the Shah used to entrust to him any unpleasant task which had to be carried out. In other words, he became the public executioner. He was promoted to the office of *ešīk-āqāsī* of the harem and finally raised to the status of emir. But his acts of injustice had exceeded all bounds, and the Shah warned him to desist.

Shaikh Aḥmad was present in the Shah's camp at Kōy. A Zu'l-Qadar *qūrčī*, a kinsman of Baraḥ Beg Eymūr who had received his education in the royal household,⁵ had a quarrel over a grain store with one of Shaikh Aḥmad's servants, and the story got back to Shaikh Aḥmad. The latter, who was arrogant by nature inclined to inflict harsh punishments, at once had the *qūrčī* killed. The young man's relations complained to the Shah, who said: "When I first appointed him to a position of authority, I overlooked the severity of his actions because it was necessary to punish wrongdoers and restore law and order. It is some time, however, since I told him that these practices must cease. How has he had the nerve to kill, without cause and on his own authority, a man who was enrolled in the ranks of the *qūrčīs*?" Court officials summoned Shaikh Aḥmad before a tribunal and he arrogantly confessed his guilt. The interrogators kept on asking him which of his retainers was responsible for the murder, but he insisted that he himself had committed the crime. When this was reported to the Shah, he ordered Shaikh Aḥmad to be handed

⁵*Evčī-zāda* (*Evčī-oḡlū*) normally refers to *golāms* trained and educated in the royal palace. The use of this term in regard to a *qezelbāš* is unusual, and perhaps indicates that the man in question was a *yasāvul-e soḡbat* (see *TM*, p. 133), i.e., the son of an emir educated in the palace with the royal princes.

over to the relatives of the murdered man, who were seeking blood revenge. No one thought they would dare to apply *lex talionis*, but they immediately put him to death. His son, Takta Beg, was given command of his troops, and placed in charge of appropriate duties.

While the Shah was still in camp at Sokmanābād near Kōy, he received a report of the death of the ruler of Transoxania, Bāqī Khan Özbeg. His younger brother, Valī Moḥammad Khan, had been placed on the throne at Bokhara with the consensus of the Uzbek emirs.

The Shah's Punitive Expedition against the Maḥmūdī Kurds in the Mākū Region and Related Events

When the weather began to get a little cooler, the Shah decided to lead a punitive expedition against the rebel Kurdish emirs of the Maḥmūdī tribe who held the forts of Mākū and Pasak and had failed to present themselves at court. One section of the tribe (related to the sons of Manšūr Beg), which belatedly declared its allegiance to the Safavid house, was transferred to Iraq. The Shah then sent a detachment against the tribes under the jurisdiction of the governor of Pasak, and himself marched to Mākū. Moṣṭafā Beg, urged on by some habitual troublemakers, relied on the strength of the fortress at Mākū, which was situated in a valley at the foot of a mountain and had hitherto proved impregnable, to enable him to defy the Shah. He placed his baggage under guard in the fort of Dāmankūh, which was his normal place of residence. The Shah first sent a detachment of Qarādāglū and Moqaddam⁶ tribesmen against the fort of Dāmankūh, and these troops stormed the fort at the first assault. The Shah himself commenced the bombardment of the main fort and rapidly succeeded in breaching the walls. The garrison was massacred, and noncombatants found within the fort were plundered of all their possessions.

After this success, the Shah sent a raiding party to ravage Maḥmūdī territory. He gave orders that no attempt should be made to capture the fort of Mīān-kūh, which could not be easily subdued; if the Maḥmūdīs came out to fight, then the raiding party was to teach them a lesson; if not, their homes were to be plundered. As it happened, few Maḥmūdī tribesmen were in the fort of Mīān-kūh, partly because of the lack of space and partly because of the shortage of water. In consequence, the tribe suffered heavily at the hands of the

⁶See *TM*, p. 17.

Safavid troops, and all their livestock, both in the Pasak and the Mākū areas, was looted—all as a result of the obduracy of Moṣṭafā Beg and a few of his fellow tribesmen. So many animals were seized that one could buy a good sheep in the royal camp for half a *derham*, the equivalent of fifty Iraqi *dīnārs*, and a cow for two *derhams* (two hundred Iraqi *dīnārs*). Many Maḥmūdī women and children were carried off as captives. The Shah's troops ravaged the area for ten days, and not even those tribesmen who had fled to the mountain tops escaped their fate.

The Shah then decided to move to Naḳčevān and camp near the Aras River, and thus be in a position to check Ottoman troop movements between Erzerum and Vān. If the Ottoman commander in chief succeeded in mobilizing fresh forces and taking the offensive again in Azerbaijan, the Shah would be well-placed to intercept him. If no Ottoman force appeared, the Shah planned to winter in Qarābāḡ and proceed to the capture of the fortress of Ganja and the subjugation of Šīrvān. The Shah crossed the Aras at the ford of Yazdābād near Naḳčevān, and pitched camp near the Kayyām River. Emir Gūna Khan was ordered to repair the fort at Erīvān, and men were placed at his disposal for this purpose. At this point, the Shah received repeated reports that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was advancing from the direction of Albāq and Salmās. The Shah therefore decided to leave the restoration of the fort at Erīvān for the time being and to march back toward Koy.

The Revolt of the Georgians against Kūstandīl Khan and the Latter's Retreat from Šīrvān, Defeated and in Evil Plight

My readers will be well aware that since all earthly authority derives from God, any ruler in this world who, tempted by the Devil, yields to the promptings of his own lusts or selfish self-conceit and commits evil acts will suffer a rapid decline of his fortunes. The gravest of the acts displeasing to God of which a ruler may be guilty and to which he may be driven by ambition and his attachment to worldly things is enmity toward his parents. As the Koran says: "But the one who says to his parents, 'Fie on you both!' . . . are among those upon whom the sentence of punishment was due."⁷ History shows that, since the advent of Islam, and also in pre-Islamic times, no prince or ruler who, for the sake of acquiring worldly

⁷Koran, 46:18-19.

power, was hostile toward his father achieved the goal of his ambition; moreover, no ignoble son who has slain his father has remained on the throne for more than six months after the event. Learned biographers and chroniclers have recorded that, before the advent of Islam, Šīrūya the son of Kosrow Parvīz⁸ was guilty of this crime and enjoyed kingly power for less than six months after the murder. In more recent times, the Tīmūrīd ruler Mīrā Oloğ Beg, a learned and just prince, was put to death by his son Mīrā ‘Abd al-Laīf,⁹ who after enjoying a brief period of power was himself slain by a sudden blow of fate. In my own lifetime (at the time of writing I am fifty-four years of age,¹⁰) I have seen several instances of the same thing.

As previously related, Kūstandīl Khan, the son of Alexander Khan, had killed his father and his brother, taken over the throne, and invaded Šīrvān and laid siege to Šamāķī. Kūstandīl Khan was a brave and intrepid youth, but he became inordinately arrogant as a result of the royal favor shown to him and did not treat with proper respect and consideration the *qezelbāš* emirs who had been detailed to accompany him to Šīrvān. These emirs, for fear of the Shah's wrath, endured Kūstandīl Khan's arrogant behavior, but the Georgian emirs did not take to him for two reasons and soon became disenchanted with his rule and began to plot against him.

The first reason was the difference of religion. Kūstandīl Khan was a Muslim, and the Georgian emirs wanted a Christian ruler. The second reason was the difference in the protocol of court behavior. Relations between Alexander Khan and his nobles had always been conducted on a personal basis. The Georgian nobles were unaccustomed to lieutenants and chamberlains, and to being kept at a distance from their ruler by *yasāvols* and *ešik-āqāsīs*. They were used to being able to march into Alexander Khan's private quarters without having to get permission from a chamberlain. Now, they did not always succeed in obtaining an audience with the Khan even at the public levée held every ten days. In short, they disliked his regal behavior and conspired together to murder him, when opportunity offered, in revenge for his slaying of his father. Kūstandīl Khan had

⁸The Sasanid king, reigned A.D. 590-628.

⁹Oloğ Beg was put to death in Ramazān 853/October-November 1449. ‘Abd al-Laīf was assassinated by his emirs in Rabī’ 1, 854/May 1450.

¹⁰The bulk of the *Tārīḡ-e ‘Ālam-ārā* was completed in 1025/1616. If we suppose that this particular passage was written a few years earlier, we can arrive at the author's generally accepted date of birth, ca. 968 or 969 A.H.

with him two grandsons of Alexander Khan, and these princes the conspirators planned to take back with them to Georgia.

Although one of the conspirators informed Kūstandīl of the plot, he was so sure of himself he did not take any decisive action in the matter. Nevertheless, he wanted to do away with a number of Georgians who were at the bottom of all the trouble, and so he consulted his vizier, Kāja Zīā al-Dīn Kāšī, who had formerly been the vizier of Alexander Khan. The vizier ill-advisedly declared there was no truth in the rumor of a plot against him and persuaded the Khan to drop the matter. The vizier advised him that, if he had one of the conspirators executed, he would frighten the rest into precipitate action. The vizier took council with the principal emirs and admonished them. The conspirators declared that the Khan was their benefactor, and that they had absolutely no complaint against him. The truth of the matter was, they said, that they were tired of the prolonged campaign in Šīrvān and could not bear to stay there any longer. The vizier agreed that the emirs in question should be released to return to Georgia after a further one month's service in Šīrvān, and he urged the Khan to approve his agreement. The simple-minded Khan thought he was now secure against conspiracy, but the admonition had had no effect on the conspirators. On the contrary, they were more firmly resolved than ever.

One night about midnight, when the Georgian nobles were on guard duty, they surrounded the Khan's tent with drawn swords and started shouting. Qarā Pīrī, a *golām* of the royal household who had been delegated by the Shah to attend the Khan woke him, and the latter slashed an opening with his sword in the rear of his tent and rushed into the quarters of 'Alī Khan Movāfeq. The Georgian rebels meanwhile had stormed into the Khan's tent and cut to pieces two young attendants who were sleeping there, thinking one of them was Kūstandīl. Other conspirators ran to the tent where Alexander Khan's grandsons had their quarters and seized them. Kūstandīl himself succeeded in making his way unharmed to 'Alī Khan Movāfeq's tent. Everyone thought the Georgian nobles had planned this in collusion with the Ottomans, and so 'Alī Khan had the trumpets sounded. The *qezelbāš* who were manning the breastworks and trenches came running to his tent, and the camp was in an uproar for the rest of the night. The conspirators, hearing the trumpets and realizing that Kūstandīl was unharmed, set off for Georgia in haste, taking the princes with them. Kūstandīl went in hot pursuit, hoping

to take his revenge on the conspirators or at least to recover the princes. Foolishly, he left most of his troops behind at the fort.

At sunrise, Kūstandīl overtook the Georgians. The men he had with him still outnumbered his opponents. The Georgians turned to fight, shouting "You are a Muslim. We must have a Christian governor. We did not trust you even when there was no point of dispute between us. How can we possibly trust you after recent events? If you attack, we will fight to the last man."

Since the Georgians constituted a formidable force and it would not be prudent to attack them, the great emirs dissuaded Kūstandīl from offensive action and abandoned the enterprise. They did not dare rejoin the forces besieging Šamākī, but dispersed then and there, abandoning their baggage, and not drawing rein until they reached the Kor River. Tīmūr Sultan Moqaddam had remained behind in the camp at Šamākī because he was wounded and unable to ride. Some of his men brought the news of the flight of Kūstandīl's emirs and, in their anxiety to be gone, they lashed Tīmūr Sultan on the back of a camel and left.

This caused complete panic to break out in the camp; in their fear of the Ottomans, the men abandoned their possessions and looked to their own safety. Large quantities of stores belonging to merchants and the camp commissariat were abandoned where they lay. The ironic thing was that the Ottomans thought it was a ruse and did not stir from the fort. Finally, an artisan from Kūstandīl's camp who was sick and had been unable to join in the general exodus from the camp, since he was afraid some one might come along and kill him, dragged himself to the city gates and begged for admittance. Those on duty admitted him and learned from him the whole strange story. Once they had assured themselves of the truth of his story, the Ottomans emerged from the fort and appropriated all Kūstandīl's stores, which effectively ended their food shortage. Kūstandīl's emirs meanwhile had crossed the Kor, and gradually their men from the camp at Šamākī trickled in. When the emirs learned from them that the Ottomans had been unaware of the dispersal of Kūstandīl's force they regretted their action, but it was a bit late for regrets.

In short, Kūstandīl, because of his foolish arrogance and poor planning, suffered a major defeat without a shot having been fired. Kūstandīl went to Ardabīl and began to think how he could re-

trieve the situation. Meanwhile, Qarā Pīrī had ridden at top speed to Mākū to inform the Shah.

Kūstandīl Khan's Second Expedition to Georgia and His Subsequent Fate

Kūstandīl also sent a report to the Shah and asked for his help. Since the Shah was still uneasy about possible moves on his part of the Ottoman commander in chief, he asked Kūstandīl to come to court, encouraging him to hope that, once Jeḡāl-oḡlū's intentions became clear, the Shah might take the field in Qarābāḡ and send a detachment of troops to assist him in subjugating Šīrvān, which had been allotted to him. Affairs in Georgia would be settled in the light of his advice and in the best interests of the Safavid state.

Kūstandīl, however, either because he had enjoyed a few days of independent command and this had affected his loyalty to the Shah, or else because he hesitated to expose himself to the reproaches of his peers after his shameful defeat, disobeyed the Shah's order and declined to come to court. Further, without the Shah's permission, he decided to go to Georgia, and exacted a large sum in taxes from the merchants of Ardabīl in order to recruit an army. Then, together with emirs who had been allotted to him, he set off for the conquest of Šīrvān. He had been allotted Šīrvān, not Georgia, by the Shah, and since he was acting on his own authority in invading Georgia and against the wishes of the Shah, fate was against him and his expedition failed.

About this time, letters reached the Shah from Georgia complaining of Kūstandīl's conduct, and asking that Ṭahmūraṣ (Taymūraz) b. Da'ūd Khan, who was at the Safavid court, be appointed ruler of Georgia. It was clear to the Shah that there could be no reconciliation between Kūstandīl Khan, who had adopted Islam, and the Georgians, who adhered to the Christian faith. The Shah realized that if he named Kūstandīl ruler of Georgia, the sole result would be constant revolt on the part of the Georgians. Since the Shah had important plans in the making, he wanted to keep the Georgians quiet by encouraging them to hope for royal favor. He therefore wrote conciliatory letters to the nobles and the women of the Georgian royal house who had influence in state matters, and dispatched these letters by the hand of Ḥoseyn Beg Zu'l-Qadar, the herald; he also informed Kūstandīl Khan of the action he had taken.

After the Shah had sent the herald, he learned that Kūstandīl had decided to take matters into his own hands. Wiser people, who had had their rough edges rubbed off by hard experience, predicted nothing but failure from this enterprise, for Kūstandīl's murder of his aged father had been not only futile, but had had ambition as its motive and so was unacceptable to God or man. Furthermore, Kūstandīl had not been appointed governor of Georgia; his efforts to secure Georgia for himself did not meet with the Shah's approval and therefore did not succeed. On the contrary, Kūstandīl met his own death within six months of his father's murder.

Meanwhile, Kūstandīl had marched on Georgia with a motley army composed of Lezgīs, Šīrvānīs, and Otūz-īkī tribesmen, he was also joined by Šāhmīr Khan from Šakkī. The news of his approach caused consternation in Georgia, and those Georgian nobles who were the leaders of the opposition to Kūstandīl Khan removed Alexander Khan's grandsons and the women of the Georgian royal house for safety, and took them to the Sīdemlū¹¹ district, a region of great natural strength by virtue of its lofty mountains and narrow paths. Kūstandīl occupied the city of Zagam, the seat of government of that part of Georgia, and began to bestow his favors impartially on the people of that region, whether friend or foe, soldiers or civilians. Most Georgians of note hastened to present themselves before him and tender their allegiance. Any who proffered allegiance to him found it accepted and his hostile acts overlooked. Kūstandīl sent conciliatory letters to the women of the royal house and especially to Dīdīfāl (Dedopali), Ṭahmūraš's mother, who had played a very important role in state affairs. He told her he wanted only the heads of the four nobles who had conspired to murder him; no one else would be harmed. Her sons would be treated with nothing but kindness. He might even spare the lives of his would-be murderers if the latter used her to intercede for them and if they tendered their allegiance to him. If they hesitated to approach him directly, they should send a reliable emissary so that binding covenants could be arranged.

When Kūstandīl's envoy reached Dīdīfāl, Ṭahmūraš's mother, he was received with apparent friendliness, but Dīdīfāl and her party were waiting for a reply to the request they had made to Shah 'Abbas. Finally, the Shah's letters of appointment, issued in the name of Dīdīfāl and the great nobles of Georgia, arrived; they made it clear

¹¹I cannot identify this place.

that Kūstandīl's attempt to obtain the throne of Georgia did not have the Shah's approval. This news raised the morale and strengthened the resolve of Dīdīfāl's party, and they marched out to do battle with Kūstandīl.

The two armies met at the river Māzū Keyvolān¹² in the Sīdemlū district on Saturday, 9 Jomādā II, 1014/22 October 1605. Kūstandīl drew up his men in full battle array, with right and left wings and skirmishers out ahead, and cannon and musketeers stationed at suitable points. He himself took up his position in the center with Šāhmīr Khan, the governor of Šakkī, who was an experienced veteran of many battles, and some other emirs. Kūstandīl's initial charges shattered the Georgian ranks, and some of them turned to flee. Victory seemed near for Kūstandīl; leaving Šāhmīr Khan, 'Alī Khan Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, and other emirs in the center, he himself moved over to the right wing, where Qarčaqāy, one of the *golāms* he had raised from servitude to the status of emir with the title Qarčaqāy Sultan, was being pushed back in considerable disorder against the center.

Kūstandīl charged to Qarčaqāy's assistance without waiting for any of his men to catch up with him. Some of the Georgians who were fleeing from the battlefield recognized him as they passed, and shouted in Georgian to their fellows, "It's the Khan!" Seeing that the Khan was alone, a group of Georgians made for him. The Khan in his folly and pride (or, as others would have it, impelled by his sense of honor, which would not permit him to turn and run from a small group of the enemy), engaged them. But he received several spear thrusts against his chain mail which knocked him from his horse, and the Georgians immediately finished him off.

At first, neither side realized that Kūstandīl had been killed. The first people to be aware of it were some Georgians who had supported Kūstandīl and were fighting in his ranks. They sent a messenger to inform Dīdīfāl and the Georgian nobles to encourage them to stand fast, but the latter thought it was a trick and kept their distance. Finally, the men who had slain Kūstandīl arrived and confirmed the joyful news. Meanwhile, the *qezelbaş* emirs in the center were fighting on, convinced that victory was theirs. In the end, a number of his *moqarrabs* and trusted retainers, who normally never left his

¹²Dorn, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kaukasischen Länder und Völker*, III, 373 n.2, suggests Matsis tzkali, i.e., R. Matsis.

side in battle, went looking for him and found his body, smeared with mud and stained with blood, in a corner of the battlefield. When they informed the emirs of the center, the latter wanted to keep the news quiet and to fight on in the hopes of wresting the Georgian princes from the grasp of Dīdīfāl's faction, but it was not to be.

At this juncture, the Georgians sent an envoy to the *qezelbāš* emirs proposing that, since Kūstandīl had entered Georgia without permission from the Shah and was now dead, both sides should break off the engagement. The Georgians added that they had not contravened the Shah's orders, but were loyal servants of the Shah. Unfortunately, as the news spread among the *qezelbāš* that the Khan was dead, individual soldiers broke ranks and fled, and the emirs were no longer able to maintain order among their men. As a result of this disorderly flight, some of the *qezelbāš* lost their lives in the forests, and others lost their horses, their uniforms, and their equipment in the course of their escape. Most of the *qezelbāš* stores were abandoned to the enemy, who also plundered the belongings of the merchants who had accompanied Kūstandīl but who thus failed to make their expected profit. Some of the emirs recrossed the Kor; others returned with Šāhmīr Khan to Šakkī. The news of this debacle reached the Shah when he was too busy to pay any attention to it, for Jeḡāl-oḡlū had advanced from Salmās to Ṭasūj with the intention of invading Azerbaijan. The Shah had marched from Koy and Marand to bar his passage, and had camped in a valley one *farsak* from the village of Šūfīān in the district of Tabriz.

Jeḡāl-oḡlū's Expedition to Azerbaijan, His Subsequent Rout, and Other Related Events

Readers will recall that Jeḡāl-oḡlū had escaped from Vān by boat across the lake, had camped in the plain of Mūšābād, and had sent *čavošes* in all directions with mobilization orders. Pashas, *beglerbegs*, and Ottoman and Kurdish *mīr-sanjaqs* responded to his summons; among their number were Mīr Šaraf, the governor of Jazīra;¹³ Maḥmūdī, Behesnī, and Ḥakkārī chiefs; the sons and brothers of Zakarīā Khan, and all the other tribes in the area except the Barādūst. The Ottoman commander in chief marched in the late autumn of 1605 and reached Salmās via Albāq. The same day he received the

¹³This is Jazīra b. 'Omar, on the east bank of the Tigris south of Lake Vān (see Le Strange, pp. 93-94).

news, the Shah crossed the Aras and marched via Čors¹⁴ to Koy, where he camped. From Koy, he sent the governor of Tabriz, Pīr Būdāq Khan, along the road to Tabriz with orders to remove to safe places in the mountains the inhabitants of all villages that lay in the path of the probable Ottoman advance and to destroy all food stocks that could not be removed. On arrival at Tabriz, his orders were to evacuate the civilian population and see to the defense of the fort.

Pīr Būdāq Khan proceeded to carry out his orders. At Tabriz he had a little trouble from unruly elements, and some of his troops were also guilty of disorderly conduct. Pīr Būdāq Khan executed a number of ruffians who had laid their hands on property belonging to merchants and other citizens, and had their heads impaled on pikes and paraded around the city. This effectively stopped the disorders. He then entered the fort with Barğordār Beg, the commander in chief of artillery, and the musketeers, and set about putting the battlements, towers, and batteries in proper order.

From Koy, the Shah also sent out patrols to determine the strength and composition of the Ottoman forces. On the basis of their reports, he estimated the size of the Ottoman army as one hundred thousand men, and this was confirmed by a few prisoners who were brought in for interrogation. In the Ottoman camp, Jeğāl-oğlū let it be known that he planned to occupy Ardabīl and spend the winter at Qezel-Āğāč, which was close to Šīrvān and was governed by his son, Maḥmūd Pasha. He then marched rapidly along the road to Ṭasūj. Since there were no provisions to be had along this route because of the passage of the Ottoman army, the Shah marched to Marand via Čaman-e Aqtākāna, intending to intercept the Ottomans at whatever point seemed best.

The Shah would not be satisfied until he had personally verified the size of the Ottoman army, and so he climbed a mountain from which he could observe the whole enemy force as it marched past. Shah 'Abbas detached some men from his main body and placed them under the command of Allāhverdi Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, a man who stood head and shoulders above his peers in regard to soundness of judgment, administrative skill, and valor. The Shah himself took charge of the center. Zu'l-Qadar Khan, Ganj 'Alī Khan, Nīāz Sultan, and Mīr Moqaddam were detailed to act as vanguard. On the right wing, he stationed Emīr Gūna Khan and other emirs; on

¹⁴North of Koy; see *TM*, p. 164.

the left, a number of other trusted emirs. All these groups were ordered to march separately from the main body and to exercise extreme caution as they advanced; the officers were ordered to keep a tight rein on the high-spirited men under their command, lest foolish behavior or overconfidence lead them into trouble. After making these dispositions, the Shah marched to Šūfīān.

The two armies were now close to each other. Although it was not appropriate for the Shah to engage in battle in person with a mere Ottoman commander in chief, nevertheless the following day, Tuesday¹⁵ 24 Jomādā II, 1014/6 November 1605, the Shah kept himself in reserve to assist any of his army groups which, though supported by the celestial hosts, might need in addition the shelter of his kingly umbrella. The Shah accordingly formed his men up in proper battle order. They consisted of *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, musketeers, and court retainers attached to the Shah's personal service. He stationed his men on a commanding height overlooking the Tabriz road, and keenly observed the movements of his various divisions. He detailed for special duties Qarčaqāy Beg, who had at an early stage given evidence of his intelligence and ability; the Shah now gave him a detachment of *ḡolāms* of the royal household and musketeers and ordered him, after battle was joined, to assist the Safavid advance guard at whatever point he judged necessary. He was further instructed to keep watch on all sectors of the front. Qanbar Beg Gözübüyüklü, the head sword keeper (*salīḥdārbašt*), a valiant young officer of the Ostājlu tribe, was in turn given a detachment of household troops and ordered to give support to Qarčaqāy Beg and his musketeers should they appear in danger of being overwhelmed by the enemy.

The Ottomans meanwhile had advanced from Šabestar and camped near the village of Sīs, only six *farsaks* from Tabriz. They constructed a circle with their gun carriages and chains on the side facing the *qezelbaş*, and following their usual practice, stationed their Janissaries between the gun carriages. The Ottoman army contained many distinguished officers—for example, Kösa Şafar, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, whose name was a byword among the Ottomans for bravery; 'Osmān Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Syria; and 'Alī Pasha Zanjīr-qīren. When they and the other pashas learned of the approach of the royal army, they were so confident of their strength that they marched out from their camp and formed up in battle array

¹⁵24 Jomādā II, 1014, fell on a Sunday.

facing the Safavid army. The Shah was afraid that the enemy might be too powerful for his army, and so he sent a detachment of Qājars from the *qūrčībāšī*'s regiment to occupy some rising ground between the two armies. They were ordered not to attack the enemy; their function was to draw off some Ottoman troops and thus weaken the main Ottoman body.

I heard from some of the staff officers close to the Shah that His Majesty did not intend to risk everything on one decisive battle, but planned rather to cause attrition of the enemy's strength by daily, limited, engagements. He planned to use these tactics until the enemy entered Tabriz. If they then laid siege to the fort, the plan was to seal off their retreat and, when the onset of the winter snows and a shortage of provisions began to make themselves felt, to launch a general attack both from within the fort and from outside the city. If the enemy, having failed to capture the fort, moved (as they had said they would) toward Ardabīl and Qezel-Āğāč, the Shah, after invoking the aid of the Imams and the Safavid shaikhs, planned to risk a decisive engagement between Sarāb and Ardabīl.

The whole of that day, the Shah kept sending couriers to Allāhverdi Khan cautioning him to watch for his opportunity, not to be in a hurry to give battle, and to advance with circumspection. However, fate willed otherwise. Qarčaqāy Beg and his musketeers had breasted a hill and discovered that they were overlooking the main Ottoman army. Mindful of the Shah's stern prohibition against precipitating a major battle, Qarčaqāy and his men promptly turned around and descended the hill again. The Ottomans, attributing this action either to weakness or cowardice, at once launched a general attack on the Safavid vanguard, which was thrown into disorder. Most of the emirs in the van were wounded. Seeing this, Qarčaqāy Beg and Qanbar Beg formed their men up, dismounting from their horses and using them as protection against the musketballs flying in all directions; the Safavid musketeers then briskly returned the Ottoman fire.

Qarčaqāy Beg sent a courier to Allāhverdi Beg to inform him that the Ottomans had overwhelmed the Safavid vanguard and had begun a general action. "If we are not very careful," he said, "the Ottomans will order a general assault, and there will be no hope of deliverance for any of us, even in our places of ambush." At the same moment, Malek 'Alī the chief herald, who had been sent by

the Shah to see what the position was, came up to Qarčaqāy's men and at once galloped back with an eye-witness report for the Shah.

The Shah, having received Malek 'Alī's appraisal of the situation, set his troops in motion. At the same time, he sent orders to Allāhverdi Khan to advance slowly, to exhort the remnants of the vanguard to stand their ground and not yield an inch to the enemy, and to inform them that the Shah's regiments were in motion and would shortly be in action. Malek 'Alī was sent back to give Qarčaqāy Beg this welcome news. The Ottomans were now leaving their camp regiment after regiment and troop after troop, and entering the field. The Shah decided to move some of his troops over to his left, near the Ottoman camp, again with the idea of forcing the Ottomans to send men to deal with this threat and thus prevent them from concentrating overwhelming strength in any one sector. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *dīvānbeḡībāšī*, who was stationed on the right with his Šāmlū *qūrčīs* ready for action, was detailed for this job, and the *qūrčībāšī*, Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, was ordered to support him.

When it appeared that 'Alīqolī Khan was getting the upper hand, the Shah, who had been watching the situation closely, sent all the rest of the Šāmlū regiment, under the command of the *moqarrab al-ḡazrat* Moḡammad Beg Begdīlū, a leading Šāmlū chief, to support him; with the Šāmlūs the Shah sent several trumpeters and another detachment of troops from the right wing. Reinforcements were also dispatched to the assistance of Qarčaqāy Beg and the emirs of the vanguard. At regular intervals the Shah sent into action regiments from both wings of his army, constantly reinforcing different sectors of the front with fresh troops advancing in strict formation, as need arose. I was at the King's side during this battle and, setting aside for a moment the historian's conventional phrases and rhetoric, which are devoid of the reality which lies at the heart of the matter, I would like to say that Shah 'Abbas displayed outstanding generalship in this battle. His tactical moves were uniformly successful. If Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān,¹⁶ whose name is a byword for valor and whose military leadership and tactics have been taken as a model by many subsequent rulers, were alive today, in the opinion of the writer he would be an officer in the service of the Shah and would be learning from him the arts of government and generalship. But if I say any more on this subject, I shall become tedious.

¹⁶The celebrated Muslim conqueror known in the West as Tamerlane (died A.D. 1405).

The Shah now advanced with the troops of the center and ascended a small hill from which he could survey the whole battlefield. Qar-çaqāy Beg and the emirs of the vanguard, confident of support, were fighting on, and 'Alīqolī Khan and the *qūrčibāšī* were engaged in fierce combat with the Ottomans on their sector. The cleverness of the Shah's tactics now became apparent. The Ottoman commanders, seeing clouds of dust arising and a fierce struggle going on in the direction of their camp, thought the Shah himself was leading an attack on the camp of their commander in chief. In their alarm, they decided to order their right wing to the aid of their fellows fighting near the camp, and themselves left the rising ground on which they were drawn up to march slowly in the direction of the camp, keeping a sharp lookout in both directions as they went.

No sooner had they begun to move away from their positions than there arose on all sides the rousing war cry "Allah! Allah!" which was characteristic of the *qezelbāš*, as the latter flung themselves on the enemy from all directions. Caught on the move, the Ottoman formations were broken, and men turned to flee. The Ottoman commanders, still on the rising ground, held their positions for a short time in the hope that their men would rally, but their hope was vain. Since their line of retreat to their own camp was now closed, they fled in the direction of Taşuj and Salmās. The Safavid victory called to mind the Koranic verses: "We have granted you a clear victory . . . that God may assist you mightily."¹⁷

The slaughter of the fugitive Ottomans now began, and the hilly plain was soon covered by additional mounds as the dead bodies piled up. Most of the Ottoman commanders were either killed or taken prisoner. Among the prisoners of note were Kösa Şafar Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, who was constantly boasting of his military prowess; Moştafā Pasha, the son of Rażīa Kātūn, who was the second vizier and had at times been acting grand vizier; Şīr Aḥmad Pasha, the governor of Qārş; and Qūčī Khan Kord, the brother of Gāzī Khan, a renegade who had left Safavid service and thrown in his lot with Jeğāl-oğlū. Of these, Kösa Şafar Pasha was executed because of his previous unacceptable conduct. Officers of note who lost their lives included 'Alī Pasha Zanjīr-Qīren; 'Oşmān Pasha the *beglerbeg* of Syria, and some sixty or seventy officers of lesser rank—Ottoman emirs and pashas, and *sanjaq-bey*s and emirs from Kurdish tribes were either killed or captured. There is little to be gained from a recital of all their names.

¹⁷Koran, 48:2, 4.

This famous victory was complete by nightfall, but the pursuit of the Ottomans continued relentlessly even after dark. Those who escaped that night by hiding in the woods were hunted down and killed by peasants next day. Troops of the household regiments collected the heads of the slain and cast them at the feet of the Shah's horse, and the prisoners and captured weapons were paraded before the Shah. Torches were lit, and the Shah dismounted to carry out his inspection of these items and to discharge his obligation to those who had fought valiantly on this field.

The Safavid emirs, *moqarrabs*, and court attendants were summoned to a victory feast at which, by order of the Shah, handsome Ottoman captives and Frankish and Russian *golāms* who had been brought in as booty by the *gāzīs* acted as cupbearers. Wine flowed freely, and minstrels and singers contributed to the conviviality of the scene. Of the prisoners, those who possessed rank and status were kept in custody; the rest were sent to join their fellows. By a twist of fate, Moḥammad Beg, the elder son of Kāndān Aqa the *mo-taffereqa-āqāsī* (Kāndān Aqa and one of his younger sons had been captured at Vān and their lives had been spared), was taken prisoner unharmed in this battle, and he too was treated with favor by the Shah.

A strange incident occurred during this feast, as a result of which the Shah narrowly escaped serious injury; as the Koran says: "An evil plot encompasses none but the authors thereof."¹⁸ In brief, an Ottoman of huge physical stature had been brought low in the course of the battle by a spear thrust from a small, lean Ostājilū *qūrčī*, who had taken the man prisoner and led him before the Shah. Because of his youth and inexperience he had omitted to bind the prisoner's hands behind his back as was the usual practice. The Shah asked the man to state his name, lineage, and tribe. The prisoner replied that he was of the Mokrī tribe. Since a number of Mokrī tribesmen had held honored positions in the Shah's service, perhaps that miscreant thought he would save his life through the intercession of the latter. At all events, Rostam Beg, one of the chiefs of that tribe, said brusquely, "There is no kinship between my family and his; on the contrary, there is long-standing enmity and blood feuds between us." The Shah said to the *qūrčī*, "Hand the prisoner over to Rostam Beg; he can do what he likes with him." But the Shah did not utter the words "death" or "blood revenge." However, Rostam Beg refused to take the pris-

¹⁸Koran, 34:44.

oner, saying he had sworn a vow that he would not take revenge on a helpless enemy, and he could not therefore kill a bound prisoner.¹⁹

The Shah's temper became frayed by this exchange, and, although initially he had not specified that the prisoner be put to death, his aversion to the latter was now so great that he signaled to the *qūrčī* to execute him. The *qūrčī* seized the prisoner's belt, intending to drag him out of the Shah's sight before dispatching him. The prisoner, hearing the word "death" mentioned, suddenly drew a dagger and hurled himself at the Shah. The Shah grabbed his wrist, pulled his arm down, and knelt on it. Those near the Shah drew their swords but were afraid to strike because the Shah and his assailant were locked in a fierce struggle and it was difficult to tell which was which, particularly as the prisoner happened to be wearing chain mail and jerkin of the same color as those of the Shah. They stood by helplessly for a considerable time while the Shah grappled with his assailant; finally, the Shah succeeded in wrenching the dagger from the prisoner's grasp, and the man was seized by some of the *gōlāms*, dragged away, and killed. People were in a panic, fearing that some harm had come to the Shah. The writer of these words, who was present at this terrifying incident, was literally paralyzed until he heard the Shah's voice; I then breathed again with relief, and all those present gave thanks to God for the Shah's safety.

Jeḡāl-oḡlū's Retreat and the Fate of Those Ottoman Troops Who Survived the Battle of Şūfiān

The day following his victory at Şūfiān, Wednesday²⁰ 25 Jomāda II, 1014/7 November 1605, the Shah marched forth in full battle order to survey the field. He discovered that the Ottoman commander in chief, Jeḡāl-oḡlū, had not moved from his camp, and he received a report that Ottoman reinforcements, five thousand men under the command of Jān Pūlād-oḡlū, were on their way and had already reached Taşūj. Some fainthearted and short-sighted people, who during the time of Sultan Moḡammad Shah had seen the huge size of the Ottoman armies and had been intimidated by the great mass of nameless camp followers who, according to Ottoman custom, accompanied their armies to carry on trade,²¹ now uttered cowardly and

¹⁹Overlooking the fact that this man was *not* bound!

²⁰25 Jomāda II, 1014 fell on a Monday.

²¹*Gedik*: a license to trade; the right to exclusive exercise of a trade in a particular area.

weak-minded opinions. The Shah, having always in mind long-term strategy, and acting always with that caution and circumspection which is the hallmark of great generalship, was in no hurry to launch an attack on the Ottoman camp, protected as it was by gun carriages and musketeers. Wise men do not undertake even a small matter without reflection and deliberation; in matters of great moment, such as battles, the outcome of which may have grave consequences and which involve loss of life on both sides, there is no room for mistakes. The Shah therefore sent a detachment to intercept Jān Fūlād-oġlū, intending to postpone a decision as to how to deal with Jeġāl-oġlū until he knew the outcome of the former operation.

At this juncture, a Kurdish prisoner was brought in. He was one of the retainers of Mīr Šaraf, the governor of Jazīra. Mīr Šaraf was one of the most powerful Kurdish chiefs in terms of the number of tribes under his control, and was a vassal of the Ottomans. On this campaign he had accompanied Jeġāl-oġlū, and at the battle of Šūfiān had been stationed close to the commander in chief and had taken no part in the fighting. Since Mīr Šaraf had been associated with the Safavid court for a number of years,²² the Shah released the prisoner and sent him back to Mīr Šaraf with this message: "So far, because of the physical distance between us, there has been no contact between *qezelbāš* troops and your men, and bloodshed, which aggravates hostility, has been avoided. In consideration of your former loyalty to the Safavid house, I have even abstained from putting to death any of your men who have been taken prisoner. If you can, come and join me; if this is impossible, then withdraw with your troops to Jazīra, so that no harm may befall you or your men." The bearer of this message was taken to the Ottoman lines by an escort of Sīāh-manšūr troops. Upon receiving this message, Mīr Šaraf managed to think of a scheme to enable him to retire with his men in the direction of Jazīra, although he had to abandon all his baggage.

The Ottoman commander in chief Jeġāl-oġlū, on the morning after the battle, uttered words of encouragement to his Janissaries

²²Mīr Šaraf b. Šams al-Dīn Kān b. Šaraf Kān was born in 949/1543, and was brought up in Shah Tahmasp's harem, where he spent three years (958-61/1551-54). He remained in Safavid service for the remainder of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and under Shah Esma'il II was made chief adviser to the Shah on Kurdish affairs. *Qezelbāš* jealousy led to his being accused of plotting against the Shah, who exiled him from court to the governorship of Naķčevān. There, he succumbed to the blandishments of Kosrow Pasha and the Ottoman commander in chief, Mošafa Pasha, and entered Ottoman service (986/1578); *Šarafnāma*, i, 455-56).

and other troops, and set them to strengthening the gun-carriage defenses, seeing to the ordering of the artillery and of the right and left wings. The camp servants, called by the Ottomans *at-oğlānı* (grooms), were encouraged to hope for officers' privileges, and, until noon, Jeğāl-oğlū managed to keep his men happy with various old soldier's ruses of this sort which were designed to deceive the rank and file. In the afternoon, however, Mīr Šaraf's defection became general knowledge, and the weakness of Jeğāl-oğlū's position became apparent to all.

Jeğāl-oğlū vacillated between one plan and another, unable to make up his mind. At this point, a report reached him that Jān Fūlād-oğlū, who had reached Ṭasūj on the day of the battle of Šūfiān, had turned tail and marched back to Vān when he had met fugitives from the battle. This news merely increased the panic in the Ottoman camp, and men began to slip away in twos and threes and then in platoons and companies. Jeğāl-oğlū was forced to abandon the various military deceptions he had been practicing and to take counsel with his officers, *qāžīs*, and *moftīs*. They all voted for retreat under cover of darkness. Everyone waited fearfully for nightfall, and at sunset chaos broke out in the Ottoman camp, as the troops, concerned only with saving their own skins, abandoned their possessions and left their commander in chief to fend for himself.

From the annals of mighty kings of old, we learn that it is incompatible with the chivalrous conduct expected of kings to bar the line of retreat of an enemy army; furthermore, it is usually in the best interests of the state not to prevent them from leaving. The Shah therefore sent 'Alīqolī Khan to verify the reports that the Ottomans were decamping. As torches were being lit all over the Safavid camp, 'Alīqolī Khan reached the Ottoman camp and discovered that the only people left in it were a few of the sick. By the time his report to this effect reached the Shah, one watch of the night had elapsed. It has never been the policy of princes to pursue an enemy at night, and the Shah had no intention of authorizing a pursuit on this occasion. However, some of the baser sort of men, and even some rascally *qezelbāš*, set off in pursuit in the hope of obtaining loot. They caught up with a number of poor wretches who had not been able to bring themselves to abandon their mules and camels, and slew the men and carried off their animals.

Some five hundred Ottoman fugitives lost their way in the dark-

ness, and found themselves in the morning among the gardens surrounding the small town of Ṭasūj. They offered gold to one of the locals to guide them to safety, but this man, being a loyal supporter of the Safavid house, led them straight into the central square of Ṭasūj and aroused the townspeople, who set upon the Ottomans. The Ottomans were so exhausted that a single civilian, without any military weapons and armed only with a cudgel or a blacksmith's hammer, was able to overcome three or four fully armed Ottomans, disarm them, and kill them. In this way, the people of Ṭasūj completely wiped out this group of Ottomans, and appropriated all their belongings. The Kurds harassed the retreating Ottomans all the way to Albāq and Salmās; if they spared their lives, they stripped them of their clothes.

By midnight, the whole *qezelbāš* army realized that the Ottomans had flown, and they poured into the Ottoman camp to plunder. They were busy looting until morning, and those who penetrated furthest into the Ottoman camp reported that they had found tents still fully carpeted, with treasure chests still in place, camels still lying in front of the tents, and horses still in the stables. These were the property of those who had been killed or captured in the battle, or had fled from the battlefield, and the Ottomans in the camp had been too pre-occupied with the problem of their own survival to think of touching them. They had taken with them whatever they could of their own stock of cash and precious articles and abandoned their other possessions.

Pīr Sultan Qazāqlū entered the Ottoman commander in chief's tent early in the evening and sent the following report back to the Shah: "In the commander in chief's private tent I found a quantity of gold and silver coins which he had dropped there, and his ring lying at the side of his bed, and a jeweled sword, of the type worn by emirs, which he had left behind. I went on into his treasury tent, which was large and lofty; treasure chests, covered with velvet and brocade cloths, were piled all round the sides of the tent, and most of them were still locked. I opened one or two, and found them full of personal belongings and fine linens. Since I had only one man with me, we brought a string of camels from the stables and loaded fourteen chests on to them, without knowing what was inside the chests. I then left the tent, carrying the sword I mentioned above." After Pīr Sultan left, men poured into the camp from all sides in search of plunder; someone seized the commander in chief's personal standard, which was embellished with gold and precious stones and lapis lazuli.

li; to it was affixed a silk pennant on which the Ottoman secretaries had inscribed a suitable exordium, Koranic verses, and traditions; the man who had grabbed it took it to show to the Shah.

Since most nobles keep in their treasure chests letters and other documents which are a source of family pride, the fact they abandoned these is an eloquent indication of the panic in which the Ottomans departed. Enormous quantities of booty were carried off by the rank and file of the Safavid army without anyone's having any tally of it. Some of the Safavid officers who brought their loot to the Shah for inspection were allowed to keep it all. Pīrī Sultan Qazāqlū was one of them. Barğordār Beg Anīs, the commander in chief of the artillery, was ordered to take charge of the Ottoman artillery, and about one hundred pieces of all kinds were captured.

After this victory, the Shah sent his heavy baggage to Tabriz and marched toward Salmās. Moṣṭafā Beg Maḥmūdī, who had adopted a rebellious posture at Mākū, now presented himself to the Shah with a sword slung round his neck and was pardoned. Another of the Kurdish rebels, Zeynal Beg Maḥmūdī, the kinsman of Soleymān Beg and governor of Kōšāb, was also received with favor and given a royal decree conferring on him the district of Kōšāb. Emir Khan Čulāq Barādūst, who was a protégé of the Shah's, came from his fief at Orūmīya and prostrated himself. The Shah, in the interest of placating the rest of the wild Kurds, as a matter of military expediency overlooked the fact that he had failed to assist him in the recent campaign. Zakarīā Khan Ḥakkārī sent envoys to the Shah's court to congratulate him on his victory and to renew his pledges of allegiance, but the envoys were given a rough reception by the Shah, who said he would believe Zakarīā Khan's protestations of fealty only when he came to court in person, freely and of his own accord, without any ideas of getting more land grants. Zakarīā Khan, frightened by this brusque reply, decided there was no alternative but to go to court; he set off for Salmās in considerable trepidation.

Since the Shah had already spent twenty days at Salmās and had dealt with all urgent matters there, and since the weather was turning colder, he decided to depart for Tabriz, leaving some of the great emirs at Salmās with instructions to welcome Zakarīā Khan and bring him to Tabriz. Zakarīā Khan was duly received by the Shah at Tabriz, delivered his gifts, and was welcomed with marks of royal favor. For several days he was admitted to the Shah's private

banquets and gatherings, and was then given permission to leave, loaded with gifts from the Shah which included magnificent robes of honor; dagger and sword belts of gold, studded with pearls and rubies; pedigreed Arabian horses with jeweled saddles and bridles; fine linens and precious stuffs; gold decanters and goblets; and the like. His nephew, Ḥasan Beg, the governor of Albāq, was also at the Shah's order awarded robes of honor and sent on his way contented.

After his precipitate retreat, Jeḡāl-oḡlū reached Vān with a handful of men. But hearing of the Shah's march to Salmās, he retreated farther to Dīār Bakr. On the way, he met Jān Fūlād-oḡlū; one day, in the course of conversation; Jeḡāl-oḡlū upbraided him for his delay in coming to his assistance and, at a signal from the commander in chief, some of his men fell on him, killed him, and threw his head into the camp of the Aleppo contingent, which was mainly composed of soldiers of fortune devoid of breeding and lineage. These men promptly panicked and set off for Aleppo. After this incident, a band of men gathered around his son and became rebels, and their subsequent history will be given in the section on Jalālīs, Jeḡāl-oḡlū proceeded to Dīār Bakr, whence he sent a report to the Ottoman Sultan; he died there shortly afterward.

The Dispatch from Naḵčevān to Khorasan and Ġarjestān of an Expedition under Jahāngīr Khan, Moḥammad Salīm Sultan Özbek and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā

The reader will recall that Bāqī Khan's annexation of Balk had caused a number of Uzbek princes and emirs to seek sanctuary with Shah 'Abbas: Jahāngīr Khan, the son of Seyyed Moḥammad Sultan; Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, the son of Pīr Moḥammad Khan Özbek; Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā, formerly *dīvānbeḡī* and chief minister at Balk; Shah Kāja; Šīr-afkan Mīrzā; Arab *atālīq*; and others. The reader will also recall that the Shah's expedition to Balk in 1010/1602 ended in failure.

This year, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā put the following plan before the Shah: He suggested that he, in the company of the Uzbek princes, should proceed to Khorasan, and that those places and forts in Ġarjestān held by dependents of the Safavids should be made over to Jahāngīr Khan. With the help of the Khorasan emirs, they would then proceed to the conquest of the rest of Ġarjestān, which was Uzbek-occupied territory and contained many strong forts. Once

they had secured Ġarjestān as their base, they would attempt to recapture Balk. The Shah, however, who had committed himself to the reconquest of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, did not want to get involved at that time in operations on the borders of Khorasan; he wanted to postpone the implementation of this plan until after the successful conclusion of his campaign in the west.

Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā insisted that they would never have a better opportunity, because Bāqī Khan had just died and his brother, Moḥammad Khan, had not yet succeeded in establishing himself as ruler. The latter was fully occupied with dealing with problems in Transoxania, and it was not yet clear whether he would succeed in establishing himself at Balk and other places this side of the Oxus. At the moment, Balk could easily be recovered, but the opportunity would soon pass. Since these arguments seemed to be sound and the plan not unrealistic, and since Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā was well informed about what was going on in Transoxania, the Shah acquiesced and fitted the princes out with what they needed for the expedition. Orders were sent to Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, and to other emirs in the region, instructing them to place themselves at the service of the Uzbek princes and to hand over to them all the forts held by the Jamšīdī tribe and other dependents of the Safavids.

The Uzbeks took their leave of the Shah on the banks of the Aras near Naḡčevān. One of their companions, Shah Ķāja, wished to remain at the Shah's side, and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā gave his consent to this because it would be useful for his party to have a friend at court. His party was still at Qazvin when they received news of the Shah's victory at Šūfīān. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā and his companions left their womenfolk at Qazvin and rode to Herat, where they were detained for a while by Ḥoseyn Khan until he had made all necessary preparations for their expedition. At the beginning of the Year of the Horse (1014/1606), when the Shah opened his campaign in Qarābāḡ and laid siege to Ganja, Ḥoseyn Khan equipped the princes with a force consisting mainly of Šāmlūs and sent them off to Ġarjestān. The takeover of the forts in Ġarjestān proceeded according to plan. All the elders and chiefs came to visit Jahāngīr Khan, and most of the commandants of forts and chiefs of the local tribes, the Hazārajāt and Šadajāt, tendered their allegiance to him. Jahāngīr Khan's strength gradually increased to the point that Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā determined to march against Balk.

The Shah's Campaign in Qarābāḡ and the Capture of Ganja

The campaigning year 1014/1605 had been a long and hard one, though crowned with the great victory at Šūfīān, and the men naturally longed to see their families and their homes, but not one of the emirs or Shah's personal attendants dared to broach the subject of leave, for the Shah's mind was inexorably set on the reconquest of Qarābāḡ and nothing would deflect him from this course.

The Shah marched from Tabriz in the depths of winter, when mountains and plains were white with snow, when ice prevented the animals from getting a grip on uneven ground, and when people were thinking of their firesides and cozy winter quarters, and no one dreamed of the possibility of military operations. Allāhverdi Khan was sent to Fārs to raise an army for service in the spring. The troops from Khorasan were sent on leave, and some other units, whose equipment was deficient because of the length of the campaign, had to be sent on leave with orders to report for duty in the spring. Ḥasan Khan Ostājilū, the governor of Hamadan, who had been sent to guard the frontier in the Baghdad area, was recalled, and made his way to the Shah's camp, men and animals plunging and stumbling through snowdrifts the whole way.

On arrival at Ardabil, the Shah visited the tombs of his ancestors and invoked their aid. At the beginning of Ramaẓān 1014/January 1606, the Shah moved to Kalḡorān, the burial place of Sultan Jeb-rā'īl,²³ where he stayed several days to deal with urgent matters. One of these concerned the maladministration of Khorasan. The Shah had received reports that local governors and tax collectors in Khorasan had been levying more than the statutory amount of taxes and embezzling the difference. The Shah appointed an experienced civil servant to the post of *vazīr-e koll*²⁴ of Khorasan, with full authority to check these abuses. The man chosen for this job was Kāja Moḥammad Šaftī, the *vazīr-e koll* of the province of Gīlān; he was a distinguished vizier, and was styled Mīrzā 'Ālamīānī. He held his new appointment in addition to his other positions and made a full inquiry into the financial administration of Khorasan, appointing and dismissing tax collectors and *kalāntars* as he thought fit.

²³The father of Shaikh Šaft al-Dīn; died 656/1258.

²⁴Principal vizier—i.e., taking precedence over other officials in Khorasan holding the rank of vizier (see Savory, "Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safavid Empire."

There was a general shortage of food this year on the borders of Azerbaijan; in Qarābāğ, agriculture had been interrupted by the military operations conducted by the *qezelbaş*, and no crops had been sown. To guard against any shortage of supplies of grain for the army, the Shah ordered the officials of the supreme *divān* to indent for twenty thousand *karvārs*, each of one hundred *man*, to be provided by those areas of Azerbaijan which had an abundance. This grain was to be transported to the royal camp by peasants using their own donkeys, and the price was fixed at five thousand Shah 'Abbas *dīnārs* per *karvār*. In addition, in view of the distance involved, each peasant was to receive one Iraqi *tomān* per *karvār* to cover the cost of transportation. Special collectors were appointed and dispatched to see to this task.

From Kalğorān the Shah moved to Arasbār, on the Aras River, where he lodged at the house of Kalaf Beg the tailor in order to observe the fast for the remainder of the month of Ramazān. From Arasbār, he sent letters to the pasha, *qāzī*, *moftī*, and garrison of Ganja; he called their attention to the fact that Azerbaijan and Šīrvān were his hereditary territories, which the Ottomans had overrun after the death of Shah Tahmasp, thereby breaking a peace treaty confirmed by the most solemn oaths and covenants. "Now," continued the Shah, "I have resolved to retake these provinces, and nothing will shake this resolve. So far, my efforts have been uniformly successful. Jeğāl-oğlū and his great army have been put to flight. You cannot expect any reinforcements to reach you this year. In the circumstances, it is not only your legal duty but only common sense to cease hostilities and not to defend the fort. Anyone who has dependents in this province and wishes to stay here can come to my court without fear, and I will extend my mercy to him. Anyone who wishes to leave and take his family and possessions with him may go in peace, without fear of being molested by my men. On the other hand, if you resist, no quarter will be granted after I capture the fort. Whatever calamity you suffer will be upon your own heads." The Shah then crossed the Aras, advancing slowly and hunting as he went, to give the garrison at Ganja time to accept his terms. But the Ottomans refused to heed his advice and put the fort in a state of defense.

Toward the end of this year, the governorship of the Kakhetia region of Georgia was awarded to Tahmūras, the grandson of Alexander Khan. When the Shah was in camp at Kürek Čay, he had been

visited by the Georgian nobles who had opposed Kūstandīl Khan and who now offered their allegiance to the Shah and asked forgiveness for their shortcomings; in addition, they besought the Shah that Ṭahmūraṣ b. Dā'ūd Khan b. Alexander Khan, who was at the Shah's court, be appointed ruler of Kakhetia, and they pledged themselves to serve Ṭahmūraṣ. In return, they undertook to bring to the Shah's court two other grandsons of Alexander Khan then in Georgia, to demonstrate the genuineness of their protestations. On receipt of these two princes, the Shah had agreed to give Ṭahmūraṣ Khan permission to return with them to Georgia.

To set the Georgians at ease, the Shah had summoned the great emirs and the principal officers of state to a royal fete, at which Ṭahmūraṣ was officially proclaimed ruler of Kakhetia with the style of khan. It is the custom of the Georgians, whenever one of their princes enters into his royal inheritance, to perform the following ceremony: A monk (who in the Christian religion is equivalent to a spiritual guide [*morshed*]) and a group of Georgian elders spread out a brocade rug and seat their prince on it. Each man carries a tray of gold and silver coins and, while the prince stands on this carpet, flings handfuls of the coins to the assembled company. They then kneel before him and offer him a drinking cup, which he in turn offers to those present.

On this occasion, when the Georgians reached the point in the ceremony at which the trays of money are distributed, the Shah, after inquiring about the significance of the custom, intervened to announce that he would first distribute largesse himself. He had trays of gold and silver containing gold and jewels brought for him to distribute. The emirs and others present then followed suit and distributed largesse commensurate with their rank. After this, the Georgian nobles distributed gold and silver coins and circulated the drinking cup in accordance with their tradition. The Shah, in order to divert his guests, devoted the whole day to merrymaking with the Georgians, whose songs and speech were not devoid of strange expressions. They then departed, replete with royal favors.

Toward the end of February 1606, the Shah reached Ganja and camped near the tomb of Shaikh Neẓāmī.²⁵ He ordered the commander in chief of artillery, Barḡordār Beg Anīs, to start casting cannon, using the molds which had been constructed at Bargoṣāṭ. Qarčaḡāy

²⁵The celebrated 11th-century Persian poet.

Beg and some of the other emirs were ordered to reconnoiter the area of the fort and to determine a suitable place for the royal camp and sites for the breastworks. First of all, in order to deny the enemy ingress and egress, the Shah had a blockhouse built facing the main gates of the fort, and stationed there 'Alī Khan Movāfeq and Qanbar Beg the chief swordbearer, with a detachment of *golāms* and musketeers. While the Shah was still waiting for the gun molds to arrive and for sufficient material for the breastworks to be collected, the year came to an end.

Another event which occurred this year was the death of the Mogul emperor, Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar. Akbar had fallen ill at his capital, Agra, and the labors of his physicians had been without success. As the Koran says, "When their time is come, they cannot delay it or anticipate it by a single minute."²⁶ His son Salīm was on his way to Agra from Allahabad but failed to reach there before his father died. The majority of the Mogul emirs and nobles preferred Sultan Kosrow, Salīm's son and a favorite of Akbar's, as the new emperor, but Shaikh Farīd Baḳṣī, a leading emir, and a few of the other principal officers of state opposed this choice. They went to Salīm and proffered their allegiance to him. The other emirs then realized that to put Akbar's grandson on the throne while his eldest son was alive would cause certain difficulties, and so they abandoned the idea.

Kosrow, who had ambitions in regard to the throne, fled from Agra toward Lahore and the Punjab when he saw which way the wind was blowing, and Salīm marched in pursuit of him at top speed. On arrival at Lahore, Kosrow collected a force of some twenty thousand men composed of Čaġatays, Hazāras, Afghans, Rajputs and others. Shaikh Farīd, who led the vanguard of Salīm's forces, joined battle with Kosrow; after hard fighting, Kosrow's troops broke and ran as more and more of Salīm's troops came up and entered the fray. The Rajputs alone stood their ground, and were virtually annihilated. Kosrow fled across the Lahore River, but was recognized by the boatmen, who informed Qeltj Khan, the governor of Lahore. Qeltj Khan gave Kosrow assurances of good treatment and presented him to his father when the latter reached Lahore. Salīm then returned in triumph to Agra and ascended the throne. The poet Seyyed Moḥammad Kermānī composed the following chronogram to mark his accession:

²⁶Koran, 10:50, etc.

"In the place of the Emperor Akbar sits his son, Salīm."²⁷ Kāja Šo'eyb Jowšaqānī devised another chronogram: "The death of the Emperor Akbar"; although this gives the year 1015 instead of the correct date, 1014, the poet gives the reader a clue in the preceding hemistich as to how to arrive at the correct date.

I have it on reliable authority that a large number of Kosrow's men who were taken prisoner were hanged, and that Shah Salīm told his son to go to the place of execution and amuse himself by arranging his men in order. Sultan Kosrow replied that it was he who was to blame, not these innocent men, and that if anyone were hanged, it should be himself, and he begged his father to release him from his shame and tribulation. His father spared his life but ordered him to be blinded by having a red-hot iron passed before his eyes. Salīm took no revenge on those of his father's emirs and principal officers of state who had supported Kosrow. Kosrow himself was placed in the custody of the officers of the harem. Apparently the prince's sight was not damaged by the red-hot iron.

Although the events related above have no direct connection with the history of Iran, which is my primary objective, nevertheless, since the events themselves are important, and since the Mogul dynasty has a long tradition of diplomatic relations with the Safavid dynasty, it is not really so inappropriate to relate these events; the author will not, he hopes, incur criticism for so doing.

²⁷The Persian text, *be-jā-ye akbar šāh pādešāh-zāda salīm*, yields the correct date-1014/1605.

Events of the Year of the Horse, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1015/1606-07, the Twentieth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas; These Events Include the Capture of the Fortress at Ganja

New Year's Day this year occurred on Saturday, 15 Zu'l-Qa'da 1014/24 March 1606.¹ The Shah was in Qarābāg, a region whose damp climate keeps it green and springlike both summer and winter. Having celebrated the New Year festival in his camp near the tomb of Neẓāmī, he marched to Ganja. The task of constructing breastworks was allocated, and each section of the army was allotted the task of digging trenches for itself. Fresh detachments of troops began to arrive, and the gunners busied themselves with casting cannon. Meanwhile, the defenders directed constant fire on their attackers from cannon, muskets, and heavy siege guns. In order to preclude the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the *qezelbāš*, and thus to compel their men to exert themselves to the maximum, the Ottomans put to death Rostam Sultan Söklen Zu'l-Qadar, a prisoner of war who had been held at the fort for two years, and also executed an innocent Māzandarānī *seyyed*, a kinsman of the Shah's maternal grandfather, Mīr Bozorg, who resided in the city of Ganja and was much esteemed there. None of these stratagems had any effect, however, because God willed otherwise.

By the time the cannon had been cast, the breastworks had been pushed forward to the edge of the ditch where the guns were to be placed, and protective earthworks were constructed. The struggle went on for several months. On one occasion, an Ottoman sortie against the sector held by Zu'l-Faqār Khan surprised his men, who suffered some casualties. On several other occasions, the Ottomans attacked the sector held by Hüseyn Khan Ostājilū but were thrown back. In the fourth month of the siege, a number of heavy siege guns went into action and began to make an impression on the towers and walls. At this juncture, Allāhverdi Khan arrived with the army of Fārs and took up his position on the east side of the fort. He pushed

¹For once, our extraordinarily accurate author seems to have slipped up. The year 1013 was a leap year, so New Year's Day 1014 would have fallen on 13 Zu'l-Qa'da/22 March 1606. Incidentally, 15 Zu'l-Qa'da was a Friday, and the 13th a Wednesday.

forward breastworks from that side too. Meanwhile, *qūrčīs*, *golāms*, and others had been active in digging mines under the walls of the fort, starting from the ditch. They had succeeded in excavating about five hundred cubits of the actual foundations of the fort and in shoring up the wall with timbers. They then set fire to the timbers, and the wall above came crashing down. The defenders rushed to repair the breach, but fire from Safavid musketeers prevented them from doing so.

A group of *qūrčīs* made a determined assault on one of the strongest towers in the fort, known as the Čahār Tāq tower, and swarmed up it despite the hail of musketfire from the defenders, who also hurled down pots of naphtha and gunpowder on the heads of the *qūrčīs*. Some of the latter had their faces and hair burned to such an extent that it was impossible to distinguish a formerly bearded man from a beardless youth; others were killed. But the *qūrčīs* continued to press their assault undeterred, and in the late afternoon a few intrepid fellows succeeded in getting a foothold at the top of the tower. Shah 'Abbas was concerned at the casualties suffered by his crack troops, the *qūrčīs*, in this dauntless attack; he saw no need for such haste and reprimanded the *qūrčībāšī* for ordering the assault, saying that one *qūrčī* was worth more than ten towers. Despite the losses they had suffered from artillery and musketfire and from naphtha pots, the *qūrčīs* hung on to the tower and claimed to have wounded one hundred and fifty Ottomans and killed seventy or eighty others. Following this success, the *golāms* of the royal household made an assault from their positions, stormed several towers on the rampart, and began to make breaches in the wall of the citadel itself.

The Ottoman garrison, which had received no aid during the months of the siege, realized that its position was desperate. The commandant, Moḥammad Pasha, exhorted his men to further efforts, but the attackers passed beyond the towers of the ramparts and pressed their attack on the inner citadel. The *gāzīs* and *golāms* stormed several of the main towers, and the garrison cried for quarter and sent an envoy to the Shah to negotiate, but the Shah refused to listen, since their case had already been decided. The next day, Monday² 28 Šafar 1015/5 July 1606, the Pasha and his officers came out of the fort and prostrated themselves before the Shah.

²28 Šafar was a Wednesday.

They were allowed to return to their quarters that night, but they left the keys of the fort with the *golāms* of the royal household, and no guard was mounted on the walls. Qarčaḡāy Beg and a detachment of *golāms* entered the fort that night and mounted guard there. The following day, the names of all the members of the garrison were recorded and the prisoners were paraded before the Shah. Each batch of prisoners was handed over to a regiment of *qūrčīs* or *golāms*, who stripped them of their possessions and divided these among themselves, according to their rank.

Moḥammad Pasha, the commandant, had entered Ottoman service as a young man; he was a protégé of Aḥmad Pasha, the governor of Vān, who had raised him to the rank of pasha and given him a governorship. Since he was a Tabrīzī by birth, the inhabitants of Tabriz asked the Shah to hand him over to them for execution. The sons of Rostam Sultan Söklen also petitioned the Shah to allow them to put him to death in retaliation for the Pasha's murder of their father. The Shah, however, gave priority to preserving the personal inviolability of *seyyeds*, and handed Moḥammad Pasha over to the Māzandarānīs for execution as prescribed by the religious law, in retaliation for his murder of the Māzandarānī *seyyed*. A few Ottomans who had declared their "love for the Shah" and had left the citadel before the final assault were pardoned. The rest were massacred to a man, since some of them were renegades, natives of that region who had entered Ottoman service, and the Shah's wrath against the whole garrison was implacable. The camp at Ḥasan Čāy was piled high with heaps of corpses, two thousand five hundred in number. A few men of lowly status, who had acted as camp servants, were spared. The poet Žiā-ye Nūrollāhī, the grandson of Mīrzā Aḥmad Kofrānī Eš-fahānī, devised the excellent chronogram: "The capture of Ganja is the key to Šamāḡī."³

Miscellaneous Events: The Capture of the Forts of Lori, Tiflis, and Tūmānūs; Events Subsequent to the Capture of Ganja and the Subjugation of Qarābāḡ

The governor of Qarābāḡ, Ḥoseyn Khan Qājār, was dismissed from his post for improper conduct, after complaints had been received from the people of Qarābāḡ. He was replaced by Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oḡlū Qājār.

³The words "the key to Šamāḡī" yield the date 1015/1606.

After the capture of Ganja, the Shah turned his attention to the forts at Lori, Tiflis, and Tūmānūs. When he reached Aḥsanābād, the commandants of these forts abandoned all thought of resistance. First, Moḥammad Pasha Qazāqlū, the commandant at Lori, hitherto a loyal servant of the Ottoman Sultan, was obliged to offer his submission to the Shah through the mediation of Moḥammad Beg Begdelū Šāmlū, an officer who was close to the Shah. If the Shah would forget his past, he said, he would come and prostrate himself. The Shah, convinced of his sincerity, sent his officers to bring him to court, where he was presented by the emirs and *moqarrabs*. The Shah loaded him with gifts—royal robes of honor, a *qezelbaş tāj*, jeweled swordbelt, a horse with a jeweled saddle, and more. Moḥammad Pasha handed over the keys of the fort at Lori, and the Shah sent men to take charge of the fort and of the cannon and other equipment there.

Next, the Shah received humble supplications from the garrison at Tūmānūs to the effect that, if the Shah would spare their lives, they would surrender the fort. The Shah granted their request and decreed that anyone who wished to remain in Qarābāğ should receive double the pay and income from fiefs⁴ which they had received from the Ottomans; on the other hand, anyone who wished to leave was free to depart unmolested with his family and possessions. The garrison accepted these terms joyfully, and hastened to present themselves at court. Those who opted to leave were allowed to depart in peace; those who opted to stay found their highest expectations fulfilled.

Third, when the Shah reached the Alget River on the borders of Georgia, 'Abd al-Laṭīf Pasha, the governor of Tiflis, and his senior officers, having noted well the distinction between the Shah's wrath and the Shah's mercy, as shown by the contrast between his treatment of the garrison at Ganja and the garrisons at Lori and Tūmānūs, followed the example of the latter and tendered their submission. The Shah sent letters by the hand of the chief herald, Ḥoseyn Beg Qūr Zu'l-Qadar, granting them an amnesty. Although the Pasha and his officers were well aware that the Shah never broke his promises, and that persons to whom the Shah granted amnesty would not be molested by the *qezelbaş*, nevertheless, mindful of the Koranic verse "[I ask this] that my heart may be set at rest,"⁵ in order to set at rest the

⁴*Timār*, a category of small fiefs the revenues from which were used to pay Ottoman troops (see Gibb and Bowen, pp. 47ff.).

⁵Koran, 2:261.

minds of their troops and in order to preserve their own honor and to obtain recognition of the fact that the status of the fort at Tiflis was superior to that of the other forts, asked the Shah to send a high-ranking emir to take the fort and escort them to court.

The Shah detailed 'Altqolī Khan Šāmlū for this task. When the latter neared Tiflis, 'Abd al-Laṭīf Pasha and his officers came out to receive him. They handed the fort over to him, and spent several days purchasing mules to transport themselves and their belongings. 'Altqolī Khan stationed a detachment of Šāmlūs and musketeers in the fort and escorted the Pasha and his fellow officers to the Shah's camp at Alget-čay, where they were received with great favor and awarded gifts commensurate with their rank. Some of the officers elected to stay and were given excellent postings. The Pasha and other officers who elected to return to Ottoman territory were escorted to the frontier. The Shah then visited the fort in person and made a thorough examination of its strong and weak points.

The fortress of Tiflis stands on the slopes of a high mountain, which rises to the heavens behind the fort. The Kor River, which for most of its course maintains a generally west-east alignment until it joins the Aras in Šīrvān and the two rivers debouch into the Caspian Sea, in the vicinity of Tiflis alters its direction and runs north-south; it flows south of the fort at Tiflis and then adopts an easterly course. Within the precincts of the city and the fort, the course of the river is flanked by a high stone wall; where the river meets the mountain on the slopes of which the fort stands, it is spanned by a strong bridge that carries the highroad to the interior of Georgia. The city of Tiflis is situated to the west of this bridge. From the mountain, there issues an abundance of springs, some seventy or eighty of which are hot springs. In former times, both Muslim rulers and infidel Georgian princes built domes over these hot springs, and these now constitute the public baths for the inhabitants of Tiflis. Some of these bathhouses are situated within the fort, but the majority are outside. Today, some thirty or forty of these bathhouses are actually in operation, and others could be brought into use.

The fort has always been considered to be impregnable because it is protected on three sides by the mountain, and on the remaining side by the waters of the Kor. Its physical surroundings are such that there is no suitable camp site within the environs of the city or the fort. That this fort, which is the key to the control of the provinces of

Georgia and Širvān, should be captured with such remarkable ease can be attributed only to God's help and the good fortune of the Shah. The inhabitants of the city of Tiflis are mostly Christians, Armenians, and Georgians, with a small Muslim minority. There are many ancient Christian churches and places of worship in the city and the surrounding area.

While the Shah was engaged in his campaign in Georgia, there occurred the death of Gorgīn Khan, the son of Samā'ūn Khan, the ruler of Kartlia. A number of Georgian nobles visited the Shah to report this to him, and the Shah appointed Gorgīn's son, Lūārsāb Khan, ruler of Kartlia, and styled him "my son." The Shah sent splendid gifts to the new ruler and to the women of the royal household, and he instructed one of the *moqarrabs*, Moḥammad Beg Beg-dīlū Šāmlū, to go to Kartlia and see to the welfare of the dependents of the deceased. Moḥammad Beg returned within a few days, bringing with him a number of princes and Georgian nobles who were overwhelmed by the tangible marks of the Shah's generosity and returned to their own country happy and contented. Additional gifts were also sent to Lūārsāb Khan.

The governorship of Tiflis, and the post of commandant of the fort, were given to Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, known as Deli Moḥammad, who was allotted a detachment of musketeers from troops of the royal household. All supplies of weapons, equipment, and munitions from the forts at Lori and Tūmānūs were removed and taken to the fort at Erīvān. The Shah then proceeded to Erīvān, with the intention of repairing the fort there as a preliminary to the reconquest of Širvān, provided the Ottomans sent no reinforcements to their garrisons there. The Shah marched from Tiflis to Gökča Deñiz⁶ in ten days, over a route of formidable difficulty through the Aḳtābād⁷ Mountains; the route lay through forests so dense that the light of day hardly percolated through.

One of the administrative changes this year involved the dismissal from the *ṣadārat* of Emir Abu'l-Valī Enjū Širāzī, and the appointment in his place of Qāzī Khan the son of Mīrzā Borhān, an eminent Sab'ī Ḥasanī *seyyed* of Qazvin and a descendant of Qāzī Jahān, the vizier of Shah Tahmasp. Some of Emir Abu'l-Valī's employees had, without the *ṣadr*'s knowledge, been guilty of embezzle-

⁶The large lake lying east of Erīvān.

⁷See *TM*, p. 167.

ment of funds belonging to the shrine at Mašhad; they had been emboldened to commit this crime by the *šadr*'s dislike of unpleasantness and his consequent tendency to keep himself aloof from the actual administration of the shrine revenues. Some important districts, such as Isfahan, Qom, Yazd, and Kashan, were constituted as a separate jurisdiction, and the office of *šadr* in these areas was conferred on Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan Šalā'ī Eṣfahānī, a learned *seyyed* from the metropolitan district of Isfahan, whose forebears had had a distinguished record of public service under the Safavid dynasty.

The Restoration of the Fort at Erīvān and Various Incidents Which Occurred before the Shah Decided to Subjugate Šīrvān

On his arrival at Gökča Deñiz, the Shah kept with him Allāh-verdī Khan and some of his personal retainers and *moqarrabs*, and sent all the rest of his troops, under the command of Allāhqolī Beg, the *qūrčibāši*, to Erīvān to repair the fort there. The Shah himself marched in leisurely fashion toward Nağčevān via Sīšhān, hunting as he went.

About this time, the Shah received representations from Samā'ūn Khan, the former ruler of Georgia who had been carried off to Istanbul by the Ottomans. A Georgian woman named Golčehra had been in the service of dependents of the Safavid house during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, had returned with Samā'ūn to Georgia after the death of Tahmasp, and had been sent with Samā'ūn to Istanbul by the women of the Georgian royal house. Golčehra, by dint of knowing her way around and how to conduct herself as a servant, had insinuated herself into the service of Vāleda Sultan, the mother of the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad III, who had great political influence. After she had been at Istanbul for a considerable time, a group of Ottoman viziers and principal officers of state, at the instigation of Darvīš Pasha the grand vizier, sent her and a *čavoš* to the Shah on behalf of Samā'ūn Khan, with the following message: "Just rulers have also placed the security and welfare of the people of the world above their material aspirations. Enmity and strife between two powerful kings causes destruction to their realms, disrupts the lives of the common people, and causes needless bloodshed." The message went on to appeal to the Shah to terminate his hostilities against the Ottoman Sultan so that he might acquire renown in this world and

reward in the next. In return, the Ottoman officials, and in particular Darvīš Pasha, pledged themselves to work for peace.

The Shah in his reply reminded Samā'ūn Khan and the Ottoman senior officials that a lengthy period of peace had existed between Shah Tahmasp and the Ottoman Sultan Süleymān II and his successor Selīm II. This peace had been broken after the death of Shah Tahmasp by the Ottomans, who had seen their opportunity to take advantage of Iran's internal problems and to occupy Iranian territory. The Shah said he was now merely seeking to recover that territory. If the Ottoman Sultan was prepared to make peace on the basis of the *status quo ante* as regards borders, he was ready to conclude peace for the benefit of God's servants. Otherwise, he would continue to wage war until he had achieved all his objectives.

Another event which occurred this year was a raid by Emir Gūna Khan's troops into Ottoman territory as far as Vān and 'Ādeljavāz in retaliation for the incursion by the Ottomans the previous year into the Gökča Deñiz area and their plundering of several villages belonging to the Emir. A considerable number of local chieftains visited Emir Gūna Khan both to demonstrate their loyalty and to obtain various objectives they had in mind, and Emir Gūna Khan, acting as their intermediary, took them to meet the Shah at his camp near Naķčevān. They included various Kurdish chiefs of the Maḥmūdī tribe, such as 'Abdollāh Beg, governor of Kōšāb; Zeynal Khan, governor of Qarā Heşār; Moştafā Beg, governor of Mākū; Zeynal Beg, governor of Čors; and ambassadors from the Ottoman vassal governors in the area, such as Mīr Šaraf, governor of Jazīra; Žiā al-Dīn Khan, son of Šaraf Khan, governor of Tiflis; and Zakarīā Khan Ḥak-kārī.

Emir Gūna Khan was ordered to join the other emirs at Erīvān, and the various chieftains were received graciously by the Shah. Zeynal Beg was confirmed as governor of Čors, and Moştafā Beg as governor of Mākū; the latter received a cash bonus of two hundred royal Iraqi gold *tomān*. The case of 'Abdollāh Beg presented greater difficulty. 'Abdollāh Beg, after the death of his brother Soleymān Beg, had assumed the position of head of the tribe and governor of Kōšāb. His cousin Zeynal Khan had been hostile toward Soleymān Beg, and had wrested Qarā Heşār from the latter by force. This Zeynal Khan, after the Shah's victorious campaign against Jeğāl-oğlū, had presented himself to the Shah at Salmās and had been

avored by the Bāyandor sultans⁸ and allowed to maintain his position as independent governor of Ordūbād. After the accession of Shah Esma'il I, because of the slanders of envious men and persons with an ulterior motive, he went into voluntary exile to Egypt. Eventually, Shah Esma'il happened to pass through Ordūbād⁹ and inquired why the magnificent residences he saw there were in such a state of decay. Hoseyn Beg Lala, one of the Shah's close companions, told him the whole story. He also mentioned that Malek Bahrām was a kinsman of the secretary Kāja 'Atīq who, when Esma'il emerged from Gilān to make his bid for power, was the first man to affix his endorsement to Esma'il's letters of appointment. This information increased the Shah's interest in the case, and he wrote a friendly letter to Malek Bahrām, calling on him to return to his native land. Malek Bahrām did so and set about putting his affairs in order.

Under Shah Tahmasp, Malek Bahrām was regarded with even greater favor, and was appointed *kalāntar* at Ordūbād. Shah Tahmasp was very much attached to Ordūbād, so much so that he had the finest artists embellish the portico of the Čehel Sotūn palace at Qazvin with a landscape painting of the area. The Shah frequently went fishing in the waters of the Aras, and on such occasions he used to stay at Ordūbād at the home of Malek Bahrām, who entertained him royally and consequently rose still higher in the Shah's favor. The late Mīrzā Kāfi,¹⁰ the secretary, because he was a relative of Malek Bahrām, was appointed *monšī al-mamālek* (state scribe)¹¹ by Shah Tahmasp, and for some years was the confidant and close companion of the Shah. In short, by virtue of their excellent service to the Safavid dynasty, the Ordūbādīs usually had one of their number in this high office.

Malek Bahrām, when he was well into his eighties, decided to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and the resting places of the Imams, but he died en route between Damascus and Medina. His son Adham Beg, who was with his father, buried Malek Bahrām where he died, at a place called Qal'a-ye Heydar. When Ma'sūm Beg Šafavī later went on a pilgrimage (976/1568),¹² Malek Bahrām's

⁸The Aq Qoyūnlū dynasty, at the height of their power in Iran, 1467-78 (see Savory, *Struggle*).

⁹On the Aras River, southeast of Naķčevān.

¹⁰Died 969/1561-62. He was a native of Ordūbād.

¹¹See *TM*, p. 132.

¹²For his career, see Savory, *Principal Offices II*, pp. 75-76. He was killed in mysterious circumstances in 976/1568 while crossing Ottoman territory en route to Mecca and Medina.

eldest son Mīrak Beg was in the emir's retinue, and he removed his father's body and had it reinterred at Medina.

At the time of his death, Malek Bahrām had five sons living, and I knew them all. Although biographical details about them are not strictly relevant to my history, nevertheless, as I indicated at the beginning of this section, my deep friendship for and devotion to this family compel me to give them. Malek Bahrām's eldest son was the Mīrak Beg mentioned above. When the latter first left Ordūbād, he entered the service of Ma'šūm Beg Šafavī, under whom he held the offices of secretary (*monšī*) and army scribe (*laškar-nevīs*).¹³ He eventually rose to the rank of vizier, a post in which he enjoyed full independence for a number of years. When Ma'šūm Beg, shriven as he was for the holy pilgrimage, was slain by the Ottomans, Mīrak Beg took charge of the martyred emir's dependents and looked after them. Finally, Mīrak Beg was appointed *majles-nevīs* (secretary of state)¹⁴ at the court of Shah Tahmasp, and was thus able to continue to care for their welfare. While still in office, he died at Qom.

The second son of Malek Bahrām was Adham Beg, who was also a man of ability. After his father's death, Adham Beg completed the rites of the pilgrimage and then returned to court, where he began his training in bookkeeping. He was subsequently appointed *mostowfī* (accountant) in the financial administration of Sultan Moštafā Mīrzā,¹⁵ and finally became the latter's vizier. When Sultan Moštafā Mīrzā was put to death by Shah Esmā'il II in 984/1576, Adham Beg was out of a job for some time. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he was appointed *kalāntar* of Tabriz, an important post. But he left this office because of the arrogant and self-opinionated behavior of Emir Khan Torkmān and his financial officials, and retired to Ordūbād. When Emir Khan Torkmān was dismissed by Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā (992/1584) and subsequently executed, and 'Alīqolī Khan Faṭḥ-oḡlū Ostājīlū was made governor of Tabriz, the latter invited Adham Beg to resume his former position, and he ultimately became vizier to the governor.

¹³See *TM*, pp. 141-42.

¹⁴See *TM*, p. 121. The *majles-nevīs*, also called *vāqe'a-nevīs*, was possibly the most important official in the bureaucracy after the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, and was sometimes termed *vazīr-e ḥaṣ* in contradistinction from the latter, who was termed *vazīr-e rāst*.

¹⁵The fifth son of Shah Tahmasp; born ca. 964/1556-57, put to death by Shah Esmā'il II in 984/1576.

After his accession, Shah 'Abbas executed 'Alīqolī Khan Fath-oḡlū Ostājlu, and Adham Beg was appointed vizier to Aslams Khan Tātī-oḡlū Zu'l-Qadar, the keeper of the seal. Finally, he tired of worldly office, and turned his mind more to the acquiring of merit in the life to come. He retired for a while to the Ardabīl shrine, but after his eminent brother had expressed the wish to see him, he visited him in Iraq and decided to take up residence at Shiraz, where he received an annual pension, amounting to one hundred royal *tomān*, in the form of a tax immunity assigned on the revenues of Qaṣr al-Dašt near Shiraz. From Shiraz he again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, and on several occasions performed the pilgrimage to Mašhad. He died at Shiraz in the Year of the Fowl, 1017/1608-09.

Malek Bahrām's third son was Ḥātem Bēg, who presently holds the office of vizier with the title of *e'temād al-dowla*. He succeeded his father as *kalāntar* of Ordūbād and discharged his duties admirably despite his youth. But he voluntarily left this post in disgust after disputes with a number of envious people. He went to the Shah's court and, some time afterward, became the vizier of Delī Būdāq Rūmlū, the governor of Kōy. After the dismissal of the latter, Ḥātem Beg was unemployed for a year or two, and lived at Ordūbād. After the accession of Shah Esma'il II, he took up residence near the Ardabīl shrine. After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, he was appointed vizier to Valī Khan Afšār, the governor of Kerman. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Valī Khan came to court, and the governorship of Kerman devolved upon his son, Bektāš Khan; at the behest of Valī Khan, Ḥātem Beg had no choice but to remain at Kerman as vizier to Bektāš Khan.

As the reader will recall, the arrogant behavior of Bektāš Khan led to trouble between him and Ya'qūb Khan Zu'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiraz, himself not a model of humility. Eventually Ya'qūb Khan marched against Bektāš Khan, who was defeated and killed in a battle near Yazd. As a result of this incident, Ḥātem Beg's possessions were plundered, but Ya'qūb Khan, after he had met Ḥātem Beg, treated him with honor and took him back with him to Shiraz. When all this was reported to the Shah, and the royal army reached Isfahan, Shah 'Abbas sent a *qūr'ī* to summon Ḥātem Beg to court. The Shah's intention was to rehabilitate Ḥātem Beg, but Ya'qūb Khan foolishly thought that the Shah had summoned him in order to make inquiries into what had happened to Bektāš Khan's treasures and other possessions, and he could not decide whether to send him or not. But ultimately he had no alternative.

At the time when Farhād Khan marched from Shiraz to Kerman to deal with the revolt of Yūsuf Khan Afšār at Kerman (998/1590), Ḥātem Beg went with him, since he had years of experience of affairs at Kerman and was trusted by the Afšār tribe. Ḥātem Beg played a large part in the settlement reached at Kerman. He returned to Shiraz and was received in audience by the Shah, who appointed him to the office of *mostowfī al-mamālek* (comptroller of finance). After holding this office for six months, during which he did most of the work of the vizier's office as well, he was appointed vizier of the supreme *divān* on New Year's Day 1000¹⁶ (the Year of the Hare)/21 March 1591. Although I have said a few words in praise of Ḥātem Beg in the exordium to this history, I cannot forbear to repeat myself here.

In the course of his tenure of office as vizier, Ḥātem Beg rendered outstanding service to the Safavid dynasty. His concern was for the welfare of all men, and he brought security into the lives of Iranians. The pernicious system of fines, which former viziers had sanctioned as one of their perquisites of office and which bore heavily upon the people, was found by Shah 'Abbas to be incompatible with royal justice, and was abolished. Ḥātem Beg was a model for all in regard to the administration of justice, his knowledge of accounting procedures, and his organization of *divān* affairs. On several occasions he was given special missions by the Shah which necessitated his absence from court, and he fulfilled these tasks to the Shah's satisfaction. These are related in their proper chronological sequence, and I will not weary the reader by repeating them here. In the Year of the Dog, 1019/1610-11, Ḥātem Beg was sent to subdue the rebel Emir Khan Barādūst and capture the fort of Domdom. One night, in his camp before the castle walls, he was suddenly taken ill and died, to the great sorrow of all. His son, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, succeeded him as vizier of the supreme *divān*. At the time of writing, 1025/1616-17, the latter still holds this post. May he long continue to prosper in the Shah's favor!

The fourth son of Malek Bahrām was Abū Torāb Beg, and the fifth was Abū Ṭāleb Beg; both were skilled in the secretarial art and in bookkeeping, and both were present at court in the time of Shah Tahmasp. Abū Torāb Beg was for some time an accountant (*mostowfī*) at Mašhad. From the time of Shah Esma'īl onward, he was vizier to the governor of Mašhad, Morteẓāqolī Khan Pornāk, until his

¹⁶New Year's Day of the Year of the Hare fell on 25 Jomāda I, 999.

death. Abū Ṭaleb Beg was the accountant of the governor-general of Herat, Alīqolī Khan Šamlū, to whom he was related. In 1587, 'Abdollāh Khan Özbek invaded Khorasan and laid siege to Herat. After enduring a protracted siege,¹⁷ the situation for the defenders became desperate, and 'Alīqolī Khan sent a small delegation, consisting of Abū Ṭaleb Beg and a few of his exhausted Šamlūs, to the Uzbek Khan in the forlorn hope of obtaining truce terms. But the latter, in violation of all accepted protocol regarding the treatment of envoys, slew them all by having them fired from cannons in the direction of the fort.

It is now time to return to the main theme of my discourse. When Shah 'Abbas proposed to visit Ordūbād, Ḥātem Beg's retainers hastened to make all necessary preparations for his visit, and the inhabitants turned out in force to demonstrate their loyalty and welcome the Shah. In a relaxed and happy mood, the Shah lodged at residences belonging to the vizier's family. The vizier organized a feast worthy of such a guest. Bowls of wine were circulated freely by handsome youths and rosy-cheeked girls, and the vizier's retainers exerted themselves to the utmost to supply the guests with food, drink, and fruits of all kinds. For several days the vizier entertained his guests, comprising all the emirs and principal officers of state, and all the Shah's personal officers and the *moqarrabs* of the court. In addition, as the emirs who had been busy restoring the fortress at Erīvān completed their tasks, they began to arrive at Ordūbād. A number of the nobles, in accordance with their means, distributed lodging allowances and other gifts to these men, and the servants and entertainers were rewarded with robes of honor, cash payments, and lavish compliments.

After a few days at Ordūbād, the Shah expressed the wish to be taken on a tour of places of interest in the surrounding area. One such place was the flourishing village of Vanand, situated on the slopes of a mountain, with a valley running through it. Both sides of the valley were covered with gardens and orchards, and watered by countless springs. Some of the Naşīrīya family have their residences here too, and here again the vizier made provision for his guests. The Shah then moved to the small town of Kalīs, where most of the inhabitants are Christians, but where some Muslims also live.

¹⁷Alīqolī Khan Šamlū, whose rival Moršedqolī Khan Ostājlı deliberately delayed sending him assistance, was forced to surrender Herat after putting up a heroic resistance against the Uzbeks for nearly a year (August 1587–summer 1588).

After visiting these places, the Shah returned to Ordūbād to make his plans for the invasion of Šīrvān. An extremely difficult road, known as the Darra-ye 'Alī route, runs from Ordūbād across Qarā-bāg. The Shah ordered his army to take this route, and to rendezvous in the lush and level plains near Čoldūr and Bargošāṭ. In view of the arduous nature of the route, the Shah and his party gave the main body ten days' start. They remained at Ordūbād for this period as guests of the Našīrīya family, who continued to entertain them on a scale that won plaudits even from their detractors. Shah 'Abbas again expressed satisfaction with his reception, and conferred robes of honor on all the family. The fort at Erīvān being now restored, the Shah moved there for safekeeping all stores and his officers' personal belongings. Emir Gūna was made commandant, and the Shah marched to join the main army.

The Shah's Successful Expedition to Šīrvān

Not one of the leading officers of the Safavid state approved of the plan to invade Šīrvān. The army had been in the field for four years, and for nearly two of these years Azerbaijan had suffered from a crop shortage. The price of wheat had soared, and the ordinary soldiers, for want of fodder for their animals, lacked mounts and were obliged to go on foot. The officers only kept their horses going by allowing them to graze the thin grass of the plains, and the animals were weak and lacking in stamina as a result. The men's equipment was also in poor shape as a result of the length of time they had been in the field. On top of all this, the Shah's advisers were of the opinion that the Ottomans, since they had not put a fresh army in the field this year, would undoubtedly do so in the spring. If the Safavid army were to campaign in Šīrvān now, it would be in an even sorrier state by the spring and would be unable to withstand a fresh Ottoman invasion. They therefore counseled the Shah to return to Iraq and reequip his army to meet this probable threat.

The Shah, however, had had premonitions of victory, and was not going to miss the chance to invade Šīrvān while the Ottoman garrisons there could not hope to receive any reinforcements. He therefore gave the order to march. He also sent Moḥammad Beg, the son of Kūr Kolafā Rūmlū, who was one of the officers attached to his person and was an experienced, sensible, and able officer, to Aḥmad Pasha, the *beglerbeg*, and the other Ottoman officers at Šamākī with a letter similar in terms to that which he had sent to the Ottoman garrison at

Ganja. The gist of the letter was as follows:

Since I opened my campaign for the recovery of my hereditary provinces of Azerbaijan and Šīrvān, my efforts have been uniformly crowned by victory, and I have captured the forts in my path. No new Ottoman army has taken the field this year, and no help can reach you till next year. Consider your probable fate (bearing in mind the fate of the garrison at Ganja) if you continue to resist; contrast the amnesty granted to the garrisons at Tiflis and Tūmānūs. The purpose of this letter is to warn you that, if I am forced to take the fort by storm, no quarter will be granted, and the blood of your men will be upon your heads.

While waiting for a reply, the Shah filled in time hunting.

On receiving this letter, Aḥmad Pasha took counsel with his officers. They usually followed the advice of Šams al-Dīn Pasha, who was descended from the shaikhs of Šīrvān but had risen high in Ottoman favor through his services to them and had been rewarded with the status of emir and pasha. On this occasion, Šams al-Dīn Pasha behaved like a fraudulent and hypocritical shaikh. By specious arguments he seduced the garrison from the path of security and safety, and he tried by trickery and deceit to delay the approach of the *qezelbāš* army. Using hypocritical speech which lacked the ring of truth, he replied to Moḥammad Beg as follows. It was true, he said, that the province of Šīrvān belonged to the officers of the king of Iran. "However," he said, "it will be impossible for us to leave in the depths of winter, since we all have our families here with us. Let us ask the Shah for three or four months' grace, during which time he can amuse himself by hunting in the Arasbār region. In the spring, when once again it becomes possible to move freely, if our actions do not suit the Shah, we will leave the outcome to God."

At this juncture, some people in Šamāḳī who had relatives in the Safavid camp sent a message to the Shah outlining the Ottoman plans: Aḥmad Pasha, they said, had sent Šams al-Dīn Pasha to Istanbul to obtain help; pending the arrival of reinforcements, Aḥmad Pasha intended to withdraw from Šamāḳī to Darband, which was an even stronger fort with the strong defensive terrain of Dāğestān behind it, and spend the winter there.

Šams al-Dīn Pasha returned via Kaffa bringing letters of appointment from the Ottoman Sultan to the Ottoman governors in Šīrvān and to the people of Šīrvān. Several thousand Janissaries were on their way and had already reached Kaffa; a major Ottoman army would take the field at the beginning of spring, and Ġāzī Gerāy Khan, the ruler of the Crimea, would lead a Tartar force to Šīrvān. The Sultan urged Aḥmad Pasha to defend Šamākī and to abandon his plan to retire to Darband. Finally, in an allusion to his illuminatory insight and miraculous powers, he declared that the saints and the *aqṭāb*¹⁸ had informed him that the *qezelbāš* forces would not succeed in their attempt to subjugate Šīrvān, and that no harm would befall the fort at Šamākī or its garrison.

The Ottoman garrison at Šamākī was deceived by the lying words of their Sultan, who was as hypocritical as 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ,¹⁹ and determined to defend the fort at Šamākī, hoping to hold the *qezelbāš* off until the arrival of reinforcements in the spring. When the Shah realized what their plan was, he marched from his camp at Khan Arķī in the Arasbār district and reached the Kor River on 3 Ramaẓān 1015/2 January 1607. The Ottomans had destroyed the bridge at Javād,²⁰ and there was no other crossing point nearby. The Shah therefore crossed over with his men by boat, leaving the baggage to be floated across later on rafts constructed of wood and reeds. The horses and camels were driven into the river and forced to swim across.

The next day, the Shah continued his march north of the river, camped at Qara Sū, and then proceeded toward Šamākī via the Māsāmāl Pass. It was ten days before the rest of his troops and the commissariat personnel succeeded in crossing the river and joining him. The crossing of the river at such a season was in itself a tremendous feat; indeed, it was thought by many to be impossible. Chunks of ice and mounds of snow filled the river and made navigation hazardous for the boatmen. The weaker horses, camels, and donkeys, unable to cope with the current and the ice and snow, were drowned in midstream. Many of the stronger animals were terrified by the ice

¹⁸*Aqṭāb*: plural of *qoṭb*: the *qoṭb* is at the top of the Sufi hierarchy of saints whose unseen presence is a powerful influence in preserving the order of the universe.

¹⁹The celebrated Muslim general who conquered Egypt in 19/640. The reference here is to his mission to Abyssinia in 616. Before his own conversion to Islam, he was one of two envoys sent from Mecca to try and persuade the Abyssinian Negus to surrender a number of Muslims who had taken refuge with him from persecution by the Meccans.

²⁰Just east of the confluence of the Aras and Kor rivers.

floes and turned back; on reaching the southern bank, they were once again driven into the water, where they stayed afloat for a while but finally drowned. Those animals which were not terrified by the ice floes but swam on changed course every time they found their passage blocked by ice, and swam along with the stream until they found a gap in the ice. In this way, some of them finished up half a *farsak*, and some as much as a *farsak*, downstream before they made their way to the northern bank. In short, the Safavid losses in animals were very high.

Meanwhile, the Shah had crossed the Māsāmāl Pass, and, on 10 Ramaẓān 1015/9 January 1607, he set his troops in proper order and marched on Šamāķī. He chose as a site for his camp a spot about a mile to the west of the fort, flanked by two mountains. The Ottoman garrison, consisting of about four thousand men, looked to the defense of the fort.

The Siege of Šamāķī

No sooner had the Safavid army settled into camp than heavy rain began to fall; this transformed the ground into a sea of mud, and made it difficult for the men to move from the main camp to the commissariat section either on foot or on horseback. More serious was the fact that the army was cut off from the outside world; food supplies in the camp began to run low, and prices rose correspondingly. Barley and straw were particularly scarce. To alleviate the situation, the Shah ordered that all horses and transport and riding donkeys not needed for the siege were to be sent to the alluvial plain of the Kor River, a warmer region where both dried and fresh grass was always available. For two or three months the Safavid troops sat it out in camp. The weather was uniformly bad; the sky was constantly overcast; and it rained nearly every day and sometimes incessantly, day and night.

As soon as Ramaẓān was over, the Shah proceeded with the siege, despite the weather. My learned readers will be aware that the city of Šamāķī is situated astride the highway along a valley. The oldest part of the town, which contains the residential quarters of the ordinary people, lies to the south on the lower slopes of a mountain. The residences of the governors and princes of bygone times are adjacent to the mountain to the north, on higher ground overlooking the rest of the city. The Ottomans had constructed citadels in each quarter and

connected them by defense works. The northerly citadel, standing on higher ground, has lofty masonry towers, too high to scale and too strong to be breached by sappers' tools. In addition, because of the lie of the land, the construction of breastworks to the north would be a difficult task.

Having completed his appraisal of the Ottoman position, the Shah divided up the work of digging trenches. The sector to the north fell to Allāhverdi Khan; to the west, the sector in which the royal camp lay, and which faced the whole length of the city and the two forts, the work of constructing breastworks was divided between the *qūrčibāši* and the *qūrčīs*; Zu'l-Faqr Khan and the army of Azerbaijan; Qarča-qāy Beg with the *golāms* and musketeers; and Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman. In the southwest corner was stationed 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsibāši*. The rest of the emirs were instructed to assist wherever they were needed; no troops were stationed east of the Ottoman position.

There were no materials at hand for the construction of breastworks, and neither camels nor donkeys were available to get through the mud to fetch any. So the Shah, who had had the advantage in his youth of learning the arts of war from experienced veterans, ordered his men to start digging trenches, commencing at a point a considerable distance from the fort. Every few yards the Shah ordered a tower-like structure to be erected, with a ditch around it, and in these defense points he stationed musketeers, archers, and crack troops to protect the men who were digging the trenches. In this way, the trenches were pushed forward.

The work went on steadily, despite the incessant rain. At first, the Ottomans would march out boldly to the south and east of the citadels, where no Safavid troops were stationed, and draw themselves up in battle array on the slopes of the mountain; sometimes they came closer, and there was some skirmishing. The Safavids were unable to deliver a cavalry charge, which would have taught the enemy a lesson, because most of their horses, not needed in siege warfare, had been sent off to the pasture grounds mentioned earlier. The Ottomans daily grew bolder, intercepting Safavid troops as they moved about the camp and attacking them. Finally, the Shah discovered that some men had sent their horses off to pasture although they had sufficient supplies of fodder to keep them in camp. He reprimanded them, and told them to get their horses back forthwith. When they got them

back, they charged the Ottomans on several occasions and drove them back behind their defenses.

By this time, the palisades were creeping closer to the walls, the breastworks were being strengthened, and the Ottomans were penned more and more within the four walls of their forts. Several times they launched attacks on the breastworks, but were repulsed. The besiegers now began mining operations, and the Shah ordered the heavy siege guns that had been used at Ganja to be transported to Šamākī. Since it was advisable that the Shah, in order to protect the weak and the lower classes in Šamākī, appoint a governor before the capture of the forts so that the latter could assume his responsibilities immediately, he appointed Zu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, governor of Šamākī and *amīr al-omarā* of the whole province of Šīrvān. I will digress at this point to give details of other victories which took place during the siege of Šamākī.

The Capture of the Forts at Bākū and Darband

I do not have to tell my readers that, with God's help, the most astonishing feats can be achieved by man—for example, the capture of the great fortresses at Bākū and Darband, which are protected on the one side by the Caspian Sea and on the landward side by earthworks of immense size and strength. The fort at Darband, also known as Bāb al-Abvāb and Alexander's Bastion, has an extremely high keep, and the city walls actually extend into the sea. At the time that the garrison at Šamākī was thinking of withdrawing to Darband, it did not enter anyone's head that the fortress at Darband might be captured. When the garrison at Šamākī allowed itself to be trapped there, however, only a token force of some two or three hundred men was left at each of the other two forts—and these men were mostly locals who had been enrolled by the Ottomans and who received fodder allowances and assignments.

After the Shah had been camped before Šamākī for a few days, some local notables at Bākū decided to demonstrate their loyalty to him by gathering together a band of men and attempting to seize the commandant and take possession of the fort. Their plot was discovered by the Ottomans, and so the conspirators decided to strike first. They seized the commandant and rounded up his men one by one, killing any who resisted arrest. A number of locals who had thrown in their lot with the Ottomans and who had received trading licenses and

assignments on the revenue from them did not resist the coup but hid themselves. The news of this patriotic act reached the Shah, and was followed shortly afterward by the arrival of the prisoners and the heads of the slain. The conspirators were rewarded with robes of honor, cash payments, tax immunities, and all the property and possessions of the enemy in Bākū.

When the news of this loyal act reached Darband, the inhabitants there conceived the idea of demonstrating their loyalty too, even though most of them had entered Ottoman service and had been enrolled in the military. The leader of the coup was the son of Kāja Moḥammad Darbandī. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, his father had performed distinguished service in Šīrvān and had been a faithful servant of the Shah. It so happened that the Shah had appointed Ūsmī Khan Qeytāq governor of Darband when the latter had visited him in his camp near Ganja, and Ūsmī Khan had left the royal camp at Algetčay bearing in his hand the royal mandate appointing him to the governorship of Darband. The leaders of the conspiracy now summoned Ūsmī Khan, who marched to Darband with two or three hundred men from Qeytāq. The townspeople declared for the Shah and opened the gates to him. The Ottoman commandant Ḥasan Pasha, known as Kōr, in great alarm retreated inside the keep with some sixty or seventy Ottomans of whose loyalty he could be certain.

The son of Kāja Moḥammad Darbandī then visited the Shah with a group of notables from Darband and a number of Ūsmī Khan's retainers. The Shah praised them for their fine achievement and conferred on them robes of honor, cash bonuses, and jeweled weapons. He declared the income from their estates to be free of tax, and remitted all *dīvān* dues to the townspeople. He sent a letter to Ūsmī Khan, congratulating him and exhorting him to show concern for the lower classes of society. Manūčehr Beg, a *golām* of the royal household, who had demonstrated his competence, was sent to take charge of Darband with a detachment of Čaġatāy, Kōrāsānī, Iraqī, and Bāfqī musketeers; his orders were to guard the roads and to capture the keep. Several other emirs were ordered to support him: Shah Naẓar Beg Tūkelī,²¹ who had recently been promoted to the rank of khan and appointed governor of Mašhad; Šahqolī Sultan Mīr Bayāt; Ne'matolāh Sultan Mīr Šūft; and others.

These emirs joined Ūsmī Khan at Darband and besieged the keep.

²¹A Čaġatāy tribe (see *TM*, p. 17).

Palisades were pushed up close to the walls, mines were sunk beneath the towers, and the situation looked black for the defenders. K r  asan sued for quarter; if he and his men were spared, he said, he would hand over the keep and would present himself to the Shah and offer his services to him. The emirs transmitted his request to the Shah, who granted it. K r  asan surrendered the keep and was enrolled in the Shah's service.

In this way the mighty bastion of Darband, its one side resting on the slopes of the Alborz Mountains, its other side joining the Caspian Sea, fell into Safavid hands. All the traffic between  irv n and the  azar and Qep  aq steppes and the steppes of southern Russia is channeled through one gate in this bastion, known as the B b al-Abv b. The * adr*, M r Jal l al-D n  asan  al 'i, composed the following chronogram: 'Auspicious was the capture of imperial Darband.'²² I heard a story from an elderly citizen of  irv n about a caravan which reached Darband from the north after nightfall and was obliged to camp outside the walls. In the morning, when the gates were opened, there was no trace of the caravan. It was discovered that the caravan had managed to squeeze by close to the walls of the fort on the ocean side, where the water is comparatively shallow at certain states of the side.

The Shah now ordered Qanbar Beg G z -b y kl , the chief sword-bearer, to repair the towers and strengthen the old bastion at Darband. Masons and engineers were detailed to carry out this work. In particular, the men were instructed to extend the walls into deeper water, if this was possible, so that it might not be possible for animals to bypass the fort even at low tide. The plan was to construct a new tower out in the water, to link this to the existing tower by a stout wall, and to station alert guards on all the towers. This work took a long time, but was eventually completed by Qanbar Beg and his master craftsmen. I was told that, at the spot where the new tower was built, the engineers succeeded, by use of cunning techniques, in draining all water from the site. When this was done, the foundations of an old tower, dating from pre-Islamic times, were revealed; they were solidly built of stone, kiln-dried brick, and iron bars. The structure had either collapsed in the course of time under the incessant pounding of the waves, or else the rulers of former times had de-

²²This chronogram appears to yield the date 1017, whereas Darband presumably surrendered in 1015 or 1016/1607.

stroyed it to prevent the passage of foreign armies²³ and it had not been rebuilt by those who subsequently controlled the area. Jānī Beg Khan, the ruler of the Qepčāq steppe,²⁴ invaded Azerbaijan by this route during the time of Malek Ašraf Čübānī, and Tīmūr marched north from Iran by this route against Toqtameš Khan.²⁵ But God knoweth best what really happened!

It is the common belief that the "bastion of Alexander the Great" mentioned in the Koran²⁶ is this same Bāb al-Abvāb. But this is impossible, because Alexander's bastion was constructed of brass and iron and lead, at the farthest northeastern limits of the world, to form a barrier between mankind and Gog and Magog. The bastion at Darband, however, was constructed by Kosrow Anūšīrvān to protect his subjects from the ravages of the people of the steppes, who bore no resemblance to human beings except the human form. Since it is the practice of the common people to attribute everything to God, perhaps for this reason Bāb al-Abvāb has been identified with Alexander's bastion. Perfect knowledge belongs to God alone! Glory be to God! What am I saying, where am I going, and what am I talking about?

The fall of these two great fortresses (Bākū and Darband) adversely affected the morale of the garrison at Šamāķī. At this juncture, Ḥājjī Beyrām arrived as ambassador from Ġāzī Gerāy Khan, ruler of the Crimean Tartars; he was accompanied by the centurion Ṭāleb Beg Ev-oğlū, a kinsman of Abu'l-Qāsem Beg, who had earlier been sent with letters of friendship from Shah 'Abbas to the Tartar Khan. The Tartar envoy brought gifts from his master and a letter in which the Tartar Khan expressed his loyalty to the Shah and declared himself to be a devoted servant of the Safavid house. In his letter, the Tartar Khan recalled his imprisonment at Alamūt and his release through the kindness of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, an episode which I related in the first book of this history. The refusal of the Tartar Khan to come to their assistance further dispirited the Ottoman garrison at Šamāķī, which had been led by the false assurances of Šams al-Dīn Pasha to hope for relief from this quarter.

²³I do not follow the argument here. I would have thought that the tower would better have prevented the passage of foreign armies if left standing.

²⁴Khan of the Blue Horde in southern Russia and western Qepčāq 741-58/1341-57.

²⁵Khan of the White Horde in Siberia and eastern Qepčāq, 778-797/1376-95; reunited the White and Blue Hordes as the original Golden Horde 780/1378, and sacked Nizhni Novgorod and Moscow in 784/1382; the archenemy of Tīmūr, who ultimately expelled him from his domains.

²⁶Koran, 18:94ff.

Events of the Year of the Sheep, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1015/1606-07 and Part of 1016/1607-08, the Twenty-First Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday, 22 Zu'l-Qa'da 1015/21 March 1607. The Shah was still camped before the walls of Šamākī. The rain and continual cloud of the preceding three months gradually gave way to sunshine with the onset of spring, and the fields and plains around Šamākī became green with new growth. The mud dried out, and tradesmen were once more able to come and go freely.

The spirits of the troops rose accordingly, and they redoubled their efforts to take the fort. Hoseynqolī Beg Qājār, the brother of Emir Gūna Khan, who had been charged with bringing the heavy siege guns from Ganja, crossed the Kor without mishap and delivered the guns and gun carriages to the royal camp; one cannon was placed by Al-lāhverdī Khan's breastwork, and another at that of Qarčaqāy Beg. Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, obeyed the Shah's summons and reported with his troops. After he had kissed the supports of the Shah's throne, he was directed to take up his station east of the fort, where there were no Safavid troops at the moment, and to push breastworks forward on that side. On every side, the breastworks ringed the fort ever more closely, and sappers drove their tunnels ever closer to the walls. Then the siege guns began hurling large boulders at the fort.

It will be recalled that Shah 'Abbas had acceded to the Georgian request to make Ṭahmūraş Khan ruler of the Kakhetia district, and the party supporting that prince had pledged its submission to the Shah and promised to make amends for its past shortcomings. Shah 'Abbas now called on Ṭahmūraş Khan to honor this pledge and to report for duty with his men before Šamākī. But Ṭahmūraş, who constantly allowed himself, in his folly, to be seduced from the straight path by troublemakers, procrastinated. He begged to be excused from presenting himself for service in person, and promised he would send what troops he could under the command of his mother, Dīdīfāl, who in fact managed the affairs of state.

The Shah replied that he had no objection to this, but warned Ṭahmūraš that more literal-minded people might interpret his failure to come in person as disaffection, if not rebellion. His example might be followed by other frontier governors. The Shah advised him that his best course was to present himself in person at court to demonstrate his loyalty, and then to return to Georgia and send his mother with an army. Ṭahmūraš merely made more unacceptable excuses, and a few days later his mother arrived at Šamāḡī with a Georgian force numbering not more than one thousand men, and some of those of doubtful quality. The Shah, although he was incensed by Ṭahmūraš's behavior, received his mother with great respect and introduced her to the members of the royal harem. The Georgian troops, however, were not detailed to carry out any duties during the whole of the time they were in the Shah's camp.

At this point, the governors of Dāġestān and the princes of Circassia began to visit the Shah's camp: the brothers of Rostam Khan, Ūsmī Khan Qeytāq, 'Alī Beg Zāḡorī, Ma'šūm Khan the governor of Ṭabarestān, and the like came and tendered their submission to the Shah. The people of Dāġestān are wild beasts in human form who have been reared in the wilderness, deprived of any social graces or human intercourse. The said Ma'šūm Khan, having for no reason at all become apprehensive of something, suddenly departed for Ṭabarestān without taking leave of the Shah, who sent robes of honor and letters of appointment after him to reassure him.

An astonishing incident occurred on Sunday, the 'Eyd-e 'Aẓḡā (10 Zū'l-Ḥejja 1015/8 April 1607).¹ The Shah was standing in a portico which master carpenters had erected on wooden pillars at the side of the royal audience hall; the portico was roofed with reeds. He was participating in the ceremonies of the festival. A throne seat had been placed for the Shah's use at the upper end of the portico, and the *šads*, *'olamā*, emirs, viziers, and principal officers of state were gathered at the entrance awaiting their turn to kiss the royal throne seat and congratulate the Shah. About noon, the time the Shah was due to leave, it had been arranged that all the rest of the courtiers, those at court, such as the royal princes from Dāġestān, representatives from Šīrvān, and *qezelbāš* nobles, should assemble in the portico. After all those at the Shah's levée had been seated, they would be shown to their proper places, in accordance with their rank, by the *ešīk-āqāsīs*. About one-third of these personages had still to

¹The day of sacrifice.

take their places when a tremor brought the roof of the portico crashing down. The Dāgestān contingent, who were sitting to one side, saw what was happening and managed to get out in time, but the *šadr*s and *'olamā*, who were less capable of rapid movement, were buried by plaster and wooden beams.

Fortunately, a squad of gardeners of the royal household had started work on a garden in front of the portico, and they immediately rushed in with their shovels and began removing the rubble and dragging out the bodies one by one. Shah Qavām al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the son of 'Allāmat al-'Olamā'i Mīrzā Ebrahim Hamadānī, and Šīr Aḥmad Pasha, were both killed; the latter was the Ottoman governor of Qārş, who had been taken prisoner in the battle with Jeğāl-oğlū, and had been pardoned by the Shah and accorded a place of honor at court. Those who were injured but were hauled out from under the rubble included the *šadr* Qāzī Khan; the *šadr* Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan; the *qāzī-ye mo'askar* Mīr Seyyed Moḥammad, the son of Mīr Seyyed Ḥoseyn the *mojtahed*; Mīr Šadr al-Dīn Moḥammad 'Alavī, the *mohtaseb al-mamālek*; Mīr 'Abbās Gilānī, a member of the *'olamā*; and Ḥājji 'Enāyat Tabrizī. The majority of the injured, however, lay with their limbs contorted and their faces so blackened that it was impossible to recognize them. The Shah ordered phlebotomists to come and bleed the injured who, after they had been bled, revived a little. The next day, Mīr Šadr al-Dīn 'Alavī, whose liver had been crushed, died. Others remained bedridden. On Thursday evening, 8 Rabī' II, 1016/2 August 1607, the *šadr* Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan was afflicted by stomach cramps and diarrhea and died after being confined to his bed for three months as a result of the injuries he received. The rest of the injured recovered.

After examining the Shah's horoscope, the royal astrologers had predicted that at midday on the day in question there would be a threat of danger to the Shah's person, but the influence of the auspicious stars which were at that moment dominant in the Shah's horoscope would mitigate the effect of this threat, and there was hope that no harm would come to the Shah's person. The astrologers had therefore held the Shah in conversation in his private audience hall to prevent him from making any movement until the moment when the danger was at its height had passed. This was why the Shah was a little late in rising to leave the hall, and it was at this point that the disaster had occurred. However, Vaḥīd al-Zamānī Mowlānā 'Alī Reżā the calligrapher, who was a close companion of the Shah, told

me personally that the Shah had told him that, at the time he was due to leave the hall, he had involuntarily gone into a dreamlike trance and was still in this trance when the disaster occurred, and this was why he was late leaving the hall. Truly, if God's protection is shielding you, what harm can befall you? If God's grace is bestowed upon you, what influence can the stars have on your fate?

The news of this calamity caused consternation among the troops manning the breastworks. The emirs rushed to the court in a panic, but saw the Shah, who had remained where he was in order to reassure people, alive and unharmed. The emirs prostrated themselves before him in thankfulness, and went about their business. There are various other happenings this year which I must relate before returning to events at Šamāḵī.

The Capture of Several Forts by Emir Gūna Khan and His Victories in the Erīvān District

Some of the victories I am going to describe happened last year and some this year, but I have brought them together in order to maintain the cohesiveness of my discourse.

As previously related, the fort at Erīvān had been repaired and provisioned, and Emir Gūna Khan and his followers, who in the past few years had seen service at Alanjaq, Ordübād, and Naḡčevān, were stationed there. The area had been completely devastated by the fighting, and there was hardly a serviceable habitation to be seen. Emir Gūna Khan garrisoned the fort with his own emirs and men he could trust, and billeted the rest of his men in neighboring villages, which were also largely in ruins. He also attached to Erīvān numbers of Turkman tribesmen from various parts of Azerbaijan. The men of the Aqča-qoyūnlū clan of the Qajār tribe and the Mūsā-oḡlū Bayāt tribe, who had come from Iraq on orders from the Shah and had been placed under the command of Emir Gūna Khan, were all allotted winter camping grounds in the Šarūr and Erīvān districts.

It had been deliberate policy to leave the Erīvān region uncultivated until such time as Azerbaijan was once more firmly under Safavid control, in order to deny food supplies to Ottoman armies operating in that area. Emir Gūna Khan asked the Shah for permission to plant crops around the fort to provide fodder for the men's horses. If he heard of the approach of an Ottoman army before the crops were

ripe, he said, they would be destroyed; but if the crops ripened, they would be harvested and at once brought within the fort to supplement the men's rations. After obtaining the Shah's permission, Emir Gūna Khan brought a large area under cultivation, using oxen looted from enemy territory across the border, and employing his tribesmen and *qezelbaş* to till the soil. Some of the peasants of the Erīvān district who had not been able to flee to Iraq and had gone into hiding, hearing of cultivation in progress, came out. Wherever there were groups of two or three houses still standing, they sowed crops roundabout. By good fortune, the Ottomans were unable to send an army to Erīvān the following spring, the crops were harvested, and life became easier for the *gāzīs* of the garrison. Emir Gūna Khan carried out incessant raids into enemy territory and established his superiority over enemy forces along the frontier.

The first success he scored was the capture of the fort of Mağāzberd,² situated between Erīvān and Qārş. As a result of his raids, which extended from the area of Qārş and Ḥasan Qal'a as far as Erzerum, movement had become difficult for the garrison at Mağāzberd. The commandants at Qārş and Erzerum were in a weak position themselves and unable to send any help. The commandant at Mağāzberd therefore sent an envoy to Emir Gūna Khan and declared his "love of the Shah." After some negotiation, in the middle of the Year of the Horse (1014/1606), the commandant, 'Alī Beg, known as 'Alī Beg Mağāzberdī, and his officers surrendered in person to Emir Gūna Khan; his men dispersed in all directions, and the fort was occupied by Safavid troops. When Shah 'Abbas returned to Tabriz at the conclusion of his campaign in Şīrvān, these Ottoman officers were paraded before him. Each was given pay and fiefs commensurate with his rank and ordered to serve under Emir Gūna Khan's colors.

The second fort to fall into Safavid hands in the Çokūr-e Sa'd area was that of Mejengerd; its garrison, weary of being stationed there and of the nonarrival of its pay and allowances, surrendered as soon as a Safavid force appeared on the scene.

The garrison at Qārş, however, showed fight. Having asked for reinforcements from Erzerum, the commandant marched toward Erīvān by the Mağāzberd road with about three hundred men, and camped in a valley near Mağāzberd. There, a *qezelbaş* patrol came upon them, much to its own surprise. The *qezelbaş* at once charged

²See *TM*, p. 166.

at full gallop; the Ottomans, caught by surprise, seized whatever horse happened to be nearest in an effort to meet the attack, and about one hundred of them rode out to meet the *gāzīs*. They were scattered by the *qezelbaş* charge, and most of them were killed; the survivors fled back to Qārş. The *qezelbaş* sent the heads of the slain and the captured weapons to the Shah at Šamāķī, and were suitably rewarded with gifts. This reverse made even the Ottoman garrison at Erzerum nervous, and its commander made conciliatory gestures toward Emir Gūna Khan.

This was also the year of the defection of Alvand Beg Rūzakī and Mošafā Beg Maḥmūdī, the governor of Mākūya and Qal'a-ye Bāyazīd. The former was the *vakīl* of Zīā al-Dīn Khan b. Šaraf Khan the governor of Betlīs, who had declared his "love of the Shah" in the year when Allāhverdī Khan marched against Vān, had returned to court with the Safavid commander, and had been honorably treated by the Shah; the latter, despite his rebellious behavior, had constantly been the recipient of royal favor. Both men now defected from Tabriz and joined the enemy. Emir Gūna Khan sent a detachment of troops against the Maḥmūdī tribesmen who supported Mošafā Beg, and the latter surrendered the forts of Mākūya and Bāyazīd to Safavid officers. A detachment of Bayāt *gāzīs* was left to garrison them.

Following these successes, the fortress at Qārş was also captured by Safavid troops. Qārş is a province of Lesser Armenia³ and lies between Erīvān and Erzerum; the area is now known as the province of Erzerum. The author of the *Nozhat al-Qolūb* states that the whole of Lesser Armenia was part of Iran.⁴ At the time when the Turkman dynasties were in power, Qārş was a dependency of Čokūr-e Sa'd. After the Ottomans annexed Erzerum and Arzenjān, the province of Qārş became a bone of contention between the governors of Čokūr-e Sa'd and those of Erzerum. When Sultan Sūlaymān was on the throne, the Ottomans had the intention of strengthening the fort at Qārş and annexing the province. Since the province of Qārş was adjacent to the districts of Šūra-gel and Āğča-Qal'a in the province of Čokūr-e Sa'd, Shah Tahmasp disapproved and moved to prevent the completion of this scheme. For some years Ottomans and Safavids fought it out for control of Qārş, as I related in Book I. As a result, the whole province was devastated and the fort destroyed.

³See *Nozhat al-Qolūb*, p. 100.

⁴Ḥamdollāh Mostowfī, *Nozhat al-Qolūb* (ed. Moḥammad Dabīrstaqi), p. 117, said: "Lesser Armenia does not really form part of Iran!"

When peace was concluded between the Ottoman and Safavid empires,⁵ one of the terms of the treaty was that the fortress at Qārş should be left in ruins and the province in its existing state of desolation; neither side was to occupy this territory. When Sultan Morād broke the peace, one of his first actions was to send troops to restore the fort at Qārş. Peasants were brought from all parts of Armenia to rehabilitate the villages and bring the fields under cultivation again, and a permanent garrison of three hundred men was installed at the fort under the command of a pasha. This year (1015/1606-07) it is exactly thirty years⁶ since the Ottomans restored and garrisoned the fort at Qārş. In the Year of the Dragon (1012/1603-04) Shah 'Abbas, after the capture of Erīvān, once more devastated the province of Qārş and sent his troops to burn the crops and remove all the inhabitants, both Muslims and Armenians. Some were transferred to Iraq, others were taken into captivity. Because of the lack of supplies, 'Osman Pasha, the commandant at Qārş, eventually retired to Erzerum, leaving his junior officers to stick it out at Qārş without prospect of reinforcement.

In the main *qezelbaş* troops controlled the area; on the one occasion when the Ottomans came out to fight, they were soundly defeated by the army of Çökür-e Sa'd, as already related. Without provisions, the plight of the survivors at Qārş grew daily worse and men began to desert, until no more than fifty or sixty were left in the fort—about two or three hundred persons counting their servants and families. Finally, in the middle of the Year of the Sheep, when Emir Gūna Khan marched against them, they sued for quarter, which was granted, declared their "love of the Shah," and marched to Erīvān. On orders from the Shah, the fort at Qārş was again razed, as it had been in the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and all munitions (cannon, mortars, muskets, lead, and gunpowder) were removed and taken to Erīvān. The Shah received the news of the fall of Qārş on 9 Rabi' II, 1016/3 August 1607. Of those in the fort, a number who were employed as servants and were native to the area were registered as employees of the *dtvān* and allotted wages; others preferred military service. Emir Gūna Khan, as a result of this victory, obtained complete mastery of the frontier region, and kept the Ottoman garrison at Erzerum penned within their four walls.

This year the son of a Safavid defector returned to Iran. This was

⁵By the Treaty of Amasya, 1555.

⁶Lunar years, of course, which dates the reoccupation of Qārş to 985/1577-78.

Mahdīqolī Beg Sa'dlū. His father, 'Alīqolī Sultan Sa'dlū, had been one of the emirs of Čokūr-e Sa'd, and had held the governorship of Qāqezmān; when the Ottomans took over the area, he defected to them and still holds office under them. This year his son, who had an innate "love of the Shah," came to Erīvān. He was received by the Shah, granted an appropriate rate of pay and a fief, and placed under the command of the *beglerbeg* of Čokūr-e Sa'd.

The Unsuccessful Expedition of Jahāngīr Khan and Moḥammad Salīm Sultan from Garjestān to Balḵ, and the Death of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā

The Uzbek tribes, especially those this side of the Oxus, had gradually gathered around Jahāngīr Khan, Moḥammad Salīm Sultan, and Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā in Garjestān. When their number reached twelve thousand, the three leaders marched on Balḵ, as they had been hoping to do for some time. The guardians of Nadr Moḥammad Sultan, the younger son of Yatīm Khan, who was the governor of Balḵ, barred the gates against them, and the Garjestān contingent settled down to a siege.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, the brother of Bāqī Khan, who had become ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan after the death of his brother, happened to be at Qaršī at the time. He at once sent twenty thousand men, under the command of Moḥammad Bāqī Qalmāq, Šaqāl Mīrzā, and Qūzī Mīrzā, to the relief of Balḵ. This army crossed the Oxus at Termez and marched to Balḵ. The Garjestān army halted siege operations and drew itself up for battle. When the armies neared each other, a body of five hundred picked cavalry under Šaqāl Mīrzā and Qūzī Mīrzā rode out ahead of the army of Transoxania and confronted the troops led by Jahāngīr Khan, but Jahāngīr Khan's men charged them and almost annihilated them. This initial success caused many of the Uzbek tribesmen to desert from the army of Transoxania and join Jahāngīr Khan. In view of this, the Transoxania commanders decided to dig in where they were. At their rear they had the Oxus River, and they protected their front with palisades.

Among the Uzbeks, very few, except the most valiant, seek the command of armies. For the majority, the supreme act of bravery is to make an individual charge against the enemy with drawn sword, to achieve a few feats of individual valor, and to ride back from the battlefield. The warriors who had rallied around Jahāngīr Khan

began to talk wistfully of this sort of thing, and to sing the praises of Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā. The latter was a young, brave, and intrepid warrior; either because of his pride and inexperience, or as the result of the taunts of people who were envious of him, he now suddenly decided to make an individual charge against the enemy in the traditional Uzbeg manner. He rushed out with drawn sword, and charged the enemy around the palisades and trenches, wounding several of them. As he was riding back, he saw an enemy footsoldier fitting an arrow to his bow and taking aim at him. Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā at once swung his horse around and galloped at him, intending to cut him down with his sword; but before he reached him, an enemy musketeer, also on foot, fired at him and brought down his horse. According to another version, Yār Moḥammad Mīrzā's horse fell as it was leaping a trench.

At all events, the prince fell from his horse and was taken prisoner; none of his men was there to help him because Jahāngīr Khan's lines were a long way off, and he had been extremely negligent about looking where he was going. Moḥammad Bāqī Qalmāq and the other Transoxanian emirs thought it best not to send him alive to Valī Moḥammad Khan, and put him to death on the spot.

When Jahāngīr Khan's men heard of this disaster, they broke up and scattered in all directions: Šīr-afkan Mīrzā retired with his men to Badaḡšān; another group fled in another direction, taking Moḥammad Salīm Sultan with them, and the latter's ultimate fate is unknown. Jahāngīr Khan, stunned by this sudden reversal of fortune, returned to Ġarjestān with some three thousand men who had remained loyal to him. Valī Moḥammad Khan sent his men across the Oxus to raid Khorasan.

The Attack on Khorasan by the Army of Transoxania and Its Withdrawal, Discomfited

The army of Transoxania assembled in the area of Mārūčāq and Bādḡīs for the invasion of Khorasan, and some three thousand men were sent to ravage the province of Marv and return to Bokhara via Čahār-jū. The main force reached Qal'a-ye Ḥowz-e Khan, and for three days camped before its walls. Ḥowz-e Khan is a reservoir which 'Abdollāh Khan had built at the junction of the roads to Bādḡīs and Herat; at this time it had a fortification and was garrisoned by a detachment of musketeers and other troops sent by the *beglerbeg* of

Herat. The Uzbegs decided not to attack the fort. Some moved off to ravage the Zūrābād region, and others decided to plunder the tribes living in the Bādġīs area. Hoseyn Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, had been forewarned of the Uzbek incursion, and had sent couriers to all the outlying posts under his command to warn them to man the forts with plenty of musketeers and to be ready for action. Hoseyn Khan busied himself with mobilizing his troops and awaited orders from the Shah.

At this point, the raiders were forced to turn back by a heavy and unexpected snowfall and by the onset of a spell of extremely cold weather. Many lost their lives in the drifts in the valleys round Bādġīs. The Uzbegs were even forced to leave behind the plunder they had accumulated. As they passed Mārūčāq on their retreat, Qazāq Khan the son of Hoseyn Khan issued from the fort and attacked them, and slew some seventy or eighty of them near the Morġāb River.

The Uzbegs who had gone in the direction of Marv ravaged the area, and set off back to Čahār-jū with their booty, which included personal property and animals. Bektāš Khan Ostājilū, the governor of Marv, left three hundred of his men to guard the fort and set off in pursuit of the Uzbegs with twelve hundred men, three hundred of whom he sent ahead as the vanguard. As soon as they spotted the Uzbegs, the *qezelbāš* vanguard charged them, and most of them fled without having had time to form up for battle. However, the Uzbek officers and some four or five hundred veterans disengaged themselves from their booty and formed up for battle. Bektāš Khan arrived with the main body at this moment, and a fierce struggle ensued; the Uzbek veterans fought to the limits of their endurance, but eventually the survivors fled from the field, abandoning their booty. Bektāš Khan judged it prudent not to pursue them, and set his men to gathering up the loot.

About four hundred Uzbegs were killed or taken prisoner in this engagement. On Wednesday, 1 Zu'l-Qa'da 1015/28 February 1607, a courier from Bektāš Khan reached the Shah's camp before Šamāḡī. He brought with him an Uzbek prisoner, who narrated for the Shah's benefit the story of the battle, and confirmed that three hundred Uzbegs had been killed and eighty taken prisoner. Bektāš Khan returned to Marv and restored the stolen property to its owners. Twelve Uzbek prisoners of note were sent to the Shah's court with an escort of *ġāzis* who had distinguished themselves in this action. When the

prisoners and their escort reached Mīān-sarāy in Kalkāl, riding in separate groups because of the narrowness of the path, one of the Uzbek prisoners managed to get his hands free. He freed several of his fellows who were walking along yoked together, and they seized the sword from the belt of one of the Khan's retainers and slew him and wounded several others. They then released the rest of the Uzbek prisoners, and all fled into the mountains.

The rest of Bektāš Khan's men, who had been riding on ahead, warned the villagers of the Kalkāl district about the escaped prisoners, and went in search of them. They caught seven of them, but the rest hid in caves during the night and got away. The prisoners whom they finally delivered at the Shah's camp were all warriors of note, but the Shah, instead of treating them with his habitual clemency, had them executed on the spot for their audacity in trying to escape. One of the prisoners was a handsome youth whose beard had not yet grown, and the executioners did not want to put him to death, but the youth adjured them in the name of Almighty God to let him join his fellows, and so they did. I will now return to the siege of Šamākī.

The Capture of the Fortress of Šamākī and Other Events in Šīrūān

The fire of the heavy siege guns, which projected a shot weighing thirty *man*,⁷ was beginning to make breaches in the walls and towers of the fort at Šamākī and to damage the battlements. The sappers had penetrated beyond the ditch, and had tunneled under the walls themselves. The Ottomans tried in vain to prevent the progress of this work. The besiegers had everything ready for the assault, and merely awaited the Shah's command. The Shah, although he had sworn not to grant quarter to the garrison, was innately averse to bloodletting and hesitated to order the assault. In the general sack that follows the storming of a castle, no distinction is made between military and innocent civilians. The rules governing the storming of castles and conquest permit killing and plundering, and in fact it is impossible to prevent it. In a general assault, good and bad alike are consumed in the fire of war. The Shah kept hoping, therefore, that he could achieve his ends by some other means, and his emirs did not dare to act in this delicate situation without a command from him.

On Thursday, 25 Šafar 1016/21 June 1607, a party of *gōlāms* from

⁷About 196 lbs.

the breastwork commanded by Qarčaqāy Beg saw their opportunity to scale a tower that had been cracked and breached by artillery fire. The rest of the Safavid troops thought this was the signal for a general assault and leapt from behind their breastworks, but Qarčaqāy Beg, terrified of the Shah's anger, stopped the attack and made the men who had scaled the tower come down and go back to their tents. Several good men were lost in this aborted attack to no purpose, for God had willed that, of those within the fort, neither soldier nor civilian should be spared. Whatever man proposes, it is powerless to alter the course of the divine will.

The following day, Friday, 26 Šafar/22 June, about the middle of the morning, two of the besieged who had reached the end of their tether because of the hardships of the siege emerged from a tower facing the breastwork of Zu'l-Faqār Khan and shouted that they had been the only two Ottomans in the tower, which was now empty. By a coincidence, several feet of wall not far from this tower had collapsed of its own accord a few days previously, and a breach had been formed. Zu'l-Faqār Khan's men, without waiting for orders, charged at the breach, and about one hundred and fifty of them forced their way inside. Zu'l-Faqār Khan, who had just learned what was happening, realized that not a moment was to be lost if he was to save the lives of those hundred and fifty men; already the inhabitants of the town and the defenders of the fort were stirring themselves to meet the threat. He was forced to order the rest of his men to attack, and he himself mounted the tower and blew his bugle.

Qarčaqāy Beg, hearing the din of the fighting, and learning that Zu'l-Faqār's men were within the city walls, also refused to wait any longer and ordered his *gölāms* to attack. They stormed the tower that had been damaged by artillery fire. Trumpets, tympani, and kettle-drums contributed to the general din, as all the other Safavid emirs sent their troops into action. The Ottomans, unable to hold the walls and battlements, tried to find hiding places in the city, but were hunted down and killed. Three or four thousand people perished in the assault on the city and the sack that followed, while the attackers lost no more than three or four men.

The situation in the upper fort, where Allāhverdī Khan and the *qūrčībāšī* had their stations, was different. Here, the Ottomans had been more vigilant in defense; the attackers had suffered a number of casualties from Ottoman musketballs, and no breaches had so far

been made in the towers, which consequently could not yet be scaled. The two Safavid commanders therefore kept their men in their stations and did not order an attack, since they had no orders to do so.

After the fall of the city, Ahmad Pasha and the other senior officers tried to hold on in the upper fort, but their efforts were like the convulsions of a dying man. They held on for another five or six days, but in vain. The attackers who had overrun the city approached the upper fort under cover, by dint of boring holes through the walls of adjacent houses, and finally were able to undermine the fortifications. The *qūrčīs*, mindful of their reputation as crack troops, labored night and day at the tunnel which ran from their breastwork, and succeeded in extending it to the ditch. Once they reached the ditch, in one night they constructed a covered shelter beneath the walls, and within a few days had excavated an area underneath the tower. The siege guns meanwhile were playing constantly on the tower, which showed some slight signs of damage, but not enough to render it easy to scale.

On the fifth day of the siege of the upper fort, one hundred and fifty intrepid young men, who considered it the supreme act of devotion to the Safavid house to lay down their lives in its service, holding their shields above their heads, rushed at the tower. The defenders, who knew they had to hold the tower if they valued their lives, rained down a hail of arrows, musketballs, naphtha pots and other incendiary objects which they had prepared for just such an occasion. Allāhverdī Khan sent his troops from the army of Fārs to their support. The struggle was one of extreme ferocity. Finally, some *qūrčīs*, with drawn swords and shields held over their heads, succeeded in scaling the tower—heaven knows how—and engaged the defenders in hand-to-hand combat. The Ottomans were forced to evacuate the tower, but continued to fire on the *gāzīs* from the roofs of the houses. The *gāzīs* who had stormed the tower fixed up a sort of screen to protect themselves from the enemy fire. All the Ottoman efforts to dislodge the *gāzīs* from the tower were unsuccessful, and more *gāzīs* were swarming up the tower to join their fellows all the time, until the tower was completely under their control; they did not, however, leave the tower and enter the interior of the fort, for fear that the Ottoman treasuries and other property might be plundered.

Many of the defenders, realizing that the fort was lost, gave up the struggle. Aḥmad Pasha kept urging the Janissaries and slaves of the

Porte and other troops to further efforts, but the men refused to follow his orders and sent an envoy to Allāhverdi Khan to ask for quarter. The Pasha himself, with a group of his personal retainers and *seğmens*,⁸ climbed on the roof of a palace that used to be the residence of the rulers of Širvān in former times, and maintained a steady fire on the *qūrčīs* and *golāms*. But eventually this fire too slackened. Since the Pasha had originally elected to fight rather than negotiate terms, he fought on to the bitter end.

A reliable source told me that Aḥmad Pasha used to say, "I had a slave, bought with gold, who was so bashful and polite he never dared to speak to me. During the time he was with me, he served me devotedly and bravely. When the *qezelbāš* gained control of the tower, he and I had two muskets; he loaded one while I fired the other. During a lull in the fighting, he turned to me and said: 'I have doubts about your sanity when I see you risking your life in this way. Everyone else has given up the struggle, and is resigned to the inevitable. Why are you kicking against fate? What can we two do to alter the situation? Save your life tonight and wait to see what the morrow will bring forth. So saying, he turned his head away from me, and refused to hand me the musket which he had reloaded. When I saw that even my faithful slave had had the audacity to disobey my orders, I realized that the game was up. I discharged the musket I had in my hand, and then submitted to my fate. I shouted to the *qezelbāš* on the tower to cease firing, because I had surrendered, and the fort was the Shah's." At all events, the Pasha kept firing as long as he had an arrow left in his quiver, and then he too sent an envoy to Allāhverdi Khan, asking that the *qezelbāš* not be let loose to sack the fort that night; the next day, he said, he would submit to the Shah's will, whatever it might be. Allāhverdi Khan and the *qūrčī-bašī* transmitted his request to the Shah, who ordered his troops to hold off that night, but to mount close guard to prevent anyone from slipping out of the fort.

On the morning of the sixth day after the fall of the lower fort, Wednesday 2 Rabī' I, 1016/27 June 1607, the court chamberlains convened a royal assembly, and the Shah, having returned thanks to Almighty God, took his seat upon the throne, and kettledrums were beaten in the camp to celebrate the victory. Qarčaqāy Beg and his *golāms* were ordered to take charge of the fort and place guards at

⁸Originally an independent corps, the *seğmens* later became a division of the Janisseries (see Gibb and Bowen, pp. 314ff).

the gates. Hüseyn Beg Qūr Zu'l-Qadar, the chief herald, was sent into the fort to summon Aḥmad Pasha and Šams al-Dīn Pasha with his brother and young son (these men were responsible for the Ottoman resistance), together with Küçük Ḥasan and several others. Aḥmad Pasha procrastinated and said to the chief herald, "I am guilty of such misdeeds against the Shah's servants that I deserve execution; I am therefore not worthy to enter a royal assembly. I hope the Shah will order one of his retainers to come into the fort and execute me here." After the Shah had given him an assurance that his life would be spared, Aḥmad Pasha entered the royal assembly and prostrated himself contritely before the Shah. Since he was an intelligent man, he uttered expressions appropriate to the circumstances.

The Shah, despite the anger which dominated him that day, spoke gently to Aḥmad Pasha and did not upbraid him, but Šams al-Dīn Pasha felt the rough edge of his tongue as the Shah began to enumerate his crimes. Küçük Ḥasan thought to ingratiate himself with the Shah by joining in the condemnation of Šams al-Dīn Pasha: "You knew that the garrison was not strong enough to withstand the Shah. The garrison would have abandoned Šīrvān and gone to Darband, but you would not permit it. You yourself destroyed the drawbridge and encouraged us to stay and fight. You claimed to be in mystical communion with God and to possess miraculous powers. You said that the saints and the *aqlāb* had told you no harm would befall the fort at the hands of the *qezelbāš*." Malek 'Alī Beg the herald, who was a wit and was allowed considerable license to exercise his talent at court, said to Šams al-Dīn Pasha, who sported a long beard, "I am surprised that you continue to wear a shaikh's beard, since your claim to mystical and miraculous powers has proved to be false, and the promise of divine assistance which you made to the garrison has not been fulfilled. In view of this, I think it is desirable to shorten your shaikh's beard a little." So saying, after receiving the Shah's consent, he grasped Šams al-Dīn Pasha's beard and began to pull out the hair in handfuls.

The Shah's wrath against Šams al-Dīn Pasha could only be assuaged by the meting out to him of extreme penalties, and so he, his brother, his young son, and several other people whose words and actions had aroused the Shah's anger were tortured in various ways. After being deprived of their sight, they were taken to the commissariat area and cut to pieces. A certain Morāl, a Šīrvānī by birth, who had grown up among the Ottomans and was a trusted retainer

of theirs, considered himself an outstanding warrior and a champion archer. He inscribed his name on all his arrows, and boasted of his valor. One of the officers of the royal court, whose brother had been killed by one of this man's arrows, asked permission to kill him in blood revenge. Permission was granted, and he went immediately to the fort, cut off Morāl's head, and brought it to the Shah. Although the whole Ottoman garrison deserved to be put to death, the Shah allowed them to depart on condition that they hand over all their possessions to the *ḡāzis* as blood money.

One of those captured in the fort was the brother of Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn Gīlānī, the vizier of Khan Aḥmad, the ruler of Gīlān. This man had held the position of *qūrčībāšī* to Khan Aḥmad. When Khan Aḥmad fled to Šīrvān and thence to Asia Minor, this man had remained in Šīrvān and had continued to style himself *qūrčībāšī*. He was noted for his wealth, and was highly regarded by the Ottomans for his ability. The Shah had regarded Kāja Ḥosām al-Dīn and his brothers with great disfavor, since he held them responsible for the troubles in Gīlān and the revolt of Khan Aḥmad, and he had already executed at Qazvin one of the brothers, Kāja Šams al-Dīn. This particular brother had remained loyal to the Ottomans throughout the siege, and had been their adviser on important matters. When he was brought before the Shah, he began to talk smoothly and utter lying words, as is the habit of Gīlānīs. He agreed to satisfy the demands of the *dīvān*, and undertook to deliver to the Safavid troops a large sum obtained from the property of the Ottoman garrison. In this way, he saved his neck for a short time. Initially, he talked of delivering the sum of fifty thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*.

Although the Shah knew he was not to be trusted, he decided it was expedient to give him a chance to prove himself. He bestowed gifts on him and cheered him by telling him he might appoint him vizier of Gīlān—or even of Isfahan and Māzandarān. The "*qūrčībāšī*" summoned the Ottoman clerks and, on the basis of their registers, made a list of all the men who drew pay and allowances during the siege, taking no account of whether they were alive or dead. Against the name of each he put a sum of money, in every case beyond the man's means; if the man was dead, the sum was entailed on his heirs. He fixed another sum of money to be paid by the aldermen⁹ and inhabitants of Šamāḡī who had collaborated with the Ottomans and who had been in the upper fort during the siege; this sum

⁹*Kadḡodās* were either the leading men of urban wards, or the heads of guilds.

was to be regarded both as a fine and as a ransom for their lives. When he had added all this up, it still did not come to more than thirty thousand *tomān*.

The total sum to be levied was divided between the *golāms*, *qūr-čīs*, officers at court, and musketeers who had served at the siege of Šamāḳī, and each detachment of troops was allotted a certain number of people on the register from whom they could collect the appropriate sum. If anyone complained that the sum was too much or too little, the "*qūrčībāšī* of Gīlān" would reach a settlement with him in conformity with the computation of the account. By various ruses and subterfuges, the "*qūrčībāšī*" maintained his position as consultant and person of influence among the garrison and townspeople for several days, while the business of extracting the money from people waxed fast and furious. From persons of means, the full amount of the fine was collected, but from others, they managed to extract only a half, a third, or even a quarter. Of the share charged to persons now dead, they collected very little. The total sum accruing to the *ḡāzīs* came to no more than five or six thousand *tomān*; the rest was uncollectible.

The falsehood of the promises of the "*qūrčībāšī* of Gīlān" being now apparent, he was deemed deserving of punishment for his past sins, and was handed over to the dunners. Upon interrogation he confessed that he had unlimited wealth stored away in Gīlān, and the dunners took him there and began the expropriation of his property. Most of what he said was lies, and he kept making absurd excuses. One day, on the pretext of performing his ablutions, he went to the bank of the Safīd River and threw himself into the water, hoping to escape by swimming across. But he was weighed down by his crimes and drowned. Glory be to God! My pen has once again led me away from the main theme of my discourse! My justification is that the subject of this digression was connected with the siege of Šamāḳī, and was therefore not entirely irrelevant.

Aḥmad Pasha, with a few servants, was handed over to 'Isā Khan Beg, the grandson of Ma'sūm Beg Šafavī, who was connected with the Safavid royal house and subsequently became *qūrčībāšī*. After spending a few days as the guest of 'Isā Khan, Aḥmad Pasha was sent to the fortress-prison of Qahqaha and was not heard of again.

Among the Ottoman garrison were a number of Šīrvānīs who had

entered Ottoman service and become fiefholders.¹⁰ The interests of the Safavid state dictated that no punitive action should be taken against these persons at that time, because this might cause disturbances among the inhabitants of Šīrvān in general, who had been under Ottoman rule for years and had given their support to them. The royal favor was therefore bestowed upon a number of these Šīrvānīs, each of whom was granted two or three localities as a fief or had their revenues granted to him in the form of a tax immunity. The Shah also decreed that the sons and brothers of these persons should be enrolled in Safavid service in Iraq. However, Safavid governors gradually assumed control of areas granted to these Šīrvānīs, because of their fear of possible revolt on the part of the latter.

The rest of the Ottoman troops had lived for years among the people of Šīrvān, and had formed friendships and intermarried with them. The Shah decreed that these Ottomans should be handed over to their friends and kinsmen among the people of Šīrvān, who would provide them with travel expenses and send them on their way to wherever they wished to go. The people of Šīrvān realized that they were under a cloud for having collaborated with the Ottomans, and they were looking for some way of clearing their name. They hit on the plan of murdering all the Ottoman soldiers, thereby demonstrating their enmity toward the Ottomans and their "love for the Shah," and one night they disposed of the lot. The only Ottomans to survive were a few servants and other ranks who were fortunate enough to escape the swords of the Šīrvānīs.

About this time Zu'l-Faqār Khan committed a dastardly act that later brought him ill fortune. His elder brother, Rostam Khan, who had been driven out of his seat of government by a revolt on the part of the emirs of Țāleš, had crossed the Kor and, with his brothers and supporters, gone to live in Šīrvān. For a while he had established a *modus vivendi* with the Ottomans, but ultimately the Ottomans had become suspicious of him and had thought it advisable to put him out of the way. Rostam Khan, with several of his brothers and their followers, had been put to death; Farhād Khan, the younger brother of Rostam Khan, and two other brothers younger than himself, Zu'l-Faqār Khan and Alvand Sultan, escaped from the Ottomans and fled to Azerbaijan.

¹⁰Holders of *ze'āma* or *tīmār*; the distinction between the two types of fiefs was simply one of value (see Gibb and Bowen, I/1, pp. 47ff.).

When Shah 'Abbas came to the throne, he put to death any *qezel-bāš* who defied his authority, and brought security and order back to the country. The refugees thought they were safe from their enemies and came to court, where they rose to high office. I have already related part of their story in the appropriate place. A foster-sister of theirs and two other daughters of Rostam Khan, in addition to a number of servants, were still in Šīrvān in Ottoman hands. All three women had been married by Ottoman nobles, and the honor of the family had been thus preserved. There had been both male and female issue of these marriages. When Zu'l-Faqār Khan was appointed governor of Šīrvān just before the fall of Šamāḳī, the husbands and their sons turned to him for help, relying on their kinship with him through Rostam Khan. The Shah, who was apprised of this, ordained that the husbands, their sons, and their followers should be entrusted to the custody of Zu'l-Faqār Khan, and that no one should molest them.

As a result, the sum which the "*qūrčībāšī* of Gilān" had set against their names as part of the fines levied on the Ottomans was left for Zu'l-Faqār Khan to pay, so that no alien tax collector should call at their houses. But Zu'l-Faqār Khan, jealous of the family honor and heedless of the eventual consequences of his action, put to death all three women, their husbands, their children (both male and female), their sons-in-law, and their servants, between twenty-seven and thirty people in all. The victims are said to have been murdered in one night, but there are differing accounts on this point. The Shah expressed his loathing of the deed, which was condemned by all. Since Zu'l-Faqār Khan had violated the bonds of kinship and murdered innocent women and children, it was not long before divine retribution brought his own life to a close.

After these events, the province of Šīrvān was divided among the *qezelbāš* emirs: The districts of Darband and Šāberān went to Čerāğ Sultan Gerāmpā Ostājilū, and Shah Naẓar Beg Tükeli was ordered to give him assistance; they replaced the troops currently in the Darband area. Zu'l-Faqār Khan entered the city of Šamāḳī and set about repairing the damage done to the fort. The tunnels and trenches dug by the Safavid forces were filled in. The weather now being uncomfortably hot, the Shah moved to summer quarters in the nearby mountains.

The Dāğestānī and Circassian emirs and governors, both those

who had come in person to court and those who had professed their loyalty to the Shah by sending representatives, were given leave to depart after receiving robes of honor and gifts of money, and Rostam Khan Dāgestānī received suitable honors. Ma'šūm Khan, the ruler of Ṭabarsarān, still felt guilty about having left the royal camp without the Shah's permission, and was kept in a perpetual state of anxiety by the continued presence of the Shah in the area. The Shah therefore sent Moḥammad Šāleḥ Beg, the vizier of Šīrvān, on a mission to him with yet more gifts, and special indulgences on the part of the Shah. Ma'šūm Khan's anxieties were finally stilled, and he was exalted above his peers by these gifts. He sent some of the inmates of his own harem for service in the royal palace, and once more entered the ranks of the Shah's loyal servants.

The Shah's Return from Šīrvān to Tabriz and His Visit to the Shrine at Mašhad

Once the decision to strike camp at Šamākī and march back to Iraq had been taken, 'Alī Khan Beg Javānšīrī was sent on ahead to Javād to construct a bridge across the Kor. When this was ready, the Shah struck camp, crossed the Kor, and set off for Tabriz via Darra-verd. He sent the emirs, principal officers of state, and the tents via Ahar, while he himself, with a few personal attendants and *moqarrabs*, visited the shrine of Shaikh Šaftī at Ardabil before rejoining his troops at Tabriz. At Tabriz, the Shah spent some days seeing to the needs of the emirs and nobles of Azerbaijan, and ordering the affairs of that frontier. He welcomed ambassadors from Mīr Šaraf, the governor of Jazīra, and Zakarīā Khan and the other Kurdish emirs, congratulating him on his victory at Šamākī and on the conquest of Šīrvān; they were loaded with gifts and sent on their way.

Ġāzī Gerāy Khan, the chief of the Crimean Tartars, had asked the Shah to release Kāndān Aqa, the *motaffereqa-āqāsī*, who had been taken prisoner at Vān and was a close friend of his. The Shah accordingly released from imprisonment at Qahqaha Kāndān Aqa and his two sons, one of whom had been taken prisoner with his father at Vān, and the other in the battle with Jegāl-oḡlū. Kāndān Aqa was a wise and experienced officer, and he now offered to leave his sons with the Shah as hostages and, together with Ġāzī Gerāy Khan, make overtures to the Ottoman Sultan with a view to negotiating peace on the same terms as those of the Treaty of Amasya.

The Shah gave his approval to this suggestion, and sent Kāndān

Aqa on his way accompanied by Abu'l-Qāsem Beg Ev-oğlū the centurion, who had been nominated ambassador to the Khan of the Crimean Tartars and carried with him a friendly letter from the Shah. As the party crossed Circassia, they heard of the death of Gāzī Gerāy Khan, and at the same time they were attacked by a certain Circassian governor named Ūtiya who bore a long-standing grudge against Kāndān Aqa. Kāndān Aqa, who had become separated from Abu'l-Qāsem Beg, was killed. Abu'l-Qāsem Beg fought valiantly against the Circassians and was wounded; Ūtiya, after looting all his baggage, eventually sent him back safe and sound because of his fear of the Shah's wrath. After the death of Kāndān Aqa, his sons remained in an honored position at the Shah's court for a time, but later showed their ingratitude by fleeing from it, as will be described shortly.

The whole of the Shah's hereditary territories of Šīrvān and Azerbaijan, which had been under Ottoman occupation for nearly twenty-five years, was now back in Safavid hands. All the forts in these two provinces, which had been well garrisoned by the Ottomans and stocked with provisions and munitions, had been recaptured. The whole area had been swept clean of Ottoman troops, but it had taken almost five years of continuous campaigning to achieve this. Not since the time of Tīmūr, two hundred and fifty¹¹ years ago, had any ruler kept his armies in the field for five continuous years and achieved such an uninterrupted run of victories. After spending several days reviewing his troops at Tabriz, the Shah sent his men on leave. Since the Shah attributed his victories to the assistance of God and the infallible Imams, especially the Eighth Imam, he decided to make the pilgrimage to the shrine at Mašhad and gain spiritual refreshment after the rigors and hardships inseparable from military campaigns.

At Qazvin, the local notables prepared illuminations in the markets and the Meydān-e Sa'ādatābād, and celebrations went on for several days. At the conclusion of these festivities, the Shah set out for Mašhad with a small party of personal attendants. He was received at Mašhad by the governor, Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the governor of Herat, and most of the emirs of Khorasan. After completing the ceremonies of the pilgrimage, the Shah returned to Isfahan, which he entered on 26 Rajab 1016/16 November 1607. The city, the bazaars, and the

¹¹The figure is approximate; Tīmūr first invaded the Iranic world in 1380-81.

Qeysariya¹² were gay with decorations, and several days were devoted to popular festivities.

The emirs, when they reviewed their men at Tabriz, had, at the Shah's command, faithfully recorded the names of those under their command. Men who had served continuously for the last five years without a break were singled out for special reward. Those who had distinguished themselves by particular acts of heroism in the field—and their name was legion—had the details of circumstances recorded under their names so that they might be suitably rewarded. These muster rolls had been delivered to the comptrollers of finance, the men had been sent on leave, and the emirs had been given permission to return to their fiefs. The vizier, Hâtem Beg, was given permission to return home to Ordübâd to lay the foundations of certain buildings he had in mind, and I accompanied him on this trip, since I was usually in attendance upon him. Although I had not seen my loved ones and children for five years, I could not bear not to be at the vizier's side. Since the vizier strongly urged me to go with him, I decided that the advantages to be gained by accompanying him took precedence over my own wishes, and agreed to his request. Although the details of this trip have no place in my history, strictly speaking, I devoutly hope that by giving them I will not incur censure from my learned readers.

My Trip to Ordübâd with the Vizier, Hâtem Beg, and Our Return to Isfahan

When Hâtem Beg left Tabriz for Ordübâd, he had the following traveling companions: (1) Seyyed Nâşer, the son of Seyyed Mobârak Khan the ruler of Hâvîza. Seyyed Nâşer, from his early youth, had been brought up by the vizier as his own son, and had mastered many branches of learning. (2) Moştafâ Pasha, a distinguished Ottoman emir who held the status of vizier. He had been taken prisoner at the battle of Şûfîân. He was a man of genial temperament, a good conversationalist, and a man of secretarial cast of mind. He had been placed in the custody of Hâtem Beg by the Shah, and the vizier treated him like a friend and invited him to all his gatherings. (3) Moḥammad Hüseyn Tafreşî, a most learned man, skilled in the secretarial art, and possessed of the most excellent taste as regards inventing new expressions and metaphors. For some years he had been the tutor of Mîrzâ Tâleb Khan. (4) Mîr 'Abd al-Ġanî Tafreşî, a relative

¹²The royal bazaar.

of the above, a *seyyed* of congenial disposition. Both he and Moḥammad Ḥoseyn had been fellow students attending the classes of 'Al-lāmat al-'Olamā'i Mirzā Ebrahim Hamadāni. Mir 'Abd al-Ḡanī was also no mean poet. (5) Mowlānā Moṭrebī Qazvīnī, an outstanding singer of his age, and a specialist in the singing of rounds. In both the composition of lyrics and in playing he is the envy of his fellow artists. He is an extremely witty man an excellent companion. (6) Ostād Ḥeydarqolī 'Ūdī,¹³ a dexterous and melodious wielder of the plectrum, who was attached to the court.

Ḥātem Beg's other companions, such as your humble servant, were privileged to be constantly in attendance at his private parties with the distinguished people mentioned above, and contributed to the general enjoyment by composing poetry, narrating history, and telling stories and anecdotes.

First, we went to Dū-zāl and Kor-dašt, two villages in the Dezmār district on the southern bank of the Aras River. We stayed for three days in these delightful spots, whose gardens abound with every kind of fruit, especially sweet pomegranates that are preferred by connoisseurs to those of Yazd, Abarqūh, Šāhvār in the Sāva district, or Qom; excellent grapes are also cultivated in great variety. The yield of fruit crops in this area is extremely heavy, particularly in the case of pomegranates, which are produced in sufficient quantity to supply the whole of Azerbaijan, Šīrvān, Arrān,¹⁴ and Georgia.

Mūsā Beg Dezmārī is related to the Našīrīya Ṭūsīya family, and also comes of the same line as Elyās Kalīfa, one of the Qarāja-dāg *kalīfas*, a distinguished and influential family. Elyās Kalīfa had been appointed governor of that region by Shah 'Abbas, and had provided extremely pleasant accommodation at Dū-zāl for travelers, to whose needs he catered to the best of his ability. We were entertained royally by Elyās Kalīfa and by the son of Mūsā Beg, especially by Šāhroḡ Beg, a talented and clean-living young man who is an excellent calligrapher and who now holds the office of vizier of the *qūrčīs*,¹⁵ and by his brother Ḥeydar Beg, who holds the rank of centurion. Ḥātem Beg gave suitable gifts to the *kalīfa*, his sons, and all the members of his family.

¹³I.e., the lute player.

¹⁴I.e., Qarābāg.

¹⁵Each of the four principal corps of the Safavid army in the time of Shah 'Abbas (*qūrčīs*, *golāms*, *tofangčīs*, *tūpčīs*) had its own vizier. On the function of the vizier of the *qūrčīs*, see *TM*, p. 72.

From Dū-zāl, we proceeded contentedly on our way to Ordūbād, where we lodged in houses that had belonged to the vizier's family for generations. Everyone, high and low, came out to welcome the vizier and to express their joy at seeing him. The vizier treated all sorts and conditions of men as his friends and brothers, and behaved with the generosity expected of one of his station, bestowing gifts on all dependents of the Naṣīriya Ṭūsīya family. All, down to artisans and craftsmen, were recipients of his bounty, and holy men, dervishes, and deserving women were not forgotten. We stayed at Ordūbād for twenty days, and every day there was a feast of noble proportions. The vizier visited Vanand and Kalīs for a few days, and the whole time he was in an excellent humor.

In the midst of the gardens of this region there is a hill called Naẓāra (lookout point), a favorite place for excursions. From it, one obtains a beautiful view over the gardens and orchards on the slopes of the hill, and of the Aras which flows through them from the west. The vizier had had water led down from higher up the mountain in order to install fountains at Naẓāra, and he had built there an octagonal pleasure house, each side having a portico. On top of the building, a cistern had been constructed so that water could be distributed around the house. In front of each portico was a pool. On the southern side of Naẓāra, ten cubits¹⁶ below the level of the building, there was a plot of ground some three or four *jarībs*¹⁷ in area. The vizier planned to level it and to construct on it a large pool, surrounded by gardens. In the middle of this pool were to be fountains, and the jets of water were designed to rise to a height of ten cubits after the manner of those at the Taḳt-e Šefr at Herat, which are one of the wonders of the world. Unfortunately, the vizier's plans had not fully materialized before his death. I hope that his son and successor in the office of vizier will be able to have the work completed.

We left this refreshing place at the beginning of Rajab 1016/end of October 1607, and our hosts accompanied us to the farthest limits of the district of Dezmār. We then proceeded to visit the shrine of Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī at Ahar, and from there we went to Ardabīl, where we lodged in pleasant accommodations, situated near the river, which were placed at our disposal by the vizier of Ardabīl, Kāja Moḥammad Reżā. As I was writing this, it occurred to me that I ought to say something about this personage.

¹⁶Approximately 17'6".

¹⁷A *jarīb* is 10,000 square meters.

Ḳāja Moḥammad Reżā is an amateur poet, a lover of jest but withal a thoughtful man. He was born at Joveyn, a district of Qazvin, where his family had lived for generations. His father, Ḳāja Malek, had been skilled in bookkeeping and the secretarial art, and held various posts in Khorasan as secretary to emirs. He had left Khorasan at the time of the troubles there, having lost all his possessions, and retired to his native place, where he died. His son, however, was too ambitious to be satisfied with village life, and he aspired to office; in pursuit of this ambition, he was put through the usual mill that all aspirants for office have to endure. He entered the service of Zu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū and rose steadily in the latter's esteem, eventually becoming his vizier. After proving himself in this office for several years, he was transferred to the supreme *diwān* and enrolled in the ranks of the viziers and bureaucrats there, and was subsequently appointed vizier of Azerbaijan. On the Shah's expedition to Georgia, he performed services of such outstanding merit (they will be described in the events under the head of the appropriate year) that he was honored by the sobriquet *fedavī* (devoted servant), and was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* of the court. At the time of our visit he was in Ardabil on official business, but during his stay there he made friends with the local poets and did everything in his power to assist them. He is a gentleman of ascetic temperament, but a wit and a genial companion. Witticisms and elegant jests were constantly being generated by his harmonious genius, and in his *ḡazals* he has many verses of genuinely mystical content.

Ḥātem Beg stayed at Ardabil for three days, during which he visited the shrine of Shaikh Ṣāfi al-Dīn and the tombs of the other Safavid shaikhs. During his stay, Ḳāja Moḥammad Reżā spared no effort to oblige his guests, and the two viziers extended courtesies to each other. When Ḥātem Beg left for Iraq by the Ḳalkāl road, Ḳāja Moḥammad Reżā escorted him for several stages of his journey. On his arrival at Qazvin, Ḥātem Beg took up residence at a house on the Ḳiābān-e Bāḡ-e Sa'adat. After three days in Qazvin, he traveled to Sāva, where he was the guest of Seyyed Nāṣer, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, who was the governor of that region. From Sāva the vizier went to Qom, where he visited the shrine of Fāṭema and bestowed gifts on the *seyyeds*, clients, and attendants of the shrine. When the townspeople of Qom brought him some juicy pomegranates, he produced some of the ones he had brought from Dezmār, and appointed some judges to adjudicate between them. The pomegranates from Dezmār were judged to be juicier and their flesh more delicate. The

people of Qom refused to accept this verdict, but by so doing they were committing an injustice against the Dezmar pomegranates!

After spending a day at Kashan, the vizier reentered the capital on 8 Ša'bān 1016/28 November 1607. The whole way from Ordūbād to Isfahan, it had been the practice of the vizier to summon his companions after they had recovered from the fatigue of the day's journey. Everyone would talk and listen to the singing and playing of the artists in their party. The trip had been unalloyed pleasure from beginning to end. The members of the party had enjoyed the company of the vizier, and reckoned that short trip to be the epitome of a lifetime. The same day that the vizier reached Isfahan, he was received in audience by the Shah, who welcomed him with great kindness.

When I started this narrative, I apologized for doing so; however, since I was a member of the vizier's party on this trip, it seemed to me that I had an obligation to describe it in detail, in gratitude for the many kindnesses which were lavished upon me in the course of it. My object was twofold: to express my gratitude for the hospitality I received, and to hope that this praiseworthy custom of entertaining guests may be emulated by all the great men of the age. I now return to my central theme.

Shah 'Abbas, after spending some time at the Naqš-e Jahān palace at Isfahan, and after he had rested from his travels and social activities and hunting, and seen to the administration of justice and the ordering of affairs in Iraq, expressed the wish to go hunting in Māzandarān. He left Hātem Beg the vizier, the *šads*, the emirs, and the other principal officers of state at Isfahan to carry on the business of the *dīvān*, and set off with a small party of *moqarrabs* and personal attendants. He spent the whole of the winter of 1607-08 and the spring of 1608 in Māzandarān. Māzandarān in the autumn, and in the spring when the ground is carpeted with tulips, narcissus, and all manner of flowers, is one of the best places in the world.

Miscellaneous Events

This year an estrangement occurred at Mašhad between Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān and Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Mašhad. The quarrel had its origin in the impatient and arrogant behavior of Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān, and was fanned by troublemakers. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, as a result of the Mīrzā's hostility and obstinacy, stopped

treating him with the unfailing courtesy he had hitherto extended toward him, and began being rude to him. Since the governor was a military commander, with troops at his disposal, Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān, though he had no reason to be afraid, took sanctuary at the shrine of the Eighth Imam and sent couriers in all directions to mobilize a force of musketeers. Both parties to the dispute sent their version to the Shah. In the Shah's opinion, Mīrzā-ye 'Ālamīān had been behaving like a madman, and he summoned him to court and took him with him to Māzandarān, where, as a matter of deliberate policy, he paid little attention to him, because it was highly desirable to take him down a peg in view of the fact that his insane behavior had its roots in arrogance.

Another event this year was the promotion of Kāja Moḥammad Re-zā, of whom I have already spoken, to the post of vizier and *momayyez* of Azerbaijan; this appointment was made when the Kāja visited the Shah's court in Māzandarān and was received with favor because of his past record of service and his capable financial administration.

Finally, on the death this year of Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan Šalā'ī, who had held the post of *šadr* of Iraq and Māzandarān, this post was given to his nephew, Mīrzā Rażī.

*The Shah's Constituting His Private Estates and Personal Property as a Vaqf (Benefaction) in Favor of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones*¹⁸

This year, the Shah received the inspiration to constitute all the personal estates he had legally acquired over the years (a fair market price for which would be more than one hundred thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*, and which, after payment of agricultural subsidies, would yield an average income of about seven thousand *tomān*), together with the hostelryes, the Qeysariya market, the stores around the Naqš-e Jahān Square in Isfahan, and the bathhouses in that city, as a benefaction to the Fourteen Immaculate Ones. Having ascertained what the minimum income from this property was, the Shah divided it into fourteen shares of declining magnitude, the largest share going to the Prophet Moḥammad. The Twelfth Imam was allotted a special share; in addition to the share allotted to each of the Imams,

¹⁸The Prophet Moḥammad, his daughter Fāṭema, and the twelve Imams. On these benefactions in general, see J. A. Pope, *Chinese Porcelains from the Ardabil Shrine*, Washington, 1956, pp. 7ff.

he received as a further benefaction several places the income from which, after payment of agricultural subsidies, could be as large as the original share.

The management of these trusts remained in the Shah's hands during his lifetime and was then entrusted to his successors, on conditions set forth in the trust deed, which was drawn up by the *mojta-hed* Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn Moḥammad. The disposition of the trust funds was at the discretion of the manager. After a sum had been set aside as a management fee, the trust income was to be used as the occasion demanded for administrative expenses and subsistence allowances for the employees at each location, and for subsistence allowances for those living in the neighborhood of these locations, for pilgrims, scholars, pious men, and students of theology. The spiritual reward for these acts was consigned to the spirits of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones.

At the same time, the Shah gave orders for fourteen signet rings, each inscribed with the name of one of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones, to be made at Isfahan under the supervision of the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, and the *ṣadr*, Mīrzā Raḡī. The same inscriptions which were considered blessed and were used on signet rings in the lifetime of each of the Immaculate Ones, as recorded by learned doctors of religion in biographical and hagiological works relating to members of the Prophet's house, were now inscribed on these rings at a propitious hour. The rings, affixed to straps studded with rubies, were entrusted to the *ṣadr*, Mīrzā Raḡī, so that the documents relating to all transactions connected with every branch of the trust administration might be blessed by being sealed with one of these signet rings. The *ṣadr* was designated the Shah's deputy in all matters concerning the administration of these benefactions, and this important function was conferred on him in addition to the office of *ṣadr*.

Shah 'Abbas also constituted his personal property into a trust. He was so zealous in the execution of this policy that he was frequently heard to say, "Every item in my household, and every item which it is possible to tax, is covered by the terms of this benefaction, even the two rings which I am wearing. The only condition is that the revenues accruing from this benefaction shall be used according as I, who am the manager of the trust, shall dictate, and shall be expended in the interests of religion and the state." In this way, Shah 'Abbas donated to the shrine of the Imam Reḡā at Mašhad his library copies of the

Koran and scientific books in Arabic—works on jurisprudence, commentaries on the Koran, traditions, and the like. His Persian books—historical works, collected works of poets, and the compositions of Persian authors in general—were bequeathed to the shrine of Shaikh Şaft al-Dīn at Ardabīl, together with his collection of Chinese porcelain, including large dishes, celadon ware, wine cups, and other Ġūrd and Chinese bowls which were in the royal china store. The Shah's jewels, jeweled weapons, and bowls of gold and silver; his studs of horses (Arabian chestnuts, pure-bred Ottomans, Bayāts, Georgians; Aleša horses from Heşār, Badağşān, and Transoxania, the equal of which could not be found in the stables of any other monarch; and his herds of camels, and flocks of sheep and goats, in number beyond computation—all this was included in the benefaction, and each item was allocated to some specific purpose. The value of the Shah's personal property described above is impossible to calculate.

My learned readers will admit that the generosity of this benefaction is beyond the comprehension of human beings, wedded as they are to material possessions, particularly in view of the fact that the acquisition of such possessions is normally an ambition of kings. It is true that in former ages kings have made pious bequests, but never on such a scale, nor without the ruler's renouncing the things of this world and living as a recluse. Although an act of this nature seems improbable to those whose horizons are limited by worldly considerations, thoughtful people will realize that it is not surprising in a man who is the ninth lineal descendant of Shaikh Şaft al-Dīn, since the Shaikh and his descendants have maintained in due order the chain of spiritual direction, have been received before the throne of God's unity, and have traversed the stages of asceticism and self-denial. God be praised that the Shah, immersed though he is in the problems of this world, has, like his ancestors, followed the path of self-denial and, while still in this earthly world, has laid the foundations of his life in the hereafter. God be praised that the Shah, though he has inevitably been forced, like all princes, to drink the intoxicating draughts of power and ambition, has yet retained his senses and, in the midst of the desolation of this phenomenal existence, has tried to cultivate the world of the spirit. It is my confident hope that, as a reward for these munificent acts, he will succeed in attaining his objectives in this world. May his reign be coterminous with the second coming of the Lord of the Age!¹⁹ May his subjects rest secure

¹⁹I.e., the Twelfth Imam, or Mahdī.

in the shadow of his majesty and justice on earth, and in the next world, through his mediation on the day of resurrection, quaff the waters of paradise!

Events of the Year of the Monkey, Part of Which Corresponds to the Muslim Year 1016/1607-08, and Part to the Muslim Year 1017/1608-09, the Twenty-second Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Thursday, 3 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1016/20 March 1608. The Shah, still in Māzandarān, remained there until the weather began to get uncomfortably hot, and then he began to think of hunting in the Isfahan region. With all his emirs and nobles, he moved to the summer quarters of Kahrīz-olang and Farīdūn. While he was there, he received some joyful news from Baghdad which gave rise to the hope that that province would be reconquered. But it was not to be, for all things have their seasons and the time appointed for the reconquest of Baghdad had not yet arrived.

After the death of Ozūn Aḥmad, his son, Moḥammad Pasha, had declared his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, and the principal officers of the Ottoman state had taken Ozūn Aḥmad's sons under their wing as a reward for his faithful service and as compensation for his being taken prisoner. They set his sons' minds at rest in regard to their father's former actions. Moḥammad Pasha was appointed governor of Baghdad; the *sanjāq* of Ḥella was given to his brother, Moṣṭafā Pasha; and both men were urged to be loyal to the Ottoman house. Moḥammad Pasha discharged his duties loyally and brought the whole of Arab Iraq under his control. However, in order to maintain his position vis-à-vis the army at Baghdad, he gathered together a personal bodyguard of Janissaries of the corps known as *seḡmen*, and nearly all the profits and occasional revenues of Baghdad were consumed to defray the pay and allowances of these men.

As a result, there was insufficient income left to meet the demands of the regular troops at Baghdad who had assignments on the revenue. The regular officers turned against him, but were unable to take any open action because of the size of his bodyguard and the power he had acquired. They therefore incited one or two of the pages to murder him. The latter eventually saw their opportunity and dispatched him in his private apartments in the keep. The *seḡmens* then rallied around his brother, Moṣṭafā Pasha, and proclaimed him governor of Baghdad. Moṣṭafā Pasha's first step was to carry out a

purge of those he suspected of being involved in the murder of his brother and divide their property among the *seğmens*. As a result, his power became even greater than that of his brother, and the regular troops were terrified of him. However, some people came forward to mediate between them and the governor, and an uneasy truce was patched up.

Morād Pasha had been *amīr al-omarā* of Qarāmān during the sultanate of his grandfather, Sultan Morād III. He had accompanied 'Osmān Pasha when the latter invaded Iran, had taken part in the campaigns in Azerbaijan against Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā, had been taken prisoner, and had been incarcerated at Qahqaha for six years. When Shah 'Abbas came to the throne and peace was concluded with the Ottomans, Morād Pasha had been released as part of the mutual exchange of prisoners that occurred at that time. After his return, he had from time to time held the governorship of some province. Because of his great ability and experience, he was now appointed by Sultan Aḥmad I to the offices of grand vizier and commander in chief. His charge was to deal with the critical problems facing the Ottoman empire: the growing challenge from the Franks in Europe, the Jalālī revolt, and the insecure state of the frontiers in the east resulting from the *qezelbāš* counteroffensive. Morād Pasha, who had pitched camp near Aleppo, hearing of events at Baghdad and of Moṣṭafā Pasha's seizure of power there, appointed as governor of Baghdad Maḥmūd Pasha the son of Jeḡāl-oḡlū. He wrote conciliatory letters to the army at Baghdad and to the chiefs of the Arab tribes in the rural areas of Iraq and Jazīra, calling on them to support Maḥmūd Pasha, who meanwhile marched to Iraq and camped at Old Baghdad.

As soon as the officers and men of the regular forces at Baghdad heard of Maḥmūd Pasha's arrival, they renounced their allegiance to Moṣṭafā Pasha and came out openly in opposition to him. Moṣṭafā Pasha barricaded himself in the keep of the fortress at Baghdad with his *seğmens* and appealed to Shah 'Abbas for assistance. He wrote letters to the Shah and to the frontier emirs. He sent to the Shah as his envoy Beyrām Khan, the son of Sūlāḡ Ḥoseyn Takkalū, who had gone to Baghdad during the Ottoman occupation and had remained there. If the Shah would march on Baghdad, said Moṣṭafā Pasha, and send one of his emirs with a detachment of troops to the fort, he would surrender it to the Shah's officers and declare himself to be the Shah's servant.

On receiving Moṣṭafā Pasha's letters, Ḥasan Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, and Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār had marched to the banks of the Māhīdāšt River and halted there, awaiting orders from the Shah. Beyrām Khan and Moṣṭafā Pasha's other envoys were received by the Shah in his summer quarters at Farīdūn. The Shah treated them kindly, sent robes of honor for Moṣṭafā Pasha, and exhorted him to hold the keep, for he (the Shah) was on his way; at the same time, he sent orders to his frontier emirs to be ready to attack Baghdad and, as soon as his own forces approached the area, to go on ahead. The emirs carried out their orders, and skirmishes took place daily between them and the *seğmens*. Although Maḥmūd Pasha had been informed of all these developments, he did not dare to advance, though urgently requested by the regular troops at Baghdad to do so.

One day, the *seğmens* issued from the fort and charged through the city, killing and plundering. The regular troops, spreading the rumor that Maḥmūd Pasha was on his way to support them, engaged in fierce fighting in the streets with the *seğmens*. They gained the upper hand and slew many of them; the survivors retreated within the fort. The news of their success encouraged Maḥmūd Pasha to move to their support. Reinforced by Emir Nāṣer b. Mohannā 'Arab, he crossed the Tigris, entered Baghdad, and laid siege to the fort. Moṣṭafā Pasha was alarmed by the turn of events: Most of his men had been killed and he, remembering what had happened to his brother, no longer felt confident of the loyalty of his troops. Accordingly, he did not stay to await the arrival of the *qezelbāš* army, but opened negotiations with Maḥmūd Pasha and concluded a truce on the following terms: He would be pardoned and allowed to return to his governorship at Ḥella; he would hand over Baghdad to Maḥmūd Pasha; and there would be no retaliation by either side. Some time after his return to Ḥella, Moṣṭafā Pasha took refuge at the Shah's court, but this will be related under next year's events.

The news of Maḥmūd Pasha's occupation of Baghdad reached the Shah at his camp at Āq Ölang near Hamadan, and the Shah decided not to pursue the attempt to capture Baghdad at that time, since the hot season was at hand. Before he left the Hamadan and Dargozīn area, the Shah dealt with various matters, including the execution of various Lurs and Kurds who had been practicing highway robbery. The event that finally put the whole scheme for an expedition to Baghdad in abeyance was the Jalālī revolt.

The Origins of the Jalālīs, together with a Description of Their Battles with the Ottomans and of the Coming of a Group of Them to the Shah's Court

As my learned readers will be aware, I have stated repeatedly in the course of this history, and especially in the foreword, that my object is to record the history of Iran and the Iranians. However, I have from time to time been forced to dwell on extraneous but relevant matters which have temporarily diverted me from my original purpose; these digressions have been essential to a proper understanding of events in Iran. I therefore turn now to an account of the Jalālīs.

The term Jalālī is used by the Ottomans for any group which is in revolt against the reigning sultan and engages in plundering and devastating the countryside. The only reason which occurs to my feeble intelligence as to why such people are called Jalālīs is that they are manifestations of divine majesty (*jalāl*),¹ since there is no compassion or forgiveness in their nature. At all events, the first person in the Ottoman empire to stir up rebellion during this epoch became known as a Jalālī. He was a low-grade clerk named Qarā Yāzījī (scribe), who started a revolt in the Amasya and Tūqāt region during the sultanate of Sultan Moḥammad Khan b. Sultan Morād.² By dint of lavish donations of other people's property and money which he had acquired by highway robbery and the looting of travelers and merchants, he gathered around him a band of ruffians and scoundrels, and his reputation as a brave and generous leader spread throughout that province. The ranks of his followers were swelled by the improvident, the idle, and the adventurous, all attracted by the prospect of money. Qarā Yāzījī was constantly moving his base, and from time to time he would ravage a certain area. He had four or five thousand men under his command when he suddenly died.

He was succeeded as leader of the Jalālīs by his brother Ḥasan Beg, who was also dubbed Yāzījī because the name was by now so celebrated. Ḥasan Beg soon caused even more uproar and disturbance than his brother had done, and achieved some remarkable feats. At first, the principal officers of the Ottoman empire and the provincial governors, disinclined to take Yāzījī seriously, had been slow to take action against him. When Ḥasan Beg succeeded him as leader of the Jalālīs, however, and when his reputation for daring, bravery, and

¹*Jalāl* is one of the attributes of God, and is usually rendered as "majesty."

²Moḥammad III (1003-1012/1595-1603).

generosity came to exceed that of his brother, men with disordered minds and ill-starred persons from every class, if they had no family ties, joined him. The Jalālīs began systematically to attack and kill regular Ottoman troops and to plunder their belongings, and their appetite increased with every success. Unlike his brother, Ḥasan Beg rarely molested merchants and civilians generally, but any Ottoman soldier who fell into his hands was a dead man. Caravans of merchants and travelers, by seeking him out and identifying themselves, could obtain a *laissez-passer* and proceed toward their destination unmolested, though he expected a modest gift in return. Similarly, any district could purchase immunity from his depredations by sending him gifts. On the other hand, if any opposed him he pillaged their territory without mercy. Provincial governors and pashas, finding themselves unable to travel freely about the territories under their jurisdiction, confined themselves to their castles, powerless to take offensive action against him. The inhabitants not only of rural areas but of urban districts too were obliged to submit to him. The number of Jalālīs had now increased to between ten and fifteen thousand men.

Ultimately, Ḥasan Beg's writ ran in most of the provinces of Anatolia, and any draft he wrote to the financial agents, clerks, and residents of these provinces was invariably honored. Wherever he went, he used to collect protection money from the local inhabitants. On one occasion, the emirs and pashas made an attempt to deal with him, but Yāzījī scattered their forces without trouble and acquired much booty as well. Next, the officers of the central Ottoman administration appointed Kosrow Pasha commander of a force of Janissaries and *qapı-qolları*, but this force too was defeated and retreated to Malāṭīya. After his defeat of Kosrow Pasha, Yāzījī began to act like a de facto governor, appointing his own men as emirs and *bölükbaşıs*.³ Next, an imposing army consisting of the governors and pashas of Erzerum and Arzenjān, together with Şarīf Pasha the *beglerbeg* of Erivān, a most experienced officer, was dispatched against Yāzījī under the command of Ḥasan Pasha, the son of Moḥammad Pasha. Moḥammad Pasha had been grand vizier under Sultan Sülaymān, and Ḥasan Pasha had made a name for himself among the Ottoman emirs by virtue of his valor, his great wealth, and his connection by marriage with the Ottoman royal house; at this time he was *beglerbeg* of Baghdad.

³The *çavuşes* were divided into fifteen companies of forty-two men, each commanded by a *bölükbaşıs*.

Hasan Pasha marched from Baghdad toward Tūqāt, leaving his heavy baggage to come on more slowly; he was joined by various contingents of regular troops on the way. Yāzījī, supremely confident of his ability to defeat Hasan Pasha as he had defeated other Ottoman armies, sent his emirs and *bölükbaşıs* to give battle near Tūqāt. But they were defeated with heavy losses. Informed of the rout of his men, Yāzījī marched out from Tūqāt to engage the Ottomans, but when he came to grips with them, he realized that he was not strong enough to withstand them, and fled to a remote and mountainous area with some three or four thousand men who were still with him. Hasan Pasha camped at Tūqāt and decided not to pursue the Jalālīs; he was indifferent to their fate, being confident they were not capable of further activity.

Yāzījī, however, was far from being finished, and in his mountain hideout he was gradually reinforced by fugitives from Tūqāt. He now operated in a clandestine manner, taking care that there should be no visible sign of himself or his men in the area. He sent spies to Tūqāt to find out what the situation was and discovered that Hasan Pasha, with a few of his personal attendants, was living in the castle; the rest of his men were billeted in houses in the town. The wealthier soldiers were living a comfortable life, but most of the men, having only meager resources, had scattered in all directions to find provisions for themselves and fodder for their horses. When Yāzījī's spies reported how negligent the Ottoman commander was, the Jalālī leader determined to make a surprise attack on Tūqāt, to place a guard on the gates of the castle to prevent anyone from leaving, and to massacre all the troops he found in the city. Accordingly, he marched on the city with all his forces, which now numbered seven thousand men.

The first piece of luck he had was to fall in with Hasan Pasha's supply train which, it will be recalled, was following on behind the Ottoman commander and making for Tūqāt. This supply train contained all Hasan Pasha's baggage and treasure chests, and was accompanied by about one thousand camel drivers and one thousand *sepāhs* (regular Ottoman cavalry). Yāzījī surrounded the supply train, massacred the *sepāhs*, took prisoner all the women, girls, and good-looking boys, and took possession of all the treasure chests and other property, including jeweled weapons, which represented the accumulation of years. Yāzījī then marched like the wind on Tūqāt. Hasan Pasha was so overwhelmed by the disgrace of what had hap-

pened that, despite all his years of experience, he lost his head completely, was quite unable to rally his men and prepare for battle, and could think of nothing but trying to hold out in the castle despite the lack of provisions there.

Yāzîjî took control of the city and surrounded the fort. When Ḥasan Pasha was killed by a chance musketball, his men obtained the promise of quarter from Yāzîjî and handed over the fort to him. The Jalālîs were now wealthy as a result of the booty they acquired from the Ottomans. Yāzîjî, with a view to spreading his fame and renown throughout Anatolia, had Ḥasan Pasha's corpse suspended by the neck at the castle gates, and left it hanging there for a number of days. Tūqāt now became Yāzîjî's base. Another version of the story has it that Ḥasan Pasha, who was an extremely proud man, committed suicide by taking poison because of the disgrace he had incurred, and that Yāzîjî subsequently hanged his corpse on a gibbet, but the author considers this version less reliable.

After this triumph, Yāzîjî was once again in a position of power. However, a change came over him; he repented of all the depredation, bloodshed, and strife for which he had been responsible in the course of furthering his ambitions, and decided to turn over a new leaf and ask the Ottoman Sultan to pardon his crimes and give him the job of guarding one of the frontiers of Islam, so that he could spend the rest of his life raiding infidels. He accordingly sent a representative to the Ottoman court to state his requests. The principal officers of state, who were wondering how they could suppress his revolt, considered this offer a godsend, and promptly appointed him governor of a province in Rumelia on the borders of Frankish territory. They sent him a robe of honor and a mace and assured him of a pardon from the Sultan. Yāzîjî gave up his lawless ways and took up his new post. Some of his freebooters chose to go with him, others left him at this point.

Yāzîjî spent several years raiding infidels in Europe. Someone told me that he died on board ship as he was proceeding by sea to make one of his raids. One of his men, Jān Fūlād, who had remained in Anatolia, assumed the leadership of the Jalālîs there and began causing a disturbance in the Aleppo region. He carried on the Jalālî tradition, and a lot of ruffians and knaves joined him. A rival bandit chief named Qarāqāš also appeared briefly on the scene in the Erzerum region.

At this juncture (1012/1603), the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad III died and was succeeded by his son Aḥmad I. The new Sultan, as already related, appointed Senān Pasha, known as Jeḡāl-oḡlū, grand vizier and commander in chief, and dispatched him to the Persian frontier. Jeḡāl-oḡlū succeeded in persuading Qarāqāš to cease his lawless behavior and return to his allegiance to the Sultan. Qarāqāš met Jeḡāl-oḡlū at Erzerum and, with some of his men, accompanied the Ottoman commander on his expedition to Iran. In the Aleppo region, however, Jān Fülād increased his influence and extracted from persons of rank in that province, from merchants, and from both Muslim and European travelers large sums of money with which he paid his troops.

The following year, when Jeḡāl-oḡlū was driven out of Vān by the *qezelbāš*, and retreated to the Mūš plain, he managed to bring Jān Fülād back to his allegiance to the Sultan by dint of appointing him governor of Aleppo and its dependencies. In return, he asked his assistance against the *qezelbāš*, and Jān Fülād promised to join him with an army. On the day that Jeḡāl-oḡlū and the *qezelbāš* army fought their great battle not far from Tabriz, Jān Fülād had reached Ṭasūj with three thousand men. As already related, after Jeḡāl-oḡlū's defeat, Jān Fülād retired from Ṭasūj, an action that later led Jeḡāl-oḡlū to quarrel with him and put him to death. Jān Fülād's son occupied Aleppo and went back to the old Jalālī ways; some twenty thousand men rallied to him, and he came out in open revolt against the Ottoman Sultan.

Yet another Jalālī outbreak occurred when Moḥammad Pasha, known as Qalandar-oḡlū, rebelled against the Sultan. Moḥammad Pasha was a haughty and ambitious officer who had been enrolled in the ranks of the *čavošes*, and had been appointed governor of Ḥemş by Jeḡāl-oḡlū. The previous governor refused to yield his authority to him, and even made an attempt on his life. Moḥammad Pasha thought that Jeḡāl-oḡlū was behind this, and for this reason he rebelled and became a Jalālī. After Jeḡāl-oḡlū's death in Dīār Bakr, Moḥammad Pasha's power rapidly increased, and he began to plunder and devastate the area. He carried his raids as far as Borsā, the capital of the early Ottoman sultans, despoiling the tombs of the sultans and carrying off the coverlets of the coffers, the gold and silver candelabra, and the ornaments and decorations of the Ottoman mausoleum, which he distributed among his men. Many other outrages of this sort were committed by his followers without any re-

prisals on the part of the Ottoman authorities. A force was once dispatched against him from Istanbul, but it achieved nothing. There was still another outbreak of revolt between Aleppo and Dīār Bakr on the part of a cavalry officer named Ṭavīl.

Thus, the whole of Anatolia, from Borsā to Erzerum, was ravaged by the Jalālīs, who caused much devastation. Sultan Aḥmad and his principal officers of state thought the suppression of enemies at home should take precedence over other matters, and they pondered what should be done. Morād Pasha, who had been made grand vizier and commander in chief, had been sent to Europe to take charge of operations against the Franks. When he received reports of events at home, he opened peace talks with some of the Franks and imposed tribute on others; in this way he quieted the European front and then returned to Anatolia, where a huge force was assembled to take the field against the Jalālīs. It consisted of troops from Rumelia, Anatolia, Menteşā, Qarāmān, Tripoli, and other Ottoman provinces, as well as troops of the royal household.

This army marched first to Aleppo against Jān Fūlād-oġlū, who came out to give battle with twenty thousand men. Morād Pasha was an experienced officer who had demonstrated his ability to deal with both the rough and the smooth in life. To begin with, he declined battle and opened negotiations with the Jalālī leader. The latter saw this gambit as evidence of the weakness and cowardice of the Ottoman army, and neglected to take the precaution of forming up his men for battle. The Ottoman commander meanwhile appeared on the battlefield with his men in proper battle array. Jān Fūlād-oġlū, in a panic, got his men in order and engaged the Ottomans. A great battle was fought in which the Jalālīs were defeated with heavy losses, and Jān Fūlād-oġlū retreated to Aleppo, where he barricaded himself in the castle and set to work strengthening the defenses. Most of the Jalālī fugitives from this battle joined Ṭavīl. Morād Pasha camped within sight of Aleppo and proceeded to lay siege to and capture the fort, and to wipe out Jān Fūlād-oġlū and the rest of his men. Having cleared the whole of this province of Jalālīs, Morād Pasha turned his attention to the remaining groups of rebels.

At this moment Ṭavīl, the Jalālī leader in Dīār Bakr, died. Two or three thousand of his men rallied around his brother Moḥammad Beg, who was still a beardless youth, and with him joined Mohammad Pasha Qalandar-oġlū. The latter was also joined by a certain Qarā

Sa'īd, a desert Arab who had become a Jalālī and whose valor was renowned in Asia Minor. Moḥammad Pasha thus became the focal point for all the Jalālī groups, and his power increased accordingly. He took whatever he wanted from every town and district which lay in his path, and similarly from every fort he chanced upon, neither soldiers nor civilians being able to deny him anything. Morād Pasha wintered in the Aleppo area and made no move against the Jalālīs that year.

This year, the Year of the Monkey (1016/1607-08), Morād Pasha took the field against the Jalālīs, and Qalandar-oḡlū marched to meet him with his emirs, *sardārs*, and *bölükbāšīs*, the chief of whom were Qarā Sa'īd 'Arab, the brother of Ṭavīl, Kord Heydar, Āḡā Jeden Pīrī, Kekeč (the stutterer) Moḥammad, Ḥoseyn Beg Arnāūt, Qarā Ḥoseyn, Tūmāl 'Isā, and others. Since Qalandar-oḡlū had repeatedly defeated superior Ottoman forces, he was supremely confident of success on this occasion too. When the two armies met, Morād Pasha, apprehensive of the intrepidity and dash of the Jalālīs, drew up his men on some rising ground and stationed his gun carriages, linked by chains, on the slopes of a hill overlooking both armies; his plan was to bring his forces into action gradually and by cunning tactics break up the enemy forces into separate groups. Qalandar-oḡlū interpreted these maneuvers as pusillanimity, and hurled all his twenty thousand men into action at once. Morād Pasha gave his men strict orders not to break ranks and descend the hill.

As a result, the horses of the Jalālīs were exhausted by the time they reached the Ottoman lines, and Morād Pasha brought his artillery into action and shattered the Jalālī ranks. Morād Pasha then gave the order to advance, and his cavalry swept into action on horses that were still fresh. The Jalālīs fought hard and stubbornly, but were eventually defeated with heavy losses. At the end of the day, the Jalālī commanders withdrew their men from the battlefield. The Ottomans did not pursue them, but retired to their own camp. The Jalālī commanders now regretted their impetuosity; they knew they could not risk another encounter with this Ottoman army, which next day would move in for the kill. During the night, therefore, they abandoned camp, leaving behind their baggage and supplies, and set off for Erzerum unencumbered, covering ten *farsaks* that night; there were about ten thousand of them.

The next day, Morād Pasha, discovering that the enemy had struck

camp, marched down from the hill, camped in the plain, and allowed his men to pillage the Jalālī camp. He sent Ebrahim Pasha, known as Ekmekçi-oğlu (the baker's son) in pursuit of the Jalālīs with twenty thousand men. Ebrahim Pasha overtook the Jalālīs and fought two engagements with them on the way to Erzerum. In the first encounter, the Jalālīs got the upper hand, but Ebrahim Pasha, knowing that their horses must be tired and that the men had not slept all night, pressed his pursuit, and came to grips with them again near Erzerum. The Jalālīs had no stamina left. Large numbers were killed in Ebrahim Pasha's first charge, and the rest made a fighting retreat from the field and made for the Persian border. The Ottomans then called off their pursuit. The Jalālīs sent a courier to Emir Gūna Khan at Erīvān to inform him that they were coming, and the Jalālī *sardārs* and *bölükbāšīs* set off for Erīvān, followed a little later by Moḥammad Pasha himself and his personal retainers.

Moḥammad Pasha sent one of his commanders, Ḥoseyn Beg Arnāūt, to the Shah, to profess his "love of the Shah"; he declared that love of the Shah had been the sole motive for his revolt against the Ottomans. The Shah bestowed gifts on the Pasha's representatives, issued letters of appointment in the names of the Pasha and his commanders assuring them of his favor, and sent an emir to meet them and escort them to his court.

The Mission of the Vizier, Ḥātem Beg, to Escort the Jalālīs to Isfahan

Since the Shah did not have full information about the intentions of the Jalālīs and prudence dictated that he should not place full confidence in men who had become accustomed to a life of banditry, rebellion, and plunder, he decided to send one of his most experienced and courageous statesmen to meet the Jalālīs and see what the situation was. He further decided to allot the Jalālīs winter quarters in Azerbaijan and to summon to court Moḥammad Pasha, his commanders, and his nobles. After reviewing the list of his emirs and principal officers of state, the Shah chose the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, for the job, since he considered him to be possessed of all the necessary qualities. As the Jalālīs were his guests, the Shah allotted them twelve thousand sheep and twenty thousand *karvārs* of grain for their subsistence. He provided the vizier with confidential requisition

orders,⁴ sealed with the *mehr-āṣār* seal, authorizing him to issue orders for whatever he deemed necessary in the circumstances; I was instructed to accompany him. A body of troops was placed at the disposal of the vizier, consisting of *qūrčīs*, *gōlāms*, and Aqa Sultan Moqaddam, the governor of Zenjān. The vizier left the Shah's camp near Hamadan and departed for Tabriz.

When the Jalālīs neared Erīvān, Emir Gūna Khan sent some of his emirs and other officers to meet them. He instructed them to camp at Ūč Kalīsā, three *farsaks* from the fort at Erīvān, and he sent them as a gift whatever supplies he could spare. In an open space outside the fort he set up ceremonial tents and brocade canopies, covered the ground with gaily colored carpets, and invited the Pasha and his senior commanders to a feast. When he met them, he excused himself for not having come in person to receive them; his orders, he said, forbade him to leave the fort which was in his charge and which was, in effect, a royal dwelling. Two or three thousand men sat down at the feast, which was on a scale that elicited favorable comment from all. At the conclusion of the feast, Emir Gūna Khan bade the Pasha, his senior commanders, and the three hundred retainers he had with him to erase the memory of the hardships they had endured and the battles they had fought. He then conducted the senior officers to his own tent; the *bölükbāšīs* were made the guests of his officers and emirs. In his own tent, he held court for the senior officers and conversed with them in royal fashion. The following morning, after they had bathed, he had sets of clothing appropriate to their rank brought to the bathhouse for them, and the other hosts emulated their commander in entertaining their guests.

It is the custom of the Jalālīs to devote most of their time at their assemblies to bragging about their exploits, each seeking to outdo the others in this respect. This is their sole topic of conversation. During the reception in Emir Gūna Khan's tent, Moḥammad Pasha and Qarā Sa'īd had been boasting drunkenly of their valorous deeds, and Qarā Sa'īd had forgotten himself and had called the Pasha a coward. When they left the Emir's tent, the two Jalālī leaders challenged each other to a duel and attacked each other with javelins. The Pasha wounded Qarā Sa'īd before Kord Ḥeydar and Āgā Jeden Pīrī suc-

⁴*Ṭavāmīr-e bayāz*; *ṭūmār* (plural *ṭavāmīr*) normally means "rolls, schedules." I am not sure what *bayāz* means in this context. The normal meaning of *bayāz* is "fair copy," but it may mean "confidential" because the document was folded so that its contents could not be seen and was therefore blank (*bayāz*) on the outside (See *TM*, p. 203, n. 2).

ceeded in parting the combatants. As a result of this incident, the Jalālīs split into several factions: Qarā Sa'īd and the brother of Ṭavīl and their supporters; Moḥammad Pasha, his retainers, and a number of the *bölükbāšīs*; and Kord Heydar and Āgā Jeden Pīr and their supporters. After resting at Ūč Kalīsā for several days, each faction made its own way individually to Tabriz.

The Jalālīs were received at Tabriz by Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor, and by Kāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan. Each group was billeted in suitable quarters and allotted sufficient provisions to meet their needs; in addition, each of the Safavid officials feasted them for one day. Some of the Jalālī commanders and their men had already left Tabriz and set off for Iraq when word came from the Shah that the vizier was on his way to Tabriz. The Pasha and his senior officers, who were still at Tabriz, accordingly waited for the arrival of the vizier, and their needs were met every day.

After receiving his commission, Hātem Beg had gathered together the necessary supplies of clothing, food, drink, and so on, and had set off for Tabriz. He began handing out food and gifts on a scale that exceeded all expectations. If I were to give a detailed description of his largesse it would take too long, so I will content myself with mentioning what I actually saw with my own eyes.

As soon as the vizier's party left the Shah's camp at Hamadan, the vizier every day invited a large group of the emirs, *qūrčīs*, *golāms*, and *yasāvols* (aides-de-camp) to an assembly, and handed out as rations food, drink, and sweetmeats in quantities greater than the recipients needed. Along the way, the vizier's party was joined by some groups of Jalālīs who had already set out from Tabriz: At Kord-čāy, Qarā Hōseyn met him with a hundred men; at Zenjān, Kekeč Moḥammad with five hundred men; at Nīk Pey, 'Alī Beg Donyā'ī with three hundred, Qolī Beg Kord with a hundred and forty, and Kord 'Alī with three hundred; and at Mīānaj, Yāzījī the *bölükbāšī* with forty. Hātem Beg gave a feast for each group, and gave to each leader and his men gifts such as cloaks, topcoats, kerchiefs, and turbans appropriate to their rank and status. Each group was allotted camping grounds for the winter, and *qūrčīs* and *yasāvols* were appointed official hosts (*mehmāndārān*) to each group to look after their needs at the Shah's expense. It was agreed that, after Nowrūz, each leader should leave his men in their winter quarters and, accompanied by two or three servants, make his way to court for an audience with the Shah.

When Hâtem Beg's party reached Fahvasfanj, a village near Tabriz, Kāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan, came out to welcome him, and the following day Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, marched out with banners flying to meet him. Hâtem Beg then proceeded into the city with a large crowd of emirs, centurions, *qūrčīs*, *ḡolāms*, aides-de-camp, and household retainers; people flocked from the city and surrounding areas to meet him, and a huge throng gathered at the end of the main avenue in Tabriz, completely blocking the road. The whole of the way to the center of the city, a distance of about two miles, Jalālīs lined the street on both sides with infantry and cavalry, and they came forward, company by company, to greet the vizier and pay their respects to him. The vizier greeted their leaders warmly, and welcomed them on behalf of the Shah.

The total number of Jalālīs in the city, both infantry and fully armed cavalry, was about ten thousand men. Although everyone was a bit nervous at the idea of the vizier's placing himself at the mercy of ten thousand turbulent and headstrong Jalālīs, who could not be trusted whether they were friend or foe, the vizier rode calmly into the city at their side and took up residence at the Jahānšāhiya palace. Since he had received reports that Ebrahim Pasha Ekmekči-oḡlū had come in pursuit of the Jalālīs with twenty thousand men and was still hovering around near the frontier hoping for a military success of some sort, the vizier dispatched Pīr Būdāq Khan and his men to guard the frontier in the Kōy and Salmās region and to keep watch on any enemy movement from the direction of Vān; the frontier in the region of Erīvān was already adequately guarded by Emir Gūna Khan. A few days later, it was reported that Ekmekči-oḡlū had retired, and Pīr Būdāq Khan returned to Tabriz.

The day after his arrival at Tabriz, Hâtem Beg received in audience Moḥammad Pasha, the brother of Tavīl, Qarā Sa'īd, and the rest of the Jalālī leaders, and exchanged formal courtesies with them. These concluded, he summoned the official secretaries attached to the Jalālīs and instructed them to make complete lists of the names of the men, so that provision might be made for their needs in conformity with their status. Not counting those who had gone on ahead, the count came to thirteen thousand, six hundred and five serviceable troops; of these, exactly ten thousand men were musketeers and fully-armed cavalry, and the rest were servants and grooms. The vizier planned a huge feast, and set a day for a public audience at which the

whole of that army should be his guests, and at which all the Jalālī commanders, *bölükbāšīs*, and anyone of rank among them should receive robes of honor. After that, he planned to hold private audiences daily to which different groups of Jalālī commanders would be invited.

The festivities began with the public banquet in the Bāg-e Jahān-šāhī. For several days, the chefs labored to prepare the food for it; about one hundred and twenty cooks and butlers were busy preparing all kinds of dishes, desserts, fruit and nuts, and preserves. Prodigious quantities were prepared. A vast area of the garden, where two thousand people could sit down to the feast, was set aside, and tents were erected and carpets laid. The sixth day after the vizier's arrival in Tabriz was set as the date of the feast. The vizier decided that, in addition to the Jalālī commanders and *bölükbāšīs*, from every hundred of their men twenty should be selected to receive a robe of honor. Thus, of the total ten thousand Jalālīs, two thousand received robes.

The robes of honor conferred on Moḥammad Pasha comprised a brocade cloak; a velvet topcoat with gold embroidery; a kerchief all of gold, and a square embroidered with gold thread; a jeweled turban brooch; and a fine horse and saddle—gifts to the value of thirty *tomān* in all. The brother of Ṭavīl received gifts similar to those of the Pasha, but of lesser value. Qarā Ḥoseyn, Kord Ḥeydar, Āgā Jeden Pīrī, Ḥasan-e Kadqodā, the *vakīl* of the brother of Ṭavīl, and the rest of the *bölükbāšīs* received comparable gifts appropriate to their station. Of the remaining ranks, upper, middle, and lower, the upper ranks received cloaks of brocade or shot silk, velvet topcoats, either embroidered or plain, and kerchiefs of various colors, and some received squares in addition; the middle ranks received cloaks of *mīlak*, *moṭabbaq*,⁵ or *na'iband* cloth, velvet jerkins, and yellow turbans; the lower ranks received cloaks of cotton or red silk and turbans.

The whole two thousand men, wearing their robes of honor, then took their appointed places at the feast, and the rest of the ten thousand Jalālīs sat on the ground, company by company, outside the banqueting area. A Georgian prince, 'Aṭā Beg Khan, the son of Manūčehr Khan the ruler of Meskhia, who had chanced to arrive in Tabriz at that moment with a party of priests and Georgian nobles and was on his way to seek audience with the Shah, was also invited

⁵Dozy, ii, 26, gives *éttoffe d'un tissu serré*.

to the feast. The Georgian party also received robes of honor and travel expenses, and other forms of hospitality were bestowed upon them. Some details of the feast: After the guests had partaken of the great variety of dishes provided, servants took around cups of coffee, and about three hundred trays of sweetmeats, some of them wondrous examples of the confectioner's art, and trays of every kind of fruit, on which sugar had been sprinkled. Following this, a thousand bowls of dessert were brought in—one bowl between every two guests. Huge piles of fruit had been placed in front of the guests—cantaloupes, watermelons, grapes, and other fruits. When the principal guests had been fed, those who had been sitting around the edges came forward company by company and took their turn. One thousand dishes of food were served at the banquet, and one thousand dishes were served to those outside the main feast. My pen admits its inability adequately to describe all the details of this great feast.

The vizier of Azerbaijan, Kāja Moḥammad Rezā, and the other officials at the provincial court had waited upon their guests at the banquet. When they were released from these duties, they turned their attention to the task of allotting the Jalālīs suitable winter quarters and of appointing official hosts to escort them. The Pasha and *bölükbāšīs*, at the discretion of Hātem Beg, were allowed to retain a few personal servants and retainers, about five hundred men in all. The rest of their men were dismissed to their winter quarters, the intention being that they should all reassemble in the spring and be presented to the Shah at his summer quarters. All these matters were settled within three days, and the Jalālīs marched off to their appointed stations. On the tenth day Hātem Beg left Tabriz and camped at Šamsābād for two days before continuing his journey back to court. The whole cost of the subsistence of the Pasha and his entourage, five hundred men, on their journey from Tabriz to Isfahan, was paid by the vizier. Every day, in addition to the free meals provided at the vizier's assemblies, a variety of other dishes and desserts was supplied by the vizier and sent to the tents of the Jalālīs, as a formal memento of their journey. On top of that, every day a string of mules, laden with whatever was available in the way of preserves, sweetmeats, nuts, and fruit, was provided so that they might refresh themselves on the road. Since the Shah, once he was satisfied about the security of the frontier, had returned to the capital, the vizier traveled to Isfahan in twenty-two stages, with only one stop en route, at Kashan, and then only for one day. At Kashan, he again sent to the bathhouse a fresh set of clothes for the Pasha and his of-

ficers. In short, the vizier omitted not even the smallest detail in providing hospitality for the Jalālīs.

In the Bāḡ-e Tājābād at Naṭanz, the vizier had convened a formal assembly and a serious discussion had taken place. As all were mounting their horses at the conclusion of the assembly, some of the Jalālīs who bore a grudge against the Pasha started brawling with some of his servants, and several people were wounded. When the Pasha was informed, he emerged from his tent in an equally contumacious mood to take his revenge on those responsible for the attack on his men. Within the twinkling of an eye, as is the discreditable habit of the Jalālīs, the supporters of both parties had rushed out to join in the fray, and had started laying into one another with their swords. At this point the vizier and a handful of his retainers who happened to be at hand rode fearlessly between the combatants and kept them apart, lashing some with their tongues and belaboring others with cudgels. They censured the Pasha for his folly and surly irascibility, and prevented what threatened to be a very ugly situation from developing.

From Naṭanz, the vizier reached Dowlatābād in two stages, and Aqa Kamāl Dowlatābādī acted as host. The following day, 3 Ša'bān 1017/12 November 1608, the vizier entered Isfahan. The emirs, principal officers of state, *moqarrabs*, and other court officials, at the Shah's order, came out to welcome him and escort him into the city. The Jalālī officers had the privilege of kissing the Shah's stirrup in the audience hall of the Naqš-e Jahān palace. The Shah received them graciously and they, after kissing the supports of the Shah's throne and expressing their satisfaction with their treatment at the hands of the vizier, broke up and went off to the quarters allotted to them; provisions and lodging allowances were supplied to them by the royal exchequer. The Shah praised the vizier highly for his conduct. The Shah remained in Isfahan during the winter of 1608-09, and the Pasha and his officers were generally invited to his private gatherings—a display of royal favor that overwhelmed them. The Shah's object was to get to know each of them personally and to form his own opinion as to their trustworthiness. He found the Pasha to be more sincere and friendly in his attitude toward him than the other officers, and the Shah accordingly treated him with greater honor and esteem.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

When the Shah heard that the Jalālīs were coming with Ekmekçi-oğlū in pursuit of them, as a precaution he had sent a detachment of a thousand musketeers from the musketeers of the royal stirrup to Tabriz, under the command of Lāčīn Beg, a *golām* of the royal household; the men spent the winter at Tabriz.

Ġāzī Gerāy Khan b. Dowlat Gerāy Khan, the chief of the Crimean Tartars, died this year. His line, descended from Joči the son of Genghis Khan, had for generations held sway over the Tartar tribes of the Qepčāq steppe, with their seat of government at Bāğča-sarāy. I gave the earlier history of this dynasty in book I. After Ġāzī Gerāy Khan had been made ruler of the Crimean Tartars by Sultan Morād III, he had become a loyal servant of the Ottomans. During the reign of Sultan Moḥammad III, Ġāzī Gerāy Khan had been ordered to take part in operations in Europe, and had fought in many major battles there. One year, he had wintered at a place on the frontier called Szombor, and had lived up to his name of "raider" (*ġāzī*).

After the accession of Shah 'Abbas and the conclusion of a truce of sorts with the Ottomans, Ġāzī Gerāy Khan had written a friendly letter to the Shah by the hand of Hāfez Qarāqāš Tabrīzī, who had been a friend of his at Tabriz and had gone with him to Turkey. The Tartar Khan had acknowledged his debt to Sultan Ḥamza Mirzā and the Safavid house during the time he had been a prisoner in Iran, had professed his loyal devotion to the Safavid house, and had requested that Beyrāmqlī Beg Qūčīlūy Ostājlū, who had been his jailer at the prison-fortress of Alamūt and had treated him well, be sent to him. In his reply, the Shah had expressed his friendship for the Tartar Khan and his regrets that, after the Khan's release from prison, the *qezelbaş* nobles, because of their preoccupation with the Ottomans, had not fostered the sort of relationship with him that they should have done. The Shah had sent gifts with his reply, in the course of which he had declared that, as far as he was concerned, the former hostility between them had been forgotten. He invited the Tartar Khan to ask for whatever gifts he wanted from Iran without any false modesty. Beyrāmqlī Beg had traveled to Kaffa disguised as a merchant and had made his way to the Khan's court.

On receipt of the Shah's letter, the Tartar Khan was overjoyed at its friendly tone, and sent Beyrāmqlī Beg back laden with honors.

He also took the Shah at his word and wrote in his own hand requesting that certain items be sent to him as gifts. This time, the Shah had sent the centurion Abu'l-Qāsem Ev-oġlū with a letter and the articles requested, and from then on diplomatic relations had been maintained. In the Year of the Sheep (1016/1607-08), when Shah 'Abbas was engaged in the conquest of Šīrvān, the Tartar Khan had sent Hājji Beyrām as an ambassador, and hard on his heels Abu'l-Qāsem Beg Ev-oġlū had returned bearing another friendly letter for the Shah. The Ottomans, of course, had come to hear of Ġāzī Gerāy's activities, and they had encouraged Salāmat Gerāy, one of Dowlat Gerāy's sons, who was in Istanbul, to hope to obtain the khanship of the Tartar tribes. When Shah 'Abbas had begun his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan the Ottoman viziers and principal officers of state had ordered Ġāzī Gerāy to take an army to Šīrvān to assist the Ottoman forces there which were engaged with the *qezelbāš*, but Ġāzī Gerāy Khan had made various excuses for not going and shortly afterward had died.

The Tartar emirs had chosen as his successor Toqtameš Gerāy Khan, but the principal officers of the Ottoman state were determined to exclude Ġāzī Gerāy's sons from the succession because of their father's rapprochement with the Safavids. They therefore conferred on Salāmat Gerāy the title of Khan and sent him to Kaffa urging the Tartar chiefs, with a mixture of blandishments and threats, to accept him. The emirs, for their own safety, considered it expedient to obliterate all memory of the years of Ġāzī Gerāy's cordial relations with the Safavid court; they prevented Ġāzī Gerāy's sons from opposing the succession of their cousin, Salāmat Gerāy, and gave their allegiance to the latter.

This year, the Year of the Monkey (1017/1608-09), Salāmat Gerāy is still firmly established on the throne and is a loyal servant of the Ottoman Sultan. When he was in Istanbul, he had promised the Ottoman Sultan that he would lead an army to Šīrvān and, with the assistance of the Ottomans, drive out the *qezelbāš*. But after he acceded to the throne, the elders of the tribe dissuaded him from this foolish action. "War with the *qezelbāš*," they said, "has never had happy results for your house; when Moḥammad Gerāy Khan took an army to Šīrvān, he left his brothers there: of these, 'Ādel Gerāy was taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš* and subsequently executed; the other, Ġāzī Gerāy, was also taken prisoner and spent several years in jail. Do not make yourself the third. Remember the saying, 'calamities

always come in threes!'" Salāmat Gerāy heeded their advice, and did not go in person, but he promised the Ottomans to send ten thousand troops to Anatolia via Kaffa and to Tripoli, to serve under Ottoman command. He actually sent about six or seven thousand men, and they accompanied Morād Pasha in his campaigns against the Jalālīs. At the conclusion of this campaign, Morād Pasha had sent them to Georgia, to the districts of Meskhia and Ākesqa. Some of them died there as a result of the attrition of war; others returned home. About two thousand men remained in Ākesqa under the command of Jīl Pasha. Their ultimate fate, and the death of Jīl Pasha, will be related (God willing!) under the events of the Year of the Dog (1019/1610-11), when Morād Pasha marched on Tabriz.

Ġāzī Gerāy Khan had reigned for twenty-five years.⁶ He was an able, talented, and warlike ruler. He wrote both Turkish and Persian in a polished, secretarial style, and he also composed poetry in both Turkish and Persian, under the pen name of Ġazā'ī.

⁶He had actually reigned, with only a brief interregnum, from 996/1588 to 1016/1608, a period of twenty years.

The Events of the Year of the Fowl, Corresponding in Part to the Muslim Year 1017/1608-09, and in Part to the Muslim Year 1018/1609-10, the Twenty-third Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Saturday, 14 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1017/21 March 1609. The Shah as usual held a big celebration in the Naqš-e Jahān park at Isfahan. A stream that runs through the middle of the park feeds a huge pool as big as a small lake. At the side of this pool, and on the upper reaches of the stream, former kings, especially Shah Esma'il I, had constructed pleasant residences, so that the whole effect was reminiscent of the gardens of paradise "beneath which streams flow."¹ Space along the banks of the stream was allocated, on the basis of rank and status, to the distinguished citizens of Isfahan and its rural districts, and to the citizens of Khorasan, property owners of Tabriz, and merchants and members of guilds who happened to be in the capital, so that each group could congregate in its own allotted place. The area around the pool was reserved for the use of the viziers and other officers of state, and for *moqarrabs* of the court. In front of each group's plot of ground a pavilion² was erected; carpenters and engineers exerted their skill to fashion different designs and all were decked with lights. The whole night long the stars of the firmament looked down with envy at the brilliantly lit scene. Every night, the Shah would wander through the park, stopping to talk with whichever group he pleased; sweet-voiced singers and dexterous musicians banished everyone's cares, and rosy-cheeked girls passed the wine and kept the revelers in a happy mood. The celebrations went on for three days and nights. For most of this time, Moḥammad Pasha and the Jalālī emirs enjoyed the company of the Shah.

It will be recalled that Moṣṭafā Pasha had patched up a truce with Maḥmūd Pasha, had surrendered Baghdad to the latter, and had retired to Ḥella. There, he learned that the Ottomans planned to do away with him because he had made overtures to the Shah and had offered to hand over Baghdad to Safavid officers. Moṣṭafā Pasha

¹Koran, 43:6, etc.

²The *ṣāḥr-ṣāq* is a building consisting of a roof resting on four supports, and open at the sides.

accordingly came to distrust even his closest confidants, and asked to be transferred to the governorship of Karkūya, one of the districts of Šahrazūr, in order to get farther away from Baghdad. His agents and retainers divined that his object in asking for a transfer to Karkūya was to give him a chance of escaping to Persian territory, and they began to plot against him. In fear of his life, Moṣṭafā Pasha abandoned his possessions, considering life more valuable than them, and fled to Persian territory with a few companions. His agents and men appropriated his possessions and went to Baghdad. Moṣṭafā Pasha, passing through Hamadan, reached Isfahan during the New Year's Day celebrations. He was received by the Shah and granted gifts both in cash and in kind—a horse and saddle, a jeweled turban brooch, a dagger belt, and a sum of gold in cash, and was awarded the fief of Sonqor in the province of Hamadan.

After the conclusion of the Nowrūz festivities, the Shah decided to send the Jalālīs, under the command of a number of *qezelbāš* emirs, on a punitive expedition to Kurdistan. This seemed a good plan for two reasons: first, the Kurds were constantly causing trouble on the frontier; second, the Jalālīs only stopped fighting among themselves if they were able to sink their differences in the face of a common foe. The Shah, who had nominated Moḥammad Pasha the *amīr al-omarā* of the Jalālī army, had frequently exhorted the Jalālīs to cease fighting among themselves and to acknowledge Moḥammad Pasha as their leader. He took covenants and pledges of their good behavior from them before they left for their summer quarters at Marāḡa, where they were to join forces with their own men who had been in winter quarters in Azerbaijan, and with the *qezelbāš* emirs detailed for this expedition. The Shah gave them cash grants, made them a present of their equipment, and sent them from Isfahan.

When the Jalālīs reached Qazvin, Ḥasan Khan Ostājlu, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, received orders to proceed to Marāḡa to join Moḥammad Pasha with one thousand of his men and the following emirs: the other emirs of Hamadan province; Eskandar Sultan Mīr Moqaddam with a thousand of his tribesmen; Ne'matollāh Sultan Mīr Šūfi, in command of four hundred men; Koşrow Sultan, chief of the Bebevi, dependents of the Pāzūkī tribe, with seven hundred men; Qabān Sultan Begdilū Šamlū, governor of Gāvṛūd and Sārū-qarḡān, with four hundred men; and Kalīl Sultan, chief of the Sil-süpür, with three hundred men. On the arrival at Marāḡa, Ḥasan Khan was to take with him Qobād Khan Mokṛī, the governor of Marāḡa, and

to move into Kurdistan and Dîār Bakr. In the case of those Kurdish chiefs who submitted and joined him with their men, their territory was not to be ravaged; in the case of those who opposed them, the area inhabited by their tribes was to be plundered, and their territories were to be seized and given to Jalālī chiefs. The punitive expedition was then to move on to Erzerum and join Emir Gūna Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Çokūr-e Sa'd, and the emirs who had been ordered to carry out raids in that region. Emir Khan Barādūst was appointed governor of Orūmīya by the Shah, with instructions to act as guide to the expedition, since he was thoroughly familiar with the situation in Kurdistan and with the terrain through which the expeditionary force would have to pass. If he discharged his duties loyally and faithfully, the Shah would show even greater favor toward him. The adventures of this expeditionary force will be described later.

The Dispatch of an Ambassador to India

It was three years since the Mogul emperor Akbar had died (1014/1605) and had been succeeded by his eldest son, Moḥammad Salīm. Since friendly relations had always existed between the two dynasties, the Shah had long resolved to send a distinguished *qezelbāš* officer as an ambassador to India to offer his condolences on the death of Akbar, and to congratulate his son on his accession; his preoccupation with the campaigns in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān had prevented him from carrying out his resolution until now. The Shah chose as ambassador Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, an emir and a *qezelbāš*, the grandson of Kalīfat al-Ḳolafā, who had been governor of Baghdad during the reign of Shah Esma'il I. Yādegār 'Alī was noted for his eloquent and persuasive tongue.

The Shah wrote a letter for him to take to the Mogul Emperor, and Yādegār 'Alī set about making the preparations for his mission. He was given an escort of fifty officers, all of whom had spare horses and splendid equipment, including turban jewels and sword belts. The gifts the embassy was taking for the Emperor included fifty Tūpčaq, Arabian, Georgian, and Bayāt horses from the royal stables; it is doubtful whether any other monarch could boast even one horse of the quality of these. In addition to the horses, there were brocade and velvet horse blankets, and three black, long-haired Russian fur coats, the value of each estimated at between eighty and ninety Iraqi *tomān*, because the black fox skins used to make them were extremely rare. There were also one thousand five hundred pieces of precious stuffs—

brocaded velvets, both with gold thread and silver thread; silks, both with gold and silver threads; brocade squares; European and Chinese satins and velvets; precious stuffs from Yazd and Kashan; and other gifts too numerous to mention, but all of a quality compatible with the status of the two parties.

Various Successes Won by Safavid Arms This Year

The first success to be mentioned is the capture of Moḥammad Pasha the son of Zāl Pasha, who was the Ottoman governor of Arjīš and 'Ādeljavāz. This Moḥammad Pasha was an extremely arrogant man, always boasting of his valor, and he wanted to achieve some notable exploit on the Persian frontier that would bring him renown; with this in mind, he was always causing incidents along the frontier. This year, Salmān Sultan Donbolī the *sūbāšī*,³ who was governor of Čors on behalf of the Shah and was the Safavid officer nearest Moḥammad Pasha, sent in a full report on the latter's misdeeds to Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz and *amīr al-omarā* of that frontier zone, and asked for his assistance.

Pīr Būdāq Khan sent two hundred Turkman *gāzīs* from his own establishment, and a hundred men in the service of other emirs, under the command of one of his experienced officers. With this reinforcement, Salmān Sultan led his forces, five hundred in all, by forced marches to Arjīš, which was Moḥammad Pasha's base. On arrival there, Salmān Sultan detailed two hundred men to attack the castle; stationed one hundred men in ambush ready to fall on the Paṣha if he made a sortie against his attackers; and led the remaining two hundred men on a plundering expedition in the surrounding countryside. As soon as the first forty or fifty of his men had reached the fort, Moḥammad Pasha sallied forth to attack them with the men he had at hand. The *qezelbāš* defended themselves vigorously. When the rest of their comrades reached the scene, they began to get the upper hand. Seeing this, Moḥammad Pasha entered the fray in person and engaged a Turkman in hand-to-hand combat, but his adversary hurled him from his saddle with a thrust of his spear and leaped down, ready to give him the coup de grâce. The Pasha hastily shouted his name, whereupon he was taken prisoner. His men fled, but most of them were cut down before they could regain the safety of the castle. The *qezelbāš*, after plundering the area, returned in triumph, and Pīr Būdāq Khan sent the Pasha on to court.

³An officer in the regular Ottoman army ranking below the *alay-beyt* (see Gibb and Bowen, I/1, p. 51). Presumably this officer had received this rank in Ottoman service.

Before the prisoner arrived there, the sons of *Kandān Aqa*, who were honored guests at the Safavid court, had frequently mentioned his name to the Shah and lauded his ability and valor. The Shah, by virtue of his natural inclination to clemency, and having regard for customary practice governing the treatment of such prisoners, treated *Moḥammad Pasha* as an honored guest, admitted him to his private assemblies, and invited him to his private banquets. This courtesy, however, merely increased the Pasha's natural arrogance. He made a number of unfortunate remarks at the Shah's assemblies and told a number of stories that had been better left untold. Finally, he asked the Shah's permission to send one of his men to Anatolia to tell his family and retainers that he was alive and well. Permission having been granted, the Pasha sent one of his servants, a eunuch, with a letter which he showed to the Shah for approval. The Shah, who had taken his measure, sent instructions to the frontier emirs that they were to detain the servant on the pretext that they could not let him proceed without obtaining confirmation from the Shah; they were to impound the letters he was carrying and send them, with the seals unbroken, to him. When the letters reached the Shah, he discovered that the Pasha had made additions to the draft he had submitted for approval: He had added unprofitable remarks about the *qezelbāš*, and had given various bits of useful information to the enemy. His treachery being plain, the Shah, when he marched to *Qarābāg*, left him at *Tabriz* in the hands of *Pīr Būdāq Khan*, and he died in custody.

The second success along the frontier this year is the capture of the pashas at the battle of *Āḡesqa* and the slaying of the Tartars in Georgia. As I stated in book I, when peace was concluded between Shah Tahmasp and the Ottoman Sultan *Sūlaymān*, the frontiers between the two empires were demarcated: The Meskhia district of Georgia, the ruler of which was the father of *Manūčehr Khan* the son-in-law of Simon Khan, was included in *qezelbāš* territory, and the provinces of *Āḡesqa* and *Qarāča Ardahān*, adjacent to *Erzerum*, formed part of Meskhia. During the reign of Sultan *Moḥammad Shah*, when *Lala Pasha* invaded Iran, he marched by this route to *Šīrvān*; first, he annexed the province of *Āḡesqa* and its dependencies and put the forts there in a state of defense. As long as *Manūčehr Khan* was alive, he and Simon Khan continued to resist; but after his death, the Ottomans consolidated their hold on the province. The daughter of Simon Khan, who was *Manūčehr Khan's* widow and a spirited woman, took to the forests with her young son and a few of her husband's retainers who owed their position to that dynasty.

During the twenty-five years that the whole of Georgia was subject to the Ottomans and paid tribute to them, this widow sought to get the Ottomans to treat the province like the other provinces of Georgia, in which they had left the local rulers in place and exacted tribute from them; in Meskhia, of course, she hoped they would leave her son, Atābeg, as the ruler. The Ottomans, however, refused. They gave Atābeg and his mother a fief in the province of Ākesqa, and he eked out a precarious existence from this. When Shah 'Abbas invaded Azerbaijan and laid siege to Erīvān, Shah Yūsuf Pasha, an emir's son from Ākesqa who had become a Muslim and had been raised to the rank of pasha by the Ottoman Sultan, was made governor of parts of Meskhia; about that time, the province was raided by a force of *qezelbāš* under Ḥasan Khan Ostājilū. After the defeat and retreat of Jeğāl-oğlū, Emir Gūna Khan established himself in control of the area and sent his raiding parties as far west as Erzerum. Qarāča Ardahān and Ākesqa were frequently raided during this period, and the fortunes of Shah Yūsuf Pasha and the Ottomans in the area declined.

At this juncture, Atābeg's mother appealed to the Shah for assistance in recovering her hereditary domains, and the Shah instructed the Šams al-Dīnlū, Qazāqlar, and other emirs from Tiflis, Zagam, Aḳtābād, and Lori to go to her aid. In the Year of the Sheep (1016/1607-08), when Shah 'Abbas invaded Šīrvān, that intrepid woman girded herself for action and marched against Shah Yūsuf Pasha with a detachment of *qezelbāš*, took him and a hundred and fifty of his men prisoner, captured the fortress of Ākesqa, one of the most important in the region, and brought most places in the area under her control. She and her emirs reported to the Shah at Šamāḳī on Sunday, 4 Rabī' I, 1016/29 June 1607,⁴ and Atābeg Khan, then sixteen years old, was left to govern the province with the aid of his mother.

The *beglerbeg* of Erzerum reported these events to Morād Pasha just after he had been appointed commander in chief and was preoccupied with the Jalālīs. After Morād Pasha had dealt with the Jalālīs, he sent Jil Pasha, the commander of the Tartar army which Salāmat Gerāy, as already related, had sent to serve under Morād Pasha, to Meskhia; with him went Farhād Pasha and the son of Moḥammad Pasha, a Georgian prince from Meskhia who had become a Muslim, had been educated among the Ottomans, and had been raised to the rank of pasha and awarded a governorship. Jil Pasha and

⁴ Rabī' I was a Friday.

Farhād Pasha reached Ākesqa toward the end of the Year of the Monkey (1017/1609) and expelled Atābeg Khan and his mother, who took refuge in Kartlia with Atābeg Khan's cousin. His mother stayed on with her nephew, but sent her son, who was of outstanding beauty, to the Shah's court.

Early this year, the Šams al-Dīnlū and Qazāqlar emirs and others, together with some Georgian troops, followers of Lūārsāb Khan the ruler of Kartlia, raided Ākesqa and brought back a large number of prisoners. Jil Pasha sent against them a force of two thousand Tartar horse under Farhād Pasha and the son of Moḥammad Pasha, with orders to ravage the Kartlia region of Georgia. The Tartar force plundered the area and started back, but found itself trapped in narrow defiles in the forests between the *qezelbāš* and the troops of Lūārsāb. Both Pashas were taken prisoner. Their men scattered in every direction, abandoning their booty when they found the roads barred against them. The Georgians hunted them down and killed some seven hundred of them. The remainder, many stripped naked by Georgian peasants, made their way back to Ākesqa after suffering great hardships. The Pashas were taken to the Safavid court; Farhād Pasha was pardoned at the request of the Georgian princes, but the son of Moḥammad Pasha was executed.

The Engagement between Zu'l-Faqār Khan and the Army of Šīrvān, and the Men of Ṭabarsarān

During the disorders in Šīrvān, the men of Ṭabarsarān had taken advantage of the situation and annexed a portion of Šāberān contiguous with Ṭabarasarān. While the Ottomans occupied Šīrvān, the *qezelbāš* had been unable to recover this territory because the Ottomans had supported the men of Ṭabarsarān. After the Safavid reconquest of Šīrvān, the people of Ṭabarsarān had refused to hand this territory back to the governor of Šīrvān, and the governor's men found it extremely difficult to enter the area because of the hostility of the people. The Shah, who always looked to the future in the midst of the problems of today, decided to construct a fort in the area. Zu'l-Faqār Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, was instructed to carry out this task, to stock the fort with provisions and munitions, and to garrison it with a force of *gāzīs* and musketeers; in this way, the Shah hoped to keep the men of Dāġestān out of the area, so that both *qezelbāš* and the inhabitants of Šīrvān might travel without hindrance.

Zu'l-Faqār Khan proceeded to carry out his orders. First, he sent a message to Ma'sūm Khan, the ruler of Ṭabarsarān, to explain what he was doing and to assure him that he had nothing to fear. But Ma'sūm Khan refused to allow him to build the fort without a fight, and marched against him with ten thousand men, mixed cavalry and infantry, after Zu'l-Faqār Khan had picked the site and started work on the fort. Since the ruler of Ṭabarsarān had a channel of communication open at court and had always at least professed to be a servant of the Shah, and since Zu'l-Faqār Khan had no orders to give battle to him, Zu'l-Faqār Khan sent a number of messengers warning Ma'sūm Khan of the consequences should he persist in preventing him from carrying out his orders. But all in vain; Ma'sūm Khan forced a battle on the Safavid commander. His men, however, dispersed after the first charge by the Safavid skirmishers, and a thousand Ṭabarsarānīs fell within a few minutes. Ma'sūm Khan fled from the battlefield, and Zu'l-Faqār Khan forbade his men to kill and plunder the fleeing Ṭabarsarānīs. He was afraid that, since he had had no orders to fight a battle with the Ṭabarsarānīs, the incident might not be to the Shah's liking. Zu'l-Faqār Khan completed the fort and sent a report to the Shah. Although Ma'sūm Khan had been the aggressor, since the Shah had already pardoned him on a previous occasion and had given government posts to some of his relatives, he expressed himself as being unhappy about this incident, and ordered Zu'l-Faqār Khan to send an envoy to Ma'sūm Khan to console him. The Safavid commander did as he was told, and Ma'sūm Khan repented of his action and was once again forgiven.

The Expedition Led by Emir Gūna Khan, at the Orders of the Shah, to Qarāča Ardahān to Plunder the Georgians of That Region

Emir Gūna Khan disliked the presence of Jil Pasha and the Tartar cavalry in Ākesqa, which bordered on Çoğūr-e Sa'd, and he had sent a report to the Shah urging the advisability of a preemptive strike. The Shah therefore sent all the emirs of Azerbaijan, together with household musketeers whom he had sent to Tabriz the previous year, to report to Erīvān. Under the command of Emir Gūna Khan, they were to proceed to Qarāča Ardahān and the region of Erzerum and to devastate the land and repulse the Tartars. Two thousand Jalālīs, under the command of Qarā Sa'id and Āgā Jeden Pīrī, also formed part of this expedition. In compliance with the Shah's orders, Pīr Būdāq Khan from Tabriz and Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oğlū Qajar

from Qarābāg marched with the Jalālīs from Marāğa to Erīvān. After Emir Gūna Khan had extended hospitality to the great emirs and the officers from the court for several days, they marched off in good order. The Ottomans and Tartars did not consider themselves strong enough to withstand this army, and they withdrew into their castles.

The Safavid troops entered Georgia, plundered the area, took prisoner many Georgian women, and rendered the region unusable by the enemy. Emir Gūna Khan heard meanwhile that an Ottoman army was assembling on the plain of Mūš, and so he took the troops from Erīvān, marched in that direction, and dispersed them. Of the Georgian prisoners, those who were suitable for service in the royal household were sent as a tithe to the Shah in the custody of 'Alī Khan Beg Javanšīr. The *qezelbāš* were now in even more complete control of the Erzerum frontier region than before, and none of the Ottoman *beglerbegs* and pashas dared come out into the open and fight them.

The Shah's Visit to Azerbaijan, and his Dispatch of an Expeditionary Force of Jalālīs to Kurdistan

The Shah had spent some time at Isfahan dealing with urgent matters; since the weather was now turning hot, it was time to move to the summer quarters of Farīdūn. A few days after his arrival there, the Shah ordered his emirs and principal officers of state to take the heavy baggage and, keeping to the high ground for the sake of coolness, proceed to Solţānīya. He himself returned to Isfahan with a few *moqarrabs* and close companions and performed the ceremony of the sprinkling of the water in the Čahār Bāg. This ceremony is an ancient custom of the kings of Iran, and Shah 'Abbas considered it an auspicious omen. The Shah then went to Qazvin by the Kashan road and stayed at the palace there for about six weeks. When his baggage train reached Solţānīya, the Shah joined it and camped there.

At this juncture, an ambassador arrived from the Ottoman Emperor in the person of the *čavoš* Keyr al-Dīn; he was accompanied by Moḥammad Beg, the son of Ḥoseynqolī Kolafā-ye Rūmlū, who was returning from an embassy to Turkey. The Ottoman ambassador was introduced at court by the great emirs. He presented the Shah and the principal officers of the Safavid state with letters from Morād Pasha, the grand vizier, and other principal officers of the Ottoman state. The letters talked about the possibility of concluding peace on the

terms that had been discussed before through the good offices of Simon Khan.⁵ The Ottoman ambassador's object was to obtain a personal interview with the Shah, discover what was in the Shah's mind regarding the possibility of concluding peace and what terms would be acceptable to him, and return with this information. The Ottoman officials pointed out that the Shah's previous ambassador, Moḥammad Beg, had not been the bearer of a letter from the Shah to the Ottoman Sultan; they urged the Shah, if he was serious about peace negotiations, to send such a letter next time. They pointed out that it had not been compatible with the Sultan's dignity and prestige to discuss peace terms while the Shah was busy reconquering provinces which had been conquered by Sultan Aḥmad's grandfather, Sultan Morād III, and had been in Ottoman hands for a generation. The Shah had in the process seized possession of all the Ottoman guns and equipment in the forts he had captured, and had inflicted thousands of casualties on the Ottomans, both military and civilians.

If the Shah continued his campaigning, this would only postpone the chances of peace; and hostilities, which caused hardship to all Muslim people, would inevitably continue. Such a situation would only weaken the Muslim forces engaged in the struggle with the Frankish princes, who were in a constant state of war against the Muslim world, and would produce malicious joy among Christians and other infidels. There were many instances in history of rulers who had given the welfare of mankind precedence over their own ambitions. If the Shah would begin peace negotiations, and would give in a letter some indication of a serious desire for peace, this would at least open the door to further discussions and give those Ottoman officials who wanted peace a chance to begin talks to that end.

The Shah treated the Ottoman ambassador, Keyr al-Dīn, with honor, expressed himself in friendly fashion toward the Ottoman Sultan, and sent a cordial message to the principal officers of the Ottoman state in the following terms:

The lamp of the Ottoman empire's prestige has shone with particular brilliance as a result of the holy war and the raids it has conducted against the infidel. In addition, the Ottoman Sultans are the guardians of the holy places of Mecca and Medina, a fact which distinguishes them among other Muslim rulers and

⁵In 1015/1606-07 (see above).

makes it incumbent upon all Muslims to assist them. However, as I have repeatedly stated, Sultan Morād III, taking advantage of our weakness at the time, deliberately and without cause broke the peace which had been concluded by our ancestors and reaffirmed generation after generation by the most binding covenants, and occupied some provinces which belong to me by right of inheritance. Now, with God's help, I have obtained my rights, and intend to defend them. If the Ottoman Sultan will relinquish his claim to this territory, I am ready at any time to discuss peace for the benefit of all Muslims. What could be better than that Muslim rulers should live together in peace and harmony, and thus frustrate the designs of the enemies of the faith?

The Shah decided to send a letter as requested by Morād Pasha, the grand vizier, and the other Ottoman officials who desired to get peace talks started. I will describe the contents of this letter and the dispatch of an ambassador to the Porte under the events of the following year.

After a short stay at Solţāniya, the Shah marched via Mīānaj to Ardabīl, where he visited the shrine of Shaikh Şaft al-Dīn and the other Safavid shaikhs and stayed there a few days. He then visited the tomb of Shaikh Zāhed-e Gīlānī.⁶ After that, he spent a few days hunting in the Qezel Āğāç area and then returned to Tabriz. From Tabriz, he visited Ordūbād, and then proceeded by way of 'Alī Darra to Qarābāğ, where he spent the winter.

An extraordinary incident occurred this year. As everyone knows, Shah 'Abbas is excessively fond of hunting, and often goes off hunting with a small party of *moqarrabs* and close friends. When the Shah was in Kalkāl district, on his way to Ardabīl, some crazy lost soul decided to pass himself off as the Shah. He gathered together a group of people even madder than himself, equipped himself with some animals designed to look like a hunter's bag, retired to a remote corner of Kalkāl where the people had never seen the Shah in person, and took up residence at the home of some local headman. He gave each of his crazy followers the name of one of the Shah's *moqarrabs*, and they

⁶The leader of the Zāhedīya Sufi Order and the spiritual director (*moršed*) of Shaikh Şaft al-Dīn. On Shaikh Zāhed's death in 1301, Shaikh Şaft al-Dīn assumed the leadership of the Order, which henceforth became known as the Şafavīya Order.

addressed him in the *qezelbāš* fashion, using the phrases "My king! My king! May I be your sacrifice?" The simple-minded, loyal villagers were overjoyed at the presence of the "Shah" among them, and exerted themselves to serve him. People from neighboring districts started flocking in to kiss his stirrup, and to bring him gifts and votive offerings. The "Shah" and his "attendants" spent their time enjoying themselves, heedless of the future.

As soon as the news spread to surrounding districts, a detachment of *gōlāms* of the royal household was dispatched under the command of the centurion Yūsuf Beg. They came upon the pseudo-Shah and his followers just when the latter were beginning to realize the full enormity of their crime and were thinking of riding off. One or two who had already mounted their horses fled into the mountains and disappeared; the pseudo-Shah himself and a few of his companions were arrested. Since it was essential that people who had the temerity to behave in this way should be severely punished as a warning to others, they were executed. Glory be to God! To what lengths man will go when he is under the influence of his carnal soul, and what dangerous actions he will commit, heedless of the consequences, when Satan whispers in his ear! God preserve us from Satan the accursed! Although this was not a very edifying incident, I felt I should record it as a warning to other improvident, idle men.

While the Shah was at Ardabīl, Zu'l-Faqār Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, came to court; he accompanied the Shah on his pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Zāhed, and on his hunting expedition in Qarā Āğāč, before returning to his post.

After the Shah had sent the Jalālīs to Kurdestan, he judged it wise to send a detachment of troops under the command of Emāmqolī Khan, an emir of the *dīvan* and the son of Allāhverdi Khan, in the direction of Salmās, which is adjacent to Kurdestān, to keep an eye on them.

Another event which occurred about this time was the death of Kord Heydar, one of the Jalālī emirs and commander of a thousand men. Inordinately proud of his strength and bravery, he frequently behaved in a rude and arrogant manner toward Moḥammad Pasha, who was afraid of him, and whose fear and suspicion of him increased in the course of the Kurdestan expedition. One day, Moḥammad Pasha held an assembly in his tent, and he noticed that Kord Heydar was not

drinking much and was uttering all sorts of threats. This increased Moḥammad Pasha's anxiety to the point that he ordered his *iç-oghlāns* (pages)⁷ to murder Kord Ḥeydar. They at once drew their swords and cut him and two of his men to pieces. The rest of his men at once gave up all idea of mutiny. The Pasha attached them to his own command, divided Kord Ḥeydar's possessions among them, and sent in a report to the Shah, who applauded his action.

While the Shah was at Ardabīl, there was reported to him the revolt of Emir Khan Barādūst, who had opposed Ḥasan Khan and Moḥammad Pasha and had shut himself up in his fort. The vizier Ḥātem Beg was instructed by the Shah to take charge of this operation, with full authority to deal with the matter as he thought fit. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, was instructed to accompany the vizier with a detachment of gunners and musketeers, to lend support if needed. The author was ordered to accompany the expedition, and so I will give an eyewitness account which I will endeavor to avoid making too long.

The Rebellion of Emir Khan Barādūst, the Expedition under the Command of the Vizier to Orūmīya, and the Siege of the Fort of Domdom

The story of Emir Khan Čülāq is a cautionary one. Gentle reader, listen to my tale a few brief moments, and learn the circumstances of this affair. Emir Khan was of the Kurdish tribe of Barādūst. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp, a certain Qarā Tāj of that tribe declared his "love of the Shah" and was enrolled among the servants of the Safavid state. Shah Tahmasp allocated to the Barādūst tribe the districts of Targavar and Margavar in the province of Orūmīya and Ošnūya.⁸ After the death of Shah Tahmasp, when the Ottomans began to encroach on Kurdistan and many Kurds transferred their allegiance to them, a certain Barādūst chief named Moḥammad Beg was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan as chief of the tribe and governor of the Barādūst district. Emir Khan withheld his allegiance from Moḥammad Beg and served successively a number of leading Kurdish chiefs. For a time, he served 'Omar Beg the governor of Sohrāb. In one of 'Omar Beg's many fights with his enemies, one of Emir Khan's hands was severed at the wrist; as a result he became known as Emir Khan Čülāq (the one-handed).

⁷See Gibb and Bowen, index. Eskandar Beg says "*iç-oghlāns*, also termed *kīç-oghlāns*." I have not been able to find any authority for the latter form.

⁸Roughly west of the southern tip of Lake Orūmīya.

In the year that Shah 'Abbas opened his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan and marched on Nağčevān and Erīvān, Emir Khan came to court and declared his "love of the Shah." The Shah received him with favor, made him chieftain of the Barādūst tribe, and granted him the districts of Targavar and Margavar with the rank of khan; in addition, he granted him the districts of Orūmīya and Ošnūya, which in Shah Tahmasp's time constituted a *qezelbāš* governorship. The Shah commanded his master goldsmiths to fashion an artificial hand out of gold, embellished with rubies and other jewels, and the Shah showed him the highest degree of favor in consideration of his loyalty and bravery. For a time Emir Khan remained at court; when he returned to his governorship, he stood higher in the royal favor than any of his peers. He annexed the territory of a number of Kurdish chiefs who had gone over to the Ottomans and acquired a great reputation in Kurdistan. Many Kurdish chiefs sought to gain favor with the Shah by entering Emir Khan's service, and it was not long before the latter began to get inflated ideas of his own importance.

In the year that Jeğāl-oğlū invaded Azerbaijan and was defeated outside Tabriz, Emir Khan failed to present himself at court. But he later put in an appearance at the Shah's camp near Salmās, and his dereliction of duty was overlooked. In order to reassure him that this was really the case, and in order to reassure the rest of the Kurdish chiefs (who are among the wilder specimens of the human race), Emir Khan was not held in custody at court, but was allowed to return to his post on the pretext of carrying out some duty or other. However, whether he felt an antipathy against the *qezelbāš* on religious grounds, or whether it was merely his own evil nature, he began to act in a hostile manner toward the *qezelbāš* frontier emirs and to harbor ideas of independence. He conceived the idea of building a castle, and wrote to the principal officers of the Safavid state as follows: "The old fort at Orūmīya is in ruins and beyond repair; it cannot be relied upon. I need a castle for the protection of my property and family. If you grant me permission, I will construct a fort at some suitable spot." On receiving permission, he laid the foundations of a fort some three *farsaqs* from Orūmīya, on a high hill just inside the Targavar district. There is a Kurdish tradition that there used to be a fort there in pre-Islamic times, known as Fort Domdom, which had fallen into ruin in the course of the centuries.

Pīr Būdāq Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Tabriz, who was a shrewd and experienced officer, observed signs of rebellion on the part of

Emir Khan and reported to the Shah that Emir Khan had laid the foundations of a lofty castle which would stand him in good stead in case of need. Pīr Būdāq did not consider this to be in the best interests of the state. The Shah replied that Pīr Būdāq was the *amīr al-omarā* in charge of that frontier; if he thought the construction of this fort was not in the best interests of the state, he should send an officer to Emir Khan to tell him to desist. The *amīr al-omarā* did so, and his subordinate delivered this message:

You are enrolled in the ranks of the Shah's great emirs, and you are the Shah's protégé. You profess your devotion to the Shah. Although the Shah trusts you and believes this profession of devotion to him, if you build this castle, slanderous tongues will start wagging. If your reason for building the fort is fear of the Ottomans, even if the Ottomans re-invade this region, as long as the forts at Erīvān and Tabriz are in our hands, there is no need for a fort here. If you are nervous about your fellow Kurdish chiefs, we servants of the Shah, whose duty it is to guard this frontier, will come to your assistance without delay. The old fort at Orūmīya is quite adequate to protect you and the Barādūst tribe for a few days. It is better that you cease building this fort and thereby avoid slanderous imputations against you. I urge you to accept this friendly advice, which is consonant with your own best interests, and not to lay yourself open to charges of rebellion.

This was friendly advice indeed, for the construction of this castle caused Emir Khan's ruin.

Emir Khan not only paid no heed to this advice, but put Pīr Būdāq Khan's messenger to death. He completed the new fort, which he made impressively strong, stocked it with provisions and munitions, and transferred his men there from Orūmīya. He began acting in a way quite contrary to his professions of single-minded devotion to the Shah. For example, he gave sanctuary to Khan Abdāl Mokrī, the brother of Shaikh Ḥeydar, who was in a state of revolt against the Shah and had been driven out of his hereditary camping grounds by Safavid troops. Khan Abdāl Mokrī took refuge with Emir Khan with twenty of his men, and the latter gave him quarters in the castle and

made them welcome. He then sent messengers to the Shah craftily making out that he had apprehended the rebels and representing this as an act of devoted service on his part.

When the Shah sent a combined Jalālī and *qezelbāš* force to Kurdestan, Pīr Būdāq Khan had initially been placed in supreme command of this force. Hearing this, Emir Khan Barādūst wrote to the principal officers of the Safavid state as follows: "There is a feud between me and Pīr Būdāq Khan, and the latter has made various accusations against me. It is therefore quite impossible for me to cooperate with the force which is under his command." To placate him, the Shah replied that he had replaced Pīr Būdāq with Ḥasan Khan, an officer of the Iraq establishment and a man of the utmost integrity. If Emir Khan's own affairs prevented him from joining Ḥasan Khan in person, said the Shah, he should send one of his sons or one of his senior chiefs, with a detachment of two or three hundred men. This would demonstrate his solidarity with the other Kurdish chiefs, and no false construction could be placed on his behavior.

Despite the fact that the Shah had gone to such lengths to placate him, Emir Khan remained stubbornly rebellious. When Ḥasan Khan and the other *qezelbāš* emirs joined forces at Marāḡa with Moḥammad Pasha and the Jalālīs and set off on their mission to Kurdestan, they called on him to act in accordance with the Shah's instructions; if he could not come in person, he should send a number of reliable officers who were well acquainted with the Kurdish scene and with the terrain, whose advice would be most useful, and who could act as guides for the expeditionary force. Emir Khan made various excuses for not coming in person: The Jalālīs, he said, were a self-willed, unruly, and improvident lot. Even though they were accompanied by detachments of *qezelbāš* troops, he said, he could not bear to be part of an army which had seven or eight thousand Jalālīs in it. Let them take whatever route they wished, he said, and he would send some men along later. The emirs strongly disapproved of this disobedience at the very outset of their mission, and they determined, since their path lay across his territory, to bring him to heel by whatever means they could. If Emir Khan, who professed to be loyal to the Shah, could behave like this, they reasoned, what might they expect from the rest of the Kurdish emirs? They therefore sent a cordial message to Emir Khan telling him that they would be camping for a few nights in his neighborhood and asking him to act as their host. They could then take counsel together, they said, and follow whatever course of action he advised.

Emir Khan, however, paid not the slightest attention to the message of Ḥasan Khan and the emirs. When the advance guard of the expeditionary force reached his area, the Barādūst tribesmen engaged the Jalālīs, killing two of them and wounding others. Ḥasan Khan ordered his men to retire and not retaliate; he then approached to within half a *farsak* of the castle and camped in a suitable spot. The Kurds entered the fort and began firing on the *qezelbāš* camp with artillery and muskets. Ḥasan Khan again sent a messenger to Emir Khan and asked him for an explanation of his behavior. Despite all Ḥasan Khan's efforts to establish friendly relations, Emir Khan persisted in making unacceptable excuses and rejected his overtures. The Kurds started making sorties from the fort, attacking and plundering any groups of Jalālīs or *qezelbāš* they encountered in the course of bringing provisions into the camp. Hostility between the two sides increased, and Moḥammad Pasha, determined to avenge the death of his men, kept leading men up to the walls of the fort and engaging in skirmishes with the Kurds who came out against him; both sides suffered in these encounters. The time for negotiations had now passed, and warfare began in earnest.

At this point, a group of Jalālīs who were fearful of Moḥammad Pasha defected and joined Emir Khan, an action that confirmed Emir Khan in his rebellious attitude and increased Moḥammad Pasha's anger; the renegades consisted principally of three or four hundred men under the command of Moḥammad Beg, the brother of Ṭavīl. In accordance with the Shah's *farmān* governing the operations in Kurdistan, the Safavid forces assumed control of Emir Khan's territory, and Ḥasan Khan sent a report on the situation to the Shah. This report reached the Shah at Ardabīl and, as already related, he appointed the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, to take charge of the situation. If Emir Khan showed any sign of being prepared to return to his allegiance, he was to be offered a royal pardon, and the Jalālī troops were to march away from the castle and be allotted winter quarters on the same basis as in previous years. Ḥātem Beg was given the sum of five thousand *tomān* in cash, in gold coin of the realm from the royal treasury, to defray the expenses of the Jalālīs. If Emir Khan persisted in his rebellion, Ḥātem Beg was to take punitive action against him and divide up his territory among the Jalālīs, so that the latter might devote their energies to subduing other Kurdish rebels.

The Vizier's Siege of the Castle of Domdom

The vizier, on receiving this commission, went from Ardabīl to Tabriz and assembled a force consisting of Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz; Barğordār Beg Anīs, the commander in chief of artillery; detachments of musketeers from Isfahan, Khorasan, Tabriz and Bāfq; and two thousand Jalālīs who had just returned from the raid on Qarāča Ardahān. At Salmās, he was joined by Khan Emir, the son of Ġazī Beg Kord, the governor of Salmās, and by Owlīā Beg the son of Kūr Seyf al-Dīn, the governor of Anzal and Şowmāy who were the Shah's appointees. On Tuesday, 26 Şa'bān 1018/24 November 1609, the vizier's army reached Ḥasan Khan's camp at Orūmīya. He and his men were welcomed by Moḥammad Pasha, Ḥasan Khan, and the other emirs.

The next day, the vizier sent an envoy, in the company of Malek Aqa Moḥammad Ṭasūjī, who was an acquaintance of Emir Khan, asking for a meeting within the confines of the fort. The vizier wished to learn what was in Emir Khan's mind, and try to remove the causes of his rebellious behavior and calm him down. Emir Khan agreed, and the vizier went to the rendezvous with a few men and entered into wide-ranging discussions with Emir Khan. Emir Khan, concealing his trickery and guile under a cloak of loyal submission, told the vizier he had taken refuge in his castle because of the lawless behavior of the Jalālīs and because of his lack of confidence in Ḥasan Pasha's ability to check them and protect him. Moḥammad Pasha, he alleged, had designs on his territory, and had accused him of opposition to the Shah. Emir Khan asked that the vizier undertake to plead his case before the Shah, and that no action should be taken against him that winter; he undertook to send one of his sons to court with gifts for the Shah, and to appear himself at court in the spring when the Shah moved to his summer quarters.

The vizier agreed to present Emir Khan's case at court, on condition that he carried out his side of the bargain. It was further agreed that, since the news of Emir Khan's revolt and his taking refuge in his castle was by now general knowledge, he should make public demonstration that his disloyalty was a thing of the past, should come out of the fort with his troops and mingle freely with the *qezelbaş* emirs. For one day he and his men would be the guests of the vizier, and the following day the vizier and the emirs would be his guests at the castle. Each side would treat the other in an appropriately friendly

manner, so that reports of a reconciliation would succeed those of the hostility between the parties.

Emir Khan agreed to be the guest of the vizier the following day, and the vizier set about making the necessary preparations for a reception to which all the *qezelbāš* emirs were invited. Since Emir Khan still wished to keep his distance from Moḥammad Pasha and the Jalālīs, the latter were not invited. The next day, the vizier waited the whole day for Emir Khan to appear, but there was no sign of him. The vizier sent Aqa Moḥammad Ṭasūjī back to the fort to tell him that they were all waiting for him. After endless discussions between Emir Khan and Aqa Moḥammad, Emir Khan finally sent a blunt answer: "The Barādūst elders," he said, "do not feel secure from treachery either on the part of the Jalālīs or of the *qezelbāš*. They do not feel confident that the vizier would be able to protect them, because the vizier is a Persian and a 'man of the pen,' and they have therefore prevented me from coming. In short, I will not put my neck at your mercy. If I consider it expedient, I will send my son to court with gifts. If the *qezelbāš* have any other course of action in mind, I shall have no option but to defend the fort against them."

The vizier realized that all the negotiations had been fraudulent and that Emir Khan, relying on the strength of his fortress, was set upon rebellion. The vizier took counsel with his emirs. There was general agreement that to show further leniency toward Emir Khan would not be in the interests of the state. For the principal minister of the Safavid state to come to the foot of the castle walls and then return without attaining his object would lead to all kinds of mischief. There was therefore a unanimous vote in favor of laying siege to the castle. The vizier reported this to the Shah, and began to make preparations for the siege.

At the beginning of this episode, I asked forgiveness from my readers for going into this affair in such detail. In order to set the scene properly, I must give some description of the fort of Domdom. It is situated on top of a high hill, the peak of which consists of a single long, narrow mass of rock, wider at one end than the other. On two sides, the ground falls away steeply into deep valleys, and an approach from either of these directions would be unthinkable without the use of ladders; in fact, the drop is so precipitous that the Kurds had not bothered to build defenses on these two sides. Of the other two sides, across the width of the rock, the east side is on rising

ground which runs into the mountains; it is fortified with a blockhouse and lofty towers, and has a gateway. On the western side, where the altitude is less, two strong blockhouses had been constructed, and there was a gate south of the second blockhouse. A path, hewn out of the rock, runs from this gateway to the ground below; the path is extremely narrow, and it is difficult for even one horseman to negotiate it. It is impossible to carry forward breastworks except on the east and west sides. On the east side, the ground for the distance of a bow-shot is solid rock, in which neither trenches nor tunnels can be dug. Nevertheless, to preclude the possibility of tunneling activity, another tower had been built on this slab of rock, overlooking a valley. This tower was a veritable small fort in itself, and no besieging force could hope to advance breastworks toward the main fort until it had gained possession of it.

For their water supply, the garrison defenders relied on rainfall, the rainwater being stored in a huge cistern. There was also a spring in the valley north of the fort that provided a little water. Emir Khan had had this spring cleaned out and a cistern constructed that filled up in the course of a night and provided one day's supply of drinking water for the officers of the garrison. The cistern was covered by a domed roof flush with the level of the ground to make it as invisible as possible. This cistern was called the *şūloq* (water container). For the protection of this water supply and of those carrying the water to the fort, a tower had been built adjacent to the wall of the fort and connected with it. To the south of the fort, again adjacent to the wall, was an ice pit, which filled with ice and snow during the winter. Beneath the pit was another cistern, in which water collected as the ice and snow melted in summer, and this water came in handy during periods of drought and excessively hot weather. The ice pit was also protected by a miniature fort, garrisoned by archers and musketeers. This ice pit was called either the *būzloq* or *qarlıq*; as in the case of the *şūloq*, the access route to it was concealed from prying eyes.

In other words, the fortress of Domdom consists of five separate forts: the main fort; the lower fort; the *şūloq*; the *būzloq*; and the tower outside the eastern gate. Each is of outstanding strength.

At this juncture, the vizier received reinforcements in the form of five hundred Māzandarānī musketeers from the royal camp, and a force of Čeganī *qūrčīs* under the command of the centurion Şafar-qolī Beg; Ganj 'Alī Khan was on his way from Tabriz with his troops.

Hasan Khan and the emirs in his force, together with the musketeers from Isfahan under the command of Mīr Fattāḥ, took up positions east of the fort. The west side, that is, on the side of the lower fort, was allotted to Pīr Būdāq Khan and his men, together with the musketeers from Khorasan and Bāfq. Morād Khan Sultan Čapnī, Kalīl Sultan Sīl-süpūr, and Moḥammad Taqī Beg the chiliarch (*men-bāšī*), commander of the Azerbaijan musketeers, were stationed to the south of the fort, opposite the *būzloq*. Ganj 'Alī Khan's task was to guard the gateway at the southwest corner. The Māzandarānī musketeers, and Šafarqolī Beg and the Čeganī *qūrčīs*, were stationed to the north of the fort, opposite the *šūloq*.

Barğordār Beg Anīs was ordered to cast two heavy large cannon and one exceptionally heavy siege gun (*balyemez*). Qabān Sultan Begdīlū was ordered to supervise the artillery and give general assistance to the gunners. A small cannon which had been found in the fort of Gowgar-Čīnloq (it had been transported by boat across the Black Sea) was placed in Ḥasan Khan's breastwork opposite the eastern tower. Moḥammad Pasha, who was suffering from a heart condition, was excused all duties, but the Jalālīs were stationed in support positions at various points. The five thousand *tomān* in gold coins which the vizier had brought with him were distributed among the Jalālīs in proportion to their status. Every unit was allocated winter quarters, and the Safavid army settled down for the winter, each detachment going about its business.

Emir Khan was alarmed by these preparations and repeatedly sent envoys professing submission, hoping once again to wriggle out of the trap, but since his earlier protestations had proved false, no notice was taken of them on this occasion, and Emir Khan was forced to defend himself. Several chieftains' sons from the Barādūst tribe escaped from the fort and declared their "love of the Shah." Both they and all other enemy soldiers who left the fort unanimously asserted that the garrison was suffering from a shortage of water. It had been a dry year and there was not much water in the cistern; such water as there was, was fetid and could only be used for the animals. The garrison was therefore completely dependent on the *šūloq* for its drinking water, which was brought in in bowls and distributed among the officers. If the *šūloq* were occupied, said these informants, the garrison would have no choice but to sue for quarter and surrender the fort. The *šūloq*, they added, could easily be seized by resorting to tunneling.

This plan commended itself to the vizier, since forcing the garrison to surrender was preferable to incurring the losses of an assault. At his orders, master welldiggers began tunneling operations. On the eastern side, Ḥasan Khan and his fellow emirs divided up the task of constructing breastworks and digging trenches. As far as the soil extended, they dug trenches; when they reached the area of solid rock, they wove baskets and, dividing the night into two shifts, carried soil from a considerable distance, filled the baskets, and stacked them on top of one another to form a protective avenue of approach to the fort. On the western side, Pīr Būdāq Khan proceeded in the same manner, even though the approach on this side was uphill. From dusk until dawn, these approach works came under heavy attack from the Kurds, who inflicted casualties on the *gāzīs* with shots from their bows and their muskets. On several occasions, the Kurds launched heavy daytime attacks, but the *qezelbāš* held their ground, both sides incurring casualties in this fighting. On one occasion, the Kurds attacked the breastwork held by Ne'matollāh Sultan Šūfī and caused a breach in it, but the Sufis defended it so fiercely that, though five men were killed one behind the other, the Kurds were unable to force an entry. As each man was killed, another hero took his place, and the Kurds were eventually forced to retire. In this struggle, the *qezelbāš* lost seven or eight men killed and ten or fifteen wounded; the Kurds lost twenty with thirty or forty wounded.

Meanwhile, the small cannon installed at Ḥasan Khan's breastwork had been playing on the eastern tower. After bombarding it for three weeks or perhaps a month, some cracks appeared in the walls, but they were not large enough to enable anyone to scale the tower. Since this tower blocked the way to the main fort, Ḥasan Khan, in his impatience and without consulting the vizier, ordered an assault toward the end of the day. About a dozen intrepid youths succeeded in reaching the top of the tower; several of them were wounded and crashed down from the top; this discouraged others from following, and the rest of the assault group was forced to scramble down again. Ḥasan Khan then stationed two hundred of his men at the base of the tower with orders to start undermining it. About midnight, the Kurds made a sortie against these *gāzīs*, who were forced to retire with the loss of a number of fine men because the heavy musket fire the Kurds maintained from the top of the tower prevented any help from reaching them. As a result of this setback, Ḥasan Khan was ashamed of his impulsiveness. The vizier consoled him, because reverses like these are inevitable in siege warfare.

After the welldiggers had been working for several days, the Kurds got wind of what they were doing. The reason for this was that the welldiggers, in order to maintain the correct alignment of their tunnel, made a hole through to the surface every few paces and inserted a marker. In a panic at the thought of losing their water supply, the Kurds launched attacks against the tunnel every night, and clashed with the Māzandarānī musketeers and Şafarqolī Beg and his Ćegānī qūrĉīs, who had been detailed to guard the tunnelers. As a result of these ceaseless attacks, the tunnelers were unable to proceed with their work. For three months, Ramażān-Zu'l-Qa'da 1018/November 1609-February 1610, the struggle went on in this way. On several occasions, large numbers of civilians, women and children, left the fort; they amounted to nearly a thousand persons in all. They were all suffering from thirst, and they hurled themselves upon the nearest source of water.

The besieged were well aware that the spring was their lifeline, and they defended the *şūloq* with desperation. Although the Safavid forces strove their utmost, they made no progress toward it during these three months. Since the water of life was hidden,⁹ the vizier thought of another plan. The scheme was to construct a breastwork around the domed roof of the spring and then make a hole in the roof. He ordered the heavy cannon and the monster siege gun to be brought up and directed at the wall of the stairway that led down to the spring, so as to deny access to it to the Kurds. Meanwhile, work on the tunnel was to continue. Mīr Şūfī, Mīr Pāzūkī, and Mīr Moq-addam were withdrawn from their respective positions and given the job of constructing the breastwork around the spring; Ḥasan Khan was directed to leave reliable officers in charge of his breastwork and to supervise operations at the spring. At the same time, Pīr Būdāq Khan was ordered to begin carrying forward a breastwork toward the *şūloq* from his position west of the fort. The vizier's own troops, who were particularly diligent in their conduct of sieges, moved from their own lines and took charge of the gun positions, and for twenty-one days they maintained a steady fire from morning till night and saw to the protection of the breastworks. At night, they inspected the work that had been done during the day by each of the emirs, and if any had been derelict in his duty, he was reprimanded.

The Kurds were greatly alarmed at these new developments. Every night, a few hours after darkness had fallen, they made a sortie in the

⁹A nice allusion to the legend of Kezr, who discovered the hidden source of the water of life and so became immortal.

direction of the *şūloq*. The Safavid musketeers, aiming by the light of torches, repelled them; every night there were casualties on both sides. There was a cave in the mountainside that overlooked the roof of the *şūloq*, and the Kurds were busy constructing a tunnel designed to come out inside the cave; from this cave, they would be able to fall upon the breastworks around the *şūloq*, scatter the *gāzis*, and be in a position to prevent any further operations in that area. When the emirs learned of this plan, they decided to try and forestall it by occupying the cave. About thirty young *qezelbāš* daredevils and musketeers volunteered for this duty.

One morning, when the sun was just up, these volunteers sprinted across the open ground between their breastworks and the cave; they came under heavy fire from the fort, but not more than one man was hit. The emirs mounted guard on their breastworks until midnight, but after midnight, the Kurds issued from the castle in two columns. One column made for the breastworks around the *şūloq* and kept the Safavid troops there fully occupied; the other made for the cave by a path beneath it and rushed the entrance. As long as the *qezelbāš* had bullets and arrows left, they held on grimly to the cave. When they had no ammunition left and ten of their number had been killed, they drew their swords and tried to hew their way to safety. Of the twenty who charged out of the cave, eight, though wounded, succeeded in breaking through, but the rest perished. Two of the wounded, one an Eşfahānī musketeer and one a Pāzūkī tribesman, were taken prisoner and hauled off to the castle. Emir Khan, impressed by their valor, refused to allow them to be put to death; on the contrary, he had physicians see to their wounds, and after they had recovered he sent them back to the Safavid lines.

In the light of the dawn, the bodies of the slain *qezelbāš* could be seen lying around the mouth of the cave, and *qezelbāš* morale suffered a slight shock. The vizier was strongly affected; he severely reprimanded the Moqaddam, Pāzūkī, and Şūfī emirs, and even uttered threats against them. But the emirs, regarding the setback as being all in a day's work and desirous of preventing the enemy from enjoying their triumph, shrugged the incident off and redoubled their efforts. The very same day, forty Ostājīlūs came forward from Ḥasan Khan's regiment and volunteered to occupy the cave. The vizier was of two minds as to whether he should sanction their going in view of the disaster the previous night, but Ḥasan Khan pressed him to grant permission and swore that this time he would himself take three hundred men to give support to the men in the cave.

The vizier reluctantly gave his consent, stipulating that Qabān Sultan Begdlū and Emām Sultan Ājorlū should also take their troops out that night in support of Ḥasan Khan. At the insistence of the other emirs, ten additional volunteers were chosen from their men, making fifty men in all to go to the cave. This commando group, taking all necessary weapons and equipment, and rations for several days, at once went up to the cave at the double and in good order. The Kurds were astonished by their bravery and audacity. When night fell, the Kurds emerged from the fort earlier than they had the previous night, and engaged them. A severe struggle took place. Ḥasan Khan and the other emirs and musketeers from outside, and the commando group from within the cave, fought on until daybreak. The Kurds, despite all their efforts, were unable to dislodge them; they retired dispirited to the fort, while the *gāzīs* mounted guard on the cave.

Every night, the Kurds lost a few men as they went to and fro between the fort and the *şūloq* to fetch water, as a result of the fire from the heavy siege guns and muskets. The breastworks had now been pushed forward to the edge of the cistern, and the roof covering it had been pierced. Through the hole, the *qezelbaş* could see the course of the water and trace it to the spring. The Kurds sought to remedy this situation; every day they sent patrols that fought the enemy in the tunnel and interrupted the work of the tunnelers. On 18 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1018/14 March 1610, about noon, the emirs stuffed straw in the hole in the roof of the *şūloq* and set fire to it. The Kurds guarding the cistern fled back to the castle because of the smoke, and the *gāzīs* descended and occupied the *şūloq*. They then blocked the access staircase for a distance of ten steps above them with rubble. This success caused a strong reaction from the defenders, who strove to regain control of their water supply, but without success. Māzandarānī musketeers were stationed on guard at the *şūloq*, and the emirs retired to their respective breastworks. The vizier's troops also left the gun positions and returned to their original posts.

After the occupation of the *şūloq*, Emir Khan and his officers hung on for ten or fifteen days by dint of using the water from the *būzloq*, while his men had to make do with the fetid water from the storage tank in the fort. At this critical point in the siege, the garrison was saved by the onset of the spring rains. Unlike the previous year, this time they were heavy and continuous. By the will of God, which is beyond human understanding, it rained incessantly for nearly a month, giving the garrison six months' water supply. All the efforts

of the previous three months on the part of the besiegers to gain control of the *şūloq* were thus wasted, and the garrison was encouraged to continue its resistance even more stoutly. At this juncture, those unreliable Jalālīs began to disperse.

The Defection of the Jalālīs and the End of Moḥammad Pasha

Morād Pasha, who had been given the task of extirpating the Jalālīs from Ottoman territory, had been carrying out his mission with ruthless efficiency, putting to death anyone who had ever had the slightest connection with the Jalālī movement, and the Ottoman Sultan was well satisfied with his efforts.

Nevertheless, some of his enemies set out to destroy his work. They attributed the escape of the Jalālīs to Iran to poor tactics on the part of Morād Pasha, and told the Ottoman Sultan that Morād Pasha's actions in dealing with the Jalālī problem had not been in the best interests of the state and were not calculated to restore order within the empire. The result was that Sultan Aḥmad I told Morād Pasha that, although he had tried hard to suppress the Jalālīs, things had not turned out well, since twelve thousand of the rebels had joined the *qezelbāš*. "What you should have done," said the Sultan, "was to have offered the rest of the rebels amnesty after you had defeated the main body of them. Even if a few of their leaders had not trusted the promise of amnesty and had defected, undoubtedly the rank and file, if assured that their lives would be spared, would not have left their homeland." The upshot was that Naşūḥ Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr and one of Morād Pasha's chief enemies, who had been acting in a high-handed manner along the frontier, wrote placatory letters to the Jalālī emirs urging them to return to Ottoman territory. Moḥammad Pasha and Qarā Sa'īd, who in view of their past activities had no hope of saving their necks, did not respond, but the rest, lured by the distant magic of the Ottoman spell, resolved to return. One factor in their decision was that, in the Ottoman empire, they had become accustomed to a lawless way of life and to doing as they pleased, whereas in Iran the king's justice restricted their activities.

The first Jalālī to return to Turkey was Āgā Jeden Pīrī, who with his five hundred men slipped away from his winter quarters of Oşnū toward Karkūya in the district of Baghdad. As a result of his defection, the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, distrusted the rest of the Jalālīs and

consulted Moḥammad Pasha about them. Moḥammad Pasha said that Kekeč Moḥammad, who had seven hundred men, was unreliable and a troublemaker; if he could be removed from the scene, he (Moḥammad Pasha) would answer for the loyalty of the remainder. The vizier reported this to the Shah, who wrote a friendly letter to Kekeč, encouraged him to hope for royal favors, and summoned him to court. Kekeč set off thither with a group of his men. The Shah then issued a second order, in the name of all the rank and file of the Jalālīs: The Jalālīs were foreigners who had come to his kingdom, said the Shah, and were consequently his guests; as long as they were in his realm, it was incumbent upon him to treat them as such. If at any time they wished to leave, even though it was usual for guests to express the wish to come and to ask permission to leave, he would not insist on the latter requirement being carried out, since it was not compatible with the code of gentlemanly behavior to cause vexation to one's guests. However, said the Shah, there was no need for the Jalālīs to incur the disgrace of running away and by this action to give the *qezelbāš* the reputation of having treated their guests badly. Let them leave openly and escorted by the frontier emirs; he would do nothing to prevent their leaving.

When the Shah's letters arrived, the vizier called together all the Jalālī leaders and read them the contents of the Shah's letter. They all with one accord vowed that they had no intention of leaving. "Since we came to this land," they said, "and sought protection in the shadow of the Shah's clemency, we have no longer gone in fear of our lives. We have been overwhelmed by the Shah's munificence, and we have no worries. Why should we want to leave? We are ashamed of our disloyal colleagues who have run away." They talked a lot in this vein, but secretly they felt considerable trepidation about staying in Iran, and all ranks made plans to leave. Moḥammad Pasha, distracted by his illness, spoke to them harshly and ill-temperedly.

Only a few days later, some of his own personal *bölükbašīs* defected with two thousand men, and made for Dīār Bakr to join Naşūḥ Pasha. After they had left, Moḥammad Pasha left the vizier's camp and went to Orūmīya for purging and other forms of medical treatment; he was now too weak to carry out his duties. Next to leave were a thousand of his personal retainers, by the Salmās road. Less than two days later, Ebrahim Aqa, the Pasha's *vakil* and right-hand man, left by the same route, taking with him the Pasha's private stable. When the Pasha heard this, despite his illness and weakness,

he set off in pursuit of them with some two or three hundred men who had remained loyal to him. When he caught up with them, the renegades sent a messenger to him to tell him that, since they had eaten his salt, they were reluctant to fight him; it would be better, they said, for him not to trouble them or himself, but to go back. If he did not, they would fight. The Pasha, who did not have the strength to fight them, with a heavy heart resigned himself to the loss of his horses, and went back. This group of Jalālīs committed all sorts of crimes on their return journey, appropriating the property of any peasant, *qezelbaş*, or traveler they chanced to meet. They committed the unpardonable crime of eating salt and then smashing the salt cellar.¹⁰

After the defection of the Pasha's men, the vizier's subordinates thought it better not to leave the Pasha at Orūmiya, in case the Jalālīs who remained plotted some treachery against him, and so they brought him back to the camp. He was suffering from some liver complaint and from stomach pains. He refused to have anything further to do with doctors, but pinned his faith on some popular Turkish remedies, dismissing his mortal disease as "a touch of the spleen." He had a strong desire to live, and refused to consider the possibility of death. However, at the end of Şafar 1019/May 1610, he died. His death destroyed what cohesion there remained in the Jalālī ranks; a number of his *bölükbāšīs*, some three hundred in all, were taken into the Shah's service and provided for. Since the Pasha had no heir, the Shah granted his belongings, comprising his horse, his mules and camels, his equipment, jeweled weapons, and cash in silver and gold, to the value of about three thousand *tomān* in all, to Qarā Sa'īd. The rest of the Pasha's troops were also transferred to his command. By this time, not more than five hundred Jalālīs remained in Iran, counting those who had entered the Shah's service, and the men under the command of Qarā Sa'īd, Kekeč Moḥammad, and the other *bölükbāšīs*.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

Shah Naẓar Sultan Tükelt Čaġatāy, the governor of Jām, who had been appointed commandant of the fort of Darband in Šīrvān, was made governor of Mašhad as a reward for excellent service.

¹⁰I.e., accepting hospitality and then behaving treacherously and disloyally.

Deaths

Maryam Sultan Begom, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, who had been the wife of Khan Aḥmad the ruler of Gīlān, died at Isfahan. The Shah and the women of the royal family received the news in his summer quarters at Āq-Ölang near Hamadan, and the news occasioned much sorrow. Qāẓī Sultan, the warden of the shrine at Mašhad, who happened to be in the royal camp, was charged with bearing the body to Mašhad and burying it within the sanctuary of the shrine.

Mīrzā 'Alamīān Mīrzā Moḥammad Šaft'. I have already related some details of his career. He was descended from a family of shaikhs from Kadkan in the district of Nishapur. As a young man, he had learned the art of secretarial composition at Mašhad from the secretaries in the governor's office, and had entered the service of Kāẓemqolī Khan Pornāk. After the latter's death, he had been appointed vizier to Ebrahim Khan Torkmān. When the latter was dismissed from office, Mīrzā 'Alamīān was for a while out of a job. In the Year of the Hare, 1000/1591-92, when Farhād Khan marched to Nishapur, Mīrzā 'Alamīān presented himself to the Khan and asked him for a job. Because he was a Nīšāpūrī, he was given the job of writing official documents and allowed to accompany the Khan on his campaign. Gradually, his talents won recognition, and his influence grew with his experience, until finally he was appointed vizier.¹¹

The esteem in which he was held increased steadily, and Farhād Khan frequently used to sing his praises to the Shah. After the execution of Farhād Khan, Mīrzā 'Alamīān was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of Gīlān, and performed well in this office—so well, in fact, that he was given the honorific title of Mīrzā 'Alamīānī and was made vizier of Qazvin in addition to his other appointment. In the Year of the Horse (1015/1606-07), he was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of Khorasan in addition to his two other offices. He had full authority in administrative and financial matters, with power to appoint and dismiss financial officials and *kalāntars* as he thought fit. Unfortunately, he was not a big enough man to cope with all this power. As previously related, he began behaving in an improper manner toward some of the emirs of Khorasan, especially the governor of Mašhad, Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, and his behavior eventually suggested that he was mentally unbalanced. He was recalled by the Shah, who was then in Māzandarān with his court, and for a time was out of favor and debarred

¹¹Of Khorasan, not of the central administration.

from royal assemblies. He fell ill at his summer quarter in the Isfahan area and went to Qazvin, where he died at the beginning of this year. The chronogram of his death is "I am eternal; all else perisheth."¹² Among the financial and other officials appointed by him are Behzād Beg Astarābādī, the vizier of Gīlān; Aṣlān Beg, the vizier of Qazvin; Mīr Abu'l-Qāsem, a kinsman of his, the vizier of Māzandarān; and Kāja Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥoseyn, the vizier of Mašhad.

Bektaş Khan, the governor of Marv; he belonged to the Dānālū clan of the Ostājīlū tribe. He had started his career as the *vaktl* of Moršedqolī Khan Yakān in Khorasan, and in Iraq he had acted as his *dārūga* at Isfahan. After the execution of Moršedqolī Khan, Bektaş Khan, at the Shāh's bidding, was for a time in charge of some of the rural districts of Isfahan. But, after his dismissal from this position, he was for a time in straitened circumstances. In the Year of the Dog, 1006/1597-98, when Khorasan was reconquered, Bektaş Khan was raised to the status of emir and appointed governor of Mārūčāq, where he served with distinction and played a large part in the pacification of that frontier. In the Year of the Rat, 1008/1600, when Moḥammad Khan Ūzbeg was removed from office as the penalty for rebelling, the governorship of Marv-e Šāhījān was given to Bektaş Khan. He fought many battles against the Uzbegs along the frontier and was uniformly successful in these engagements. This year, in his tenth year in this office, he died, and his governorship was given to Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Mašhad.

Moḥammad Zamān Sultan Bāyandor, who came from a family of Bāyandorī Turkman emirs which had a record of loyal service to the Safavid house. He came to court from Yazd, which was his family seat, and entered the service of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. At the time of the civil war between the Turkmans and the Takkalūs, since his sister, Āgā Jān Kānom, was married to 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū and was responsible for the upbringing of the young prince 'Abbas, Moḥammad Zamān Sultan went to Herat on the pretext of wanting to see his sister. After the loss of Khorasan to the Uzbegs, he returned to Iraq and lived for a time at his native city, Yazd. During this period, he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. On his return from the Ḥejāz, he was taken into royal service and enrolled among the *moqarrabs* and close companions of the Shah at court, where he remained in favor until the time of his death, although the Shah sometimes reprimanded him for his habit of making cutting remarks and of being

¹²This chronogram yields the correct date, 1017/1608-09.

unpleasant to people in a subtle way. He was a witty conversationalist and a connoisseur of poetry, but was not devoid of military skills, which he had inherited from his forebears. To begin with, he was noted as a dispenser of charity, but after his return from the pilgrimage, he was guilty of various misdemeanors—either because this sort of behavior reflected his true nature, or because he had been seduced by love of power and worldly goods. May God pardon him for these shortcomings!

Ḥoseynqolī Beg Qājār, the brother of Emir Gūna Khan, was stabbed to death one night while he was asleep by one of his servants, a youth from Gīlān, who feared that the Khan might make advances to him. His murderer was executed.

Ḥājji Adham Beg, the brother of the vizier Ḥātem Beg, died at Shiraz. I gave some account of his career under the Year of the Horse, 1015/1606-07, and so I do not need to repeat it here. This year, he returned to Shiraz after making the pilgrimage to Mašhad, and died after a short illness. He was a capable and honest official who, after his retirement from public office, lived a life of quiet piety at various holy places. His brother and his son, Mīrzā ʿAbd al-Ḥoseyn, received the news at Ardabīl; his son held the high office of *monšī al-mam-ālek*. The Shah offered his condolences to his family, to each of whom he sent a suitable robe of honor.

This concludes my account of the events of the Year of the Fowl.

The Events of the Year of the Dog, Corresponding in Part to the Muslim Year 1018/1609-10, and in Part to 1019/1610-11, the Twenty-fourth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Sunday, 25 Zu'l-Ḥejja 1018/21 March 1610, was New Year's Day. The royal court had wintered in Qarābāg, and the Shah spent the early spring hunting and dispensing justice to the people. The *moqarrab al-haẓrat* Qarčaqaý Beg was sent to Šīrvān when some of the local governors of Dāğestān and the wild men of Ṭabarsarān, who persisted in thinking that the construction of the fort by Zu'l-Faqār Khan already referred to was a prelude to their own subjugation, entertained vain thoughts and went astray. Qarčaqaý Beg took a force of *gōlāms* and *qezelbāš* to Šīrvān, with instructions to join up with Zu'l-Faqār Khan, proceed to Šābarān, and, as a first move, send placatory letters to the governors of Dāğestān. Any who demonstrated their loyalty were not to be molested; their sons, brothers and other kin were to be brought to court and enrolled among the retainers of the royal stirrup. Appropriate action was to be taken against those who showed signs of resistance.

A cautionary event which occurred this year was the execution of Zu'l-Faqār Khan, which had been ordered by the Shah. Qarčaqaý Beg told Zu'l-Faqār Khan that he had secret orders from the Shah which they must open in private in their tent and then act upon. Qarčaqaý Beg went to Zu'l-Faqār Khan's tent; after formal greetings had been exchanged, the tent was cleared. By previous arrangement, a number of Qarčaqaý Beg's *gōlāms* then rushed in with drawn swords and killed Zu'l-Faqār Khan. The governorship of the province of Šīrvān was given to Yūsuf Khan, the master of the royal hunt (*mīr-šekārbāši*). Of Zu'l-Faqār Khan's personal retainers, those who belonged to the Qarāmānlū tribe were enrolled in the ranks of the *qūrčīs*; the rest of his troops were transferred to Yūsuf Khan's command. The local governors of Dāğestān, who had feared Zu'l-Faqār Khan, were reassured by his execution, and flocked in happily to tender their submission to Qarčaqaý Beg; they sent their relatives and appropriate gifts to the Shah. After ordering the affairs of Šīrvān, Qarčaqaý Beg returned to court.

Superficially, it appeared that the execution of Zu'l-Faqār Khan

had been ordered by the Shah in order to gratify the governors of Dāğestān; in other words, the only reason for it was that the interests of the state required it. However, it was clear to more perceptive and intelligent observers that there could be only one reason for the execution of such a powerful khan—namely, that the Shah had some doubt about his loyalty. The Shah needs intelligent and prudent servants, who grow in wisdom as their power and authority increases, who do not become puffed up by pride, and whose thoughts do not stray from the path of prudence.

The Shah had heard that the 'Emādiya and Sohrān Kurds had asked for assistance from Naşūḥ Pasha, who was in Dīār Bakr, and were on their way to Orūmīya to relieve Emir Khan. As a precaution, the Shah at once sent additional forces to Orūmīya under the command of Emāmqolī Khan, the governor of Lār; the force was a composite one of *qezelbaş*, *qūrčīs* and *golāms*, similar to the one which had been sent to Salmās the previous year. Emāmqolī Khan's instructions were to give assistance to the vizier, Ḥātem Beg, if he should need it. If the reports of movements by the Kurds turned out to be false, he was to pitch camp in the area and keep his eye on the frontier in the region of Vān. The weather in Qarābāğ was turning hot, and the Shah was thinking of moving into summer quarters, when he heard of the sudden death of Ḥātem Beg. The Shah was grieved by the death of such a wise and beneficent vizier, without equal in his age. In recognition of his outstanding service as vizier over a period of almost twenty years, the Shah conferred the office on his son, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb. Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, despite his youth, was his father's equal in practical matters, and his superior in learning. The Shah marched from Qarābāğ to summer quarters near Tabriz; from there, fearing that the death of the vizier might have caused some relaxation of the siege, he sent the *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat*, Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, who stood close to him, to Orūmīya to cooperate with the emirs in the vigorous prosecution of the siege and, it was to be hoped, the capture of the castle.

The Capture of the Fortress of Domdom, the Killing of Emir Khan and His Followers, and Events Both Preceding and Following the Death of the Vizier, Ḥātem Beg

Readers will recall that the effect of the capture of the *şuloq* had been nullified by the onset of heavy and prolonged rains. It was decided that the only thing left was to try and take the fort by storm; in

order to get the troops close enough for an assault, all the emirs were ordered to push forward their breastworks by means of avenues of baskets. The vizier, Hâtem Beg, moved his men from their positions to the sector commanded by Hasan Khan, and he and the troops of the royal household took over a breastwork commanded by Şafarqolî Beg Çeganî. Night and day men worked to bring up materials, and the basket weavers worked flat out to produce more baskets. Other men fetched earth and clay to fill the baskets, carrying it considerable distances. A thick screen, faced with iron and mounted on a gun carriage, was constructed so that the workmen could continue without danger from enemy bullets and mortars; in this way, working at night and standing guard during the day, they inched their way forward. Even so, never a night passed without several men being killed by enemy fire.

Finally, Hasan Khan, Elyās Kalîfâ Qarâdâglû, and Mîr Fattâh, chiliarch of the Isfahan musketeers, carried their avenues of baskets up to the walls of the large tower that stood outside the walls on the north side of the fort. Qarâ Beg, the *vakîl* of Emir Khan, and a group of Kurds were charged with its defense. The sappers went to work on the walls, exposing the wooden beams that had been set in the mud brick to reinforce them and setting fire to them; this so weakened the structure that, about noon one day, when the sappers had left their excavations and were on their way to the valley to one side of the tower to eat lunch, part of the wall collapsed, and some of the defenders crashed down with it into the valley below.

When this was observed by the Safavid forces, the vizier said to Hasan Khan, "What are we waiting for? We must attack the tower." Hasan Khan at once ordered his men to the assault. The first man who reached the top of the tower killed Qarâ Beg with a musket shot and cut off his head; his name was Pahlavân Moḥammad, of the Kûzânî Eşfahânî regiment of musketeers. Close behind him were about a dozen more musketeers, who cut down about seven or eight Kurds they encountered at the top. Emir Khan's nephew, a handsome youth, managed to scramble down the tower without doing too much damage to himself, but he was set upon by some idiot of a Çapnî guard in the valley below and killed. The vizier, upset by this incident, reprimanded the man responsible and did not give him the reward he had expected when he brought in his victim's head.

The tower was now fully under Safavid control, most of the guards

having been killed. Its capture represented the turning of the tide for the Safavid forces. Once it was in their hands, their task became easier, and in ten days they pushed the avenues of baskets up to the walls of the fort itself. The heavy siege guns were then brought up. One was trained on the upper fort and one on the lower fort, near the breastwork of Pīr Būdāq Khan. Things now began to look black for the defenders; Emir Khan was in a panic, and his Kurds had given up hope. Since some of his chief allies had been killed in the fighting, the morale of the rest of the garrison declined, and every day groups of ten or twenty Kurds or Jalālīs left the fort, made their way to the breastworks, and declared their "love of the Shah." They were warmly greeted by the vizier and given gifts and cash grants. It seemed likely that the fort would be captured within the next few days, when the vizier suddenly died.

Hātem Beg had spent the day in Ganj 'Alī Khan's quarters. He had returned to his own quarters toward the end of the day, inspecting the artillery positions on the way. Early in the evening, he entered his audience tent. After performing the obligatory religious duties, he engaged in convivial conversation with his companions until late in the night, as was his wont. Finally, he retired to sleep. I had not yet reached my own tent when a messenger overtook me and summoned me to return. I was surprised, and wondered what the cause of the summons might be. While I was on my way back, a second man ran up and said that the vizier had had a stroke and was dead. Everyone was filled with consternation. The great emirs were summoned, and word was sent posthaste to the Shah. The same night, the vizier's body was washed and wrapped in a burial shroud; the next morning, it was sent to Tabriz. The emirs sent a messenger to summon Emāmqolī Khan from Salmās.

The death of the vizier slowed up the prosecution of the siege at a moment when success was close at hand. The defenders took heart, and ceased to hand themselves over to the Safavid forces. However, with the arrival of the new commander in chief, Moḥammad Begdīlū Šāmlū, all bent themselves to their tasks with renewed vigor. Within a few days, breastworks had been pushed forward to the walls of both the upper and lower forts, which had been so shaken by the bombardment of the heavy siege guns that cracks were beginning to appear. In the direction of the upper fort, assault troops gained possession of several towers. On the western sector, Pīr Būdāq Khan's Turkman *gāzīs* had carried their breastworks up to the towers of the lower fort,

the officer in charge of which was Emir Khan's eldest son. The garrison of the lower fort abandoned their positions and retreated to the upper fort. The Safavid forces then set about destroying the wall between the lower and upper forts. The guards at the *büzloq* sent a messenger to the Safavid emirs to ask for quarter, and they handed over the *büzloq*.

Three of the five defensive positions that constituted the fort complex at Orūmīya had thus been captured, and the morale of the Kurds had been broken. They all repaired to Emir Khan's quarters, which had been made into a keep, to decide what to do. By this time the *gāzis* were swarming all over the upper fort, and all the fortifications except Emir Khan's own quarters were in their hands. Emir Khan told his men to lay down their arms and sent a messenger to Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū asking him to come to the fort with his Šāmlūs to protect him from Ḥasan Khan and his troops, of whom he was apprehensive because of the blood that had been shed in the course of the siege. He asked Moḥammad Beg to escort himself, his sons, and his dependents in safety to the Shah.

At this point, Khan Abdāl Mokrī left the fort with a number of his men and surrendered; they were placed in the custody of Elyās Qarā-dāglū, as his guests; next came Moḥammad Beg, the brother of Ṭavīl, and his Jalālīs; they were divided into groups and placed in the custody of various emirs. After this, Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū acceded to Emir Khan's request and entered the fort, where he received the surrender of Emir Khan, his eldest son, a group of Barādūst tribesmen and others—a hundred men in all, all clad in chain mail and carrying their muskets and full equipment. About two hundred other Kurds were left in the fort. Moḥammad Beg placed a guard on the fort with orders to prevent any looting of the Kurds' houses. He then took Emir Khan and his group to his own quarters, had tents and a large pavilion erected apart for them, and summoned Ḥasan Khan and the other emirs to come and meet Emir Khan and decide how to deal with him in the light of the best interests of the state.

Moḥammad Beg and his brothers were sitting with Emir Khan and his companions and performing their duties as hosts when Ḥasan Khan approached the tent and sent one of his men to summon Moḥammad Beg outside. When Ḥasan Khan failed to appear and Moḥammad Beg left the tent, the Kurds became extremely nervous. Meanwhile, Ḥasan Khan was arguing violently outside with Moḥammad Beg:

"Have you taken leave of your senses?" he said. "You and your brothers are mad to trust these rebels, who have got nothing to lose, and to sit down among them in this way. The best course is to separate them into several groups. You should keep Emir Khan, his son, and several of his kinsmen in your own custody, and break up the rest in small groups among the emirs, so that we can deal with them later in whatever way the Shah orders." Moḥammad Beg was persuaded by this argument, and sent a man to Emir Khan to tell him that it was not practicable to keep him and so many of his men together; he, his son, and other relatives should remain where they were and take their ease. Emir Khan agreed, but his companions demurred; "You are all right," they said, "because the emirs would not dare to kill you on their own authority. But they will not leave one of us alive. You and we have sworn to stand together in good times and bad. You are apparently now ready to desert us for the sake of winning a few extra days of life, but we will not desert you. If we are to die, we will fall together." They sent this answer back to Moḥammad Beg.

While all this had been going on, uproar broke out in the quarters of Elyās Kalīfa. It turned out that, at the moment when Khan Abdāl Mokrī was sent to Elyās Kalīfa's quarters, the latter was absent at the breastwork which was in his charge. His servants busied themselves with entertaining the Khan and brought him cooling drinks. At this point Elyās Kalīfa, who was an unsophisticated Sufi, arrived with a few of his men and greeted his guests formally. He began to chide his servants because they had not made his guests comfortable in the great heat by removing their weapons and equipment. A servant came forward to relieve them of the burden of their equipment, but Khan Abdāl and his fellow Kurds, putting a sinister interpretation on this action, at once leaped up and drew their swords, wounded Elyās Kalīfa several times and also wounded a number of his kinsmen and retainers who were in the tent unarmed. The Qarādāglū *gāzis* then rushed in with drawn swords, saw Elyās Kalīfa and two of his kinsmen lying there dead and others wounded, and immediately launched themselves at Khan Abdāl and his followers and cut them down.

When Ḥasan Khan heard of this incident, he lost all faith in that treacherous crowd, and his *gāzis* began to kill all those, both Kurds and Jalālīs, who had emerged from the fort that day prior to Emir Khan, because one could no longer credit their professions of submission. Hearing the uproar, and seeing *qezelbaş* troops running up and

surrounding their tent, Emir Khan and his companions made holes in the felt of the tent and began firing their muskets. The *qezelbaş* returned their fire and, when about thirty of the Kurds had been hit, the remainder rushed out of the tent with drawn swords and fought till they dropped. The *qezelbaş* were by now so roused that they even killed and plundered a number of Kurds who had surrendered and declared their "love of the Shah" some six months previously; wheat and chaff were consumed together. The Kurds who remained in the keep also surrendered and submitted to their fate.

According to some of the Kurds, Emir Khan and his companions, since they thought it extremely unlikely that the *qezelbaş* would leave them alive, had devised the following plan: They would leave the fort fully armed and, when all the emirs had assembled to greet them, would draw their swords and kill the emirs inside the tent before help could reach them from outside; if not, they would die like men. According to this account, this was why Khan Abdāl Mokrī had behaved the way he did and had had the temerity to kill Elyās Kalīfa. God knoweth best!

After the massacre of the Kurds, the younger sons and other dependents of Emir Khan were sent to court, and the possessions of the Kurdish garrison were distributed among the *qezelbaş*. The Shah received this news at his camp at Gāvdūl near Marāḡa. He ordered Ganj 'Alī Khan to mount guard on the fort for a while with a detachment of musketeers, and the rest of the emirs to report back to the royal camp; they rejoined the Shah at Qarāčūq. Qabān Khan, the brother of the *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat* Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū, was made governor of Orūmīya and allotted the sum of three thousand *tomān* in gold to purchase whatever was necessary for the fort and to pay his troops. All the emirs and governors of the districts of Sārū Qorḡān and Gāvrūd as far as Salmās were ordered to answer his summons and not to act contrary to his orders. Qabān Khan proceeded to Orūmīya and began to repair the fort, and Ganj 'Alī Khan and his musketeers returned to court.

The Shah's Punitive Expedition to Marāḡa and the General Massacre of the Mokrī Tribe

The Mokrī tribe, who were subjects of the Safavid state, inhabited the Gāvdūl district of Marāḡa, Soldūz, and Mīāndūāb. In the time of Shah Tahmasp, a certain Amīra Beg was emir of the tribe. After the

accession of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when the Ottoman Sultan violated the peace and invaded Iran, the frontier region was thrown into disorder and troublemakers had a field day. The above-mentioned Amīra rebelled, declared his allegiance to the Ottomans, and began to plunder and kill the inhabitants of Soldūz and Mīāndūāb. He attacked the Qarāčūq stud farm, which was Shah Tahmasp's private stud and famed throughout the world, slew many of the workmen and guards, and took possession of the stud. He was a constant thorn in the flesh of the *qezelbāš* emirs who were governors of Marāḡa, killing and plundering and carrying off into captivity women and girls. After the death of Amīra Beg, Shaikh Ḥeydar was made chief of the tribe by the Ottomans, and acquired even greater influence among the tribe than his father.

After the accession of Sultan Moḥammad III, Shaikh Ḥeydar rebelled against Ja'far Pasha, the Ottoman *beglerbeg* of Tabriz, and on several occasions sent envoys to the Safavid court to declare his loyalty to the Shah. When Shah 'Abbas launched his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan, Shaikh Ḥeydar presented himself to the Shah, who forgave the Mokrī tribe for its past misdemeanors and made Shaikh Ḥeydar governor of Marāḡa, a post which in the past had always been held by a *qezelbāš* emir. Shaikh Ḥeydar was killed in battle against the Ottomans before Erīvān. In recognition of his services, the Shah made his son, Qobād Khan, governor of Marāḡa, though he was still a child. The elders of the clans of the Mokrī tribe were made recipients of royal favor, and were adjured to obey Qobād Khan. Until he came of age, the elders were instructed to obey the orders of his mother, an intelligent woman who was the daughter of a *qezelbāš* noble.

In order to give this arrangement a chance to work, the Shah removed from the area Emir Khan Beg, a brother of Shaikh Ḥeydar, and gave him a fief in the Garmrūd region; another brother, Khan Abdāl, who had ambitions to be chief of the tribe, rebelled when his young nephew was made chief. Troops were dispatched against him on several occasions and finally, as already related, he took refuge with Emir Khan Barādūst. Ultimately, all the clans of the Mokrī tribe came under the sway of Qobād Khan, but there were still elements which harassed the *qezelbāš* who had fiefs and private estates in the Marāḡa area, and refused to allow the landowners undisturbed enjoyment of their hereditary private estates. Qobād Khan, when he

reached the age of discretion, allowed himself to be swayed by these seditious elements. In defiance of the Shah's command, he sequestered the private estates and fiefs of Safavid officers and acted in an unseemly manner toward the *qezelbaş*.

At first, Shah 'Abbas had overlooked Qobād Khan's sins for the sake of his father's memory. However, Qobād Khan eventually exceeded all reasonable bounds of behavior. As already related, he had disobeyed the Shah's express command to go to the assistance of the vizier, Hātem Beg, at the siege of the fortress of Domdom. Since Qobād Khan realized that the Shah would march to the Marāḡa region the following spring to set affairs in order there, he hastened to visit the Shah at his winter quarters in Qarābāḡ. The Shah had decided to show no more leniency toward the Mokrī tribe, who had revealed themselves to be seditious rebels in whom it was impossible to have confidence, and he had resolved to visit condign punishment upon them. As a matter of practical politics and everyday common sense, however, the Shah for the time being continued to show favor to the Mokrī chief.

When the Shah moved toward his summer quarters and camped near Marāḡa, he learned that Qobād Khan and the elders of the Mokrī tribe, suspecting that the Shah would demand the restitution of the Qarāčūq stud, had sent the horses, all picked beasts, to a place miles away, and had substituted for them a number of poor-quality Kurdish nags. If there was any talk of handing over the stud, they intended to send these nags to the Shah! In addition, the Shah discovered that Qobād Khan was still in communication with Ottoman commanders and other enemies of the Safavid state, and had tendered his allegiance to the Ottomans. Further, he oppressed the poor, the townsfolk, and the Shi'ites of Marāḡa because of his religious bigotry. In a word, people were at the end of their tether as a result of his tyrannical behavior and financial exactions. It had become imperative for the Shah to deal with Qobād Khan and his supporters, who were Muslims only in name.

When the Shah reached Gāvḏūl, Qobād Khan's seat of government, Qobād Khan entered the royal camp with one hundred and fifty men. In the late afternoon, he was admitted into the royal presence with a few of his kinsmen. They entered the audience tent and, while they were still taking off their boots, were seized by the *golāms* and dispatched before they had the chance to make a move. Their bodies

were thrown into the passageway at the back of the tent. In order to prevent any harm coming to any of the *golāms* or court attendants, the Shah ordered the *ešik-āqāsibāši*, 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, to stand at the door of the tent and admit the rest of the Kurds one by one, so that the *golāms* could dispatch each man as he entered and throw his body behind the tent to prevent those still to come from realizing what was going on.

After some twenty or thirty Kurds had been dealt with in this way, the rest of the lineup began to get a bit suspicious. Finally, one of those who entered the tent, seeing blood all over the place and no sign of Qobād Khan or the others who had gone before, shouted at the top of his voice, whipped out his dagger, and wounded Moḥebb 'Alī Beg Šāhī-sevan Šāmlū. The men immediately behind him turned around and tried to get out of the tent, but were slain by the *golāms* and *qūrčīs* in the vestibule. Those still outside, now alerted, rushed for their horses; some were cut down in front of the tent, others as they fled through the camp. The Shah entered that awesome assembly, immediately mounted his horse, and rode off toward the castle of Gāvduḷ, sending detachments of *qezelbāš* in all directions to ravage and kill the Mokrī tribe.

The Shah reached the castle about two hours after dark, before the garrison had heard what had happened in the royal camp. The royal troops entered the castle and slew all whom they came across. 'Alīqolī Khan was sent against another fort in the area. He brought back some fifty or sixty prisoners, yoked together and with their hands tied, and these were immediately slaughtered by the *gāzīs*. Many of the tribesmen who were brought in by the *gāzīs* had their skulls smashed by the royal gardeners and other servants with blows from spades, clubs, and hammers. Emir Khan Beg, the brother of Shaikh Ḥeydar, was at Garmrūd with about fifty horsemen; Esfandīār Beg *evčībāši* 'Arabgīrlū¹ skillfully lured them into his net and destroyed them all. Shaikh Ḥeydar's nephew, Ḥoseyn Sultan, was at Orūmiya, and Ḥasan Khan and other emirs were sent to deal with him.

In short, the Shah ordered a general massacre of the Mokrī tribe. All prisoners brought in while the Shah was encamped at Gāvduḷ were put to death. In addition, members of other tribes, such as the Bebe'i and Urīād who had taken up residence in Mokrī tribal districts, were brought in and put to death on the grounds that they had

¹A clan of the Šāmlū tribe.

chosen to live with enemies of the Safavid state, and had not left the area and joined the *qezelbāš* at the time of the Ottoman occupation. The women and girls of the Mokrī tribe were taken into captivity and servitude and thus obtained their just deserts. After a few days, the violence of the Shah's anger abated. He summoned a certain Šīr Beg, who had professed his loyalty to the Shah, and whose brother, Maqšūd Beg, was an *ešik-āqāsī* at the Shah's court, and proclaimed that the lives and property of any members of the Mokrī tribe who rallied to Šīr Beg would be safe. A few survivors of the massacre gathered around Šīr Beg. The Shah then moved to the pastures of Qarāčūq, where he spent several days inspecting the horses of the Qarāčūq stud farm. The region of Marāğa was conferred upon Aqa Sultan, the chief of the Moqaddam tribe.

While the Shah was still at these pastures, he was visited by Sekandar Sultan Bāna'ī,² a Kurdish chief of the Bāna tribe. At the time of the Ottoman occupation, he had declared his "love of the Shah," had come to court, and had served there for a number of years. After the Safavid capture of Erīvān, Sekandar Sultan had been allotted the district of Bāna, a dependency of Marāğa. But such is the seditious and evil nature of all Kurds, he had subsequently shown signs of revolt; from the time of his appointment as chief of the Bāna district, he had neglected to come to court and remained aloof from the Shah. At this moment, when the Shah's anger against the Kurds was still at fever pitch, Sekandar Sultan came before him bearing a sword and a shroud, and prostrated himself. Despite the fact that there would have been a number of advantages to be gained by removing him from the scene, the Shah was so struck by his temerity in coming before him at such a time that he overlooked his misdemeanors and addressed him as follows: "Although you deserve death for your improper behavior, and sparing your life will probably cause me all sorts of trouble, nevertheless, since you have come in person at such a moment, I will not put you to death this time. But if I see any sign of disloyalty from you in the future, prepare to die, for you will surely be shriveled up by the royal wrath." The Shah then gave him a robe of honor and allowed him to depart. Sekandar Sultan went in fear and trembling, and his terror was such that he had no desire to visit the Shah's court again. In the end, however, he paid for his disloyalty, and did not prosper.

²On Bāna, see *TM*, pp. 104, 172.

*The Arrival of an Embassy from Valī Moḥammad Khan,
the Ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan*

This year, the ruler of the lands of Tūrān, Valī Moḥammad Khan, in order to cement the bonds of friendship between himself and Shah 'Abbas, sent Shah Moḥammad Mirzā Ūzbeg, his treasurer, as ambassador to the Shah.

While his brothers, Dīn Moḥammad Khan and Bāqī Khan, had been on the throne, there had been continual hostility and warfare between the Uzbegs and the Shah. Dīn Moḥammad Khan had fought a battle at Herat with Shah 'Abbas, and had died of wounds received in this battle. In the Year of the Tiger, 1011/1602-03, Shah 'Abbas had marched on Balḵ and had taught Bāqī Khan a lesson. After Bāqī Khan had died a natural death, his younger brother, Valī Moḥammad Khan, succeeded him on the throne of Transoxania and Turkestan. In the Year of the Sheep, 1015/1607-08, Jahāngīr and Yār Moḥammad Mirzā had marched against Balḵ, but Yār Moḥammad Mirzā had been killed and Jahāngīr Khan had fallen back in disorder to Ġarjes-tān. The Shah had been preoccupied with his campaign in Šīrvān, and Valī Moḥammad Khan had sent a large army to ravage Khorasan, but had been repulsed with considerable losses. Valī Moḥammad Khan had then decided that his best interests lay in negotiating a pact of friendship with the Shah, and had accordingly sent envoys to the *beglerbegs* of Khorasan with this end in view. The Shah had made reciprocal gestures of friendship, and had sent as his ambassador to the Uzbek Khan the centurion Mirzā 'Alī Beg Torkmān. It was in response to this latter embassy that Shah Moḥammad Mirzā now arrived at the Shah's court and was admitted to audience. After he had presented his master's gifts, the emirs and other principal officers of the Safavid state, at the Shah's command, gave the Uzbek ambassador a state banquet in the Qarāčūq meadows. Each day, the Uzbek ambassador was a guest in the house of one of the *moqarrabs* of the court.

Another visitor to the Shah's camp in the Qarāčūq meadows was Lūārsāb Khan, the grandson of Simon Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia region of Georgia; he was accompanied by his mother Dīdīfal—a name which, in the Georgian vernacular, means “mother of the king.” The Shah sent Moḥammad Amīn Beg, the brother of Kāja Moḥammad Rezā the vizier of Azerbaijan, to meet him and escort him stage by stage to court. He was received in audience by the Shah, who be-

stowed on him marks of special favor. In recognition of his father's loyal service, the Shah conferred on him the province of Tiflis, which had been wrested from his father by the Ottomans and, after its conquest by the Safavids in 1015/1606-07, had been governed by a *qezelbaş* officer, Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū. At this time, Lūārsāb was a handsome youth of seventeen years. All the Georgian princes, and indeed most of the Georgian people, both men and women, are noted for their beauty, which derives from the pleasantness of the climate and is superior to that of the inhabitants of other regions. They are also noted for the elegance of their speech and the excellence of their manners. Although Christianity prevails in Georgia and the Georgians consequently are strangers to the true religion, still, when one considers the beauty of the inhabitants, the agreeable nature of the climate, and the verdant character of the country, one might prefer it to most other regions of the world. Lūārsāb, his mother, and the other women of the Georgian royal household stayed at court for six months, returning to Georgia after the departure of Morād Pasha. Morād Pasha's advance on Azerbaijan occurred at the end of the year, and there are one or two more things I must mention before I describe this.

The Dispatch of Moḥammad Beg, the Son of Kūr Qolafā-ye Rūmlū, as an Ambassador to the Porte, in the Company of the Čavoš Keyr al-Dīn

As already related, last year the *čavoš* Keyr al-Dīn had been sent to Iran with the returning Iranian ambassador Moḥammad Beg Rūmlū, with peace proposals. The same two envoys were now given leave to return to Istanbul. At the suggestion of the grand vizier, Morād Pasha, the Shah had written a letter to the Ottoman Sultan, Aḥmad I; in this letter, the Shah said that, whenever the Sultan showed a desire for peace and friendship, he would reciprocate. Moḥammad Beg Rūmlū, an excellent diplomat, was instructed to press for peace on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya.

The envoys accordingly went on their way. When they reached Dīār Bakr, they heard of the approach of Morād Pasha, and they proceeded to Morād Pasha's camp in the company of Naşūḥ Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr. They met Morād Pasha near Erzerum and delivered the Shah's letter addressed to him. Morād Pasha explained that he had moved his forces to Erzerum in response to an appeal for help from the *beglerbeg* of that province, who had reported that a

qezelbaş force was laying siege to the fortress of Erzerum. "That necessitated my coming here," said Morād Pasha. "Now that the Sultan's treasure has been spent on mobilizing this army, I have approached the frontier. In order to protect the reputation of the Sultan and to give validity to the peace talks, I must complete my mission, but I hope that, when I near the frontier, reliable negotiations from both sides can meet and decide what shall be done in the best interests of both parties." Morād Pasha then marched in the direction of Azerbaijan, taking the two ambassadors with him.

The Dispatch to Erzerum of an Army under the Command of Emir Gūna Khan Qājār, the Beglerbeg of Çokūr-e Sa'd, and the Battle between the Ġāzīs and Ḥasan Pasha and the Ottoman forces in That Area

When the Shah's spies reported that Morād Pasha, the Ottoman commander in chief, had marched out from Istanbul and was mobilizing an army at Eskūdar, since this action was at variance with his previous actions and was contrary to what had been said by Keyr al-Dīn, the Ottoman ambassador, about the Sultan's desire for peace, the Shah decided on a precautionary measure so he sent a force in the direction of Erzerum to burn all the crops along the probable line of the Ottoman advance, and to ensure that there should not be one *man* of wheat, straw, or hay to be had within a distance of ten days' march of Erīvān. Emir Gūna Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Çokūr-e Sa'd, who had acquired a great reputation along that frontier for valor, was given this task, and Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oġlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāġ, and the other emirs in that area were ordered to assist him. In addition, 'Alī Khan Beg Javānšīr was ordered to take a detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup and join him.

This Safavid force duly assembled and proceeded in good order toward Erzerum. They discovered that Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, was marching to meet them with a force of ten thousand men, and had reached Ḥasan Qal'a; the Ottoman force consisted of the emirs and pashas of that region, in particular Tūrkča Bīlmez³ and 'Osmān Pasha, and other fiefholders, with their troops. According to the reports of several men who were present at this battle, I learned that the Safavid force hastened to give battle, but the Ottomans for two days hesitated to engage them; each time the Safavid army ad-

³Literally, "he does not know Turkish"—a proverbial expression for a person not very quick in the uptake.

vanced, the Ottomans fell back. On the third day, only two *farsaḵs* from the city of Erzerum, the Ottomans formed up for battle, with Ḥasan Pasha in the center and Türkča Bılmez and 'Oṣmān Pasha out in front. The skirmishers on both sides came to grips, and the Safavid skirmishers were forced by an Ottoman charge to yield ground. Emir Gūna Khan, although Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū and the army of Qarābāḡ had not yet reached the scene, decided to launch an attack with the thousand men he had with him in an attempt to stabilize the situation. He led his men in a furious charge against the troops of Türkča Bılmez, the most valiant of the enemy commanders, and hurled them back.

The impetus of his charge was such that he broke through to where 'Oṣmān Pasha's men were stationed, shattered their ranks also, and penetrated to the Ottoman center. Although it is not normal military practice for a commander in chief to lead his men into battle in person, Emir Gūna did so on this occasion because he feared that, owing to the slowness of the army of Qarābāḡ in reaching the scene, his own forces might suffer defeat. He urged on his *gāzīs* to greater efforts and, trusting in the Shah's propitious fortune, launched his men against on the Ottoman center. The Ottomans realized, from the intrepid nature of the Safavid attack, that Emir Gūna Khan must be leading his men in person. Ḥasan Pasha was unable to stand his ground, and gave the order to retire. Moḥammad Khan, coming up with the army of Qarābāḡ, ordered his men to fan out and pursue the enemy right up to the walls of their fort. The army of Erzerum was virtually annihilated in this battle, and the *gāzīs* acquired large quantities of booty. The victorious *qezelbāš* camped on the spot and remained there for three days while they carried out their mission. Emir Gūna Khan was inclined to blame Moḥammad Khan for his slowness in bringing up his men, but others rejected this imputation, saying that Moḥammad Khan had acted with no more than the normal amount of caution essential in battle, for it is imperative that those in the forefront of the battle have a strong force in support.

The Mutiny of the Prisoners at the Prison-Fortress of Qahqaha

An extraordinary event which occurred this year was the mutiny of the inmates of the prison-fortress of Qahqaha. Qahqaha is situated in the Yāft district of Qarāja-dāḡ,⁴ on top of a high hill and built on solid

⁴See *TM*, p. 164.

rock. From the entrance of the fortress, a narrow path runs up the mountainside for a distance of about half a *farsak*; this path is so narrow that even a single horseman has difficulty in making his way along it, and one musketeer could hold it against an army.

During the time of Shah Tahmasp, when the Ottomans repeatedly invaded Azerbaijan and the whole area was in a state of disorder, the royal treasuries were moved there for safety. At various times the royal princes Esma'il Mīrzā, Alqāṣ Mīrzā, and Sām Mīrzā were imprisoned there with their families. No foreign ruler ever attempted to capture this impregnable fortress, the commandant of which was always a trusted emir of high rank.

The actual commandant at this time was Elyās Kalīfa Qarādāglū, the governor of Qarāja-dāg, a Sufi devoted to the Safavid house and the foremost of its loyal disciplines. Elyās Kalīfa was absent, taking part in the siege of the fortress of Orūmīya, and one of his officers, Moẓaffar Beg Qarādāglū, was in charge. The prisoners held in custody at the time included a number of Kurdish and Ottoman prisoners of war; the most important of these were Moṣṭafā Pasha, Aḥmad Pasha, Kūr Ḥasan, and two sons of Ġāzī Khan Kord: Šāhqolī Beg and Kāled Beg, together with their cousin, Qūčī Beg. These men conspired together and willynilly brought into their plot a number of Turkish and Iranian political prisoners incarcerated there, including two sons and a brother of Ḥasan Khan Afšār, formerly the governor of Kūh Gīlūya. This whole group, about twenty men in all, suddenly mutinied, murdered the commandant, seized his weapons and those of his men, expelled from the fortress a number of his retainers, and assumed control of the fortress. Elyās Kalīfa's men gathered around the fortress and tried by various stratagems to gain access, but without success, and they were forced to report the situation to the Shah.

This coup, coming as it did at a time when the Ottoman commander in chief was reported to be on his way to Azerbaijan with an army, could bring only dishonor and disgrace to the Shah, and to tolerate the situation would be to invite further serious trouble. It was unlikely that the Kurds and Ottomans who had engineered this coup would be amenable to reason. The conspirators' first idea had been to try and get away. Finding their path of escape blocked, they hoped to be saved by the arrival of the Ottoman commander in chief. For two months they guarded the fortress, never once opening the gates. The Shah hit upon the idea of sending to the fortress Kāja

Maqşūd 'Alī, who hailed from Kūh Gīlūya, had formerly been a secretary in the employ of Ḥasan Khan Afšār, and knew Ḥasan Khan's brother and sons extremely well. Kāja Maqşūd 'Alī's present job was supervisor of the royal kitchens. The Shah's plan was to try and split the conspirators by offering Ḥasan Khan's relatives a pardon. The Kāja managed to make his arrival at Qahqaha secretly known to Ḥasan Khan's relatives through some of Elyās Kalīfa's men. Since the Ottomans held the key to the fort, Ḥasan Khan's relatives secretly hauled the Kāja over the walls on the end of a rope, and the Kāja gave them the good news of the Shah's offer of a pardon and the promise of royal favor.

Ḥasan Khan's brother and sons, who came from a long line of Sufis loyal to the Safavid house, received the Kāja's news joyfully, pledged their obedience to the Shah, and put their heads together to devise a scheme to get rid of the Ottomans. The Ottomans heard what was going on and started quarreling with the Safavid faction; after a lot of argument, words turned to blows. A few of the other prisoners also declared their "love of the Shah," and the two factions set to in earnest. The Kurdish-Ottoman faction, which consisted of seven or eight men, fought for their lives, but in the end were all slain by those loyal to the Shah. Ḥasan Khan's brother and sons were escorted to court by Kāja Maqşūd 'Alī and enrolled in the ranks of the *qūrčīs*, and the Kāja was congratulated by the Shah on his achievement. In consideration of Elyās Kalīfa's outstanding services to the crown and his sterling efforts before the walls of Domdom, the Shah forebore to visit his wrath upon his men at Qahqaha for their gross negligence. He appointed his son, Borhān al-Dīn, *kalīfa* in his place, and enrolled him among the *kalīfas* of Qarāja-dāğ. The governorship of Qarāja-dāğ was conferred on his kinsman, Maqşūd Sultan, and the Qarādāğlūs were allowed to continue as custodians of the fortress of Qahqaha as before.

The March on Azerbaijan by Morād Pasha, the Ottoman Commander in Chief and Grand Vizier, and His Retiring from Tabriz without Achieving His Object

I have already described Morād Pasha's hopes of achieving fame by being the principal agent in the negotiation of peace between the Ottoman and Safavid empires, and of preliminary moves in this direction culminating in his meeting with the Ottoman and Safavid ambassadors and his taking them with him to Erzerum. The Shah had

decided that an Ottoman advance on Azerbaijan this year was improbable in view of the lateness of the season; he himself had left his camp at Qarāčūq near Marāğa and returned to Tabriz with just a small party of his personal attendants, and he had ordered his emirs to conduct a review of their troops at Qarā Čaman in the Mīānaj district and then return to Iraq. The emirs had carried out their orders and had proceeded one day's march in the direction of Iraq when they received reports of the approach of the Ottoman commander in chief. The Shah at once countermanded his orders and summoned them back to Tabriz. A force was sent to Marand with instructions to determine the route by which Morād Pasha was approaching and to take whatever action seemed best in the circumstances.

From Qārş, Morād Pasha sent a *čavoš* with a letter to the Shah: His sole object, he said, in approaching the Iranian frontier was to continue his attempts to negotiate a peace settlement, in which matter the Sultan had given him full authority; he informed the Shah that he had kept the Safavid ambassador with him, intending to take him with him to Istanbul after the conclusion of the preliminary peace talks. The Pasha also remarked that it was not conducive to friendly relations to send an ambassador without providing him with suitable gifts. The *čavoš* was admitted to audience with the Shah, who sent the following reply to the Pasha's letter:

Since the distinguished vizier first broached the idea of peace negotiations, I have signified my willingness to let these proceed, out of my concern for the welfare of God's servants, and I sent a friendly letter to the Sultan as suggested by you. My terms remain the same as those communicated to you by Moḥammad Beg. If the Porte is willing to conclude peace on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya, a treaty which was affirmed by binding covenants, I am willing to terminate hostilities; if not, God's will be done. As for your remark about gifts, since no truce has yet been agreed upon, it is not appropriate to send gifts while fighting is still going on. However, since you think it advisable for me to do so, and since I do not want to wreck your efforts for peace at the very outset, I am sending you forthwith a perfumed pomander of grey ambergris weighing one thousand eight hundred *meşqāls*, in a filigree bowl

cunningly fashioned by Indian goldsmiths from eight *man* of red gold, a gift to me from the Mogul Emperor Salīm. It is not a usual gift, for it is rare to find a piece of raw, unrefined grey ambergris of such a size; such a piece will not be found in the treasuries of kings and princes. I send it now to the Ottoman Sultan so that my letter may not be devoid of content. If I perceive any hint of amity and concord on the part of the Ottoman Sultan, and if genuine negotiations for peace are entered into, from that time onward my ambassadors shall not set out emptyhanded.

The Shah dispatched the *čavoš* with this message.

Meanwhile, Morād Pasha, who had been advancing from Qārş, had swung off the Erīvān road to Čālderān; when he reached Koy, he passed by the fort there at a distance of about one *farsak*, and marched on to Salmās. According to travelers, the Pasha's object in turning aside from the usual road was to get to Tabriz without having to fight a battle with *qezelbāš* forces; once at Tabriz, the Pasha intended to make the fact that peace talks were in progress his excuse for withdrawing, so that he could not be accused of cowardice.

Once the route by which the Pasha was advancing was confirmed, since such a rapid advance precluded any thoughts of peace talks, the Shah recalled his troops from Marand, summoned Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oḡlū and the emirs of Qarābāḡ, and Emir Gūna Khan and the army of Čokūr-e Sa'd. He instructed them to leave the fort at Erīvān in safe hands, and he himself set about strengthening the fort at Tabriz. All the Turkman and Takkalū *gāzis* who were in the Shah's escort, whether they were *qūrčis* or belonged to other regiments, were detailed to put the fort in a state of defense under the direction of Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz. In addition the Shah fortified the complex of buildings at Šanb-e Gāzān, which he thought the Ottomans might think of using as an artillery post from which to bombard the fort; this complex, dating from the time of the İlkan Gāzān,⁵ comprised theological seminaries and convents grouped around the tomb of the İlkanīd ruler; the dome over the tomb is of a height surpassed only by the dome of Haromān. This key point was stocked with cannon, muskets, munitions, and provisions, and a detachment of reliable musketeers was sent to garrison it.

⁵Reigned 694-703/1295-1304.

The Shah then sent couriers out in all directions to move the rural population out of harm's way; his officers had instructions not to leave any food supplies on the Ottoman line of march. Any peasant who was not able to remove his own supplies of grain was instructed to leave them to be transported into the fort, and to draw payment for the grain from the *divān* at the current market price. Since the Pasha was now only two or three days' march from Tabriz, the civilian population evacuated the city, taking with it all stocks of food. The Shah left the city and, going by way of the pass of Mount Sorḡāb, camped on the banks of the river Ājī where he waited for his troops to assemble and for the Pasha to show his hand before deciding on his own course of action.

At this point, another ambassador arrived from the Pasha and his son-in-law, 'Alī Pasha the *beglerbeg* of Rumelia. "Our primary object in coming to Tabriz," they wrote, "is to lay the foundations of peace, taking advantage of the proximity of the Shah. We have no thought of giving battle to the *qezelbāš* army. As proof of the genuineness of this statement, we point to the fact that, in the course of our march, we have passed several forts held by *qezelbāš* garrisons and have not molested any of them." It seemed advisable, they said, to replace Moḥammad Beg, who had been away on his mission for a long period of time, by a new ambassador, and to send with him suitable presents. Privately, the Ottoman commanders had instructed their ambassador to urge the Shah to restrain his troops from offensive action against him, since they themselves had no intention of giving battle.

After apprising himself of the gist of the various letters brought by the Ottoman ambassador, the Shah replied in the same vein as before: "My terms are still the same," he said. "My ambassador, Moḥammad Beg, is a trusted *qezelbāš* officer and has my full confidence. If the Ottoman Sultan wants peace on the terms I have repeatedly laid down, I am willing to conclude peace on those terms. If not, the fate of both parties is in God's hands. In regard to your hope, expressed to me verbally by your ambassador, that I will restrain the *qezelbāš* from offensive action, my comment is that no *qezelbāš* would dare to wear arms without my permission, so how could he fight? However, I have instructed some of my emirs to take all necessary steps to protect the civilian population. If your men go out in search of loot, or to find supplies of food, there will inevitably be clashes with my troops. If you wish to avoid such encounters, confine your men to camp. In

regard to your remarks about sending presents, God willing, when peace is achieved, I will do whatever is compatible with the dignity of both parties."

Some villagers had still not left their homes and moved out of reach of the Ottomans, notably the rural population of the Mīān-kūh region, on the Ottoman left, and in the direction of Kosrow Shah, on the Ottoman right. The Shah therefore sent Ḥasan Khan Ostājlu, the governor of Hamadan, with a force of regulars and of Čaġatāy and Korāsānī musketeers under the command of Mahdīqolī Beg Čaġatāy, the master of the king's horse, to take up positions on the Ottoman left. 'Alīqolī Khan Šamlū and Emāmqolī Khan the son of Al-lāhverdi Khan, with another force, were to take up positions on the Ottoman right. Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg, with the army of Kerman, was stationed in the vicinity of the city itself. These emirs had orders to lie in ambush for any Ottomans who might leave their camp looking for plunder.

On 24 Ša'bān 1019/11 November 1610, Morād Pasha came close to the city and camped on the other side of the Ājī. Across the river, the Safavid troops were steadily arriving at their rendezvous from Čokūr-e Sa'd, Qarābāġ, and elsewhere. Every day, skirmishes occurred between the ġāzīs and Ottoman foragers, and a steady stream of Ottoman prisoners and captured weapons was brought in. Every Ottoman who left his camp was either killed or taken prisoner by the *qezelbāš*. Morād Pasha, who was a wise and experienced commander, had meanwhile received full reports on the size of the *qezelbāš* army, the freshness of their horses, and the preparations made to defend the city. He did not want to fight a battle, and he was not equipped to undertake a siege. His only thought now was how to extricate his army safely from Tabriz, and he was fearful that, when he began his withdrawal, the *qezelbāš* might change their minds about wanting peace and attack him.

He therefore sent yet another envoy to the Shah, in the person of 'Alī Aqa, an officer in the Rumelian contingent, representing 'Alī Pasha. 'Alī Aqa brought the following message: "Morād Pasha is the deputy of the Sultan in these negotiations, and the Shah is requested to appoint a deputy with full powers to discuss matters such as the terms of the peace and demarcation of frontiers." (Moḥammad Beg had already sent a dispatch to the Shah about this.) The Shah replied that there was no change in his position, but the vizier, he

said, had been at pains to preserve the honor of both parties in his search for an agreement, and he (the Shah) would stand by the pronouncements he had made on numerous occasions.

The Clashes between the Ottoman and Safavid Troops, the Death of Jil Pasha, and the Withdrawal of Morād Pasha

During the few days that the Ottoman army lay before Tabriz, on several occasions groups of pashas and *sanjāq-beys* marched out in full battle order with detachments of *at-oğlāns* (grooms) in search of provisions. On the first of these occasions, a forage party went in the direction of Kosrow Shah. When they were about one or two *farsaks* from the camp, 'Alīqolī Khan, Emāmqolī Khan, and their men sprang out of their hiding places and rushed at the foragers, who scattered in flight in all directions, pursued by the *gāzīs* as far as the Ājī. Many were killed; a number were taken prisoner; and horses and other booty fell into the hands of the *gāzīs*. On the second occasion, Jil Pasha, the commander of the Tartar brigade, which was famed among the Ottomans for its bravery and élan, was sent in the direction of Mīān-kūh, with a detachment of Ottoman regulars and large numbers of packhorses and donkeys. Jil Pasha rashly penetrated into various valleys and other dangerous places, and collected large quantities of provisions. On his way back, however, he was suddenly attacked by Ḥasan Khan and the musketeers. Ḥasan charged the Ottoman vanguard and swept it aside, while Mahdīqolī Beg, the master of the royal horse, led his musketeers against their center. Jil Pasha rushed into the fray in person in his usual intrepid manner, but was killed by a shot from one of the Safavid musketeers. His men fled, most of them being cut down before they could regain their camp. Jil Pasha's head and the heads of the other Ottoman dead, together with the prisoners and captured horses, mules, weapons, and equipment, were paraded before the Shah.

The death of Jil Pasha caused panic in the Ottoman camp, and the officers were unanimously in favor of withdrawing from Tabriz to a position of safety. They began to pull out on the fifth day of their stay at Tabriz, without waiting for the return of their ambassador, 'Alī Aqa, who was on his third mission to the Shah. As soon as the news of their withdrawal reached the Safavid camp, all the *qezelbaş* emirs went to the Shah and begged to be allowed to take their revenge on the Ottoman army for daring to march on Tabriz and for all the

damage and loss of life and property it had occasioned. "Let us pursue them," they said, "and give battle at the appropriate place, and strive to annihilate the enemy. We hope that, by divine favor, and Your Majesty's propitious fortune, which we have experienced on so many occasions, we shall defeat the enemy. In their present demoralized state, they are no match for Your Majesty's troops. If, with God's help, we wipe out this army, the Ottomans will not be able to put a force of comparable size in the field for several years."

The Shah, with that magnanimity and chivalry he had inherited from his eminent ancestors, replied to his loyal subjects as follows:

It is true that the Ottomans are notorious for trickery and guile. Nevertheless, Morād Pasha from start to finish has talked of nothing but peace; he has knocked on the door of friendship and concord, and has apparently been trying to avoid a battle. With an eye to the stability of the dynasty, I have therefore ignored the fundamental evil of the Ottoman nature and have shown my willingness to discuss peace proposals. I do not deem it fitting for me to contravene what I have said and written. Moreover, the month of Ramaẓān is upon us,⁶ and warfare is forbidden during Ramaẓān. If these two great armies come to grips, I do not have to tell you how much blood will be spilled. I do not wish to have this blood on my hands during the holy month of Ramaẓān.

However, in case the Ottomans attacked the fort at Kōy as they withdrew, the Shah sent the governor of Kōy with a detachment of musketeers to guard it. Furthermore, he set the royal army in motion and marched in the wake of the Ottoman withdrawal for several stages, though he ordered his men not to attack or molest the Ottomans or to take booty. Despite this, at the end of each day's march, bodies of unidentified men hung around the rear of the Ottoman army and brought back heads, prisoners, and captured weapons. In the course of his withdrawal, Morād Pasha sent back to the Shah's camp, decked in robes of honor, a number of the men who had been harassing the Ottomans in this way and had been taken prisoner by his troops, and with them he sent one of Moḥammad Beg's retainers,

⁶1 Ramaẓān 1019 fell on 17 November 1610, the day after Morād Pasha began his withdrawal.

with the following message: "I trust that Your Majesty will not distress yourself too much on account of the unruly conduct of these men; all they have done is to cool the ardor of some stupid and arrogant Ottomans who have never suffered any buffets from fate and are ignorant of the ways of the world. I hope that peace will be signed on terms acceptable to Your Majesty."

The Shah responded by releasing some forty of fifty Ottoman prisoners, all Janissaries, who had been captured during the withdrawal, and he in his turn equipped them with robes of honor. The Safavid troops who escorted the Janissaries back to the Ottoman lines reported on their return that the Ottoman army was in a state of great nervous tension, and that the Shah's leniency toward them had done little to reassure them. At the end of each day's march, they said, a shout went up, "The *qezelbaş* are coming!" and chaos broke out in the Ottoman camp.

In short, the Ottoman army returned from this expedition in extremely poor shape, having lost many men and countless horses and mules. When the Ottomans passed Albāq and neared Vān, the Shah ceased to shadow them, and marched back to Tabriz via Ṭasūj and Šabestar. On arrival at Tabriz, he devoted his energies to restoring conditions to normal there, and the displaced inhabitants from the city and surrounding areas returned to their homes and resumed their normal occupations. Those persons who had suffered loss as the result of enemy action had the regular *dīvān* taxes remitted for both the current and the following year. The Shah then reviewed his troops, who had been under arms for two years, and sent them on leave to their homes and their fiefs, after settling any claims they might have.

The Construction of a Fort in the Rašīdīya Quarter of Tabriz, the Demolition of the Old Fort, and Various Other Events Which Occurred This Year

As is well known, the Ottomans are skilled in the construction and defense of castles. 'Osmān Pasha, who had captured Tabriz during the reign of Sultan Morād III, as I related in book I, had built a wall around the city and had selected the site of an old palace for a fort. This site was generally considered by expert opinion to be a suitable one, and Shah 'Abbas concurred with this view. However, he frequently used to point out that the Mehrān River, which flows down

into the city from higher ground, and which passes the fort, could be dammed in such a way as to direct the water against the walls of the fort, and this would probably cause them to collapse. In view of this, said the Shah, too much reliance could not be placed on the fort, and another site was selected in the Rašīdīya quarter,⁷ on the slopes of Mount Sorḡāb.

The demolition of the old fort and the construction of the new had had to be postponed because of the approach of the Ottoman army under Morād Pasha. After the Ottomans had withdrawn, the Shah delegated the task of constructing the new fort to Manūčehr Beg the *ešīk-āqāsi*, a *ḡolām* who had been in the service of Shah Tahmasp and was an experienced officer. The Shah gave orders that all necessary building materials should be collected by the spring from demolished buildings in Tabriz, and particularly from Šanb-e Ġāzān, which was in a state of ruin, and be transported to the Rašīdī quarter. Master builders and masons and construction workers were ordered to report to Tabriz from Iraq and other places, so that the new fort might be built as rapidly as possible. Manūčehr Beg proceeded with the work, including the towers and water-storage tanks, and the governor and inhabitants of Tabriz helped. Within the precincts of the fort, a bathhouse and mansion were built, and the governor of Tabriz transferred his residence there. After the completion of the new fort, the old fort was demolished. Once he had reviewed his troops and put in motion the plans for the new fort, the Shah began his return journey to Iraq, and traveled to Ardabīl by the Ahar road.

About this time, Ṭahmūraš Khan, the ruler of the Kakhetia region of Georgia, who had come to court because he had had heard reports of the approach of Morād Pasha, was received in audience by the Shah. Ṭahmūraš told the Shah of his suspicions in regard to certain Georgian nobles, and the Shah turned his attention to his problems and also those of Lūārsāb Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia region of Georgia, who was already at court; the two rulers were then loaded with favors and given leave to depart.

The Shah spent several days at Ardabīl, attending prayers at the shrine of Shaikh Šaft, and then traveled to Qazvin via Ġalkāl and Ṭārom; from Qazvin, he proceeded to Isfahan and took up residence for the winter at the Naqš-e Jahān palace.

⁷See Le Strange, p. 162.

Morād Pasha wintered in Dīār Bakr. He sent a *čavoš* to Istanbul with Moḥammad Beg and the following message for the Sultan: "Since Shah 'Abbas has ceased hostilities, and has made friendly overtures to us, and since he has not so far violated the frontiers as demarcated by the Treaty of Amasya, it is in the best interests of the Ottoman empire that we, too, should substitute peace for war and conclude peace on the terms of that treaty." Moḥammad Beg was received in audience by the Sultan, and delivered to him the Shah's letter and the pomander in its gold container. The Sultan replied to Morād Pasha: "We gave you full authority in this matter, and we will support any course of action you think advisable. Act as you think fit in the best interests of the state." Sultan Aḥmad also wrote to the Shah in the same vein, saying that whatever decisions Morād Pasha took would have his support. Moḥammad Beg returned from Istanbul and reported to Morād Pasha, who sent one of Moḥammad Beg's retainers to report to the Shah, since he wanted to retain Moḥammad Beg himself to help him decide the problems of the demarcation of the frontiers; he planned to send him back to Iran after the terms of the peace treaty had been drawn up. Both envoys were received by the Shah when he reached Isfahan and reported on the progress of the peace negotiations.

Deaths

That incomparable vizier Ḥātem Beg, who died of a stroke on Thursday,⁸ 6 Rabi' I, 1019/29 May 1610 before the walls of the fortress of Domdom. His body was taken to Tabriz, and thence to Mašhad, where it was buried in a vault he himself had restored, situated below the tomb of the Imam Reẓā. Since I have already said something about the vizier's admirable qualities, I hesitate to repeat myself here.

Moḥammad Pasha Jalālī, who fell ill at Domdom and died toward the end of the same month.⁹ His career has already been described.

Moḥammad Sultan Bayāt, governor of Nishapur. He was the son of Bābā Elyās, whose family had for generations been chiefs and elders of the Qarā-bayāts, a Čagatāy tribe.¹⁰ Ever since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, this tribe had supported it loyally. During the

⁸6 Rabi' I was a Saturday.

⁹*TAAH*, ii, 802 states that Moḥammad Pasha died at the end of the preceding month, Šafar 1019/May 1610, and not Rabi' I.

¹⁰See *TM*, p. 17.

reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, when Moršedqolī Khan was pro-consul in Khorasan, his brother, Moḥammad Beg, was made emir of the tribe with the title of sultan. During the Uzbek occupation of Khorasan, Moḥammad Beg, some of his brothers, and many other relatives and members of the tribe were killed, but Moḥammad Sultan made his way to court with a few of his followers. In recognition of the heroic resistance of the Qarā-bāyāts, the whole tribe was absolved from payment of *divān* dues and enrolled as regular soldiers in the Safavid forces. Moḥammad Sultan held successively the posts of governor of Esfarā'īn, Sabzavār, and Nishapur; he had held the last of these posts for twelve years at the time of his death. His relative, Beyrām 'Alī Sultan, succeeded him as emir of the tribe and governor of Nishapur.

Mīr Feyzollāh, the vizier of the *ḡolāms*.¹¹ He was a Mūsavī *seyyed* of Mašhad. His father, Mīr Maqšūd, was a witty conversationalist. Mīr Feyzollāh came to Iraq during the troubles in Khorasan and entered royal service. He had an outstandingly good voice and played the *tonbūr* (a kind of guitar) exceptionally well. These talents gained him admittance to the Shah's assemblies and brought him favorable notice. As a consequence of the special affection the Shah felt for the people of Khorasan, and in particular for the *seyyeds* and other inhabitants of Mašhad, Mīr Feyzollāh was appointed to the office of *majles-nevīs*¹² (secretary of state). He held this office for some time, and continued to hold it when he was promoted to the position of vizier of the *ḡolāms*, which is an important position these days. He succeeded in the latter office his kinsman Mīr 'Abd al-Qāder, who was killed by the Ottomans in the battle between the Shah and Jeḡāl-oḡlū, and he rose steadily in royal esteem and trust.

He died in the middle of this year of a stroke, at the royal camp at Qarāčūq. Mīr Feyzollāh had just mounted his horse and was riding toward the royal audience tent when he collapsed and died without even having time to dismount. His offices were conferred on the *moqarrab al-ḡāqānī* Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, an eminent *seyyed* from Barzrūd in the Naṭanz district; he was a descendant of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn, an attendant of Shaikh Ṣafī al-Dīn, and this family had continued to serve the Safavid state faithfully generation after generation. Abu'l-Ma'ālī himself had entered royal service at an early age, and had been appointed superintendent of the royal stables and storehouses.

¹¹On the duties of this official, see *TM*, p. 73.

¹²*Majles-nevīs* equals *vāqe'a-nevīs*; see *TM*, p. 121.

The Events of the Year of the Pig, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1020/1611-12 and to Part of the Year 1021/1612-13, the Twenty-fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Friday,¹ 6 Moḥarram 1020/21 March 1611. Since 'Āšūrā, the day on which Shi'ites and friends of the house of the Prophet commemorate the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn, fell within the period of the traditional New Year festivities, the latter were not held until after the conclusion of the period of mourning. The Shah then ordered a great feast to be prepared in the Bāḡ-e Naqš-e Jahān to which all classes of society were invited; emirs, viziers, *moqarrabs* of the court; people from various parts of the Shah's dominions who happened to be at court, merchants, and members of craft guilds. Each group was allotted its own particular place in the park, and gold tents and canopies of silk and Chinese brocade were set up. Booths, embellished in various remarkable ways and illuminated with lamps, were erected in front of each group. Pages plied the assembled gathering with cheering draughts, and the merrymaking went on for several days.

At this juncture, a courier arrived from Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Marv, to announce that Valī Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Transoxania and Turkestan, had been driven from his throne and, on 8 Moḥarram 1020/23 March 1611, had crossed the Oxus at Čahār-jū and entered the district of Marv with the intention of going to see the Shah. The courier delivered a friendly letter to the Shah from the Uzbek ruler, and the Shah hastened to respond in similar vein and to issue orders to his emirs and governors to supply the Uzbek Khan with everything he needed at every stage of his journey, to give him suitable gifts—in short, do everything in their power to please him. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *ešīk-āqāsībāši*, one of the greatest emirs at court, was sent to welcome the Uzbek ruler at Semnān and to escort him and act as his host on the rest of the journey to Isfahan. The remainder of the Nowrūz festivities were held over until Valī Moḥammad Khan arrived in the capital. Orders were given for the decoration of all the bazaars, the Qeysariya, and the shops around the Naqš-e Jahān Square. I will devote a separate section to an account of the Uzbek Khan's arrival in Isfahan and the reasons why he had been forced to leave his kingdom.

¹6 Moḥarram was a Monday.

About this time, too, the messengers from Morād Pasha, already mentioned, arrived in Isfahan to report on the progress of the peace negotiations. But before they could return to Dīār Bakr with the Shah's reply, Morād Pasha died, and as a result, the negotiations were held in abeyance.

Also about this time, the Shah decided to repair the fort at Ne-hāvand, and he delegated the *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat* Mahdīqolī Beg Čaġatāy, the master of the royal horse, to see to this task.

The Construction of Masjed-e Shah at Isfahan

This year, Shah 'Abbas conceived the idea of building a great mosque adjacent to the Naqš-e Jahān Square in Isfahan—a mosque which would be without equal in Iran and possibly in the entire civilized world. Shah 'Abbas had made the city of Isfahan like a paradise with charming buildings, parks in which the perfume of the flowers uplifted the spirit, and streams and gardens. He had already built a mosque and a theological seminary on the eastern and northern sides of the square, respectively, but he was dissatisfied with these. Just as the city of Isfahan was the envy of other cities in respect of its residential buildings, its *Qeşarīya*, its *caravanserais*, and its markets, and called to mind the Koranic verses: "Eram, possessor of lofty buildings, the like of which have not been created in these regions,"² the Shah wanted its mosques, seminaries, and pious foundations also to be the finest of their kind in Iran, and to rival the temple at Mecca and the mosque at Jerusalem.

The site selected by the Shah for the new mosque was the south side of the square, where stood a large caravanserai. This was demolished, and at a propitious hour determined by the astrologers from an examination of the royal horoscope, skilled architects and engineers, each of whom claimed to be without peer in the science of engineering, laid the foundations of the mosque and the sanctuary and the master craftsmen set to work. By an extraordinary coincidence, a marble quarry, the existence of which had previously been unknown, was discovered near Isfahan. The hand of providence must have kept it hidden from prying eyes so that it might be available for use in this mosque. Its discovery is a clear sign and manifest indication of the strength of the Shah's faith, and of his standing in the eyes of the Heavenly Architect. It enabled blocks of this marble, of a size, length, breadth, and color rarely seen anywhere in the

²Koran, 89:8-9.

world, to be used to adorn this second temple of Mecca. Indeed, the chronogram for the laying of the foundation of this mosque is "A second Kaaba has been built."³ I pray that this great mosque may be completed in accordance with the plans of its founder, and that the people of this realm may for years to come worship in it under the protection of this great king. May he be rewarded for this act both now and in the hereafter, and may it bring him long life and the stability of his kingdom, and may he be spared to perform other beneficent works and to establish other pious foundations. In the name of the Prophet, and of 'Alī, and of the holy family of the Prophet, Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

The Downfall of Valī Moḥammad Khan, the Uzbek Ruler, and the Reason for His Leaving His Country and Traveling to the Court of Shah 'Abbas

I warned readers repeatedly in the introduction to this section that, in order to make my history of Shah 'Abbas intelligible, I would be obliged from time to time to include reference to events in the Ottoman empire which, strictly speaking, form no part of the history of Iran. In the same way, I must give some background to the sudden arrival of the Uzbek ruler at the Safavid court.

Valī Moḥammad Khan b. Jānī Beg Sultan, the nephew of 'Abdolāh Khan, ascended the throne of Transoxania and Turkestan after the death of his brother, Bāqī Khan. The princes of the blood royal agreed to his accession, the Uzbek emirs and military commander tendered their allegiance to him, and he consolidated his power as an independent ruler. According to what I have heard from travelers coming from those parts, he treated his brothers and other relatives with love and compassion: He gave the province of Samarkand to his nephew Emāmqolī Sultan b. Dīn Moḥammad Khan; and the province of Balk, Andekūd, and Šoborgān, and other districts west of the Oxus, to another nephew, Nadr Moḥammad, the brother of the aforementioned Emāmqolī Sultan. He appointed a guardian for each of them, and for a while the two princes remained loyal to their paternal uncle.

Gradually, however, Emāmqolī Sultan, who was the elder of the two brothers, driven by his own ambition and urged on by seditious men who had gathered around him, showed signs of rebellion and put

³This chronogram yields the date 1021/1611-12.

his guardian to death. Vali Moḥammad Khan was grieved by his nephew's rash and headstrong action; his attitude toward his nephew changed, and he marched on Samarkand to chastise him and disperse the troublemakers there. Emāmqolī Sultan did not wait for him to arrive, but crossed the Oxus and joined his younger brother at Balk. Nadr Moḥammad followed his elder brother's example and put to death his own guardian, and the two brothers resolved to stand together and defy their uncle.

First, they sent an envoy to their uncle and, by way of excuse for their actions, putting forward various reasons, asked forgiveness for their actions. Emāmqolī Sultan alleged that he had been incited by a number of evil mischief-makers at Samarkand to commit these crimes; he had left Samarkand because he had detected some change in his uncle's attitude toward him. It would be obvious to their uncle, they said, that the income of the province of Balk would be insufficient to meet the expenses and pay the troops of both. Emāmqolī Sultan therefore asked his uncle to leave him in control of Balk, and to give his younger brother the province of Heṣār-e Šādman, Qon-doz, and Baqlān and their dependencies, which were close to Balk.

Vali Moḥammad Khan, scenting rebellion in the behavior of his two nephews, and being unwilling to allow Emāmqolī Sultan to acquire more power and wealth, rejected his request and conferred the province on an Uzbek emir named Gowhar Tāher, who stood high in his favor because of his exceptional devotion to him. This exacerbated the mutual distrust and hostility between the Khan and his nephews. For several years, their relationship alternated between animosity and outward amity. Vali Moḥammad Khan overlooked the serious crimes they had committed and contented himself with admonishing them as though they were his own sons. His nephews, especially Emāmqolī Sultan, kept producing plausible excuses for their actions, and concealed their real intentions. Gradually, Emāmqolī Sultan attracted to him numbers of ambitious young Uzbeks who had given up hope of gaining preferment from Vali Moḥammad Khan.

At this point, Vali Moḥammad Khan began to declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Shah, and there was an exchange of ambassadors, as already reported, the Shah sending a Turkman centurion to Transoxania and the Uzbek Khan sending a return embassy led by his treasurer, Shah Moḥammad Mitrā. At the instigation of

mischievous makers, Emāmqolī Sultan began to talk to people about this situation, sometimes discussing it openly, sometimes making veiled allusions to it. As a result of this whispering campaign, Valī Moḥammad Khan began to distrust some of his emirs and made efforts to distinguish those who were loyal to him from those who were not. The only result of this was that most of his emirs began to feel insecure, and any emir who felt he was under a cloud secretly sent a courier to Emāmqolī Sultan urging him to come out in revolt against his uncle and march to Transoxania. Finally, some of these emirs wrote to Emāmqolī Sultan pledging their support if he would march to Bokhara and overthrow his uncle.

One of the conspirators informed Valī Moḥammad Khan, who sent men to intercept the messenger, and he gained possession of the letter with the seals of all the conspirators affixed to it. Some of the conspirators were in Bokhara, others had gone to Samarkand. The Khan issued orders to summon those who were absent, intending to hold a judicial enquiry into the whole matter when they returned. However, he was too impatient to wait for their arrival. Fearing that news of the affair would leak out, he summoned those conspirators who were in Bokhara on the pretext of calling them to a council meeting and accused them of plotting against him. They strenuously denied the accusation, whereupon the Khan produced the letter and showed each of the conspirators his seal on it. The conspirators maintained their denial, and alleged that their enemies had forged their seals. Valī Moḥammad, refusing to accept this excuse, had them all executed.

He then sent trusted men to bring in the conspirators who were absent. The latter, forewarned, fled for their lives, with their families and relations, to Balk, where they conferred the title of khan on Emāmqolī Sultan and began to address him as "My king! My king!" Emāmqolī Sultan's head was turned by this flattery. He began to see himself as a mighty king and, coming out openly in revolt against his uncle, he marched on Bokhara with seven thousand men. When he reached Qaršī, Valī Moḥammad Khan marched out to give battle to him. He had with him nearly three thousand Uzbek emirs and nobles, but he no longer had confidence in them, even those closest to him.

Emāmqolī Sultan did not have the strength to meet his uncle in the field, and so he fell back to a defensive position, with his rear

protected by the Oxus, and began to dig in. He sent messengers to his uncle to convey various protests and complaints, and various conspiratorial emirs began all sorts of behind-the-scenes maneuverings. Emāmqolī Sultan learned from people who came across from his uncle's camp that Valī Moḥammad Khan at heart was anxious to avoid a showdown, and was willing to allow Emāmqolī Sultan to continue in power at Balḵ if he would only show contrition for his behavior, dismiss the troublemakers he had gathered around him, and pledge his fealty to his uncle.

As luck would have it, one night a few wild boar emerged from a reedbed near Valī Moḥammad Khan's camp and started charging around among the tents. Some of his men rushed out of their tents, yelling and shouting, and started attacking the boar. The din woke the Khan, who asked what was going on. Some stupid, ignorant babblers told him that Emāmqolī Sultan was making a surprise attack on the camp. Since men, prompted by Satan, are only too ready to believe rumors, this report spread through the camp in a flash, and the Khan's men began buckling on their equipment and making for his tent. Valī Moḥammad Khan, who distrusted his emirs, thought this might be a plot on the part of some conspirators to surround him in his tent, and so he took some reliable men he had with him and rode off to one side as a precaution, taking up his position on some rising ground in an effort to see what was really going on in the camp. By this time, his men had reached his tent and could find no sign of him; some thought he had fled, others thought he had been kidnapped by conspirators who supported Emāmqolī Sultan. Merely on the basis of these conjectures, group after group of his officers marched to Emāmqolī Sultan's camp and saluted him as king.

Valī Moḥammad Khan remained standing on his little hill till day-break, when he was able to see that his army had vanished and joined Emāmqolī Sultan. He still did not know what had actually happened; whether this was some quirk of fate, or whether it was all part of some deep-laid plot among his own officers. He was inclined to think it was the latter; that most of his officers had betrayed him, invited Emāmqolī Sultan to assume the throne, encouraged the latter to assemble an army and to march on Bokhara, and that everything that had happened was the work of these traitors who, had he not been alert and left his tent, would doubtless have murdered him. Anyway, Valī Moḥammad Khan went sadly back to Bokhara with the handful of men he had with him.

When the governor of Bokhara, who resided in the citadel, saw the Khan returning in this sorry state, he stayed in the citadel and procrastinated in regard to presenting himself and making his obeisance to the Khan. He sent a message to Vali Moḥammad Khan to the effect that Emāmqolī Sultan would be at Bokhara within a few days with his army; Vali Moḥammad Khan, he said, did not have enough men either to fight a battle or endure a siege; it would therefore be best for all of them if he left the city and did some hard thinking about the realities of his situation. Vali Moḥammad Khan, pondering in bemused fashion on the tricks of fate and the treachery of men, asked for and received some of his womenfolk who were in the citadel, and set off a few days later for Samarkand, accompanied by his son, Rostam Moḥammad Khan, and a number of other dependents and about four or five hundred men. However, since he feared further treachery either on the part of his own men or on the part of the people at Samarkand, he changed his mind about going there and decided to go to Iran and seek help from Shah 'Abbas. He crossed the Oxus at Čahār-jū and reached the fort there. He sent his son Rostam Moḥammad Sultan with a few trusted men to Herat via the Saraḵs steppe, intending to follow later himself. He also sent a courier to the governor of Herat, Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, to inform him of the situation.

Meḥrāb Khan counseled him to travel to Herat via Marv, and Vali Moḥammad Khan, leaving his dependents at the fort at Čahār-jū in the charge of one of his officers he could rely on, traveled to Marv with the remainder of his companions (the most important of whom was Kājom Birdī *atālīq*, three hundred men in all. Meḥrāb Khan received him with honor, and at once sent a report to the Shah together with an affectionate letter to the Shah from the Uzbek Khan. After entertaining him in appropriate style for several days and conferring suitable gifts on the Uzbek Khan, Meḥrāb Khan sent him on to Mašhad, where he camped in the Čahār Baḡ and was entertained by Mīrzā 'Arab, the brother of Shah Naẓar Khan Tükeltī, who was acting as *dārūḡa* there on behalf of his brother. After about three weeks there, recovering from the fatigue of his journey, he set off for Iraq, entertained at every stage by the emirs along his route. When he reached Beštām, he was met by the governor of Astarābād, Farīdūn Khan, acting on orders from the Shah. Farīdūn Khan presented him with gifts, escorted him as far as Čašma-ye Alhāk, eight *farsaḡs* from Beštām. The whole of the way to Kār and Semnān, which falls within the jurisdiction of Iraq, the Uzbek Khan was

in the care of agents of Farīdūn Khan. At Kār, he was welcomed by the *eshik-āqāsibāshi*, 'Alīqolī Beg Khan Šamlū, who had come to meet him from Isfahan at the Shah's command.

After formal greetings had been exchanged, 'Alīqolī Beg asked permission to entertain the Uzbek Khan and his men at a feast the following day, at which more gifts were presented to them. They then resumed their journey to Isfahan, entertained in appropriate fashion at every stage of their journey. At Kashan, the inhabitants decorated the main square with lights, and the Uzbek Khan rested there for several days before proceeding to Isfahan. I obtained all the above information from travelers; if there are any inaccuracies in my account, they should be attributed to discrepancies in the reports I received, and I should not be accused of telling lies. "The responsibility for the accuracy of the report rests with the transmitter!"

The Arrival of Valī Moḥammad Khan at Isfahan and His Reception by the Shah

Twenty thousand musketeers, drawn from the city of Isfahan and the rural districts around it, were detailed to welcome Valī Moḥammad Khan at Dowlatābād, three *farsaks* from the city. The shops on all sides of the Naqš-e Jahān Square, the Qeysariya, the caravanserais, and the coffee shops were gaily decorated. On the day on which the Uzbek Khan actually entered the capital, the Shah himself rode out to welcome him, accompanied by his emirs and principal officers of state, such as Allāhverdi Khan, Allāhqolī Beg the *qūr-čibāshi*, Nadr Khan the keeper of the seal, and others. Such was the Shah's magnanimity and generosity that he waived all formal protocol and did not insist on his royal prerogatives, but rode out as far as Dowlatābād. Finding the Uzbek Khan on horseback, he embraced him with the utmost warmth and made all sorts of friendly inquiries of him. The *qezelbāsh* emirs, not to be outdone, added their greetings.

Aqa Kamāl Dowlatābādī had requested the Shah that his honored guests should visit for a few moments his humble dervish cell, and Shah 'Abbas and the Uzbek Khan complied with the Shaikh's request and went together to his home. The Shaikh had spread on the ground outside his house suitable floor coverings, and he busied himself with offering hospitality to his guests. He presented them with gifts he thought suitable. The Shah's party then remounted and rode toward

the city. The whole way from Dowlatābād to the Naqš-e Jahān Square, the ground had been covered with floor coverings of elegant cloth supplied from the royal household stores, and the route was lined on both sides with musketeers. The throng of spectators pressing on all sides was so great that the escort, following behind, was not able to keep up with the Shah. The Shah therefore engaged the Uzbek Khan in conversation and they went slowly forward together, stopping from time to time to quaff draughts of wine and to continue their conversation. When they reached the city gates, the Shah gave orders for the gates to be kept closed for a while, to give his party a chance to make its way through the streets and the markets.

After they entered the city, the Uzbek Khan was allotted accommodation in some pleasant buildings that had been designed as residences for the Shah. 'Alīqolī Khan continued his duties as host, and every day all Valī Moḥammad Khan's needs were supplied by the royal household administration. Poets devised various chronograms to commemorate this event. One of these was by Kāja Šo'eyb Jowšaqānī, who was a vizier and officer of the *dīvān* and also no mean poet. His chronogram ran: "The moon has become the guest of the sun at a banquet."⁴ This chronogram yields the number 1019, whereas the Uzbek Khan actually arrived at Isfahan early in the year 1020/1611. However, it is possible to obtain the number 1020 if one takes into account the words of the preceding hemistich, and takes the "lighting of the candle" at the royal assembly metaphorically, in which case the "candle" could be held to signify the number 1. My own nephew, Moḥammad Šāleḥ, composed another chronogram which yields the figure 1020: "The king of Tūrān has come."⁵

The following day, the Shah visited Valī Moḥammad Khan at his residence and continued his friendly conversation with him. If the Shah perceived from time to time some signs of melancholy on the part of the Khan as he reflected on the way fate had treated him, he would banish such cares by the warmth and expansiveness of his manner. The Shah arranged a private banquet in his own apartments and invited the Khan and a few of his close companions. The Shah himself, with complete lack of formality, supervised the arrangements for the banquet, and rosy-faced pages circulated the wine. Dexterous musicians and melodious singers banished care from all hearts, and beautiful girls from Iraq and Khorasan delighted the guests by their dancing.

⁴The Persian words *māh šod mehmān-e bazm-e āštāb* yield the number 1019.

⁵The Persian words *āmada pādešāh-e tūrān* yield the number 1020.

Vali Moḥammad Khan was amazed at this splendid sight, and displayed the greatest pleasure at the entertainment. The Shah employed the kind expressions of condolence with which one customarily soothes grieving hearts. He praised the men who had accompanied the Khan for their loyalty and steadfastness, and promised them handsome rewards. The banquet continued through the small hours. If I were to attempt to list all the facilities and services and requirements which were provided by the Shah, all worthy of such a guest and of such a host, in the way of cash, clothing, household necessities, and so on, I would become tedious. Since the Shah's usual recreations were watching polo, archery competitions, and firework displays in the Naqš-e Jahān Square, these forms of entertainment were also provided for the Khan. After the archery and the polo, master craftsmen provided fireworks displays the like of which had never been seen before. Fireworks were lashed to one of the royal elephants, and when these were ignited and cannon were fired, the huge beast performed strange antics and made terrifying charges, to the great amusement of the Khan and other spectators. Crowds were packed on all sides of the square to see the show. After the spectacle was over, the Shah and his guests walked around the square to admire the illuminations on the shops, the Qeysariya, and the caravanserais. Convivial private parties were going on all sides. The Shah became momentarily more unbuttoned, and radiated even a greater degree of geniality and hospitality than before, and kept talking about other celebrated festive occasions held in the Naqš-e Jahān Square.

When the sun enters the sign of Cancer, there takes place the old festival of the Sprinkling of the Water, and the Shah and the Khan went together to the Čahār Bāg to watch this ceremony. That day, more than one hundred thousand people, from every class of society, packed into the Čahār Bāg to sprinkle water on each other. So many people took part that the Zāyanda-rūd was drained dry. This ceremony certainly is an astonishing sight!

After all the junketing, the Shah and the Khan got down to the serious business of state and discussed how the Khan's fortunes might be repaired. Although the ordering of men's affairs is in the hands of God, the Shah considered that he and all the *qezelbaş* had an obligation to assist the Uzbek Khan. He thought that the Khan should be equipped with a large force and dispatched to Transoxania, and that he himself should take an army to Khorasan so as to

be in a better position to lend support to the Khan in case of need. "However," said the Shah, "the Ottoman commander in chief last year penetrated as far as Tabriz; he has retired to Dīār Bakr for the winter and is talking about peace, but one can place no reliance on the word of Ottomans, and I have therefore decided to go to Azerbaijan in the spring to keep an eye on matters there. If I do not go, a major disaster may occur. I suggest, therefore, that you regard my house as your own, and that you stay in whatever part of my dominions you choose and relax for a while. If the vital problems of the northwest frontier are solved this year, next year, God willing, we will take the field together in the east."

Valī Moḥammad Khan admitted that the Shah could not change his decision to go to Azerbaijan this year. "However," he said, "I have been talking with the elders and officers who have accompanied me, and they are of the opinion that it is imperative for me to return to Transoxania this year. The situation, in their opinion, brooks no delay. They have pointed out that the majority of the Uzbek emirs and governors in Transoxania are still my appointees, and so far they have not gone over to Emāmqolī Khan, but are looking for my return. They say I must strike while there are still people who have not submitted to Emāmqolī Khan, and before he has consolidated his position, because the task will be more difficult later on. In addition, they do not like the idea of my going back at the head of a *qezelbāš* army; the sight of *qezelbāš* troops, they say, may cause people to flee in terror, and they may not rally around me as we hope. Up till now, every Uzbek and Čaġatāy prince who has sought help from the Safavid house has achieved his ends. My object in coming here was that, through meeting you, my affairs might prosper, and my resolve be strengthened. I trust that you will not deny me your aid, both material and spiritual, and that you will be my friend and ally. I hope that, as a result of having turned to you for help, and assisted by your material favors and spiritual support, I shall regain my kingdom. If matters go badly and the hopes of my friends do not materialize, the troops you have in Khorasan will be sufficient for the job. May I ask you to instruct the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan to stand by to assist me should I require it, and to send troops with my son, Rostam Moḥammad, who is presently at Herat?"

The Shah's view was that, since the Uzbek Khan had sought his assistance, they should spend some considerable thought in order to arrive at the best means of restoring his fortunes in Transoxania,

which was no easy matter, and should not rush into hasty action, because relations between the Khan and the rest of the Uzbegs had broken down and too much reliance should not be placed on them. However, at a number of subsequent council meetings the Khan held with his elders, they put intense pressure on him to return at once, without *qezelbāš* support. From Khorasan too, reports came in that large sections of the Uzbeg army were awaiting the Khan's return. Finally, the Khan gave way and took his fate in his hands. The Shah gave him whatever he needed in the way of cash, clothing, horses, mules, camels, tents, stores, equipment, and so on.

On the day the Shah had chosen as being propitious for the commencement of his campaign in Azerbaijan, he had his campaign tent and equipment assembled on the banks of the Zāyanda-rūd and brought into the city. He then summoned Valī Moḥammad Khan, and they spent the night in private conversation together. The Shah gave the Khan a lot of friendly advice on government, on how to win over both friends and enemies, on forgiving the shortcomings of troops if these occur in situations beyond their control, and on having knowledge not only of everyday realities but also of supernatural events. Then, after the Shah had taken sworn covenants from his officers, especially Kājom Bīrdī *atālīq*, in which they pledged their loyalty to the Khan, the Shah and the Khan said farewell to each other. Zeynal Khan Beg Šāmlū, a Šāmlū officer of high standing, was instructed to be at the service of the Khan as long as he was in the Shah's dominions, and to see that all his needs were supplied. The Khan spent two more days in the capital and then set out. During their stay in Iran, some of his men were guilty of misdemeanors which were overlooked by the Shah because they were his guests.

Valī Moḥammad Khan's Expedition to Khorasan and Transoxania and His Restoration to the Throne

Valī Moḥammad Khan traveled from Isfahan to Stāh-kūh in the district of Kashan, accompanied by Zeynal Khan Šāmlū, and once again at every stage on his journey he was received with honor by the local emirs. As a historian, I must now bring my readers up to date with events in Transoxania, based on information I have obtained from people coming from those parts. After Valī Moḥammad Khan's army defected to him, Emāmqolī Khan marched to Bokhara and established himself on the throne. He issued coinage stamped with his name and had his name included in the *koṭba*. The comman-

dant of the citadel at Bokhara presented himself before him and handed over the keys of the citadel and its treasure houses. Emām-qolī Khan confirmed his brother, Nadr Moḥammad Sultan, in the governorship of Balk and its dependencies. Then, hearing that Valī Moḥammad Khan had left his dependents and an infant son in the fort at Čahār-jū, he sent a detachment of troops there. The commandant of the fort had no choice but to surrender. Valī Moḥammad Khan's dependents and retainers were taken to Bokhara, and one of Emām-qolī Khan's officers was made commandant of the fort at Čahār-jū.

After meeting Valī Moḥammad Khan's womenfolk, Emām-qolī Khan declared he felt a passionate attachment to one of his uncle's wives, Āy Kānom, and wanted her to live with him, but that chaste woman refused. Emām-qolī Khan turned to the *qāzī* and the *moftī* for assistance in getting his way in this matter. According to my informants, the jurists of Bokhara refused to have anything to do with the case, but the worldly *qāzī* of Bokhara, casting his religion to the winds, complied with his request and issued a *fatvā* to the effect that, since Valī Moḥammad Khan had shown himself in the colors of heresy,⁶ he was no longer to be considered as a Muslim and his wives were to be considered as having been divorced. It was therefore lawful for anyone else to marry them. Emām-qolī Khan, having overcome Āy Kānom's scruples by giving his action an air of legality, married her, an act obnoxious in the sight of both God and man. Evil is the condition of a man who acts thus and reckons his action to be compatible with religion and the law!

Some of the princes of Turkestan took advantage of the deposition of Valī Moḥammad Khan to extend their territories; they occupied Tashkent and marched on Samarkand. Emām-qolī Khan marched to meet them, arranging that his brother Nadr Moḥammad Sultan should bring his troops from Balk and meet him at Samarkand. When Emām-qolī Khan reached Samarkand, he opened negotiations with the Qazāq princes and conceded Tashkent to them as the price of purchasing a temporary truce. Because the Transoxanians did not trust the Qazāqs they remained at Samarkand, but neither side molested the other.

At this point, the news of his mother's illness reached Emām-qolī

⁶*Rajza*, a useful "smear" word rather like "Communist" today. Valī Moḥammad Khan had, of course, laid himself open to this charge by consorting with Shah Abbas,

Khan at Samarkand, and the Khan was also seized by the desire to see his new wife. He left his emirs and troops at Samarkand and traveled to Bokhara with a few personal retainers. There he visited his ailing mother and disported himself with his uncle's wife. The news of the approach of Valī Moḥammad Khan threw him into a state of consternation, and he left Bokhara three days before Valī Moḥammad Khan entered the city. Taking with him his wife and mother, he moved in the direction of Qarāī.

When Valī Moḥammad Khan reached Mašhad, he was in two minds whether to go to Herat, collect his son, and march on Balk with *qezelbāš* help, or go to Marv and march on Bokhara via Čahār-jū. He decided on the latter course on the basis of reports he received from a succession of his supporters from Bokhara who came to see him at Mašhad. They reported that the bulk of Emāmqolī Khan's troops were at Samarkand, and they therefore hoped it would be easy for Valī Moḥammad Khan to occupy the capital. Once the news got around that he was securely reestablished on the throne, his opponents' forces would begin to disperse. Valī Moḥammad Khan accordingly marched to Marv. The governor, Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, was opposed to the idea of his setting out without *qezelbāš* support, but the Uzbek elders managed to assure him that it was not necessary, so Meḥrāb Khan contented himself with entertaining them in appropriate fashion.

A group of Uzbeks, of whom there were many in the Čahār-jū area, especially Kamāl Kāja, who knew all about the situation at the fort there, undertook to capture it. Valī Moḥammad Khan sent them, with the blessing of Meḥrāb Khan, by forced marches to attack the fort, and he himself followed on behind. Meḥrāb Khan escorted him for several *farsaks*, and then, because he did not want him to be entirely without *qezelbāš* support, sent with him a force of about five hundred *qezelbāš* and musketeers, with orders to go with Valī Moḥammad Khan wherever he wished, and to return when he no longer needed them.

The Uzbeks who had gone on ahead reached the fort at Čahār-jū early one morning, swarmed up the walls where there was a fissure they knew of, and took possession of the fort and the town by surprise. When the *qezelbāš* detachment arrived, the governor of Čahār-jū, who was in the citadel, had no option but to surrender. Valī Moḥammad Khan stationed some of Meḥrāb Khan's musketeers in the

fort and marched rapidly toward the Oxus, sending Kamāl Kāja on ahead. Crossing the Oxus at the fort at Čahār-jū, he pushed on toward Bokhara, being joined by groups of Uzbegs on the way. Hearing of Emāmqolī Khan's flight from Bokhara, Valī Moḥammad sent Kājom Birdī *atāliq* ahead to the city, which he himself entered on Wednesday,⁷ 16 Jomādā II, 1020/26 August 1611, and all the populace came out to welcome him.

The following day, 17 Jomādā II/27 August, Valī Moḥammad seated himself once more on his throne, had his name inserted in the *koṭba*, and coinage minted in his name. The *seyyeds*, 'olamā, and other notables of Bokhara came to prostrate themselves before him, and demonstrated their joy at seeing him again. Valī Moḥammad Khan, however, did not feel as happy as he should have on this occasion, because the fate of his wife had cast a cloud over his joy. He peremptorily summoned the *qāzī* who had declared him to be an infidel and legalized the marriage of his wife to Emāmqolī Khan. The *qāzī* took refuge in all sorts of unacceptable excuses, saying that he had been bullied by the Khan and had been terrified of what would happen to him if he refused, and so on. Valī Moḥammad Khan's rage mounted steadily as he demanded the death penalty for the *qāzī*. The wretched man was spared at the intercession of the *seyyeds* and 'olamā and because the Khan did not want to affront men of learning, but he was totally disgraced. Valī Moḥammad Khan then sent summons to all the Uzbegs and notables of Bokhara who had conspired against him. He treated them extremely severely, not showing the tolerance and flexibility that are desirable—nay, essential—characteristics in a ruler.

Most of them were arrested and heavily fined, and this harsh treatment caused all persons who thought they might be under suspicion to be terrified of his vengeance. As a result, the Uzbegs, although they outwardly swore allegiance to him, under the surface remained as disaffected as ever. In his presence, they were ready to swear that black was white and to urge him to take all sorts of actions that were against his interests. In the end, their hypocrisy and perfidy were his undoing.

Valī Moḥammad Khan's March from Bokhara to Samarkand, His Battle with Emāmqolī Khan, and His End

When Valī Moḥammad Khan was restored to his throne, his faded

⁷16 Jomādā II was a Friday.

hopes revived as men flocked to Bokhara from all sides to offer him their felicitations. There was no indication as to where Emāmqolī Khan had gone. Some shortsighted sycophants, hoping to ingratiate themselves with him, asserted that Emāmqolī Khan had left the province, since he had no *pied-à-terre* left there. He would not have gone to Balḵ, they said, for fear that his younger brother might oppose him. The only other place he could go to was Kabul, and thence to India. No other possibility existed. As for the troops in Samarkand, as soon as they heard of Emāmqolī Khan's flight and of the approach of Valī Moḥammad, they would, they assured the Khan, in a short space of time flock to his colors and tender their allegiance.

Valī Moḥammad Khan allowed himself to be diverted from the proper course of action by the specious arguments of these so-called loyal advisers. Imagining himself to be already undisputed king, he wrote to the Shah telling him that he was firmly established on the throne with full independence, that Emāmqolī Khan had fled, and that the Uzbeks had submitted to him. He retained a small detachment of *qezelbāš* troops for intelligence purposes; the rest he sent home. Demonstrating his complete lack of patience, every day at Bokhara he breathed fire and slaughter against those who had been disloyal to him, and the latter were quite terrified of him.

At this juncture, word came that Emāmqolī Khan was at Qaršī. Valī Moḥammad Khan, his mind now at rest, marched against him with seventeen thousand men, intending to lay siege to Qaršī, if his rival was still there, and take him prisoner. If he had fled from Qaršī too, it would mean that he could not be trusted at all. After Valī Moḥammad Khan had marched a few stages, however, his officers and elders told him that it would be a much better plan to go first to Samarkand, win over the troops there, and add them to his army, before tackling Emāmqolī Khan. Valī Moḥammad Khan then consulted the *qezelbāš* group who were with him, and in particular Bū-dāq Beg Qājār, and they agreed with his plan. Since Emāmqolī Khan was at Qaršī, with only a handful of men, and the main body of his supporters was at Samarkand, the best course was to march to Qaršī as rapidly as possible and deal with Emāmqolī Khan, because their task would be much more difficult if he succeeded in rejoining his men at Samarkand.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, strive as he might to get to Qaršī as fast as possible before the bird had flown, was frustrated by the Uzbek

elders, who opposed this scheme and were adamantly determined to go first to Samarkand. Finally, the Khan gave in and agreed to this mistaken plan, which the Uzbeks had an ulterior motive in pressing for, and sent ahead conciliatory letters to the Qazāq princes.

When the emirs at Samarkand had received the news of Valī Moḥammad Khan's restoration to the throne, opinion in the first instance had been divided, some being for submitting to him and asking for pardon, and others, who had cause to be afraid of him, hovering uncertainly between hope and fear. When the news arrived that Emāmqolī Khan was at Qaršī and that Valī Moḥammad Khan was marching against him, the two factions became more sharply divided in their allegiance. Some of Emāmqolī Khan's supporters rode like the wind to Qaršī, told him of the situation, and brought him back with them to Samarkand by a little-used route. When he rejoined his troops, Emāmqolī Khan's hopes of regaining power revived, and he resolved to do battle with his uncle; the pro-Valī Moḥammad Khan faction was thereupon thrown into confusion.

Valī Moḥammad Khan, ignorant of these developments, was now being counseled by his elders to proceed slowly toward Samarkand, and lead the emirs there to hope for royal favors, because a rapid advance would cause them all to flee. Once again, Valī Moḥammad Khan concurred, and moved slowly forward, momentarily expecting to be met by some of the emirs from Samarkand. The nonsense which had been fed to him by the Uzbeks had had such an effect on him that he thought everything in the garden was lovely, and it did not enter his head that he had any enemies left to contend with. At this point, however, news of the real situation at Samarkand reached him, and he partially awoke from his daydreams. He railed against those who had frustrated his plan to go to Qaršī and thus released Emāmqolī Khan from the trap, but these same men turned aside his wrath with smooth words. "How could a handful of men from Samarkand dare to try conclusions with your royal army?" they said. "They will shortly bring in Emāmqolī Khan as a prisoner, to atone for their misdeeds; or else a group of those who fear you may flee with him to Mongolia." Valī Moḥammad Khan kept sending patrols ahead to find out the strength and disposition of the enemy. They reported that Emāmqolī Khan's army was about ten thousand strong, and had dug in in defensive positions. Valī Moḥammad Khan took counsel with his emirs. It was agreed that, since their own forces outnumbered those of the enemy, they should attack without delay.

At this moment, Vali Moḥammad Khan received word that the Qazāq princes, two brothers, were on their way to assist him with five thousand men. The Uzbek emirs said with one voice, "Emām-qolī Khan and his faction were hoping for the support of the Qazāqs. This development will fill them with dismay." They advised delaying battle until the Qazāqs should arrive. By this time, Vali Moḥammad Khan was nearing Samarkand, and battle was imminent. On Wednesday, 6 Rajab, 1020/14 September 1611, as Vali Moḥammad Khan was making his preparations for battle, he was informed that one of the Qazāq princes had arrived, and he sent a detachment of troops to welcome him. One of the brothers had arrived with three hundred men; after saluting the Khan, he explained that he had pressed on by forced marches, and that his brother would arrive next day with the rest of the troops. Vali Moḥammad Khan embraced the Qazāq prince warmly, and his elders suggested that, since the prince was fatigued after long forced marches, they should entertain him at a banquet and postpone battle until the next day.

The following day, Thursday 7 Rajab/15 September, Vali Moḥammad Khan's patrols reported that Emām-qolī Khan's camp was in an uproar, and that his troops were putting on their weapons and mounting their horses. Although Vali Moḥammad Khan's emirs were still making stupid remarks to the effect that those who feared Vali Moḥammad Khan would flee and the rest would join them, Vali Moḥammad Khan thought it prudent to order his men to put on their armor and to draw themselves up in battle array. Up to this point, the Khan and his officers still thought their forces were too strong for the enemy to dare to attack; but as the minutes passed and patrols kept sending in reports that the enemy was indeed making ready for battle, Vali Moḥammad Khan's confidence began to ebb. Since the reports he had received from Uzbeks had frequently been conflicting, the Khan sent Būdāq Beg Qājār, one of Mehrāb Khan's retainers and a veteran soldier, together with one of his elders, to make a careful estimate of the enemy strength.

A reliable source told me that Būdāq Beg had told him that he had gone forward with the elder and taken up a position on some rising ground. They saw below them some twenty thousand men, advancing in good order. "I said to the elder," related Būdāq Beg, "your cause is lost. May your king banish you from his sight, for you have deceived him! During the whole of this campaign, you have not given him one word of sound advice on which he could reflect and make a proper

decision." The elder retorted, "We never imagined things would be like this. Now that they are, if we tell the truth, the army's morale will be destroyed." "So the elder went back," related Būdāq Beg, "and told a pack of lies, but I went back and told Valī Moḥammad Khan the truth. I said, 'These people have deceived you. If only you had not dismissed the *qezelbāš* troops! Even though there were not many of us, we would have guarded your person during the battle and, if we had suffered defeat, we would with God's help have escorted you in safety from the field. At least keep the handful of us who are here at your side; do not give us any other duties.'" "The Khan," related Būdāq Beg, "was much disturbed by my plain words, and gave orders that the *qezelbāš* detachment should not stir from his spare mounts."

As the two armies neared each other, a ruined fort came into sight on the Khan's left. His elders counseled against advancing further, in case there were a group of the enemy hidden there who, if they advanced beyond the fort, could attack their center in the rear. It would be better, they said, to send a detachment of five hundred men to guard these ruins. The Khan gave the necessary orders. "Now," said the Khan's military advisers, "send the *qezelbāš* detachment along with them, since most of them are musketeers, and *qezelbāš* troops are better at defending fortified positions than Uzbegs." The Khan refused. They insisted, and finally the Khan once again gave way and dispatched Būdāq Beg and his men, who numbered no more than two hundred, to the ruined fort. The *qezelbāš* left their horses at the foot of the walls and climbed up on foot. Hardly had they arrived when the enemy sent two thousand men to occupy the ruined fort, and heavy fighting ensued. The *qezelbāš* musketeers drove the enemy off with heavy losses. A second wave of attackers, between two and three thousand strong, was also repulsed.

At this moment, Valī Moḥammad Khan received the shattering news that the other Qazāq prince, who had been on his way with five thousand men to reinforce him, had instead joined Emāmqolī Khan. He had taken this action at the instance of a Naqšbandī shaikh; the Naqšbandī shaikhs are the spiritual directors of the Qazāqs, and the Qazāq rulers account themselves their disciples. Valī Moḥammad Khan, seeing the strength of the enemy forces and the dissensions and poor morale among his own men, was in a state of great agitation. He recalled Būdāq Beg and his men from the fort, but the Uzbegs in the fort refused to let them go; "If you leave," they said, "the

Uzbegs will be encouraged, and will overwhelm us and wipe us out." Būdāq Beg reported the situation to the Khan, who then ordered Būdāq Beg to join him with about eight of his men.

Būdāq Beg found the Khan greatly disturbed and full of regrets. Suddenly a Qazāq horseman rode up, spoke to the prince, and rode back to the enemy lines. The prince said to Valī Moḥammad Khan, "My brother says that, as he was approaching the battlefield, he found his way barred by Emāmqolī Khan's army. He could discover no way of getting around it, and was forced to fall in with the enemy. The moment battle is joined, he says he will break ranks and join you." The prince asked Valī Moḥammad Khan for permission to move forward so that, if the Uzbegs pursued his brother when he broke away from their lines, he could go to his defense. Valī Moḥammad Khan knew this was another pack of lies, and he consulted his elders. Since by this stage it made little difference whether the Qazāq prince was with him or not, and little advantage was to be expected from his presence, he gave him permission, and the prince moved his men off to one side. As soon as he was clear of the Khan's lines, he led his men hell-for-leather to the enemy lines.

His action caused a disturbance in Valī Moḥammad Khan's ranks right across the whole front, and Emāmqolī Khan chose this moment to order fifteen thousand men to charge. Valī Moḥammad Khan, unable to contemplate the disgrace of flight, drew his sword and went to meet the enemy. But most of the officers and men who were with him in the center turned and fled. As a result, Valī Moḥammad Khan flung himself against the enemy with no more than two or three hundred men, and he and they were soon swallowed up in the swirling clouds of dust. One of the enemy recognized Valī Moḥammad Khan, who was lying on the ground wounded and unable to defend himself. The enemy soldier immediately seized the Khan and hauled him before Emāmqolī Khan, and the Uzbek emirs, who had been responsible for this civil war, hastened to kill him.

Since most of the Uzbegs on each side had kinsmen in the other army, they fraternized with one another, and no more than two or three hundred men on both sides were killed in the battle. Būdāq Beg and his handful of men, despairing of the lives of the rest of the *qezelbāš* who were still at the fort, made a fighting retreat from the field and rode until nightfall. After dark, they changed their uniforms for civilian clothes, and pressed on, riding at night and hiding by day,

until they reached Bokhara. There they made friends with a merchant from Marv, and traveled with him to Marv disguised as merchants. Gradually, some thirty or forty *qezelbaş*, of those who had been in the fort, trickled in, after employing all sorts of ruses in order to escape. There was no trace of the remainder.

On arrival at Tabriz, Būdāq Beg made a full report of the facts as stated in my narrative. The Shah, deeply grieved, sent a messenger bearing gifts to the Khan's son, Rostam Moḥammad, at Herat, to offer his condolences. Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, was instructed to provide him and his retainers with whatever they needed, and to assure him that the Shah would not fail to support him to the utmost of his ability. It was not long before Emāmqolī Khan and the Qazāq princes fell out. In the ensuing fighting, most of the traitorous and rebellious emirs were killed.

The Shah's Expedition to Azerbaijan

This year, the Shah spent the three spring months at Isfahan. Then he marched toward Azerbaijan by way of the summer stations of Farīdūn and Āq-Ölang. At Āq-Ölang, he detached his heavy baggage and sent it on to Solṭānīya, while he and a few close companions went to Nehāvand to inspect the fort, which was in process of being restored under the supervision of Ḥasan Khan and Mahdīqolī Beg Čaġatāy, the master of the royal horse. After a holiday traveling and hunting in the beautiful regions of Nehāvand and Tuī Sarkān, he joined the royal camp at Solṭānīya. Allāhverdi Khan arrived with the army of Fārs, and was received in audience.

When all his troops were assembled, the Shah marched toward Owjān in the Tabriz district. He and a small group of chosen companions and *moqarrabs* turned aside from the line of march to visit the Safavid shrine at Ardabīl before rejoining the camp at Owjān. He was expecting some word from the Ottoman commander in chief as to whether the future held peace or war, and intended to formulate his plans accordingly. Some time previously he had heard of the death of Morād Pasha and of the appointment of Naṣūḥ Pasha, the governor of Diār Bakr, as the new commander in chief and vizier.

Shortly after his arrival at Owjān, the Shah received an envoy from Naṣūḥ Pasha in the person of a distinguished member of the Ottoman 'olamā, the *qāzī* of Mārdīn. This envoy announced that

Naşûh Pasha had been granted the full powers to make decisions in regard to peace or war which had previously been held by Morād Pasha. It was the desire of Naşûh Pasha, he said, to acquire fame and distinction among Muslims by being the person responsible for bringing to an end the warfare between two such great monarchs, and for negotiating a peace on the basis of the Treaty of Amasya. To this end, said the envoy, Naşûh Pasha requested that Moḥammad Beg, the duration of whose term as Safavid ambassador was now a long one, be replaced as the principal Iranian negotiator by a high-ranking *qezelbāš* emir, and that the person chosen be dispatched to him with a letter of friendship; Naşûh Pasha would then accompany the Iranian plenipotentiary to Istanbul.

The Ottoman envoy, in consideration of his learning and scholastic distinction, was lodged in the house of the *şadr*, Qāzī Khan al-Ḥasanī. At the beginning of the month of Rajab 1020/September 1611, the Shah moved from Owjān to Tabriz, where he was welcomed by the townspeople. On arrival at Tabriz, the Shah appointed Qāzī Khan, who held the high office of *şadr* and was the leader of the "possessors of the turban" in Iran and a wealthy and powerful man, as the chief envoy to the Porte. He was given an allowance by the Shah for the journey of about one thousand royal Iraqi *tomān* in gold, besides necessary clothing and equipment. Several men were named to accompany him on this mission: Qāzī Mo'ezz Eşfahānī and Mowlānā Sultan Ḥoseyn Nadūšanī Yazdī, both leading scholars; Qāzī Mo'men, formerly *qāzī* of Isfahan; and Ḥakīm Abdī Ṭabīb Ardebīlī. They were furnished with gifts and a letter to Sultan Aḥmad I; the gifts were in the care of Darvīš Beg, an eminent Mar'ašī *seyyed* from Qazvin, and included silken stuffs, cloth woven with gold thread and silver thread of many different kinds, and other precious articles from Iran. They also carried letters from the Shah to *qāzīs* and jurists at the Ottoman court, to the following effect:

Since God has called all Muslims to follow the path of the religious law of Islam and of the faith of the people of Moḥammad, and has appointed kings to guard the frontiers and protect the lives of Muslims, both parties to the present dispute should abandon their animosities and work for a reconciliation of their differences, for such a policy is ordained by the religious law, will strengthen Islam, will smash the banners of unbelief, and will ameliorate the situation of Muslims.

The *şadr*, having made all preparations for his mission, set off with an escort of one hundred retainers and a number of other companions, both Turks and Persians.

The Shah spent the months of Ša'bān and Ramaẓān 1020/October-December 1611 at Tabriz. After he had dealt with the business of state and the administration of justice, and with petitions from both the military and civilians, he would relax playing polo, or hunting, or taking archery practice. After the end of Ramaẓān, he spent several days reviewing his troops (regulars, household troops, and men on the reserve), and then sent them on leave. The new fort in the Rašīdī quarter of Tabriz now being completed, the Shah ordered the demolition of the old one. The work was completed in ten days, and the river was then diverted over the site, with the result that, in the direction of the old palace, there was soon no sign left of the various buildings which had been constructed over the years. The Shah ordered the officers of the *dīvān* to proceed to Isfahan and see to it that the troops got their pay and allowances. The Shah himself, with a few personal friends, set off to Gīlān and Māzandarān by the Ahar and ʿTavāleš road, with the intention of going hunting.

The Shah's Visit to Māzandarān and His Construction of the Palace at Faraḥābād

The Shah proceeded in leisurely fashion toward Māzandarān. At each place he reached in ʿTavāleš and Gīlān, he lingered for a few days' hunting. The Shah was in a jovial mood, and treated the members of his hunting party (close friends, *moqarrabs*, drinking companions, entertainers, *qūrčīs*, and other court retainers) as his guests, supplying all their needs at his own expense. As a result, the whole party was in an expansive mood when it reached Māzandarān, and continued hunting and enjoying itself as it traveled across the province to Faraḥābād.

At Faraḥābād, formerly ʿTāhān, on the shores of the Caspian, the Shah and his party stayed at the attractive residences in the beautiful gardens which were the product of the Shah's fertile imagination. The location had deserved to be developed because of its natural beauty. The waters of the Tejīna-rūd flowed through it on their way to the Caspian Sea. Shah 'Abbas had added to the royal palace on the banks of the Tejīna and, since he was always in a happy mood when he was there, he renamed the place Faraḥābād (place of joy).

Each year, Shah 'Abbas made additions to the buildings there, and constructed a marketplace, bathhouses, mosques, and caravanserais. From Farahābād to Sārī, a distance of four *farsaks*, he had had a highway constructed. Because the heavy rainfall, which is common to all the Caspian provinces and is heaviest in Gilān, frequently turns the ground into a sea of mud, the Shah had this highway built in the form of a stone causeway. The houses of the emirs and principal officers of state were built along the highway and along the banks of the river. Over the years, there was considerable migration to Farahābād from other parts, as people from all classes of society took up residence there and built houses, *tālārs*,⁸ and whole districts on one side of the river or the other. The river exactly bisected the town and was spanned by a fine bridge.

At the time of writing (1025/1616-17), this flourishing town, by reason of the multitude of its buildings, gardens, and orchards, and the size of its population, is the envy of all. Nor was this Shah 'Abbas's only development in Māzandarān. At Āmol, Sārī, and Bār-forūš, all beautiful locations, he constructed fine buildings and laid out charming gardens. At every stage along the road, accommodation was provided for the Shah's overnight stops. Camels had never been able to make their way along the paths in the Caspian provinces, because of their narrowness and uneven surface and because of the denseness of the forests. As a result, the inhabitants of those parts had never before seen one of these strange beasts, one of God's curious creations: "Do they not look at the camel, how it is created?"⁹

While the Shah was in his winter palace at Farahābād, the place was a hive of activity, as troops, petitioners, and merchants made their way to and fro, and many camels and pack animals were lost either in the mud or on the hazardous tracks over the mountains. The Shah therefore resolved to widen the Savād-kūh highway, which is the major highway through Māzandarān, and placed Mīrzā Taqī, the vizier of the province, in charge of this work. He was empowered to hire the necessary workmen and to defray the cost from *dīvān* funds. The vizier accordingly set to work, aided by a team of *golāms*, and completed this task, which many thought impossible, in 1031/1621. The materials required for the construction of the highway—stone, lime, bricks, and sand—were transported over long distances,

⁸Houses built on wooden pillars to preserve them from damage by flood water, etc. Such houses are a common sight in the Caspian provinces.

⁹Koran, 88:17.

and strong masonry bridges were built over all the streams that crossed the highway. By a happy coincidence, the words "a work of benefaction"¹⁰ yield the date of its completion. Royal orders were issued to all landowners in the Caspian provinces, particularly Māzandarān, to assist in this work. Although I should more properly have described the completion of this highway under the year 1031/1621, now that I have started I might as well finish. In short, the highway was successfully completed, and the mud drained by means of ditches and sloping banks of sand. Today, camel trains move along this highway day and night. The inhabitants of the region live in peace in the shadow of the Shah's justice and are grateful to him for these benefactions.

Notable Deaths

Malek Beg, the vizier of the *qūrčīs*, who was afflicted by an inflammation of the bladder and died after suffering a great deal of pain. After passing several stones, he was afflicted by diabetes; nevertheless, he continued to perform his duties regardless of his weakness. On the way back from Tabriz, the jolting from riding his horse increased the pain; he was unconscious by the time he reached Mīānāj and died at Rabāṭ-e Nīk-pey. He was descended from the local *maleks* of Asadābād near Hamadan. As a young man, he had gone to Khorasan and, after many vicissitudes, had entered the royal secretariat and been appointed *mostowfī* of the *qūrčīs*. After the death of Moršedqolī Khan, he had been promoted to the office of vizier of the *qūrčīs*. He was a humane man of genial disposition, and had considerable acquaintance with both Turkish and Persian poetry. A year or two before his death, he had traveled to the Ḥejāz and had performed the pilgrimage. His body was taken to Mašhad and buried in the shrine precincts.

Aqa Abu'l-Faṭḥ Eṣfahānī, a leading member of the secretarial profession and a scrupulously exact accountant; he was comptroller (*mostowfī*) of the royal household. He had accompanied the Shah on his trip to Māzandarān, but had fallen ill at Lāhījān in Gilān and had died. His office was given to Kāja 'Alī Akbar Eṣfahānī, who is descended from a family of shaikhs from Andalān near Isfahan. His ancestors had built a convent there; they claimed descent from the Zu'l-Nūnīya line of shaikhs. He was a man of integrity, greatly esteemed in office.

¹⁰*Kār-e keyr*.

Šahverdi Khan Kord of the Maḥmūdi tribe, the governor of Bon Fahl in the district of Kij and Makrān. This year he came to court from Bon Fahl, but fell ill near Isfahan and died. His brother, Širāzi Sultan, was appointed governor of Bon Fahl in his place. The Shah decreed that Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg, with a detachment of the army of Kerman, should proceed to Bon Fahl, wrest the castle there from the hands of some Makrāni rebels, and hand it over to Širāzi Sultan.

Events of the Year of the Rat, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1021/1612-13, the Twenty-sixth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Tuesday,¹ 16 Moḥarram 1021/19 March 1612, and found the Shah still in Māzandarān. When the weather began to turn hot, the Shah had a mind to see the traditional Gīlānī festival of dancing, which takes place each year during the five supplementary days which are added to the Iranian calendar at the end of the three months of spring, in accordance with the computation of astrologers. In the rest of Iran, this is the time of the "sprinkling of the waters" ceremony. Men and women, young and old, go down to the seashore and spend the five days feasting and merry-making. Everyone strips off his formal clothes, goes into the water with his family, and disports himself in the sea. Truly, an astonishing sight!

Accordingly, the Shah traveled to the small town of Rūda-sar in the Rānekūh district, where the festival was being held this year. While he was in Gīlān, the Shah dismissed the vizier of the province, Behzād Beg, who had been guilty of various misdemeanors. He was arrested and punished. The task of collecting the arrears of taxes and verifying the *dīvān* revenue accounts pertaining to his period of office was given to Šahverdi Beg Bāybordlū, an aide-de-camp, and Loṭf 'Alī Khan Beg the *davātdār* (keeper of the inkholder).² The Shah then traveled to Qazvin by a narrow track across the mountains and stayed there for some time, residing mainly at a mansion known as the New Building, which he himself had had built. He played polo and practiced his archery in the Meydān-e Sa'adat.

The governorship of Qazvin had been conferred that year on Salmān Khan Ostājilū, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā Ostājilū, who was the son of Shah Tahmasp's sister; and he himself was connected by marriage with the Safavid royal house. Salmān Khan, at the urging of grasping officials, farmed out the job of collecting taxes and meddled in all sorts of matters in every branch of the administration. It was not long before people began to complain of the malpractices and avarice of his tax collectors, and the governor was arrested, fined,

¹16 Moḥarram was a Monday.

²See *TM*, p. 89.

and spent two years in jail in chains. From Qazvin, the Shah traveled to Damāvand, and then via the summer stations of Lār and Fīrūzkūh to Mašhad.

The Enlarging of the Main Courtyard of the Shrine at Mašhad, the Construction of Streets and Buildings, the Provision of a Water Supply, and Other Projects

After performing the pilgrimage ceremonies at the shrine of the Imam Reẓā, the Shah resolved to increase the prosperity of the shrine's fiefs and other lands, to restore the buildings and dwellings, and to enlarge the main courtyard of the shrine, because he considered the existing one unimpressive. The Mīr 'Alīšīr portico was the entrance to the shrine; it was situated on the south side of the courtyard, facing north, but it was extremely badly located in the corner of the courtyard. The Shah's plan was to demolish some older buildings lying east of the courtyard and already in ruins, and to incorporate the land thus acquired within the courtyard in such a way that the Mīr 'Alīšīr portico would then be located in the center of the southern wall. He also planned to construct a second portico in the north wall, facing south and opposite the Mīr 'Alīšīr portico, and two other porticos in the east and west walls, respectively. An avenue would then be constructed from the west gate of the city running east to the shrine; on reaching the shrine, it would circle around it, passing by all four entrance porticos.

Both the inhabitants of Mašhad and pilgrims to the shrine suffered from the lack of water in the city. The city's water supply derives from the Golaš spring. The Shah had new *qanāts* dug, and the water was led down the middle of the new avenue into a large cistern in the middle of the courtyard; from the cistern, the water flowed in an easterly direction past the tomb of the Imam. Skilled architects and engineers set to work, and the Shah's plans soon materialized under the supervision of the governors of Mašhad. Today, the city of Mašhad, by virtue of the twin blessings of the grace of the Imam and the benefactions of Shah 'Abbas, is the most prosperous city in Khorasan. Next, the Shah turned his attention to the restoration of the shrine of Kāja Rabī' al-Ḳoṣeīm, situated one *farsaḡ* from Mašhad, and he had a beautiful building erected over the tomb.

The Shah also restored the Qadamgāh shrine at Nishapur, which is so well known as not to require description. Since the Qadamgāh

lies on the slopes of the mountains and water reaches it from above, the Shah had fountains installed and a tree-lined avenue constructed for the benefit of the public for half a *farsak* from the gates. When I visited this spot on my way to perform the pilgrimage at Mašhad, words failed me adequately to describe the beauty of the site and its buildings. Anyone who tries to do so will get bogged down in high-flown and hyperbolic phrases, and so I will leave the task to other visitors to the site. May the Shah obtain his reward for these works in the form of long life and the stability of the realm, Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

The Shah spent nine days at Mašhad, performing the rites of pilgrimage at the shrine and ordering the officials of the *dīvān* to deal with the requests of petitioners. On the tenth day, the Shah left. Not far from the city, he encountered Hoseyn Khan Šamlū, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, who had ridden with a few companions from Herat to seek audience with the Shah; after spending a few days at the Shah's side, he returned to Herat.

Kāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ġūrīānī, one of the most notable men of his age, was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of Khorasan, having commended himself to the Shah by his integrity and his administrative ability.

The Shah proceeded to Astarābād via the Baḥrīān plain, where he indulged in some hunting. At Astarābād, he busied himself with the administration of justice and dealing with petitions. The governor, Farīdūn Khan, exerted himself in a fitting manner to entertain the Shah. Leaving Astarābād, the Shah returned to Faraḥābād for the winter.

The Founding of the Town of Ašraf in Māzandarān

At the small town of Ašraf in Māzandarān, formerly known as Panj-hazār, situated not far from Astarābād, the Shah laid the foundations of another palace, with all necessary ancillary buildings such as bathhouses, workshops, and houses. Mowlānā Maḥmūd Beheštī Ġilānī devised the chronogram "the bliss of Ašraf" to mark this event.³ Ašraf lived up to its name in every respect; the Shah devoted an increasing amount of attention to it, and laid out gardens and parks in

³The chronogram yields the date 1021/1612-13. The words "*dowlat-e ašraf*" could also be taken to mean "royal felicity," and so the chronogram constitutes a nice literary conceit.

which nestled attractive residences, each equipped with a cistern. In the midst of each cistern fountains played, the water for them being brought down from the higher slopes of the mountains. The fountains were fashioned with cunning artistry, some taking the form of flames, others the shape of the cascade which firework makers make from gunpowder. Since Ašraf has become the Shah's favorite retreat in Māzandarān, most of the *moqarrabs* and other court officials have built themselves residences there, with the result that Ašraf is now a large city and, as a result of the Shah's patronage, a celebrated one.

Miscellaneous Events

One of the events which occurred this year was the murder of Moḥammad Khan Qazāqlar, the governor of Lori, and several of his retainers, by Georgian nobles of the Kartlia district, subjects of Lūārsāb Khan. The Qazāqlar tribe had traditionally raided across the Georgian frontier, either openly or by stealth, and had carried into captivity Georgian women and children and ravaged the area. As a result, the Georgians had a long-standing feud with the Qazāqlar. During the Ottoman occupation, when Ja'far Pasha led an army from Tabriz against Simon Khan, Naẓar Sultan, Moḥammad Khan's father, became a renegade, went over to the Ottomans, and was made a pasha. His men, who knew every inch of ground in that area, were used as scouts by the Ottomans, while Naẓar Sultan was the man who tracked down Simon Khan and handed him over to the Ottomans. The hatred between the Georgians and the Qazāqlar was handed down to the next generation.

Readers will recall that Moḥammad Khan Qazāqlar had been received in audience by the Shah and been given a royal pardon. The Qazāqlar and the Georgians had undertaken to bury their differences and to keep the peace, but Lūārsāb Khan invited Moḥammad Khan and some of his leading officers to a banquet and had them all murdered. Although Moḥammad Khan richly deserved this end—he had a treacherous nature and was totally lacking in integrity, and had maintained a clandestine correspondence with the Ottomans—nevertheless, Lūārsāb Khan and the Georgian nobles incurred dishonor by this act of treachery. Shah 'Abbas decided to accept the *fait accompli*, and appointed the murdered Khan's brother, Moṣṭafā Beg, emir of the Qazāqlar tribe with the rank of khan.

The second of these miscellaneous events to occur this year was

the expedition against the Bāna Kurds led by the governor of Sārū Ğorqān, Sārū Sultan Begdīlū. Readers will recall that Eskandar Bāna had been received in audience by the Shah at his camp at Qarāčūq but had gone straight back to his tribe and resumed his seditious ways. Sārū Sultan therefore led a detachment of Šāmlū troops on a punitive expedition against him. The Bāna tribesmen, after initial resistance, fled, and Sārū Sultan captured Eskandar's castle and put to death about seven hundred miscreants. Those who survived the sword scattered in all directions.

The third of these miscellaneous events was the secret departure of Rostam Moḥammad Khan, the son of Valī Moḥammad, from Herat toward Ğarjestān without the permission of Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan. A number of rascally, treacherous Uzbegs had gathered around Rostam Moḥammad at Herat; Ḥoseyn Khan, as a precaution, had allotted them quarters outside the city, but the Uzbek prince had refused to be separated from his men, who on several occasions had expressed the desire to go to Ğarjestān. Ḥoseyn Khan, who did not trust the Uzbegs, refused to allow them to take the prince with them, and he did not dare, without the Shah's permission, to allot them a *qezelbaş* escort. One night, the Uzbegs succeeded in spiriting Rostam Moḥammad away, and rode like the wind toward Ğarjestān. Ḥoseyn Khan was perturbed, fearing that the Shah's wrath might be visited upon him because of his negligence. However, when the prince reached Ğarjestān, he was welcomed by the people there, who had received orders from the Shah to serve him. After he had led a raid against a group of people subject to the governor of Balḵ who had opposed him, and had brought back quantities of loot and sent some of this as a gift to Ḥoseyn Khan, good relations between him and the *beglerbeg* were restored.

Rostam Moḥammad reasserted his allegiance to the Shah and declared his gratitude for the favors he had received from him. He asked forgiveness for his abrupt departure, excusing his behavior on the ground that he had been unable to resist the importunate urgings of the Uzbegs, a people traditionally impatient for action. If he should suffer any reverse, he said, he would again seek refuge within the Shah's dominions. Ḥoseyn Khan, reassured, sent a report to the Shah. An account of Rostam Moḥammad's expedition to Balḵ will be given under the head of next year's events.

The next miscellaneous event was the killing of 'Alī Khan Beg

Javānšīr and his brother, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg. The Javānšīr, a Turkman tribe from Qarābāg, are made up of thirty-two clans, and are accordingly known also as the Otūz-İki;⁴ the Javānšīr family has held the leadership of the tribe for generations. During the Ottoman occupation, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg submitted to the Ottomans but remained with his tribe and family in Qarābāg. A few years later, his younger brother, 'Alī Khan Beg, visited the court of Shah 'Abbas and was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*. When the Shah opened his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg in his turn came to court. Since it was not the moment to sit in judgment on his past conduct, the chieftainship of the tribe was again conferred upon him.

A feud developed between the two brothers—it was a feud which had a number of causes, but the principal one was rivalry over the leadership of the tribe. Eventually, 'Alī Khan Beg was commissioned to repair the fort at Ganja. One day, when the governor of Ganja, Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū, was away from the city on a trip, 'Alī Khan Beg saw his opportunity to kill his brother, and he led a band of Javānšīr tribesmen to Zīād-oḡlū's house, where Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg was staying. The latter fled in a panic into the women's quarters of the house, but 'Alī Khan Beg, showing scant respect for the honor of the harem, pursued him there with the intention of killing him. A number of Zīād-oḡlū *gāzīs*, appalled at the disrespect shown to their Khan's harem, tried to prevent 'Alī Khan Beg from going on, but without success; they then, led by Sarāy Beg, attacked the Javānšīr group and slew all sixty or seventy of them, including 'Alī Khan Beg. The latter was a self-willed and excessively proud man who intended to murder his brother, but met the retribution for his crime before he had committed it. When Moḥammad Khan returned, he thought it expedient to put Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Beg to death as well, since he had been guilty of seditious activities during the Ottoman occupation and he saw no point in preserving his life. No official inquiry was made into either of these deaths, since it was in the interest of the state to have both men out of the way.

The next cautionary event I wish to record occurred at the end of the year; it is the execution of the *qūrčībāšī*, Allāhqolī Beg Qājār, who was arrested at Farahābād by Pīrī Beg, known as Qarā Pīrī Qarāmānlū. Allāhqolī Beg, relying on the unusual degree of favor the Shah displayed toward him and on his excellent services to the

⁴Turkish for "thirty-two."

crown, frequently used to make impudent remarks in the presence of the Shah, and to make jests of a kind which are not appropriate to distinguished officers of the state, even though they have permission to make them. He ignored the old adage about a subject needing to keep his place even though he is apparently in favor with the king. The Shah used to react to his jibes jovially and good-naturedly, not standing on his dignity, and derived a great deal of enjoyment from them. Everyone, when they heard the news, thought that Allāhqolī must have gone too far and that his insolence had been the cause of his downfall; but the Shah himself, after his arrest, repeatedly mentioned his ingratitude and his evil nature as being the reasons for his fall from favor.

Allāhqolī Beg, although he was an experienced officer, was extremely worldly and avaricious in regard to the accumulation of money, property, and estates, and he had amassed a fortune amounting to twenty thousand *tomān*. His fear that something might disturb the even tenor of his life and prevent him and his sons from enjoying this fortune led him to entertain foolish thoughts and harbor suspicions regarding his spiritual director and benefactor. The money on which he had set his heart had corrupted him, and on several occasions he collected taxes and divided the money between his *ḡāzīs* and his cronies. Since the Shah had decided to destroy his whole family, he and his sons were blinded and subsequently died under the blows of the dunners' cudgels. Thus he did not live to enjoy any of his wealth or estates, and he had no good works as his memorial.

He was succeeded as *qūrčibāši* by 'Isā Khan, the son of Seyyed Beg the son of Ma'sūm Beg Šafavī. 'Isā Khan was connected by marriage to the Shah himself, and had risen from the rank of centurion to the position of governor. He was a courteous young man, endowed with many praiseworthy qualities, shrewd and of a pleasant disposition.

Deaths

1. Nūr Moḥammad Khan Özbek, the son of Abu'l-Moḥammad Khan, the son of Dīn Moḥammad Khan, the son of Alūš Khan, of the line of Šībān b. Joči b. Čengīz Khan. As previously related, he was living at Shiraz on a pension of one gold royal Iraqi *tomān* a day; he died in the course of this year.

2. The eminent jurist and *mojtahed* Mowlānā 'Abdollāh Šūštārī,

who had come to Iran from Najaf a number of years ago and resided at Isfahan. The Shah always showed great favor toward him. He fell ill on Friday,⁵ 24 Moḥarram 1021/27 March 1612, but the illness did not seem serious. On the Saturday, his son-in-law Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer and Shaikh Loṭfollāh Meysī 'Āmeli, who had often had violent arguments with him on theological matters and problems of *ejteḥād*,⁶ went to visit him, and he embraced them warmly and chatted gaily with them. Early on Sunday morning, the 26th of Moḥarram/29 March, the Mowlānā, after performing his early morning prayers and supererogatory acts of worship, went out to look at the weather. On his return, he collapsed and died without being able to utter a word.

The Mowlānā was a man of outstanding spiritual accomplishments: pious, continent, eschewing the pleasures of this world. As for food and drink, he made do with the bare minimum, and fasted much of the time; he would break his fast with a bowl of broth without any meat in it. He lived at Karbala and Najaf for about thirty years, as a student of the late *mojtahed* Mowlānā Aḥmad Ardabīlī. It is said that Mowlānā Aḥmad gave him authority to conduct the Friday prayers, to gather around him pupils of his own, and to instruct them in problems of *ejteḥād*. He was greatly mourned; because of the press of people in the old congregational mosque of Isfahan, it was not possible to give his body ritual ablution from the water of the well there, and Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer and the other scholars and theologians conducted the burial service where they stood. His body lay for a few days in the Imamzada-ye Esma'īl, and was then taken to Karbala for burial. Various attractive chronograms were devised to mark his death: One was, "Alas! Alas! the exemplar of the Shi'ites has gone!" Another was "Alas for the exemplar of Iran, alas!" And Shaikh Maḥmūd 'Arab Jazā'eri produced "The *mojtahed* of the age is dead!"⁷

3. Moḥammad Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, a *moqarrab* at court and a member of the Shah's assemblies. He fell ill in Māzandarān and was attended by the physician Ḥakīm Salmān Širāzī, but he did not carry out the treatment prescribed by the latter. When he was absent, Moḥammad Beg followed the advice of Turkish physicians. He ate un-

⁵24 Moḥarram was a Tuesday.

⁶The solution of theological problems on the basis of analogical reasoning, precedents being derived from the Koran, the *hadīṡ*, and the consensus of the community, according to conditions laid down in the works of authorities on the religious law.

⁷The last two chronograms give the correct date (1021/1612), but the first one yields 1022.

suitable food, and too much of it. His illness gradually became worse, and he died at the beginning of winter. The Shah took charge of the burial arrangements, and sent his body to Mašhad for interment; he also looked after his dependents. The deceased was a wealthy man, but had constituted his personal estates as a pious endowment. Since he had no heir, his effects, according to religious law, went to his brother, Ḥeydar Sultan the *ešīk-āqāsi* of the harem.

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Events of the Year of the Ox, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1022/1613-14 and Part of the Year 1023/1614-15, the Twenty-fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday¹ 27 Moḥarram 1022/19 March 1613. On that day the sun, after a duration of nine hours, ten degrees, and twelve minutes, left the sign Pisces and entered the sign Aries, and thus marked the beginning of spring. On Friday,² 29 Moḥarram/21 March, the Shah left Farahābād and traveled to Isfahan, where he received a great welcome. The artisans, craftsmen, and merchants of the city decorated the bazaar, the Qeysariya and the stores around the Meydān, and the Shah held a traditional New Year's festival in the Naqš-e Jahān palace. As a token of his satisfaction with the services of the people of Isfahan, the Shah waived for a period of three years, throughout the whole province, the taxes payable by both landlords and peasants; he also distributed in the form of cash grants to the landlords, peasants, and cultivators of state lands one-tenth of the revenues accruing from these lands, amounting to more than fifteen thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*. This bounty, coming on top of the Shah's other acts of generosity, led all the inhabitants of the province to pray for his welfare.

The Capture of the Fort of Bon Fahl in the Province of Kij and Makrān

Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, had been ordered to capture this fort, as readers will recall. He marched to Bon Fahl with troops from the army of Kerman and contingents from the tribes in the region. On arrival there, he laid siege to the fort, and made raids into the surrounding countryside as opportunity offered. Malek Šams al-Dīn, the son of Malek Dīnār, the ruler of that region, together with the rest of the besieged, soon abandoned the defense of the fort. The Zig *gāzīs* occupied it and took prisoner Malek Šams al-Dīn and his sons and dependents, and sent them to court. Apparently most of the population in that province are Sunnis of the Šāfe'ī rite. Malek Šams al-Dīn, since he claimed to be a *seyyed* and a Shi'ite and a friend of the Imams, was pardoned by the Shah and allowed to return

¹27 Moḥarram was a Tuesday.

²29 Moḥarram was a Thursday.

to Kerman and live peacefully with his family and dependents in that province. However, on arrival at Kerman, he died.

The *maleks* of Kij and Makrān knew nothing of the rulers of this world except their names, and had never traveled outside their own province. They had remained untouched by the vicissitudes of the times, and in their ignorance thought that the province of Kij and Makrān was the choicest spot in the civilized world. They thought their line of kings were mighty princes with whom the other rulers of the world could not compare; in keeping with this, the inscription on Šams al-Dīn's signet ring was "king of kings."

One of their ancestors, the late Malek Dīnār, who was the ruler of the whole of the province of Makrān and Kij, seemed to be a little more modest when he had inscribed on his signet ring:

Had the Lord of the World not possessed so many
realms,
He would not have given away Kij and Makrān
for the price of a *dīnār*.³

Even then, literary men will perceive that these words, too, are an allusion to the magnitude of the province and the greatness of its ruler!

The Arrival of an Embassy from Europe Consisting of Ambassadors and Christian Fathers at the Shah's Court

This year a number of European ambassadors and Christian fathers (scholars and monks) arrived at the Shah's court, sent by the King of Spain, the most powerful of the rulers of Europe. The embassy was received by the Shah at the Naqš-e Jahān palace, delivered its gifts to the Shah, and was welcomed with great favor. Friendly relations were customary between Shah 'Abbas and the Christian princes of Europe, and diplomatic exchanges had regularly taken place. Thus, a few years ago, the Shah had sent Dengīz Beg Rūmlū, a smooth-tongued centurion, on a mission to Europe, and this envoy now returned to Iran with the foreign embassy. The Shah had received reports from Europe that his ambassador, as a result of his grasping and avaricious nature, had committed various acts displeasing to the Shah; indeed, they had so angered him that, the moment Dengīz Beg

³Or, "to a *dīnār*," a word play on his own name.

entered the court, the Shah handed him over to the executioner without giving him a chance to make excuses for his sins. He was put to death⁴ by being suspended upside down from a gibbet, and died miserably and in disgrace.

One of Dengīz Beg's crimes was that, when he reached Cadiz, at the insistence of Būzra, who was the governor of the city and the admiral in charge of the Frankish ports, he broke the seal on the Shah's letter to the King of Spain, read the letter, and revealed its contents to the governor. The sacrilegious act of breaking the royal seal is considered by kings to be a serious crime, and to divulge to another the secret communications of kings is a heinous crime. Another source of complaint against Dengīz Beg on the part of the Shah was his manner of dress in Europe. It is the custom for ambassadors, when they are sent on missions to foreign lands, to continue to wear the style of dress which is usual in their own country, and at no time in history have kings permitted their ambassadors to do otherwise. When Dengīz Beg reached the Spanish court, he found the court in mourning for the Queen, who had just died.⁵ In order to flatter the King, he bought himself black mourning robes and appeared in them, whereas he should have continued to wear his ordinary costume. If requested to wear mourning, he should have replied, "Praise be to God! My king and benefactor is in good health; what need is there for me to wear mourning?" This would have been a fitting excuse for not wearing black, and one which would have been applauded.

Yet another ground for complaint was the letter which the Shah had written to the Pope at Rome, who is so to speak the Christian caliph, and the vicar of the apostles of Christ. The letter had been given by Dengīz Beg to some merchant or other, and this merchant had paid him a sum of money for the privilege of calling himself Dengīz Beg and having the excitement of delivering the letter to the Pope. Again, this was completely unacceptable behavior on the part of the ambassador. If there really was some reason why he could not deliver the letter in person, he should have brought the letter back and explained the circumstances to the Shah. Instead of doing this, he showed disrespect for his benefactor's letter by virtually selling it to some unknown merchant and thinking nothing of it. The greatest

⁴The verb used, *šala kardan*, is usually used only of judicial executions under *lex talionis*. Its use in this case therefore suggests that Dengīz Beg had been guilty of murder in Europe.

⁵This was Margaret, queen-consort of Philip III, who died in 1611.

of his crimes, however, was that he treated the fellow members of his mission so badly that several of them embraced Christianity as a means of escaping from his clutches, and remained in Europe. The honor of Islam demanded the death penalty; as the poet has it, "Only oppression causes a man to change his religion."

The Return of the Şadr, Qāzī Khan, from His Embassy to the Porte, the Arrival of the Ottoman Ambassador with Peace Proposals, and the Flaws in These Proposals in the Eyes of the Shah

Qāzī Khan returned from Istanbul with the new Ottoman ambassador, Moştafā Pasha, known as Enjillū Čavoš. Qāzī Khan related that, according to orders, he had traveled to Istanbul with Naşūh Pasha, who had been received in audience first by Sultan Aḥmad I, had described the negotiations so far, and had laid emphasis on Qāzī Khan's rank and lineage. The following day, all the Ottoman pashas, emirs, and nobles, together with a large crowd of ordinary folk, had gone out to meet Qāzī Khan and escort him into the city with great honor. Qāzī Khan and his colleagues had then asked for an audience with the Sultan through the good offices of the grand vizier, as was the custom, stated the object of their mission, and presented their gifts.

The *şadr* was treated with greater esteem by the Sultan than had been the lot of previous ambassadors. During his stay in Istanbul, he had been visited by viziers, pashas, *moftīs*, *'olamā*, *qāzīs*, and jurists, who had discussed with him the prospects for peace, and there were some spirited arguments on both sides. After a lot of discussion, peace on the basis of the treaty between Sultan Süleymān and Shah Tahmasp was agreed to, and Enjillū Čavoš was appointed ambassador and dispatched, bearing suitable gifts, in the company of Qāzī Khan.

The Shah received Qāzī Khan and the Ottoman ambassador with favor. The Ottoman Sultan had given Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān, full powers in the matter of demarcating the frontiers of Azerbaijan, and Maḥmūd Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Baghdad and son of Jeḡāl-oḡlū, full powers regarding the frontiers of Arab Iraq, with orders to demarcate these boundaries as they had been at the time of the Treaty of Amasya, in consultation with the Safavid plenipotentiaries. Shah 'Abbas appointed Emir Gūna Khan, the *beglerbeg* of

Çokür-e Sa'd, his plenipotentiary for Azerbaijan, and the *moqarrab al-hazrat* Mahdîqolî Beg Çağatây, the master of the king's horse, his plenipotentiary in the Baghdad region.

Since a long time had elapsed since the Treaty of Amasya, many changes had taken place in the frontiers in the interim: For example, the Meskhia region of Georgia and the forts in the Ākesqa district, which under the treaty had been defined as Safavid territory, had in the meantime been occupied by the Ottomans and were still in their hands. On the other hand, some forts in the direction of 'Arabestān and Baghdad which had been defined as Ottoman territory were now in Safavid hands. It was clearly going to be hard for either side to surrender the territory it had occupied, and so it seemed easier for each side to keep the territory actually in its possession at the time of the signing of peace. In this way, neither side would begrudge the other the territory it held, and instructions were given to the plenipotentiaries to this effect. It was hoped that this procedure would remove all grounds for conflict, and that the larger objective, peace, would not be lost sight of as a result of haggling over details. Emir Gūna Khan marched in good order to Salmās and met Moḥammad Pasha, and for two months discussion went on before all the details were settled. Then, one copy of the boundary settlement, sealed by Moḥammad Pasha, the frontier *sanjaq-begs*, and other nobles, was handed to Emir Gūna Khan, and he gave Moḥammad Pasha another copy to which he and the other emirs in the region had affixed their seals.

In the 'Arabestān and Baghdad regions, however, Maḥmūd Pasha had a much more difficult job, since there had been greater changes in the frontier, and it proved impossible to demarcate the boundary here. In the end, peace did not materialize because of frontier incidents caused by troublemakers among the Georgians and the Kurds, and fighting between the Ottoman and the Safavid empires broke out once more.

Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan's Expedition to Balḵ, and His Being Routed and Retreating in Disarray and with a Bitter Taste in His Mouth

This year, Emāmqolî Khan, the Uzbek ruler at Bokhara, marched toward Samarkand intending to campaign against the Qazāqs who had seized possession of Tashkent and were conducting raids along

the borders of the province of Samarkand. He summoned his brother, Nadr Moḥammad Sultan, from Balḵ to assist in this campaign, but the latter demurred, pointing out that Rostam Moḥammad Khan was in Ġarjestān, just waiting for his opportunity to seize Balḵ. Emām-qolī Khan kept insisting that he send troops, and finally Nadr Moḥammad Sultan gave in, sent a large army to assist his brother, and himself also crossed the Oxus. As soon as Rostam Moḥammad Khan heard of his departure, he marched at top speed to Balḵ with the three thousand men who had gathered around him.

The officer in charge at Balḵ was not strong enough either to repulse him or man the fortifications of the city, and so he retreated into the citadel and abandoned the city. He sent a conciliatory message to Rostam Moḥammad Khan, saying his men had their wives and families in the citadel and were therefore honor-bound to defend them; apart from that, he said, the whole place was his, and there was no cause for dispute between them. Nadr Moḥammad Sultan's mother, who was a Reżavī *seyyed* and the sister of Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī Mašhadī, was terrified that Rostam Moḥammad Khan might assault the citadel, and so she kept sending messengers to the latter, appealing to him like a mother appealing to her son, and promised him her daughter in marriage. She also urged the cousins to make peace with one another, and suggested that the realm, presently divided into two parts, should be divided into three. The three brothers, she said, could then live together in peace—a state greatly preferable to war.

Rostam Moḥammad Khan allowed himself to be deceived by her, and remained quietly at Balḵ without taking any particular precautions. Those in the citadel, however, had sent envoys for help in all directions, and were waiting for the arrival of troops. Rostam Moḥammad Khan's men scattered all over the district, engaging in various commercial dealings and extorting money from the local inhabitants.

Without warning, some of Nadr Moḥammad Sultan's troops arrived. Rostam Moḥammad Khan's men, with no time to assemble, looked each man to his own safety. Rostam Moḥammad Khan fled toward Mārūčāq with some twenty or thirty men but on the way some of his supposedly friendly Uzbegs planned to seize him and take him to Bokhara. Others, however, remained loyal to him, and fighting broke out between the two factions; eventually those loyal to him overcame the traitors. Rostam Moḥammad trailed back toward Herat

with only ten men. Soon after his arrival there, news came in that the princes of Transoxania had been routed by the Qazāqs near Tashkent, and on Tuesday, 14 Rabī' II, 1022/3 June 1613, a courier from Ḥoseyn Khan reached Isfahan from Herat with this news. Since the Shah was not wedded to the cause of Rostam Moḥammad Khan, he did nothing to assist him in this campaign, preferring to leave the outcome to fate.

Miscellaneous Events that Occurred This Year

This year, ambassadors were sent to the Deccan. The rulers of the Deccan had long been devoted friends of the Safavid house; 'Ādel-šāh, the ruler of Bījāpūr, had sent an embassy to the Shah in the person of Mīr Kalīlollāh Kōšnevīs (the calligrapher), a distinguished *seyyed* from Bāqarz in Khorasan and unequaled in his time as a writer of the *nasta'liq* script, who happened to be in the Deccan at his court. Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh, the ruler of Golconda, had sent as ambassador Malek 'Anbar, a general descended from the Neẓām-šāhī house. The object of these embassies was to seek help from the Shah against the Čaġatāy army which, on orders from the Mogul Emperor, was troubling their borders.

The Shah's problem was that friendly relations had always existed between the Safavid house and the Mogul Emperors, and the reigning Emperor, Salīm Shah, had demonstrated even more strongly than his predecessors the desire to live on good terms with him. The Shah, as a first move, wrote to the Mogul Emperor, telling him of the petition of the princes of the Deccan, and the Emperor, to please the Shah, ceased hostilities against them. This year, the Shah sent ambassadors to the Deccan: Ḥoseyn Beg *qeyčāči* Tabrīzī was sent as an ambassador to the Qoṭbšāh, Darvīš Beg Mar'ašī to the Neẓām-šāh, and Malek 'Anbar and Šāhqolī Beg Zīg to 'Ādelšāh. To each prince he sent a friendly letter and appropriate presents, including horses and other wonderful gifts. In the interval between the departure of the ambassadors from India and their return, Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh had died and been succeeded by his nephew and son-in-law, Sultan Moḥammad, and so the ambassador to the Qoṭbšāh was instructed to offer condolences on the death of the former ruler and congratulations to his successor. The ambassadors were given leave to depart from Isfahan, together with Mīr Kalīl. Darvīš Beg died en route at Shiraz, and his son, Moḥammadi Beg, was nominated ambassador in his place. Moḥammadi Beg and Ḥoseyn Beg both

reached their destinations, but Šāhqolī Beg spent some time at Shiraz, waiting for a propitious moment to travel, with the result that he missed the season during which it was possible to make the sea voyage to India; Mīr Kalīl Kōšnevīs, the envoy sent by Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, returned to court from Shiraz; his subsequent history will be related later.

Another event which took place this year was the marriage of Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, the blind⁶ son of Shah Tahmasp, to Kābolī Begom, the daughter of Moḥammad Ḥakīm Mīrzā b. Moḥammad Homāyūn, the Mogul Emperor. Kābolī Begom had previously been married to Šāhroḡ Mīrzā, the grandson of Shah Soleymān b. Sultan Oveys Mīrzā, known as Khan Mīrzā, b. Sultan Maḥmūd Mīrzā b. Sultan Abū Sa'īd b. Sultan Moḥammad b. Mīrzā Mīrānšāh b. Emir Tīmūr, who was the ruler of Badaḡšān. Šāhroḡ Mīrzā had died in India, and his widow set off for the Ḥeǰāz with his corpse, intending to bury it there. However, because of her fear of the desert Arabs, she never reached her destination, but entrusted her husband's body to some Arab camel drivers and herself returned to Bašra. From there she traveled to Shiraz, where she was received with honor by Allāhverdi Khan and sent on to Isfahan. There, she was received by the members of the royal harem, and the Shah married her to his uncle, Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā, but no rapport developed between them, and they treated each other coldly.

Also this year Seyyed Nāšer b. Seyyed Mobārak Khan was sent to 'Arabestān, and Aḥmad Khan b. Holow Khan Ardalān to his hereditary province of Kurdestan. Seyyed Nāšer, sent as a child to the Safavid court by his father, had been brought up there and treated with special favor by the Shah. For some time, Seyyed Nāšer had been petitioning the Shah to allow him to go to 'Arabestān to visit his aged father and stay with him, during which time one of his brothers could be sent to court, but the Shah had not hitherto permitted this. This year, it was reported that Seyyed Mobārak's elder sons, Seyyed Badr and Seyyed Baraka, had died, and that his surviving sons were still infants. The Shah therefore now consented to the return to 'Arabestān of Seyyed Nāšer, who was getting on in years, to prevent any dynastic disturbances there.

⁶Sultan 'Alī Mīrzā was the eighth son of Shah Tahmasp. He had been blinded by Shah Esmā'il II (the *Aḥsan al-Tawārīk* wrongly states that he was murdered by the latter). His probable date of birth is 970/1562-63, which would mean that in 1022/1613-14 he would be about fifty or fifty-one years of age.

Khan Aḥmad Ardalān had also been brought up from childhood at the Safavid court, and the Shah devoted a great deal of attention to his education, so that he could take his father's place eventually as chief of the Ardalān tribe. The Shah now sent him to his father with the following message: "Since you are now an old man, and have no helpers among the tribe, I am sending your son to remain at your side."

Both men were dispatched from the Shah's camp at Ganja when he was en route to Georgia with a punitive expedition.

Shah 'Abbas's Punitive Expedition against the Georgians

Ṭahmūraṣ b. Dā'ūd Khan b. Alexander Khan, the ruler of Kakhetia, and Lūārsāb b. Gorgīn Khan b. Samā'ūn Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, were both protégés of Shah 'Abbas. In the Year of the Dog, when Morād Pasha came to Tabriz, both princes had been at court. When they left, they had begged the Shah to let them know whenever he was going on a hunting expedition to Māzandarān, because they would very much like to accompany him. They agreed that, whenever the Shah sent a courier to summon them, they would come at once. Accordingly, the Shah had summoned them the previous winter, which he spent in Māzandarān, but the princes had detained his courier, the groom Amīrqolī, and had procrastinated, each saying he would go if the other went. They delayed their departure so long that spring, the hunting season in Māzandarān, passed, the weather began to get hot, and the groom returned without accomplishing his mission.

The two princes, at the instigation of certain Georgian trouble-makers, particularly a certain Šarmazān, then formed an alliance with each other against the Shah. They convenanted with each other to be allies, as their fathers had not been; as far as possible not to leave their respective territories; and not to submit to the *qezelbāš*. By concluding this alliance, they caused the destruction of their realms. The Shah was so angered by their conduct that words and excuses could not appease him, and he decided to lead a punitive expedition against them. He would give them a last chance; he would march to Qarābāḡ and, if the princes presented themselves before him, apologized for their behavior, and made amends for it by worthy service at the Shah's side, he would forgive them; if not, he would punish them severely.

The weather continuing hot, the Shah remained for a while in his summer quarters at Farīdūn and Parjīš. When the weather turned cooler, he returned to Isfahan and marched from the capital on Thursday, 2 Ramaẓān 1022/16 October 1613. Since the business of the demarcation of the frontiers had not yet been completed and the boundary commissioners had not yet returned, the Shah instructed the Ottoman ambassador to remain at Isfahan until he returned from the Georgian expedition; once all the boundary problems were settled, he would send him on his way in a fitting manner. The Shah marched slowly toward Ardabīl, being joined at intervals by contingents of Safavid troops; at Ardabīl, he spent a day visiting the Safavid shrine.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Amasya, Georgia had been divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids as follows: the districts of Meskhia, Kartlia, and Kakhetia belonged to Iran, and Bāšī-Āčūq, Dādīān, and Gūrāl to Turkey. The Shah, anxious that his expedition to Georgia not be misinterpreted and not constitute an obstacle to the peace negotiations now in progress, a development that would be injurious to the welfare of Muslims, sent a courier, Moḥammad Beg Ṭāleš, to explain to Naṣūḥ Pasha the reasons for his expedition.

Since Ṭahmūraš Khan had made his decision to renounce his allegiance to the Shah and trusted in the natural strength of the mountains and forests of his land, he did not present himself to the Shah. Shah 'Abbas planned a pincer movement against him: Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, was ordered to start combing the country from the direction of Tiflis, the western⁷ limit of the Kakhetia district, using as scouts Delī Moḥammad Šams al-Dīnlū and his men. This emir was from Qarābāg, which bordered on Georgia, and knew the topography of the region. The other arm of the pincer consisted of Yūsuf Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, which lies to the east of Kakhetia. The Shah himself crossed the Kor at Qūmīn-ūlamī, and camped near the Qabrl River.

When Ṭahmūraš heard of the Shah's approach, his complacency was slightly shaken; he mobilized his cavalry and infantry and constructed a strong defensive position in the forests, making barricades of tree trunks. The Shah was reluctant to lose one of his protégés without one last attempt to bring him back to his allegiance, and so he sent Zāker Āqā qūšči (royal falconer), who had been close to

⁷The points of the compass are transposed in the text.

Ṭahmūraṣ while the latter was at the Safavid court, to urge him to present himself to the Shah and to warn him that this was the only way in which he could save himself. Ṭahmūraṣ claimed he was too terrified of the Shah's wrath to come in person, but he sent his mother and his two infant sons, with a delegation of Georgian nobles, priests, and monks, to intercede for him with the Shah. He asked the Shah to overlook his conduct and return to Iraq; when he was assured of the Shah's pardon, he would come in person. The delegation reached the Shah's camp on the banks of the Qabrī River, and was received with honor.

The Shah was prepared to accept the pleas of Ṭahmūraṣ's mother, when Bogrāt Mīrzā, the nephew of Lūārsāb the ruler of Kartlia, who had always served as a member of the Shah's retinue and was a *moqarrab* at court, partly from loyalty and partly from fear of being found out if he concealed it, showed the Shah a letter in the Georgian language which Ṭahmūraṣ had written to him. In the course of this letter Ṭahmūraṣ made various remarks which gave the lie to what his mother had been saying and were singularly inappropriate at that particular moment. The Shah was infuriated, and the efforts of those who were interceding for Ṭahmūraṣ no longer had any hope of success. Ṭahmūraṣ's mother and two children were sent to Iraq, and the Georgian nobles placed in the custody of reliable officers. The Shah marched against Ṭahmūraṣ, who abandoned his defensive position and fled toward Kartlia by little-used paths with his family and dependents and a few supporters—some five or six hundred persons in all. He joined Lūārsāb in Kartlia, and the two fled together over the Ottoman border into Bāṣī-Āčūq, where they took refuge with Gorgīn Khan, the ruler of that region, who was an Ottoman vassal.

Deaths

1. This year, when the Shah was at his summer quarters of Farīdūn and Parjīš, his son Esma'il Mīrzā, who was twelve years of age, fell ill at Isfahan and died on 29 Jomādā II, 1022/16 August 1613. His body, after lying at the Imamzada Esma'il shrine in the Golbār district of Isfahan, was transferred to Mašhad when the weather turned cooler and buried within the precincts of the shrine. May his father live forever, and his fortunes be untouched by the hand of fate! I ask this in the name of Moḥammad and his descendants.

2. Allāhverdi Khan. The Khan, who had come on a visit to Isfa-

han, reached the city at the same time as the Shah returned from Māzandarān, and was received in audience. The Khan was slightly indisposed, and the Shah had a premonition, deriving from the insight he possessed by virtue of the saintly authority, the supranatural powers and the function as spiritual guide he had inherited from his ancestors, that the Khan was going to die, and he so informed those around him. A few days later, the Khan became seriously ill, and on Monday, 14 Rabī' II, 1022/3 June 1613, the fourteenth day of his illness, he died. The Shah himself, with all his emirs and nobles, escorted the bier to the place appointed for the ritual washing of corpses, and saw that all the preparations for burial were made with the utmost reverence and respect. His body was sent to Mašhad for burial in a vault which had recently been completed near the sanctuary.

By a strange coincidence, the official who had supervised the construction of this vault had happened to come to Isfahan a few days previously, and Allāhverdi Khan had asked him how the building was getting on and had questioned him about its decoration. The simple-minded Turk had replied that the vault and portico of the tomb had been finished and were beautifully decorated, and were just waiting for the Khan to set foot in them! Those present rebuked the fellow for speaking foolishly, but the Khan said, "His utterance was based on some power of clairvoyance," and the Khan's health began to deteriorate from that moment, which proves that many a true word is spoken in jest! The same day his father died, Emāmqoli Khan, the governor of Lār and an emir of the *divān*, was appointed governor of Fārs in his father's place, in addition to his previous governorship. The next day, the Shah visited Allāhverdi Khan's house and offered his condolences to the bereaved. Allāhverdi Khan was one of the most powerful emirs to hold office under this dynasty. During his lifetime, he was responsible for the construction of many public buildings and charitable foundations. He was a man of great forbearance, modest and chaste.

3. Šāhverdi Beg Bāybordlū, an aide-de-camp and one of the *moqarrabs* of the court, a man very close to the Shah. He had fallen ill the previous year in Gilān, and had been taken to Māzandarān. When the Shah left Māzandarān for Isfahan, he had been too ill to accompany him, and he died at Farahābād early this year. He was a man of great wealth, which passed to his heirs. The story goes that, while he was in Māzandarān, some weak-minded, demented dervish

visited him and made an abusive remark to him. Šāhverđī Beg, who was a proud man, punished him severely, whereupon the dervish consigned him to God; the same day, Šāhverđī Beg was taken ill. The only result of all this was that the faith of the people of Gīlān in this crazy dervish was mightily increased.

Events of the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding in Part to the Muslim Year 1023/1614-15 and in Part to the Year 1024/1615-16, the Twenty-eighth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Friday,¹ 10 Šafar 1023/22 March 1614. On Thursday, New Year's Eve, the royal army crossed the Qānoq River, which is third only to the Tigris and Oxus in size, and reached the Qeseq district, which was the fief of Šarmazān. The following day, the traditional New Year's feast was held in that delightful spot, and the Shah conferred the governorship of Kakhetia on 'Isā Khan b. Gorgīn Mīrzā b. Alexander, the nephew of Ṭahmūraš. 'Isā Khan had been at the Safavid court since he was a child, and had become a convert to Islam. The Shah appointed Dā'ūd Beg, the greatest of the Georgian nobles in those parts, to be his *vakīl*. Following Georgian tradition, 'Isā Khan was seated on a throne and gold was distributed by way of largesse, and the *qezelbāš* emirs and nobles, at the command of the Shah, followed suit and distributed gold and silver coins, gold goblets, and silver trays.

The majority of the Georgian nobles, with the exception of the few who had chosen to go into exile with Ṭahmūraš, rallied around 'Isā Khan. The Shah's authority was such that the property and possessions of the Georgian population were absolutely secure, and no rascal dared lay his hands on even a piece of straw belonging to a peasant. A few ignorant fellows who, in the course of the march through Georgia, had come across deserted houses belonging to Christians and had plundered them, had their stomachs ripped open and were paraded round the camp. This had a salutary effect, and the Georgians, who fearing the depredations of the *qezelbāš* had scattered in all directions, heard of the Shah's justice and gradually returned to their homes.

From Qeseq, Shah 'Abbas marched to the town of Gīram (Grem), which is the seat of the Georgian rulers of Kakhetia. He camped for a time in this delightful spot, resembling the gardens of Eram,² which the Christians had made their abode in this world; indeed, "this

¹10 Šafar was a Saturday.

²Fabulous gardens said to have been devised by Šaddād b. 'Ād in imitation of the gardens of paradise.

world is a prison for the believer, and a paradise for the unbeliever!" There is a magnificent church, beautifully decorated, at Gīram. It is not clear whether, ever since the advent of Islam, the call to Islam has ever been heard in these parts, or whether the inhabitants of the region have seen any men of religion in this church but Christian monks, who are immersed in error. Most of the inhabitants are Christians; there are a few Jews, and none has heard more of Islam than its name. Accordingly, Shah 'Abbas, the Defender of the Faith, went to the church, and had sweet-tongued muezzins utter the Muslim call to prayer. At every church and convent he reached, he made the heavens ring with the cry, "There is no god but God, and Moḥammad is His Prophet."

The Shah reached the church at Alaverdi, one of the largest and most important Christian churches in Georgia—a truly magnificent building. There, the Shah heard of the existence of a fort at Ṭarāḡāy (Torḡa), in the extreme north of the country; he heard that this fort was held by a group of Georgians who had not submitted to 'Īsā Khan, and that some of Ṭahmūra's possessions were stored there. The Shah dispatched a contingent of troops under the command of Moḥammad Taqī Beg Tabrizī, a chiliarch of the Azerbaijan musketeers. After a brief resistance the garrison fled, abandoning the fort. Among the booty found by the *qezelbāš* was a crown, encrusted with pearls and rubies, which was worn by the priest in charge of the church at Alaverdi at services on holy days and major Christian festivals, and was regarded by the congregation as a sacred relic. Expert jewelers valued it at five hundred royal Iraqi *tomān*. The Shah decided to make the church a stronghold; he had fortifications constructed around it, and stationed a detachment of two hundred Azerbaijan musketeers there to defend it, under the command of the *tofangčībāš*³ Esma'il Beg. The work of building the fortifications was divided among the emirs and various regiments of the army. Even though supplies of stone and lime were nonexistent in the area and had to be brought from a considerable distance, the work was completed within three weeks.

Shah 'Abbas was enraged by the fact that both Ṭahmūra and Lūārsāb had taken refuge in the rugged mountain region of Bāši-Āčūq, which was ruled by an Ottoman vassal. He vowed to pursue

³This is not the commander in chief of all the regiments of musketeers, who was called *tofangčī-āqāsi*. *Tofangčībāš* presumably denotes a rank in a regiment of musketeers.

them wherever they fled, and not to turn back until he had taken them captive. He therefore marched from Kakhetia to Kartlia by routes so steep and narrow that the Georgian princes had never succeeded in traversing them with cavalry, particularly in the spring time, when it rained incessantly and the dense foliage of the trees shut out the rays of the sun. Officers and men thought the task of crossing such terrain difficult, if not impossible, but the march was accomplished in three days, though not without considerable loss of pack animals and members of the commissariat. On the fourth day of his march, the Shah reached the headwaters of the Qānoq and Qabrī rivers, where the ground was carpeted with poppies and other wildflowers.

The Arzād and Tayānāt regions of Kakhetia were ravaged by the *qezelbāš* in retaliation for the fact that the inhabitants had spirited Ṭahmūraṣ out of the country, guiding him along little-known paths, had known about his escape, had concealed him from the *qezelbāš* troops who were searching for him, and had not notified them of his whereabouts; and also in retribution for the refusal of the Georgian chiefs in those regions to tender their allegiance to 'Isā Khan. The *qezelbāš* troops marched off into the forests, company by company, and brought back about thirty thousand captives and forty thousand sheep and cattle. After the Shah's tithe of one-fifth had been set aside, the remainder was distributed among the troops. Thirty thousand infidels were obliged to become Muslims, and this great feat will undoubtedly bring the Shah long life in this world and its reward in the next.

When the Shah reached the Aragvi River, the boundary between Kakhetia and Kartlia, he sent a message to Gorgīn Khan, the ruler of Bāši-Āčūq:

Peace negotiations are well advanced between myself and the Ottoman Sultan, and one of the conditions of peace is that neither party should give sanctuary to vassals of the other party. It is therefore your clear duty to extradite the two Georgian princes Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb, both of whom were brought up at my court and who have foolishly fled to your territory, and not to commit any act which might endanger the peace negotiations now in progress. If they are returned, they will be treated with royal clemency; if

they are not returned, my troops will come and fetch them, and something untoward may occur which will give rise to regret later.

Ḳāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan, volunteered to take this message. He met Gorgīn Khan and the two princes and, by dint of employing every form of argument in the diplomatic armory, succeeded in persuading them to express a willingness to return to their allegiance. Gorgīn Khan treated Ḳāja Moḥammad in a friendly manner and did his best to assist; he said that it had been impossible for him, in view of his kinship with the fugitive princes, not to admit them to his territory, but he now asked that their sins be forgiven. The Ḳāja replied that this could only be achieved if the two presented themselves to the Shah. The princes said they were willing to do this if they were sure their lives would be spared. The Ḳāja accordingly returned to court to make his report to the Shah, taking with him representatives of the two princes.

The Ḳāja was warmly greeted by the Shah as "my devoted servant" for having performed this delicate and dangerous mission among people who, although they possessed human form, had behaved like untamed and rebellious wild beasts. The Shah instructed the royal secretaries henceforward to include the title "devoted servant of the Safavid house" among the Ḳāja's official titles. To Gorgīn Khan and the other princes he replied that the situation was exactly as they had been informed by his devoted servant; if Ṭahmūraş and Lūārsāb presented themselves at court, they would be received by him.

The Shah then decided to raid the pillage and district of Ruisi, the inhabitants of which were Christians and nominally subject to the ruler of Bāşī-Āčūq but who, relying on their mountain fastness, paid scant regard to his orders. The Shah sent a detachment of troops there under the command of Begverdi Beg Gorji, an officer in the service of the *beglerbeg* of Fārs. These troops made their way with difficulty across mountains and through valleys deep in snow. Any who opposed them were cut down; those who fled into the mountains and forests had their dwellings plundered. Nearly five hundred captives and two thousand cattle and sheep were brought back from this expedition. The Shah decided to build two forts in Kartlia: one at Sūrān near Āḡesqa and Bāşī-Āčūq; and the other near Gori, the ancient seat of government of the rulers of Kartlia. Both forts were completed in a short space of time.

Lūārsāb's Coming to Present Himself to the Shah, and the Shah's Return from Georgia to Māzandarān

When Ṭahmūraṣ and Lūārsāb still hesitated to come to the Shah's court, the ruler of Bāši-Āčūq and his wife, who played a considerable part in the political and financial administration, sent the following message to the Shah via Kāja Moḥammad Reżā: "Since Lūārsāb rebelled at the instance of Ṭahmūraṣ, and his word is not to be relied upon, we suggest that you extend your patronage to our son, enroll him among the *golāms* at your court, and allocate to him that portion of Kartlia which is adjacent to Bāši-Āčūq." The Shah approved this plan, and sent Ya'qūb Khan Beg Qarāmānlū, a *qūrčī* of bow and arrow, a simple-hearted, loyal Turk who was one of the Shah's close companions, to Bāši-Āčūq to warn Lūārsāb that, if he did not hurry to the Shah's court, Gorgīn Khan's son would be appointed governor of the whole of Kartlia and would return with him to court. This message shook Lūārsāb out of his complacent attitude, and he hastened to express his regrets to Ya'qūb Khan Beg. The latter gave him some sound advice, and Kāja Moḥammad Reżā wrote him a letter urging him to stop following the advice of troublemakers and thus alienating himself from the Safavid court, lest all sorts of calamities befall him.

Lūārsāb accordingly put on an outward display of loyalty, but retained that black and evil heart and capacity for intrigue characteristic of Georgians. Leaving his mother and other dependents in Bāši-Āčūq, he accompanied Ya'qūb Khan Beg to the Shah's court and, on 13 Ramaẓān 1023/17 October 1614 was received in audience. He was received with great honor by the Shah, but a few days' march along the road to Gori, he fled by night from the royal camp. Kāja Moḥammad Reżā, who had been placed in charge of him, went in pursuit, found him in the vicinity of the camp, and brought him back to his quarters early in the morning. Although this behavior must have destroyed the last vestiges of any confidence the Shah may have felt in him, the Shah once again overlooked his conduct and, in order to cover his embarrassment, agreed to let him send a messenger to summon his mother and dependents. In secret, however, Lūārsāb told the latter not to come to the Safavid court, no matter how importunate the messages he might send requesting them to come.

His treachery and deceit were reported to the Shah by some of Lūārsāb's fellow countrymen, of whom there were many, both men

and women, in the service of the court, including a number of Kartlian nobles who were enrolled among the *golāms* and officers of the court. The Shah therefore refused to allow him to return to Kartlia, although he continued to treat him with honor and keep him at the royal stirrup. The governorship of Kartlia, as before, was left in the hands of his agents and appointees. Aqa Sohrāb Lārijānī was made commandant of the fortress of Tiflis and given a garrison of three hundred Rostamdārī musketeers. The subsequent history of Lūārsāb will be given under the events of next year.

Meanwhile 'Isā Khan, who had embraced Islam, had been repudiated as ruler of Kakhetia by the Georgian population because he had failed to show proper respect for the cross and for Christian monks. Fearing that, once the Shah left the area, his Christian subjects would get rid of him, 'Isā Khan abandoned his governorship and fled to Ardabīl. As a result, Bektāš Beg Torkmān was dispatched with a contingent of *qūrčīs* in the direction of Zagam to maintain order in that region. Dā'ūd Beg, the *vakīl*, was left in charge of the administration of Kakhetia, in the hope that Ṭahmūraš Khan would return to his allegiance, be pardoned, and take up his position again as a ruler. If he did not, the Shah would reconsider the situation, but in the meantime, he did not appoint another independent governor.

The Shah then marched from Tiflis toward Qarābāg, where he enjoyed himself hunting quail and francolin. His troops were sent in all directions to round up the game, and to organize a battue on the Āgča Bodī plain. Stags with fat flanks, gazelles the envy of the gazelles of China, and all sorts of other wild animals were caught within the hunting ring. The Shah went out with his personal attendants and *moqarrabs* to hunt; when the circle became smaller, the members of the Shah's hunting party began to seize the gazelle in such quantity that there was fresh meat in camp for ten days' march. 'Isā Khan, who had fled to Ardabīl, joined the Shah while he was engaged in hunting; his excuses for his failure were accepted by the Shah, who enrolled him again as an attendant at the royal stirrup.

The Shah camped for a few days near the Aras River and dealt with petitions from his troops before sending them on leave. He himself, intending to spend the winter in Māzandarān, traveled via Qezel Āgāč and Āstārā along the shore of the Caspian Sea. When he reached Gaskar, he lodged at the residence of Morteżāqolī Khan, the son of Amīra Siāvoš, the local governor. The Shah was indisposed for a few

days, but recovered his full vigor, thanks to the prayers of ordinary people who lived in peace and security under the protection of his justice. The Shah went to Rašt, hunting as he went, and the main square at Rašt was hung with illuminations in his honor. He took part in wild boar hunts, of the type known as bell hunts, described earlier in my work, which are a specialty of Gilān.

From Rašt, the Shah proceeded to Lāhījān, where the people came out to welcome him. To celebrate his visit, the local people had constructed a summerhouse, surrounded by a garden, on an island in the middle of a small lake known as Jahūd Kelāya, which was situated in the foothills; around the summerhouse booths had been erected and hung with lights. Access to the island was by boat, and the whole lake was dotted with small boats filled with beautiful women who had been gathered from the city and the surrounding area. The Shah spent a week at Lāhījān before proceeding to Māzandarān; he reached Farahābād on 4 Šafar 1024/16 March 1615, and spent the rest of the winter hunting.

Miscellaneous Events

While the Shah was on campaign in Georgia, his ambassador to the Porte, Moḥammad Beg ʾĪlālēš, returned and reported that the Shah's detention of the Ottoman ambassador, Enjillū Čavoš, and his campaign in Georgia had been deliberately misinterpreted by trouble-makers along the frontier and represented as a breach of the peace negotiations. He further reported that ʾTaḥmūraš and Lūārsāb had both sent a communication to the Sultan assuring him that they counted themselves servants of the Ottoman house. The Ottomans, he said, were accusing the Shah of bad faith and of breaking his covenants. The Shah decided he had to release the Ottoman ambassador and send him back with another embassy of his own designed to explain the whole situation to the Sultan and rebut the charge of bad faith, for the Koran says: "Do not break your oaths after making them firm."⁴

The Shah accordingly dispatched Ḥoseyn Beg Zu'l-Qadar the *meh-māndār* to Isfahan to summon Enjillū Čavoš, and he hastily sent Zāker Aqa the falconer on a mission to the Porte with a letter which, after the formal opening phrases, read as follows: "Since I had resolved to raid and conduct a holy war against some of the infidels of

⁴Koran, 16:92.

Georgia who from time immemorial had been tribute-paying vassals of the Safavid house, but had rebelled against me, I marched against them solely for the purpose of exalting the banners of Islam and punishing the rebels. Many Christian churches and other places of worship were converted into mosques." As gifts to the Sultan, the Shah sent a sample of the spoils of Georgia, including the crown described above.

Enjillū Čavoš had meanwhile reached the Shah's camp in Georgia, and was sent on to Istanbul in the company of Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān. A communication had been received from the Sultan expressing the hope that the Ottoman prisoners would shortly be released, especially Moṣṭafā Pasha the son of Raḡīya Kātūn, an old and faithful servant of the Ottoman house, and Moḥammad Amīn Beg, the son of Moḥammad Pasha the former grand vizier, who was the stepson of 'Alī Pasha and the foster-brother of the Sultan himself. The Shah therefore released these two high-ranking officers and sent them, suitably equipped, in the company of Enjillū Čavoš. At the same time, the Shah issued orders for the release of all the Ottoman prisoners of war, numbering some thousand men; some were in the royal camp, others were in different parts of the empire. All prisoners who wished to return were sent with the Ottoman ambassador. None of the conditions laid down in the preliminary peace treaty now remained unfulfilled. The Shah also brought to the attention of the Ottoman ambassador the reports of the boundary commissioners on the results so far achieved, and sent copies of these reports along with the ambassador.

At this juncture, the Shah received word that Naṣūḥ Pasha's enemies had succeeded in getting him executed on various charges, and that Moḥammad Pasha, known as Öküz Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Egypt, had been made grand vizier.

One of the events which occurred this year was the flight of Moḥammad Beg and Yūnos Beg, the sons of Kāndān Aqa, the Ottoman *moteferreqa-āqāsī*. I mentioned previously that these two young men had been taken prisoner in action, had attracted the Shah's notice, and had been made *moqarrabs* at court. The Shah lavished so many favors on them that they became the envy of all. They were allotted pleasant residences at Isfahan, and both of them married there and had children. There was no end to the gifts heaped on them by the Shah—Arabian horses, jeweled weapons, vessels of gold and silver,

and similar luxury items. They were on good terms with most of the other *moqarrabs* and nobles at court, and no one suspected them for a moment of flight, treachery, or rebellion.

During the Georgian campaign this year, when the Shah was in camp at Gori in Ramazān 1023/October 1614, he had gone hunting with a number of his retainers and trusted Ottoman attendants. The two men had suddenly left the hunting party and fled, taking with them their stirrups, their ice chests, their jeweled weapons and other precious articles, their items of silver and gold, and their spare mounts, but abandoning the rest of their possessions, their baggage, their wives, and their children. They reached Āḡesqa, and from there made their way to Anatolia. The news of their flight caused great astonishment at court next day. The Shah, such was his natural clemency and kindness to foreigners, ordered that the servants and workmen attached to their household should continue to serve their dependents, and 'Īsā Khan, the chief falconer, who was a great friend of those two untrustworthy men, was ordered to take care of their children; any time they wished to leave, he was to send them on their way.

Another event which occurred this year was the arrival at court of Šāhīn Gerāy Khan b. Sa'adat Gerāy, the ruler of the Crimean Tartars. Šāhīn Gerāy had been at the Ottoman court; after the death of his uncle Salāmat Gerāy, he had been promised the chieftainship of the Tartars. The Ottoman authorities, however, had had second thoughts, and had transferred their support to Jānī Beg Gerāy b. Mobārak Gerāy b. Eslām Gerāy b. Dowlat Gerāy; Salāmat Gerāy had died without an heir, but had married Jānī Beg Gerāy's mother, and so Jānī Beg Gerāy was his stepson. The Ottoman authorities had planned to arrest and imprison Šāhīn Gerāy, but he had discovered their plan and seized his opportunity to escape to Iran. He was received with honor by the Shah at his camp near Gori. The Shah embraced him like a brother, and gave him a place in his retinue.

During the Ottoman occupation of Šīrvān and Qarābāḡ, many of the inhabitants of those provinces had taken refuge in the Kakhetia region of Georgia and had settled there, having been given sanctuary by Alexander Khan. The Shah this year issued orders that, since these people were not natives of Georgia, all those who were Muslims, Jews, or Armenians should be transferred to Māzandarān. In addition, the loyalty of all inhabitants of Šīrvān and Qarābāḡ, including

tribes resident in these provinces, who had either elected to enter Ottoman service or who had collaborated with the Ottomans and had held privileges from them or held office under them, was suspect, and the Shah decided it was not in the interests of the state to leave them in these frontier areas. Such persons were accordingly transferred to Farahābād in Māzandarān. Esfandiār Beg *evčibāši* 'Arabgīrlū was put in charge of moving the Šīrvānīs, and La'if Khan Beg Qājār in charge of moving the people from Qarābāg. In all, nearly fifteen thousand families were transferred to Farahābād, an act which led to the development of that area. Thus exile was their punishment for disloyalty to the crown. One of the tribes of Qarābāg, the Aḥmadlū, obstinately refused to leave, and the Shah, in his anger, sent troops among them to kill and plunder. By contrast, those who had moved to Farahābād lived there in peace and prosperity.

This year there occurred the execution of Farhād Beg Čerkes the falconer, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs* and had been promoted to the office of *amīr-šekār* (master of the king's hunt).⁵ He was charged with treachery, with forming a seditious relationship with the Shah's eldest son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mīrzā, which was displeasing to the Shah, and with encouraging him to commit various disloyal actions of the sort that lead to revolt. His disaffection was reported to the Shah by impartial informants who had observed his secret meetings with the prince. He was arrested at a royal assembly and delivered bound to the prince, who ordered his men to put him to death and expropriate his possessions.

Also this year, a number of the *kalīfas*⁶ and Sufis of Qarāja-dāg were executed. A number of the inhabitants of Qarāja-dāg had from the early days of the Safavid movement been loyal supporters of the Safavid dynasty; during the period that the future Shah Esma'il I was at Lāhījān in Gīlān, hiding from his enemies, Sufis from Qarāja-dāg maintained frequent contact with him, and the descendants of these men are known today as "veteran Lāhījānī Sufis," and by virtue of this honorable title take precedence over other Sufis. When Esma'il left Gīlān, seized the throne, and established the Safavid dynasty, these Sufis were rewarded with various kinds of tax immunities.

When the Ottomans occupied Tabriz and left Ja'far Pasha there

⁵See *TM*, p. 51; the falconers and officials in charge of the royal kennels were under his jurisdiction.

⁶See Savory, *The Office of Khalfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids*, pp. 497-502.

with a garrison, one of the descendants of these *kalīfas*, Šāhverdī Khan the son of Kalīfa-ye Anšār, who was governor of Qarāja-dāğ, turned traitor and exchanged his *qezelbāš tāj* for an Ottoman turban. He sent his son to Ja'far Pasha, and the latter's emissaries went to Qarāja-dāğ to take the oath of allegiance from Šāhverdī Khan. Šāhverdī Khan forcibly assembled most of the Sufi leaders and bade them take the oath of allegiance; some of them obeyed. The path of discipleship, and the rules governing the relationship between spiritual director (*pīr*) and disciple (*morīd*), require that true devotees do not relinquish the hand of their perfect spiritual director (*moršed-e kāmēl*) in good times or bad, but endure patiently every kind of hardship. They are required to put obedience to their perfect spiritual director before their own worldly ambitions. As already related, Šāhverdī Khan received his deserts for this dastardly crime.

This year, the Shah ordered the governor of Qarāja-dāğ, Maqšūd Sultan, together with Moḥammadqolī Kōlafā-ye Rūmlū, who held the position of *kalīfat al-kōlafā*, to conduct an inquiry and to purge all other traitors who had followed the example of Šāhverdī Khan. They discovered that most of the Sufis in Qarāja-dāğ who had been guilty of this crime had already died, but a number of *kalīfas* and other Sufis who were still alive were executed. The Shah, by ordering this purge, wished to indicate that this group from now on was no longer to be included within the circle of Sufis, and to make a clear distinction between Sufis and non-Sufis.

Another event this year was the execution of Mošṭafā Khan Qazāqlar at the hands of Delī Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, which took place at the small town of Šamkūr in Qarābāğ on the Shah's return march from Georgia. Mošṭafā Khan's father, Nāzar Sultan, had gone over to the Ottomans with the whole of the Qazāqlar tribe, and had risen to the rank of pasha in Ottoman employ. After Shah 'Abbas's reconquest of Azerbaijan, Moḥammad Khan, Mošṭafā Khan's brother, had held the fort of Lori for several years and had defied the *qezelbāš*. When the *qezelbāš* captured Ganja and the other forts in that area, Moḥammad Khan was forced to submit and present himself at court. Although he was favorably treated by the Shah and his past sins forgiven, signs of seditious behavior were frequently observed from him; eventually, as already reported, he met his end at the hands of the Georgians. His brother, Mošṭafā Khan, was also considered unreliable, and the Shah resolved this year that the untrustworthy Qazāqlar and Donūk tribes should henceforth not be left in the frontier regions.

After the execution of Moṣṭafā Khan, the chieftainship of the Qazāqlar tribe was given to Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar, who had demonstrated his loyalty by coming to court as soon as the Shah launched his campaign for the reconquest of Azerbaijan, even before the capture of Erīvān. At the Shah's orders, Šamsī Khan transferred his tribe from Qarābāg to Fārs, where it was allotted fiefs.

On his return march from Georgia, when he reached the Aras River, the Shah received an ambassador from India, Moḥammad Amīn, known as Mīr Jomla, who had come from the Deccan. He was a distinguished *seyyed* from Isfahan and was the uncle of the *šadr*, Mīrzā Raḏī. He had emigrated to the Deccan some years previously, and had elected to enter the service of the Qoṭbšāhī ruler of Golconda. Because of his efficiency as an administrator, he had been promoted to the post of vizier, called *mīr jomla* in those parts, and had become wealthy and powerful. The Qoṭbšāh, Moḥammad-qolī, died, and was succeeded by his nephew and son-in-law, Sultan Moḥammad. Mīr Jomla did not get on with the new ruler and was not accorded the same freedom of action in office as previously. Mīr Jomla told me that love of his native country and the desire to return to Iran and the delights of Isfahan, and to kiss the feet of the Shah, had overcome him. He had willynilly given away his possessions as gifts, and had obtained leave to depart; on arrival at Bījāpūr, he had also given gifts to Ebrahim 'Adešāh, and had left India.

At all events, he had enough jewels and other possessions left to make suitable gifts to the Shah, and he stayed for some time at court. His overweening ambition led him to make remarks displeasing to the Shah; for instance, he let it be known that he would be satisfied with nothing less than the positions of vizier of the supreme *dīvān* and *vakil-e nafs-e homāyūn*!" He did not succeed in these objectives, and left the Shah's court in Māzandarān and went to Isfahan. Although in his native city he possessed excellent houses, attractive private estates, and everything he needed to live like a gentleman, he still hankered after high office, and so he decided to emigrate again. He left his children and other dependents in Isfahan and traveled to the court of the Mogul Emperor Shah Salīm. The Shah, who was glad to see him go, looked after his children.

The most astonishing event to take place this year was the execu-

⁷Mīr Jomla had obviously got out of touch with developments in Iran during his stay in India! The office of *vakil-e nafs-e (nafts-e) homāyūn* had been in abeyance for many years. See Savory, Offices II.

tion of the Shah's eldest son, Moḥammad Bāqer Mirzā, which took place at Rašt in Gīlān. For some time, a number of court sycophants and place seekers had been trying to poison the Shah's mind against his son by accusing the latter of holding secret meetings with seditious persons and plotting against his father. The Shah had attached no importance to the stories of these informers and had not raised the subject with his son, either openly or by allusion. He decided to leave the matter to God, and courageously ignored the whole affair.

However, when the Shah was on campaign in Georgia, these sycophantic destroyers of the Safavid house, who pretended to be loyal servants of the Shah, produced a number of the prince's servants, dependents, and retainers who on several occasions made secret reports to the Shah which convinced him of the truth of their accusations. The result was the execution of Farhād Ćerkes, which I have already reported, but the Shah still refused to suspect his son and exercised his royal discretion in the matter. A Ćerkes *golām*, Behbūd Beg, planned to murder the prince in order to demonstrate his devotion and gratitude to the Shah. On 3 Moḥarram 1024/2 February 1614, Behbūd Beg met the prince, either by accident or design, as the latter was on his way alone to the palace to see the Shah. Without warning, the *golām* attacked him and inflicted several mortal wounds. Terrified of what he had done, he took shelter⁸ as other criminals had done before him, in the royal stables, which are recognized by supporters of the Safavid house as constituting sanctuary. He sent a message to the Shah saying that, since the prince had been heard to make treacherous remarks about his benefactor, he had murdered him as a mark of his fidelity and to clear the Circassian *golāms* of suspicion.

The same night, the Shah ordered the *ṣadr*, Mirzā Rażī, to arrange the funeral ceremonies. The prince's body was taken to Arda-bīl for burial within the precincts of the Safavid shrine. Since the *golām* had acted out of loyalty to the Shah, and since the prince's death had a number of objective and subjective advantages which will be readily apparent to persons of intelligence, the Shah pardoned the murderer and did not order any judicial inquiry. Behbūd gradually became confident that no action would be taken against him. The inner meaning of this incident was concealed from the common people, who see only the externals of this phenomenal world and know nothing of the underlying causes. However, the actual facts are as I have reported them, and I can assert this without fear of con-

⁸See Savory, article *Bast*, in *EP*, Vol. I.

tradition. Scholars who delve deeply into the matter will see nothing but God's grand design to preserve the sacred person of His Majesty from all harm, so that God's servants may live at peace under the shadow of his justice. Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

The last of these miscellaneous events this year was the attack on Khorasan by the Uzbegs. Taking advantage of the lengthy campaign in Georgia, which tied down the *qezelbaş* forces in that area, Yānalteġiś Bahādor crossed the Oxus with twenty thousand men. Meġrāb Khan Qājār, the governor of Marv, sent out *ġāzī* patrols to reconnoiter. The latter made contact with Uzbeg patrols and drove them back, but were forced to retire when the main Uzbeg army came on the scene. Some *ġāzīs* were killed, but the rest made a fighting retreat to Marv. Meġrāb Khan, apprised of the strength of the Uzbeg army, strengthened his defenses at Marv and stationed musketeers at strategic points on the battlements and towers. Yānalteġiś reached Marv, camped outside the city, and sent groups of his men to ravage the surrounding countryside. These marauders penetrated as far west as Paśākūh in the Maśhad district, plundering the tribes living in the area. On hearing that Shah 'Abbas had returned from Georgia and was wintering in Māzandarān, the Uzbeg commander retired across the Oxus, taking with him many peasants from the Marv area; the rest of the inhabitants gradually trickled back to their homes.

Deaths Which Occurred on the Georgian Expedition

1. Šāhroġ Beg b. Ganj 'Alī Khan the governor of Kerman, one of the most powerful emirs of the Safavid state. While the *qezelbaş* were negotiating a pass between Kakhetia and Kartlia, he fell from his horse and rolled into the valley below; he died as a result of injuries to his liver.

2. Malek 'Alī Beg Tājī-büyük, the herald, who persisted in following the royal expedition to Georgia even though he was a sick man; he died in the same pass as Šāhroġ Beg. An Eşfahānī by birth, Malek 'Alī Beg was an extremely witty man. He never allowed the fact that he was in pain to dominate him; on the contrary, he would raise the spirits of any whom he saw depressed with a cheerful word and a merry jest. Whenever it fell to his lot to make a proclamation about some matter, he would embellish the official announcement with striking phrases and amusing gestures. If he was ordered to

execute some criminal, he would laugh and joke with the condemned man all the way to the place of execution, so as to make the execution seem like a game for the victim. Despite all his jocularities, he could inspire awe; on occasions when he placed on his head the unique jeweled headgear which was his special perquisite, and wore his jeweled earrings dangling on both sides of his face, and came to court with his Tājī-büyük retainers, all of whom were clad in special and unusual costume, everybody trembled. The Shah mourned the loss of such an incomparable servant, and as a token of his gratitude for all his years of service, gave his office to his son, Şaftqolī Beg, an able young man who unfortunately did not turn out well, as will be related in due course.

3. Tahmāspqolī Beg Šāmlū, a veteran *qūrčī* of the sword, who was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*. He fell ill in Georgia and died there. He had no heir, so his office was conferred upon Qarā Khan Beg, a kinsman of his.

4. Shah Naẓar Beg the *yasāqčībāšī*,⁹ who died on the Georgian campaign; his office was given to Yādegār Beg, his kinsman.

⁹This office is not mentioned in *TM* but, based on the meaning of *yasāq*, it would seem that the *yasāqčībāšī* was the officer in command of troops in reserve.

Events of the Year of the Hare, Corresponding to Part of the Muslim Year 1024/1615-16 and Part of 1025/1616-17, the Twenty-ninth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

At eleven at night, on Friday,¹ 21 Şafar 1024/22 March 1615, the sun entered the sign Aries, and Saturday, 22 Şafar/23 March, was officially counted as New Year's Day. The Shah left Faraḥābād which, like the rest of Māzandarān, was fresh and green after the spring rains, and traveled to Isfahan via Fīrūzkūh.

This year, the crops in the Isfahan area were struck by blight, and the people were in distress. The Shah waived the *dīvān* dues for one year, and in addition paid cultivators of state lands a tithe of the income accruing from crops on crown lands. This bounty alleviated the lot of the peasants and of his subjects generally, and converted their expectation of scarcity into one of abundance.

After the Shah had spent a few days at Isfahan at the Naqš-e Jahān palace, his tranquillity was once again disturbed by trouble on the frontier, and his hopes of peace collapsed like a playhouse which children build in a watercourse and which is swept away by a flash flood. However, the Shah was able to deal with every crisis as it occurred.

A major crisis had arisen after the execution of the Grand Vizier Naşūḥ Pasha, an experienced and wise administrator who was working for a peace settlement. Sultan Aḥmad I, despite the fact that several ambassadors bearing friendly letters had been sent to Anatolia and were still at Istanbul, and despite the fact that the Safavids had done nothing to violate the truce, chose to listen to the lying words of the two Georgian princes and to take offense at the minor disturbance in Georgia. The Sultan was also incited to take a tough line by some of those close to him who had been brought up in the harem or the royal palace, and who were as yet untouched by the slings and arrows of fortune, whose feet had not yet been blistered by toiling up and down the rough paths of insurrections and rebellions. It was reported that the Sultan had lost patience, had thrown covenants and sworn agreements out of the window, and had sent

¹21 Şafar was a Monday.

the new grand vizier, Moḥammad Pasha, known as Öküz² Moḥammad, against Iran.

As a precaution, until he knew whether this report was true or not, the Shah sent 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *dīvānbeḡī*,³ to Tabriz to take up residence there with the emirs of Azerbaijan and to report the situation. Troops were sent to raze the fort at Ganja, because it could not be relied on as a defensive position. Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg*, was ordered to transfer his seat of government from Ganja to Tiflis. 'Alīqolī Khan learned that Moḥammad Pasha had reached the frontier, intending to winter in Dīār Bakr and take the field against the *qezelbāš* in the spring. His arrival had caused a fresh outbreak of disorders in Georgia, Šīrvān, and elsewhere.

The New Disorders in Georgia and Šīrvān, and the Return of Ṭahmūraṣ Khan to Georgia

The advance of the Ottoman army caused new uprisings in the frontier areas: Dā'ūd Gorjī, who was acting as 'Īsā Khan's lieutenant, showed signs of rebellion. The Georgians of Kakhetia went in large numbers to the church of Alaverdi to celebrate a Christian festival, and the musketeers who were on guard at the church carelessly allowed too many of them to enter. After the conclusion of the service, they began rioting. Incited by Dā'ūd Beg and Ṭahmasp Qeseqī, a noble of Qeseq and a supporter of Ṭahmūraṣ, they attacked and killed most of the musketeers. Dā'ūd Beg at once sent a courier to Ṭahmūraṣ Khan urging him to return to Kakhetia. In Šīrvān, a number of persons who had been accused of collaborating with the Ottomans and had been sentenced to be sent into exile—in particular Malek Pīrī, known as Deli Malek 'Eṣābā'ī, who was the chief of the Turkman tribes of Qabala and Qābestān—came out in revolt. Malek Pīrī made Dāḡestān his base. A group of seditious persons from Šīrvān gathered around him, and he began to ravage the frontier. He too sent a messenger to Ṭahmūraṣ declaring his allegiance to him.

Thus urged on from all sides, Ṭahmūraṣ Khan returned to Kak-

²Not a very complimentary sobriquet! *Öküz* means ox, and hence dull, stupid.

³See *TM*, pp. 119-20. The *dīvānbeḡī* was the highest civil magistrate in the land and, since in practice '*urf*' (customary law) had greater influence than the *ṣarī'a* (canon law), it followed that the *dīvānbeḡī*'s judicial authority was greater than that of the *ṣadr*. From the time of Shah 'Abbas onward, he became one of the seven members of the supreme council of emirs (*TM*, p. 44).

hetia and gathered a large army. He sent Dā'ūd Khan, the *vakīl*, against Bektāš Beg the centurion and his *qūrčīs*. The latter, not having the strength to withstand him, allowed themselves to be taken prisoner in the hope of eventually being repatriated, but the Georgians put them all to death. Delī Malek followed with a success against Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Sultan, the grandson of 'Emād al-Dīn Beg Šīrvānī and the nephew of Šāhqolī Kalīfa Zu'l-Qadar the keeper of the seal, who was governor of Areš. Delī Malek and his Šīrvānīs caught Moḥammad Sultan off his guard when he left the fort on the occasion of the arrival of his baggage train. Though Moḥammad Sultan and the small band of men he had with him fought bravely, they were all slain, and the rebels took possession of the baggage. The Sultan's retainers in the fort hoped they might be able to negotiate a withdrawal on condition their lives were spared. Delī Malek camped before the walls of the fort at Areš, and the Qorūglū Zu'l-Qadar *gāzīs* inside the fort, not being numerous enough to endure a siege, were filled with consternation and sought a way out of their dilemma. They were saved by the news of the approach of a *qezel-bāš* relief force, which promptly caused the Šīrvānīs to decamp.

As soon as the Shah was sure the Ottomans did not intend to invade Iran until the spring, he sent the *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat* Esfandīār Beg 'Arabgīrlū, the *evčībāšī*, with a detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup, to deal with the revolt in Šīrvān. 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the *dīvānbegībāšī*⁴ was ordered to march from Tabriz to Qarābāg, together with the whole of the army of Azerbaijan, and Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oḡlū and the emirs of Qarābāg. 'Alīqolī Khan marched rapidly to Šīrvān, joining forces en route with Esfandīār Beg.

The revolts in the Šīrvān and the threat of Ottoman invasion did not prevent the Shah from enjoying himself in Māzandarān as usual during the winter. While he was there, he heard that Rostam Moḥammad Khan, who had returned to Herat after the disastrous failure of his expedition to Balk, wished to see him. So the Shah dispatched Zamān Beg (who at that time was still a *moqarrab* but later became *nāẓer*), to fetch him as quickly as possible, because spring was at hand and the hunting in the Mīān-kāl district of Māzandarān, and the boar hunting in Gīlān, were calling the Shah. They say that Zamān Beg covered the more than twenty stages to Herat in seven

⁴There were, of course, no subordinate *dīvānbegīs*, and so the term *dīvānbegībāšī* (head *dīvānbegī*) is a solecism.

days and nights and returned with the Uzbek prince, who was received with honor and given gifts.

The Seizure of the Fortress of Domdom by the Barādūst Kurds and Its Recovery by Safavid Forces

Readers will recall that, after the suppression of the earlier Barādūst revolt, Qabān Khan Begdlū, the brother of Moḥammad Beg, had been made commandant of the fort of Domdom and governor of the province of Orūmīya. One of Emir Khan Čulāq Barādūst's wives, who came from a low-class family, and a group of Kurds were in the fortress acting as servants to the *qezelbāš* garrison; Qabān Khan thus made the fatal mistake of admitting Kurds into the fort, however base-born and apparently servile they might be. From time to time too, Qabān Khan went out hunting. Oloḡ Beg Barādūst, a kinsman of Emir Khan, who lived like an owl among the ruined forts along that part of the frontier, was in constant correspondence with Emir Khan's wife and the Kurdish servants, and had instructed them to let him know the next time Qabān Khan was absent from the fort at night. This they duly did. Oloḡ Beg arrived with about fifty of his Kurds, and his accomplices within the fort made a hole in one of the towers of the *sūloq*, which readers will remember was adjacent to the northern wall of the fort. The raiding party crept into the tower one by one. They slew the guards in their beds and killed anyone they found sleeping in any of the other towers. They then went to the bandstand and beat the drums in triumph in the name of Oloḡ Beg. All the Kurds in the fort rushed to join Oloḡ Beg; the garrison, officers, men, and servants, not knowing how large a body of assailants had fallen upon them or who they were, fled from the fort, so that by morning there was no sign of a *qezelbāš* anywhere. Thus the Kurds seized possession of the fort and everything belonging to the *qezelbāš*, and they sent orders to the Kurds in the surrounding area calling on them to help.

Qabān Khan hastened back to the fort to retrieve the situation, and by good fortune met Aqa Sultan Moqaddam, who had marched at top speed from Marāḡa when he heard the news. Together, the two *qezelbāš* emirs attacked and routed a group of one hundred and fifty Kurds who were making their way to the fort in answer to Oloḡ Beg's summons. Pīr Būdāq Khan, the governor of Tabriz, and Šāhīr Sultan Mokrī, also on their way by forced marches to Domdom, were met by a shamefaced Qabān Khan. The emirs learned that the fort

was held by only a small body of Kurds, and they were planning an assault when they had an unexpected piece of good fortune. One day, Oloğ Beg was handing out gunpowder to his musketeers. A spark fell on the pile of gunpowder, which exploded and severely burned his face; he collapsed unconscious, and several of his men were also injured. The Kurds, seeing the fort surrounded by *qezelbaş* troops and learning of the rout of their reinforcements, decided there was nothing to do but try and escape. One night, they loaded what possessions they could onto their well-rested horses, lashed Oloğ Beg to a horse, opened the gates of the fort, and rode off at top speed. The emirs sent some men in pursuit, but they failed to catch them.

Thus the fortress of Domdom, after being in the hands of the Kurds for no more than eight or nine days, was recovered by the *qezelbaş*. Qabān Khan's brothers were somewhat ashamed of his negligence, but the Shah, because of their excellent record of service, did not vent his wrath on the family as a whole. Qabān Khan was dismissed from the governorship of the province of Orūmīya, which was placed initially under the jurisdiction of Pīr Būdāq Khan and subsequently given to Aqa Khan Moqaddam; a garrison of Kōrāsānī artillerymen and musketeers from the royal household regiments, under the command of Majnūn Beg, a centurion of musketeers, was placed in charge of the fort.

The Battle between Ṭahmūraş Khan the Georgian and 'Alīqolī Khan at Boḥrān, and the Destruction of the Qezelbaş Army

When God wills a certain action, there is nothing man can do to change it, and man can only accept God's will. As I previously related, 'Alīqolī Khan and Esfandiār Beg, marching north with the army of Azerbaijan, reached the Aragvi River, which marks the boundary between Kakhetia and Kartlia, and camped there. Their army consisted of about fifteen thousand men, but they had marched without waiting for the arrival of the musketeers and some other regular units. The camp lay astride the road to Bāši-Āčūq, and they thus thought to bar Ṭahmūraş's path should he try to reach that province. Those Georgians who had declared their "love of the Shah" and had come forward to help were sent out on patrol with the *qezelbaş*, and every effort was made to block any route by which Ṭahmūraş might approach and to obtain intelligence regarding his movements.

Ṭahmūraş was on his way to give battle to the Safavid army, but the *qezelbaş* emirs, since there was no apparent sign of him, were inclined to believe false reports put out by the Georgians that he had retreated. However, one night the Georgian patrols reported that Ṭahmūraş was in the vicinity, intent on battle. The *qezelbaş* emirs, although placing no reliance on these reports, prepared for battle the following morning as a precaution, and marched out to find suitable ground on which to fight. After a long wait, since their patrols still brought in no report of the enemy, they returned to camp, each unit returning to its own tents. Suddenly drums were heard, and word came that the enemy was upon them. The Georgians who had protested their "love of the Shah" had betrayed them, and had kept from the *qezelbaş* information regarding the route by which Ṭahmūraş was advancing—a route unknown to the *qezelbaş*.

The *qezelbaş* at once mounted again and prepared for battle, with Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oġlū Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābag, leading the vanguard; he was accompanied by other emirs from Qarābag—Peykar Sultan İġirmi-dört⁵ and Delī Moḥammad Sultan Şams al-Dīnlū. However, because the emirs had been caught unprepared, not all units had mounted or taken up their battle stations before Ṭahmūraş Khan appeared on the scene with five or six thousand cavalry and launched a vigorous charge against the Safavid van, which was routed. The support troops for the vanguard, Peykar Sultan and Delī Moḥammad Sultan, were also swept aside. Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oġlū and a number of his Qājārs were killed. The Georgians swept on, without checking rein, and hurled themselves against the Safavid center, where 'Alīqolī Khan and his Şāmlūs had their station. The Azerbaijan auxiliary troops fled without even using their weapons, and the center was also thrown into confusion, with men being cut down by the Georgians in all directions. 'Alīqolī Khan and Esfandiār Beg, both outstandingly brave men, tried to fight on to preserve their honor, but soon saw that further resistance was futile; they left the field and marched toward Tiflis. Ṭahmūraş entered the abandoned *qezelbaş* camp in triumph and occupied 'Alīqolī Khan's quarters, while his men took over all the *qezelbaş* possession.

Apart from Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oġlū, the Safavid officers of note lost in this disastrous defeat were these: Ḥoseyn Khan Gīlānī, the governor of Kūhdom in Gīlān; and the centurion Ḥoseynqolī

⁵A clan of the Qajar tribe.

Beg ʿĀleš, the son of Yādegār ‘Alī Sultan. Eshāq Sultan Mīr Šūfi was wounded.

Morteżāqolī Khan Gaskarī, the governor of Gaskar, who was stationed on the edge of the battlefield, attacked the Georgians in the rear after they had swept past him, killed some fifty of their infantry, and then joined the other emirs at Tiflis. ‘Alīqolī Khan left a garrison at Tiflis consisting of Moršedqolī Beg, the son of Moḥammad Khan, with a detachment of Qājārs and a group of musketeers, and retired to Ganja, intending to spend the winter in the ruins of the fort there. He reported the disaster to the Shah, who although furious at the turn of events, sent comforting letters to ‘Alīqolī Khan and the other emirs. In military history, he said, victory and defeat have been indissolubly connected; they should not grieve too much, therefore, at this defeat to the armies of Islam, but await his arrival; with God’s help, he said, he would exact retribution on this impious enemy.

Events in Khorasan This Year

This year, one of the Uzbek chiefs named Qarā Toğma, who had risen to prominence in the Balḵ region, gathered an army of irregulars, ultimately some five thousand men, and began making raids in all directions. He had already entered Khorasan once and had descended on the Jām, Kāf and Bākarz area and ravaged the region unchallenged. Now he returned to Khorasan and clashed with the Jamšīdī tribesmen who held the fort at Karoḵ,⁶ both sides suffering casualties. Failing to take the fort, he moved on to the Herat region, and finally retired toward Kohdastān with his booty. Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Herat, sent a scratch force of six or seven hundred men against them under the command of Beyrām Beg Kašta (squint-eyed) Šāmlū, but after this force had left, he reflected that it would not redound to his credit if it was defeated, and so he sent after it a second force of two hundred regulars under the command of Kosrow Beg (later, Kosrow Sultan, governor of Mārūčāq).

Beyrām Beg, passing the Uzbek camp in the Kohdastān plain during the night, near dawn fell in with some Jamšīdī tribesmen who knew its location. He sent out a reconnaissance party that reached the Uzbek camp while some of the enemy were still asleep. But those who were awake heard the neighing of the horses, the clink of weapons, and the braying of camels. Beyrām Beg feared that, in

⁶See *TM*, p. 168.

view of the great numerical superiority of the Uzbegs, if he waited to attack until full light and the Uzbegs became aware how few men he had with him, his men would be annihilated. Trusting in God, he attacked at the first hint of daybreak. Seven or eight hundred Uzbegs ran in panic for their horses, mounted, and a fierce struggle ensued in which the Uzbegs suffered heavy casualties. While the battle was still at its height, Kosrow Beg and his two hundred men descended on them like a thunderbolt. The Uzbegs heard Kosrow Beg's trumpets sounding, and thinking Hoseyn Khan was upon them, turned and fled. The *gāzis'* swords flashed from their sheaths, and they returned with much booty. It was thought at first that Qarā Toğma had perished in the battle, because no trace of him could be found, but it was later discovered that he had survived. This single victory by the Šamlūs discouraged the Uzbegs from crossing the border into Khorasan for quite a while.

Another event which occurred in Khorasan this year was the murder of Qazāq Khan, the son of Hoseyn Khan the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, who was the governor of Mārūčāq. A number of men from the Arolāt Čağatāy tribe, under their chief Čalma Sultan, had come over to the Safavids and been allotted fiefs in the Zāva and Moḥavvalāt region. Čalma Sultan had put to death several leading men of his tribe on the suspicion of disloyalty to himself, and those who had been supporters of those men were on the point of fleeing in fear of their own lives. Another group of Arolāt tribesmen had come to Mārūčāq at an earlier date and were still there. Hoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, censured Čalma Sultan for his action in the presence of the elders of the Arolāt tribe, and tried to reassure the Arolāt tribesmen and dissuade them from leaving. The Arolāts, however, declared that Čalma Sultan still bore a grudge against them, and so they agreed with Hoseyn Khan to join their fellows at Mārūčāq. The whole group would continue in the service of Qazāq Khan. However, they did not keep their word; instead of staying at Mārūčāq, they left and joined the Uzbegs.

Their flight caused nervousness and anxiety among the original Arolāts at Mārūčāq too, and one of the young men of the tribe, a servant of Qazāq Khan and trusted by him, stabbed his master to death when the latter was in a drunken coma; no one knew whether he had acted on his own initiative, or at the instance of one of his kinsmen. As a result of the murder of Qazāq Khan, the whole group of Arolāts, either because they genuinely feared for their lives or be-

cause they were secretly disaffected, left Mārūčāq the same night and fled in the direction of Meymana.

The garrison at Mārūčāq did not dare to send anyone in pursuit of the fugitives, but immediately reported what had happened to Herat. Ḥoseyn Khan was deeply grieved by the death of his son, but it was no use fretting, and he bore his grief patiently. He sent a detachment of veterans to Mārūčāq under the command of Kosrow Beg in case any further disturbances should break out. When a report on these events reached the Shah, he appointed Kosrow Beg governor of Mārūčāq.

Finally, while the Shah was at Isfahan, Mīr 'Emād Qazvīnī the calligrapher was murdered. He was a Ḥasanī *seyyed* from Qazvin, from the well-known Seyfī family of *seyyeds*. He was a master of the art of writing the *nasta'liq* script, and his letters were well-proportioned and attractive. Mīr 'Emād was known to be a Sunni; he was murdered by a fellow Qazvīnī, Ostād Maqṣūd, the copper-smith, either in an excess of Shi'ite zeal, or to clear himself of the suspicion of being a Sunni—a suspicion that falls on most of the people of Qazvin.

The Shah's Almsgiving during the Month of Ramaẓān

Commencing this year, the Shah decided to give away each year, in the form of alms to his Shi'ite subjects throughout Iran, the whole income for the month of Ramaẓān, the month "in which the Koran was sent down"⁷ and in which acts of devotion and worship are particularly incumbent upon mankind; this income was that which accrued from *dīvān* dues, taxes, leases, and rents from property. In other words, during the month of Ramaẓān, all men were exempt from tax demands on the part of the *dīvān*, and no creditor was allowed to hound a debtor. No one was permitted to lay covetous eyes on the peasant's bursting ears of wheat, and the threshing floors of cultivators everywhere were safe from invasion by tax collectors, who could only look longingly at them. The Shah's purpose was that every man should be able to spend the month of Ramaẓān in fasting and prayer, with his mind free from financial anxieties. Letters to this effect were distributed throughout the Safavid empire, and this bounty was added to those already granted by the Shah.

The Shah also turned his attention to the fines collected by the

⁷Koran, 2:186.

aḥdās (night watch).⁸ Previous monarchs had neglected to levy the amount of taxes under this head which was entered in the official tax registers, because the collection of these fines involved judicial proceedings and the fining of the guilty parties; it is the function of the *dārūga* to lay charges and to collect the *aḥdās* fines, and the practice of levying as a separate tax on the public the sum entered in the tax registers as *aḥdās* fines has naturally given rise to the suspicion in the minds of the taxpayers that they are being taxed twice over. When Shah 'Abbas was reviewing his financial administration, his sharp eye spotted this anomaly, which he brought to the attention of the accountants of the *dīvān*. The accountants all confirmed that the Shah was right, and praised him for his perspicacity. This tax was reduced throughout the Shah's dominions, and a royal order was issued that the chief accountants should enter both taxes, currently collected throughout the Safavid empire by financial officials and fiefholders, and amounting to the sum of approximately thirty thousand royal Iraqi *tomān*, in fresh ledgers at a reduced amount, and that no alterations should be made in the amounts. I hope that the Shah receives his reward for this action both in this world and the next.

⁸The *aḥdās* were officers under the jurisdiction of the *dārūga* (see *TM*, pp. 82, 149). Their duty was to patrol the city at night, to arrest prostitutes, stop brawls in the taverns, break up gambling parties, and so on.

Events of the Year of the Dragon, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1025/1616-17, the Thirtieth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas, and in Particular the Punitive Expedition to Georgia Led by the Shah

It had been the Shah's policy to devastate the Kakhetia region of Georgia, to subjugate the infidels there, and to convert them to Islam, and more than one hundred thousand women and children had already been taken captive in the course of his previous campaigns. When Shah 'Abbas, who was in Māzandarān, heard that Ṭahmūraṣ had returned to Georgia and had defeated a *qezelbāš* army, his rage knew no bounds, and he resolved to lead an army to Georgia to chastise those impious people who had dared to slay Muslims. He therefore issued a general mobilization call; several thousand musketeers from Isfahan and other places in Iraq who were on the reserve were called to the colors. The Shah did not consider it expedient to meet the Georgian princes, and so he sent Lūārsāb to Astarābād and 'Isā Khan to Damāvand, with instructions to the local governors to keep them in custody until he returned from the Georgian campaign.

At a propitious time, the Shah left Farahābād and marched west along the shore of the Caspian Sea, being joined at intervals by contingents of the royal army. New Year's Day fell on Tuesday, 2 Rabī' I, 1025/20 March 1616.¹ The customary New Year's celebrations were not held because of the exigencies of the campaign. At the rendezvous at Ganja, the Shah was met by 'Alīqolī Khan and the other emirs. Pīr Būdāq Khan Pornāk and the emirs who had come with him from Azerbaijan were ordered to return and keep watch on the frontier, and Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, was ordered to accompany him.

When the Shah reached Tiflis, he conferred the governorship of the province of Kartlia on Mīrzā Khan b. Dā'ūd Khan b. Lūārsāb, who had embraced Islam during the reign of Shah Tahmasp and had been honored by being given the title of khan and the style of "my uncle." From Tiflis, the Shah marched to Kakhetia; Ṭahmūraṣ, who had

¹10th (*dahom*) in the text is a mistake for 2nd (*doyyom*), which gives 20th March.

thought that the *qezelbaş*, because of the threat of Ottoman invasion, would not be able to send an army to Georgia this year, promptly fled to Bāšī-Āčūq.

The Shah divided his army into several army corps, each under the command of a senior emir. Yūsuf Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, was ordered to invade Georgia from the east, while the Shah himself advanced from the west; Kakhetia was thus completely surrounded by Safavid forces. In accordance with the Koranic injunction, "Slay all those who attribute partners to God,"² the Shah ordered his men to spare no male Georgian, to take prisoner the women and children, and to plunder their possessions. The Georgians, finding themselves trapped, fled into the forests to strongholds approached by only one path; wherever possible, they protected these defensive positions with ditches and moats. Into these strongholds, which the Turks call *saqnāq* (hideouts), they moved their troops, civilians, and belongings.

Most of these defensive positions lay the other side of the Qānoq River, which could be crossed at this time of year only by boat because it was in flood as a result of the spring rains. The Georgians had concealed all available boats. The Shah therefore left all his heavy baggage on this side of the river, in the custody of Nadr Khan Zū'l-Qadar the keeper of the seal, who was appointed camp commander, and Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, an aide-de-camp. He then led his men, who carried only their personal weapons, across the river, obeying the Koranic injunction: "Strive in the way of God."³ Because of the lack of boats, however, the Safavid army lost many horses, camels, and mules.

Once across the river, the *qezelbaş* began the methodical storming of the Georgians' hideouts, and every day the heads of the slain and prisoners were paraded before the Shah. The centurion Hüseyn Beg Šāms al-Dīnlū, who had been sent into the forests by the *qūrčībāšī* with a detachment of *qūrčīs* and other troops, came across a major Georgian hideout that housed nearly ten thousand families and the greater part of the Georgian army. A ditch, filled with water, had been dug around this hideout. The only approach was across a narrow wooden bridge. Without bothering to ascertain the size or composition of the enemy force or to make a prudent appraisal of the

²This "verse" appears to be a synthesis of Koran, 9:5 and 9:36.

³A recurrent phrase in the Koran—see 9:41, 22:79, and so on.

situation, three or four hundred of the *qūrčīs* leapt off their horses, swarmed across the narrow bridge into the hideout, and scattered in all directions in search of plunder and prisoners.

The Georgian troops rushed out to attack the *qezelbāš*. Hōseyn Beg was slow in sending reinforcements, and the Georgians had time to cut off the retreat of the men inside the hideout by destroying the wooden bridge. The *qezelbāš*, surrounded by the enemy and broken up into isolated groups, fought on as long as they had bullets and arrows left. They then tried to escape, but most were slain; a few men, though wounded, managed to swim across the ditch. The Shah summoned Hōseyn Beg and gave him a severe dressing down: "You had no orders," he said, "to attack the hideout; on discovering it, you should have made an appraisal of the strength of the enemy force and of possible approaches. Having got this information, you should then have made a report to your superior officer, who sent you on this mission. Instead, you sent a group of men, without an officer, into the middle of the enemy's hideout, with no information about it and not knowing how the men were going to get out again. If it is true that the men charged into the hideout without your orders, your concern should immediately have been to protect them by finding alternative ways of crossing the ditch and by stationing troops to guard the crossing points. You should then have brought up the rest of your troops and sent them into action against the hideout in proper battle order and with the inspiration of your leadership. If you judged it inappropriate to continue the action, you could then have brought your men out safely by the routes you had already prepared."

Hōseyn Beg opened his mouth to make excuses for his behavior, but since there is no acceptable excuse for incompetence in action of this sort, the executioner did not give him a chance to speak. He was put to death and his corpse paraded around the camp. After his execution, the *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat* Qarčaqāy Beg was dispatched to the hideout with a strong force. In accordance with the Shah's advice, he ordered his men to cut down trees and construct bridges across the ditch at suitable crossing points; he then sent his men in to the attack in proper battle order. At various points, the Georgians had constructed stockades which they prepared to defend like forts. Qarčaqāy Beg, ordering his men not to attack the stockades, brought up artillery and smashed them one by one.

The *gāzīs* then went in to the attack, and fighting continued all

day. Both sides broke off the action after nightfall, and the *gāzīs* reassembled and mounted guard for the night. In the middle of the night, a group of Georgians from the hideout, estimated at between four and five hundred men, equipped with riding horses and pack-horses, some on their own, some with their women and children lashed across the cruppers of their horses, opened up an escape route at the rear of the hideout and fled to the foothills of Dağestān. Next day, the Georgians who had stayed behind considered further resistance impossible, and fled in every direction. They ran into a group of *qezelbāš* who were combing the plains, mountains, and forests for the enemy, and the men were slain to a man, while the women and children were taken captive. The *gāzīs* found much booty in this hideout, and the other hideouts they discovered were systematically reduced.

The Shah remained encamped across the other side of the Qānoq River for twenty days while the *gāzīs* continued their mopping-up operations. Yūsuf Khan and the emirs of Šīrvān, who had been advancing from the east from the direction of Zagam, followed the same routine. One day, as Yūsuf Khan and his men were encamped near a river, they were attacked by a large force of Christians from Zagam. The Christians were almost annihilated, and their homes and territory devastated. In short, the whole of Kakhetia was ravaged because of the rebellious activities of Ṭahmūraš, and it is doubtful whether this area had ever suffered so much destruction since the advent of Islam. The number of slain exceeded sixty thousand, and the number of prisoners, including many beautiful girls, exceeded one hundred thousand. This was the number of prisoners who were paraded before the Shah, but in my estimation, more than thirty thousand more persons were taken prisoner but not recorded on the lists of prisoners of war.

Three months had now elapsed since Nowrūz. The Ottoman commander in chief was encamped in the plain of Mūš, and the Shah decided it was not wise to stay longer in Georgia. He returned to Kartlia via Mardānqūb, spent a few days at Tiflis seeing that Bagrāt Khan had everything he needed for the defense of the castle there, and then marched to Gökča Deñiz via Aḳtābād and the summer station of Meydānjūq. There he remained for three months, the period during which the Ottomans might be expected to make a move.

The Battle of Salmās, between the Qezelbāš Army and Takkalū Pasha, the Beglerbeg of Vān, and the Emirs of the Kurdish Subprovinces; and the Death of Pīr Budāq Khan

Pīr Būdāq Khan, as previously stated, had been instructed to keep watch on the frontiers of Azerbaijan, with Ganj 'Alī Khan to assist him. He had marched in the direction of Salmās to deal with some rebellious Kurds, in particular the sons of Ġāzī Beg b. Šāhqolī Balīlān, who had seized the fort of Qarnī-yarūq by guile and were raiding the Salmās area. Pīr Būdāq Khan had been joined by Maqşūd Sultan Kangarlū Ostājlū; Salmān Sultan *sūbāšī* Donbolī; Ebrahim Beg, the brother of "my devoted servant" the vizier of Azerbaijan, with auxiliary troops from that province; and Moḥammad Taqī Beg, a chiliarch of the regiment of Azerbaijan musketeers. This combined force had marched to Qarnī-yarūq, and the Kurds had hastily sent a courier to Vān to seek assistance from the *beglerbeg* of Vān, Moḥammad Pasha, known as Takkalū Pasha, and from the Kurdish emirs. In response to this request, Takkalū Pasha came with his Ottoman troops, and Zeynal Khan Maḥmūdī, the governor of Kōšāb, and other Kurdish *sanjaq-begs*, brought contingents—in all some six or seven or seven thousand men.

Pīr Būdāq Khan, who had about five thousand men with him, calculated the time of arrival of the Ottoman force at Salmās, and his calculation was confirmed by intelligence reports that came in from his scouts. He then sent a courier posthaste to Ganj 'Alī Khan, requesting him to meet him at Salmās on the appointed day so that they might jointly give battle to the Ottomans, but the plan went awry. Pīr Būdāq Khan's men arrived at the rendezvous a day early; the various units having become strung out on the march, they camped in not very good order. Ganj 'Alī Khan, on the other hand, was a day behind schedule, and had only reached Ṭasūj. Suddenly the *qezelbāš* scouts reported that they had sighted the enemy. The *qezelbāš* emirs, in a state of great confusion, sent Maqşūd Sultan Kangarlū with some of his men to hold off the enemy. But before the main body had time to form up for battle, the Ottomans had swept aside Maqşūd Sultan's outriders and were advancing in a compact mass. Maqşūd Sultan was cut off and unable to regain contact with the main *qezelbāš* force.

The Safavid auxiliaries stationed in the rear at once took to their

heels, and the main body of *qezelbaş* was overwhelmed. Pīr Būdāq Khan, conscious of the disgrace of flight, fought on stubbornly until two or three of his retainers seized his horse's reins and started to drag him away from the battlefield. Zeynal Khan Maḥmūdī came around behind him with a group of his Kurds, and wounded him without knowing his identity. One of the *gāzīs* gallantly threw himself on Zeynal Khan, but was cut down by the other Kurds. At that moment, Pīr Būdāq Khan died of his wound.

Salmān Sultan *sūbāšī* and Moḥammad Taqī Beg managed to gain the shelter of a walled garden with some of their men, and they kept up a steady fire on the enemy through cracks in the wall. The enemy, content with their victory, camped on the spot, and collected all the *qezelbaş* possessions outside the walled garden. The next day, they launched repeated attacks against the garden, but were driven back by musket fire. The news that the Shah was marching back from Georgia caused the enemy to retire, and the gallant band in the garden were able to withdraw toward Tabriz.

Meanwhile, Ebrahim Beg and other fugitives from the Safavid army had reached Ganj 'Alī Khan at Ṭasūj. The latter did not consider it within his power to go to the assistance of the men holding out in the garden, and he fell back on Tabriz, intending to mobilize more troops before engaging the enemy. He found panic reigning in the city, where the populace hourly expected the arrival of the Ottomans. His own arrival, followed by the news that the Ottomans had retired, calmed the Tabrizīs.

Ganj 'Alī Khan's report on the situation reached the Shah on the march between Aḳtābad and Gökča Deñīz and cast gloom on those with the Shah, especially the Turkman⁴ tribe. The Shah, however, received the news with his customary *sang-froid*, and appointed Pīr Būdāq Khan's son *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan and governor of Tabriz, with the rank of khan, in recognition of his father's bravery. Salmān Sultan *sūbāšī* who had also fought gallantly, was also promoted to the rank of khan, and Moḥammad Taqī Beg received marks of royal favor. Hearing that the Ottoman commander in chief was on the move, the Shah sent Ḥasan Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, in the direction of Tabriz, and ordered Kalb 'Alī Beg Šamlū, an aide-de-camp, to collect the frontier emirs and keep watch on the border.

⁴Pīr Būdāq Khan was a Turkman.

The March of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Moḥammad Pasha, toward Azerbaijan, His Siege of Erīvān, and His Return without Achieving His Objective

After Sultan Aḥmad I had wilfully destroyed the chances for peace, after preliminary covenants had been sworn and exchanged, Moḥammad Pasha (known as Öküz Pasha) had collected a huge army from Rumelia, Anatolia, Menteşe-İli, Egypt, Syria, Aleppo, Trablus, Trebizond, Upper Mesopotamia, and Erzerum, and from contingents sent by the Kurdish *sanjaq-begs*. It was the largest and most capable army ever sent against Iran by the Ottomans. In its ranks were all the Ottoman viziers, pashas, and principal officers of state—even the *yeñiçeri-āğāsī* (Aga of the Janissaries), who normally never left the Sultan's side. The army was equipped with an abundance of guns of all kinds.

The Shah's first move was to see to the defenses of the fortress at Erīvān. He sent a force of Qājār *qūrčīs* and a strong contingent of musketeers from the Isfahan, Khorasan, and other regiments, under the command of their respective officers: Mīr Fattāḥ, chiliarch of the Isfahan musketeers, an experienced officer especially skilled in the art of defending fortresses; Aḥmad Sultan Moçakī⁵ Kōrāsānī; Mollā-zāda-ye Bāfqī; and others. This force was sent to reinforce Emir Gūna Khan at Erīvān. From the Kūbīklū tribe, too, a group of doughty *qezelbāš*, that is to say, men who have a natural desire to perform valiant deeds, was dispatched to Erīvān with fine promises of royal favor if they distinguished themselves.

The Ottoman commander in chief arrived before the walls of Erīvān on 13 Ša'bān 1025/26 August 1616. Thanks to the presence of the Aga of the Janissaries and men who were skilled in siege warfare, and of Tūrkča Bilmez, the governor of Āḡesqa, who was always uttering empty boasts along this frontier, the capture of Erīvān was thought to be an easy matter. More than one hundred thousand Ottoman troops, experts in siege warfare, surrounded the fortress. Shah 'Abbas decided against committing his troops to a pitched battle; instead, he divided his army into various corps and dispatched them to Erīvān with orders to shadow the Ottomans and take advantage of any opportunity which presented itself to make limited attacks on a section of the Ottoman camp. The *moqarrab al-ḥazrat*

⁵The vocalization of the name of this tribe, which was of eastern origin, is uncertain—*TM*, p. 17, gives merely "M. ch. Ki."

Qarĉaqāy Beg, who had recently been promoted to khan with the title commander in chief of Iran (*sepahsālār-e irān*),⁶ led one of these army corps, which consisted of *qūrĉīs*, *gōlāms*, and the pick of the retainers of the royal stirrup. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, was ordered to approach the Ottoman camp from the east; Ḥasan Khan, Ganj 'Alī Khan, and the other emirs who were at Tabriz with Kalb 'Alī Beg Šamlū, the aide-de-camp, were ordered to join forces with Emāmqolī Khan. Delt Moḥammad Šams al-Dīnlū was ordered to approach the Ottoman camp from the west, i.e., from the direction of Erzerum, with specific orders to cut the Ottoman lines of communication.

Qarĉaqāy Beg detached from his corps a troop of veterans, under the command of Kalaf Beg *sofraĉī* (the sewer),⁷ and sent them to a place called Kona-gīr, situated on the slopes of a mountain one *far-sak* north of the fortress, and thus located between the fort and the royal camp. The duty of this group was to keep open communications between the fort and the royal camp, and to ensure safe passage for any couriers going between the two. Qarĉaqāy Beg held his main force in readiness to go into action whenever an opportune moment presented itself. He sent out experienced patrols in every direction to obtain intelligence regarding the enemy. Emāmqolī Khan and the other emirs kept constantly on the move, probing the enemies' defenses all the time, and maintaining close contact with one another. The Ottomans were not allowed to relax for a moment, and were forced to maintain a force of up to fifty thousand men ready for instant action. In other words, about half the Ottoman army was prevented from taking part in the siege operations.

When the weather in the Shah's summer quarters at Gökĉa Deñiz turned cold, the Shah moved his camp to Alākīs, near Gökĉa, which has a very pleasant climate. Meanwhile the Ottoman officers were prosecuting the siege with great vigor. In several places, breastworks and trenches had been pushed forward, and cannon placed in these forward positions bombarded the fort night and day; the artillery was

⁶It is probable that this ancient title was revived by Shah 'Abbas when the *qezelbaş* were no longer the principal, or even the majority, element in the Safavid army, the point being that the terms used for commander in chief under the early Safavid empire, first *amīr al-omarā* and later *qūrĉībāšī*, were irrevocably associated with the *qezelbaş*.

⁷The OED defines "sewer" as "An attendant at a meal who superintended the arrangement of the table, the seating of the guests, and the tasting and serving of dishes." I.e., an officer of the royal household.

directed by both Ottoman and European gunners. On the other side of the fort, a mound of earth designed to rise higher than the walls was gradually being pushed forward. Emir Gūna Khan and his men expended every effort to defend the fort, and the Shah sent dare-devils every day to get an up-to-the-minute report on conditions. This evidence of the Shah's concern and support kept the morale of the defenders high, even though they were faced by an enemy renowned for their skill in siege works.

One day, the Ottomans made an assault on one of the gateways of the fort which had had two or three of its towers destroyed by artillery fire. But they were repulsed with heavy casualties by heavy cannon and musket fire from gunners who, without the slightest exaggeration, were capable of hitting the eye of an ant if it presented itself as a target. The Shah thought it prudent to reinforce the garrison with a thousand musketeers from the musketeers of the royal stirrup regiment. The reinforcements moved by night and took up their station at Kona-gīr with Kalaf Beg, and informed Emir Gūna Khan of their intention. In the darkness before dawn, Emir Gūna Khan opened the north gate facing Kona-gīr, and the musketeers ran like the wind and hurled themselves into the fort. The impartial reader must admit that to pass a thousand armed men through the lines of such a huge enemy army and to get them safely into the fort was a victory in itself. The drums were beaten in the fort to celebrate this feat.

The Ottomans, informed of this piece of audacity, stepped up their bombardment and pushed forward their breastworks with redoubled energy. One day, the Aga of the Janissaries and Türkča Bīlmez, with several pashas who had had more experience of handling artillery than the other officers, came up to the gun positions and directed the artillery fire. As chance would have it, a lucky shot from one of the cannons in the fort struck the Aga of the Janissaries, Türkča Bīlmez, and a third man, who happened to be standing one behind the other.

The Ottomans who were pushing forward the mound of earth had now reached the ditch and had started to fill it in when the Qājār *gāzis* and other troops from the fort made a sudden sortie against them, slew some behind their breastworks and earthworks, and took prisoners and captured a lot of weapons. Every day, there were clashes between defenders and besiegers. Some of the enemy were brought before the Shah for interrogation, and with one voice they

declared that a general assault on the fort was planned for a certain day, the point of the assault being an area of the wall where Ottoman fire had caused cracks to appear in several of the towers. The Shah at once sent a man into the fort to warn the garrison to be on their guard that day and to fight like men; at the same time, he ordered his emirs to be ready to sound the general advance if the Ottomans carried out their plan of attack.

On the appointed day the Ottoman assault began, and the attackers were met by determined fire from muskets and bows. The assault went on from morning till noon, and the Ottoman dead began to pile up against the walls. The Ottoman commander in chief called off his men, but only as a ruse, and immediately launched a second attack, thinking to catch the defenders off their guard and exhausted. The *gāzīs*, worn out by their exertions and weak from not having eaten all day, had not yet reached their quarters when a sudden din heralded a second assault. They rushed back to their positions on the battlements and repulsed this second assault too, again with heavy loss to the Ottomans.

The morale of the defenders was now higher than ever, while that of the attackers had sunk proportionately. All the defenders had performed prodigies of valor, but especially the *Qājār gāzīs*. As the siege dragged on, a shortage of food began to make itself apparent in the Ottoman camp. With the onset of wintry weather, sickness began to affect the Ottomans too, and men died every day. The Ottoman commander in chief began to despair of taking the fort, and on several occasions sent *Kalīl Aqa* to discuss peace with the Shah, and in return the Shah sent first, *Sārū Beg Begdīlū*, and second, *Čerāg Sultan Gerāmpā Ostājīlū*. Details of these negotiations will be given below, but first, I must describe various encounters between Safavid and Ottoman troops outside the walls of the fortress of *Erīvān*.

Encounters Which Took Place between Safavid and Ottoman Troops outside the Wall of the Fortress of Erīvān during the Course of the Siege

I have already described how the Shah divided his army into various corps with the object of surrounding the Ottoman camp and harrying the attackers whenever the occasion arose. Every day, there were clashes between Safavid and Ottoman troops, and the heads of the Ottoman dead and the captured weapons were displayed to the

Shah. It would take too long to describe all these encounters, so I will content myself with describing the principal ones.

The first of these occurred when the Ottomans, their food supplies almost exhausted, sent out a forage party in the direction of Korpi on the road to Naḳčevān; this party consisted of grooms under the command of a number of *mīr-sanjaqs* and *ala-begs*, and having with them two thousand horses, mules, and donkeys. Emāmqolī Khan led the army of Fārs against this forage party; he descended on it like a thunderbolt when the Ottomans had reached a village and the men had dispersed inside the houses in search of provisions. About one thousand five hundred Ottomans were slain or taken prisoner, and several thousand horses, mules, and donkeys fell into Safavid hands, together with captured weapons. The survivors made their way with difficulty back to the Ottoman camp.

The second encounter occurred soon after Emāmqolī Khan had been joined by Ḥasan Khan, Ganj 'Alī Khan, and the emirs who had come from Tabriz with Kalb 'Alī Beg. The whole force was encamped near the river Karri-čay when it was attacked by an Ottoman force of four thousand men and sixty or seventy standards. Qar-čāqay Beg's spies and scouts had reported the approach of this Ottoman force, and he had immediately warned the emirs, who had time to send their baggage and other impedimenta to higher ground and prepare themselves for action. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, and Begverdī Beg, Emāmqolī Khan's lieutenant (*vakīl*), led their men in a charge in which some twenty of the Ottoman advance guard were killed and a number of others captured. Ganj 'Alī Khan, who was an old hand at warfare, prudently called his men back when the Ottoman main body came in sight and rejoined his own center, which formed up in a good position on rising ground. Begverdī Beg, being a more impetuous officer, did not immediately withdraw his men, but was eventually forced to do so and to rejoin his center after losing about fifty musketeers, though not frontline troops. After this skirmish, the Ottomans declined battle and withdrew.

The third encounter occurred between Kalaf Beg and Delāvar Pasha, who repeatedly tried to dislodge the *qezelbāš* from the vital station at Kona-gīr, which kept open the lines of communication to the fort. He made one particularly determined effort to assault the *qezelbāš* position, but the *qezelbāš* made an equally determined charge against the Ottomans, and after heavy fighting defeated the

attack and returned to their positions. In the course of the fighting, Jahāngīr Khan Baḳtīārī, a Lor chieftain who was under Kalaf Beg's command, launched his two hundred Lors against a much more numerous group of the enemy and was almost taken prisoner. But aided by fortune (as the name of his tribe suggests),⁸ he and his men succeeded in hewing their way to safety. After they had been repulsed, the Ottomans brought up more troops, but did not dare to make another attack, and finally retired.

The fourth encounter occurred between Maqṣūd Sultan Kangarlū, the governor of Naḳčevān, and a group of Ottoman and Kurdish reinforcements who were on their way to Erīvān from Vān and Kurdistan. Maqṣūd Sultan intercepted them, slew many of them, and pillaged their baggage; he also intercepted a camel train belonging to Hāfez Pasha which was on its way to Erīvān.

The fifth encounter involved the capture of an Ottoman baggage train belonging to Delāvar Pasha and other pashas from Dīār Bakr. This incident occurred during the Ottoman withdrawal from Erīvān, and Tīmūr Beg *ev-oghlū*, an aide-de-camp, intercepted this baggage train as it was on its way to Vān with an escort of Kurds.

Finally, Delī Moḥammad Šams al-Dīnlū, who had been sent in the direction of Qārṣ and Erzerum to keep watch on enemy movements, on several occasions intercepted groups of Ottomans and overpowered them. He captured the *čavošes* who were on their way from Istanbul to Erīvān with orders for the Ottoman commander in chief, and also couriers dispatched by the latter with reports for the Sultan, and all these documents were forwarded to the Shah.

The Withdrawal of the Ottoman Army and Renewed Peace Negotiations

When the Ottoman commander in chief, despairing of being able to capture the fortress of Erīvān, reopened peace talks, he accused the *qezelbaş*, through their negotiator Čerāğ Sultan, of having violated some of the conditions of the preliminary peace treaty negotiated between Naṣūḥ Pasha and the *ṣadr* Qāzī Khan. But the Shah denied the charge and asserted that all the conditions laid down in the preliminary treaty had been observed. It was the Ottomans, he declared, who had broken the preliminary agreement without reason,

⁸A pun on the two words *bešt* (fortune) and *yārī* (assistance).

and had recommenced the fighting. What had they achieved, he asked, during the holy month of Ramaẓān, the month of fasting, except the shedding of blood and the incurring of loss in this world and the next. Now the Ottomans wanted to talk peace again; well, his terms had not changed, said the Shah. If Moḥammad Pasha wanted to discuss the actual terms of the preliminary treaty, Qāẓī Khan was still alive even if Naṣūḥ Pasha was not, and he could ask him, or any of the Ottoman officers who were with him and had been privy to the discussions, such as Delāvar Pasha, Bāqī Pasha, and Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha. If there was any query about the report of the boundary commission, a copy of the text was available, authenticated by the seals of these officers. If Moḥammad Pasha wished, said the Shah, he would send Qāẓī Khan to discuss matters with these pashas face to face.

It was so agreed, and Qāẓī Khan went to the Ottoman camp to reaffirm the bases of the peace treaty. On 25 Šavvāl 1025/5 November 1616, however, before Qāẓī Khan had arrived in the Ottoman camp, Moḥammad Pasha had sent an envoy to Emir Gūna Khan to inform him that peace had been concluded between himself and the Shah, and that consequently he was withdrawing his forces to Erzerum. Qāẓī Khan met the Ottomans on the march. He was received with honor by the pashas, who begged him to accompany them to Erzerum, because they were nervous about possible pursuit by the *qezel-bāš*. At Erzerum, the preliminary peace treaty was reaffirmed on the same basis as before; Qāẓī Khan was then given leave to depart, and Moḥammad Pasha and the other Ottoman nobles continued on to Istanbul.

During this campaign, the Ottomans lost close to forty thousand men, either killed during the siege of the fort or in the various encounters outside the fort, or dying from cold or sickness. Countless mules and camels died from lack of fodder. Qāẓī Khan and his companions used to relate how, in the course of their retreat, the Ottomans never stayed more than a night anywhere, and went on without resting. At every stage of their journey, an Ottoman cemetery would be created as they buried the day's dead. At every stage, too, they left behind so many tents through lack of pack animals to carry them that it seemed as though the army had not in fact marched. At least half the army was forced to march on foot.

At an early stage of the siege, Kāja 'Alī Akbar Eṣṣāhānī, who was

descended from the Zu'l-Nūnī shaikhs and was a member of the royal secretariat, had a dream in which he asked some person he met what the outcome of the struggle for Erīvān would be, and this person had replied that "victory would go to the son of 'Alī." I started thinking whether this phrase could be fitted into a chronogram, and I finally managed it by dint of adding the words "the exalted, the saint" after 'Alī.⁹ All the inmates of the fort, good Shi'ites all and devoted supporters of the Safavid dynasty, kept the day of their deliverance from the enemy as a festival, and Kāja Moḥammad Yūsuf Qazvīnī, another member of the secretarial profession, devised this chronogram: "To-day is a festival for Shi'ites."¹⁰

After the withdrawal of the Ottoman army, the Shah sent his heavy baggage to Bargošāt and went to inspect the new fortress of Erīvān, which had been constructed in the Year of the Horse but had not been seen by him. He loaded Emir Gūna Khan and the other officers at the fort with honors, and conferred on Emir Gūna Khan, in recognition of his valor, the title of blond lion (*sārū ašlānī*).

It is well known that the Ottomans learned the art of siege warfare from the Europeans and then became superior to them in the subjugation of fortresses, because they have captured from the Europeans several fortresses of great strength, such as that at Constantinople. During the reign of Shah 'Abbas, the *qezelbaş* surpassed the Ottomans in capturing castles, taking from them several notable fortresses such as the old and new forts at Erīvān, and the forts at Ganja, Šamākī, Darband, Tiflis, and elsewhere, all of which were well-garrisoned and provisioned. The garrison at Erīvān held the fort for two and a half months against more than one hundred thousand Ottomans, and Bābā Sultan Qalandar Qomī, who belonged to one of the dervish fraternities which had special initiation ceremonies of girding and so on, composed a quatrain on the subject.

After inspecting the fortress, the Shah moved to winter quarters in Qarābāğ. After reviewing his troops at Naḵčevān, he sent them on leave. He caught up with his heavy baggage at Bargošāt, and then went on a hunting expedition along the river Kor. Since the subjugation of Georgia had still not been completed to his satisfaction, the Shah chose the plain of Dāneqī, on the other side of the Kor, as a

⁹The chronogram *fath az pesar-e 'alt-ye 'ālī-ye valt* produces the correct date, 1025/1616.

¹⁰The words *āmad emrūz shī'īānā 'eyd* yield the correct date, 1025/1616.

suitable spot for his winter quarters. Qāzī Khan, the *şadr*, arrived from Erzerum and was received in audience by the Shah; he reported on his discussion with the pashas regarding the peace terms. But once again the hopes of peace did not materialize: A group of high Ottoman officials, who held the real power in the state, in their eagerness to rise even higher, and in particular to wrest the office of grand vizier from Moḥammad Pasha, charged the latter with dereliction of duty in his conduct of the siege of Erivān. As a result, Sultan Aḥmad dismissed him from the office of grand vizier and from his post as commander in chief, and replaced him by Kālī Pasha.

The following year, the Year of the Serpent (1026/1617), the Sultan sent Kālī Pasha to Dīār Bakr to winter there and mobilize yet another Ottoman army for the invasion of Iran in the spring of the Year of the Horse (1027/1617-18). He was to be joined by Jānī Beg Gerāy Khan, the chief of the Crimean Tartars, with twenty thousand men. However, "man proposes, but God disposes," and Sultan Aḥmad was suddenly taken ill and died. As the deceased Sultan had only infant sons, the principal officers of the Ottoman state chose as his successor his brother Sultan Moṣṭafā, who was known to be mentally deranged and for that reason had not been put to death in the customary manner on the accession of Sultan Aḥmad. After Sultan Moṣṭafā had been on the throne for six months, a group of nobles, tired of his reign, transferred their allegiance to Sultan Aḥmad's eldest son, 'Oṣmān, now a boy of twelve, and deposed Sultan Moṣṭafā.

Sultan 'Oṣmān proceeded with the plans to invade Iran in the Year of the Horse (1027); Kālī Pasha was defeated at the battle of Sarāb and, like his predecessor, decided after being defeated to resume peace negotiations. Once again, not only did the Ottomans gain no advantage from this campaign, but their Tartar allies caused a great deal of devastation in Ottoman territory. But I will give full details of all these events in book III, as I promised, if I am spared to record them as Shah 'Abbas's reign goes into its second thirty-year period.

Events Which Occurred While the Shah Was in His Winter Camp at Dāneqī

Despite the severity of the Shah's punitive expedition to Georgia in 1025/1616, which had devastated and depopulated the country, his wrath was still unassuaged, particularly since he had received reports that Deli Malek Šīrvānī, Dā'ūd Gorjī, and Tahmasp Qeseqī had

entered Kakhetia and were busy raising a fresh army from the scattered survivors of the previous campaign and from among the Georgian peasantry, who were living a miserable existence, a group here and a group there, in the plundered ruins of their homes. The Shah delegated the *qūrčibāši*, 'Isā Khan, to take a force of *qūrčis*, *golāms*, and musketeers to Georgia. The Qeseq district was the first to be swept clean; the men were to be put to the sword, and the women and children taken captive.

The Safavid troops discovered where Dā'ūd's hideout was, and pushed their way to it through dense forests over paths covered with snow. Dā'ūd learned of their approach just before they arrived; he abandoned his possessions and fled with some of his womenfolk, making for Dāğestān by narrow, snow-filled tracks. His party was still in sight when the Safavid troops reached the scene. They pressed the pursuit with great determination along tracks so narrow that it was quite impossible for two horsemen to ride abreast along them. Most of the Georgians sent their women ahead on horseback, and they themselves made their way in ones and twos through the forests, prepared to fight their way to safety. Ḥasan 'Alī Beg, the brother of Peykar Sultan Ġirmī-dört, who had outstripped his colleagues in the pursuit, was killed by a musketball. The centurion Bagtar Beg Ev-oğlū, the son of Abu'l-Qāsem Beg the *ābdārbaši* (chief of the department which supplied cooling drinks to the Shah), came up and was stringing an arrow to his bow when he was struck in the chest by a musketball and rolled from his horse. Mīr Fattāḥ Eṣfahānī, the chiliarch, came from behind and leaped on Bagtar Beg's horse, but he too was hit and died later of his wounds. The cost of pursuing this small group of Georgians was becoming too great, and as the sun was also setting, the pursuit was called off. Once again Dā'ūd and his fellow rebels escaped their appointment with death.

However, some ten thousand prisoners were taken—the cream of the Georgians, who had escaped the first punitive expedition but were captured this time because their escape routes were blocked by heavy snow. The weather was also intensely cold. A great quantity of booty fell into the hands of the *ğāzīs*. The northern part of Kakhetia, being adjacent to the Dāğestān border, had always been exposed by raids by Dāğestānīs who were on the lookout for captives. This year, because the province of Kakhetia was in such a chaotic state and there were no Georgian forces guarding the frontier, the Dāğestānīs penetrated deeper than usual in their search for prisoners. Only small

groups of inhabitants had remained in this part of the province, hiding in holes and corners in the forests—but even these few, in fear of the Lezgīs from Dāğestān, now fled over the border into Kartlia, Bāšt-Āčūq, or Didoeti. This northern part of the province became completely depopulated. Thus, through the folly of Ṭahmūraš, this rich province, which had substantial annual revenue, was ruined. Several thousand families of the Anīsel tribe and Georgians from Zagam and neighboring regions, preferring exile to the prospect of being plundered and taken captive by the Lezgīs, asked to be transferred to Māzandarān. The Shah granted their request and moved them to Farahābād.

The Shah had heard that the people of Dāneqī, subjects of the governor of Ganja, had shown signs of disaffection during Ṭahmūraš's rebellion and that some of them had supported him. They had put to death a number of Moḥammad Khan Ziād-oḡlū Qājār's retainers who were stationed there. After his arrival in Dāneqī, the Shah held a judicial inquiry; when the guilt of the suspects had been proved, he executed the local chief and some thirty or forty of his nobles. Others, whose loyalty was somewhat doubtful, were transferred to Farahābād.

While the Shah was in winter camp at Dāneqī, he received envoys from the local governors of Dāğestān and Ṭabarsarān, who brought him gifts. The envoys were given robes of honor and other marks of royal favor, and the affairs of those regions were settled to the Shah's satisfaction. Since this year had been one of signal success for the Shah—the Ottomans repulsed from Erīvān, and thousands of infidels slain—he needed the slight reverse his forces suffered in Khorasan to prevent things from being too perfect. Toward the end of the year, a raiding party of one thousand two hundred Uzbegs under Moḥammad-qolī Dūrman ravaged the Saraḵs and Herat region. Kosrow Sultan, the governor of Mārūčāq, led a body of men against them. He was joined by Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Saraḵs. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan was the son of the celebrated Mīr Ḥoseyn Sultan Firūz-jang, and he brought with him a contingent of Čağatāy troops who regularly displayed their military prowess in clashes with the Uzbegs along the frontier.

Kosrow Sultan, confident of his own valor, carelessly selected an unsuitable site for the battle; strive as he might, he was eventually defeated and left the field. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, an experienced veteran, could not bear the disgrace of flight, and so led his Čağatāys in a charge

against the enemy. His son, Mīr Sultan Ḥoseyn, was killed in this charge. Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, grieving for his son, was even more determined not to live now that his son was dead; he fought so stubbornly that, in the end, he and the band of Čaġatāys with him were all killed. The rest of his men then withdrew to the banks of a nearby stream and took up defensive positions behind it. They fought on doggedly until nightfall, when they were able to withdraw safely. The Shah, who always recognized what he owed to those who served him loyally, appointed Moẓaffar Ḥoseyn, another son of Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan, governor of Saraḵs with the rank of khan, and transferred to him his father's fiefs.

Deaths This Year

1. The *Allāmat al-'Olamā* (most distinguished *mojtahed*) of his time, Mīrzā Ebrahim al-Ḥasanī al-Hamadānī, about whom I had something to say in my biographical sketches of *seyyeds* and theologians of the time of Shah Tahmasp, in book I. Mīr Fānī Kermānī devised the following chronogram to mark his death: "With a heavy heart I told him the year of his death, 'may the tree of paradise be his station.' "

2. Seyyed Mobārak Khan, the ruler of the Ḥavīza region of 'Arabestān. He was a Shi'ite *seyyed* of pure faith who, after the death of Shah Tahmasp, brought that province under his control by the strength of his good right arm, and became governor of it. Before his accession, he had from time to time been at loggerheads with the *qezelbāš* emirs in the area, but, after the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he pledged his allegiance to him and sent his infant son, Seyyed Nāṣer, as an earnest of his good behavior. Seyyed Nāṣer was brought up at the Safavid court. This year, shortly before his father's death, Seyyed Nāṣer was given permission to go to 'Arabestān. After his father died, he inherited his kingdom, but he too died before the year was out. In accordance with the wishes of the elders of the tribes in the area, the governorship of 'Arabestān was conferred on Seyyed Mobārak's nephew, Seyyed Rāšed.

3. Mīr Fattāḥ Eṣfahānī, the chiliarch, who was killed in action in Georgia, as already related. His eldest son was given his position, with the title of Mīr Fattāḥ the second.

Epilogue to Books I and II

Exponents of the secretarial art and annalists and historians have produced prodigious quantities of the most exquisite prose as their memorial; although any attempt of mine to emulate them must necessarily fall short of the mark, and although people say that there is nothing new left to say in the world, I offer this epilogue to my readers, judging it, thanks to the grace of God, to be not entirely devoid of literary merit.

In the preface to this work, I dared to state that my purpose was to write a history of Shah 'Abbas, who considers himself, such is the purity and sincerity of his faith, to be the personal servant of the Commander of the Faithful, the Imam of Muslims, 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb (the blessings of God be upon him and his immaculate descendants!), and takes pride in this relationship (which is a mystery). I undertook to write my history without undue literary elaboration, and without worrying too much about elegance of phrase or the use of metaphor. In this way, I hoped my history would be a useful tool for other scholars and historians. Now God be praised that I have completed my task, and have recorded in book I the events of the reign of Shah 'Abbas from his birth, when Khorasan was filled with the luster of his future greatness, up to the time of his accession to the throne of Iran. In book II, I have brought the story down to the time of writing, which is the year 1025/1616-17 and completes the first thirty years of the reign of Shah 'Abbas. My hope is that, when the rulers and monarchs of the world study his achievements, they will take them as their model and exemplar. My hope is, further, that my history will meet with the approval of Shah 'Abbas, and that it will be spared the criticism of the envious and the ignorant. Finally, I hope that it will pass muster with students of history, and that they will derive enjoyment from it. God willing, if I am spared, I will continue the history of Shah Abbas in a third volume, and so I will leave the real epilogue until the completion of that. Verily, God does what he wishes, and ordains whatsoever he desires!¹

O Lord, of Thy boundless grace,
Grant me a place within the precincts of Thy
throne;
Turn the night of my misfortune into day,
Strengthen my heart with the hope of reaching
this goal.

¹A combination of Koran, 22:19 and 5:2.

Book III

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

Praise and thanksgiving to the Creator of heaven and earth, who has given order to this world through the medium of kings who are defenders of the faith and dispensers of justice; and salutations to that title page of the book of prophethood, Moḥammad (the blessings of God be upon him and his family and his pure descendants!), and especially to that progenitor of the immaculate Imams 'Alī, who proves the truth of the Tradition of the Prophet: "I am the city of knowledge, and 'Alī is its gate" (the blessings of God be upon 'Alī and all the Imams, who are the repositories of knowledge, the most excellent men of the faith, and guides on the paths of designation.

Readers will recall that this least of God's creatures, Eskandar Monšī, expressed the intention right at the beginning of this work of devoting the second book of this history to the reign of Shah 'Abbas, and that book II would comprise two parts: Part 1, from the accession of Shah 'Abbas to the end of the thirtieth year of his reign; part 2, from the thirty-first year of his reign onward, concluding with some rare anecdotes and strange tales of the times. Part 1 has been completed (book II). I will now commence part 2 (book III), in the hope that God will grant me the years to complete it, and that, watered by the springs of his abundant grace, this tender literary plant may become green and flourish. "I have no power save through God!"¹

¹Koran, 11:89.

The Beginning of the Year of the Serpent, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1026/1617, the Thirty-first Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

As previously recorded, the Shah spent the winter of 1025-26/1617 at Dāneqī. For the period of the Shah's sojourn there, pleasant residences and bathhouses were prepared, and all the principal officers of state built themselves pavilions and summerhouses of wood and reeds. Thus the winter passed agreeably, and spring arrived at 9:42 A.M. Monday, 12 Rabi' I, 1026/20 March 1617, when the sun left the sign Pisces and entered that of Aries. After the Nowrūz festival, when the weather began to get hot, the Shah left Dāneqī and moved toward the winter quarters of Georgia.

One of the successes which attended the Shah's arms about this time was the capture of the fortress of Qirlānqūč, which was held by some Georgian rebels. This fort was situated in a position of great natural strength atop a hill, and was not commanded by higher ground on any side. The height of the fort was such that, in order to reach the garrison's quarters from the main gate, one had to climb fifty or sixty stairs. If this fort, in addition to its rainwater cistern, had possessed a spring, it would have been quite impregnable. The proximity of the Shah caused the Georgian garrison to negotiate for terms, using the ruler of Kartlia, Bogrāt Khan, as their intermediary, and they surrendered the fort. The garrison was granted quarter; those who wished to go to Kartlia and enter the service of Bogrāt Khan were allowed to do so; others were sent to Farahābād. The Shah placed a garrison of musketeers of the royal household in the fort.

At this juncture, the Shah learned that a number of other Georgian rebels, who had escaped the swords of the *gāzis*, had gathered at Qeseq. Since the Shah's wrath against the Georgians was still unassuaged, he at once sent a detachment of troops against them, and followed this up by sending Zamān Beg, a centurion of the *golāms*, with another force to ravage the area and take prisoners. A large number of infidels fell into Safavid hands. The nobles and many of the rank and file were put to death; others were taken captive with their wives and children, but were put to death on arrival at the Shah's camp.

When he had dealt with the affairs of Kakhetia to his satisfaction,

the Shah marched toward Tiflis, where he was entertained by the ruler, Bogrāt Khan, who was rewarded with marks of royal favor beyond his expectation. From Tiflis, the Shah marched to Somḡeti, where he lodged for a few days in the house of Malek Aṭābeg, the grandson of Malek Mīrman Somḡeti, a loyal supporter of the Safavid house. From there he marched to the summer quarters of Gökča Deñiz, where he spent a few pleasant days on the shores of the lake, and in the surrounding countryside.

The Expedition Sent to Erzerum and Then to Vān under the Command of Qarčaḡāy Khan, the Commander in Chief of Iran

While the Shah was in summer quarters at Gökča Deñiz, repeated reports came in from his spies that Sultan Aḡmad, the Ottoman Emperor, had renounced the preliminary peace treaty concluded the preceding year by the Ottoman commander in chief, Moḡammad Pasha, and at the instigation of the enemies of Moḡammad Pasha, had accused the latter of dereliction of duty and dismissed him from the post of grand vizier, replacing him with Kaḡlī Pasha. Kaḡlī Pasha was also appointed the new Ottoman commander in chief, with orders to winter in Anatolia and prepare for an invasion of Iran the following spring, in conjunction with the Tartar army under Jānī Beg Gerāy Khan. Kaḡlī Pasha had marched from Moḡammadīya at Istanbul, the Shah's spies reported, with an army of *qapı-qolları*, or troops of the royal household, and was now on his way to winter quarters.

After verifying these reports, the Shah decided to lay waste the Erzerum-Vān area, which any invading Ottoman army would have to cross, so that the Ottomans, bereft of provisions, would have a hard time crossing this region. Qarčaḡāy Khan, who was the Shah's protégé and had demonstrated his wisdom and ability and deserved to be placed in command of this expedition, was given the title of commander in chief and dispatched by the Shah after he had spent several days reviewing his troops at Qereḡ-bolāḡ in the Gökča district. The Shah himself marched toward the river Aras, hunting as he went. Crossing the river, he marched to Ahar via Gargar. He visited the shrine of Shaikh Šehāb al-Dīn Aharī and then, leaving his heavy baggage at Ahar, rode to Ardabīl to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of the Safavid shaikhs.

Qarčaḡāy Khan meanwhile, following orders, had marched toward

Erzerum. Hasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum and a distinguished Ottoman officer, had retreated within the walls of the fort. A group of bold spirits among the Ottomans who tried to oppose Qarĉaqāy Khan were swept aside by the Safavid skirmishers and driven back into the city; the *ġāzīs* pursued them up to the walls of the fort, killing some and taking others prisoner. Qarĉaqāy Khan remained in the area for several days and sent detachments of troops to ravage the surrounding countryside. The *qezelbāš* troops did their job so thoroughly that no benefit could be derived from the area as far as agriculture was concerned, and the devastation of the region was total.

From Erzerum, Qarĉaqāy Khan proceeded to Vān. The *beglerbeg* of Vān was Moĥammad Pasha Takkalū, known as Takkalū Pasha, a pasha renowned for his power, daring, and courage. His victory the preceding year at Salmās over Pīr Būdāq Khan and other Safavid emirs had increased his self-confidence immensely. Some of Qarĉaqāy Khan's advisers had considered it inexpedient to proceed to Vān, because the *qezelbāš* had covered a lot of ground in the Erzerum area and their horses were tired and unfit for action. On the other hand, they said, Takkalū Pasha and the *sanjaq-begs* of Vān had large forces at their disposal and their horses were fresh; they were eager for battle, and the *qezelbāš* might easily be worsted. A council of war had been held, and all the emirs and senior officers had said their piece. It had finally been decided, after it had been ascertained from travelers that the forces under the command of Takkalū Pasha and the Kurdish emirs at Vān did not exceed fifteen thousand, that it would be unworthy of the honor and prestige of the Safavid state to decline to give battle. All those *qezelbāš* whose horses were unfit for action should be sent back to Tabriz. The remaining forces, a mixture of cavalry and infantry, should put their trust in God and march on Vān.

This plan had won the support of a majority of the emirs, and the Safavid army marched. It had not gone more than a few stages before Qarĉaqāy Khan received the astonishing news that Takkalū Pasha had been slain by Ĥakkārī Kurds.

The Death of Moĥammad Pasha, known as Takkalū Pasha, and of Yaĥya Beg the Son of Zakarīā Khan, at One Another's Hands

According to reports from reliable informants, the story goes as

follows: Takkalū Pasha, learning of Qarčaqāy Khan's march to Erzerum, had set out from Vān with a force of some ten or twelve thousand Ottoman and Kurdish troops, intending to ravage the region in the direction of Tabriz. When he reached Qarā Darra in the district of Kōy, near Čalderān, he heard that Qarčaqāy Khan had left Erzerum and was on his way to Vān. Takkalū Pasha wanted to mobilize the remainder of the *mīr-sanjaqs* and tribal chiefs in the area and give battle to the *qezelbāš*. But the Kurdish emirs he had with him did not like this idea and agreed among themselves to leave him and return each to his own tribal base to see to the defense of his own territory and castles, because they knew that the *qezelbāš* would wreak havoc on their tribes if they left them defenseless. They strongly advised the Pasha to return to Vān and look to the defense of the city; with most of his troops gone to protect their homes and families, he would not be able to give battle to the *qezelbāš*.

Žiā al-Dīn Khan, the son of Šaraf Khan, the ruler of Tiflis, left with his men without permission from the Pasha and returned to Tiflis. Yaḥyā Beg, the son of Zakariyā Khan and the chief of the Ḥakkārī tribe, planned to follow his example, but the Pasha got wind of his plans and determined to prevent him from leaving. He sent a *čavoš* to summon him, but Yaḥyā Beg made excuses and did not answer the summons. The *čavoš* exceeded his authority and began cursing Yaḥyā Beg and threatening him with his sword, whereupon one of the latter's men, unable to tolerate this affront to his chief, lunged at the *čavoš* with his sword and killed him. Takkalū Pasha, enraged by the news, sent a posse of men to seize Yaḥyā Beg by force. By the time this posse arrived, the Ḥakkārī tribe was already on the march, and Yaḥyā Beg himself was on the point of leaving with his officers and personal attendants. Afraid of the outcome of a general free-for-all, Yaḥyā Beg made no open show of resistance, but accompanied the Pasha's men back to his camp. The moment the Pasha saw him, he rounded on him and, laying his hand on his sword, rushed toward him.

Several of Yaḥyā Beg's retainers, close friends of his, thinking that the Pasha intended to kill Yaḥyā Beg, cast prudence to the winds, ran forward, and struck the Pasha with their weapons, whereupon the Pasha's men drew their swords and attacked Yaḥyā Beg. Both men were killed, as were several others on each side. With the two commanders dead, and reports coming in regarding the momentary approach of the *qezelbāš* army, confusion broke out in the Ottoman

camp as every man looked to his own safety. The Ottomans retreated to Vān, and the Kurds dispersed to their own bases.

Fortune indeed smiled on the *qezelbāš* by dispersing the Ottoman army and disposing with such ease of two powerful adversaries. Yaḥyā Beg's ancestors had for many generations been chiefs of the Ḥakkārī tribe; his family claimed descent from 'Abbās b. 'Alī (upon him be peace!), and with the concurrence of Shi'ite circles, counted themselves *seyyeds*. However, since Sunnis count as *seyyeds* only the children of Fāṭema, the Ottomans refused to recognize their claim to *seyyedship*, and did not use the style *seyyed* in any of the enactments issued in respect of Yaḥyā Beg or his forefathers. Yaḥyā Beg's father, Zakarīā Beg, had declared his allegiance to Shah 'Abbas, and was constantly sending letters to the Shah in which he expressed his loyalty and counted himself a faithful supporter of the Safavid crown. Shah 'Abbas showed him special favor because of his *seyyedship* and descent from 'Abbas, and bestowed on him the title of khan. However, his son Yaḥyā Beg reversed his father's policy and, with Ottoman assistance, deprived his father of all authority and seized power over the Ḥakkārī tribe. He was hostile to the *qezelbāš*, and committed many enormities against his father. Thus he finally obtained his deserts, as the heavens demonstrated such astonishing sleight of hand. "How sweet it is to kill two birds with one stone!"

When Qarčaqāy Khan and the other Safavid emirs heard the news, they pressed ahead with even greater speed; they devastated the Vān area in the same manner as the Erzerum region before returning to Tabriz, where they were received in audience by the Shah.

Kalīl Pasha's Expedition to Dīār Bakr and His Dispatch of a Force to Hamadan; and the Lull in Hostilities Caused by the Death of the Ottoman Emperor Sultan Aḥmad and the Accession of his Brother, Sultan Moṣṭafā I

The newly appointed Ottoman grand vizier and commander in chief, Kalīl Pasha, had assembled an army for the invasion of Iran and had wintered on the frontier; because of the devastation wreaked by the *qezelbāš* in the Erzerum area, he had been forced to spend the winter in Dīār Bakr. He allotted his ally, Jānī Beg Gerāy b. Mobārak Gerāy, ruler of the Tartars, suitable winter quarters, and dispersed his Ottoman and Tartar troops to quarters wherever supplies were still available. The Tartars caused a lot of damage on Ottoman soil

this year. The Shah decided to station Qarčaqāy Khan on the frontier of Azerbaijan to confront Kālīl Pasha; he therefore left him at Tabriz, together with a detachment of Safavid troops accused of dereliction of duty in Georgia.

*The Allocation of Pay and Allowance to the Household Troops in the Form of Permanent Annuities (Hama-sāla)*¹

It had been the Shah's constant aim to ensure that all the troops of the royal stirrup, down to the apprentices in the royal workshops, should have their pay allotted in the form of permanent drafts on some stipulated location, so that they might be able to draw their pay regularly each year from that place, and not have to bother with repeated visits to the paymaster's office and the *dīvān* to seek orders for pay and allowances; in this way they would be encouraged to perform their duties zealously. This year Shah 'Abbas put his plan into effect, and gave orders that the whole of the army estimates was to be met from local cash revenues. The *e'temād al-dowla* Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, was put in charge of this operation; he was instructed to get together with the scribes of the royal secretariat this winter in Tabriz, and to assign the pay of every individual in every group at some location suitable to that person, bearing in mind the distance to the place in question from the person's home, and seeking to arrange this to the satisfaction of the payee. Each man was to be given a draft in the form of a permanent annuity. The vizier and the chief accountants spent four months at Tabriz working on this task. The author of this history was one of the secretaries delegated to help in this work, and I spent four months working night and day writing out payment orders under the supervision of these senior officials.

The Shah meanwhile had moved to winter quarters in Māzandarān to prepare himself for whatever trials might face him in the spring. Before the end of the year, Kālīl Pasha sent a detachment of Ottoman troops under Qāyeš Pasha, together with 'Omar Beg the *mīr-sanjaq* of the Sohrān tribe and a body of Tartars, from Dīār Bakr in the direction of Karkūya and Šahrezūr, with the object of ravaging the province of Hamadan. Hoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū Afšār, the Safavid officers in charge of this section of the frontier, marched against the invaders and came to

¹The *hama-sāla* was the best type of *barāt* (draft), since it was assigned on the same source or person and did not have to be renewed annually like the *yak-sāla* (TM, p. 153).

grips with them at MāhIdašt. After a severe struggle, the Ottoman force was put to flight, and Qāyeš Pasha was killed in the battle; 'Omar Beg was taken prisoner. The Ottoman army suffered heavy casualties, while the Safavid army did not lose any officer of note and did not suffer a significant number of casualties. The Shah congratulated the emirs on their victory and entrusted 'Omar Beg to the custody of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū at Rayy. He was not heard of again.

The Ottoman emperor, Sultan Aḥmad I, died this year. According to reliable sources, the Sultan fell ill in the autumn after the dispatch of Kalīl Pasha to Iran and died a few days later at Istanbul, though still a young man. His life was cut short because he broke his sworn oath, an act expressly forbidden by God and considered reprehensible by men. He was buried in a building which he himself had built at Istanbul. He had two sons: Sultan 'Oṣmān, who was twelve years old; and Sultan Morād, who was five. The senior officials of the Ottoman empire, and in particular the *qızlar-āqāsī*,² an official of great influence in the royal harem, decided to pass over the two princes in view of their youth and to confer the sultanate on the deceased Sultan's brother, Sultan Moṣṭafā. The latter was mentally unbalanced, and had for this reason not been put to death by Sultan Aḥmad at the time of his accession, but had remained in the harem in the care of the women. My informants from Asia Minor tell me that Sultan Moṣṭafā had been averse to his brother's policy of sending armies to Iran to fight against fellow Muslims and had on occasion given expression to his opinions, though whether his remarks stemmed from shrewdness or insanity it is hard to say.

After his accession, he decided on a peace policy toward the *qezelbaş*, adopting this policy either on the basis of his own convictions or on the advice of the *qızlar-āqāsī* and other principal officers of the Ottoman empire. It will be recalled that a Safavid ambassador, Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān, had been sent two years previously to Istanbul in the company of the Ottoman ambassador, Enjīllū *čavoš*, and the Ottoman prisoners of war who were being repatriated from Georgia. Qāsem Beg carried with him a letter of friendship from Shah 'Abbas and gifts for the Sultan. Sultan Aḥmad, who in his arrogance and enmity toward the *qezelbaş* had decided not to proceed with the peace negotiations, had refused to give audience to Qāsem Beg, and had placed him in custody in the Haft

²He ranked third in the Ottoman empire, after the grand vizier and the Shaikh al-Eslām (see Gibb and Bowen, p. 76 etc.).

Qal'a at Istanbul. Qāsem Beg was now summoned into audience by Sultan Moṣṭafā, received with proper ceremony, and allowed to depart after delivering his gifts.

This year, Khan Aḥmad Khan, the son of Holow Khan Ardalān, was firmly established in the government of his hereditary territories. Readers will recall that last year Shah 'Abbas sent Khan Aḥmad Khan, who had been brought up since infancy in the care of the royal household, back to Kurdestan to his father. His father had become very old, and the Shah's plan was that, if he died, Khan Aḥmad Khan would succeed him. But Holow Khan, like all human beings, wanted to hang on his worldly possessions as long as there was breath left in his body, particularly since these possessions included the leadership of his tribe and rank and power. He was afraid that his son might deprive him of power, and he became suspicious of him and refused to admit him into his presence. Finally, on the advice of some of his soldiers, he allotted him land in Šahrezūr and the castle of Zalam. Some of the Ardalān tribe gathered around him there, and trouble-makers caused relations between father and son to deteriorate. In the end, fighting broke out between the two sides, and Khan Aḥmad Khan, who was afraid of his father, withdrew for a while.

This year, Holow Khan left his seat of government, Ḥasanābād, in order to see to the strengthening of one of his other forts. Khan Aḥmad Khan took advantage of his absence to slip into Ḥasanābād with a few men, gain entrance to the fort by trickery, and seize possession of the fort and all his father's treasuries, filled with the accumulated wealth of years. He proclaimed to the Ardalān tribesmen that he would pay grants and bonuses to them, and as a result large numbers of them rallied around him and acknowledged him as their governor. Holow Khan, because of his great age and physical infirmity, had no choice but to accept the *fait accompli*; with his son's approval, he set off for the Shah's court. He asked the Shah's pardon for his past sins of disobedience, and the Shah overlooked them in view of the fact that he had sent his son to enter the Shah's service at court (though he had been obliged to do this), and sent him to Isfahan to spend the rest of his days there. Although Holow Khan had passed his eightieth birthday, he did not look more than seventy.

The Invasion of Khorasan by the Uzbegs from Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān and the Victory of Meḥrāb Khan, the Governor of Marv, over them

At the end of autumn and beginning of winter this year, Emāmqoli Khan Özbek, the ruler of Transoxania, sent a force of some thirty thousand men from the army of Bokhara to ravage Khorasan; this army was under the command of Nadr Toḡāy, the *divānbeḡibāš*. Crossing the Oxus, the Uzbegs made for Marv; they then rode west to Abīvard, and from there swung southwest via Darra Jaz and pillaged the Nishapur area. The Bayāt, Čamešgezek, and other tribes living in the area suffered greatly from their depredations. The Uzbegs were proposing to ravage the Mašhad' area when they heard the news of Meḥrāb Khan's victory over the Uzbek army from Ḥeṣār, and they withdrew in a panic.

A force of fifteen hundred crack Uzbek troops from Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān had been instructed to join Nadr Toḡāy, and this force had marched from Ḥeṣār under the command of Tūlak Bahādor and Dūstom Mīrzā. The force had bypassed Marv and was several *farsaks* west of that city when Meḥrāb Khan heard the news and set out in pursuit of them with one thousand veteran *qezelbāš* and expert musketeers. When the Uzbegs saw the vanguard of the *qezelbāš* army, they dismounted and made a breastwork of their folded tents; they then took cover behind their horses and prepared to fight on foot. When Meḥrāb Khan realized what the Uzbek tactics were, he ordered his musketeers forward with instructions to aim at the Uzbek horses. The musketeers carried out their orders, and in the process also inflicted heavy casualties on the Uzbegs themselves. Seeing the Uzbek morale flagging, Meḥrāb Khan gave the order to charge, and the Uzbegs broke and tried to reach their horses to escape on horseback. Some were successful, others fought briefly on foot before they were cut down. Altogether, five hundred of the Uzbek force were killed, and two hundred and fifty taken prisoner, including both the commanders, Tūlak Bahādor and Dūstom Mīrzā.

Meḥrāb Khan detailed a troop of *ḡāzīs* to go in pursuit of the Uzbegs who were fleeing across the plain on horseback or on foot, but the Uzbek commanders begged him in the name of the Shah to call off the pursuit and be satisfied with the victory God had granted him. Meḥrāb Khan agreed. Deeming it unwise to remain any longer away from the protection of his fort, he returned to Marv and sent a report

to the Shah. He also sent ten prisoners of note, with their officers, to the Shah, who put them all to death. Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan, who was in Herat, begged the Shah to release the two emirs. The Shah agreed to this and sent them both to Herat; some four or five days after their arrival at Herat, however, the Uzbek emirs left the city and fled to Heṣār.

This year, Qāẓī Khan Seyfī al-Ḥoseynī was dismissed from the *ṣadārat*, and was replaced by Qāẓī Sultan Torbatī, a Mūsavī *seyyed* from Torbat-e Heydariya and warden of the shrine at Mašhad. The latter post was given to Mīrzā Moḥsen Reżavī, the son of Mīrzā Oloḡ, who was connected by marriage to the Shah. On the very day of his appointment as *ṣadr*, Qāẓī Sultan fell ill. After being bedridden for seven days, he died at Ardabīl on the eighth day of his illness. Mīrzā Rafī' al-Dīn, the son of Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Ḳalīfa Seyyed 'Alī, known as Ḳalīfa Sultan Eṣfahānī, was now made *ṣadr*. He came from a Māzandarānī family descended from Mīr Bozorg, the former ruler of Māzandarān. One of their ancestors, Emir Neẓām al-Dīn, had been forced by circumstances to migrate to Isfahan, where he had settled. The family had become known as the Ḳalīfa *seyyeds*. Mīrzā Rafī' al-Dīn came to court from Isfahan and assumed the post of *ṣadr* with full independence in office. He was an extremely learned man, and a person of integrity and charity. His father, Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd, had been one of the most learned theologians of his time, and I said a few words about him in 'Book I under the head of *seyyeds* and '*olamā* of the time of Shah Tahmasp.

Deaths of Notable Persons This Year

1. Qāẓī Sultan, mentioned above. He had come to Iraq during the troubles in Khorasan, had come to the notice of the Shah by virtue of his ability, and had been appointed to high office. After the reconquest of Khorasan, he had been appointed governor of Torbat-e Heydariya and warden of the shrine at Mašhad. He discharged these offices for twenty-one years to the complete satisfaction of the Shah.

2. Seyyed Nāṣer, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, the ruler of 'Arabestān-e Ḥavīza; he was related by marriage to the Shah. At the Shah's orders, he had gone to Ḥavīza the previous year and assumed the position of ruler after his father's death. This year, he became seriously ill and died. Some people think he was poisoned by one of the women in the harem who had had a son by Seyyed Mobārak and had

been incited by Arab troublemakers to murder Seyyed Nāṣer. God alone knows the truth! Since this other son of Seyyed Mobārak was still a child, the governorship of the province was conferred on Seyyed Rāṣed, his nephew. Seyyed Nāṣer was a humble man, who always treated people with great magnanimity. He was so good-natured and self-controlled, in fact, that the fiery part of one's nature which is most necessary to kings and governors was almost completely lacking in him.

3. Mīrzā Raṣī b. Mīrzā Taqī, an Eṣfahānī *seyyed* of the highest rank, of the family of Šahrestān *seyyeds*; he was connected by marriage to Shah 'Abbas. While the court was in its summer quarters at Gökča and Meydānjūq, he was afflicted by some stomach disorder, but rarely bothered to have treatment for it. He accompanied the Shah from Ahar to Ardabīl, and there his illness became more severe; he was afflicted by diarrhea, and daily grew weaker. When the court left Tabriz to return to Iraq, he was too weak to mount his horse and had to be carried in a litter; he died at Zenjān. His body was taken to Qom and buried near the tomb of Fāṭema. The Shah, much affected by his death, gave his office of *ṣadr* in the first instance to his son Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Moḥammad, his own grandson through his daughter. In view of his extreme youth, his cousin Mīrzā Raṣī' was initially appointed his deputy, but eventually Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn became *ṣadr* in his own right, was honored by a marriage alliance with the Shah, and was made keeper of the seal of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones, an office which had belonged to Mīrzā Raṣī.

4. Heydar Sultan Begdīlū Šāmlū, the *eṣṭik-āqāsibāši-ye ḥaram*,³ died in office this year at Isfahan. His post was given to Abū Qāsem Beg the *ābdārbaši* (keeper of the royal pantry), and the latter's post was given to his brother, Čelebī Beg. The deceased was a member of the Begdīlū clan of the Šāmlū tribe, and he and his brothers had attracted the Shah's attention by their devoted service. They enjoyed the Shah's confidence, and had become powerful and wealthy. Heydar Sultan's assets, which amounted to nearly two thousand Iraqi *tomān*, were inherited by his son Nūr al-Dahr Beg, a level-headed young man of excellent behavior.

5. Moḥammad Reżā Beg, the head of the torchbearers,⁴ who had been sent to India as ambassador to Jahāngīr the Mogul Emperor.

³See Savory, *EL*, Vol. IV, p. 118.

⁴On his duties, see *TM*, p. 138.

He had just obtained leave to depart and had set out on his return journey to Iran, when he died at Lahore. He was born at Herat; as a youth, he had been in attendance on the young prince 'Abbas in that city, and had been placed in charge of the torchbearers' department. His luster remained undimmed to the end of his days. He was a personable young man, a good conversationalist, and a connoisseur of poetry. He had an expansive manner, and his talk was larded with colorful and witty remarks. His son succeeded him in office.

Events of the Year of the Horse, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1027/1617-18, the Thirty-second Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Nowrūz this year fell on Wednesday,¹ 23 Rabī' I, 1027/20 March 1618. The sun left the sign Pisces and moved into the sign Aries on Tuesday, after completing seven hours and nine minutes of its journey. The Shah left Farāḥābād and traveled to Qazvin via Māzandarān and Fīrūzkūh, indulging in some hunting on the way. He spent two months at Qazvin in residence at the Bāḡ-e Sa'adatābād, and issued general mobilization orders naming Solṭānīya as the rendezvous. The Shah was still at Qazvin when he heard that Sultan Moṣṭafā had been deposed, and that Sultan Aḥmad's son, Sultan 'Oṣmān, had been put on the throne.

The reason given for the deposition of Sultan Moṣṭafā, and one which makes sense, was that Kālīl Pasha, who was away in Dīār Bakr on an important campaign, had not been consulted, and it was contrary to Ottoman practice to make a decision of this kind without the advice of the grand vizier. The decision to put Sultan Moṣṭafā on the throne had been taken primarily by the *qızlar-āqāsī* and other nobles in Istanbul. Kālīl Pasha refused to accept their decision, citing in justification of his attitude Sultan Moṣṭafā's deranged mind, which was a fact known both to friend and foe and was responsible for a lack of confidence in the Sultan. He asserted that Sultan Moṣṭafā was not capable of holding such an important position as that of Sultan, and that Sultan Aḥmad's son 'Oṣmān, even though he was young, was a better man for the position; he would soon reach maturity, he said. As a result of all this, six months after the accession of Sultan Moṣṭafā the Ottoman nobles urged him to abdicate voluntarily in favor of Sultan 'Oṣmān, which he did, retiring once again to his habitual way of life as a recluse.

The Ottomans sent a long letter to Shah 'Abbas, embellished with a preamble, an enumeration of all his customary titles and the usual polite phrases. This letter was brought to the Shah at Qazvin by the *čavoš*, Ḥasan Aqa, and a retainer of Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān (Qāsem Beg himself had returned from his embassy to Istanbul after the accession of Sultan Moṣṭafā). The gist of the letter was as follows:

¹23 Rabī' I was a Tuesday.

It has pleased God to take the life of my father, Sultan Aḥmad, while he was in the prime of life and at the beginning of his reign. My esteemed uncle, Sultan Moṣṭafā, agreed to leave his solitary way of life and take charge of the state for a while, but he longed to return to this way of life, and has now agreed to do so and to hand over the throne to me. I have received ambassadors from near and far congratulating me on my accession. Kālīl Pasha, who was entrusted by my father with the task of settling the problems of the frontier with the *qezelbāš*, has now been given full authority by me to determine this question of peace or war.

When the Shah had perused this letter from Sultan 'Oṣmān, and another communication from Kālīl Pasha, he perceived in them a desire to make peace. To alleviate the lot of God's people, and prevent further strife, he accordingly reciprocated by sending as his ambassador to Kālīl Pasha Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Abharī, a vizier and member of the secretariat. His message was as follows:

In the time of Sultan Aḥmad, peace terms were negotiated through the good offices of Naṣūḥ Pasha and other well-wishers, and I sent as my ambassador to the Porte Qāzī Khan the *ṣadr*, a distinguished *seyyed* and theologian. In the presence of the *moftī*, the chief *qāzī*, and other Ottoman dignitaries, these peace terms were approved and further exchanges of envoys took place. Suddenly, without any infringement of the peace terms from this side, Sultan Aḥmad broke his oath and dispatched Öküz Moḥammad Pasha with a large army against Erīvān. Your Majesty well knows that this expedition led to nothing but loss of life among both the military and civilians. Sultan 'Oṣmān has now made you his plenipotentiary in the matter of peace and war; I still desire peace, and my terms are the same as before. If you are minded to conclude peace on these same terms, which were repeatedly agreed upon with Öküz Moḥammad Pasha, what could be better? God's servants will once more be able to live in peace and security, without being trampled underfoot by mar-

ching troops, and pilgrims to Mecca will once more be able to perform the pilgrimage unmolested, and will offer prayers for the continuance of both realms, and both parties will obtain rewards from such a policy. If, however, you desire war, I am ready for that too, and let fate decide between us.

After sending this message to Kālīl Pasha, the Shah marched toward Azerbaijan and spent several days in the summer quarters of Kālkāl. Of the great emirs, he retained at his side 'Isā Khan the *qūrčibāši*, 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, and a number of other principal officers of state and *moqarrabs*. The rest of the emirs he sent on to Tabriz to join Qarčaqāy Khan, the commander in chief, with orders to be ready for action.

Kālīl Pasha's March to Azerbaijan and Related Events

Shortly after the arrival of spring, Kālīl Pasha, having been joined by the frontier *sanjaq-begs* of Anatolia and Syria with their troops, left his winter quarters and marched toward Azerbaijan. En route, he was met by the Iranian ambassador Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn. Kālīl Pasha gave the previous ambassador, Qāsem Beg, leave to depart, and sent him back to the Shah with an envoy of his own and a message in which he declared his sincerity and his concern for the welfare of all Muslims. "The Shah knows well," he said, "that everyone has his enemies who find fault with him, and that troublemakers lurk on all sides who represent his virtues as defects and parade them before the eyes of all. By divine decree and the orders of the emperor, the Ottoman army is now on the march under my command. This action is made necessary by the interests of the state and the exigencies of the moment; I hope you will agree that 'the man who is only obeying orders is guiltless.' I cannot turn back and endure the taunts of my enemies. However, when our two armies near each other, I pray that God the Compassionate will find some solution which is in accordance with His will, with the well-being of his people, and with the interests of both parties."

Qarčaqāy Khan, stationed at Tabriz, learned that Kālīl Pasha had not given a clear answer on the question of peace and war, but had left the outcome in the hands of fate. Without express orders from the Shah, Qarčaqāy Khan could not give battle to the Ottomans; but in order to protect lives and property, he removed all civilians from re-

gions through which the Ottomans were likely to march, and he also evacuated all civilians from the city itself. He then awaited orders from the Shah. When the Ottomans reached Tabriz, they found the city stripped of military stores, and were unable to stay more than five days; on the sixth day, they moved to the village of Fahvasfanj, three *farsaks* southeast of the city.

The Shah meanwhile had moved from Kalkāl to Ardabīl, and had visited the tombs of Shaikh Ṣaḥī al-Dīn and his other illustrious ancestors to invoke their aid in the coming struggle. At Ardabīl, the Shah received in audience Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān and 'Oṣmān Aqa, Kalīl Pasha's ambassador, who uttered all manner of smooth and deceitful words. The Shah replied: "Since Kalīl Pasha talked of his desire for peace, I have thus far restrained the *qezelbāš* and have forbidden them to give battle. But your actions do not match your words, and to advance thus with so little circumspection can lead to only one result—battle." The Ottoman envoy made excuses; Kalīl Pasha's advance beyond Tabriz, he said, had been forced on him by lack of provisions; the Ottoman army had advanced to its present position so that it might not suffer hardship from lack of food during the peace negotiations; "in other words," he said, "we shall be your guests for a few days."

The Shah dismissed 'Oṣmān Aqa and sent Qāsem Beg back to Kalīl Pasha with appropriate messages. Although the Shah was fully confident that he would be the recipient of God's favor and of the support of all pure souls in the holy places, and although he had great faith in the ability of the holy spirits of the Safavid shaikhs to protect the region, nevertheless, just to be on the safe side, he ordered all civilians to be evacuated from Ardabīl and dispersed in the surrounding countryside, where they might be safe from harm. In addition, since the ambassadors had returned by way of Qarčaqāy Khan's camp at Saqīnsarā near Sarāb, prudence dictated that the location of the camp should be changed. A new campsite was selected, and the heavy baggage was sent on ahead.

The very morning that Qarčaqāy Khan proposed to strike camp and move to the new site, his scouts came in with the news that the Ottomans were close at hand and about to give battle. His emirs gathered around him in a great state of perturbation, because there was no time to inform the Shah and get instructions from him. While their council of war was still going on, the advance guard of the Ot-

toman army came in view and was almost upon them. The emirs had no alternative but to agree to fight, and Qarčaqāy Khan set about making his battle dispositions.

Qarčaqāy Khan's Victory over Kalīl Pasha and the Tartars, and the Conclusion of Peace

The following account of the battle is based on reports from reliable sources. Jānī Beg Gerāy, the ruler of the Crimean Tartars, had gone to the Ottoman commander in chief, Kalīl Pasha, together with a number of emirs, pashas, and prominent warriors from the area, and had discussed with him the problem of how to deal with the *qezelbāš*. "The Tartar army has been on Ottoman soil now for several years, waiting to invade Iran," they said, "and people's land and property have suffered heavily in consequence. No positive result can be expected from this policy. The Tartar army cannot remain longer in these regions, and insists on giving battle. We advise you," they said, "to give battle to Qarčaqāy Khan; if we are victorious, we have achieved our object. If we are defeated, at least we will not be taunted with cowardice and accused of failing in our duty." Although this plan ran counter to the negotiations in which Kalīl Pasha had been engaged, this group argued its case strongly and succeeded in convincing the Pasha that he ought to give battle. According to the most reliable account, the Tartar army at that time did not number more than fifteen thousand men, and Kalīl Pasha detailed an additional thirty-five thousand men, Ottomans and Kurds, under the command of Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, who held the rank of vizier. Others put the Ottoman forces at forty thousand men, and the total number of men committed to battle at sixty thousand; but the former account is the more reliable.

This combined Ottoman-Tartar army had left at night and marched from their camp at Areštanāb, situated four *farsaks* from the *qezelbāš* camp at Saqīnsarā. Qarčaqāy Khan stationed his household troops, some twenty thousand men, in the center; the Šāmlū *gāzis* and others were stationed on the right, under the command of Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū and Emāmqlī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, on the left; he then set his whole army in motion, and marched in battle array, with center, right and left wings, skirmishers and advance guard all in their proper stations, toward the enemy. The outriders of the two armies made contact at a place called Pol-e Šekasta (Broken Bridge), and heavy fighting ensued.

The Ottomans launched such determined attacks that they appeared to be getting the upper hand. Zeynal Beg Begdlū, fearing a Safavid defeat, led his Šāmlū centurions and *qūrčīs*, and his Afšārs of the Imānlū clan, in a furious charge against the Ottoman center, despite his inferiority in numbers. The impetus of his charge carried him to the heart of the Ottoman center, where he and his men inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Simultaneously, Emāmqolī Khan, who had fought off repeated Ottoman attacks on his sector, also led his men in a charge against the Ottoman center, which was thrown into disorder by this combined attack and turned to flee. Ḥasan Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, was taken prisoner by the *qūrčī* Šāh-geldī *ev-oğlū*; since Ḥasan Pasha was severely injured and was unlikely to live, he was put to death by the *qūrčī* and his head taken to Zeynal Beg. The latter sent it on the commander in chief. Moḥanımād Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān, was taken prisoner by a Šāmlū *qūrčī* of the Imānlū clan, and many other pashas and officers of note were either killed or captured.

Jānī Beg Gerāy's cousin, ŠāhIn Gerāy Khan, who had declared his allegiance to the Shah when the latter was in Georgia, was stationed in the Safavid vanguard, and the two cousins therefore confronted each other. Some of Jānī Gerāy's experienced men, apprehensive of some harm coming to the Khan, had persuaded him to move some distance away from his standard. When the Ottoman ranks broke, Jānī Gerāy at once turned and fled. Most of his men, however, fell beneath his standard, and his *vakīl*, Mīrzā Beg Aqa, who was his chief administrator (*jomlat al-molk*) and wielded immense power among the Tartars, was taken prisoner with some eighty Tartar princes and sons of emirs. Mīrzā Beg Aqa and a few others were spared; the rest were put to death. The Safavids captured some seventy or eighty Ottoman standards, termed *alay*, each belonging to a field officer.²

After his victory, Qarčaqāy Khan restrained his center, composed entirely of household troops, from pursuing the enemy, and sent couriers to recall the troops of his right and left wings currently engaged in pursuit of the Ottomans. He took these steps for several reasons: In the first place, he suspected that the enemy might have troops in reserve (called by the Turks *bosū*) ready to ambush the pursuers, and so military prudence dictated that he not commit his

²*Alay* in Turkish means an array or formation of troops (Gibb and Bowen, p. 51); see Gibb and Bowen, index, for the status and duties of the *alay-begs*.

center to action. Second, he had fought this battle without permission from the Shah, and so he did not dare to go further than he already had. Third, the day was drawing to its close. However, the Khan's orders were not obeyed to the letter, because his men's blood was up, and some of them slipped away and pursued the enemy as far as the Šebli pass, three *farsaks* from the battlefield, and returned in triumph. They kept quiet about the matter, in the manner of subordinates, and it only came to light later.

Qarčaqāy Khan sent an immediate report to the Shah and then marched to rejoin his heavy baggage, which had reached Kord-kandī. The next day, he took stock of the heads of the enemy dead, the captured weapons and standards, and congratulated those who had distinguished themselves in the battle. The names of about fifteen thousand enemy dead were recorded; the Safavid army, protected by God, did not lose a single officer of note. The *gōlām* Yūsuf Beg took the news of the victory to Ardabil, and was followed by Moḥammad Taqī Beg Tabrīzī, a chiliarch of the Azerbaijan regiment of musketeers, who gave the Shah fuller details and a complete list of the names of the prisoners. Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān; Mīrzā Beg Aqa-ye Tatār; and several other prisoners were presented to the Shah, who received them with kindness.

When the Ottoman survivors streamed back to Kālil Pasha's camp, the latter's first reaction was panic, thinking that the whole *qezelbāš* army would soon be about his ears. The sons of Kāndān Aqa, who had been in attendance on the Shah for some time and had made their escape during the expedition to Georgia and were currently in the Pasha's retinue, were familiar with *qezelbāš* practice. They assured the Pasha that no *qezelbāš* emir would dare to take independent action of this sort without instructions from the Shah. The battle which had just been fought had been forced on the *qezelbāš* emirs before they had had time to obtain orders from the Shah.

Their words reassured the Pasha, who started thinking rationally again. He advanced several stages and sent another envoy to the Shah to reopen peace talks. He talked more enthusiastically about peace than he had on the previous occasion, and he absolved himself from blame for the battle, blaming this on the Tartar ruler and a number of his less experienced officers. He asked the Shah to appoint as his ambassador a high-ranking *qezelbāš* officer, whom he could send to the Ottoman court furnished with a covenant regarding peace sealed

with the Shah's seal. Such a covenant, he said, would give assurance to well-disposed persons in both camps, and would be a guarantee to both parties that there would be no retreat from this position. Once the ambassador had made his formal greetings to the Ottoman Sultan, the peace negotiations could be carried on through the good offices of himself, and would be concluded to the Shah's satisfaction in a manner that protected the peace from future violations. Kālīl Pasha said in conclusion that he would stay a few days on Iranian territory as the guest of the Shah, to await the arrival of the ambassador bearing the Shah's covenant. During this time, no action would be taken by him which might prejudice the peace negotiations. After the Shah's plenipotentiary had arrived, said Kālīl Pasha, he would send back Mīrzā Moḥammad Ḥoseyn and the other servants of the Shah who were at his camp.

Shah 'Abbas had initially been willing to conclude peace on the basis of the treaty signed between Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Süleymān, and he had sent to the Porte Qāzī Khan the *şadr*, one of the most eminent *seyyeds* in the whole of Iran, with full powers to negotiate on these terms. Since then, Ottoman armies, for no apparent reason, had broken the truce by invading Iran. Although on every occasion Safavid arms had been victorious, the Shah had agreed, whenever the Ottomans once more wished to discuss peace, to make peace on the same terms as before, in case people should accuse *him* of having broken the truce for the sake of obtaining more advantageous terms. So on this occasion too, the Shah accepted Kālīl Pasha's excuses and released Moḥammad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Vān, who was a well-disposed person and an officer of great integrity, and several of the other prisoners. He also acceded to the Ottoman commander in chief's request to appoint a *qezelbaş* officer as plenipotentiary, and nominated as his ambassador Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Tāleš, who was an experienced officer of proven worth, just back from a mission to India. He had been promoted to the high office of *kolaḫā*. This officer was dispatched to Kālīl Pasha with the stipulated covenant, suitable gifts, and a friendly letter from the Shah.

Since Kālīl Pasha had substituted amity for enmity and had said that he and his men were the Shah's guests, the Shah's native generosity and his natural inclination to extend hospitality to his guests, be they friend or foe, led him to set aside the ordinary protocol regulating the behavior of the rulers of this world, and to send Kālīl Pasha and his officers the ingredients of a banquet. He accordingly

designated for the Pasha's use five hundred camel loads of flour, rice, cooking fat, sugar, candy, preserves, sheep, all kinds of fruit, and other foodstuffs, together with fodder for their animals. These supplies were sent to Qarčaqāy Khan, with orders to the commander in chief to deliver them to the Pasha whenever the time was right. When this news reached Kālīl Pasha, he at once struck camp and retired.

The Shah knew that the Ottomans always looked to the long-term advantage and were capable of great guile, and he had on numerous occasions learned by experience that their actions did not necessarily match their words. It occurred to him to wonder, therefore, whether Kālīl Pasha had been deceiving him on this occasion too, and his talk of peace was merely a ruse to keep the *qezelbāš* quiet and enable him to withdraw his troops in safety from Iran. He therefore instructed Qarčaqāy Khan and his emirs to shadow the Ottoman army as it withdrew. "I have given my covenant," he said. "If the Ottomans are sincere in their desire for peace, the Pasha must soon send a reciprocal covenant bearing his seal, for the Sultan has made him his plenipotentiary; this covenant must also be sealed by the other officers of the Ottoman state who are with him, such as the *qāzī* and the *moftī*, and must be sent to me by the hand of my earlier envoys who are still with him."

Following orders, Qarčaqāy Khan and the Safavid emirs shadowed Kālīl Pasha's army as far as Čaman-e Ak̄tākāna near Marand. At each stage, they camped so close to the enemy that each side could clearly see the other's tents. Kālīl Pasha was proposing to take no action until the new Iranian ambassador arrived, but the sons of Kāndān Aqa spoke frankly to him and to the Aqa of the Janissaries and the *qızlar-āqāsī*, both officers of the highest rank in the Ottoman empire. "The fact that the *qezelbāš* are shadowing us so closely," they said, "is a sure sign that they have received permission from the Shah to attack us if necessary. If you are serious about the peace negotiations you have initiated, you must send back the Shah's earlier ambassador with the covenant which they have requested, in terms acceptable to the Shah; do not quibble over matters of detail. If you do not do this, you had better be ready to fight the major battle which is undoubtedly imminent."

Since the Ottoman army had been seriously weakened by the loss of the Tartars and was beginning to look more and more ragged the nearer it got to Ottoman territory, the Pasha was of the opinion that

it was in no fit state to fight. He therefore decided to strengthen the bases of peace, and he dispatched to the Shah by the hand of Mīrzā Ḥoseyn a covenant sealed by himself, the *qāzī-ye 'ashar*, the *moftī*, and his senior army officers. When the latter reached Qarčaqāy Khan's camp, the Safavid commander in chief released to the Ottomans the Shah's gift of food, and forwarded Mīrzā Ḥoseyn to Ardabīl, where he was received by the Shah, who at once dispatched Yādegār 'Alī Sultan to Istanbul. The final stages of the conclusion of peace will be described in my account of events next year, God willing.

Qarčaqāy Khan returned with his troops to Torkomān-kandī near Garṃrūd, where he received orders to review his men and send them on leave. The Shah himself, with his personal attendants, returned to Tabriz, where he devoted his energies to restoring life to normal for the ordinary citizens of the area. Qarčaqāy Khan was appointed governor of the city and *amīr al-omarā* of the whole province of Azerbaijan. Safavid losses in this whole campaign had been extraordinarily light: apart from a few musketeers who lost their lives early on at Kosrow Shah near Tabriz, when they unexpectedly ran into a Tartar patrol, and four or five junior *qezelbaş* officers killed by musketballs in the battle at Pol-e Šekasta, no one else of note had been killed. God is the repository of all knowledge! The Shah, having ascertained the losses suffered by the peasants as a result of the passage of the Ottoman army through Azerbaijan, generously compensated them from the funds of the supreme *dīvān* for the full amount of their loss and something in addition. The peasants, overjoyed at the Shah's munificence, offered prayers for his well-being. The Shah then returned to Iraq.

The Arrival at the Shah's Court of Various Foreign Embassies

I have previously mentioned the dispatch by Jahāngīr, the Emperor of India, on a mission to Iran, of Mīrzā Barğordār, styled Khan-e 'Ālam. The latter was a leading Mogul emir, and belonged to the Barlās Čağatāy tribe, which traced its ancestry to İkü-Tīmūr; the Emperor used to address him as Bā'ī, meaning "My brother." He had traveled to Iran with the returning ambassador Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, and had remained for a while at Herat. This year, he continued his journey to the Shah's court. As the Shah was absent on campaign in Azerbaijan, he ordered a *moqarrab*, Kalb 'Alī Beg

Šāmlū, one of the aides-de-camp, to receive him and conduct him to Qom. The Indian ambassador proceeded to Qazvin with Yādegār 'Alī Sultan, and then turned south to Qom while the latter went on to the Shah's camp.

I happened to be in Qazvin on the day when Khan-e 'Ālam entered the city, and I saw the pomp and ceremony with which he arrived. Oldtimers said that never since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty had an ambassador from either Turkey or India come to Iran with such a magnificent retinue, and it is hard to imagine that, even in the days of the Ḳosrows or the Keyānīds, any embassy to the Shah's court that equaled the splendor of this embassy from India, come to do honor to Shah 'Abbas. Mighty kings of other countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have gladly established friendly relations with Shah 'Abbas, and a connection which is both material and spiritual, and love of the Shah is so firmly rooted in their hearts that they regard the mutual exchange of ambassadors between themselves and his court as conferring honor and prestige on themselves. God be praised for that!

When Khan-e 'Ālam set foot on the soil of Iran, he had with him about a thousand royal retainers and personal attendants, not to mention servants. Included among his retinue were two hundred falconers and huntsmen. Some of these people were sent back from Herat to India, but, on the day when Khan-e 'Ālam entered the city of Qazvin, he still had with him some seven or eight hundred retainers of the royal household, personal attendants, servants and zookeepers, together with ten huge elephants, equipped with gold howdahs and embellished with all kinds of trappings, and a variety of animals, including tigers, leopards, antelope, Indian lambs, cheetahs, rhinoceroses, talking birds, and water-buffalo which pulled various types of litters.

When the Shah returned from Azerbaijan to Qazvin, he summoned Khan-e 'Ālam. When the Indian ambassador neared the city, he was met by a group of the great emirs, who escorted him with honor into the city and saw him to his quarters in the Bāg-e Sa'adatābād. The following day, while the Shah was enjoying polo and archery practice in the Meydān-e Sa'adat, Khan-e 'Ālam was received and accorded an unwonted degree of royal favor. The Shah said, "The Emperor of India and I treat each other as brothers; he has called you his brother, and the brother of a brother is also a brother." Accordingly,

during the formal salutation, the Shah embraced Khan-e 'Ālam like a brother, and showered on him royal honors and many informal acts of kindness.

During the few days that Shah stayed at Qazvin, he held social gatherings in the Meydān-e Sa'adatābād every day, and Khan-e 'Ālam was honored by being invited to these. Khan-e 'Ālam wanted to display all the gifts he had brought from India; his idea was to display a few items each day to the Shah and in this way to prolong the proceedings. However, the Shah had other ideas; he wanted to travel via Gilān to Māzandarān to take part in the bell-hunt which, as I have mentioned before, is peculiar to that province and takes place at a fixed time. Time was getting short if he was to get there in time, and so he could not fall in with Khan-e 'Ālam's plan. The baubles of this world were not so important to the Shah as to justify his spending several days of his valuable time inspecting them and as a result missing the hunting in Māzandarān. He therefore allotted the Indian ambassador one day in which to display his gifts, and instructed him to show a few choice articles in each category, and to make a detailed list of the remainder and hand them over to the royal workshops, so that he might inspect them at his leisure. The Indian ambassador was extremely put out, but was forced to comply. He selected some three hundred items, including items of jewelery, bizarre objects, precious stuffs, and so on, and paraded them before the Shah in the Meydān-e Sa'adatābād. The Shah then left the royal workshops behind at Qazvin and rushed off to see this special type of wild boar hunt called the bell-hunt.

The Arrival of the Russian Ambassador

The Russian ambassador, who was a distinguished emir and ecclesiastic, arrived this year at Darband in Šīrvān after traversing the Kazar steppe and crossing the Caspian Sea, and he followed the royal progress from Ardabil to Qazvin, where he was received in the Meydān-e Sa'adatābād by Shah 'Abbas. Through the medium of an interpreter, he expressed the desire of his master, the Tsar, for a friendly alliance between their two countries, and delivered to the Shah a massive letter written in Turkish. He was received graciously and allowed to present the Tsar's gifts on the same day that the Indian ambassador presented his. The Tsar's gifts included a number of hunting falcons, of a type not found anywhere in the world except in Russia. The Shah gave one of these falcons to Khan-e 'Ālam. The Russian ambassador had indeed brought with him rare and unusual

gifts, and he was given permission to return to his own land by way of Gīlān, after he had been the recipient of much royal favor.

The Arrival of the Ambassador from the Qoṭbšāh, the Ruler of Golconda in the Deccan

A third foreign ambassador to arrive this year at the Shah's court was Shaikh Moḥammad Kātūn, a distinguished theologian and scholar. His father, Shaikh 'Alī Kātūn, who had acquired the sobriquet of Kātūn among that Arab family, had been one of the holy men in the employ of the Mašhad shrine during the reign of Shah Tahmasp, and had drawn a stipend from the shrine administration. During the Uzbek troubles in Khorasan, Shaikh Moḥammad Kātūn had migrated to the Deccan, and had entered the service of the Qoṭbšāh. Shaikh Moḥammad reached Qazvin in the company of Ḥoseyn Beg *qey-čāčī* (the tailor) Tabrīzī, who had been sent to the Deccan three years previously to offer the Shah's condolences on the death of Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh and his congratulations to his successor, Sultan Moḥammad, who was the nephew and son-in-law of the deceased ruler. Shaikh Moḥammad was received by the Shah. He presented a letter of friendship from the Qoṭbšāh and delivered the latter's gifts plus his own offerings.

After he had dealt with all these state matters, Shah 'Abbas left for Māzandarān for the hunting, and spent the winter at Faraḥābād in the congenial company of his guests and personal friends.

This year, the Uzbeks had been encouraged by the death of Ḥoseyn Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Khorasan, to raid that province in search of plunder, and about a thousand marauders under Yānaltegiš Bahādor and a number of other emirs from Balḵ and Bokhara camped near Ġūrīān. Ḥasan Khan had taken charge at Herat after the death of his father, Ḥoseyn Khan, and it was the consensus of the Šamlū officers and the officers from other *qezelbāš* tribes stationed at Herat that they should not meet the Uzbeks in the field but should defend the fortress at Herat. Yānaltegiš, realizing he could not take Herat, attacked Ġūrīān, which was stoutly defended by the vizier of Khorasan, Kāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ġūrīānī, who erected barricades in the streets. After heavy fighting, the Uzbeks failed to pierce the defenses. Meanwhile, Ḥasan Khan and Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan Özbek who, as previously related, had been driven to take refuge at Herat by the hostility of their cousins and were presently encamped outside the city, had conceived the excellent plan

of raiding the Uzbegs' baggage train, which had been left at Čičak-tū and Meymana. With some of their own men and a detachment of Šāmlūs, they plundered the baggage train and brought back large quantities of booty and animals. This action caused the immediate withdrawal of Yānaltegiš Bahādor.

Another event this year was the appearance of a number of celestial signs. The first of these was a slanting shaft of light, shaped like a sword, which was visible in the east nearly every morning; its tail pointed southward. The astrologers called it the "morning light." A few days after this, a fiery comet made its appearance in a north-easterly direction, sending off rays of light. It continued with extreme brilliancy for a month or six weeks, and remained visible, although with reduced brilliancy, for two or three months. The astrologers interpreted this to mean the onset of pestilence with heavy loss of life, and the imminence of wars and bloodshed. It would have its maximum effect, they said, in the east, north, and south, and would have less impact on Iran, which was the center of the civilized world. Despite this prediction, serious effects were felt in Iran as well as elsewhere: there were uprisings and wars in many countries, for instance between the Ottoman empire and the rulers of Europe,³ and there was fighting in Transoxania and Turkestan and elsewhere; in addition, various types of pestilence made their appearance in Gīlān and Māzandarān and other northerly regions, and many people died; and seditious mutterings among the common people affected even the upper classes.

Another occurrence this year was the quarrel between the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, and the comptroller in chief, Qavāmā Moḥammad Eṣfahānī. Each accused the other of malfeasance and misappropriation of *dīvān* funds, and each told his side of the story to the Shah. The Shah set up a board of inquiry consisting of the *šadrs* under the chairmanship of Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū, an aide-de-camp, to hear both parties and adjudicate between them. The board met in Farahābād; the comptroller in chief set forth a detailed list of charges, and the vizier made a rebuttal of each. The Shah divined that there was no substance in any of these accusations, which arose simply out of the mutual jealousy of the two parties, and so he closed the inquiry and the two parties concerned withdrew shamefacedly and said nothing further on the matter.

³The astrologers had not mentioned effects in the *west*!

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Hoseyn Khan Šāmlū, the *beglerbeg*, an old retainer of the Shah's. His length of service and excellent performance of his duties had earned him royal patronage and promotion. He had been governor of Herat and governor-general of Khorasan with full powers for twenty years,⁴ and the Shah, in his orders and letters of appointment, used to style him "my faithful old servant." He fell sick and died this year, and the Shah, in recognition of his services, ordered his body to be buried within the precincts of the shrine at Mašhad. His son, Ḥasan Khan, succeeded him in office and took over command of his troops.

2. Mahdīqolī Beg Čaġatāy, the master of the royal stables, a trusted retainer and *moqarrab*; he was a man of sound judgment. Early this year, when the Shah had reached Qazvin on his way from his winter quarters in Māzandarān to Azerbaijan, Mahdīqolī Beg fell ill, grew steadily weaker, and died at the beginning of Ša'bān 1027/end of July 1618. He was also buried at Mašhad. His sons were all too young to take on his office, which was therefore bestowed on another of the Shah's old retainers, 'Alī Beg Zangana, known as 'Alī Bālī.

3. Shah Nāzar Khan Tūkelī Čaġatāy, governor of Mašhad, fell ill and died this year. He was a valiant officer, whose excellent services had won him a governorship and the rank of khan. His first governorship was that of the province of Jām, and he was subsequently promoted governor of Mašhad. After his death, his nephew succeeded him as chief of the Tūkelī tribe, and held the post of governor of Jām.

⁴He was appointed in 1007/1598, after Shah 'Abbas's reconquest of Khorasan from the Uzbeks.

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Events of the Year of the Sheep, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1028/1618-19, the Thirty-third Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Nowrūz this year occurred on Thursday, 4 Rabi' II, 1028/20 March 1619.¹ The sun moved from the sign Pisces to that of Aries a few minutes after nine o'clock on the eve of the Thursday above-mentioned. The Shah celebrated Nowrūz at Ašraf, a small town in Māzandarān which had been developed by His Majesty. The *moqarrabs* and other members of the court presented the usual New Year's greetings to the Shah. At the conclusion of the Nowrūz celebrations, after the Shah had dealt with essential affairs of state, he decided to go hunting at Mīānkāl. He gave orders for beaters to gather from all over Māzandarān and drive the game to Mīānkāl.

Mīānkāl is a promontory surrounded on three sides by water, measuring approximately three *farsaks* in length and two-thirds of a *farsak* at the widest point, where it joins the mainland; from this point, the spit of land gradually becomes narrower, until it disappears into the ocean. Once the beaters had driven the game onto this promontory, they would block their way of escape by erecting a line of tents across the neck of the promontory; the hunters would then start the slaughter with their arrows and bullets. Wild animals from both mountain and plain were caught in the beaters' net, and included antelope, cheetah, leopard, and gazelle. The gnus, startled by the firing and the din made by the hunters, threw themselves into the water and swam as much as half a *farsak* offshore. When their strength was exhausted, they were forced to return to the shore, though some, seeing themselves trapped, tried without success to postpone the evil moment. Truly, it is a rare sight and a novel method of hunting. At several points, the Shah had had chalets constructed. He retired to these when he had had enough hunting, and made merrymery with his close companions and special friends. He bade the emirs, principal officers of state, nobles of the court, guests, and visitors known and unknown to join in the hunt, which went on for a week, the Shah moving to a different chalet every few days. At the end of a week, he dismissed the beaters and returned with his court to Farahābād, where he remained for another two months. In the third month after Nowrūz, when the weather began to grow hot, the Shah moved to Isfahan.

¹Text has Rabi' I, but this must be an error, since Nowrūz fell on 4 Rabi' II this year.

The Shah received news that *Ḳalīl Pasha* had returned to Istanbul, taking with him the Iranian ambassador and plenipotentiary, *Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ḳolafā*. The Shah decided to recall *Qarčaqāy Khan*, lest the continued presence near the frontier of the officer who was the commander in chief of the *qezelbaş* army might cause unease to the Ottoman nobles. He therefore appointed *Qarčaqāy Khan* governor of *Mašhad*, and the governorship of *Tabriz* reverted to *Šāhbanda Khan Pornāk*.

One of the curious events which occurred early this year can only be attributed to the calamitous effects of the comet, which had been predicted by the astrologers. While the Shah was still at *Ašraf*, a young Georgian named *Ramāz*, one of those who had declared their "love of the Shah," was murdered by a Georgian noble named *Ḥajna Beg*, who, with several of his brothers, was enrolled among the *gōlāms* of the royal household and who had a grudge against the murdered man. The Shah ordered the vizier of the supreme *dīvān*; *Kalb 'Alī Beg Šāmlū* the aide-de-camp, who at that time held the post of *dīvānbegī*; and *Ommat Beg Sīāh-manšūr*, the *dārūga* of *Farahābād*, to summon *Ḥajna Beg* and question him as to his motive for this crime. This tribunal was convened in the audience hall at *Farahābād*. *Ḥajna Beg* and two of his brothers presented themselves before the tribunal, and *Ḥajna Beg*, in response to questioning, admitted quite openly that he and his brothers had killed *Ramāz*.

Since they had admitted their guilt before the tribunal, the *dīvānbegī* wanted to arrest them and report to the Shah for instructions. Without waiting for permission from the vizier of the *dīvān*, he grabbed *Ḥajna Beg* by the belt, but the latter and his brothers promptly drew their swords and seriously wounded *Kalb 'Alī Beg*; and one of them made a thrust at the vizier. People ran in from all sides, but retreated again when they saw the gleam of cold steel. The assassins then forced their way into the private quarters of the palace; *Ommat Beg* the *dārūga* and some others who tried to bar their way were wounded, and two men were killed. Since they had violated the sanctity of the royal palace, which is a place of refuge for criminals, and had had the temerity to commit these dastardly acts, they merited the death penalty. *Ommat Beg* collected some more men and shot the murderers down in the private garden behind the palace.

Another event this year which could be attributed to the effects of the celestial signs involved *Amīrḳolī* of the Kurdish tribe of *Gar-*

rūs, one of the royal grooms. As a reward for excellent service, he had been made chief of the Garrūs tribe with the rank of sultan. While the Shah was in his summer quarters, Amīrqolī was visited at Isfahan by Tīmūr Khan, another groom and also of the Garrūs tribe, and a number of his colleagues. As they were leaving Amīrqolī's house after dining with him, Tīmūr Khan, apparently consumed with envy of his host, suddenly drew his sword and mortally wounded Amīrqolī, who was escorting them from the house; in the process of killing him, Tīmūr Khan broke his sword. One of Amīrqolī's servants seized the piece of broken sword and inflicted such a deep wound on Tīmūr Khan that the latter stirred no more. Tīmūr Khan's companions, a man named Alvand, also a royal groom, and his son, terrified of being implicated in Amīrqolī's murder, fled but were arrested shortly afterward and executed after having had both feet amputated. The Shah's wrath was also visited upon certain other members of the Garrūs tribe who had shown hostility toward Amīrqolī. The position of emir of the tribe was then conferred on Amīrqolī's son, Nafsqolī Sultan.

A third calamity which occurred this year was the collapse of a wall at Isfahan which buried some forty or fifty people; the bodies were still being dug out of the rubble two or three days later. This occurred in the middle of the month of Jomādā I 1084/beginning of May 1619, some forty days after Nowrūz.

The fourth calamity resulting from the malignant effect of the comet was an earthquake in parts of the Zāva and Moḥavvalāt districts of Khorasan. In the prosperous village of Dūḡābād, the shock was the greatest ever experienced. A reliable informant told me that the houses were so completely destroyed that the village resembled one huge mound of earth, with no trace of houses or walls remaining. Fortunately, most of the inhabitants were out in the fields at the time of the earthquake, but even so, some seven or eight hundred people lost their lives. About eighty of the victims were women who were taking part in a wedding reception at the bride's house. Through God's excellent wisdom, their rejoicing was turned to mourning. By a miracle, the bride herself was unharmed; when the earthquake started, in her panic she cowered between the door and the window, and the wooden beams protected her, thus providing an excellent illustration of the Koranic statement: "You will something only if God has willed it."²

²Koran, 76:31 and 81:30.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Bagrāt Khan, the son of Dā'ūd Khan b. Lūārsāb Khan Gorjī. Lūārsāb Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia province of Georgia, rebelled during the reign of Shah Tahmasp and met his death at the hands of the army of Qarābāg, as I related in book I. His son, Dā'ūd Khan, went to Shah Tahmasp's court, and was converted to Islam and appointed governor of Tiflis, the capital of Kartlia, which had come under the administration of the Safavid *dīvān*. Dā'ūd had sent his infant son, Bagrāt Khan, to Shan Tahmasp's court, and the lad had been brought up among the *qezelbāš* and had acquired a knowledge of philosophy. He had been appointed governor of Kartlia by Shah 'Abbas, but this year he fell ill at Tiflis and died. Shah 'Abbas, demonstrating his habitual magnanimity toward those who had served him well, appointed his son Simon, who was still a child, governor of Kartlia, with a Georgian noble who was a convert to Islam, Mūrāv Beg, as his *vakīl* and guardian.

2. 'Alī Pasha Rūmī, an eminent Ottoman emir and *beglerbeg* of Tabriz. As previously related, he had been the recipient of royal favor and had become a member of Shah 'Abbas's retinue. Last year, when Kalīl Pasha invaded Iran, 'Alī Pasha had discreetly retired to Mašhad, where he received an annual pension of three hundred Iraqi *tomān* in cash, and an allowance of about five hundred camel loads of wheat. He died this year, and received the signal honor of being buried within the precincts of the shrine. He had no legal heir in Iran, and so the Shah ordered his effects to be collected and sent to Anatolia in the care of the Ottoman ambassador, to be distributed there to any of his relatives who had a legal claim to the property, at the discretion of the *qāzīs* and religious authorities there.

Events of the Year of the Monkey, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1029/1619-20, the Thirty-Fourth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Friday, 15 Rabi' II, 1029/20 March 1620; the sun left the sign Pisces and entered the sign Aries at 5 A.M. that day. The Shah was at Isfahan for the Nowrūz celebrations.

The season was marked by the arrival of the Ottoman ambassador, Ebrahim Aqa, an experienced negotiator. He arrived with the returning Iranian ambassador, Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Kōlafā, and brought an affectionate letter from the Ottoman Sultan, 'Oṣmān. The Sultan assured the Shah in this letter of his sincere desire for peace. Through the good offices of the *moqarrabs*, Ebrahim Aqa received an audience with the Shah, who lavished marks of royal favor upon him. The Ottoman ambassador displayed to the Shah the gifts he had brought from the Sultan. The Shah had an equally friendly letter penned in reply to the Sultan, and sent it by the hand of the centurion Taḳta Beg Ostājilū, who last year held the office of *dārūga* of Isfahan. The new ambassador, bearing suitable gifts for the Sultan, set off in the company of Ebrahim Aqa.

Peace was thus concluded on the basis of the treaty signed by Shah Tahmasp and Sultan Sülaymān, with the following changes: (1) the district of Āḡesqa in the Georgian province of Meskhia, formerly Persian territory and now in Ottoman hands, should remain Ottoman territory; (2) the district of Dar-e Tang and Zanjīr, on the borders of Iranian territory and Arab Iraq, formerly Ottoman territory and now in Iranian hands, should remain Safavid territory. Both parties contracted to observe the status quo in these two regions and not make them the cause of further dispute. In all other respects, the terms of the earlier peace treaty were to apply. The Shah was reluctant to surrender Āḡesqa, but he agreed to these terms at the request of Kalīl Pasha and the other negotiators. At the request of Ebrahim Aqa, the Shah issued orders to his frontier emirs stating the terms of the agreement, and Ebrahim Aqa departed well satisfied. Thus peace descended on the frontier between the two empires; fate does not allow man to live in peace for long, but one may hope that an agreement which is in the best interest of all Muslims will have some durability.

The Shah's Scheme to Bring the Waters of the Kūrang River to Isfahan

The Kūrang River had its origin in two springs, one of the same name, the other named the Maḥmūdī spring. These waters issue from the mountains in the district of Rārūmzūj on the borders of Isfahan province, and flow south via Nahr-e Moqa'ar toward Kūh Gīlūya and Kūzestān, finally debouching in the Ṣaṭṭ al-'Arab. There is no mention of the Kūrang in the *Nozhat al-Qolūb*, the *Ṣovar-e Aqālm*, the *Masālek al-Mamālek*,¹ or other standard geographical works. According to current information, the waters from these two springs become one as they flow down from the mountains; their source lies across the watershed from the Zāyanda-rūd which flows through Isfahan. The Kūrang River, throughout its course from its source to the Ṣaṭṭ al-'Arab, flows through a steep gorge, and no land along its course is irrigated by it.

Shah 'Abbas had long had a scheme to divert the waters of the Kūrang, link them with the Zāyanda-rūd, and increase Isfahan's water supply, so the inhabitants of the city might not suffer from a shortage of water in a dry year. The extra water would also permit additional acreage to be brought under cultivation or planted with orchards. The vizier of Isfahan, Mīr Faẓlollāh Ṣāhrestānī, was first put in charge of the plan. The chief difficulty was that a lofty mountain massif lay between the headwaters of the Kūrang and those of the Zāyanda-rūd. Mīr Faẓlollāh had hired miners and well diggers, who tunneled away at the rock and made as much progress as they could, but finally gave up in despair. The work had been abandoned. The Shah, however, had refused to let go of the idea, and for several years he kept sending teams of masons and engineers. But certain short-sighted, faint-hearted people kept declaring that the project was impossible, and the scheme, splendid though it was, was allowed to lapse.

A few years ago, the Shah sent Moḥebb 'Alī Beg, the *lala* (guardian) of the *ḡolāms*,² who was in charge of the administration of the royal palaces in Isfahan, with a team of experienced engineers and others, to have another look at the feasibility of the project. This team re-

¹The Road Books: Ninth-century works which give details of the principal routes of the Islamic empire, together with information on the revenues, products, and so on of the different regions (see *Le Strange*, pp. 11ff.).

²See *TAI*, pp. 57, 127-28.

ported that the scheme was feasible on the following conditions: the waters of the Kūrang must be dammed to raise the water level eighty meters; and a tunnel must be bored through the mountain, three thousand meters long, at a depth of one hundred and fifty meters. If this were done, water would flow from the dam in the direction of Isfahan. The Shah gave orders for work to start.

Lala Beg assured the Shah that he could complete the work in four or five years, and the Shah told him to start. But it was an enormous project, and the Shah was looking for some way of completing the work in his lifetime, so that he could thereby acquire fame in this world as well as gaining reward in heaven, and he had no confidence in Lala Beg's ability to complete the work in the contracted time. So this year, the Shah put Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, in charge of the mining operations, and made Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and the chief of the Baḳtīārī tribe, at this moment Jahāngīr Khan, responsible for construction of the dam; he allocated funds to meet their expenses and to enable them to collect the necessary materials. It was agreed that they should have this year for the collection of materials, and be ready to start construction next year. Builders and stone masons were gathered from all over the country, and the Shah ordered the populace of Fārs, Isfahan, and Lorestān to help in the work of excavation against receipt of wages. The emirs set to work with a will. God grant that the Shah may see this project brought to a successful conclusion!

Some mean-spirited people consider the project to be impossible because, they say, the core of the mountain massif will probably turn out to be a slab of solid rock which no drillers can penetrate. Furthermore, they say, the scene of operations is in an extremely cold region, which has cold weather and frost for four or five months of the year, during which time no work can be carried on. At that rate, they say, the five years needed to complete the job will extend to twenty years; and one must not forget that, during the whole of this time, there will be other little problems to contend with, such as directing armies in the field, defending the realm against its enemies, and so on. It is true that the project is one of extreme difficulty, but the Shah, in defiance of majority opinion, has devoted all his energies to the task. It should not be forgotten that, with God's assistance, he has already accomplished many tasks during his lifetime which were said to be impossible. God grant that he may add this to his list of achievements!

The Dispatch of Ambassadors to the Mogul Court, to the Porte, and to the Deccan

Early this year, the Indian ambassador Khan-e 'Ālam obtained permission to depart, and one of the Shah's personal attendants at court, Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū the *tūšmālbāši* (superintendent of the royal kitchens), was nominated ambassador to India. Khan-e 'Ālam was furnished with a magnificent robe of honor, munificent gifts of cash, quantities of precious stuffs, and Arabian horses. The value of what he was given when he left Iran, plus the value of everything he had been given during his stay in the country, amounted to more than fifteen thousand Iraqī *tomān*, not counting the cost of the requisitions on the *dīvān* made by the *moqarrabs* and nobles of the court and by the governors of Khorasan, nor the cost of the gifts the Shah sent to the Mogul Emperor, which included jewelry; precious stuffs from Turkey, Europe, Russia, and Iran; rare items from many places; and countless numbers of Arabian horses.

One of the rare items was a turban decoration composed of egret's feathers, the choicest that could be found, selected from thousands of feather's and studded with rubies and pearls. One of the rubies was of a size and luster not to be found in the treasury of any mighty king. Jewelers had appraised its value at seven thousand *tomān*, if not more. On it was inscribed the name of Mīrzā Oloğ Beg b. Šāhroğ b. Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān; it had passed into the possession of Shah Esma'il I, and since then had been handed down to each of his successors and had been deposited in the royal treasury. The Shah also sent to the Mogul Emperor a fraternal portion of the gifts which the Ottoman ambassador had brought to Iran this year, together with a letter of friendship.

The ambassadors from the Deccan were also given leave to depart, laden with gifts and favors. Ṭāleb Beg *ev-oğlū* was nominated ambassador to Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, the ruler of Bijāpūr, and traveled with the returning ambassador from the Deccan, Mīr Kalīl the calligrapher. Qāsem Beg the commander in chief of Māzandarān was nominated ambassador to Sultan Moḥammad Qoṭbšāh, the ruler of Golconda, and accompanied the latter's returning envoy Shaikh Moḥammad Kātūn. Darvīš Beg was dispatched as ambassador to the Neẓāmšāh, the ruler of Aḥmadnagar in the Deccan; Darvīš Beg came of a family of *seyyeds* from Marāğa, and was enrolled among the Šāmlūs who were retainers of the royal stirrup. Darvīš Beg died in Shiraz, and his son, Moḥammadī Beg, was appointed in his place.

The Conquest of the Province of Dūraq and the Capture of the Fort There

In the time of Shah Tahmasp, the province of Dūraq had been under the jurisdiction of the *qezelbaş* emirs who governed Kūh Gīl-ūya. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, confusion reigned, as upstarts arose in every corner of the empire. Seyyed Mobārak seized possession of the Jazīra region of 'Arabestān from the Afšārs and incorporated it in the Ḥavīza district, which his father, Seyyed Moṭṭaleb, had ruled for years. Since Seyyed Moṭṭaleb and Seyyed Mobārak declared their allegiance to the Safavid crown, they were left in possession of the territory they had acquired, and this territory has remained in their possession until the present time. After the slaying of Seyyed Rāšed, the ruler of Ḥavīza, which I shall describe below, Seyyed Salāmat seized power and strengthened the fort. This year, Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, acting on orders from the Shah, took a body of troops to Dūraq and laid siege to the fort there. Seyyed Salāmat saw no alternative but to surrender the fort and retire to Ḥavīza, and the province of Dūraq came once again under Safavid jurisdiction.

The death of Seyyed Rāšed had come about as follows: Afrāsīāb Pasha, the governor of Bašra, had sent a detachment of troops against one of his enemies, Ḥasan b. Yāzījī, who ruled the territory adjacent to that of Seyyed Rāšed. Ḥasan had sought assistance from Seyyed Rāšed, who had responded by leading a force of Arab tribesmen to his aid, and this action had caused the Ottoman troops to withdraw to Bašra.

After the death of Seyyed Mobārak, some Ḥavīza Arabs of the Āl-e Foẓeyl tribe had gone to Bašra and entered the service of Afrāsīāb Pasha. Seyyed Rāšed now demanded the repatriation of these Arabs, and the latter agreed to leave Bašra and return to their homes; but Seyyed Rāšed did not believe them, and became more and more importunate in his demands that they return. Eventually, he was foolish enough to march several stages toward Bašra to fetch them, and he pressed on with a small body of men even after most of his men refused to accompany him. The Āl-e Foẓeyl, now thoroughly frightened of him, came out to fight, and in the battle Seyyed Rāšed was killed. It is not clear whether he was slain by one of the Bašra group of Āl-e Foẓeyl, or by one of the same tribe among his own troops. The probabilities are that his killer was one of his own men who had been incited to slay him by kinsmen in the Bašra group.

After the death of Seyyed Rāšed, the Ḥavīza Arabs split into three groups. One group remained loyal to the Shah, rallied around 'Abdollāh Loqmān, and held the forts of Maškūk and Ḥavīza-ye Kūček; they sent a report on the situation to the Shah.

Another occurrence this year was the messianic uprising stirred up by the deceitful *seyyeds* of Gīlān. Although all men are inclined to listen to the evil promptings of Satan and to fill their heads with perverse ideas, the people of Gīlān are more prone to this sort of thing than most men; they are always ready to lend their support to unlawful and dangerous enterprises without giving a thought to the outcome of their actions. This year, a number of deceitful *seyyeds* conceived the sort of crazy idea which arises from the consumption of too much Indian hemp. One of them, Seyyed Moḥammad by name, proclaimed himself to be the messenger and deputy of the Hidden Imam, and nominated several other people his *kalīfas* and missionaries (*dā'iān*). To begin with, he sent two men to the Shah to give him the good news of the manifestation of the Hidden Imam. Next, he published letters of appointment in the name of the Shah, sealed with his own seal after the manner of princes, and circulated them throughout Māzandarān; in these documents, he announced that he was the messenger of the Hidden Imam, and that so-and-so were his *kalīfas* and missionaries. His representatives duly reached the Shah and were regarded with disbelief and astonishment at court; the wits at court had great fun with the incident. Men were sent to bring Seyyed Moḥammad to court with honor. On arrival he stuck to his story, and was judged to merit the death penalty because of his foolish and insane behavior. When brought to execution, he confessed the falsehood of his claim, but it was considered best to proceed with the execution as a warning to other foolish people who might be tempted to make similar claims.

This year, an argument broke out between the viziers and the secretarial staff; this may be attributed to the influence of the stars, and in particular to the effect of the immersion of the planet Mercury and the departure of Jupiter from its normal path, because members of the bureaucracy are subject to the influence of these two planets. Qavāmā Moḥammadā Kafrānī Eṣfahānī, the comptroller in chief, had a dispute with Kāja Moḥammad Reżā Fadavī, who had been vizier and superintendent of financial affairs in Azerbaijan and Šīrvān for ten years, when he came to audit the latter's accounts. He claimed that Kāja Moḥammad was in arrear with his payments to the

divān, and the *Kāja* denied it. The case was heard on several occasions in the *divān*; both sides put their case before the Shah, and the verdict was that a large sum of money was owed to the *divān*. The *Kāja*'s case was that he was not guilty of embezzling *divān* funds; any arrears of tax due were shown in the detailed accounts verified by his local agents on the spot. The Shah decreed that the arrears of tax due to the *divān* should be shown as arrears in the *Kāja*'s account, and that demands for payment should be sent to the taxpayers in respect of the amount for which each individual was responsible. If anyone claimed he had already paid, or if it was discovered that the *Kāja*'s agents had embezzled the money, the matter was to be settled between the parties concerned. If the taxpayers raised no protest, they were to pay the arrears of tax. The Shah then bound both parties over to keep the peace.

However, in the course of the hearings before the *divān*, the comptroller in chief and the vizier had said some pretty hard things about each other, and the vizier had accused the comptroller in chief and the other secretaries of the royal secretariat of false practice and dereliction of duty. These charges had caused the Shah to become a little suspicious of some of the members of the secretariat, and he had several people arrested and threatened with prosecution. One of these was Aqa 'Azīz Eṣfahānī, who was the *avāraja-nevīs*³ of Khorasan, and an opium addict; he was arrested and placed in the custody of the aide-de-camp Tīmūr Beg *ev-oğlū*. The Shah decreed that his punishment should be that he should be deprived of opium.

The following day Tīmūr Beg, feeling sorry for 'Azīz Eṣfahānī, brought him some opium, but the latter refused it; "The Shah himself," he said, "who is my spiritual director and patron, decreed with his own lips that my punishment was to be deprived of opium. You are disobeying the Shah's wishes. Perhaps the Shah wants to make my punishment more severe by torturing me in this way. I will not act contrary to the Shah's will. If the Shah has forgiven me, well and good; if not, I pray for his well-being." Tīmūr Beg related what had happened to the Shah, and swore by the dust beneath the Shah's feet that he had assured 'Azīz Eṣfahānī that the Shah's words were to be taken as a joke, or as a measure of his displeasure of the moment with the officials under suspicion, and that the Shah had not really

³The *avāraja-nevīs* was the keeper of the *avāraja* books. What exactly these were is open to some argument (see *TM*, pp. 144ff.), but it is probable that they were cash-books in which payments made by individual taxpayers were recorded.

intended to cause him physical discomfort by depriving him of opium. 'Azīz Eṣfahānī, he said, as a result of not having consumed his regular dose of opium, was shaking all over, and his body was twisted by spasms of pain, but he kept on refusing the opium. The Shah relented and gave him permission to take the opium.

All the members of the secretariat who were under suspicion were fined according to their status, and Kāja Moḥammad Reżā's agents were given leave to enter in the royal register the number of cases of malfeasance or dereliction of duty, and to report to the Shah. In compliance with this order, Kāja Moḥammad Ma'sūm, who was chief accountant of Azerbaijan on behalf of Kāja Moḥammad Reżā, and Kāja Malek Aḥmad Eṣfahānī, a tax collector (*moqarrer*) and an enemy of the comptroller in chief, moved into the royal secretariat. They installed a scribe in each department and began a systematic examination of the annual account books and the registers of arrears. They were given six months to complete the job, but during this period Qavāmā Moḥammadā died, and the whole matter was allowed to lapse.

The Shah's Illness and Subsequent Recovery, by the Grace of God

One of the evil effects the astrologers had stated would result from the appearance of the comet last year was the onset of pestilence, which would be universal but would have its maximum effect in northern regions. The Shah, at the conclusion of the hearings in the *divān* concerning the civil service, went to Māzandarān, and became seriously ill there partly as a result of the unhealthiness and excessive heat of the climate, and partly as a result of the influence of the stars. He had a high fever, but despite his weakness and the persistence of the fever, moved to the summer quarters of Fīrūzkūh and Damāvand.

The same pestilence struck down large numbers of the court, and men of every station in life took to their beds. Many of the common people and some of the nobility died, and the names of these notables are recorded below. Prayers and alms were offered for the Shah, who gradually recovered his strength. After his restoration to health, he planned a pilgrimage to the shrine of the Imam Reżā at Mašhad, but when he got as far as the Semnān and Dāmḡān region, the need to attend to various matters of state caused him to abandon his plan and go instead to Farahābād, where he spent the winter.

This year, Shah 'Abbas took steps to rehabilitate the Kakhetia province of Georgia, which had suffered heavily as a result of his various punitive expeditions to the area. He planned to move some tribes into the area to settle there, bring the land once more under cultivation, and restore the buildings. He hoped that any Georgians who had escaped by fleeing into the mountains or by taking refuge in other parts of Georgia would return to their former homes and resume their normal lives once they realized that the Shah's anger was assuaged. Țahmūraṣ, who by his intransigence had brought such terrible retribution on his country, was now a stateless refugee. Accordingly, the Shah appointed Peykar Sultan İğirmī-dört⁴ governor of Kakhetia, with the rank of khan, and ordered him to proceed there from Qarābāḡ with his whole tribe, and to make his base in the vicinity of the fortress of Qırlānqūč. He was also to take with him members of any other tribes who were suitable for settlement in Kakhetia. Peykar Khan accordingly moved to Kakhetia and encouraged the scattered Georgians to return by promises of amnesty. The province was gradually restored to prosperity.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Abū Țāleb Mīrzā, Shah 'Abbas's brother, who was incarcerated at Alamūt.

2. Delī Moḥammad Sultan Šams al-Dīnlū, an emir from Qarābāḡ and *moqarrab* at court. He fell ill at Isfahan and refused either to have proper treatment or to abstain from eating and drinking unsuitable things. He died at Farahābād. His brother Salīm Beg was made emir of the Šams al-Dīnlū tribe.

3. Morteżāqolī Khan Gaskarī, the son of Amīra Sīāvoš, ruler of Gaskar. He had been brought up since infancy at the Safavid court, and was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*. He fell ill at Farahābād and Fīrūzkūh, and the treatment prescribed by the physicians had no effect. He was moved from Damavand to Tehran for a change of air and water, and died there. Since his sons were still infants, the position of ruler of Gaskar was conferred in the first instance on Behbūd Khan Čerkes, and subsequently on Yūsuf Sultan, a *ḡolām* of the royal household.

4. Ḥakīm 'Enāyatollāh Yazdī, one of the royal physicians, and a 'A Qajar clan.

good one. His wife was the daughter of Mowlānā al-Dīn Ḥakīm Yazdī, a physician renowned for his shrewdness and intellectual powers. She was an attendant in the royal harem, and Ḥakīm 'Enāyatollāh himself was closer to the Shah than any of the other royal physicians. The Shah often used to have private conversations with him, and had great trust in him. He died at Fīrūzkūh after a short illness.

5. Qavāmā Moḥammadā, the comptroller in chief of finance. He was born at Kafrān in the district of Isfahan, and was of noble birth. On Monday⁵ 10 Ramaẓān 1029/9 August 1620, without any previous warning and while he was busy in his office, he suffered a stroke and became unconscious. He remained in a coma for the rest of that day and throughout the night, and the physicians of Isfahan could not agree on a diagnosis. Some diagnosed his condition as a severe faint; others said that some bad humors had poisoned his stomach; still others said that an excess of bad blood had rendered him unconscious. The following morning the physicians decided to bleed the patient, and they drew off about eighty *meṣqāls* of blood; after being bled, the patient grew rapidly weaker and died. After his death, some declared that they saw indications that he had been poisoned. True knowledge is with God!

His body lay for a while on the dais of the theological seminary near his home, and was subsequently transported to Arab Iraq for burial at Karbala. He was a man of noble character, concerned for the well-being of others. The chronogram giving the date of his death is: "When Qavāmā died, his good reputation survived."⁶ The office of comptroller in chief was conferred on Mīrzā Sa'īd, the grandson of Kāja Qāsem who was comptroller in the time of Shah Tahmasp. He was a pious man, not in the least avaricious.

⁵10 Ramaẓān was a Sunday.

⁶*Qavāmā čū šod, nām-e nikaš bemānd*-1029 A.H.

Events of the Year of the Fowl, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1030/1620-21, the Thirty-fifth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

This year, New Year's Day fell on Saturday,¹ 25 Rabi' II, 1030/19 March 1621. On that day, at 9:11 A.M., the sun moved from the sign Pisces to that of Aries. The Shah celebrated Nowrūz in Māzandarān, and enjoyed himself by taking a holiday and hunting. Slightly more than two months later, when the weather began to turn hot, the Shah moved to Isfahan.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred at the Beginning of This Year

Takta Beg Ostājilū, the centurion, returned from his mission to the Porte, bringing with him a distinguished Ottoman ambassador, Moḥammad Aqa, who bore a most friendly letter from the Ottoman Sultan and other similar letters from the Ottoman viziers and principal officers of state, all relating to the cementing of peace between the two empires.

The ruler of Kīj and Makrān, Malek Mīrzā, visited the Shah's court at this time. These provinces, which are adjacent to the provinces of Thatta and Sind, are dependencies of the Mogul empire and give nominal allegiance to the Emperor. Because of the great distance from them to Agra and Delhi, the Emperor is satisfied with nominal tribute, and in return for this concession the rulers of these provinces do not cause trouble on the frontier. These provinces are adjacent to the provinces of Kerman, Sīstān, and Hormūz, which are part of the Safavid empire. Some years ago, as I have already mentioned, the Shah decided to subjugate the Makrān area, and sent a force under Ganj 'Alī Khan, the governor of Kerman, against Bon Fahl, a dependency of Makrān and the seat of government of Malek Šams al-Dīn, one of the princes of the region. This force had stormed the fort there and had brought Malek Šams al-Dīn back with it to court.

The Shah had then issued admonitory letters to the ruler of Makrān, Malek Mīrzā, and had sent these by the hand of Malek Ḥoseyn, one of the princes of Sīstān. Malek Mīrzā, who was the most import-

¹25 Rabi' II was a Friday.

ant prince in those parts, had heard reports of the power of Shah 'Abbas, and he was torn between hope and fear as to whether he should visit the Shah to pay his respects. Finally, this year he came to Isfahan, where the Shah rewarded him for this demonstration of loyalty by giving him a hat, a sword belt, a horse and bridle, and other presents. The Shah confirmed him in control of his hereditary lands, and he returned to Makrān rejoicing.

This year, 'Abd al-Raḥīm Kāja, the son of Kāja Kalān, arrived at the Iranian frontier at Marv with the intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca. 'Abd al-Raḥīm came from a family of *seyyeds* of Bokhara known as the Jūybārī *seyyeds*, who had great influence in the area and were greatly esteemed by the Uzbeg rulers, under whose patronage their power increased above that of the other *seyyeds* of Transoxania. From Marv, 'Abd al-Raḥīm Kāja traveled to Isfahan to present himself to the Shah before proceeding on his way to Mecca. All the *šadrs*, *seyyeds*, and *'olamā* turned out to meet him, at the Shah's order, and escorted him into the city on Wednesday,² 23 Ša'bān 1030/13 July 1621, and allotted him suitable quarters. As a mark of great respect, the Shah visited him at his lodgings and furnished him with provisions and a lodging allowance while he was in the capital. While at Isfahan, 'Abd al-Raḥīm fell ill, and the Shah sent messengers daily to inquire after his health. The Kāja was eventually restored to full health, but by that time the season for the pilgrimage had passed, and he was forced to abandon his plan to perform the pilgrimage this year.

The Shah Again Turns His Attention to the Kūrang Scheme

The Shah, who has been extremely keen on the Kūrang scheme, decided this year to go in person to the site to see how work was progressing. He spent several days in the area, informing himself thoroughly on the merits and defects of the scheme, and giving his emirs working on the project lengthy instructions. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs; Ḥoseyn Khan, governor of Lorestān; Jahāngīr Khan Baḳtārī; Šaḥīqolī Khan, governor of Hamadan, and the nobles from Fārs and Isfahan who were working on this project had been exerting themselves to the utmost in constructing the dam and tunneling through the mountain. Let us hope that the scheme is completed to the Shah's satisfaction.

The Province of Ḥavīza Is Conferred on Seyyed Maṣṣūr

After the death of Seyyed Rāšed, previously reported, affairs in

²23 Ša'bān was a Tuesday.

ʿArabestān fell into disorder, each of the Arab chiefs aspiring to make himself supreme. The Shah summoned to Isfahan Seyyed Maṣṣūr, the brother of Seyyed Mobārak, who had been sent into exile at Astarābād in order to prevent the accession of Seyyed Rāšed from being disputed. The Shah now appointed Seyyed Maṣṣūr governor of ʿArabestān and conferred on him the rank of khan. Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and ʿAlī Sultan Čaġatāy, the governor of Šūštar, were ordered by the Shah to supervise his installation. ʿAbdollāh Loqmān, who held Ḥavīza-ye Kūček, surrendered to him the forts of Maškūk and its dependencies, and swore allegiance to him. Seyyed Tahmasp, who had been thinking of opposing him, saw no alternative but to give his allegiance to him and surrender the territory he had seized. Their mission accomplished, the two emirs returned to their respective posts.

The Attack on the Portuguese at Hormūz

The Portuguese who had established themselves on the island of Jarūn (Hormūz) had repeatedly resorted to trickery and guile, had acted in an unbecoming fashion, and had broken the sworn oaths and covenants they had made with the Muslim governor of Jarūn when they first set foot on the island. They had built a fort on the island of Qešm, from which Jarūn derived its water supply, stationed a garrison, and developed quite a colony there. Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, notified the Shah of the Portuguese action, and sent a force to destroy the fort. The story of this expedition will be given in the course of my account of events of the year 1031/1621-22.

The Conversion of a Number of Christians to Islam

This year the Shah decreed that those Armenians and other Christians who had been settled in Farīdūn, on the borders of Baġ-tīārī territory, and had been given agricultural land there, should be invited to become Muslims. Life in this world is fraught with vicissitudes, and the Shah was concerned lest, in a period when the authority of the central government was weak, these Christians, if they preserved their present status as *zemmīs*,³ might be subjected to attack by the neighboring Lor tribes (who are naturally given to causing injury and mischief), and their women and children carried off into captivity. In the areas in which these Christian groups re-

³Non-Muslims (principally members of other revealed religions, including Jews and Christians) to whom the early Muslim community had extended hospitality and protection under a contract termed *zemma* (see *EI*³, Vol. II, pp. 227ff.).

sided, it was the Shah's purpose that the places of worship which they had built should become mosques, and the muezzin's call should be heard in them, so that these Christians might assume the guise of Muslims, and their future status accordingly be assured.

The *seyyed* Emir Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, the royal *majles-nevīs*, was entrusted with the task of ensuring their conversion; his family had been servants of the Safavid house for generations, and he himself had grown up from infancy under the Shah's tutelage, and was distinguished among his peers by his closeness to the Shah and the degree of trust the Shah placed in him. Some of the Christians, guided by God's grace, embraced Islam voluntarily; others found it difficult to abandon their Christian faith and felt revulsion at the idea. They were encouraged by their monks and priests to remain steadfast in their faith. After a little pressure had been applied to the monks and priests, however, they desisted, and these Christians saw no alternative but to embrace Islam, though they did so with reluctance. The women and children embraced Islam with great enthusiasm, vying with one another in their eagerness to abandon their Christian faith and declare their belief in the unity of God. Some five thousand people embraced Islam. As each group made the Muslim declaration of faith, it received instruction in the Koran and the principles of the religious law of Islam, and all bibles and other Christian devotional material were collected and taken away from the priests.

In the same way, all the Armenian Christians who had been moved to Māzandarān were also forcibly converted to Islam; this task was entrusted to Mowlānā Moḥammad 'Alī Tabrizī. Most people embraced Islam with sincerity, but some felt an aversion to making the Muslim profession of faith. True knowledge lies with God! May God reward the Shah for his action with long life and prosperity!

The Shah's Expedition to Khorasan, Which Was Dictated by the Needs of the State, and Associated Events

The Shah had long had the ambition to recapture Kandahar, which was the hereditary territory of the Safavid dynasty. As I related in book I, Kandahar had fallen into Mogul hands, but Shah 'Abbas, since he was on friendly terms with the Mogul Emperor, had not wished to jeopardize these good relations by taking steps to recover it. He had therefore generously left it under Mogul control,

even though he had had to suffer the jeers of his enemies and the taunts of idle people. Last year, he had discussed the situation frankly with Khan-e 'Ālam, the Indian ambassador.

Recently, the Shah had learned from the reports of travelers and the statements of well-wishers of the Safavid dynasty that certain troublemakers and flatterers at the Mogul court were encouraging Emperor Jahāngīr not to return Kandahar. The Shah accordingly decided to march to Khorasan in order to resolve the problem of Kandahar in a manner satisfactory to both parties, if possible without rupturing the friendly relations between the two countries. At the same time, the Shah intended to visit condign punishment on the Uzbeks for the various incursions they had made into Khorasan during the years he had been fully occupied with the Ottoman threat in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Only this year, a band of Uzbek marauders from Balk had surprised the *qezelbāš* garrison at Balā Morḡāb and slaughtered them, taking the commandant of the fort, a Šāmlū officer, prisoner to Balk. The Uzbeks had occupied the fort and had raided Bādḡīs, killing and capturing a number of Šāmlūs. The previous year, Rostam Moḥammad Khan b. Valī Moḥammad Khan, who was camped in the vicinity of Balk hoping to get an opportunity to seize the city with *qezelbāš* assistance, had raided the Andekūd and Šoborḡān regions with a force of some two or three thousand Uzbeks who had rallied to his colors, and had caused considerable damage there.

In revenge, the Uzbeks this year had sent a large army against Rostam Moḥammad Khan to the Owba and Šāqolān region. Rostam Moḥammad Khan got wind of the approach of the Uzbek army and retired to Herat. The inhabitants of the Owba and Šāqolān regions had taken refuge in their forts, and the Uzbeks had severely ravaged both districts before returning. In addition, a certain Qarā Toḡma, an Uzbek officer in command of skirmishers who had invaded Khorasan some years before, been soundly defeated, and had an undistinguished career since that time, this year moved into the Čaqčārān district of Ġarjestān and built a fort there, hoping to ambush Rostam Moḥammad Khan and take him prisoner. For all these reasons, the Shah decided on an expedition to Khorasan and issued general mobilization orders.

The Shah delayed his departure to Khorasan because of another bout of sickness, and ordered his troops to assemble at Nishapur for

the winter and to await his arrival. The officers involved were 'Isā Khan, the commander of the *qūrčīs*; 'Alīqolī Khan, the *dīvānbegī-bāšī*, in command of the junior officers of the court and their retainers; Manūčehr Beg, the son of Qarčaqāy Khan the Safavid commander in chief and himself a centurion of the *golāms*, in command of the *golāms* and musketeers. A further account of this expedition will be given under the events of next year.

The Dispatch of an Ambassador to the Safavid Court by the Uzbek Princes, to Negotiate Peace

As soon as they heard of the Shah's proposed expedition to Khorasan, the Uzbek and Čağatāy chiefs of Transoxania were filled with consternation. The Uzbek princes regretted their indiscretions and asked the Shah for forgiveness. Nadr Moḥammad Khan, the brother of the ruler of Transoxania Emāmqolī Khan, either on his own initiative or at the suggestion of his brother, sent an ambassador to the Shah in the shape of his *čūra-āqāsī* (officer in charge of the court pages), Pāyanda Mīrzā. This person, according to Uzbek custom, held the office equivalent to that of *qūrčībāšī*. He bore a letter from the Uzbek Khan, and also from the Khan's mother. The latter was the daughter of a family of Režavī *seyyeds* at Mašhad, and the step-sister of Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, the son of Mīrzā Abu'l-Qāsem. During the reign of 'Abdollāh Khan, when 'Abd al-Mo'men Khan occupied Mašhad, Talīm Khan had married her. She now sought pardon for her son who, she said, had been provoked by the hostile actions of his cousin, Rostam Moḥammad Khan; he promised, she said, never to depart again from the path of obedience as long as he lived.

The background to these events, according to travelers from Transoxania, was that Emāmqolī Khan, the ruler of Transoxania, had led an army against the Qazāq princes who had overrun the Tashkent area and who were interfering with trade in the Samarkand region. Emāmqolī Khan had rashly crossed the Šāhroḡīya River and had been defeated in a great battle there, with the loss of some twenty thousand men (the responsibility for the accuracy of this story rests with the transmitter), either killed in battle or drowned as they tried to recross the river.

Emāmqolī Khan himself made his way back to Bokhara and immediately sent a courier to his brother at Balḡ, Nadr Moḥammad Khan, requesting him to bring his troops to Bokhara so that they

could march together against the Qazāqs. However, Nadr Khan had not complied with this request, making the proximity of Rostam Moḥammad Khan his excuse; in reality, he was more than a little apprehensive of his brother. Emāmqolī Khan had refused to take no for an answer, and had marched to Balḵ with some of his men and held a council of war with his brother. Nadr Moḥammad Khan had finally agreed to send his brother, Yānaltegīš, with a detachment of troops from Balḵ and Ḥeṣār. Emāmqolī Khan, thirsting for revenge against the Qazāqs, had sent Yānaltegīš to Samarkand at the head of their combined armies. He had followed Yānaltegīš to Samarkand, and another battle had been fought in which the Qazāqs had again been victorious. The army of Balḵ and Bokhara had suffered heavy casualties. A sort of truce had been patched up with the Qazāq princes through the good offices of Ḥāšem Kāja, and each side had retired to its own base.

At all events, Pāyanda Mīrzā reached Isfahan and was admitted to audience with Shah 'Abbas at the Naqš-e Jahān palace. Among the gifts he brought with him were forty-five Aleša horses from Ḥeṣār, and Qaraqorūmī and Badaḵšī horses, a personal gift from Nadr Moḥammad. Since Pāyanda Mīrzā was an intelligent and eloquent man, he carried out his mission in an exemplary manner and won the Shah's favor. In addition, 'Abd al-Raḥīm Kāja made friendly overtures on behalf of Emāmqolī Khan. After recalling that he had been prevented by illness from carrying out his plan of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and expressing the hope that he would have a further opportunity of going to Mecca and thus a reason for visiting the Shah's court, he said he hoped the Shah would overlook the past misdemeanors of the Uzbeks in view of Nadr Moḥammad Khan's sincere desire for friendly relations with him, and would extend his forgiveness to Emāmqolī Khan, in view of the contrition the latter had expressed for his actions. 'Abd al-Raḥīm then volunteered his good offices in the service of peace after his return to Transoxania. He hoped it might be possible to effect a lasting peace, so that Transoxania might be spared from the onslaught of *qezelbaş* armies. War, he said, brought nothing except bloodshed; Muslims were pillaged and taken into captivity, and the weak and defenseless trampled underfoot. Since he had been denied the felicity of making the pilgrimage to Mecca, he said, he hoped that through the Shah's magnanimity, he might succeed in this other meritorious project instead.

In reply, the Shah complained that the Uzbeks had taken advantage

of his absence in Azerbaijan and Georgia to make repeated incursions onto his territory, and it was not compatible with his royal dignity to ignore such affronts. "I have," the Shah went on, "for a variety of reasons, decided to lead an expedition to Khorasan. Since Nadr Moḥammad Khan has sent an ambassador, has professed his sincere friendship toward me, and has asked my forgiveness, I have decided, partly out of respect for his mother, who has distinguished connections in Iran, to send a return embassy to him and reciprocate his offer of friendship. If Emāmqolī Khan decides to follow suit, so much the better, so that Muslims may live in peace during my reign. God willing, the affairs of Khorasan will be settled in a way which is in the interests of the welfare of the people, and is consonant with my royal honor."

Pāyanda Mīrzā was then dismissed with honor, and Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ Beg, formerly vizier of Šīrvān, was nominated ambassador to Balḵ, and carried with him letters of friendship to Nadr Moḥammad Khan and his mother. 'Abd al-Raḥām Kāja was also given leave to depart, and was loaded with marks of royal esteem.

After they had left, the Shah marched from Isfahan for Khorasan on 3 Rabī' II, 1031/15 February 1622, and followed the Bīābānak and Ṭabas-e Gīlākī route.

Another event which occurred this year was the arrival of Ḥabaš Khan, who had been sent as an ambassador to the Shah's court by the Neẓāmšāh, the ruler of Aḥmadnagar in the Deccan, and by Malek 'Anbar, the commander in chief, who was the real power behind the throne in the Neẓāmšāhī state. Ḥabaš Khan was descended from an Ethiopian, and was a tried and experienced officer and a friend of the Safavid house. He was a scholar, and was well versed in the Persian poets. He was received by the Shah at his court in Māzandarān, where he confirmed the friendship of his master's house for the Safavid house and delivered his gifts. When the Shah moved to Isfahan, Ḥabaš Khan obtained permission to make the pilgrimage to the shrine of the Eighth Imam at Mašhad; he returned to Isfahan in time to accompany the Shah on his expedition to Khorasan and Kandahar.

Miscellaneous and Strange Events Which Occurred This Year

The first of these is the blinding of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā. Men of discernment will be well aware that it behooves all princes to act with great circumspection and to consider well the end result of their words and deeds. The case of Sultan Moḥammad Mīrzā is a good illustration of this maxim. The prince, during his father's illness at Fīrūzkūh, forgot all his father's kindness toward him and, urged on by certain ignorant people, committed various acts which displayed the contrary of sincere affection for his father. Specifically, while his father was seriously ill, the prince spent his time in merrymaking, celebrating the fact that he would soon be king, forgetting that kingship is at the disposition of God alone. When the prince's behavior was reported to the Shah, the prince was terrified, realizing that he had destroyed the Shah's confidence in him. The Shah had him blinded, but even after this, a group of people more stupid than himself plotted to spirit him away somewhere. One of the conspirators, 'Abbasqoli, the son of Moḥammad Hoseyn Beg *tūšmāl* (assistant in the royal kitchens), was unable to go through with the scheme, and informed the Shah. When the prince was arrested, he made various unacceptable excuses. The Shah considered that he had already been sufficiently punished, but those who had planned to engineer his escape were put to death. The Shah saw to it that the prince was provided for.

The second unlooked-for event this year was the fall from favor of the vizier of the supreme *divān*, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb b. Ḥātem Beg. The only apparent reason for his downfall was that he gave too much rein to his carnal desires, which are inseparable from youth. At all events, he was dismissed from office, and the office of vizier was conferred on Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā and the grandson of 'Abdollāh Khan, who was connected by marriage with the Safavid house.⁴ Salmān Khan was conversant with all the customary branches of knowledge, was skilled in accountancy, and wrote polished prose.

The third of these examples of royal justice which occurred this year was the execution of a group of ill-starred rascals from Qom who had been causing riot and mischief in the area and molesting the in-

⁴He had married Šohra Banū Kānom, the seventh daughter of Shah Tahmasp; his bride died in 991/1583, shortly after their marriage.

habitants. The suppression of this type of mischief-maker is essential in order to preserve the stability of the realm and to keep the peace. A Šamlū officer of note, Šahqolī Beg, interceded for them with the Shah and offered to act as guarantor of their good behavior in the future. Since he was acquainted with these micreants, he too incurred the Shah's wrath and shared their fate.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Qāẓī Khan, the former *šadr*. He fell ill last year in the small town of Terešt near Rayy, and died early this year. His body was transported to Mašhad for burial. He came from the Seyfī Ḥasanī family of *seyyeds* who for generations had held the office of *qāẓī al-qoẓāt* (chief *qāẓī*) in Qazvin and the surrounding area. He himself was a learned man of fine character. He had been appointed *qāẓī-ye 'askar*⁵ by Shah 'Abbas, and held this office for some time. After relinquishing it, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca and then, in 1015/1606-07, was appointed *šadr*, which office he held for twelve years with full independence,⁶ and many students were the recipients of his favors. He left one son, seventeen years of age, who died of smallpox this same year.

2. Farīdūn Khan, the governor of Astarābād. He fell ill in his summer quarters at Sāvar and was brought back to the city, where his condition worsened daily and he eventually died. His body was transported to Mašhad for burial; he was of the Čerkes tribe, and was one of the Shah's servants;⁷ the Shah had noticed his ability and competence and had watched over his career. After his appointment as governor of Astarābād, he held that office for eighteen years and acquired a reputation for honest and just administration. He was engaged in constant warfare against the Šā'en-kānī Turkman tribes, who were forever raiding along the borders of Astarābād, and he was uniformly victorious in these engagements. As a result of this warfare, the most troublesome tribes in this group, the Göklen and the Ūklū, were left without any leader of consequence, and Farīdūn

⁵See *TM*, pp. 43, 112. The influence of this official declined partly as a result of the growing power of the *šadr* in judicial matters, and partly as a result of the increasing control of the officer in charge of the secular branch of the judiciary, the *dīvānbeḡī*, over the *šarī'at* administration as a whole.

⁶This is an error; for at least part of his term of office, Qāẓī Khan had a companion in office.

⁷*Abid*; this almost certainly means he was a *golām*, and the fact that he was a Circassian confirms this idea.

Khan made Behbūd Khan Čerkes governor of their territory. However, Behbūd Khan proved an unsatisfactory governor, and he was dismissed and replaced by Ƙosrow Khan, one of the *golāms* of the royal court.

3. Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn Moḥammad ‘Āmelī. I have said something about the remarkable qualities of this man in Book I. He reached the highest stages of *ejtehād* (independent inquiry into problems of religious law). He was a man of ascetic habit and exemplary conduct who treated other men as his equals. In the course of this year, he was performing his prayers one day at the tomb of the mystic Bābā Rokn al-Dīn Eṣfahānī, when he heard a voice from the grave addressing him as follows: “What is the meaning of all this negligence? Now is the time for vigilance.” The speaker gave his name and genealogy and revealed some mysteries, but the Shaikh did not repeat them publicly and said nothing about the remarks made by the voice from the tomb except those concerning negligence and the need for vigilance. After the Shaikh’s death, however, one of his devotees who had been a confidant of the Shaikh divulged something of these mysteries.

After this extraordinary event, the Shaikh remained immersed in deep thought, and for a few days he did not meet his devotees, intimate friends, and students, but prepared himself for death, which he expected would come in the month of Šavvāl. He did not enjoy peace of mind for a single moment. Finally, one of his students who received instruction from him every day persuaded the Shaikh by various rational arguments that, although his inner self was with God, his outward self should not neglect his students by depriving them of the benefit of his teaching; the spiritual rewards he would obtain in this way would be added to the total of his acts of obedience and devotion. Through the repetition of such arguments, the Shaikh became more serene and gradually began to mix with people again. For three months, his outward self was devoted to the teaching of his students and theological argument, and he strove to complete the manuscript of the *Jāme’e Abbāši*,^a while his inner self was in communion with the spiritual world, and with holy men inhabiting the world of shades.

On 4 Šavvāl 1030/22 August 1621, the Shaikh fell ill, took to his bed, and died eight days later on 12 Šavvāl/30 August. The Shah was in his summer quarters, but those nobles who had remained in the

^aA work on Shi’ite jurisprudence.

capital took up their station around the bier, and men of all classes vied with one another for the honor of acting as pallbearers. The throng in the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān was so great that, despite the size of the square, men were pressed tightly against one another, and the pallbearers could only with difficulty make progress through the crowd. In the old Masjed-e Jāme',⁹ the body was washed for burial, and the theologians and scholars performed the burial service. The body was housed temporarily in the shrine attributed to the Imam Zeyn al-'Ābedīn,¹⁰ which is the burial place of two eminent descendants of the Imams, and was later transported to Mašhad and buried, in accordance with his own testamentary disposition, in a tomb at the foot of the tomb of the Imam, a spot where the Shaikh used to hold his classes when he was a teacher on the staff of the shrine at Mašhad. Many chronograms were devised to commemorate the year of his death. The following one was the work of the vizier Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb: "Alas for Shaikh Bahā al-Dīn!"¹¹ My nephew, Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, devised the following: "Alas for the exemplar of the age!"¹² Many other chronograms were devised, but these two are sufficient.

⁹Begun in the eleventh century A.D., and added to and restored many times in succeeding centuries.

¹⁰The Fourth Eṣnā 'Ašarī Imam; died ca. 94/712-13, and buried at Medina.

¹¹*Šeyḥ bahā al-dīn vāy*-1030/1621.

¹²*Afsūs ze moqtadā-ye dōvrān*-1030/1621.

Events of the Year of the Dog, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1031/1621-22, the Thirty-sixth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Nowrūz this year occurred on Monday, 8 Jomādā I, 1031/21 March 1622. The Shah, as previously related, had marched from Isfahan in February en route to Khorasan, and he celebrated Nowrūz at Ṭabas-e Gilakī and dealt with petitions from the people there. Then, ordering the troops that had wintered at Nishapur to join him at Farāh, he proceeded by the road to Tūrān and the Dašt-e Beyāz, intending to enjoy some hunting along the banks of the Hīrmand River and at the same time take all necessary steps to settle the affairs of Khorasan. On arrival at Farāh, his troops marched in review before him and cheered their king.

In Books I and II of my history, I related how Kandahar passed out of the hands of officers of the Safavid house into those of officers of the Mogul dynasty, and gave my readers the history of Kandahar in instalments, so to speak. At this point I decided not to flinch from repetition, but recapitulate the main events in the city's history, so that historians avid for facts may be sated, and brave and chivalrous men of action may not regard the Shah's expedition to Kandahar as a breach of friendship with the Mogul Emperor.

In Book I, in my account of the reign of Shah Tahmasp, I recorded that on numerous occasions Kandahar was brought under Safavid jurisdiction through the efforts of *qezelbāš* emirs. Sultan Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the son of Bahrām Mīrzā, was made governor of the province, and held that post until his death in 984/1576. The governorship was then divided by Sultan Moḥammad Shah between his sons: his elder son, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, received Kandahar, and his younger son, Rostam Mīrzā, received Zamīn Dāvar. In Book II, I described how, when the Uzbegs overran Khorasan, the princes looked calmly on and, because of their divisions among themselves, took refuge with the Mogul Emperor Akbar and handed over Kandahar to his officers. In 1007/1598, when Shah 'Abbas had reconquered Khorasan from the Uzbegs, in consideration of the friendship which had long existed between the Safavids and the Moguls, he had sent a *qūrčī*, Mīrzā 'Alī Beg Kōdābandalū, to inform Akbar of his victory. In the course of his letter to the Emperor Akbar, Shah 'Ab-

bas had stated that he had reconquered all the territory in Khorasan that had been in enemy hands, plus a bit more; only Kandahar remained, he said. That was in Mogul hands and, since the Safavids and Moguls were allies, one might say that Kandahar was not in foreign hands. In view of the long-standing friendship between the two dynasties, and the more recent personal friendship between himself and Akbar, which was like the relationship between father and son, the Shah had suggested that Akbar should hand back to him Kandahar, and make their mutual friendship even stronger by this act of generosity.

Unfortunately, the Emperor Akbar had ignored Shah 'Abbas's broad hints, and had missed the opportunity to make a magnanimous gesture. Shah 'Abbas, who was a man of infinite patience, and who did not wish to damage his relationship with Akbar, said nothing further on the subject until after Akbar died and was succeeded by his son Nūr al-Dīn Moḥammad Salīm (the Emperor Jahāngīr). In the early part of his reign, Jahāngīr was preoccupied with the attempt of his own son, Sultan Ḳosrow Mahīn, to seize the throne. A group of emirs in the neighborhood, in particular the governors of Farāh and Sīstān, had marched on Kandahar with the assistance of a detachment of *qezelbāš* troops from Herat and had occupied the province and laid siege to the fort.

This action was reported to Shah 'Abbas while he was on campaign in Azerbaijan. It would have been an easy matter for him to capture Kandahar, but the Shah at the time was so busy directing the ship of state that many other worthy projects were inevitably left in abeyance. In addition, the Shah had not as yet sent the embassy, customary between friendly powers, to offer condolences on the death of the ruler and congratulations to his successor on his accession. Considering the action of the emirs unfortunate in the circumstances, he repudiated it and forbade them to attack the fort. He also sent letters to the Mogul commandant at Kandahar, Šāhī Beg Khan Čaḡatāy, by the hand of Ḥoseyn Beg Ḳodābandalū Šāmlū: "Since the Mogul Emperor and I have love and affection for each other," wrote the Shah; "and are as brothers to each other, and neither begrudges the other his territory, you may continue to administer the province of Kandahar with an easy mind." However, the Shah fully expected that, after his ambassador had arrived in India, and after the formalities had been completed, the Emperor, touched by his generosity in handing back territory he had subjugated, would consider it not

worthwhile to keep Kandahar, his own claim to which was regarded by friend and foe alike as either dubious or invalid, and would return it to Safavid possession, in accordance with past custom, as a token of his sincere love for the Shah and in return for past acts of generosity on the part of the Safavid shahs and those to be vouchsafed to him in the future.

As I have already related, Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Ṭāleš, a senior and experienced *qezelbāš* officer, was sent by the Shah as his ambassador to India. Both he and subsequent ambassadors sent by the Shah to the Mogul court had alluded or referred openly to the question of Kandahar, but had not received any satisfaction or evoked any response from the Emperor or his officials. For his part, the Shah considered it a breach of friendship to seize the city by force. Thus the matter rested, with Kandahar remaining in Mogul hands, until the arrival at the Safavid court of the Indian ambassador Khan-e 'Ālam, whom the Emperor dubbed Bā'ī, and who was the Emperor's confidant.

In the course of his conversations with Khan-e 'Ālam, the Shah had spoken openly to him about the Kandahar question, stressing that his own inaction in the matter had stemmed from his reluctance to break the bond of friendship between the two countries, and calling the ambassador's attention to the fact that the Emperor was apparently ignoring the whole matter. "My friendship for the Emperor," he said, "is too great to be injured by disputes over territory; but Kandahar is part of Khorasan, which is my hereditary territory, and men both near and far, seeing only the external appearances of this world and ignorant of the world of the spirit, utter senseless remarks in their assemblies and put an altogether different interpretation on my behavior. The Emperor's love for me, therefore, and the interests of both parties, require that he give back to me, his loving brother, territory which is far from the heartlands of India and is a stumbling block to our friendship. If he does this, the jeering tongues of my enemies will be stilled, and the news that the bonds of friendship between our two countries are stronger than ever will have considerable effect on neighboring princes, and especially on the Uzbegs, who are our mutual foes. If the Emperor finds it difficult to hand Kandahar back, I place pleasing him above all worldly ambitions. I will visit the Kandahar area and spend a few days hunting in the company of the Emperor's officers; after enjoying their hospitality for a few days, I will retire. It will thus be clear to all that the hand-

ing back of Kandahar is a pure act of friendship, and is not taking place as the result of an estrangement between us."

As already related, Zeynal Beg Begdīlū *tūšmālbašt* (superintendent of the royal kitchens), who was one of the Shah's personal attendants and his confidant, went to India with Khan-e 'Ālam and reiterated the Shah's remarks. But the Shah's plan came to naught because certain flatterers at the Mogul court, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the Emperor, listened to the evil promptings of Satan and stirred up mischief by frustrating it, giving their action the name of loyal service to the Emperor. Those who sincerely desire to serve the best interest of their master and patron, however, seek to convert enemies into friends, and to make existing friends even stronger friends; they consider this the best way to make the state prosper. How much the more should the Mogul Emperor's advisers have sought to strengthen the ties of friendship with a friend like the Shah, since the advantages of a friendly alliance with the Shah consist in an outward increase in one's prestige among other princes, and in an intrinsic strengthening of the foundations of one's own realm. If I were to say but a little of what could be said on this subject, my tale would become a long one.

Anyway, at the beginning of this year, the Shah fulfilled the promise he had made to Khan-e 'Ālam by going hunting along the banks of the rivers Hīrmand and Arġandāb.¹ From Farāh, he had sent letters to the governor of Kandahar, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, and to the other Čaġatāy emirs there, by the hand of Vešāl Beg *ev-oglu*, a trusted official of the court. In this letter, the Shah explained that interests of state required his presence in Khorasan, and that he had decided to fit in some hunting on the way. The Shah urged the governor of Kandahar to convince himself that his presence in the area had no underlying motive except hunting, and exhorted him to come out to welcome him and kiss his stirrup, and to extend hospitality, on behalf of the Mogul Emperor, to him and his party during the few days that they were in the area. He might rest assured, wrote the Shah, that the servants of his brother, the Mogul Emperor, would receive only the greatest honor and respect. "The basic purpose of this expedition," went on the Shah, "as I told Khan-e 'Ālam, is to 'show the flag' along the frontier and make it clear to recalcitrant elements, particularly the Uzbeks, that your country and mine are one and undivided."

¹See Le Strange, pp. 346-47.

The Shah reached the Hīrmand River, where Mīrzāqolī Sultan Sīāh-manšūr, the governor of Kerešk, brought in as prisoners a number of Čaġatāy retainers belonging to 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan, who had been dispatched to strengthen the defenses of the fort of Band-e Tīmūr. The Shah was furious, and severely reprimanded his officer: "The retainers of the Emperor are my retainers too," he said. "Why did you take this action without orders and without cause?" He released the prisoners, bestowed on them robes of honor, and sent them on their way to carry out their duties.

After receiving the Shah's letter, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan and the Čaġatāy nobles sent Mīrzā Bāqī Kābolī to him with a wily letter, asking the Shah to give up his plans and retire; if he advanced further, they said, their duty as servants of the Emperor would compel them to oppose him. The Shah was infuriated to have his plans frustrated by the impertinent interference of short-sighted meddlers, who apparently preferred hostility and estrangement to a peaceful alliance, and he determined to press on. He sent a detachment of troops under Kosrow Sultan, the chief of the Pāzūkī, against the fortress of Zamīn Dāvar, held by Shah Kalān, and he himself appeared before Kandahar on Wednesday,² 8 Rajab 1031/20 May 1622.

'Abd al-'Azīz carried out the threat contained in his letter to the Shah and opened fire on the Safavid camp with artillery. Despite this, the Shah held his forces back for several days and forbade them to commence the siege, while he made further attempts to persuade the garrison to abandon its resistance. But in vain. The Shah realized that he had no alternative but to take the city by storm, and that further delay would not be consonant with his dignity. He therefore gave orders to his men to commence the siege, despite the fact that he had none of the necessary resources for the task—heavy siege guns, artillerymen, sappers, and so on. His men encircled the fort and pushed forward breastworks. Daring spirits, clinging to the walls and towers by their fingernails, within seventeen days made breaches in the walls, and by means of tunneling riddled the defenses like a honeycomb. Every few days, a tower would crash down in ruins. Still the Shah refused to give the order for the assault, in his compassionate concern for those civilians who might inadvertently be cut down by the assault troops, and eventually the garrison sued for quarter.

²8 Rajab was a Thursday.

Although the garrison had behaved with great impertinence, the Shah continued to treat them with that innate magnanimity and chivalry which is a special attribute of members of the house of prophethood and sainthood, and granted them quarter, and the city surrendered on Tuesday, 11 Ša'bān 1031/21 June 1622. 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan came out of the fort with his other officers and nobles, including Šamšīr Khan, 'Alīqolī Dūrman, Mīrzā Fazl known as Maḳdūmzāda, Kāja Āftab, Shah Moḥammad Khan known as Khan-e Dowrān, the son of Šāhī Beg Khan the former governor of Kandahar, and Tūla Khan. They wanted to appear before the Shah like criminals, with their quivers slung round their necks, but the Shah refused to allow this, airily dismissing the few days' exertion he had expended in capturing the fort and calling the defense the action of loyal servants of the Emperor. The Shah received them, accepted their surrender, gave them robes of honor, and allowed them to return to their quarters in the fort.

Three days later, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khan again came out of the fort, this time with the whole garrison, numbering some four or five thousand men, and pitched camp over against the royal camp. Despite all the Shah's magnanimity toward them, the Čaġatāy army was still nervous and apprehensive. On Friday, 14 Ša'bān/24 June, the Shah entered the city, and the names of the Twelve Imams were once again recited in the Masjed-e Jāme', where they had not been heard for more than twenty-five years,³ and the name of Shah 'Abbas was mentioned in the *koṭba*. The garrison asked permission to return to India, and to present the Shah with suitable gifts as a token of their gratitude for their lives. But the Shah would not accept their gifts, being more interested in winning their hearts than in amassing worldly goods; not only did he return their gifts, but he gave them provisions for their journey and camels to carry them, and Arabian horses of Iraqi stock, as many as they needed, and sent them on their way safely with all their possessions and their wives and families.

Accompanying this caravan, the Shah sent Heydar Beg Qarādaġlū, a centurion, bearing a letter for the Mogul Emperor in which he explained the capture of Kandahar. With the letter, he sent two keys of pure, unadulterated gold, intended to be the keys of friendship and alliance between the two countries; on the one was inscribed the word Kandahar, and on the other, the names of the provinces of Iran. The Shah blamed the unfortunate incident of Kandahar on the

³In fact, Kandahar had been in Mogul hands for thirty years, since 1000/1592.

recalcitrant attitude of the garrison there, who had rejected his friendly overtures. "God in His bounty," said the Shah, "has conferred on me, your brother, all the provinces of the land of Iran. I would like you to think of these provinces as one fort, the key of which you hold in your hand; it is the key of friendship, and I beg you not to regard these words as mere empty platitudes. God be praised that His creatures attach such importance to the principles of friendship and conciliation that two great rulers, each possessing the power to cause havoc in the world, are able to ignore this incident and, allowing their actions to be governed by reason (of which faculty kings possess more than ordinary mortals), not lose sight of these principles.

As the garrison of Kandahar was about to leave for India, the Shah sent a messenger to Shah Kalān, the governor of Zamīn Dāvar, notifying him of the fall of Kandahar and bidding him and any of his men who wished to do so to join up with the caravan from Kandahar. But in their folly, the garrison in Zamīn Dāvar behaved in an extraordinary manner, and so brought about their own destruction. They had endured some three weeks of siege at the hands of Kosrow Sultan when the news of the fall of Kandahar reached them. Abandoning the defense of the fort, they marched out, but because of the fighting which had taken place between them and their besiegers, they imagined the *qezelbāš* might be out for revenge, and so they agreed among themselves that, at the first opportunity, they would cut their way through the enemy and make off in the direction of Kabul. Kosrow Sultan, in order to reassure them that the *qezelbāš* had no hostile intentions against them, invited Shah Kalān and his senior officers to a feast. The Mogul officers arrived early, before the *qezelbāš* emirs had arrived, and took their places; they were all wearing *būkadas* and Indian *jamdars* and other weapons.

Kosrow Sultan greeted them cordially but did not immediately insist on their removing their weapons, as has been the custom since time immemorial when one goes to a feast. Next to arrive were a group of Shah Kalān's men, similarly fully armed. Kosrow Sultan said mildly to Shah Kalān that he thought it was unnecessary to wear arms when the weather was so hot. If he would give the order to his men to remove their arms, they could all be more comfortable, he said. Some of Kosrow Sultan's servants moved forward to assist the guests in removing their arms, but the latter tried to stop them. One or two of the servants, in the course of trying to do their duty, foolishly laid hands on some of the *būkadas* and *jamdars*, and the Moguls at once pre-

sented their weapons at them. Kosrow Sultan, seeing this, rose and tried to leave the room, but was prevented from doing so by the drawn swords of the Čaġatāys, who wounded several of his servants. The *qezelbaş* poured in with drawn swords and a general melee ensued, in the course of which Kāja Moġol Zamīn-dāvarī took the opportunity to settle an old score with Shah Kalān by stabbing him to death. The banqueting hall was converted into a battlefield, and most of the Čaġatāys were eventually disposed of. The workings of fate are indeed mysterious. Here we had people getting ready for a banquet and merrymaking, while all the time the fates were planning something more sinister. We ordinary mortals can only shrug our shoulders and acquiesce in God's will!

When the Shah heard the news he was astonished, and started blaming Kosrow Sultan *in absentia* in order to calm the fears of 'Abd al-'Azīz and his men. Subsequently, however, some of the latter declared that Kosrow Sultan had not done anything amiss, and that the Čaġatāys had started it. The Shah continued to treat 'Abd al-'Azīz with the greatest possible favor, and he and his men realized that the incident in Zamīn Dāvar occurred because of the unjustified suspicions and stupid ideas of a few troublemakers. The Shah entrusted the families of the Čaġatāys who had been killed to 'Abd al-'Azīz.

At this juncture, the Shah received an ambassador from the Emperor Jahāngīr's son, Mīrzā Kōrram, in the person of Zāhed Beg; Zāhed Beg, on arrival at Mašhad, had heard of the Shah's impending expedition to Khorasan, and had awaited his arrival at Mašhad; he had now traveled to Kandahar at the Shah's order. During his stay at Kandahar, Zāhed Beg was invited to all the Shah's private assemblies. The ambassador submitted a request from the Mogul prince that the Shah recognize the title of Shah Jahān which had been conferred on him by his father.⁴

Another visitor to the Shah's camp at this time was Esfandiār Khan b. 'Arab Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Kārazm. The ruler of Kārazm, especially 'Arab Moḥammad Khan's father, Ḥājji Moḥammad Khan, had always turned to the Safavid court for assistance; diplomatic relations were maintained both in good times and bad, and the khans of Kārazm, if driven out of their territories, took refuge at the

⁴Shah Jahān became emperor in 1037/1628. Shah 'Abbas, with his usual acumen, had spotted him as "emperor material" early in Jahāngīr's reign; hence the special treatment of Shah Jahān's ambassador.

Safavid court. Thus Ḥajjī Moḥammad Khan and his sons had taken refuge with Shah 'Abbas when they were driven out of Kārazm by 'Abdollāh Khan and his son, and had been restored to their throne with the Shah's assistance. In the case of Esfandīār Khan, his brothers had rebelled against their father, had seized him, and had deprived him of power. Esfandīār Khan, who disapproved of his brothers' action, had marched to his father's assistance, but his brothers had promptly blinded their father and turned on him. Since he was one against three, he had been unable to withstand them, and had come via Astarābād to Kandahar, where he was welcomed by the Shah.

Esfandīār Khan took back with him orders from the Shah commanding help for him from the chiefs of the Ša'en-kānī tribes, from the governor of Astarābād, and from other emirs in the area. He went among the Ša'en-kānī tribes, raised an army, and with help from the army of Astarābād, defeated his brothers. One of his brothers, Abu'l-Ġāzī Sultan, expressed his wish to join him, and Esfandīār Khan considered it expedient to allow him to do so. After the defeat of the other brothers, Esfandīār Khan divided the kingdom with his brother, making it clear that he was the ruler and his brother his vassal. They are still ruling the country in apparent harmony, and Esfandīār Khan regularly sends envoys to the Shah's court.

The Shah's Return from Kandahar

After the annexation of Kandahar to the Safavid empire, the Shah appointed Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg governor of the province; he was one of the great emirs and an old supporter of the Safavid dynasty; he was also a brave and intelligent man, and had been governor of Kerman for many years. All the Kurdish contingents that had accompanied the Shah on this expedition were placed under his command. Aḥmad Sultan Močakī, the governor of Toršīz, was instructed to repair the fort. On Wednesday,⁵ 24 Ša'bān 1031/4 July 1622, the Shah marched from Kandahar and camped at Bābā Ḥasan Abdāl. There, he received letters from Yānaltegīs Bahādor Özbek, who was based in the Balḵ region, asking the Shah's pardon for his past actions and expressing his gratitude for the magnanimity which the Shah, at the supplication of 'Abd al-Raḥīm Kāja, had shown toward the Uzbek nobility, and which had overjoyed Pāyanda Mīrzā, the *čūra-āqāsī*

⁵24 Ša'bān was a Monday.

of Nadr Moḥammad Khan, the ruler of Balḵ. These letters had been flowing in to the Shah's officers in the area, and especially to Esfandīār Beg 'Arabgīrlū, the *evčībāši*, and the Shah sent reassuring letters in return.

The sun had by now passed from the sign Cancer to that of Leo, and the heat was appalling. The Shah realized that the army could not march back across the desert in such heat, and so he decided to spend the summer in the Ġūr region. He set off for summer quarters there on 12 Ramaẓān 1031/21 July 1622. Ġūr was the mountainous area in which the Ġūrid princes had maintained their independence for some many years.⁶ Apart from the Ġūrids, who were native to the district, I have not found any indication in the old histories that any other dynasty succeeded in crossing this mountainous region with its armies. Shah 'Abbas's army made its way laboriously across the mountains with its trains of Bactrian camels carrying the heavy baggage, and reached Herat in twenty-six stages, entering the city on the twenty-seventh day after leaving Bābā Ḥasan Abdāl.

On the way across the region of Ġūr, a detachment of the royal army under the command of Kalaf Beg *sofračībāši* (chief sewer), which was proceeding by the Ġūr-e Bālā route, fell in with a troop of rebel cavalry from Fīrūzkūh, which from time to time made common cause with the enemies of the Safavid state and caused trouble in that area. On this occasion, too, the rebels had remained aloof and had not presented themselves to the Shah. Kalaf Beg's troops wiped out most of the rebels and killed their leader, Tarenī Moḥammad.

The Conquest of Hormūz by Emāmqolī Khan, the Beglerbeg of Fārs, and his ḡāzīs.

The island of Hormūz, according to the *Tārīḵ-e Jahān-ārā*, was originally bought from the local princes of Qešm by a certain Šehāb al-Dīn Ayāz, who came from a branch of the Salḡorīd *aṭābegs* of Lorestān and Šūlestān.⁷ Šehāb al-Dīn developed the island and built a flourishing city which he ruled with complete independence. After his death, the government of Hormūz and its dependencies was taken over by Malek Kerdānšāh, who traced his descent on his father's

⁶The Ġūrid dynasty ruled an empire in Afghanistan and northern India from ca. 1000 to 1215 A.D. The dynasty was overthrown by the Kārazmšāh shortly before both states were overrun by the Mongols.

⁷See Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh 1967, 125–26.

side from the prophet Heber, and on his mother's side from Gostaham b. Ašk, whose line were kings of Iran. He established a dynasty at Hormūz that ruled the island generation after generation. One of his descendants, Salğor Shah b. Šehāb al-Dīn b. Tūrānšāh, became the possessor of parasol and banners, and was a powerful and liberal ruler.

In the reign of Shah Esma'il I, when Salğor Shah II b. Tūrānšāh was ruling at Hormūz, the Portuguese seized control by a combination of guile and *force majeure*. They built a fort near the seashore and exacted tithes from merchants and other persons traveling from port to port, remitting to the governor of Hormūz only a small portion of these tithes. The size of the Portuguese colony steadily increased, and the King of Portugal replaced the commanding officer of the garrison, called Capitan, every three years. In the course of time, the Portuguese acquired an interest in all the island's revenues and expenditures. Farroğ Shah b. Tūrānšāh succeeded as ruler of Hormūz, and after him his son Fīrūzšāh; by that time, the Portuguese had gained complete control of the island, and nothing was done without the Capitan's approval. The authority of the Muslim rulers had become a mere shadow.

After the accession of Shah 'Abbās, foreign princes became anxious to establish and strengthen diplomatic ties with the Safavid court. Shah 'Abbās did not molest the Portuguese garrison at Hormūz, but at his orders, Allāhverdī Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, reestablished Safavid control over Bahrain and the outlying dependencies of Hormūz. The Muslim ruler of the island of Hormūz, Maḥmūd Shah b. Farroğ Shah, was by this time a virtual pensioner of the Portuguese, who gave him an allowance from the revenues. There were incidents in which Muslim travelers were molested, and on several occasions the Portuguese sent ships and artillery in an effort to recover Bahrain, but without success.

Early in Shah 'Abbās's reign, the Portuguese had taken advantage of the Shah's preoccupation with other matters to build a fort on the mainland opposite Hormūz, at Gombroon,⁸ thereby violating agreements made with Shah Tahmasp. But Allāhverdī Khan and his son Emāmqolī Khan had subsequently driven them out of Gombroon,

⁸Renamed Bandar 'Abbās by Shah 'Abbās after its recapture from the Portuguese in 1622. On the origin of the name Gombroon, see L. Lockhart, *Persian Cities*, Brenford 1939, pp. 103ff. The city lay 13 miles west-northwest of the port of Hormūz.

later renamed Bandar 'Abbās. For some years after this, relations with the Portuguese on Hormūz went more smoothly, and since there was no interruption with trade from the southern Indian ports in the Deccan, and the existence of law and order on the high seas increased the profits made by our merchants, no action was taken against them.⁹

This state of affairs did not last for long, because the Portuguese secretly transported materials to the island of Qešm to build a fort there; the strategic value of Qešm lay in the fact that it was the source of much of Hormūz's water supply, which was transported by sea to that city. This act was deemed by the Shah to be an act of rebellion on the part of the infidels, and he instructed Emāmqolī Khan, who had succeeded his father as *amīr al-omarā* of Fārs, to send a punitive expedition against the Portuguese and destroy the fort on Qešm. Emāmqolī Khan sent a force there under his *ešīk-āqāsibāšī*, Begverdi Beg, who had orders to prevent the completion of the fort and destroy what was already built. The Portuguese, however, by making strenuous efforts, succeeded in completing the fort, and defied Begverdi Beg. Emāmqolī Khan sent reinforcements and eventually took the field himself, and the fort was captured, though not before the *qezelbāš* had suffered heavy casualties. The Portuguese garrison was put to death. Since the fort guarded the fresh-water supply, it was judged better to leave it *in situ* and to install a garrison there.

After this victory, Emāmqolī Khan determined to attack Hormūz itself and destroy the Portuguese colony there, and he obtained permission from the Shah for this operation. Hitherto the problem had been that, if the Portuguese were expelled from Hormūz, the sea trade with points farther east would be interrupted and the prosperity of the city would decline. For this reason, and because the Portuguese paid certain dues and tribute money to the Safavid authorities, no attempt to reconquer Hormūz had so far been made. The situation had now changed, because a group of Englishmen had recently presented themselves at the Safavid court and had said that, whenever the Shah wished to recapture Hormūz, they were ready to help him with troops. They explained to the Shah that they were enemies of the Portuguese, and that their mutual hostility derived in part from sectarian differences. After Hormūz had been recaptured, they said,

⁹The author is rationalizing; no action could be taken by Shah 'Abbas against the Portuguese on Hormūz because he did not have a fleet.

ships from other ports under English control would ensure that the Portuguese did not regain a foothold there. Shah 'Abbas decided to accept the offer of help made by the English. As the saying goes:

Although the water from the Christian well is impure,
It only washes a dead Jew, so what is there to fear?

He notified the English that he was ready to move against the Portuguese, and the English made their preparations.

Emāmqolī Khan made Gombroon, now Bandar 'Abbās, his base, and his troops were transported to Hormūz in English ships. The Portuguese Capitan and the Muslim ruler, Maḥmūd Shah, both retreated into the fort, and forced all merchants and the civilian population in general to move in as well. The fort was thus defended by both Muslims and Christians. In the besiegers' camp, the work of digging trenches was allocated, and the English fleet anchored on the side of the fort where the walls ran down into the water. After the siege had been in progress for some time, Emāmqolī Khan crossed over from Gombroon and took charge of operations. The *ḡāzīs* redoubled their efforts; the breastworks were pushed right up to the walls of the fort, and mining operations began.

According to reliable informants, the thickness of the walls of the fort was more than thirty cubits, and the walls were strongly constructed of stone cemented together with lime mortar. The *ḡāzīs* excavated the soil from beneath two of the towers and detonated charges of gunpowder that blew parts of the tower in the air but left two-thirds of it standing. As soon as the first cracks appeared in the tower, the *ḡāzīs* stood by for the assault. When the attackers began to get the upper hand, the Portuguese appealed for terms to the English, since they were fellow Christians. The Portuguese laid down their arms, and were taken on board the English ships with their baggage. Before the siege began, it had been agreed between the English officers and Emāmqolī Khan that, after the capture of the fort, the English would take charge of the Christians and their possessions, and leave the Muslims to the *qezelbāš*. Since the primary object, the capture of the fort and the city, had been achieved, the Khan adhered to this agreement and did not molest the Portuguese, but left them to the English to do what they wanted with them.

Thus the fort at Hormūz, an outstanding example of Frankish skill

in the art of building forts, fell after two months' siege. Maḥmūd Shah, the ruler of Hormūz, was taken prisoner with his followers. Of the Muslims who were found within the fort, those who had collaborated with or fought at the side of the Portuguese were executed; those who had been forced against their will by the Portuguese to enter the fort were released to return to their homes. Emāmqolī Khan appointed a governor of the city and took steps to conciliate the townspeople. Among the weapons that fell into *qezelbāš* were several large cannon and siege guns of various sizes, cunningly wrought by skilled Portuguese craftsmen. Each one was a masterpiece of the art of the Frankish cannon founders. These, and other choice items suitable for the king's eyes, were set aside for the royal workshops; the rest of the booty was distributed among the troops. Emāmqolī Khan returned to Shiraz and sent a full report to the Shah, which reached him at Kandahar during his siege of that city. The Shah sent congratulations to Emāmqolī Khan on his victory, the news of which spurred the besiegers to still greater efforts, and Kandahar fell a few days later.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred during the Shah's Stay at Herat

The Shah spent two and a half months at Herat, seeing to the affairs of Khorasan. While he was there, an ambassador arrived from Nadr Moḥammad Khan Özbek at Balk in the person of Ebrahim Kāja, a distinguished *seyyed* of that city. He was accompanied by Moḥammad Šāleḥ Beg, formerly the vizier of Šīrvān, who had been sent on a mission to the Uzbek princes at Balk and Bokhara in the company of the Uzbek ambassador, Pāyanda Mīrzā, and 'Abd al-Raḥīm Kāja Boḡārī. Moḥammad Šāleḥ Beg had delivered the Shah's letter to Nadr Moḥammad Khan Özbek at Balk; the latter had been overjoyed at its contents, and had treated Moḥammad Šāleḥ Beg with great honor and sent him on to Bokhara after he had recovered from the fatigue of the journey. At Bokhara, he had met Emāmqolī Khan, the ruler of Transoxania. The fall of Kandahar had made the Uzbek princes additionally apprehensive about their own position, and so the Shah's reassurances were all the more welcome. Nadr Moḥammad Khan had hastened to send Ebrahim Kāja to reiterate their sincere desire for peace. "I realize," he said, "that Iranians and Tūransians are traditional enemies; but, since my brother and I are sincere in our desire for friendship and alliance with you, and you have so extinguished strife that the lion may lie down with the lamb, let us

renounce the traditions of former days and follow the path of peace." This plea was reinforced by envoys who arrived shortly afterward from the Jūybārī Kājas of Bokhara.

Nadr Moḥammad Khan appealed to the Shah to remove Rostam Moḥammad Khan from the Balḵ frontier region and to take him back with him to Iraq, because, he said, the continued presence of Rostam Moḥammad Khan and his Kurds in the Balḵ area caused nothing but trouble. "He is at loggerheads with his cousins," said Nadr Moḥammad Khan, "and he has gathered around him a group of seditious Uzbeks who are looking for trouble and are constantly raiding along the frontier in search of plunder. If we ignore his activities, the population of the area suffers; if we march against him, we have to encroach on your territory, and your subjects are harmed by the passage of our troops; furthermore, such action on our part violates our sworn covenants, and provokes your wrath." The Shah responded favorably to this appeal, and decided to take Rostam Moḥammad Khan and his reliable retainers back with him to Iraq and let them live there on pension; the unruly mob of Uzbeks he had gathered would be dispersed, since one cannot trust people like that whether they are one's friends or one's enemies. The Shah decided on this course of action in order to bring peace to the northeast frontier.

The Shah had heard that Sultan 'Oṣmān, the Ottoman Sultan, had launched a major campaign in Europe against the Franks who were harassing the frontiers of Islam, and so he dispatched an ambassador from Herat, the *qūrčī* Čelebī Beg Qājār, to seek verification of these reports and to notify the Ottoman Sultan of his own victories at Kandahar and Hormūz. After the dispatch of this ambassador, and before the Shah's departure from Herat, news arrived of rebellion in the Ottoman empire and the murder of Sultan 'Oṣmān.

The Revolt in the Ottoman Empire and the Murder of Sultan 'Oṣmān

According to the reports of travelers coming from Anatolia—reports later confirmed by Ottoman envoys sent by the new Sultan—Sultan 'Oṣmān had returned victorious from his campaign in Europe, and had announced his intention of going into winter quarters at Aleppo prior to performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. Some say that he intended to break his sworn oaths and violate the peace he had concluded with the Shah. God alone knows the truth! At all events,

the Janissaries, the most important unit in the Ottoman army, warned him that his plan to go to Aleppo might cause all sorts of trouble along the frontiers with the Arabs and the *qezelbāsh*; it was not in the interest of the state, they said. "Moreover," they said, "it is not the Ottoman tradition to take the field twice in the same year; the army is but recently returned from the campaign in Europe, and the men have only recently gone on leave. Postpone your departure until next year, when if your plan seems to be in the best interests of the state, it will be carried out."

Sultan 'Osmān, however, with the arrogance of youth, and in his ignorance of time-honored Ottoman customs, remained adamant, and censured the Janissaries for opposing his wishes. He was encouraged in his attitude by Delāvar Pasha, who had recently become grand vizier and was sworn enemy of the Aqa of the Janissaries, and by several other sycophantic and ambitious advisers. The Aqa of the Janissaries and the other senior Janissary officers at once rebelled, and plotted to murder Delāvar Pasha and a number of the Sultan's other powerful advisers. The conspirators sent a message to the Sultan to the effect that Delāvar Pasha and the others were not loyal to the Ottoman state, and their dominance in the counsels of state was undermining its foundations. They were dissatisfied with their conduct, said the conspirators, and demanded that the Sultan hand them over to the Janissaries for execution. They reminded the Sultan that on occasions in the past when the Janissaries had requested something of the Sultan in the interests of the state, the Sultan had acceded to their demands. They therefore requested the Sultan to comply with their demand on this occasion.

Sultan 'Osmān refused their demands absolutely and uttered threats against the Janissary officers. The Janissaries promptly rioted and resolved to assassinate Delāvar Pasha and his associates. They, in fear of their lives, took refuge in the Sultan's palace. There, a large group of palace servants and workmen and *sepāhīs*¹⁰ rallied around them and tried to suppress the rioters. Fighting broke out and many were killed on each side. Finally, the Janissaries drove their opponents back and forced their way into the inner apartments of the palace, shouting, "Our king is Sultan Moṣṭafā, the brother of Sultan Aḥmad. After the death of Sultan Aḥmad, we gave our allegiance to him, and we were not in favor of his deposition; we have the right to give our allegiance to him."

¹⁰Feudal cavalry; see Gibb and Bowen, pp. 69ff. and 70.

Sultan 'Osmān, terrified by the turn of events, was obliged to send the following message to the Aqa of the Janissaries: "Because of my youth, I disregarded the tradition of my fathers; I regret my action, and will do whatever you decide." Some of the Sultan's advisers thought that it was too late for messages, since the Janissaries were out of control. The only chance, as far as they could see, lay in his going to the quarters of the Aqa of the Janissaries and throwing himself on the mercy of the Janissaries, in the hope that their sense of honor would prevail and they would abandon their demand that Sultan Moṣṭafā come to the throne. Accordingly, Sultan 'Osmān slipped out of the palace at the height of the riot and made his way to the house of the Aqa of the Janissaries. However, the Janissaries already within the palace murdered Delāvar Pasha, the grand vizier, and his associates such as Hüseyn Pasha, the second vizier; the *qızlar-āqası*; Hājji *sūbāši*, a *sepāhi* officer; the *çavoşbaşı*; the *bostānçibaşı*, whose authority was paramount in the palace; and others. They then went to Sultan Moṣṭafā's lodgings, brought him out, and saluted him as Sultan.

Meanwhile the Aqa of the Janissaries had learned that Sultan 'Osmān had taken refuge in his house; he greeted him and rallied to his support, addressing the senior officers of the Janissaries as follows: "Since the Sultan has come to your quarters and has shown contrition for his actions, magnanimity and the desire to avoid ill-repute demand that we reassure him. The Sultan has conceded the point at issue, and our enemies have been removed from the scene; let us seek the Sultan's forgiveness and seek to gratify his wishes." The Aqa of the Janissaries pressed his point of view vehemently, but the Janissaries, fearing that he would win the day, and that Sultan 'Osmān, a young, ignorant ruler with hatred of them in his heart, would exact his revenge on them, rushed at their commanding officer and killed him. They then seized 'Osmān Sultan and carried him away to Yedīqola near Istanbul, where they subsequently put him to death, being afraid that in some way or other he might succeed in recovering the throne. The next day, all units of the Ottoman army donned mourning and bore Sultan 'Osmān's body into the city for burial in the mausoleum of Sultan Aḥmad.

Thus Sultan Moṣṭafā returned to the throne, and there was now no check on the power of the Janissaries. The grand vizier and other high officials acted in accordance with their wishes. Since Sultan Moṣṭafā's mind was unbalanced, his mother ruled with the advice of

the viziers. A letter was sent to Shah 'Abbas at Herat informing him of these events and assuring him that they did not constitute a threat to the peace. Since Sultan Moṣṭafā's mental derangement was well known, and it was probable that his reign would weaken the state, there was one party in Istanbul that supported the candidacy of Sultan 'Oṣmān's brother, Sultan Morād, who was still an infant. These people intended to put him on the throne as soon as they could and to seek revenge for the murder of Sultan 'Oṣmān. For this reason, the letter said, the Janissaries were opposed to the idea of putting Sultan Morād on the throne, and the argument was still going on. When this news reached the provinces of the Ottoman empire, revolts broke out in many places.

Events at Baghdad and the Disturbances in Arab Iraq

The Ottoman military authorities at Baghdad had long been used to enjoying a considerable degree of independence, and to using the revenues of that province for their own purposes. The governors and pashas sent out from Istanbul had found themselves stripped of power at Baghdad. Some of the local officers would give nominal allegiance to the pasha for a time, would install him in the governor's palace, and would give him a subsistence allowance; those governors who were not satisfied with this sort of existence returned to Istanbul; the rest stayed and put up with it.

At this juncture, the governor's power at Baghdad had been usurped by two officers: Moḥammad Qanbar, the Aqa of the Janissaries at Baghdad, and Bakr the *sūbāṣī*.¹¹ Each of these officers had gathered around him a number of personal retainers, known as *sagbān*,¹² and vied with the other for control of Baghdad. When Bakr the *sūbāṣī* showed signs of getting the upper hand, Moḥammad Qanbar decided to take action. When Bakr went to Ḥella to collect taxes from some recalcitrant elements there, Moḥammad Qanbar sent a messenger to Ḥella exhorting these elements not to recognize Bakr's authority. During the latter's absence from Baghdad, Moḥammad Qanbar marched to his quarters intending to loot his possessions. A group of Bakr's men resisted him, and fighting broke out. Bakr, who heard the news when he was on his way back to Baghdad, ensured the loyalty of the men he had with him by making them cash grants and fine promises, and reentered Baghdad.

¹¹ A *sepāhī* officer below the rank of *alay-beg* (see Gibb and Bowen, p. 51 and index).

¹² Ottoman: *seḡmen*. The *Seḡmens*, originally an independent corps, were later absorbed into the Janissaries.

The city was now divided in two camps: Moḥammad Qanbar's supporters in the citadel, and Bakr's men in the city. Skirmishes took place between the two groups, but eventually Bakr succeeded in suborning most of Moḥammad Qanbar's men, who joined him in the city. In the end he got control of the citadel too, and put to death Moḥammad Qanbar and a number of his supporters of whose loyalty he was uncertain. He thus acquired all his opponents' belongings, which he distributed among his own *sagbāns* and *sepāhis*. He seized a number of the shaikhs from the mausoleum of Abū Ḥanīfa because they had supported Moḥammad Qanbar, placed them in a ship and set fire to it, and then looted their homes, in the process making off with some items which belonged to the shrine. Bakr thus made himself the undisputed governor of Arab Iraq.

When the news of Bakr's coup reached Istanbul, the officers of the Porte appointed Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha governor of Baghdad, with full powers to settle the situation in the best interests of the state and to execute the rebels. This news frightened Bakr, who contacted the *qezelbāš* frontier emirs and told Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lor-eštān, that he had engineered the coup at Baghdad out of devotion to the Shah; henceforth he wished to be the Shah's servant. He hoped he would receive help from the Shah, and he was holding Baghdad, which was the Shah's hereditary territory, until such time as the Shah could take it over. Ḥoseyn Khan sent his envoy on to the Shah, accompanied by one of his own men. Aḥmad Pasha reached Baghdad, but Bakr, backed by all the Ottoman troops at Baghdad, refused to recognize his authority, and Aḥmad Pasha was obliged to retire to Dīār Bakr and send a report to the Sultan.

Another governor was then sent out from Istanbul, 'Alī Pasha known as Kamānkaš (the archer). This time, Bakr pretended to give his allegiance to him and allowed him to enter the citadel. 'Alī Pasha decided to accept the partial authority offered to him, but Sultan Moṣṭafā and the officials of the Porte were annoyed by this capitulation, dismissed him, and appointed a third governor, Yūsuf Pasha. Yūsuf Pasha's aim was to gain control at Baghdad and wipe out the rebels, but Bakr fathomed his intentions at their first meeting and refused to see him again. Bakr then seized the Pasha, plundered his possessions, and put him to death. A fourth pasha, Kūr Ḥasan, the governor of Mosul, made an effort to deal with the revolt, but Bakr refused him admittance to the city, and he too retired. The story of the Shah's annexation of the province of Arab Iraq will be told under the events of next year.

The Shah's Return from Khorasan and His Visit to Māzandarān

After a stay of two and a half months at Herat, the Shah began his return march to Mašhad, taking with him Rostam Moḥammad Khan as requested by the Uzbek princes of Transoxania. Near Ġūrlān, Kāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ġūrlānī met him with provisions for the next stage of his journey, and the Shah proceeded to Mašhad, where he conferred the office of warden of the shrine on Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī. The Shah decided not to move farther west until he saw whether there would be any repercussions from his capture of Kandahar, and whether Esfandīār Khan had succeeded in establishing himself in Kārazm. Since it would place too great a burden on local food supplies if the whole royal army spent the winter at Mašhad, the Shah divided up his forces and sent each to a different winter quarters. He himself traveled to Māzandarān with a small body of retainers. He allotted the small town of Dargozīn to Rostam Moḥammad Khan, and sent him there. The ambassadors from the Kājas of Bokhara, and Ebrahim Kāja, Nadr Moḥammad Khan's ambassador, accompanied the Shah to Māzandarān. The former were given leave to depart there, but Ebrahim Kāja stayed with the Shah and did not return until the following year, after the Shah's return to Isfahan.

The Shah Takes Mīrzā Faṣīḥī with Him from Herat

The Shah had always liked the company of scholars and poets. Although his other preoccupations had left him relatively little time to indulge this inclination, he always liked to have someone to grace his festive gatherings with scholarly wit. During his stay at Herat, he had enjoyed the company of that eloquent wit and scholar, Mīrzā Faṣīḥī Haravī, an eminent *seyyed* and member of the Anṣārīya family. The Shah demanded that Mīrzā Faṣīḥī be present at all his gatherings. When he left Herat, the Shah had demanded that Mīrzā Faṣīḥī accompany him to Iraq. Herat's loss was the court's gain, since Mīrzā Faṣīḥī was enrolled among the *moqarrabs*.

In Māzandarān, the Shah divided his time between Ašraf and Farahābād. While he was in the province, the Shah was visited by Yūsuf Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, and his emirs. Yūsuf Khan presented the Shah with fabulous gifts: *golāms*, both male and female; swift Aleša horses; camels; large sums in cash; rich and precious stuffs from many parts; Russian sable coats of great value; rare Cir-

cassian coats of mail; muskets of great price, and other items too many to enumerate. In short, avoiding the usual poetic hyperboles of the age, Yūsuf Khan presented gifts which won the admiration of all, and he constantly received some new mark of the Shah's favor. While he remained at court, he accompanied the Shah on his hunting expeditions, and was constantly present at his private banquets. When he left, he was given magnificent robes of honor. The Shah also summoned to court Qarčaqāy Khan, the commander in chief of Iran and governor of Mašhad, so that he might renew his acquaintance with Yūsuf Khan, whom he had not seen for a long time but who was a close friend of his, since they had been brought up together as children. When Yūsuf Khan returned to Šīrvān, Qarčaqāy Khan remained at court.

The Shah's Widening of the Roads in Māzandarān

Readers will be well aware that the narrowness of the roads through the forests and over the mountain passes of Māzandarān makes it difficult for even a single rider to traverse them. At every step, the rider is forced to dismount because of some hazard, and it is impossible for slow-moving camels to make their way along them. In fact, the natives of the region had never even seen a camel, even in their dreams, and when they *did* see one, they were astonished.

The Shah had done a lot toward the opening up of the area by building the city of Faraḥābād and the town of Ašraf, by his practice of spending most winters there, and by his frequent hunting expedition in the province, but the basic problem of the roads remained. It was extremely difficult for retainers of the royal stirrup to go about their business, or for anyone else traveling to or from the court in Māzandarān to make his way along roads which were not only dangerously steep or narrow but, in their more level stretches, often a morass of mud because of the heavy rainfall in the region. As a result, both military forces and travelers in general suffered inconvenience and loss.

This year, therefore, the Shah resolved to embark on a program of road widening, so that camel trains could move easily to and fro, and travelers not sustain any loss. Mīrzā Taqī, the vizier of Māzandarān, was placed in charge of this task, which all thought difficult and many thought impossible. The inhabitants of the province were ordered to assist him. Laborers were to draw their wages in cash from funds

made available from the royal treasury, and a start was made on the work. The principal road through Māzandarān was the Savād-kūh highway, which passed through Kār, Halrūd, and Fīrūzkūh. This was the route chiefly used by those traveling to the royal court in Māzandarān. The total distance to Farahābād is eight stages, each of five *farsaks* or more. Stonemasons, woodcutters, builders, and laborers were assembled from all over the place, and the necessary materials were collected.

Solid bridges of stone, brick, and lime mortar were built over all the rivers that crossed the road. In the case of watercourses which carried flash floods down from the mountains, wherever the workmen thought the banks might collapse, they constructed diversionary channels lined with brick and cemented with lime mortar to take off the surplus water and lead it down to a river. Efforts were made to level the road, and wooded sections were cleared by woodcutters. Sand and gravel were brought from immense distances so that the ground each side of the road could be sloped off in order to carry rainwater into channels and thence into the rivers; in this way, the center of the road remained dry and free from mud. Narrow stretches of the road through the forest were cleverly widened. In some places, massive timbers were laid down, and in others, the engineers had to cut away rock, using a variety of novel techniques. The work was completed to the Shah's satisfaction in a remarkably short time, and work was then begun on the other roads in Māzandarān to bring them up to the standard of the roads in other provinces. By a coincidence, the words "a public work" (*kār-e keyr*) give the date¹³ of this great achievement.

Notable Deaths

1. Kāja Moḥammad Reżā Fedavī, known as Sārū Kāja, the vizier of Azerbaijan. He had acquired the title of *fedavī* (devoted servant) in the course of an expedition to Georgia. He had been at court for several years, and had become a *moqarrab* and one of those admitted to the Shah's private banquets. I have already said something about him, so I will merely add a few remarks here. He was born at Joveyn in the Qazvin district. From being the vizier of Zu'l-Faqār Khan Qarāmānlū, he entered royal service and became vizier of Azerbaijan with full independence. By virtue of his ability and his success in augmenting the *dīvān* revenues, he gained steady promotion. He

¹³ 1031/1622.

was a man of excellent judgment. He had close connections with poetic circles, and his ready wit made him always welcome at the Shah's assemblies.

This year, he fell ill with some affliction of the stomach which refused to yield to treatment. His condition grew worse in the course of the expedition to Kandahar, and he had to stay behind at Tūn; he came on at his own pace, but died at a small place which is the burial place of Imamzada Moḥammad, and was buried at Mašhad. He was a generous man, and did not spare himself in his concern for his friends and for all needy persons.

2. Moḥammad Šāleḥ Beg, the former vizier of Šīrvān. After his return from his mission to Transoxania, he remained with the Shah in Māzandarān for a time before being appointed vizier and *kalāntar* of Qom. Although he was ill, he set off for Qom, but died two days' journey from his destination. The people of Qom who had come out to welcome him received his corpse instead, and he was buried in the shrine at Qom. He was a Tabrīzī by birth, and was a protégé of Farhād Khan. After the Khan's execution, he entered royal service and held a variety of posts in the *dīvān*. He was a man of great integrity whose conduct in office was unexceptionable.

Events of the Year of the Pig, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1032/1622-23, the Thirty-seventh Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

Spring began officially a few minutes after eight o'clock on Sunday,¹ 19 Jomādā I, 1032/21 March 1623. The Shah celebrated Nowrūz in Māzandarān. The *moqarrabs* and the principal officers of state paid the traditional greetings to the Shah, who after the conclusion of the festivities went hunting.

The *moqarrab al-kāqān* Zeynal Beg, the *tūšmālbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens), returned from his mission to India, along with the centurion Heydar Beg Qarādāglū and Mīr Valī Beg, who had been sent on missions to India after the capture of Kandahar.

Readers will recall my description of the embassy of Khan-e 'Ālam, and of the fabulous gifts he brought from India. When the time came for him to return, the Shah did a mental review of all the emirs and *moqarrabs* and finally selected Zeynal Beg as possessing the necessary qualities for an ambassador: intrinsic suitability, shrewdness, magnanimity, natural good manners, and excellence of conduct. In addition, he was a man in whom the Shah had complete trust. For his part, Zeynal Beg resolved, on the basis of the faithful and devoted conduct expected of a Sufi, not to spare either life or property in the service of his supreme spiritual director (*moršed-e kāmel*) and benefactor; he resolved to perform his duties in a manner which would be deemed worthy by both friend and foe.

Zeynal Beg therefore set about preparing an embassy that would do credit to the Shah; he gathered together Arabian horses, jeweled saddles, and saddles of gold and silver, which are the best ornament of armies; jewelry of all kinds, and countless other luxury items. All this was in the charge of large numbers of servants and workmen from the royal workshops.

When he reached Mogul territory, Zeynal Beg was welcomed at every stage of his journey. On his arrival at Lahore, he discovered that the Emperor was absent, but expected momentarily. As ordered, Zeynal Beg waited at Lahore, and Khan-e 'Ālam went ahead to greet

¹19 Jomādā I was a Tuesday.

the Emperor. After the Emperor reached Lahore, Zeynal Beg was received in audience and presented his most humble greetings and respects. The Emperor greeted him in a friendly manner, whereupon Zeynal Beg presented his gifts and delivered the Shah's letter, and omitted nothing that might contribute to the mutual friendship between the two states.

It is the custom of the Mogul emperors to hold annual festivities on their birthday at their place of birth, and to perform the vows made at the time of their birth. The Emperor Jahāngīr was born at Delhi and his birthday was close at hand; he therefore did not linger in Lahore, but proceeded rapidly to Delhi. On the advice of Khan-e 'Ālam, Zeynal Beg broached the matter of Kandahar with the principal officers of the Mogul state, but he got no satisfactory reply. He decided to return to Iran and not bother to go on to Delhi, rejecting the advice of those who urged him to do so. Readers will recall that the Shah had intended to give as a gift to the Mogul Emperor the turban jewel inscribed with the name of Mīrzā Oloğ Beg b. Mīrzā Šāhroğ b. Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān, judging it to be an appropriate present in view of the descent of the Mogul Emperor from the house of Tīmūr. This ornament, which had not been ready in time to accompany Zeynal Beg and had been sent on later, arrived at this juncture, together with some of the gifts sent to the Shah by the Ottoman Sultan, which the Shah had sent on to the Emperor as "a brother's portion." There was also a letter from the Shah to Zeynal Beg instructing him how to present these gifts. Zeynal Beg had therefore no alternative but to proceed to Delhi. After the conclusion of the birthday festivities he delivered the gifts, and then accompanied the Emperor to Agra. However, he got nowhere with Mogul officials in his discussions about Kandahar, and he reported the situation honestly to the Shah.

When the news of the Shah's capture of Kandahar reached Delhi, the Mogul court suspected Zeynal Beg of being responsible for having suggested this action, and for several days he was in extremely bad odor. Then the centurion Heydar Beg Qarādāglū and Mīr Valī Beg the *dārūğā-ye šotor-kān* (officer in charge of the camel stables) arrived in quick succession, bearing the Shah's letters of explanation about Kandahar, and Zeynal Beg found himself back in favor again. When Jahāngīr left for Kashmir, he gave Zeynal Beg and the other Safavid ambassadors permission to depart. He also gave them a letter for the Shah in which the following sentence occurred: "I value your friendship more than the whole world, and more than any gift."

It is the custom at the Mogul court for the Emperor to hold a special reception for departing ambassadors at which the Emperor expresses his appreciation for the ambassador's services. This type of reception required the ambassador to humble and abase himself before the Emperor, but Zeynal Beg's personal pride, and his awareness of his status as the Shah's ambassador, would not allow him to make the necessary obeisance. He persisted in his refusal despite the fact that both members of his own party and officers of the Mogul court urged him to comply. "It is not the custom of the Safavid court," he said; "if the king confers some special favor or honor on a person, which is not tainted by worldly financial considerations, then it is in order for the king's servant to do him homage without stint." Certain officials at the Mogul court, partly in their desire to perpetuate their traditional ceremonial and partly in their dislike of Zeynal Beg, refused to allow the Emperor to make any relaxation in the ceremonial, and so Zeynal Beg eventually left without having been accorded one of these special receptions. When he reached the Safavid court in Māzandarān, he was congratulated by the Shah on the excellent manner in which he had discharged his mission, and his status was thereby enhanced.

The Shah, now reassured that there would be no repercussions from his capture of Kandahar and satisfied that the Uzbek princes were sincere in their protestations of peace (they had returned the commandant of the fort at Bālā Morgāb whom they had captured the previous year, and had handed back the fort itself to Safavid officers), decided that the presence of the royal army in Khorasan was no longer required. He therefore ordered 'Isā Khan the *qūrčībāši* and 'Alīqolī Khan the *eštīk-āqāsībāši* to review the troops and send them on leave. The Shah then returned from Māzandarān to Isfahan, where he spent the next six months in residence in the Naqš-e Jahān palace. Ebrahim Kāja, the Uzbek ambassador from Balk, was given permission to depart, laden with gifts and other marks of royal favor and bearing a friendly letter from the Shah to his master. Events in Arab Iraq then made it imperative for the Shah to go there in person.

Events at Baghdad and Hafez Aḥmad Pasha's First Expedition against the City

My readers will be well aware that the great and prosperous city of Baghdad, which for over five hundred years was the seat of the caliphate, passed into Safavid hands soon after the accession of Shah Esma'il I and was governed by Moḥammad Khan Šaraf al-Dīn-oğlu

Takkalū. In the year 940/1533-34, Ūlāma Sultan and Ġāzī Khan the keeper of the seal, both high-ranking Takkalū emirs, defected to the Ottomans, and at their instigation the Ottoman Sultan Sülaymān invaded Iran. The Takkalū tribe, guilty of treachery, expelled that loyal Sufi Moḥammad Khan from Baghdad, and Sultan Sülaymān occupied the city.

Since that time, Baghdad has been in Ottoman hands, but for more than twenty-five years now, it has been in a state of great disorder. Every little while an army officer, in his ambition to govern the city, has raised the standard of revolt, and the governors and pashas sent out by the Porte, such as Moḥammad Pasha and Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, have been powerless against the rebels. Not infrequently, fighting has ensued, and numbers of Ottoman regulars have been killed. As a result of the impotence of the officially appointed governors and the control of the city by rebel elements, the ordinary people have been severely oppressed, and the residents of the Shi'ite holy places in Iraq have not been able to sleep at night.

In the last few years, as I have already mentioned, the city had seen the rivalry between Moḥammad Qanbar and Bakr the *sūbāshī*, which ended in the death of the former. Bakr's rule was oppressive and rapacious; he arrested the wealthy for the purpose of extorting money from them, and in order to keep the soldiery happy, made no effort to check their license and lawlessness. As the poet Sa'dī has well said: "If a sultan allows the theft of half an egg to go unpunished, his troops will barbecue a thousand chickens." Because of Bakr's oppressive rule, the peasants and cultivators left their fields untilled, and the resulting shortage of cereals caused great hardship. To add to the troubles of the people, there was a drought in the Baghdad region which was followed by famine.

Those who had money used their capital to buy food and save their lives, though they still lived on meager rations. Of the middle classes, those who could left the city and scattered in all directions—to Iran, Baṣra, and the Ḥavīza region of 'Arabestān; altogether some one hundred thousand people deserted the city. In short, people fled wherever they heard there was a bite of bread to eat, and many people, in their desperation, slew their children with the sword. The writer of this history traveled to Baghdad in the footsteps of the royal army. There was not a single stage on my journey, and not a single village through which I passed, where I failed to see a number of destitute

refugees from Baghdad, with no fixed abode, eeking out a living on the charity and alms provided by the peasants. As for the poor, who did not possess the wherewithal either to stay in Baghdad or to leave, they collapsed in the streets and died of hunger.

At this juncture, Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, who had initially been rebuffed by Bakr and the rebels at Baghdad, returned with an army of thirty thousand men from the army of Dīār Bakr, the troops of the frontier emirs and the Kurdish *sanjaq-begs*. He had been furnished with full power to restore the situation at Baghdad to normal and to punish the rebels, and he brought with him a certain Soleymān Pasha, who had been nominated governor of Baghdad and would take office after the rebellion had been crushed. When Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha neared the city, some of the riffraff who had gathered around Bakr left and melted away, but the regular Ottoman soldiery, fearing that their repeated acts of disobedience had destroyed any chance they might have had of pardon, decided to stand firm in support of Bakr and fight it out.

When Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha camped near the citadel with the intention of investing it, some five thousand of Bakr's Ottoman regulars marched out and, with the greatest effrontery, formed up in battle array. Since they were outnumbered two to one by Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's men, they were defeated with the loss of fifteen hundred men killed, and the survivors streamed back to the citadel in sorry shape. Bakr the *sūbāṣī*, now thoroughly alarmed, bombarded the *qezelbāš* emirs in Hamadan and Lorestān with letters asking for assistance. He had turned to the Shah in all sincerity, he said, because he had no other refuge. The province of Baghdad belonged to the Shah by right of inheritance, and whenever the Shah appeared on the scene, he would give him implicit obedience.

Şaṭıqolı Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Hamadan, and the other frontier emirs reported the matter to the Shah. The Shah ordered them to move their troops to the fort of Zanjīr in the district of Dar-e Tang, nearer the frontier, in case Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's troops made any incursions across the border; he thought it possible that the refugees from Baghdad, once they heard of the movement of the *qezelbāš* troops, might find some means of escape from their plight. In response to the urgent and repeated requests for help from Bakr, and in their compassionate desire to alleviate the plight of the destitute of that province, who, already starving, were now additionally trampled

underfoot by the armies of Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha and the Baghdad rebels, the emirs moved their men two or three days' march nearer the frontier. They sent a letter to Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha by the hand of a Šāmlū *gāzi* of the Kōdābandalū clan:

We have heard reports of the hardship suffered by the people of Baghdad as a result of the scarcity and famine which has prevailed during the past two years. We have heard that most of the inhabitants of Baghdad have abandoned their homes, and that the province is in a state of total ruin. A number of the inhabitants of the province, both military and civilians, have in their desperation appealed to the Shah for assistance. In response to this appeal, we have moved our troops nearer the frontier. If both combatants can resolve their differences and stop the fighting, it will afford relief to God's servants, which is the duty of all princes, and will be the best solution for all concerned.

When Hāfez Aḥmad received the letter from the emirs, despite the fact that he had thirty thousand men and the emirs only seven thousand, he was reluctant to give battle to the *qezelbāš* and retired the following day. Before he did so, however, he sent a message to Bakr informing him that the Sultan had given him full powers to settle affairs at Baghdad; he had therefore decided, he said, to confirm Bakr as governor of the province, and to forgo the gifts which Bakr was sending him; in return he said, Bakr must take control of the province himself and, if the *qezelbāš* entered it, he must not allow them to enter the city of Baghdad or its citadel.

As a result of the maneuverings of Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha's troops, the environs of Baghdad as far as Šahrabān had been ravaged; this had added to the general despoliation of the area, and the peasants and other defenseless inhabitants of the region had been overwhelmed by misfortunes and had dispersed. After Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha had departed, the knowledge that Šaftqolī Khan and the other *qezelbāš* emirs were near at hand reassured these people, who began to return to their homes. On receipt of this news, and of further declarations of fealty from Bakr the *sūbāšī*, the Shah decided to march.

The Shah's Conquest of the Province of Arab Iraq and His Pilgrimage to the Shrines of the Immaculate Imams

Shah 'Abbas's whole being was by nature devoted to love and service of 'Alī and the other Imams. In order to indicate this devotion, he used to call himself "the dog of the threshold of felicity," that is, of the sultan of Najaf, that is, of 'Alī. He had long had the desire to make the pilgrimage to the tombs of 'Alī and of the other Imams, but this desire had remained unfulfilled because of his many preoccupations and because of the obstacles in the way, not least of which was the state of peace existing between the Safavid state and the Ottoman empire, which meant that any visit by the Shah to the tombs of the Imams would be construed as a violation of the peace.

But "events must wait upon their seasons," as the saying goes, and the situation now was completely different. A palace revolution at Istanbul had resulted in the murder of Sultan 'Osmān, and disturbances had broken out in many parts of the Ottoman empire. The Ottoman governors and pashas on the frontiers had committed acts which constituted violations of the peace, and none was subject to the authority of another. In particular, the people of Baghdad acknowledged the authority neither of the Ottomans nor of the *qezelbāš*, and the plight of the inhabitants of that province, and of those residing at the Shi'ite shrines, had been brought to the attention of the Shah. In the light of all this, the Shah, while actually en route to his winter quarters in Māzandarān, suddenly changed his plans and made a snap decision to go to Najaf and Baghdad. He hoped by this action to restore stability to the province, and security to the lives of the inhabitants and the keepers of the holy shrines.

Before taking this momentous decision, the Shah as usual sought an omen from the Koran. At the top of the right-hand page were the words, "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!" which are always taken to signify the attainment of one's goal and a successful expedition. Cheered by this happy omen, the Shah marched from Isfahan with the small body of troops he had with him. Moḥammad Yūsufā Qazvīnī devised the chronogram "I have put my trust in God"² to commemorate the event.

The Shah publicized his intention of visiting the shrines of the

²Koran, 11:57. The chronogram, *tavakkolto 'ala'llāhe*, gives the correct date, 1032/1622-23.

Imams, so that any who wished to do so could join the royal cavalcade, and he issued letters of appointment in the name of Bakr the *sūbāšī*, conferring on him the title of khan and informing him of his approach. Şaftqolī Khan and his fellow emirs advanced still farther and camped within sight of Baghdad, waiting for Bakr to fulfil his fine promises, hand over the city, and offer them hospitality. The advance of the *qezelbāš* army had saved Bakr from being besieged by the Ottoman army, but on the other hand he had been promised the governorship of Baghdad by the Ottomans, and so he resorted to the most unacceptable double-dealing in regard to the *qezelbāš*, and failed completely to behave in the manner expected. At times he said he wished to postpone his meeting with the emirs until the Shah himself arrived; at others, he resorted to other equally unacceptable excuses. After a few days of this procrastination, Bakr abandoned all pretense, threw up earthworks to defend the gates of the city and the citadel, and opened fire on the *qezelbāš* camp with heavy siege guns. The emirs moved their camp out of range and reported Bakr's treachery to the Shah, who received their dispatches in his camp at Kangāvar.

Since the main purpose underlying the Shah's expedition was his pilgrimage to the Shi'ite shrines, he again issued letters of appointment in the name of Bakr the *sūbāšī*, and made another attempt to conciliate him; if he carried out the promises he had made repeatedly to the Shah, the governorship of Baghdad would be left in his hands. The Shah insisted that he had nothing else in mind except his pilgrimage to the Shi'ite shrines. Mīr Valī Beg, the *dārūğa-ye šotor-kān* (officer in charge of the camel stables), was delegated by the Shah to take this second missive to Bakr, and the Shah waited for a reply before advancing farther. When the envoy reached Baghdad, however, Bakr, at the urging of a number of religious bigots, refused to meet him or take delivery of the letter. Some of Bakr's ill-starred, ignorant supporters slew one of Mīr Valī Beg's men and wanted to murder the envoy himself, but were fortunately restrained from doing so by a man whose name is reported as 'Abd al-Raḥmān.

Mīr Valī Beg managed to escape from this perilous situation and report to the Shah that Bakr intended to defend the city and citadel against him. The Shah's wrath was kindled, and he resolved to capture Baghdad and exterminate those seditious elements which for years had kept the region in a state of unrest, and had managed to exist by playing off Ottomans and *qezelbāš* against one another. He

gave orders to 'Isā Khan Šafavī, the *qūrčibāš*, and the *moqarrab al-ḥazrat* Zeynal Beg Begdīlū Šāmlū, the *tūšmālbāš*, who had recently returned from an embassy to India and had been loaded with honors by the Shah, to advance from Dar-e Tang and join forces outside Baghdad with Šafīqolī Khan and his men. If Bakr the *sūbāš* was still maintaining his attitude of hostility and defiance toward the latter, the combined force of emirs was to make a careful reconnaissance of the defenses, seal all routes into and out of the city, and then commence the siege.

The Victories Won by the Qezelbāš Forces before the Arrival of the Shah

The first success won by Safavid forces in this campaign was the capture of the fort of Moḥammad Lak,³ who was a *sanjaq-beg* subject to the jurisdiction of Baghdad. The Lak tribe were the riffraff of the tribes in the Shah's dominions; the said Moḥammad, during the recent troubled times, had gathered around him a band of ill-starred men and had indulged in highway robbery and general looting. In his fear of the *qezelbāš*, he had built himself a fort near Zohāb, in the district of Dar-e Tang, and had also extended his sway over various dependencies of Baghdad; he had declared his allegiance to the Ottomans, had been raised to rank of *sanjaq-beg* by the governor of Baghdad, and had continued to harass people in the area. This Moḥammad died this year, and his son and brother were resident in the fort.

Hearing of the Shah's approach, the latter sent an envoy to the *qezelbāš* emirs to declare their "love of the Shah," and the emirs detached five hundred *gāzīs* under the command of Jahāngīr Beg, a kinsman of Qāsem Sultan Īmānlū, to go to the fort and see whether this brother and son were sincere in their declaration; if they were, they were to take possession of the fort and bring them before the Shah. Moḥammad's brother and son played for time by pretending they were sincere; then they slipped out of the fort with a group of their followers who were apprehensive of the *qezelbāš*, and rode off toward Karkūya and Šahrezūr on the pretext that they were going to visit the Shah. Jahāngīr Beg sent a posse of his men in pursuit, and they slew some sixty or seventy Kurds; the rest escaped after abandoning their baggage. The fort thus passed into Safavid hands, and the Shah, when he reached the area, made Jahāngīr Beg its commandant.

³The Lak were a southern Kurdish tribe living in the Salmās area (TM, p. 165).

The Victory of the Emirs over a Group of the Reprobates from Baghdad

When Şaḫīqolī Khan and his fellow emirs were forced to change the location of their camp because of Bakr's bombardment, they crossed the Tigris to Old Baghdad and camped there, thus cutting off the Ottoman line of retreat to the west by way of the bridge. They seized a few boats, and planned a crossing opposite the shrine of Kāzemeyn.⁴ Not more than a hundred men and sixty or seventy horses had gotten across when an enemy force of one thousand men appeared on the scene; this force, under the command of Bakr's brother, Ḥamza Beg, 'Omar Kadkodā the *vakil*, and Ḥarīr Aqa, had been sent by Bakr when he heard of the attempted *qezelbāš* crossing. The *qezelbāš* charged without waiting to find out how many they were, and broke the enemy with their first charge and took prisoner all three enemy commanders; 'Omar Kadkodā was captured by Soheyl Beg the sewer of Ḥoseyn Khan the governor of Lorestān; the captors of the other two commanders are unknown to me. The *qezelbāš* pursued the enemy as far as the end of the bridge, and slew some three hundred of them. In the course of this decisive victory, Şaḫīqolī Khan, Ḥoseyn Khan, and the other emirs performed prodigies of valor, each unhorsing with his lance as many as seven or eight of the enemy. This remarkable victory against an enemy force ten times as great, which signaled the beginning of the Shah's victorious campaign in Arab Iraq, was possible only through the intervention of divine providence. The Shah bestowed his warmest congratulations on the commanders responsible. The reputation of the *qezelbāš* for valor and daring was enhanced by this victory, but the enemy still resolved to defend the citadel.

The Destruction of an Enemy Force Which Had Gone Out to Meet a Trading Caravan

Bakr the *sūbāšī*, hearing of the approach of a trading caravan from Aleppo, sent out a body of troops to meet it and expedite its entry into the citadel, in case it should fall into *qezelbāš* hands. Bakr's troops seized possession of the caravan, and the merchants, resigned to the loss of their goods, hoped only to save their lives. They secretly sent a messenger to the *qezelbāš* to say that, if they sent a force to rescue them, they would tell the full story of the seizure of the caravan. When this messenger reached the great emirs who had effected the crossing of the Tigris, they sent a detachment of troops that sur-

⁴Contains the tombs of the "two Kāzems," i.e., Mūsā and Moḥammad Taqī, the Seventh and Ninth Shi'ite Imams.

rounded the caravan as though with a hunting circle, slew all the enemy (the *gāzīs* divided their possessions among themselves), and rescued the merchants, who later appeared before the Shah at Baghdad.

The Siege of the Citadel and the Capture of the City of Baghdad

It was God's will that the province of Baghdad should be taken from the hands of a group of rebels who oppressed the people, and that justice should be restored under the Shah's rule. A clear indication of this is the fact that, if Bakr had lived up to his promises, the Shah would have had to confirm him as governor of Baghdad; but Bakr's tyrannical rule had merited divine retribution, and God willed that Bakr should oppose the Shah and thus enable the latter to be the instrument of this divine retribution.

The Shah reached Baghdad on 1 Rabi' I, 1033/23 December 1623, and pitched the royal pavilion near the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa. He sent an ultimatum to Bakr, calling on him to submit and declare his allegiance. Bakr had three days to make up his mind; if at the end of that time he had not complied with the Shah's demand, it would mean war, and if the Safavid forces captured the citadel, he could expect no quarter. Bakr's answer was to open fire with his cannon; he refused to see the Shah's messenger, and threatened him with death. Upon the expiry of the ultimatum, the Shah commenced the siege of the city and the citadel.

Meanwhile, Ḥasan Pasha, the governor of Mosul, was marching to the assistance of Bakr, and Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, with a scratch force of five hundred men, was bringing a large supply train for the benefit of the defenders of the citadel. The Shah promptly dispatched against them a detachment of troops including musketeers of the royal stirrup, under the command of Zamān Beg the *nāẓer-e boyūtāt* (superintendent of the royal workshops),⁵ while the besiegers began the work of constructing breastworks and digging trenches. Particularly good progress was made in the western part of the city, in the direction of Nārīn Qal'a, which was defended by Darvīš Moḥammad Pasha b. Bakr the *sūbāšī*. In this sector, which had been entrusted to the *qūrčībāšī*, the breastworks were pushed up to the towers within a few days, and mining operations began. In less than three weeks, the situation of the defenders had become so desperate that Darvīš Moḥammad sued for quarter. But on the eve of 21 Rabi'

⁵For his duties, see *TM*, pp. 48, 118ff.

I, 1033/12 January 1624, an assault force of *qūrčīs* stormed Nār-in Qal'a and gained an entry through a small aperture which faced the *qūrčībāšī's* breastwork; in the course of the night, two or three hundred *qūrčīs* forced their way into Nār-in Qal'a. Finally the *qūrčībāšī* himself entered, and the war trumpets were sounded to signal their success. Darvīš Moḥammad and his officers and men, seeing that further resistance was useless, surrendered to the *qūrčībāšī* and took refuge in the royal mercy. The sound of the trumpets and the din of battle jolted Bakr and his senior officers, who had their quarters in the city, out of their complacency.

On Sunday, 23 Rabī' I, 1033/14 January 1624, Baghdad fell and was returned to Safavid hands after such a long period of time. Thus Shah 'Abbas achieved a feat none of his predecessors had been able to accomplish. May Baghdad remain in Safavid hands until the end of time,⁶ and may Shah 'Abbas be spared to care for its holy shrines until the second coming of the Hidden Imam!

After the fall of the citadel, Darvīš Moḥammad b. Bakr, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Čelebī, and several others who had surrendered and declared their allegiance to the Shah were spared. Their men were then interrogated; all those who were found to be Shi'ites, although they richly deserved death for a multitude of crimes, were also spared; the rest were executed.

The principal problem facing the Safavids after their capture of Baghdad was how to deal with the starving populace. Several thousand women, children, dervishes, and the poor and needy came to the Shah's camp crying that they were starving, and their needs were seen to. Gradually, the situation improved. In the opinion of this writer, the clearest indication of the divine wisdom in bringing this campaign to a successful conclusion is the fact that the Shah's victory meant the salvation of the ordinary people from famine.

On 28 Rabī' I, 1033/19 January 1624, in the Masjed-e Jāme' which was restored by the Abbasid caliph al-Mostaṣser-bellāh (his name is inscribed on the portal),⁷ the *koṭba* of the Twelve Imams was embellished with the name of Shah 'Abbas, and this was repeated from pulpits across the city. Šafīqolī Khan, governor of Hamadan and *amīr al-omarā* of that frontier, was appointed governor of Bagh-

⁶This prayer was not answered, since the Ottomans retook the city in 1048/1638.

⁷Caliph 623-640/1226-1242.

dad and continued to hold his existing posts as well. During the month that the Shah stayed in Baghdad to see to affairs there, he constantly visited the shrine at Kāzemeyn, and bestowed gifts and alms on the employees of the shrine, and on all meritorious persons and the residents of the district in general. He enriched the shrine with gifts of carpets, embroidered decorative spreads for covering chests, and so on.

From Baghdad, he went to Najaf. One day's journey from the shrine, the Shah dismounted and proceeded on foot. He spent ten days at the shrine, engaged in prayer and devotions, and took his turn sweeping those sacred precincts. The Shah reopened a canal which had been dug by Shah Esma'il I to bring water from the delta of the Euphrates to Najaf, and which had become silted up over the years. The troops were ordered to perform this task. The water flowed in a surface channel as far as the mosque at Kūfa, but from there to Najaf the ground rises, and the Shah planned to bring the water through a *qanāt* (underground water channel) past Najaf to Najaf lake. At Najaf, the Shah planned to construct cisterns with access staircases which people could descend in order to draw water. When these were completed, the residents and people living nearby would no longer have to make do with the bitter and brackish water of the existing wells. God grant that the Shah may live to see the completion of this great work, and that in the next world he may receive his reward in the form of refreshing draughts from the river of paradise: "And their Lord will give them to drink a pure beverage."⁸

During the ten days the Shah spent at Najaf, he was in attendance at the shrine night and day, and conducted himself with the greatest humility. All the employees of the shrine, those living in the area, and all worthy persons, women and the needy of the district of Najaf, were granted pensions, votive offerings, and alms. From Najaf, the Shah went to Karbala, the burial place of the Third Imam Ḥoseyn. The year was now at an end, and so I will digress to describe other events which occurred this year before returning to my narrative of events in Arab Iraq.

The Dispatch of an Ottoman Relief Force from Mosul and Its Engagement with Qezelbāš Troops

As already related, Kūr Ḥasan Pasha, the governor of Mosul, was

⁸Koran. 76:22.

on his way to the relief of Baghdad with five thousand men. Hearing that a *qezelbāš* force under Zamān Beg was marching against him, he halted at an old caravanserai along the route and sent to Mosul for reinforcements from the Kurdish and other tribes in the area. Meanwhile, Zamān Beg's troops reached the caravanserai and surrounded it, and Zamān Beg sent an envoy to Ḥasan Pasha calling on him to surrender and enter the Shah's service. The Ottomans decided on resistance. After a few days' desultory fighting, the news arrived of the fall of Baghdad, and the defenders, despairing of receiving reinforcements from Mosul, succumbed to a *qezelbāš* assault. Ḥasan Pasha and most of his men who were captured were put to death, and their possessions and all the supplies they were taking to Baghdad fell into the hands of the *qezelbāš*. Zamān Beg marched back to Baghdad in triumph, and was congratulated by the Shah on his exploit.

The Dispatch of Qarčaqāy Khan, the Commander in Chief of Iran, against Mosul and Karkūk

The capture of Baghdad and the death of Ḥasan Pasha destroyed the morale of the Ottoman garrisons at Mosul, Karkūk, and Šahrezūr. The troops began to desert in order to save their lives, leaving the civilian populations in a state of panic. Purely in order to give security to the latter, Shah 'Abbas dispatched two columns: one consisting of *qūrčīs*, *ğolāms*, and musketeers, under the command of Qarčaqāy Khan the commander in chief of Iran, to the Mosul area; the other, under command of Khan Aḥmad Ardalān, to Karkūya and Šahrezūr, which were close to the Ardalān tribal territory. The Ottoman garrison at Karkūya promptly evacuated the fort and fled to Dīār Bakr. Khan Aḥmad and his men took possession of the fort, assumed control of the area, and took steps to protect the property of the inhabitants.

At Mosul, however, the *qezelbāš* met resistance from some of the Ottoman troops who, well supplied with provisions and munitions, were confident of their ability to defend the fort. Qarčaqāy Khan detailed some of his men under the command of Qāsem Sultan İmānlū Afšār to lay siege to the fort, while he himself made a sweep through Dīār Bakr in the course of which he acquired a great deal of plunder. By the time he returned to Mosul, the fort was on the point of falling. The presence of the commander in chief caused the *ğāzīs* to redouble their efforts, and a general assault was successful. The defenders

cried for quarter and declared their submission, but too late: The *ḡāzīs* cut down any who offered resistance, and shared the booty.

Qarṣaqāy Khan rejoined the Shah during the month of Rajab 1033/March-April 1624, when the Shah was still doing the rounds of the shrines at Najaf and Karbala, and the Shah took him and his men, who had not so far had the opportunity of visiting the shrines because of their mission to the Mosul area, on the pilgrimage. Qāsem Beg Īmānlū was promoted to rank of khan and appointed governor of Mosul, and a force of Afšār centurions and *qūrčīs* was placed under his command. Qāsem Khan strengthened the defenses of the fort at Mosul and took over the administration of the area. Abu'l-Qāsem Sultan, the son of Pīr Ğeyb Sultan Ostājīlū, was made an emir with the rank of soltan and given the district of Javāzer and its dependencies.

Emir Gūna Khan's Subjugation of the Fort of Āḡesqa and the Appointment of Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū as Governor of That Province

Emir Gūna Khan Qājār, the *beglerbeg* of Čokūr-e Sa'd, was ordered this year to subjugate the fort at Āḡesqa. As I have previously stated, the Āḡesqa region of the Meskhia province of Georgia had been part of the Safavid empire in the time of Shah Tahmasp, and its governor had owed allegiance to the Shah and had paid tribute to him. After the death of Shah Tahmasp, the Ottomans had gained control of the area, and ever since that time Āḡesqa had been a bone of contention between the two empires. After fighting a number of battles against Ottoman and Georgian troops, Emir Gūna Khan succeeded in subjugating the strong fort of Āḡesqa, the seat of the Ottoman governor. Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū, the governor of Lori, was appointed governor of Āḡesqa, and given a thousand musketeers of the royal stirrup as part of the garrison of the fort. The Šams al-Dīnlū⁹ *ḡāzīs* occupied the fort at Āḡesqa and the other dependent forts in the area, and took charge of the administration of the region.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Shaikh Loṭfollāh Meysī, an Arab from Jabal 'Āmel, an outstanding scholar and jurist of his time. I said something about him in book I, in my biographical notes on theologians and shaikhs of Shah

⁹The Šams al-Dīnlūs were a clan of the Zu'l-Qadars (*TM*, p. 16).

Tahmasp's reign. He fell ill this year and died at Isfahan, while the Shah was still in his summer quarters at Fīrūzkūh and had not yet left for his campaign in Arab Iraq. He had held the office of prayer leader at the mosque which Shah 'Abbas had built facing the Naqš-e Jahān palace.¹⁰ He resided within the precincts of the mosque, and up to the time of his death, continued to give instruction in the religious sciences, to examine theological problems, and to carry out his duties as prayer leader. His opinion on theological problems carried great weight. His name, Shaikh Loṭfollāh, produces a chronogram of the date of his death, if one excludes two *ls*.¹¹ His elder son, Shaikh Ja'far, is an extremely pious man, and excels even his father in scholarship. Shaikh Loṭfollāh's family were allotted pensions and stipends by the Shah.

2. Meḥrāb Khan Qājār, governor of Marv-e Šāhijān. He fell ill this year at Marv and, the physicians' treatment proving of no avail, died. His body was taken to Mašhad for burial within the precincts of the shrine.

Meḥrab Khan came from Qarābāg to Iraq early in Shah 'Abbas's reign and enrolled among the court retainers. His first post was that of *davātdār* (inkhorn holder), and his excellent service and natural good manners won him a place among the *moqarrabs* at court. When the Uzbegs subjugated Khorasan, the office of *davātdār* was transferred to his brother, Laṭīf Khan Beg, and he himself was raised to the emirate and appointed governor of Ṭabas-e Gīlakī. While holding this post, he stoutly defended the eastern frontier against Uzbek attacks, and he subsequently held a variety of posts in Khorasan. He was governor of Mašhad when Bektāš Khan Ostājilū, the governor of Marv, died, and he was transferred to Marv. During his term as governor of Marv, he fought a number of major battles against the Uzbegs, and he became celebrated along that frontier for his exploits. He retained the Shah's favor to the end of his days. After his death, his governorship was given to 'Āšūr Khan Čeganī.

3. Kāja 'Alī Akbar, the comptroller of Isfahan. He fell ill in Māzandarān, and died at the summer station of Kalāra-dašt, where sickness was rampant at court. He hailed from Andān in the Mārbīn district of Isfahan, and claimed descent from Shaikh Zu'l-Nūn Meṣrī. He was a man of great honesty, integrity, and piety—qualities which

¹⁰The magnificent Masjed-e Shaikh Loṭfollāh, begun in 1603 and finished in 1618.

¹¹The letters *sh. y. kh. l. f. d. h.* appear to yield the date 1035, not 1033.

won him his first post as *zābeṭ-nevīs* (revenue-collector)¹² of the royal secretariat. After the death of Aqa Abū Faṭḥ Eṣfahānī, the *mostowfī-ye kāṣṣa* (comptroller of the *kāṣṣa* branch of the administration),¹³ Kāja 'Alī Akbar replaced him. When Kāja 'Alī died after a number of years in that office, he was succeeded as *mostowfī-ye kāṣṣa* by a certain Aqa Ḥoseyn, an Eṣfahānī, who was a scribe in that department. He too died, only a few days later, and was succeeded by Mīrzā Bāqer, the *ṣāḥeb-towjīh* (the master of assignments).¹⁴

4. Jān Aqa Kānom, the daughter of Morād Beg Bāyandor Torkmān, and the wife of the late 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū, the grandson of Dūrmīš Khan. When 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū was governor-general at Herat and guardian of the infant prince 'Abbas, Jān Aqa Kānom looked after the latter, and cared for the prince for more years than any of the other women of the harem. As a result, she was given the distinguished title of *nana*, or mother, and became the doyenne of the royal harem and the object of the Shah's special favor. She died this year as the court was leaving its winter quarters in Māzandarān, and the Shah had her body taken to Karbala for burial.

5. Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, the vizier of the *golāms* and the royal *majles-nevīs* (secretary of state).¹⁵ He accompanied the Shah to Najaf. When the cavalcade reached Ḥella, Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī went to the bathhouse shortly before it was time to depart. On his return from the baths, he went to his own tent for a short nap. His servants, having gotten everything ready for the journey, came to wake him, and found him dead. Thinking he had had an apoplectic fit, they bled him, but to no avail; they could extract no more than a few drops of blood. His body was taken to Karbala, and buried there in a tomb he had had prepared only a short time before. The Shah was much grieved by the death of such an honest old servant. In view of his length of service, the Shah gave his offices to his eldest son, Mīrzā Moḥammad Reżā, who was even more capable than his father.

Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī was a Barzrūd *seyyed* from Naṭanz, who claimed descent from Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Eṣfahānī, a disciple and devoted

¹²See *TM*, pp. 76, 142; this official was in the department of the comptroller of finance.

¹³See *TM*, pp. 25, 123.

¹⁴See *TM*, pp. 76, 143.

¹⁵See *TM*, p. 121.

follower of Shaikh Şaft al-Dīn Eşhāq, who thought highly of him, as is shown by the fact that when Shaikh Şaft died, his last will and testament contained the request that Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Eşfahānī wash his body and prepare it for burial. Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī was a humble man, and a person of integrity and excellence of character. He entered the Shah's service at an early age and performed his duties so well that he rose to higher office than his ancestors and became one of the *moqarrabs* at the court.

Others of the Shah's entourage who died during the expedition to Iraq included the following.

6. Mīr Jamāl al-Dīn Kāšī, a noted scholar of his time. Last year, he held the office of prayer leader at the Masjed-e Šāh in Isfahan. He accompanied the Shah to Arab Iraq and, after the conquest of Baghdad, recited the *koṭba* of the Twelve Imams, in the name of Shah 'Abbas, in the mosque at Kāzemeyn and in the congregational mosques at Baghdad and Najaf. He fell ill at Karbala, and died and was buried there.

7. Ḥakīm Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī Ṭehranī, known as Ḥakīm Keyrātī. Wishing to visit the Shi'ite shrines in Arab Iraq, he accompanied the Shah's expedition. He too died at Karbala and was buried there, thus achieving the supreme goal of all lovers of the house of the Prophet.

8. Mīrzā 'Enāyatollāh Eşfahānī, the grandson of Kāja Ne'matollāh Mālamīrī, who for a number of years was the *vazīr-e mōhr* (the vizier of the seal). This year he was appointed vizier of Yazd. He accompanied the Shah's expedition to Arab Iraq and died at Baghdad after completing his visit to Karbala and Najaf. He was buried at Karbala.

Events of the Year of the Rat, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1033/1623-24, the Thirty-eighth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day fell this year on Wednesday, 29 Jomādā I,¹ 1033/20 March 1624, and the year began at 2:48 a.m. The Shah, who was at Karbala, visited the shrine of the martyred Ḥoseyn, and donated to the shrine brocade spreads for covering chests, carpets (including some woven with gold thread), and other items; in addition, he gave grants and alms to all the shrine attendants and holy men, and to residents of the shrine and other deserving persons, both men and women. The Shah then paid yet another visit to the tomb of 'Alī at Najaf, and returned to Karbala. He appointed that loyal officer of Sufi stock, Sārū Sultan Begdīlū, the brother of the *moqarrab al-kāqān* Zeynal Beg the *tūšmālbāšī*, warden of the holy shrines of the Imams and governor of Ḥella. Sārū Sultan was also given five hundred *qezelbāš* to form a guard at Najaf. The administration of all cultivated lands belonging to the shrines was placed in his hands as well.

After completing these administrative arrangements, the Shah began his march back to Baghdad, stopping once more at the shrine at Kāzemeyn, where he distributed more brocade spreads and beautiful rugs. The month of Jomādā II was now well advanced, and the month of Rajab, and the holy days (*vaqfa*) during which, according to sound tradition, a pilgrimage to the shrine of Ḥoseyn is particularly efficacious, were close at hand. The Shah, being informed of the special holiness of this period, left his troops at Baghdad and journeyed once more to Karbala with a few companions.

On his return to Baghdad, he devoted a few days to settling urgent matters there, and then traveled to Sorra-man-ra'a, commonly known as Samarra.² There, he visited the shrines of the two 'Askarīs³ and the Twelfth Imam, the Lord of the Age. The Shah ordered a census to be made of all residents of that holy place, including men, women, and children, even unweaned infants, and each received an allotment. There was even the case of the pregnant woman who gave birth during the night, and whose husband turned up in the morning and

¹Both printed text and MS. have, wrongly, Jomādā II.

²Sixty miles from Baghdad. See Le Strange, pp. 53ff., and Donaldson, pp. 242ff.

³The Tenth "Twelver" Imam, 'Alī Naqī, and the Eleventh, Ḥasan al-'Askarī.

claimed an allotment for the newborn child; this was granted him on the same basis as for other suckling children.

At the conclusion of all these activities, the Shah began his return to Isfahan. En route, he stayed a few days at Tāq-e Bostān,⁴ where he reviewed his troops and sent them on leave. He reached Isfahan on 17 Ramaẓān 1033/3 July 1624. From Isfahan, he sent Aqa Moḥammad, the *mostowfi* (comptroller) of the *ḡolāms*, on a mission to the Emperor Jahāngīr, to maintain the good relations between the two states which were of such long standing, and had recently been re-confirmed. In particular, the Shah wished to inform his royal brother of the capture of Baghdad, and he sent with his ambassador a portion of the choicest spoils from that campaign.

This year, Seyyed Moḥammad Khan, the son of Seyyed Mobārak, was appointed governor of the Ḥavīza region of the province of 'Arabestān. I have previously mentioned that Seyyed Manṣūr, the brother of Seyyed Mobārak, had been appointed governor of this province. The Shah had ordered Seyyed Manṣūr to join him on the Baghdad expedition with his troops, and Seyyed Manṣūr had discharged his duties satisfactorily. But Seyyed Manṣūr had made unacceptable excuses for not complying with the Shah's order; he even went so far as to utter a number of seditious remarks, and he showed hostility to those who counseled him to obey the Shah's order—men like Shaikh 'Abdollāh No'man. Seyyed Manṣūr's conduct so angered the Shah that, on his return from Baghdad, he replaced him as governor with Seyyed Moḥammad the son of Seyyed Mobārak; he conferred on Seyyed Moḥammad the title of khan, and dispatched him to Ḥavīza in the company of Shaikh 'Abdollāh No'man. Emām-qolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, was instructed to give them all necessary assistance. When Seyyed Moḥammad reached Ḥavīza, Seyyed Manṣūr defiantly closed the gates of the citadel against him. Emām-qolī Khan laid siege to the fort. When the situation grew desperate for Seyyed Manṣūr, the latter fled and took refuge among the Āl-e Foẓūl and built another fort there. At the time of writing, 1033/1624, he is still there, but he will shortly pay for his crimes.

This year, the vizier of the supreme *divān*, Salmān Khan the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, died. The Shah, after reviewing possible candidates, chose as his successor Sultan al-'Olamā'i Kālifa Sultan, the son of the *ṣadr* Mīrzā Raftī al-Dīn Moḥammad, the son of the late

⁴See Le Strange, pp. 187-88.

Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd, who possessed all the necessary qualities. Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd was an eminent *seyyed* of Isfahan, of the celebrated family of the *Ḳolafā seyeds*, who were descended from Mīr Bozorg, the ruler of Māzandarān. I said something about Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn in book I in my biographical notes on the *seyyeds* and *'olamā* of the time of Shah Tahmasp. *Ḳalīfa* Sultan's father is the present incumbent in the office of *ṣadr*; he is an extremely learned man, and is connected by marriage to the Safavid royal house. One chronogram for the date of *Ḳalīfa* Sultan's appointment is: "The ornament in the crown of the office of vizier."⁵ Another chronogram, composed by my nephew, Moḥammad Šāleḥ, ran as follows: "Sultan, the Shah's son-in-law, became vizier."⁶

This year, the Shah decreed that *Ḳāja* Moḥammad Ma'šūm, the *nāẓer-e daftarkāna-ye homāyūn* (superintendent of the royal secretariat)⁷ and *mostowfī-ye baqāyā* (comptroller of the arrears),⁸ should affix his seal to all documents pertaining to transactions coming within the purview of the Department of Arrears, in lieu of the accountants in the Department of the Comptroller of Finance, and the latter were instructed to hand over to him at the end of the year a summarized version of the accounts.

Events in the Ottoman Empire

Since an account of these events is relevant to my purpose, I have no choice but to give it. Readers will recall that the Janissaries had assassinated Sultan 'Oṣmān and had reinstated as sultan his paternal uncle, Sultan Moṣṭafā. One consequence of this action had been that the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, Moḥammad Pasha, known as Abāza Pasha, in his fury against the Janissaries, summarily executed any he could lay hands on, and appropriated their property. Then, behaving like a *Jalālī*, he gathered a band of ruffians and brought under his control the provinces adjacent to Arzan al-Rūm, or Erzerum as it is now known. He then marched on Istanbul with a large army, with the intention of setting on the throne Sultan Morād, the brother of Sultan 'Oṣmān, and of exacting revenge on the Janissaries. He reached Ūskūdar, a suburb of Istanbul, plundered it, and slew any Janissaries he came across.

⁵*Zibanda-ye afsar-e vezārat*, which yields the correct date, 1033/1624.

⁶*Vazīr-e šāh šod solṭān-e dāmād*, which also yields the correct date.

⁷See *TM*, pp. 71, 140. This officer was the head of the royal secretariat under the overall jurisdiction of the vizier.

⁸See *TM*, p. 123 and n. 1.

According to some reports (God alone knows the whole truth!), two thousand Janissaries met their end in this way, and Abāza Pasha distributed among his followers the large quantities of booty he acquired. Contrary to his expectations, the chief officers of the Ottoman state repudiated his actions and ordered him to stop taking the law into his own hands; moreover, they declared his actions harmful to the state, and prepared to take countermeasures against him. Abāza Pasha, disappointed in his hopes of gaining support among the chief officers of the Ottoman state, returned to Erzerum.

Meanwhile, Sultan Moṣṭafā, who had been deposed before because he was of unsound mind, now, after his reinstatement as Sultan, began to act in an even more insane way. The chief officers and leaders of the Ottoman state, fearing that disorders would break out throughout the empire, decided to depose him again, this time in favor of Sultan Morād, who was still a child. This move was opposed by the Janissaries, still fearful of retaliation for their murder of Sultan 'Oṣmān. Sultan Morād's mother made strenuous efforts to win over the Janissaries, and urged the army leaders to conclude a sworn covenant with the Janissaries promising that the matter of Sultan 'Oṣmān's murder was closed and that there would be no inquiry into its circumstances; further, the Janissaries would retain the traditional powers they had always had. This covenant satisfied the Janissaries. After the *moftīs* had been consulted, Sultan Moṣṭafā was again deposed and Sultan Morād IV placed on the throne.

At this juncture, the news arrived of the capture of Baghdad by the *qezelbāš*, and the Ottoman authorities took immediate steps to recover that city. Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, who was a shrewd and experienced officer and familiar with the situation at Baghdad, was appointed grand vizier and commander in chief, and given full powers to settle affairs on the *qezelbāš* frontier. A new Aqa of the Janissaries was appointed (the former one had been murdered by his own men at the time of the revolt against Sultan 'Oṣmān), and the Janissaries agreed to deal with Abāza Pasha, who had had the temerity to put to death so many of their number, and then to march on Baghdad. The troops stationed at Istanbul, known as *qapı-qolları*, were made ready and dispatched to Dīār Bakr with provisions, artillery, and other siege equipment. When Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha received his commission as grand vizier, he issued mobilization orders to all the pashas throughout Dīār Bakr, Egypt, Syria, Aleppo, Rumelia, and Anatolia, and handed over the government of Dīār Bakr

to a certain Morād Pasha. The story of his expedition to Baghdad will be told under the events of next year, God willing.

The Arrival of Various Foreign Embassies at the Safavid Court

After the Shah had been at Isfahan for some considerable while, dispensing justice and dealing with petitions, he suffered a short illness. On his recovery, he set out for his winter quarters in Māzandarān, and eventually reached Farahābād and Ašraf after spending some time on the way hunting. A number of foreign ambassadors visited his court there. They included Nadr Mīrzā-bāšī Ūzbeġ, an ambassador from Balġ on behalf of Nadr Moġammad Khan. This envoy reached Isfahan after the Shah had left for Māzandarān, and was welcomed by the governor, vizier, and people of the city of Isfahan. He was given quarters in the Sarvestān building in the Naqš-e Jahān park, and was royally entertained during his stay at Isfahan. After he was sufficiently rested from the fatigue of his journey, he proceeded to Māzandarān and was received by the Shah at Ašraf. He presented a letter of friendship from his master and gifts sent by the latter, and spent two months at the Shah's court before being given leave to depart and sent on his way with honor.

A second envoy was Kāja Ĥājji, an ambassador from Shah Jahān, the son of the Mogul Emperor Jahāngīr; he too was received by the Shah at Ašraf, and presented to the Shah a letter from Shah Jahān which described the latter's struggles against his father's officers. The letter was full of complaints about his father's treatment of him, particularly his sending armies against him. The Shah kept his ambassador at Ašraf until after Nowrūz, and then sent him back with a letter full of fatherly advice. God, he said, had enjoined sons to obey their parents; the prince should seek to do his father's will, thus removing his father's ground for complaint against him and removing the need for him to take military action against him. If the prince would take this advice, he said, he would be applauded and esteemed. He should practice the art of dissimulation toward his father's enemies and people with an axe to grind, and should devote himself to pleasing his father.

The third envoy this year was from Šāhīn Gerāy Khan, the Tartar prince who, as I mentioned earlier, had taken refuge at the Safavid court as a result of opposition from his nephew, Jānī Beg Gerāy, who

had become ruler of the Tartars with Ottoman support. Šāhīn Gerāy Khan, after a spell at court, had taken up residence at Darband in Šīrvān and was living in hope of regaining his hereditary territory. The Shah had given him moral encouragement and material assistance to that end. This year, his elder brother Moḥammad Gerāy Khan had succeeded as ruler of the Tartars, and the senior Tartar chiefs had chosen Gerāy Khan as his heir-apparent. They called him *qalgā* or lieutenant after the Tartar custom, and had sent for him. Šāhīn Gerāy had asked the Shah for his moral support and set off for the Crimea. From what the envoy told me, and from reports of travelers from the Crimea, I learned that the Ottoman Sultan had sent him large quantities of cash and presents in an effort to secure his allegiance to the Ottomans and a guarantee of his hostility toward the *qezelbāš*, but he had refused, and continued to count himself a devoted supporter of the Shah. Indeed, the signet ring with which he had sealed his letter to the Shah bore the inscription: "Šāhīn Gerāy, the slave of Shah 'Abbas." He had fought battles at Kaffa against the Ottoman pashas who had been sent against him in support of Jānī Beg Gerāy, and had been victorious. He now reported all this to the Shah, and gave thanks to him for his support. The Shah treated his envoy with the greatest esteem, and dispatched him with words of wisdom such as a spiritual director gives his disciple. He also sent the Tartar chief a robe of honor and numerous other gifts.

The fourth envoy to reach the Shah's court this year came from Abāza Pasha; he was a certain Seyyed 'Azīzī, known as Emir Efendī, (the Ottomans habitually called *seyyeds* Efendī as a mark of respect).

Abāza Pasha was the *beglerbeg* of Erzerum, and thought it expedient to keep on good terms with the Safavids in view of the fact that his province bordered on that of Čokūr-e Sa'd, which was governed by the powerful *qezelbāš* emir Gūna Khan. After his intervention against the Janissaries following their murder of Sultan 'Osmān and his subsequent withdrawal from Istanbul, he thought it prudent to make overtures to the Safavid court through Emir Gūna Khan, and he accordingly sent Emir Efendī as his ambassador to declare his allegiance to the Shah. Although the Shah did not believe there was a word of truth in what he said, and was well aware that Abāza Pasha only wanted a place to retreat to in case the Ottoman authorities decided to punish him for his recent activities, he preferred to take his protestations at face value. He received Emir Efendī

with honor and issued letters of appointment conferring the status of khan on Abāza Pasha.

He sent Emir Efendī back with gifts for his master, accompanied by a Safavid envoy in the person of Nowrūz Beg, an Ostājīlū *qūrčī*. At first, Abāza Pasha professed to be honored by having the status of khan conferred on him, and treated Nowrūz Beg with honor; later, however, his duplicity began to show itself, and he resorted to trickery and double-dealing in his relations with officers of the Safavid state.

Miscellaneous Events Which Occurred This Year

When the Shah's spies and informers reported the buildup of Ottoman troops in Diār Bakr under the command of Hāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, the Shah thought the latter might be intending to invade Azerbaijan, and so he decided to deny the Ottomans provisions along their line of march. They could take one of two routes from Diār Bakr: via Erzerum, or via Vān. Since Erzerum was insecure because of the seditious activities of Abāza Pasha, the Shah thought the Vān route would probably be chosen. He therefore sent the aide-de-camp Rostam Beg to Tabriz with orders to mobilize, in conjunction with Šāhbanda Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, the *qezelbaş* forces in that province, and to proceed in the direction of Vān and ravage all regions through which the Ottomans might pass. The necessary orders were sent out, and every commander reported for duty and paraded his men with full equipment before Rostam Beg and the *beglerbeg*. The size of each contingent depended on the size of the fief, the emoluments accruing from it, and the zeal of the individual commander in the cause of religion and the state. This force then proceeded toward Vān and stripped the area of all provisions and livestock, none of the Ottoman or Kurdish forces in the area daring to interfere. Rostam Beg then returned to court and reported to the Shah that his mission had been accomplished.

The Engagement between The Enemy in the Mosul Area and Qāsem Khan and his Afšār Qūrčīs

As previously reported, Qāsem Khan Imānlū had been stationed on the Mosul frontier with his Afšār centurions and *qūrčīs*, and held the fort there. He had no more than three hundred men with him, and the total force at his disposal numbered only seven or eight hundred. He was attacked by a combined army of Ottomans, Arabs, and Kurds,

who had been emboldened by the appointment of Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha as commander in chief and by the Ottoman mobilization in Dīār Bakr. This combined force numbered three thousand men, seven hundred of whom were musketeers, and was commanded by Ḥasan Pasha and by the brother of Kūr Ḥasan Pasha, who had been captured and executed near Baghdad. Despite their tremendous inferiority in numbers, the *qezelbāš* decided to give battle. Afšārs of the Arešlū clan led the first determined charge, followed by the other Afšār clans and by Qāsem Khan and his men, who charged the enemy at full gallop. The ferocity of their attack broke the enemy ranks, and the *qezelbāš* routed their opponents, who suffered more than a thousand men killed. When they were certain that the frontier was once again secure, the centurions and *qūrčīs* said farewell to Qāsem Khan, and marched to the Safavid court at Farahābād to display the heads of the enemy slain and the captured weapons to the Shah. I obtained the details of this battle from several *qūrčīs* who took part in it.

The Dispatch of Zeynal Beg Begdlū Šāmlū to Take Charge of Affairs in Arab Iraq, and His Victory over the Enemy Near Mosul

The news of this engagement made the Shah realize that enemy forces in the Mosul area had been encouraged by the presence of strong Ottoman support in Dīār Bakr to act in an insolent manner. He received a report that a group of Arabs, in particular Abū Ṭāleb b. Nāṣer Mohannā, were ravaging the countryside in the region of Ḥella and Najaf and causing injury and loss to the inhabitants. The Afšār tribe, the report went on, had not been able to mobilize as it had wished because of the incidence of plague at Mosul, where Qāsem Khan was still holding the castle with a small band of men. As a result, the situation was deteriorating fast. The Shah decided to send one of his most experienced officers, one of the select group of his personal attendants at court, who had distinguished himself by his honorable conduct, his valor, and his total dedication to the cause of religion and the state, Zeynal Beg Šāmlū the *tūšmālbāši*. His orders were to mobilize the available forces in Hamadan province, take the field against these rebel bands, and give all necessary assistance to the Safavid frontier commanders in the area. Zeynal Beg was given the services of Mīr Fattāḥ, the chiliarch of the Isfahan musketeers, and of another contingent of musketeers of the royal stirrup.

When he neared the frontier, he learned that a large force of Ottomans and local troops from the Mosul region was advancing on Mo-

sul, and that Qāsem Khan and the two or three hundred Afšār *gāzīs* he had with him, faced by overwhelming numbers of the enemy and suffering from a shortage of provisions and the incidence of plague, had evacuated the fort at Mosul, which had been occupied by the enemy. There was also a fear, the report to Zeynal Beg said, that Khan Aḥmad Khan Ardalān would for the same reasons hand over the fort at Karkūk to the enemy. The report concluded by stating that there had been several clashes between Mohannā's Arabs and Sārū Sultan Begdīlū, Zeynal Beg's brother, who was warden of the Shi'ite shrines and commander of the *qūrčīs* at Najaf.

On receiving this intelligence, Zeynal Beg quickened his pace. On arrival at Dar-e Tang, he was joined by Hoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, and a small body of troops. He received the additional information that the Ottoman army operating in the Mosul and Karkūk area was under the command of Ḥasan Pasha Čerkes, and was a combined force of Ottomans, Kurds, and Arabs, six thousand strong. He further learned that the enemy intended to transfer some two thousand families from Qal'a-ye Zohāb, known as Qal'a-ye Lak, and move them west of the Tigris. Zeynal Beg reviewed his troops and found that he had about three thousand regulars and musketeers. He moved against the enemy by forced marches, and reached them on the third day. The speed of his advance had been such that only about two thousand men had kept up with him. However, the mere news of his approach was sufficient to cause some of the Ottomans' Kurdish and Arab allies to desert, and the enemy army was reduced to three or four thousand men. The enemy force was speedily defeated, with the loss of some six or seven hundred men killed; the Safavid losses were nowhere near as heavy.

Ḥasan Pasha and the remnants of his routed army retreated within the fort at Mosul, and their camp was plundered by the *qezelbāš* and the Safavid musketeers. The plague still raged within the city, and some Ottomans succumbed to it every day. In view of this, Ḥasan Pasha opened negotiations with Zeynal Beg, and proposed that he should evacuate the city and that the city should be left unoccupied until the plague abated, at which time some agreement would be reached. Zeynal Beg, in his compassion for the enemy in their plight, agreed to this suggestion. He returned to their former locations the tribesmen who had been uprooted by the Ottomans, and marched back to court. On orders from the Shah, he sent Mīr Fattāḥ and the musketeers to reinforce the garrison at Baghdad. Zeynal Beg re-

ported to the Shah at Soljānīya, when the latter was on his way to Georgia. I obtained the details of the above battle, and of Zeynal Beg's march to and from Iraq, from statements made by several soldiers who fought in this battle.

The Dispatch of Qarčaqāy Khan, the Commander in Chief of Iran, to Georgia and the Revolt of Morāv

When God has decided on a course of action, no act of man can deflect the divine will. This is aptly illustrated by the campaign of Qarčaqāy Khan in Georgia, a campaign which occasioned so much bloodshed and had such important repercussions.

After the conclusion of the Shah's punitive campaigns in Georgia designed to suppress the revolts instigated by Ṭahmūraş, the government of Kakhetia was placed in the hands of Peykar Khan Ġĩrmĩ-dört Qājār. The latter made the fortress of Qirlānqūč his base, and built a whole city around it—residential accommodations of all kinds, caravanserais, public baths, and other buildings. He encouraged the Georgians who had scattered in all directions during the Shah's campaigns to return and begin the task of restoring prosperity. Gradually a number of Georgian nobles and soldiers also began to drift back, and the influx of these elements increased the risk of rebellion. Peykar Khan began sending in reports (and these were confirmed by Georgians in the royal service who had the Shah's ear) to the effect that the Georgian nobles and troops who had returned to Kakhetia were in contact with Ṭahmūraş; secret correspondence was going to and fro between the two parties, and there was a danger that they would succeed in suborning the common people too, with the result that there would be a new revolt in the near future.

The Shah decided to send an experienced officer to see what the situation was, and to take whatever steps he thought necessary in the interests of the state. He chose for this task Qarčaqāy Khan, the commander in chief of Iran, who was at the Shah's court in Māzandarān. With him he sent Morāv Beg Gorjī, who had formerly held the office of *vakīl* to Simon Khan, the ruler of the Kartlia province of Georgia. It is now more than ten years since Morāv Beg embraced Islam and with his wife and family entered the Shah's service. He was honored with the grant of fiefs and became a *moqarrab* and one of the Shah's banquet-companions. The Shah chose him for this assignment because he was a shrewd man, conversant with Georgian affairs, and trusted as a result of his loyal and excellent service.

Another member of this cavalcade was the daughter of 'Isā Khan the *qūrčībāši*, who was the Shah's own granddaughter⁹ and had been betrothed to Simon Khan.

The Shah issued orders that the emirs of Šīrvān and Qarābāg should all rally to the support of Qarčaqāy Khan and place themselves under his orders. When Qarčaqāy Khan and Morāv Beg arrived in Georgia, Yūsuf Khan the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, Moḥammad-qolī Khan Zīād-oḡlū the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāg, and the other emirs, who had been forewarned, joined them bearing wedding gifts. Qarčaqāy Khan therefore decided to celebrate the wedding of 'Isā Khan's daughter as his first move. This done, in order to clarify the situation and enable him to distinguish between soldiers and civilians, Qarčaqāy Khan issued a general call to the people of Kakhetia on the pretext of raising troops to accompany him on a raid on the Bāši-Āčūq district, which had been announced. Nearly ten thousand fully armed Georgians assembled in response to his call. Qarčaqāy Khan observed signs of rebellion among them, and urged on by Morāv Beg, decided to make an end of them. He announced that he had decided to excuse them from the expedition to Bāši-Āčūq on the ground that it would be hard for them to fight against their own co-religionists, and they should therefore stack their arms and hand them over to the *gāzīs*. When all their arms had been collected, the Kakhetians were surrounded like game and dispatched in the twinkling of an eye. After this massacre, Morāv Beg revealed his own intrinsically evil nature and apostatized—either because he had never really abandoned his Christian faith, or because he aspired to be the ruler of Kartlia. He plotted with the Georgian nobles to murder Qarčaqāy Khan and some of the other emirs, but I will keep this story for my account of next year's events.

This year, plague and pestilence struck parts of Azerbaijan. Arda-bīl was particularly hard-hit, and in that city alone more than twenty thousand people died. In neighboring districts, such as Meškīn, Sarāb, Zarnāq, Garmrūd, and Kalkāl, another eighty thousand died, making a total, without the slightest exaggeration, of more than one hundred thousand dead. The oldest inhabitants of the region tell me that they cannot remember a plague of such severity. The contagion also spread to some adjacent districts in Tārom and Qazvin, and some people died there too.

⁹'Isā Khan had married a daughter of Shah Abbas.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Esfandīār Beg 'Arabgīrlū,¹⁰ one of the *moqarrabs* of the court. He fell ill on his return from the expedition to Baghdad as he was riding along with some of his companions, and was forced to stay behind. The Shah kindly sent a traveling litter for him, but after the bearers had taken a few paces, he collapsed. He indicated that he wanted to try and ride again, but this was beyond his powers; he was forced to rest by the roadside, and died shortly afterward. He was the son of Kanāl Beg, and his family had for generations been faithful Sufis loyal to the Safavid house. He had risen to the post of *evčī-bāšī* and, just before his death, had been appointed *ešīk-āqāsi-ye ḥaram*. He had received the office of *evčībāšī*, an office hereditary in his family, after his father's death, and his excellent performance in this office had taken him to great heights. He became a *moqarrab* at court and one of the Shah's companions at private banquets. He was a man of sound judgment and counsel. Since his son was still very young, the office was not conferred on him but remained in abeyance until the boy should reach maturity.

2. Salmān Khan, son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, the vizier of the supreme *divān* and *e'temād al-dowla*. He was taken ill at Isfahan after his return from the Baghdad expedition. The indications pointed to his having cancer. Successive cuppings and the use of ice packs had no effect. The disease gained the ascendancy, and the vizier died.

His father, Shah 'Alī Mīrzā, was the son of Shah Tahmasp's sister. Traditionally, his family had been honored by marriage ties with the royal house. Salmān Khan himself was twice so honored, but both marriages were without issue, and he had no heir. While he was still in good health, he had made a gift of his personal possessions to Shah 'Abbas, as I heard him repeatedly declare with his own lips. He also held the post of auditor of the revenues of the supreme *divān*. His possessions were accordingly taken over and the office of vizier, as I have already mentioned, was conferred on Sultan al-'Olamā'i Kalīfa Sultan b. Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn the *šadr*.

¹⁰A Salmū clan.

Events of the Year of the Ox, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1034/1624-25, the Thirty-ninth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Wednesday¹ 12 Jomādā II, 1034/22 March 1625, and the New Year officially began at 10:17 a.m. The Shah was at Ašraf in Māzandarān, and the Nowrūz celebrations were held in his beautifully decorated private apartments there. The principal officers of state, foreign ambassadors, and senior representatives of every class of society presented themselves to the Shah and offered their salutations and felicitations. But men are not left in peace for long in this world: this year many slumbering revolts awoke, armies were on the move in many places, and mighty events were in the offing. Although there were rebellions and disturbances everywhere, eventually they subsided, through God's mercy and through the good fortune, strenuous efforts, and sound planning of the Shah, but not before many innocent lives had been lost. The first of these rebellions I shall mention is that of the Georgian Morāv, a rebellion which had widespread repercussions, and which brought (and still brings) ruin and affliction upon the heads of God's servants.

Morāv's Apostasy and Rebellion, and His Infamous Acts

After the massacre of the Kakhétians I described earlier, Morāv, whose conversion to Islam had been only a matter of expediency and who had in reality never abandoned his Christian faith, succeeded, by lies and falsehoods, in seducing the people of Kartlia from the path of loyalty to the Safavid house which they had always followed. He quoted to them certain remarks made by the Shah which seemed to indicate a withdrawal of the Shah's favor from them and gave rise to fear and apprehension on their part. Since Morāv held a position of trust at the Safavid court, and was privy to the Shah's secrets, the Kartlians considered his lies to be the truth. Their fear increased daily, and while Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāḡ, Peykar Khan İḡirmī-dört, and most of the other emirs had gone off, at Morāv's suggestion, to attack various infidel strongholds, the Kartlians decided to come out in revolt and to kill Qarçaqay Khan.

¹12 Jomādā II was a Saturday.

One morning, Morāv, fully armed, left his tent, went to Qarčaqāy Khan's headquarters, and informed him (as a demonstration of his own loyalty) that the Kartlians were in general revolt. He should leap on his horse immediately, he said, and go to the scene, lest the *qezelbāš* forces suffer some reverse at the hands of the rebels. Qarčaqāy Khan and his fellow emirs knew in what high regard Morāv was held by the Shah, and had seen with their own eyes the almost daily favors the Shah lavished upon him. Moreover, one of his sons and the rest of his family were in Iran, under the Shah's care, and it never occurred to them that Morāv might be plotting treachery. Qarčaqāy Khan accordingly agreed to Morāv's suggestion and got his equipment ready; as he was mounting his horse, Morāv thrust at him with his lance so viciously that the point of the lance emerged on the other side of his body. Morāv then went to the tent of Yūsuf Khan, the *amīr al-omarā* of Šīrvān, tricked him similarly, and killed him as well.

After the murder of these two high-ranking emirs, the Georgians fell upon the *qezelbāš* camp; they slew a son of Qarčaqāy Khan named Emāmverdi Beg and anyone else they came across. The rest of the *qezelbāš* fled in all directions, and the Georgians plundered the camp. The news caused consternation among the other *qezelbāš* emirs; since each had been sent on a mission in a different direction, there was no possibility of their reuniting their forces, and the one thought of each commander was to get his own men out safely. Simon Khan, the ruler of Kartlia, did not think it was the moment to go to Tiflis, his seat of government; he went with Moḥammadqolī Khan Zīād-oghlū, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ, to Ağca Qal'a, and took refuge there.

Morāv then marched on the fortress at Qırlānqūč, intending to seize Peykar Khan and to kill and plunder the İğirmī-dört tribe. Peykar tried to evacuate the tribesmen, all of whom had their women and children with them, from the area. But they were still in the process of crossing the Kor River when the Georgians caught up with them, seized large numbers of animals and other plunder, and carried off into captivity many Muslim women and children. Peykar Khan succeeded in getting away safely with his men, but the fort of Qırlānqūč, with all its provisions (which included fifty *karvārs* of silk), fell into Georgian hands. The Georgians then made for Tiflis, the seat of government of the rulers of Kartlia, hoping to get possession of the fort there by guile. That fort was garrisoned by a detachment of Nūrī

musketeers under the command of Şaṭer Şāhī; the latter, having no confidence in the loyalty of the Christians of Tiflis, moved Simon's family from the city into the fort and prepared to put up a stout defense, despite the lack of munitions and his own lack of experience in siege warfare. He expelled from the fort any Christians of whose loyalty he was suspicious; some of the Christians took up arms against him, and there were clashes between them and his men and casualties on both sides.

From the slain and from other Christians, the musketeers managed to collect enough munitions to last them for two months, and they prepared to hold out for that length of time. Morāv left a detachment of Georgians to continue the siege, while he himself took his main army to Ganja in Qarābāğ and plundered that city, which is the seat of the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ and of the chiefs of the Qājār tribe; from Ganja too, they carried off into captivity some Muslim families. There was a general exodus of the tribes of Qarābāğ, who fled south and did not draw rein until they reached the Kōdā-āfarīn bridge across the Aras River. After pillaging the Ganja area, Morāv returned to continue the siege of Tiflis, and tried by fair words and other blandishments to trick Şaṭer Şāhī, but without success; the musketeers stuck to their task and gave no answer to Morāv's letters save the whistle of arrows and bullets.

Meanwhile express couriers from the emirs and from the musketeers at Tiflis had informed the Shah of these events; they had further informed him that Morāv had declared his allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, and had sent the heads of his slain opponents to the Ottoman commander in chief of Dīār Bakr, with gifts including some of the precious stuffs which had fallen into his hands. He had urged the Ottoman commander in chief to march to Georgia and Şīrvān. The latter, thinking that Morāv's revolt was the first step in the Ottoman reconquest of this area, had issued letters of appointment conferring on Morāv the governorship of the province of Kartlia, and on Ṭahmūraş the province of Kakhetia. Ṭahmūraş meanwhile had returned to Georgia and joined up with Morāv.

The Shah appointed 'Isā Khan the *qūrčībāşı* field commander of the Safavid forces in Georgia and Qazāq Khan Čerkes, the *dārūga* of Lāhījān in Gīlān, *amīr al-omarā* of Şīrvān in place of the murdered Yūsuf Khan; Qazāq Khan's orders were to proceed at full speed to Şīrvān, mobilize the Safavid forces in the area, and then march to the

assistance of the *qūrčībāšī*. Emir Gūna Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Çoġūr-e Sa'd, and Šahbanda Khan the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan, with the emirs under their command, were also ordered to accompany 'Isā Khan. The Shah meanwhile marched from Māzandarān and camped at Qazvin; after a few days there, he moved to summer quarters at Solġānīya. Reports of Ottoman troop movements kept coming in, and the Shah remained at Solġānīya until he could ascertain the Ottoman point of attack; he was joined there by Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, with his troops. All troops who had not actually left for Georgia were now held by the Shah at Solġānīya.

The Safavid Victory over the Georgians

The *qūrčībāšī* marched toward Georgia, joined at every stage along the way by contingents of the troops that had been ordered to report for duty; he thus assembled a large army of *qūrčīs*, *ġolāms*, and musketeers of the royal household, and *qezelbāš* units from Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Šīrvān. On the Georgian side were not only Morāv but also Ṭahmūraš and Aġābeg Khan, the son of Manūčehr Khan, the ruler of Meskhia, both of whom had fled to those areas of Georgia that were subject to Ottoman jurisdiction. They had now emerged from their hiding places at the instigation of Morāv and the Ottoman commander in chief. Under their command were all the Georgian forces available in Kartlia and those from Kakhetia who had survived the massacre there, some twenty thousand infantry and cavalry in all.

The two armies met at Gūmešlū, in the Alget-ġay district, on 24 Ramažān 1034/30 June 1625. Since Šahbanda Khan and the army of Azerbaijan was still a day's march away, the *qezelbāš* army waited for him to come up before giving battle. The Georgians did not launch an attack that day either, and both camps spent the night on guard. The following day, 25 Ramažān/1 July, the *qūrčībāšī* made his battle dispositions as follows: himself in the center; Emir Gūna Khan as advance guard; and his remaining troops on the wings. The Georgians attacked in a dense mass and swept aside the Safavid advance guard, Emir Gūna Khan being severely wounded as he tried to stand his ground. No help reached them from either of the Safavid wings, the lie of the land being unfavorable to them, but the Qājārs succeeded in carrying the wounded Emir Gūna Khan away from the battlefield. The Georgians, still carried by the impetus of their charge, smashed through the ranks of the musketeers too, and the latter suffered heavy losses. The Georgians still came on with such élan that a group of

them, finding no opposition in front, swung around behind the Safavid army and fell on the commissariat. The commissariat servants, apprentices, and the like were scattered, and uproar broke out in the camp. The ruffians who accompany an army on the march fell to plundering one another's goods and fleeing with their loot. The Safavid camp, in total confusion, suffered heavy losses as a result. As I mentioned before, the site was not favorable for a battle.

The Safavid right and left wings, because of the lie of the land, could not see their center; therefore, when they heard the uproar coming from the camp, they thought the center had been overwhelmed, and they began to leave the field, some out of cowardice, some in their anxiety to save their worldly possessions. The general confusion even began to affect the Safavid center, but there the *qūrčībāšī* stood firm with his men, who put their honor before their lives. By keeping calm amid the confusion, the *qūrčībāšī* instilled new courage into other units, which re-formed and charged the enemy. At this juncture, Šāhbanda Khan reached the battlefield with his advance guard, checked the flight of those who were leaving, and joined in the fray. The Georgians were routed, with some ten thousand men killed. Their leaders, Morāv, Ṭahmūraš, and Aṭābeg, fled. The Georgian fugitives fled to Tiflis, crossed the Kor River, burning the wooden bridge behind them, and fled into the dense forests and places difficult of access. The following Georgian officers and notables were killed in this battle: Ṭahmūraš, chief of the Mokrān; Aqa Tengīz; İvāl Beg; Bījan Beg; Sohrāb Beg. On the Safavid side, a number of centurions of the *qūrčīs*, *gōlāms*, and musketeers were killed in the first Georgian onslaught. Of the lower ranks, some one thousand men were killed, mostly from the musketeer regiments.

After their victory, the *qūrčībāšī* and his emirs went to survey the Safavid camp. They found the tents stripped of all their contents, and no sign of a horse, mule, or camel. Gradually, as the news of the Safavid victory spread, the commissariat personnel began drifting back, bringing with them pack animals, mules, and other items, which were eagerly claimed by their owners, and the camp slowly regained some sort of order. The emirs then marched to Tiflis and relieved the gallant garrison there. Some of the rebels had fled to Bāšī-Āčūq and established a stronghold there. Šāhbanda Khan and Qazāq Khan marched against them and returned victorious, bringing much booty, including many mules. Swift couriers were dispatched to take the news of the victory to the Shah, whom they found camped just outside Qazvin.

The Dispatch of a Safavid Force in the Direction of Qarāqol-Kān, and the Death of Šāhbanda Khan

One of the serious setbacks suffered by Safavid arms on this campaign was the death of Šāhbanda Khan and the capture of Qazāq Khan on the road to Qarāqol-Kān. Qarāqol-Kān (Ananuri) is a small fort in an extremely inaccessible part of Georgia, and for this reason is often used by the Georgians in time of need. At this moment, the dependents of 'Abd al-Ġaffār Beg were discovered to be there. 'Abd al-Ġaffār Beg, the son of Farāmorz Beg, was a distinguished Georgian who had embraced Islam and was highly thought of by the Shah. His sister was a servant in the royal harem, and he himself was the son-in-law of Emāmqoli Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs. He was presently in Georgia, and after the Georgian rebellion, his life was in danger. The Shah swore he would spare no effort to try and rescue him and his dependents. Accordingly, the *qūrčbāši* sent a detachment of troops under Šāhbanda Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan; Qazāq Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān; and Kosrow Mīrzā, the brother of Bagrāt Khan Gorji, to the fort of Qarāqol-Kān, which they surrounded. The small garrison of the fort willingly handed over the dependents of 'Abd al-Ġaffār on condition that the Safavid troops leave without molesting them, and the emirs, seeing no point in wasting time there, agreed.

The Georgians stationed a number of musketeers and archers in ambush along the route by which they thought the Safavid troops would return. Providentially, the emirs chose a different route and advanced with extreme caution, with guards both ahead and in the rear of the main body. After a long wait at their ambush, the Georgians realized the emirs must be traveling by a different route, and they sent troops in pursuit of them. One day, Šāhbanda Khan and Qazāq Khan, who were bringing up the rear and keeping a close watch on all sides (most of the column had already passed this spot and was nearing its camping place for that night), heard musket shots and suddenly found themselves attacked on three sides by the Georgians. A number of Šāhbanda Khan's Turkmans were killed, but the rest fought back strongly; Qazāq Khan's men, however, turned and fled, abandoning their commander.

Qazāq Khan wanted to stand and fight, but Šāhbanda Khan said it was folly to stand there to be shot at; they should try to cut their way through the enemy. Qazāq Khan refused to listen; crossing a stream,

he went off on his own to try and ascertain the size of the enemy force. The Georgians, seeing him alone, closed in on him from all sides, and Šāhbanda Khan, unwilling to save his own life by abandoning his comrade to certain death, went to help him. Qazāq Khan was taken captive, and Šāhbanda Khan and several of his Turkman *gāzis* fought to the end.

Because of the extreme difficulty of the road, it was impossible for the main Safavid column to return to the assistance of the rear guard, and such an action would in fact have been pointless. So the column reached its appointed camp for the night in safety. Because Ṭāhmūraš, Morāv, and Sohrāb Beg had eaten bread and salt with Qazāq Khan at the Safavid court, they did not put him to death, and Qazāq Khan subsequently succeeded in bribing two of his guards to let him escape. He rejoined the *qezelbāš* forces, and today holds his old post of *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān.

The Shah was so touched by Šāhbanda Khan's selflessness that he raised his son, although he was only three years old, to the rank of khan, and appointed him *amīr-al-omarā* of Azerbaijan in his father's place, with one of his kinsmen acting as regent. The news of this compassionate act on the part of the Shah turned the mourning of Šāhbanda Khan's womenfolk into rejoicing, and strengthened the hopes of the Shah's servants of receiving similar royal favors. Very few monarchs in the annals of history have rewarded selfless devotion on the part of their servants to the extent that Shah 'Abbas did on this occasion, when he ignored political and military expediency and made a three-year old khan and *amīr al-omarā* of a province. I hope that the Shah will enjoy long life and prosperity, and will obtain suitable rewards in heaven!

Various Events Which Took Place This Year before Shah 'Abbas's March on Baghdad

Following Morāv's rebellion, all sorts of rumors were rife along the frontiers of the Safavid empire. Insurrections broke out on all sides as foolish opportunists interpreted the success of the Georgian revolt as a sign of weakness in the Safavid state, and a number of people who professed to be loyal showed themselves in a contrary light. For instance, Abāza Pasha threw his professions of allegiance out of the window and sent a courier to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha in Dīār Bakr to assure him of his allegiance to him. He seized the *qūrčī* Nowrūz Beg

Ostājlı, whom the Shah had sent to him as an envoy, and gave out that he had put him to death; in fact, he slew several of his companions and retainers, and sent their heads to Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha. One of his emirs, Morteżā Pasha, who held the Qarāja Ardahān district of Āḡesqa, marched to subdue the fort of Āḡesqa, either on orders from Abāza Pasha or on his own initiative. Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū, the governor of Āḡesqa, who held the fort with a garrison of musketeers, heard the alarming reports coming from Georgia and elsewhere, gave up hope, and abandoned the fort, joining the *qūrčī-bāšī*'s camp. Morteżā Pasha occupied the fort without firing a shot, and Abāza Pasha intercepted a band of Iranian merchants returning from Anatolia and seized all their goods.

On another front, the departure of Emir Gūna Khan from Erīvān to join the royal army had been the signal for the Kurds to start ravaging the Šarūr region; Emir Gūna Khan's sons led their Qājār *gāzīs* against the marauders and inflicted casualties on them in a battle. In the Salmās area, the Sohrān and Barādūst Kurds gathered with the idea of ravaging the Orūmī region. Ḥamza Beg, the son of Ġāzī Khan the grandson of Šāhqolī Balīlān, remained aloof from his brothers and declared his allegiance to the Safavid house. He warned Salmān Khan the *sūbāšī*, the governor of Čors and Salmās, of the intention of the rebels. Salmān Khan in his turn warned Aqa Sultan Moqaddam, the governor of Marāḡa, and they marched together against the rebels; in the ensuing engagement, there were casualties on both sides.

On another part of the Kurdish front, Šīr Beg, chief of the Mokrī tribe, rebelled. After the execution of Qobād Khan and the suppression of the previous Mokrī revolt, the Shah had taken Šīr Beg under his wing and had made him the chief of the tribe. Purely out of consideration for him, the Shah had not punished those who had survived the sword in the previous rebellion. For fifteen years now Šīr Beg, his brother Maqšūd Beg, and several of his sons and other kinsmen had lived peacefully under the protection of the Shah—protection which had increased Šīr Beg's own power and influence. This year, without any reason at all, at the instigation of various troublemakers in the Mokrī tribe, and particularly his own eldest son, he came out in revolt, marched to Marāḡa, and began to kill and plunder. A number of people, both military and civilians, were put to the sword, and many Muslim women and children were carried off into captivity.

The news of Šīr Beg's revolt caused astonishment at court, but the

Shah remained unmoved. He sent Zamān Beg, the *nāzer-e boyūtāt* (superintendent of the royal workshops), with a force of five thousand men consisting of court retainers, musketeers of the royal stirrup, and men from Fārs belonging to Emāmqolī Khan's contingent, against the rebels. First, however, he sent Šīr Beg one of the royal bakers, with a loaf of the bread prepared for the king's table. It was as though the Shah had said, "You are my protégé and have eaten the bread and salt of this royal house, which is descended from the house of 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb. Without any justification, you have shown yourself to be an ingrate, and I now commit you to the Lord of this bread." The arrival of this bread, with its overtones of both royal clemency and wrath and the threat of future punishment, caused Šīr Beg to regret his actions, which would shortly bring destruction and ruin on his tribe. Hearing of the approach of the Shah's punitive expedition, he fled into the hills; Zamān Beg marched to Gāvdūl, his seat of government, and pillaged the area before returning.

The Shah's Victorious Expedition to Baghdad

After the Shah had been in camp at Solṭānīya for some time, Zeynal Beg the *tūšmālbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens) returned from the Baghdad frontier and reported on the situation there. Meanwhile, the Shah's spies and intelligence agents had been sending in reports indicating that an Ottoman march on Baghdad was now definite. The Shah decided to march to Baghdad. He appointed Zeynal Beg supreme commander in the field and sent him on ahead with orders to take all necessary measures, in conjunction with the Safavid emirs and governors in the province of Arab Iraq, to guard Baghdad and repel the enemy. At the same time, the Shah issued orders that all Safavid forces in neighboring areas should report for duty to the supreme field commander and place themselves under his orders.

A special force of three thousand veteran troops, including artillerymen, officers from the musketeer regiments, and musketeers experienced in siege warfare, was sent to Baghdad to reinforce the existing garrison commanded by Šafīqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Arab Iraq, and Mīr Fattāḥ, the chiliarch of the Ešfahānī musketeers. In support of Zeynal Beg, following some distance behind him, came another force under the command of his nephew, Nūr al-Dahr Beg. The Shah meanwhile paid a private visit to the Safavid shrine at Ardabīl and sought assistance from the spirits of his ancestors. On his return to

Soltāniya, he sent orders to the *qūrčubāšī* to winter in Qarābag and complete the job of suppressing the revolt of Morāv and the other Georgian rebels; he was instructed, however, to release all the troops he could spare for service in the Baghdad campaign. On 2 Šafar 1035/3 November 1625, the Shah marched from Soltāniya.

The Siege of Baghdad by Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha

Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier and commander in chief, had had two years in Dīār Bakr to assemble a huge army for the reconquest of Baghdad, and to collect all necessary artillery, siege equipment, and munitions. The rebellion of Morāv and the death of the Safavid commander in chief, Qarčaḡāy Khan, and of Yūsuf Khan, and the revolt of the Mokrī Kurds, convinced him that the time was ripe to march on Baghdad. The rumor that the *qezelbāš* had been routed in Georgia, and that the Shah was at Ardabīl on his way to restore the situation there, clinched the matter. Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha thought that the Shah would not be able to return from Georgia and that the *qezelbāš* emirs at Baghdad, despairing of receiving help from the Shah, would not try to hold the city, which would then fall easily into his hands. The Arab chiefs in the region, such as Abū Ṭāleb the son of Nāṣer Mohannā, supported this assessment of the situation. Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha accordingly set his army in motion, sending on ahead Morād Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, who considered himself the bravest of the Ottoman emirs.

Morād Pasha had no opposition on his march to Baghdad, because Qāsem Khan and the Afšār *ḡāzīs* at Mosul had been forced by the onset of plague to evacuate the city the previous year. Morād Pasha was joined by Abū Ṭāleb Mohannā, and sent Ḥājji Beg Lak against the fort of Zohāb and Moṣṭafā Pasha Jastānī against the fort of Mandālī. Šaftqolī Khan recalled all outlying *qezelbāš* garrisons to Baghdad, an action that led to rumors of *qezelbāš* panic. Šaftqolī Khan also, as a prudent military precaution, sent quantities of his heavy baggage and his men's possessions out of the fort, so that the latter was stripped for action. These actions emboldened Morād Pasha, who had now occupied Ḥella and Karbala. His men had occupied the forts of Zohāb and Mandālī. The Safavid garrison at Najaf, however, consisting of one hundred and fifty musketeers under the command of Pahlavān Moḥsen 'Āšeḡābādī, placing their trust in the prince of Najaf ('Alī), determined to defend the place, and Morād Pasha was forced to detach some troops to lay siege to it.

Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha, regarding these preliminaries as a portent of victory, reached Baghdad on 9 Šafar 1035/10 November 1625, and blockaded the citadel on three sides. On the first day, when the Ottomans were still taking up their positions around the fort, Şaŋqolī Khan sent a group of his men to make a sudden sortie against the enemy and retire immediately. This group made its sortie from the direction of the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa, fell like a thunderbolt on the Ottomans, and slew three hundred of them before they could form up; the *qezelbaş* returned to the fort with the heads of the slain and a considerable number of horses, mules, and camels. This success taught the Ottomans that they could not afford to underestimate the defenders, whose morale was correspondingly raised so that they did not suffer from that trepidation which usually afflicts garrisons under siege.

The Ottoman lines extended along the east bank of the Tigris from the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa in the north to the Qarā-qapū gate in the south, a distance of at least one *farsak*. They threw a bridge across the Tigris near the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa, and sent a strong force of troops across the river to occupy Old Baghdad, which lies west of the citadel, and has a small fort known as Qūš-Qal'a. An abundant harvest had recently been gathered in, so the Ottoman army had plenty of provisions. When the Shah reached Hamadan, he received the news that the siege of Baghdad had begun, but the force he had sent to reinforce the garrison there had reached its destination before the Ottomans began their blockade.

Events Which Occurred during the Shah's March to Baghdad

The Shah had advanced slowly from Solṭāniya, to give time for various contingents of his army to join him; some of these units he kept with him, others he sent on ahead to reinforce the advance guard under Zeynal Beg. When the Shah reached Hārūnābād, a district of Māhi-dašt not far from Dar-e Tang, on the borders of Baghdad province, he decided to send an additional force of one thousand men who had special experience in siege warfare to reinforce the garrison at Baghdad. Thinking that the siege might be a long one and that the defenders might run short of ammunition, he had each man carry with him lead and gunpowder. The task of getting this force into a citadel already under siege appeared to most people to be an impossibility. As soon as the plan was announced, a number of men volunteered for

the operation, men like Kalb 'Alī Beg, the son of Qāsem Khan Imānlū, who with the rest of the Imānlū clan was under a cloud for having abandoned Mosul so readily and was anxious to make amends for this. Other volunteers included Farīdūn Ḥoseyn Mīrzā, the son of Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjang Čaġatāy; Morteżāqolī Beg, the son of Barġordār Beg Anīs the *tūpčībāši* (commander in chief of artillery); Mīrzā Khan Beg Qājār; Mīrzā Ma'sūm 'Arab Ġalīzī Ķorāsānī; and Barġordār Beg Zu'l-Qadar, a retainer of Emāmqolī Khan and the son of an emir of the Zu'l-Qadar tribe.

The one thousand volunteers were soon obtained and set off, putting their trust in God and the Shah. When they overtook Zeynal Beg and the vanguard, the latter, as a precaution, gave them an escort of three thousand men under his nephew, Nūr al-Dahr Beg. The escort marched to within two *farsaks* of the city and camped in the plain, standing under arms all night to give assistance to the task force if needed. The task force sent word to the garrison of their arrival, and under cover of darkness made for the gate near the tomb of Abū Hanīfa. In the darkness, Barġordār Beg Zu'l-Qadar and Mīrzā Ma'sūm Ġalīzī, with some of their men, became separated from the rest and bumped into the Ottoman lines. The two officers were both captured; some of their men were killed, and others vanished.

The rest of the task force, sticking close together, succeeded in entering both the city and the citadel, taking with them three thousand *man* of gunpowder and lead. The Ottomans in that sector failed to intercept them, and the beating of drums and shouts of triumph from the citadel signaled their safe arrival. The following day, the garrison got word to Nūr al-Dahr Beg that the task force had safely accomplished its mission, and he marched back to rejoin the Safavid vanguard. The infiltration of one thousand men through the lines of one hundred thousand besiegers represented a signal victory for the Safavids. With a king capable of such leadership and troops with such morale, it was obvious that the opposition was not going to have much success.

The fort at Zohāb, better known as Qal'a-ye Lak, and the fort at Mandālī both lay close to the Shah's line of march through Hārūnābād and Dar-e Tang. The occupation of these forts by the Ottomans was a threat to the Safavid lines of communication, so the Shah ordered Ḥoseyn Khan, the governor of Lorestān, who was on his way to join the royal camp by a route that would take him past Mandālī,

to deal with the enemy garrison there. A detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup, sappers, and other troops were sent to his assistance. At the same time, the Shah detached Yūsuf Sultan, the governor of Gaskar, with a group of Čağatāy and Kōrāsānī musketeers, to attack Qal'a-ye Lak. The Ottoman garrisons realized they could expect no help from Morād Pasha, because the *qezelbāš* army, encamped at Hārūnābād, lay astride the road between them and Baghdad. Mošṭafā Pasha Jastānī, the commandant at Mandalī, was the first to ask for quarter and to pledge his fealty to the Shah. He persuaded Moḥammad Aqa the *qapūčībāšī* (head doorkeeper) to do the same, and both officers came out of the fort and surrendered it to the *qezelbāš*. At the intercession of Mošṭafā Pasha, the lives of the garrison were spared. Since Mošṭafā Pasha Jāstānī's pledge of fealty seemed to be genuine, he was granted the rank of sultan and given the title of Abdāl 'Alī. As a reward for his achievement in capturing the fort, Ḥoseyn Khan was given Mandalī as a fief. Hearing of the Shah's clemency toward the garrison at Mandalī, Ḥājji Beg Lak and the garrison at Zohāb hastened to follow suit. They presented themselves before the Shah, who granted them quarter. Nafas Sultan Garrūs was made governor of Zohāb.

With his rear secured by the capture of these two forts, the Shah marched from Hārūnābād. It was now early spring, the time when all the watercourses were in spate, and Šaṭṭ-e Behrīz, the normal crossing point for troops, was becoming more swollen every day. Ḥeydar Sultan Qūyla-Ḥešārlū (a Rūmlū clan) was ordered to construct bridges; taking with him workmen and the necessary materials, he set to work. Zeynal Beg and the Safavid vanguard reached the Šaṭṭ and camped while they waited for the bridges to be completed; for the same reason, the Shah whiled away the last days of winter at his camp at Bašīva near Dar-e Tang. Every day, daredevil *qezelbāš* couriers went to and fro between his camp and the citadel at Baghdad, bringing the most recent news of the state of the siege; the defenders, for their part, were encouraged to put up a vigorous defense by the knowledge that the Shah was on his way.

The Battle between Zeynal Beg and the Enemy

While Zeynal Beg was waiting with the Safavid vanguard for the completion of the bridges, he performed some remarkable feats. In the first place, the bridge builders needed a lot of pitch, and none was available locally. An intelligence agent reported that the Ottomans

had brought in large quantities of pitch for bridge building at the time of the revolt of Bakr the *sūbāšī*, and that the surplus had been dumped some two *farsaḵs* from Baghdad, not far from the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa. It was still there, buried under soil. Zeynal Beg determined to get hold of it, and picked a special task force of a thousand men, including musketeers. When this force reached the spot, the men could see the light of the Ottoman lines. One group of Zeynal Beg's men started shifting the pitch while the rest stood guard, and they succeeded in carrying off as much as they wanted without suffering any casualties.

In the second place, Zeynal Beg got tired of waiting for the bridge to be finished. Irrked by the sight of the Ottomans methodically proceeding with the siege works without interruption, he decided to liven things up a bit. He ferried his twenty-five thousand men across the Behrīz canal on rafts and in boats, and marched six or seven *farsaḵs* upstream, and drew up his men in battle formation in sight of the Ottoman camp. But the Ottomans did not emerge from behind a ditch that they had dug all around their camp. The day was drawing to a close, and it was impossible for Zeynal Beg's men, who had marched there without baggage, to spend the night in the plain, and so they were forced to march back. The reluctance of the Ottomans to give battle increased the confidence of the Safavid troops. But meanwhile the Ottomans were making steady progress with the siege; working night and day, they carried their breastworks forward. In places, they had pushed earthworks forward as far as the ditch around the citadel. Their artillery fire was beginning to have its effect on the walls and towers, and their sappers had tunneled up to the walls.

Saītiqolī Khan and his men performed prodigies of valor. On several occasions, they made sorties against the breastworks and scored local successes, returning to the fort with much booty. Work parties also carried away soil from the Ottoman earthworks and took it within the fort while other men stood guard. The Ottoman artillery was located on the side facing the Qarā-qapū gate, and so the garrison expected the main Ottoman assault to come from that quarter. As a precaution, they constructed inner defense works inside the main walls. The Ottoman pashas and other officers, knowing that the Shah was close at hand, decided on an assault. At this juncture, Morād Pasha returned and rejoined Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha, having failed to take Najaf, even though his cannon and musketfire had been directed at the holy shrine, and this settled the matter in favor of an assault.

The ground underneath one of the towers on the Qarā-qapū side was excavated, and the hole filled with gunpowder. When the gunpowder was detonated, the shock of the explosion caused breaches in the tower. At the same time, scaling ladders were placed against the walls. One of the guards sounded the alarm that an assault was imminent, and the defenders rushed to their stations and opened fire on the attackers with their muskets and bows. At the tower which had been mined, however, the Ottomans charged through the breach and planted their standard on the tower. Şaḫīqolī Khan and Mīr Fattāḥ the chiliarch led a counterattack against the Ottomans who had occupied the tower, and the Ottoman standard bearer was cut down and most of the assault party wiped out. Those who had penetrated inside the fort, when they saw the inner defense wall facing them, lost heart and tried to flee, but they were cut down as they attempted to make their way out. Reliable informants told me that the Ottomans lost five thousand men in this abortive assault.

The Shah was in daily contact with the garrison at Baghdad. On the eve of the Ottoman assault, he was extremely anxious about the situation. The astrologers at court, like the sons of the "exemplar of the astrologers" Mowlānā Moẓaffar Jonābādī, predicted that the Ottomans would not succeed. Mowlānā Moḥammad Ṭāher Yazdī, one of the astrologers of the royal household and extremely skilled in the art of astrology, had right from the beginning maintained, on the basis of the positions of the stars and other celestial signs, that the Ottomans would not succeed in their attempt to recapture Baghdad. In order to show his confidence in the accuracy of his prediction, he demanded to be allowed to join the garrison! His wish was granted by the Shah, but Zeynal Beg, the Safavid field commander, would not let him enter the city and detained him at his own camp. When the news came that the assault had been repulsed, the Shah sent his warmest congratulations to Şaḫīqolī Khan and all the garrison.

When Zeynal Beg had assembled all the materials for bridging the river at Behrīz, he decided that the width of the river at that point was too great and moved all his materials to a better point farther upstream, only three *farsaks* from Baghdad. Morād Pasha was dispatched with fifteen thousand men and a number of cannon and mortars to prevent this operation, but by the time he got there, the bridge was completed and Kalaf Beg *sofračībāši* (the chief sewer) had started to cross with some of his men. As they were crossing, the bridge broke; Zeynal Beg worked feverishly to repair it, but not more

than four thousand men had crossed before Morād Pasha came up and attacked them. However, Kalaf Beg and his men charged the enemy so vigorously that they routed them and pursued them. The enemy lost fifteen hundred men killed in this action, and a number of Ottoman and Kurdish *sanjaq-begs* were taken prisoner. Morād Pasha was wounded, but he managed to escape and regain the Ottoman camp under cover of darkness.

The Shah received this heartening news on New Year's Day, and advanced to the Belād-rūd² River, one of the tributaries of the Dīāla River, which is known as the Šaṭṭ-e Behrīz.

Since throughout this history I have followed the practice of recording the deaths of notable persons at the end of each year's events, I will continue to do this and will resume my account of the siege of Baghdad under the head of next year's events, God willing!

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Qarčaḡāy Khan, murdered in Georgia. He was an Armenian Christian from Erīvān who had been taken captive as a child and enrolled among the *ḡolāms* of the royal household. Since he was an intelligent man, he rose rapidly through the ranks. His first job was in the royal tailoring department (*qeyčāčīgarī*), but he was soon placed in charge of a battery of artillery (*mīr-e tūpḡāna*) and made commander of a regiment of musketeers. From this, he progressed to the rank of field commander (*sardār*), and was promoted to the rank of *khart*. He discharged these duties so admirably that he was finally appointed commander in chief of the armed forces of Iran (*sepaḡ-sālār*). For a time he was *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan, and later governor of Mašhad and most of Khorasan. After his death, his son Manūčehr Khan was appointed governor of Mašhad, and at the time of writing still holds that post.

2. Yūsuf Khan, also murdered in Georgia. Like Qarčaḡāy Khan, he was an Armenian Christian, and became a *ḡolām* at the same time. The two men were always close friends. Yūsuf Khan's first employment was in the royal aviary, and he was also a keeper of the birds and animals used for hunting. He became skilled in this occupation, and rose to the position of huntsman (*mīr-šekār*). For a time, he was

²The town of Belād-rūd, or Belād al-rūd, formerly Barāz al-Rūd, lay northeast of Baghdad to the east of the main highway to Iran through Kāneqīn and Qaṣr-e Šīrīn.

governor of Astarābād. At the time of his death, he had been *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān for twelve years, and had been an excellent governor. Since his sons were still small and the province of Šīrvān needed an experienced officer in charge, Qazāq Beg Čerkes, the *dārūga* of Gīlān, was appointed governor with the rank of khan.

3. 'Alīqolī Khan, the *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* of the *divān*.³ He was of the Garamillū clan of the Šāmlū tribe, and an old retainer who had served the Shah since the latter's childhood at Herat. He had risen steadily in the Shah's service, and eventually became *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*⁴ and *mīr-divān*. This year, he fell ill and died at Rayy, which was his fief. His sons too were still infants; his office remained vacant for a year, but the following year, as I shall report it, was conferred on Zeynal Beg Begdīlū the *tūšmalbāšī* (superintendent of the royal kitchens).

4. Mīr Raft' al-Dīn Moḥammad Kaḷīfa the *šadr*. As I have stated previously, he was of the Isfahan family of *seyyeds* known as Kaḷīfa, which is of Māzandarānī origin and descended from Emir Qavām al-Dīn, known as Mīr Bozorg, who was the ruler of Māzandarān. His own father, Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd, was a learned *seyyed* and theologian. The Kaḷīfa family had held estates in the Isfahan area for generations. Mīr Raft' al-Dīn was appointed *šadr* after the dismissal of Qāzī Khan Seyfī Qazvīnī, and discharged this office with piety and integrity; in truth, he was an ornament to that office. At the beginning of this year, when the Shah left Māzandarān to mobilize his forces for the Baghdad campaign, the *šadr* fell ill and was carried in a litter to the shrine of 'Abd al-Azīm, where he died. His son, the vizier Sultan al-'Olamā'ī Kaḷīfa Sultan, took his body to Karbala and had it buried at the shrine there. The office of *šadr* was conferred on Mīrzā Raft' Šahrestānī, who was connected by marriage to the Shah.

5. Ganj 'Alī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Kandahar. He was of the Kurdish tribe of Zīg, and another old retainer who had also been in the Shah's service when the latter was a young prince at Herat. He had served with distinction on the eastern front against the Uzbegs, and had been promoted to the rank of khan and dubbed by the Shah *bābā*, that is "father." For nearly thirty years, he was governor of Kerman, where he had an excellent record. At the time of his death,

³Despite the fact that both printed text and MS. have *ešīk-āqāsībāšī* of the *divān-begī*, I think both are wrong. I know of no such office, and the office meant must be that of *ešīk-āqāsībāšī-ye divān*.

⁴See R. M. Savory, in *EP*, s.v., and *TM*, p. 47.

he was governor of Kandahar. One night he was sleeping on a balcony, on a couch which rested against the railing supporting the roof. During the night, the railing collapsed, and Ganj 'Alī Khan, crawling out of bed half asleep, fell off the balcony and was killed; he was only found considerably later by the servants. His son, 'Alī Mardān Beg, took his father's body to Mašhad for burial within the precincts of the shrine there. When the Shah heard the news, he appointed 'Alī Mardān Beg governor of Kandahar with the rank of khan, in consideration of his father's great services to the crown.

6. Emir Gūna Khan Sārū Aşlān, the *beglerbeg* of Ertvān. He was of the Aqçaqoyūnlū clan of the Qājār tribe. His father, Golābī Beg, was a *qūrçī* during the reign of Shah Tahmasp. He himself began his career as *eşīk-āqāsi-ye haram*, commander of the guard at the royal palace at Qazvin, and *dārūga* of that city. He was promoted to khan and appointed *amīr al-omarā* of Çokūr-e Sa'd, where he served with outstanding success against the Ottomans, and acquired as a result the sobriquet of Sārū Aşlān (yellow panther). This year, he led the Safavid vanguard on the Georgian campaign, and died of wounds received in battle. He was succeeded as *amīr al-omarā* of Çokūr-e Sa'd by his eldest son, Tahmāspqolī Beg, who was promoted to the rank of khan; the latter had already been sent to Çokūr-e Sa'd in case his father should not recover from his wounds.

7. Şahbanda Khan Torkmān, the son of Pīr Būdāq Khan Pornāk Torkmān. He had succeeded his father as governor of Tabriz and *amīr al-omarā* of Azerbaijan. This year, as already reported, he was killed in action against the Georgian infidels. He was an intelligent, just, and compassionate officer, and a man of personal integrity. His three-year-old son succeeded him, in the care of a regent, with the title of Pīr Būdāq the Second.

8. Hasan Khan Ostājlı, another of the Shah's old retainers, who served with distinction in Khorasan. After the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he was made a *qūrçī* of bow and arrow, and honored by being allowed to marry into the Safavid royal family. He was appointed governor and *amīr al-omarā* of Hamadan, and governed this province for some twenty-five years. He had retired from his governorship and military duties a year or two ago, and was living at Sāva on estates belonging to his wife, who was the daughter of Sultan Heydar Mīrzā, when he fell ill and died.

Other Safavid officers who were killed in action in Georgia included Beyrām Beg Zu'l-Qadar, a centurion; 'Alī Beg Qezellū Ostājlu, a centurion; Aqa Qavām al-Dīn Lārījānī, a centurion of the Lārījān regiment of musketeers, a competent young officer who was also a competent poet. The Shah looked after his bereaved family. I deemed it pointless to extend the list of casualties any further. May God have mercy on all their souls!

Events of the Year of the Tiger, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1035/1625-26, the Fortieth Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year occurred on Tuesday,¹ 22 Jomādā II, 1035/21 March 1626. At 2:07 A.M. on that day the sun left the station of Pisces and entered that of Aries. The year began auspiciously with the news of Morād Pasha's defeat at the hands of Kalaf Beg. The Shah, who had the cream of the Safavid troops with him, immediately organized two further columns to reinforce Zeynal Beg and the advance guard; the first was of five thousand *qezelbāš* and *gōlāms*, under the command of Taḳta Beg Ostājīlū, a centurion; the second was of three thousand men, and consisted of officers of the royal workshops and *moqarrabs* under the command of Moḥammad Beg Čaġatāy the *jelowdārbāši* (first equerry). Large sums of money to pay the troops were also drawn from the royal treasury and forwarded to Zeynal Beg, to be distributed among the troops at his discretion, and the money was duly distributed by the Safavid field commander.

Other Events Which Occurred before the Shah's Arrival at Baghdad

The failure of the Ottoman assault on Baghdad, the defeat of Morād Pasha, and the reports of the Shah's steady advance on the city shook Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha's confidence somewhat, and he began to look to the defense of his own lines. He had towers erected along the ditch which he had dug around his camp, so as to convert it into a regular line of fortifications. His plan was not to give battle to the *qezelbāš* army, but to sit tight behind his defenses and starve the garrison into submission. He was in communication with the Safavid defenders, to whom he offered alternate blandishments and threats, and also with Zeynal Beg, to whom he offered military advice, hoping to accomplish something by these means. Some envoys from Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha reached Zeynal Beg, and asked for an audience with the Shah: one was a Kurdish *sanjaq-beg* who had been captured during earlier fighting in Azerbaijan, held in custody for some time by the Begdīlū clan, and eventually released through the good offices of Zeynal Beg's brothers; the other was an Ottoman *čavoš*.

Zeynal Beg sent the Ottoman envoys on to the Shah. They said that

¹22 Jomādā II was a Saturday.

the Ottoman commander in chief had been given express orders by the Sultan to recapture Baghdad, and that vast sums had been expended to mount this expedition. It would be impossible, they said, for him to return without having achieved his object. At the same time, the fact that the Shah had taken the field in person showed that he regarded it as matter of prestige to retain Baghdad. Both armies had already been in the field for six months, and the hot weather was approaching. During this time, it would be impossible to remain at Baghdad. Accordingly, they asked the Shah to instruct Zeynal Beg to nominate a reliable officer to negotiate with the Ottoman commander in chief; if both sides put all their cards on the table, perhaps some compromise solution might be worked out that would be acceptable to both sides.

In reply, the Shah said he had no objection to Zeynal Beg's sending an envoy. However, he must point out that Baghdad was his hereditary territory. He had taken it from the hand of usurpers who were in revolt against the Ottoman government, and had suppressed the rebellion. The best solution, he said, would be for the Ottoman government to admit his claim to Baghdad, so that the peace which had been concluded between the two states might be reaffirmed. A further point, said the Shah, was that the Ottoman Sultan already claimed to be the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; it was appropriate that the holy shrines of the Imams at Baghdad, Imams who were the Shah's ancestors, should be in his hands. Since the Ottomans had disputed his claim to Baghdad, continued the Shah, he had taken steps to protect it. He hoped that the outcome of the struggle would be in the best interests of the people.

Zeynal Beg chose as his envoy Jānī Beg Šāmlū, and this officer went to the Ottoman camp with the returning Ottoman envoys. Protracted discussions were held with the Ottoman commander in chief and his emirs and pashas; Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad tried every argument he could think of to achieve his object, but the lack of sincerity of the arguments put forward by both sides caused the eventual breakdown of the negotiations.

When Jānī Beg Šāmlū returned, the Safavid emirs decided that battle was the only way the issue could be decided. Zeynal Beg led his men across the bridge with flags flying and they formed up for battle, thirty-thousand strong. Kalaf Beg *sofračībāšī* (chief sewer) and his men formed the vanguard. They advanced until there was no more

than one *farsak* between the two armies, but there was still no sign of movement from the Ottoman lines. Zeynal gave orders for the tents to be pitched right there on the spot, and sent the following letter to Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha: "We have come to do battle, though we be few; it is not fitting for you, with your superiority in numbers and boasted valor, to decline battle with what is only one corps of the total *qezelbāš* army; to decline battle will be to bring the Ottoman name into disrepute." Having sent off this letter, Zeynal Beg advanced again until the Ottoman lines were no more than the length of a few parade grounds away, and some of the bolder *qezelbāš* rode right up to the ditch around the Ottoman camp and took a few prisoners. The Ottoman army formed up behind its defensive positions, but that was all; the Ottoman commander in chief, in response to Zeynal Beg's letter, made various feeble excuses for not giving battle. The day drew to a close without any change in the situation. Zeynal Beg, having no orders to attack, returned to camp and wrote to the Shah for further orders. On receiving Zeynal Beg's report, the Shah advanced and joined forces with his advance guard.

The Shah held a council of war with his commanders as to how best to relieve the defenders of the strain of the siege, now in its seventh month. The Ottoman position was defended not only by the ditch, but by barricades of gun carriages and palisades, behind which were stationed the artillery and musketeers. An assault on this position would bring heavy losses. The Shah therefore decided to try and cut the Ottoman supply lines, both by land and water. As a first move, the Shah moved his camp to a point near the confluence of the Dīāla River and the Tigris, on the Qarā-qapū side of the city. Next, Kālī Sultan Sīl-süpūr was dispatched to Samarra to intercept the supplies coming down by boat from Dīār Bakr and Mosul; to support him, the Shah sent the aide-de-camp Rostam Beg with a strong force. Next, the bridge constructed by Zeynal Beg was taken up and laid down again across the Dīāla River at a point opposite the Shah's camp. Zeynal Beg and Kalaf Beg the *sofraçī* then recrossed the Dīāla with a strong force and camped on the west bank, about one *farsak* from the Ottoman lines; they set about protecting their camp by digging trenches and placing artillery batteries guarded by detachments of musketeers.

Emāmqolī Khan wanted to take the army of Fārs across the Tigris on rafts and boats and establish a camp on the west bank in order to cut off Ottoman communications with Hella and Baṣra, but the Shah

would not agree to this. An Ottoman army might suddenly attack him from Old Baghdad, he said, and he (the Shah) might be powerless to help him because of the strength of the current. In the end, he agreed to let Emāmqolī Beg, the *ešik-āqāsī* of Emāmqolī Khan, take the troops from Fārs and a detachment of musketeers across on rafts and boats and camp on the west bank opposite the Shah's own camp. On arrival at the west bank, this force fortified its camp in the same manner as Zeynal Beg and Kalaf Beg, and the Ottomans did not dare to make an attack on it from Old Baghdad.

After establishing his camp, Emāmqolī Beg took some of his men to attack Ḥella, which was held by Arslān Pasha Alvand-oğlū. The latter came out to fight Emāmqolī Beg with a mixed force of Arab and Ottoman troops, but was put to flight with the loss of about one thousand men killed. Arslān Pasha himself escaped in the direction of Fallūja. Large quantities of munitions which were being transported to the Ottoman camp from Bašra and Javāzer fell into Safavid hands. The Shah heard that the Ottomans, because of the lack of pasture east of the Tigris, had sent their animals across the river, and he sent two successive raiding parties in that direction. The first consisted of Lors, retainers of Ḥoseyn Khan the governor of Lorestān, and the second was under the command of Khan Aḥmad Khan Ardalān. These raiding parties traveled six or seven *farsaks* in the course of a single night, reached the Ottoman pasture grounds, and drove off several thousand animals.

One piece of luck for the Safavids was the capture of a supply caravan on its way to the Ottoman camp from Aleppo via Fallūja. The Shah's intelligence was that this Aleppo-Fallūja route was the main Ottoman supply route, so he dispatched Zamān Beg, the *nāzer-e boyūtāt* (superintendent of the royal workshops) to intercept the traffic. The Safavid successes in the region of Ḥella and Karbala effectively discouraged traffic from that direction. Some traffic that was coming by boat along the Euphrates was intercepted by Zamān Beg, who returned to the royal camp laden with cash and other booty. As a result of these operations, Ottoman supply trains west of the Tigris were interrupted, and the Fallūja route was effectively blocked.

The Shah's Move to Reprovision the Citadel at Baghdad and the Resultant Battle

The Safavid garrison at Baghdad was of considerable size and had

more than two thousand horses within the fort, so supplies of food for both men and animals had become scarce because of the length of the siege. Every day, some of the more impoverished local people and indigent persons of the lower classes slipped out of the fort and departed. As a result of loose talk, the Ottomans learned that the defenders were short of food, and confidently expected the garrison to surrender at any minute. The month of Ramaḡān (May-June 1626) came, and the price of food rocketed because the townspeople, although they had certain stocks of food, in their fear of the soldiery kept it hidden, and there was little trading in the city and the markets.

Finally, Şaftqolī Khan sent a report on the situation to the Shah. The Shah decided to collect all the stores in the royal camp that could be spared and attempt to get them into the fort by sending them by water to the west gate, opposite Old Baghdad, where a bridge crossed the river. The Shah hoped in this way both to raise the morale of the garrison and to give confidence to the local inhabitants so that they would once more bring their produce to market. At the same time, he hoped Ottoman morale would be lowered, and the Ottomans would cease to hope that the garrison would be starved into surrender, that last resort of a military commander.

The operation was going to be an extremely difficult one, because the Ottoman camp lined the Tigris at this point along both banks for a distance of about half a *farsak* from the west gate. The Shah's supply boats would thus have to run the gauntlet of Ottoman troops who, becoming short of food themselves, were keeping a sharp lookout for any supplies of food by river. To carry out this operation successfully would be a major achievement, and I have not read of anything comparable in the histories of former times. The Shah requested from Şaftqolī Khan the boats which were secured within the precincts of the fort, and a body of daring musketeers and other troops ferried these down the Tigris to the Shah's camp under cover of darkness. There they were loaded with flour, wheat, barley, rice, cooking fat, chickens, sheep, and other foodstuffs including desserts, preserves, sherbets, sugar, sugar candy, and the like. The boats were then dispatched at intervals, and Kalaf Beg was placed in charge of the operation.

There were not enough boats to take all the stores the Shah had collected, and so about five hundred *karuārs* were loaded on camels and mules, and this supply train set off along the bank of the Tigris.

The plan was to transfer the stores to boats when this supply train neared the west gate, because the Ottomans who were stationed in Old Baghdad had completely cut off traffic along the west bank by erecting breastworks, digging ditches, and placing groups of musketeers to guard these defenses. When Kalaf Beg and his men reached these defenses, after fierce fighting during which they inflicted heavy casualties on the Janissaries, they drove the Ottomans back behind the wall of Old Baghdad and cleared the bank of the enemy. All the stores were then transported into the fort without the Ottomans on the east bank being able to do anything to prevent the success of the operation. Kalaf Beg himself entered the fort and had a friendly conversation with Şaftqolî Khan before returning to the Shah's camp, where he was warmly congratulated by the Shah.

The Shah was still camped at the confluence of the Dîāla and Tigris rivers. The Safavid field commander, Zeynal Beg, who had led his men across the Tigris to the west bank, eventually got tired of the inaction and determined to engage the enemy again. He received the Shah's permission to do this, the only stipulation being that he should exercise caution and not risk undue casualties. This time, the Ottomans came out to fight; Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha, in view of the stout defense put up by the Safavid garrison and the success of the Safavid resupply operation, had decided to try a pitched battle. A gap was made in the artillery lines and gun-carriage defenses to enable his troops to march out and draw up for battle in front of the ditch. The Safavid advance troops engaged the enemy at several points on the flanks and were getting the worst of it when Zeynal Beg and Kalaf Beg launched a tremendous charge which drove the Ottomans back to their ditch with the loss of about one thousand men. A strong wind sprang up at this point and stirred up clouds of dust, which so obscured the battlefield that it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Zeynal Beg called off his men, and the Ottomans made their way back to their own lines in confusion. Some Janissaries, who were of course on foot, were trampled down by the cavalry, and others missed the way across the ditch because of the poor visibility and wandering aimlessly around. The only Safavid officer of note killed in this engagement was Moḥebb 'Alî Beg Şāhi-sevan Şamlû.

The Safavid blockade of the Ottoman supply routes was now having its effect. Not only were the Ottomans short of food, but sickness broke out in their camp, and every tent had its quota of sick men. The enemy now began to think of withdrawing from Baghdad, but were in

no fit state to do so because of their losses and the incidence of sickness. Moreover, as a result of the depredations of the *qezelbaş* and the scarcity of fodder, there was a shortage of donkeys for transport purposes and horses to ride. In these conditions, the Ottomans sent an envoy to the Shah, Moştafā Aqa, to ask him to appoint a negotiator. In compliance with their request, the Shah appointed the centurion Taḳta Beg Ostājlū, who returned to the Ottoman camp with Moştafā Aqa. The Ottoman commander in chief and his troops were at loggerheads, but after a great deal of argument and after everyone had had his say, they agreed to ask the Shah to overlook their misdeeds and allow them to retreat unmolested.

Taḳta Beg returned with a different Ottoman envoy, Moḥammad Aqa, and reported this to the Shah. The Shah agreed to the Ottoman request, but while Taḳta Beg was still at the Ottoman camp and Moḥammad Beg in the Shah's camp, and the terms of the agreement had not yet been finalized, the Ottoman troops, acting without orders, began to disperse in all directions. The Ottoman commander in chief and his officers were forced to retire on 9 Šavvāl 1035/4 July 1626. They did not even have enough donkeys to pull a few of their heavy guns, which were cast in the time of Sultan Sülaymān, and they abandoned their artillery and other weapons from the arsenal either on the spot, or at their campsite on the first night of their retreat. Various Safavid officers who found themselves in the Ottoman camp (Taḳta Beg, together with Barḡordār Beg Zu'l-Qadar, a retainer of Emāmqolī Khan, and Mīrzā Ma'sūm 'Arab Ġalīzī Ķorāsānī, who had been taken prisoner at night near the fort) were returned. A group of Šaftīqolī's men emerged from the fort and proposed to annihilate the retreating Ottomans, but the Shah, sticking to his word, ordered Zeynal Beg to shadow them for a few days but not to molest them.

Ottoman commanders in chief had frequently invaded Iran and been forced to retreat in disorder without having achieved their object, but none had retreated in such a sorry state as Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha. Several thousand sick and dying men were abandoned around the fort. The Shah ordered that they be given medical care, but the majority of them died. Large quantities of equipment and weapons were also abandoned by the retreating Ottomans, and there were distributed among the garrison as their portion of the spoils. Although the Safavid troops did not molest the Ottomans, the same was not true of the Arabs and the Kurds, who harassed them all the way to

Mosul, cutting off stragglers and releasing them after stripping them of all their clothes and equipment. At every stage along the journey, some of the Ottoman troops who were sick died.

Thus the province of Arab Iraq remained in Safavid hands, swept clean of Ottoman troops. The Shah sent letters announcing his victory to all parts of the frontier. Then, since the physicians advised that he should not remain longer at Baghdad because of the heat, the Shah sent votive offerings and alms to the residents and the poor of Karbala and Najaf, and after paying another visit to the shrine at Kāzemeyn, began his return march to Iraq, choosing the Mandali route because it was cooler. A Tabrīzī poet devised the following chronogram to commemorate this campaign: 'Alī b. Ṭāleb annihilated the Ottomans."²

Various Extraordinary and Miraculous Events Which Occurred During the Ottoman Siege of Najaf as a Result of the Influence of the Holy Spirit of 'Alī

Although the status of 'Alī is too high and his miraculous powers too well known by both friend and foe to occasion any wonder, nevertheless, to do honor to and to confer prestige on the clients and friends of the house of the Prophet, I will record what I have heard from reliable sources.

First, I heard direct from Mowlānā Maḥmūd, the keeper of the keys of the shrine of 'Alī at Najaf, that when Morād Pasha first laid siege to Najaf and pushed forward breastworks around the city, a certain Ottoman musketeer used to take up his station every day in a tower on one of the most advanced breastworks and, since he was a Sunni, hurl abuse at the defenders. Sometimes, however, he would pretend to feel sorry for the garrison: "My family comes from Iran," he said, "and so I feel sorry for you because this feeble fort will soon be taken by storm, and your men will be put to the sword, and your women and children taken into captivity, and your possessions plundered." He would then go on to urge the garrison to surrender. This constant propaganda began to undermine the morale of the fainthearted and the guards. One day, one of the children in the fort, who had never held a gun in his life and did not know how to fire one, fetched a musket to try and shoot that ill-starred propagandist. Aided by the holy spirit of 'Alī, he made his way into the tower. When

²Rūmī-rā janā harda 'Alī b. Abū Ṭāleb-1034/1625-26.

that babbler opened his mouth to utter his usual nonsense, the child fired his musket and blew the man's brains out.

The second miracle concerned another bigoted Ottoman musketeer, who had a Jazā'erī musket of particularly large caliber which he used to fire daily in the direction of the shrine, at the same time shouting abusive remarks. The range of the muskets carried by the defenders was too short to reach him, and he had considerable nuisance value. One day he took up his usual station on some rising ground and began to utter a round of abuse directed at the holy sepulcher. When he fired his musket, it burst, and a piece of it struck him such a blow on the head that his brains were knocked out and his tongue silenced for all eternity.

The third miraculous event concerned a lion which appeared near the Ottoman camp and prowled around it at night. Lions and other wild animals were not uncommon around the banks of the Euphrates, and the Ottomans, certain that it was after human prey, were afraid to go out at night and work on extending the breastworks—work which is normally carried on at night. I heard this story from Pahlavān Moḥsen 'Āšeqābādī.

The fourth miraculous occurrence concerned the barrel of lamp oil. This story was told to me by men of substance and trust who had it on the authority of Mīr Bahā al-Dīn, the son-in-law of Mīr Feyzollāh, a resident of Najaf; I myself also had the story direct from the above-mentioned *seyyed*, a most pious and God-fearing man. The story goes that, during the siege, the supplies of lamp oil for fueling the torches in the towers became exhausted, so that the defenders had to resort to using small quantities of suet and household cooking fat to keep the torches going, and the supply of these materials was inadequate. As a last resort, they took some old pieces of fat to the cellar where the oil barrels were stored and burned them inside the barrels, until there was no trace of fat left in the barrels. The guards on the towers, deprived of light, were beside themselves with worry, and the torchbearers went back to the oil cellar to see if they could find a few pieces of fat that they had overlooked. They found a large barrel brimful with oil, and when the news of this miracle got around, it raised the morale of the defenders.

The fifth miracle has to do with the appearance of the light, and the curse which Pahlavān Moḥsen laid on the attackers. I heard this

story from Pahlavān Moḥsen himself, when I was in Mīr Moḥammad Bāqer Dāmād's classroom³ and Pahlavān Moḥsen was telling him the story: "One night," he said, "we were unable to light the torches because of the lack of oil; we managed to light only one torch in one of the towers, but this threw such a bright light throughout the whole fort and both inside and out that our attackers thought we had lit the torches in all the towers. Some of our stupid assailants started taunting us, saying 'You must have a lot of oil to spare if you can afford to burn all those torches.' We shouted back, 'We have not lit any lamps; this light comes from the light of sainthood and the miraculous power of the "prince of Najaf" (ʿAlī)!' The Ottomans only roared with laughter. Then I cursed them and said, 'If we are telling the truth, you will soon see proof of it.'"

Two or three days after this exchange, the big Ottoman siege gun which had been trained on the fort and had demolished a tower burst when it was fired, and the enemy was deprived of artillery until we had repaired the tower. Morād Pasha sent an envoy to Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha to request another cannon, and reinforcements, but Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha refused and ordered him back to Baghdad, on the ground that he had been laying siege to the fort for several months and had accomplished nothing. Najaf was a dependency of Baghdad, said Ḥāfeẓ Aḥmad Pasha; "when we capture Baghdad, Najaf will automatically fall into our hands. On the other hand, if we fail to take Baghdad, what will be the point of our having taken Najaf?" So Morād Pasha marched away, and the defenders of Najaf were saved by the holy spirit of ʿAlī.

Various Exchanges between the Ottomans and Qezelbāš at Baghdad, and Details of the Contents of a Letter Which the Author Inserted in the Text as Evidence of the Accuracy of Some of the Statements He Has Made

My readers will realize that my account of the Baghdad campaign and of the various engagements between the Ottomans and the *qezelbāš*, an account which was based partly on what I saw with my own eyes and partly on information given to me by reliable persons, was given in summarized form; not wishing to lengthen my discourse unduly, I omitted many details. I was afraid that, if I put in some of these details, interfering busybodies and detractors might accuse me of embroidering the facts as secretaries are wont to do, and would say that

³Moḥammad Bāqer Dāmād, the great Shi'ite theologian.

I was trying to impress somebody and would cast doubts on my veracity.

As it happened, an Ottoman courier was intercepted on his way from the camp of the Ottoman commander in chief to Istanbul. He was carrying dispatches from the Ottoman commanders in the field, and these were seized and forwarded to the Shah. Each writer described some part of the current events in his own individual style. The writers described current events in a variety of different ways, but the pashas, emirs, and senior officers did not dwell on the excellent way in which they were performing their duties, or on the hardships they were suffering, for fear that if they did they would be accused of having some worldly motives for doing so. Among these dispatches, however, was a letter written by a senior Ottoman officer, in Turkish, to a friend of his at Istanbul named Moşlı Çelebi.⁴ The author of this letter had no ax to grind and gave the facts as he saw them. The letter was shown to me, and I reproduce it below exactly as it was written, so that my readers may be fully informed of the realities of the situation, and may not accuse me of being one of those sycophantic time servers who, in order to further their careers, calculate the profit and loss of truth and falsehood like tradesmen in the marketplace. If there are any stylistic errors or infelicities in either the Persian or Turkish of the text of this letter, I hope my readers will not attribute them to mistakes on my part, but realize that it is a line-by-line copy of the original.

Text of the Ottoman Letter

[After the customary compliments to Moşlı Çelebi, the letter reads:] "To proceed: if you inquire about what took place on this regrettable expedition and about cruel Baghdad, the abode of affliction, what can we say? May this expedition not end in favor of our adversary! We have now been laying siege to the stronghold for nine months and not a single breach more has been made in its stones. At the beginning of our siege, while there was still not a sign of those evil *qezelbaş* who were like a fox lying hidden in a valley, breastworks were made, mines constructed, and palisades erected. Many times attacks took place—in each attack several thousand of the (Ottoman) Household troops and *enfants perdus* perished. From day to day those accursed ones in the stronghold were triumphant and every enterprise ended in defeat for the army of Islam (i.e., the Ottomans). Mean-

⁴Perhaps the person of this name who became *Re'is ül-küttab* (chief secretary of the *divan*) and died in 1039/1629-30.

while a troublemaker named Zeynal Khan who was in command on behalf of the Shah of Iran appeared with probably forty thousand evil *qezelbāš*, full of cunning and good for nothing. He crossed the Dīāla River and advanced upon us. Many times he drew up his regiments in order of battle. Under cover of their movements, the Shah of Iran advanced step by step with the bloodthirsty force which was with him, paying no attention to us. He assigned a part of his force to attack the fortress of Mandālī. By force of arms he drove the army of Islam together with Meḥemmed Aqa, the *qapıjibāš* of the grand vizier, Jestānlū Moṣṭafā Pasha⁵ and others, out of the above-mentioned fortress; some were captured, some fell prey to the sword, and some he made unbelieving *qezelbāš* like himself. Afterward, when the army of Islam which was in the Lak fort was overcome, a great fear took possession of the army of Islam at this news.

"While they were in the stage of concerting measures as to whether it was feasible to go out and confront the enemy, the Shah of Iran made a general advance on us with his household troops. That worthless commander who has been mentioned earlier joined him. While he was beginning to set up a bridge across the Dīāla, the grand vizier sent fifteen thousand valiant youths under Morād Pasha, the *beglerbeg* of Dīār Bakr, with six guns to drive him off. By chance that accursed trickster swiftly eluded us and established his bridge. While three or four thousand *qezelbāš* were alighting at Šahrabān, Morād Pasha arrived and made an assault with cannon and musket fire on the *qezelbāš* who were there. They were forced to fight. One or two attacks took place (but) the Divine Wisdom of the Seventy Saints (*Rejāl al-Ġeyb*) decided in favor of the *qezelbāš*. With dust and wind and the sharp sword they made the army of Islam retreat.

"In short, with our complete defeat in the above-mentioned battle, the flower of our fine and cheerful young men from the *sanjaqs* of Dīār Bakr, Qaramān, Aleppo, and Anatolia tasted of the draught of martyrdom and what remained wet the poisoned blade. Morād Pasha, intervening in the battle in the evening, came and sought sanctuary in the camp with many of his followers severely wounded. After that the Shah of Iran came and set up a bridge at the place where the Šatt-e Qādīšān [sic] joins the Dīāla River and dispatched part of his army against us and part against Old Baghdad. Attacking us like

⁵See also *Ta'riḫ-e Na'imā*, ii, Istanbul 1281, pp. 360-7. In an account of these events by Evliyā Çelebi (*Fevāide*, ii, Istanbul, 1286-7, p. 76) he is called 'Meḥemmed Pasha, the Bey of Jesan'.

a wolf rushing on its prey, he appeared sometimes on this side and sometimes on that. In short, we were besieging Baghdad and the *qezelbāš* were besieging us so we returned to the right wing, which was galled by artillery fire. If we direct our efforts against the fortress, the *qezelbāš* will attack us unexpectedly out of the redoubt once more, so we should simply persevere in the siege of the stronghold. In the hope that the stronghold might be reduced through hunger and that we might bring them to terms, we had the fortress surrounded on four sides. When the Shah of Iran became aware of these measures, he was not unduly perturbed but dispatched ten thousand *qezelbāš* to Old Baghdad two nights ago. Three thousand loads of provisions and more arrived near the Qūš castle with camels and mules. When the army of Islam attacked them, fortune was not favorable to us. Then many of our *sekbāns* were cast into the water of the Šāṭṭ and many died a prey to the sword. In short, it was early in the morning when we were watching with our keen eyes this immense quantity of provisions ranging from sheep to butter and fowls being landed from boats at the fort. For that reason the army of Islam was defeated and at one blow all our hopes of taking the stronghold were dashed.

“While we were engaged in these melancholy thoughts about our perplexing situation, the Shah of Iran, gaining assurance from these events, told the *qezelbāš* to cut us off on all four sides from the Šāṭṭ and the Euphrates. Truly a bird could not escape by land or sea. Waters such as the Šāṭṭ and the Euphrates—both like the Danube in fury and turbulence—seemed like a brook under the horses’ hooves of those cruel *qezelbāš*. They attacked in the direction of Ḥella, Karbala, Fallūja, and Mosayyeb. It all seemed alike in those places—the army of Islam was of no more account than a dog, the Pasha than a horse and his followers than stableboys. The *qezelbāš* overcame Aşlan Pasha at Ḥella and the household troops and the Arabs in such a manner that the tongue fails in reporting it and the pen snaps in recording it. In all there were periods when not a single *oke* (2.82 lbs) of provisions came from this direction; if we engage the *qezelbāš*, the garrison of the fortress from behind us will dash our hopes. At length there was nothing for it but to dig trenches, and we made a redoubt,⁶ but they paid no heed to the redoubt. Many times they approached our redoubt and drew themselves up in battle order.

⁶*Tabūr*: a defensive position with transport wagons and gun carts chained together to form a circle.

"On 27 Ša'bān 1035/24 May 1626, when they came with the intention of attacking our redoubt, the grand vizier proclaimed among the army of Islam a general levy for all those able to bear arms—men of high and low degree, horse and foot—apart from the Janissaries, who were at their posts in the earthworks before the stronghold. We went forth and confronted them in battle. From early morning until late afternoon fighting went on under cannon and musket fire. Their commander, Zeynal Khan, put up a fierce resistance. No sooner had he set up the awning (for the Shah) on the *terre-plain* of the fort than those accursed ones beat the kettledrums of rejoicing at the sight of this. Those of humble and high degree (in the Ottoman army) were vexed; the *qezelbāš*, undismayed by the cannon and musket fire, launched an attack which, if the Elborz Range had been in front of them, would have pushed it aside! In short, with this attack the army of Islam was thrown into utter confusion. Such of our *sekbāns*⁷ as left the redoubt for the most part became trampled under the horses' hooves.

"When the *sepāhī* detachment saw that the battle was going against them, they did not stay any longer in the grand vizier's regiment but changed their resolution to stand to one of flight, and their heads fell upon desert and plain. Losing their way to the redoubt, most of them from that day forth were never seen again. So-and-so of us were overthrown and beaten down like a moth without wings. We sought refuge in the redoubt and decided to take shelter.

"After this engagement, the grand vizier took counsel with the high-ranking officers. They decided that there was no chance of breaking into the Ottoman camp. Whoever had acquired a great deal of provisions earlier on, now had some of it confiscated and some sold. By this means a time of abundant and cheap food has come about in our camp which we shall mention—1 *oke* of flour cost 1 piaster, 1 *oke* of butter 2 piasters, 1 *oke* of dates 1 piaster, 1 *kīle* (bushel) of barley 8 piasters, 3 dirhems (3.21 grams) of bread 1 asper (*aqā*), and 1 *oke* of horseflesh was sold for 40 piasters. Those of delicate constitution who were dainty in their food now are thankful when they see horseflesh! Those elegant and dandified fellows who were ashamed to wear a shirt of Egyptian cotton now are glad to get shirts of old tent canvas which do not cover their knees! Those conceited heroes who in the coffeehouses have mocked at the *qezelbāš*

⁷Troops of the provincial army armed with muskets, who liked to think of themselves as descendants of the Janissary *Sekbān* (*Sagbān*) division.

for their cowardice now when they behold the most insignificant of them three miles away on the road, compare him with Rostam son of Zāl; and those brave lads who have come in the hope of taking booty from the *qezelbāš* now abandon their tents and gear and are thankful to save their lives! Those dignitaries living in luxury who rode horses with silver trappings and used to go with their retinue to the bath now are filled with longing and regret when they see a pack-saddled ass!

“Since of the four parts of our army only one part remained mounted (i.e., only one quarter of the Ottoman army had horses) the survivors of the army of Islam are dismounted and disorganized. If we receive false reports and are forced to withdraw, there are neither men to bring away the Janissary regimental transport horses nor to protect any member of our armory or artillery train. We were reflecting that they have brought the *balyemez* and *sengendāz* guns which have been in Birejīk and Baṣra since the time of Sultan Sülaymān to reduce the stronghold. The grand vizier is tormented by the thought that it would be a dishonor for the House of ‘Oṣmān if they were abandoned. On many occasions men were sent expressly for assistance and money. No trace of them was ever seen again. We do not know whether they fell into the hands of the *qezelbāš*—not that the Sultan wished for the muster roll of the army of Islam to be obliterated from the face of the earth, only there is a ballad which is being sung among the Turks (i.e., as opposed to the Ottoman educated class) to the effect that ‘Neither from Baghdad nor Baṣra is anything coming. There is no help coming for us from those Ottoman rascals.’ Now if money and help came up to this month, there would be a chance for us; but henceforth even if the Sultan came in person, it would not be enough to help us.

“Why has Fate treated us so unkindly? On one side of us the Dīālā, on another side the Šaṭṭ, behind us Shah ‘Abbas and in front of us Baghdad. Perhaps help will come to us from God. In a word, nobody since Adam has fallen into such peril. None knows our plight; and well I know that whatever measure the Shah of Iran undertakes, it will turn out in his favor—there is absolutely no doubt that the miracles of ‘Alī have some effect. We do not know why the Emām-e A’zam (i.e., Abū Ḥanīfa) is so much weaker in exerting his miraculous power on our behalf or else we could turn for help to the saint on account of his sacred resting place and kindly spirit. When my heart is so troubled about this question, I do not say these strange

things aloud but only in a way which can be kept secret between ourselves. You will then be safe from the evil insinuations of those who care only for their own interests. *Amen, O Helper.*

"I expect you know that there is a disease associated with the climate of this province prevalent in our camp—it cuts just like the curved sword of the *qezelbaş*. It is only possible to go back again if one is fortunate enough to escape such sufferings and calamities as colic, dropsy, catarrh, sudden death, and the simoom wind. You are asking pardon and conveying our message of farewell to true friends—let them freely give up any claims against us in the Hereafter. *The judgment belongs to God, the One, the Irresistible.* We should only be thankful that we spent the rest of our life on the ground where the Emām-e A'zam lies. We have sent letters secretly to our true friends. If they see any mistakes in them it is only because when I was writing a line, three or four times the alarm arose that the enemy was coming. Those ruthless *qezelbaş* have completely overawed the army of Islam; like the wolf rushing after the sheep, they charged on our redoubt killing all they could find right up to our trenches just as well by night as by day—there were some occasions when they forced their way into our camp at night bearing lanterns. It is all up with us. We have neither been able to loosen our belts from our loins nor our two hands from our weapons—each one has to take care of himself. Apart from God none knows our plight. If all I have to tell you were written down it would not go into a hundred such letters! Truly the calamity of the Day of Resurrection will not equal these days of our sufferings here—you can draw your own conclusion from this—so farewell!"

The Shah's Return from Arab Iraq and His Wintering in Māzandarān

On arrival at Hamadan, the Shah spent a few days at the summer station of Meyham. While he was there, he made some administrative decisions regarding Baghdad. The position of warden of the holy shrines was taken away from Sārū Sultan and was given to Şaftqolī Khan, and the latter, in consideration of his valiant defense of Baghdad, received the title Šīr 'Alī. Kosrow Mīrzā Gorjī, the *dārūga* of Isfahan, was placed in charge of repairing the fortifications at Baghdad: he was to construct new towers and reexcavate the ditch around the fort; masons, master builders, and sappers were detailed to help him in this work. The garrison troops who had endured the siege were relieved by a fresh garrison.

After seeing to these matters, the Shah moved to Soltāniya, where he reviewed his troops and gave gifts and other rewards to all those who had distinguished themselves either in the Georgian campaign or in the Baghdad campaign. Those whose services had been outstanding were enrolled among the *qūrčīs* or the court retainers. Zamān Beg, the *nāzer*, was placed in command of three thousand musketeers and sent to Azerbaijan with orders to join the *qūrčībāšī* there and share in the task of guarding that frontier. Details of this will be given under the head of next year's events.

While the Shah was at Baghdad, Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha had suggested that he write a friendly letter to the Porte offering his condolences on the death of Sultan 'Osmān and his felicitations on the accession of Sultan Morād, and making allusion to the fact that Baghdad was the hereditary territory of the Safavid family. This suggestion was supported by the Ottoman ambassadors Moḥammad Āqā, who had come to the Safavid court while Sultan 'Osmān was still alive, and Moṣṭafā Āqā, who had been sent to the Shah at Baghdad by Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha. They all said that such a statement by the Shah would help to remove misunderstanding and contribute to the well-being of God's people. The Shah therefore wrote a letter along the above lines and sent it to the Porte by the hand of Ṭahmāspqolī Šīra Donboli; I will give further details of this too under next year's events.

At Soltāniya, the royal army was disbanded and the men sent on leave, and the Shah proceeded to Qazvin with the retainers of the royal stirrup. Ambassadors were waiting for him there from the Tsar and from Nadr Moḥammad Khan Özbeg, the ruler of Balk. After receiving them with due ceremony, the Shah went on to his winter quarters in Māzandarān; he divided his time between Farahābād, Ašraf, and other places, and enjoyed himself riding and hunting.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Ṭahmāspqolī Khan Tarḡān Torkmān, a *moqarrab* at court. Last year, he was promoted to the rank of khan and given a governorship, and this year he was made governor of Kerman. He was taken ill during the Baghdad expedition with some stomach complaint, which he aggravated by eating and drinking unwisely and to excess. He did not bother much about medical treatment either, and gave no credence to the physicians' advice. When the condition worsened daily, the Shah gave him permission to leave the heat of Baghdad and go to a

summer station, taking a physician with him. He went to the summer station at Kerend, but carried on as before, paying no heed to the physician. Each day, he traveled one stage further along the road to death, which he finally met. The governorship of Kerman, in addition to the office of keeper of the seal, was conferred on Emir Khan Morabbi Söklen, a senior Zu'l-Qadar emir.

2. Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb Reżavī, an eminent *seyyed* of Mašhad and warden of the shrine of the Imam Reżā. He accompanied the Shah on his expedition to Baghdad and, after the repulse of the Ottomans, visited the shrines at Kāzemeyn, Karbala, and Najaf. I went along with him. When the Shah returned to Qazvin, Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb got permission to go back to Mašhad. When he reached Tehran, he was seized by an attack of colic after eating an excessive amount of fruit; treatment proving of no avail, he died. His body was taken to Mašhad and buried within the precincts of the shrine.

Events of the Year of the Hare, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1036/1626-27, the Forty-first Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Saturday,¹ 2 Rajab 1036/19 March 1627, and the sun entered the Sign of Aries at 8:17 P.M. In consideration of his services as ambassador to India and his outstanding feats during the Baghdad campaign, Zeynal Beg Begdīlū was promoted to the rank of khan and appointed *ešīk-āqāsībāšī*; he was given the fief of Rayy, formerly held by 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū.

When the weather began to turn hot, the Shah left his winter quarters in Māzandarān and, since there were once again reports of Ottoman troop movements, marched to Qazvin. From there, he marched to Solžānīya, and kept watch on the frontiers of both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Rostam Beg, an aide-de-camp whose ability had brought him promotion to the high office of *divān begī*, was sent to Tabriz with orders to keep watch on the Vān frontier in cooperation with the governor of Tabriz and other emirs in that region, and to suppress any insurrections on the part of either the Kurds or the Ottomans.

One auspicious event which occurred this year was the escape of Qazāq Khan Čerkes, the *beglerbeg* of Šīrvān, who had been taken prisoner by Morāv and his Georgian rebels as he was on his way back from Qarāqol-kān. He was held prisoner for a considerable time, but eventually, since Morāv's fortunes did not prosper to the extent that he had hoped, Qazāq Khan was able to bribe two of his guards to let him escape. He made his way to the *qūrčībāšī*'s camp and, after having reported to and obtained permission from the Shah, returned to Šīrvān, made contact with his deputies, agents, and dependents there, and resumed his post as *beglerbeg* of the province.

The Successful Expedition Led by the Qūrčībāšī against the Fort of Āķesqa

As I related earlier, the fort at Āķesqa had been evacuated by Salīm Khan Šams al-Dīnlū and its Safavid garrison, who were afraid of being overwhelmed either by Abāza Pasha or by the Ottoman com-

¹2 Rajab was a Friday.

mander in chief, rumored to be on the march. The fort had been occupied by Ottoman troops under Morteżā Pasha, who had marched from Qarāja Ardahān either on his own initiative or on orders from Abāza Pasha. The *qūrčībāši*, who had wintered in Qarābāg, marched to Erīvān under orders to recapture the fort. Zamān Beg, the *nāzer*, and a detachment of musketeers who had been sent to Azerbaijan the previous year, were now ordered to join forces with the *qūrčībāši*.

The Safavid force laid siege to Ākesqa, and gradually carried one defensive position after another. Morteżā Pasha, realizing that the fort would shortly be taken by storm, and not having received any help from any quarter, opened truce negotiations. He and his men were allowed to depart without being molested, and to go wherever they wished; anyone who wanted to come to Iran was welcome to do so. After the necessary covenants had been concluded, Morteżā Pasha handed over the fort and came to join the *qūrčībāši*; some of his men followed him, others went their own ways. Since Salīm Khan had been guilty of dereliction of duty in abandoning the fort without firing a shot, he was dismissed from his post as governor of Ākesqa and replaced by Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar, and the latter took charge of the fort with a garrison of Qazāqlar tribesmen who were familiar with that section of the frontier.

*Another Auspicious Event Which Occurred This Year:
The Georgian Rebels Morāv and ʿTahmūraş Turn On Each
Other, and Morāv Is Defeated*

After the battle between the combined forces of ʿTahmūraş and Morāv and the *qezelbāş* army, a battle in which some of the Kartlian nobles were killed, Morāv aspired to make himself ruler of Kartlia. But a group of Kartlian nobles and leaders (*tavādān*),² more aristocratic than he, were opposed to the idea. ʿTahmūraş was a king's son and was also the ruler of Kakhetia, but Kakhetia was still in a state of devastation. Simon Khan, the former ruler of Kartlia, had died without male issue, but ʿTahmūraş's sons were grandsons on their mother's side of Simon Khan's family. Moreover, the Kartlian nobles were hostile to Simon Khan's nephew, Simon Khan the son of Bagrāt Khan, and so ʿTahmūraş hoped to arouse the interest of the Kartlian nobles in the idea of having one of his own sons as their ruler; he

²Georgian *tavadni*; for a discussion of the meaning of this term, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, London, 1971, pp. 246ff.

would thus retain the throne of Kakhetia and at the same time exercise control over Kartlia.

Some of the Kartlian nobles agreed to this scheme and deserted Morāv; this led to an estrangement between Morāv and Ṭahmūraṣ. The latter was on his guard against Morāv, but even so Morāv fell on him suddenly with a band of his supporters, and Ṭahmūraṣ only had sufficient warning to get away. Ṭahmūraṣ then collected his own supporters, marched against Morāv, and defeated him. Morāv was forced to take refuge on Ottoman soil. He fell in with an Ottoman field commander who was marching to Erzerum against Abāza and returned with him to Istanbul; he is still on Ottoman soil today. Ṭahmūraṣ considered it diplomatic after this to make overtures to the Safavids. He made offers of friendship to Dā'ūd Khan the son of Allāhverdi Khan, who had been stationed at Tiflis by the *qūrčī-bāšī* with a detachment of musketeers. Dā'ūd Khan had a meeting with Ṭahmūraṣ Khan, and the following year he passed on Ṭahmūraṣ's representations to the Shah.

Ṭahmūraṣ Khan's Overtures to the Safavid Court, Made through the Good Offices of Dā'ūd Khan b. Allāhverdi Khan

After Morāv fled to Anatolia, Ṭahmūraṣ Khan repented of his former actions and reopened negotiations with the Shah. He made friendly overtures to Dā'ūd Khan and, as he had done before, declared his submission and obedience to the Safavid house; through the good offices of Dā'ūd Khan, he asked that his sins be forgiven. Dā'ūd Khan sent a report to the Shah, which reached him as he was on his way back from Baghdad, together with a most humble letter from Ṭahmūraṣ. "I admit," he said, "that I have been guilty of many crimes over the years, and I realize that the *qezelbāš* are out for my blood because of all the wars I have been responsible for. For this reason, I do not have the courage to come before you in person. But if you could find it in your heart to forgive my past crimes and to wipe the slate clean, I will return to my allegiance and henceforth will not swerve an inch from the path of servitude. Perhaps, after I have performed some meritorious acts to demonstrate my devotion to you, acts such as will win the praise of all, I may presume to enter your service. At the moment, such is my fear of your anger at my insolent behavior, I beg to be excused from serving you at court; I will go on

living in these old ruins."³ Dā'ūd Khan, in forwarding this letter, had asked for a letter of safe conduct for Ṭahmūraş from the Shah.

The Shah accepted Dā'ūd Khan's supplications on behalf of Ṭahmūraş, and wrote the latter a conciliatory letter, in the course of which he pardoned him for his past misbehavior. But he gave Dā'ūd Khan strict instructions to remind Ṭahmūraş that he had grown up at the Safavid court and therefore knew him (the Shah) well. "I have accepted all these protestations of contrition and declarations of loyalty and obedience," said the Shah, "but tell Ṭahmūraş that his pardon will not be absolute until such time as he presents himself at court with a sword slung around his neck like a common criminal. Tell him that his specious words cut no ice with me. Let him wash away the stain of rebellion with the water of honest service and truthful speech, so that he may render himself fit to come into my presence."

When he received the Shah's orders, Dā'ūd Khan decided to meet Ṭahmūraş in person on an informal basis, taking with him only a few of his retainers. Dā'ūd Khan undertook to act as surety for Ṭahmūraş's good behavior, but delivered the Shah's warnings in a clear manner. First, the Khan demanded that Ṭahmūraş remove his Ottoman-style dress, and put on *qezelbāş* garb, and that his followers do the same. Ṭahmūraş then authorized Dā'ūd Khan to intercede for him, and swore that, if he were forgiven, he would not be disloyal again for the rest of his life. After concluding covenants to this effect, Dā'ūd Khan returned to Tiflis and reported to the Shah, and Ṭahmūraş has not so far strayed from the path of obedience.

Abāza Pasha's Second Approach to the Safavid Court

When Abāza Pasha heard the news of the retreat of the Ottoman army from Baghdad, he hastened once more to declare his devotion to the Safavid cause, and promptly released the *qūrçî* Nowrūz Beg Ostājlı; he had arrested him the previous year and had put out reports that he had been executed. He made all sorts of excuses for his past actions, which included plundering the possessions of Iranian merchants. An Ottoman commander, Kalil Pasha, had been sent with a punitive expedition against him, and Abāza hoped for support from the Shah. In view of his past duplicity, the Shah did not over-exert himself to help him, but he did order the *qūrçîbāşî* to hold

³A rather tactless allusion, one would have thought, to the devastation in Kakhetia caused by Safavid troops.

himself in readiness in the Erīvān area in case the Ottomans should make an incursion onto Iranian territory. When Kālil Pasha neared Erzerum, he detached a force of Janissaries under Dīšler Hüseyn Pasha to attempt to recapture the fort at Ākesqa, and he sent a delegation to Abāza Pasha led by Bostān Pasha and 'Isā Beg, two of his trusted officers, to try and conciliate Abāza Pasha and get him to join Dīšler Hüseyn Pasha in the attack on Ākesqa. Abāza Pasha's friends said to him, "These officers have orders to arrest you. Look out!" and so Abāza arrested them both and held them in custody.

Then, with the knowledge that he had the *qezelbaş* army in Çoğūr-e Sa'd behind him, he marched out from Erzerum and fell without warning on Dīšler Hüseyn Pasha and his men and overwhelmed them. Dīšler Hüseyn Pasha and several other senior officers were taken prisoner; Dīšler Hüseyn Pasha was brought wounded to the fortress at Erzerum, and died there. Large numbers of Ottoman regulars and Janissaries were killed. Kālil Pasha brought up the rest of his forces and laid siege to Erzerum for four months, but with the onset of winter, he was forced to raise the siege. The Shah said frankly to Abāza Pasha's envoys that he did not trust Abāza because his actions had so frequently not matched his words. "If Abāza is really sincere," he said, "let him send to me the Ottomans he has taken prisoner, as proof that his recent struggle against the Ottomans was an act of devoted service to the Safavid dynasty." I will give the rest of Abāza's story under the next year's events.

Miscellaneous Events Which Must Be Recorded

Everyone knows it is a universally accepted rule among princes that the persons of ambassadors are inviolable and their property immune from expropriation, both in peace and in war, for they are merely doing the bidding of their master in carrying messages and communications; if any prince violates this immunity, he is censured by men and held responsible for his action by God. Of recent years, as I have recorded in the appropriate place, two ambassadors have been sent from Iran to the Porte: the *qūrčī* Čelebī Beg Qājār before the Baghdad campaign, and Tahmāspqolī Sultan Šīra Donbolī after it. Both were foully murdered by senior officers of the Ottoman state: Čelebī Beg was put to death by the governor of Qarā Ḥamīd as he was returning from Istanbul, and Tahmāspqolī Sultan was murdered on his way to Istanbul by Ottoman officials who were at variance with one another and did not consider it in their interests to allow the

ambassador to reach Istanbul. They appropriated all his possessions and pretended he had died of natural causes; to salve their consciences a little, they gave some of his possessions to his retainers. In addition, the governor of Aleppo put to death a certain Aqa Jalāl the *gerek-yarāq* (purveyor), who had been sent by the Shah to Aleppo when peace still reigned between the two empires, to perform certain duties there; in this instance, too, all the envoy's possessions were seized.

If these acts were committed on orders from the Sultan, they show an astonishing lack of foresight and baseness of character; if they were committed by local governors and pashas on their own initiative, they demonstrate a dishonorable impotence on the part of the Sultan, for unauthorized acts by subordinate officials are a sign of the weakness of the state. By contrast, Shah 'Abbas, whose conduct is a model for other princes, royally entertained the Ottoman ambassadors, Moḥammad Aqa who had come to Qazvin before the Baghdad expedition, and Moṣṭafā Aqa who came subsequently, and sent them back unharmed; similarly, Ottoman merchants who found themselves on Iranian soil after the outbreak of hostilities were allowed to go their way unmolested.

The Blinding of Emāmqolī Mīrzā

Because of certain unwise actions on the part of Emāmqolī Mīrzā, he was blinded.⁴ Throughout history, kings have put the welfare of their people and the interests of the state before their own worldly aspirations or the ties of paternity. Thus Sultan Sūlaymān, the wisest of the Ottoman Sultans, put to death his eldest son, Sultan Moṣṭafā, on suspicion of rebellion, and also another of his sons, Sultan Bāyazīd, together with four of his sons. There are plenty of examples of this sort of thing in history, and I do not need to elaborate further. Emāmqolī Mīrzā, in the ignorance, folly, and arrogance of youth, had committed various acts which were displeasing to his father. The Shah perceived that his son was acting unjustly toward him, and that his unwise actions showed a lack of affection for his father. He therefore decided to have him blinded. Although this was a terrible fate, it was the least of the calamities to which princes are exposed in this world.

⁴By this act, Shah 'Abbas left himself without an heir: of his other four sons, two had died of natural causes, one had been executed, and one blinded.

The Shah's Return from Solţānīya to Winter Quarters in Māzandarān

After Kālīl Pasha had been forced to raise the siege of Erzerum and the Shah was thereby assured that there was no risk of danger to the fort at Ākesqa, he sent his troops on leave and made his way with his personal attendants to Māzandarān, where he divided his time as usual between Aşraf and Farḥābād, and spent his time hunting and in other pastimes. The *qūrċībāşī*, who had spent two winters in Azerbaijan, was recalled to court and received by the Shah in Māzandarān. Zamān Beg the *nāzer* also returned from duty in Azerbaijan, and the troops under the command of both these officers were sent on leave.

Moḥammadqolī Khan Zīād-oġlū, the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāġ, was dismissed from his post because he had been guilty of a certain degree of negligence and slackness in his conduct of the campaign against Morāv. He had abandoned Ganja and the neighboring region to the ravages of Morāv, which had caused injury and loss to both civilians and military in the area. He was replaced by Dā'ūd Khan, the son of Allāhverdī Khan, who was guarding Tiflis and the Georgian frontier.

Shah 'Abbas and the Mogul Emperors had always maintained friendly relations and had kept each other informed of the other's affairs, and ambassadors had been going to and fro regularly since the embassy of Zeynal Beg Begdīlū (now promoted to the rank of khan). The Shah now learned of the death of the prince Parvīz, who had been named heir-apparent, and he deemed it necessary to send an ambassador to offer his condolences to the Emperor Jahāngīr on this bereavement. He nominated the centurion Taḳta Beg Ostājīlū, an experienced and reliable officer, and furnished him with gifts for the Emperor: precious stuffs and other items from many lands, swift Arabian horses, and a letter of friendship. Taḳta Beg departed on his mission via Isfahan, Yazd, Kerman, and Kandahar, but he had got no further than Isfahan when the unexpected news arrived of the sudden death of the Emperor Jahāngīr himself, and of the subsequent struggle for the succession. By coincidence, two of the Shi'ite rulers of the Deccan, Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh, and Sultan Moḥammad Qoṭbšāh, also died this year. During the reign of Shah Tahmasp there was a similar occurrence, when three rulers died in a single year in India: Salīm Shah, the son of Šīr Shah Afġān, the ruler of Delhi, Agra, Lahore, and Bengal; Sultan Maḥmūd, ruler of Gūjarat; and Neẓām-

šah, the ruler of Aḥmadnagar in the Deccan. Mowlānā Qāsem Kāhī produced the following chronogram to mark this earlier instance: "The demise of the princes."⁵ Although these events have, strictly speaking, nothing to do with Iranian history, I thought them worthy of mention in view of the long-standing friendship between the Safavid and Mogul dynasties.

Notable Deaths This Year

1. Nūr al-Dīn Moḥammad Salīm (Jahāngīr), the Mogul Emperor, b. Jalāl al-Dīn Moḥammad Akbar b. Moḥammad Homāyūn b. Moḥammad Bābor b. 'Omar Shaikh b. Abū Sa'īd b. Mīrzā Sultan Moḥammad b. Mīrzā Mīrānšāh b. Emir Tīmūr Gūrakān. The Emperor was taken ill as he was returning from Kashmir and died before he reached Lahore. He had reigned for twenty-two years (1014-1037/1605-1627). After the death of Parvīz, his next eldest son was Kōrram, but Kōrram had for some time been estranged from his father and was living in exile in the Deccan. The principal officers of the Mogul state, apparently in accordance with a testamentary disposition made by Jahāngīr at the time of his death, nominated as his successor Dāvar Baḳš the son of the blind Sultan Kōsrow, who was known as Sultan Bolāḡī, and minted coins and had the *koṭba* recited in his name. The other princes who were present at court made obeisance to Sultan Bolāḡī, but a younger son of Jahāngīr, Šahryār, opposed the decision of the principal officers of state, marched to Lahore, seized the fort there, together with the arsenal, the royal treasuries, and the elephant house, and had his name inserted in the *koṭba* and coins minted in his name.

The senior emirs, *kājas*, and other nobles who were at Lahore were forced to accept him as emperor, and bound themselves to serve him; by dispensing money liberally, Šahryār raised a large army. When the army of the deceased emperor Jahāngīr and the senior emirs who were in attendance on Sultan Bolāḡī (also known as Šīr Shah), together with the other princes and the women of the royal family, neared Lahore, Sultan Šahryār sent his army out with orders to fight Sultan Bolāḡī's army if the latter insisted on supporting a man who was only the grandson of the deceased emperor in preference to himself, a natural son of Jahāngīr. When the two armies came face to face, Aṣaf Khan, the chief of Sultan Bolāḡī's supporters, apprised Šahryār's followers of the testamentary disposition of the dying Jah-

⁵*Zavāl-e kōsrovān*, which yields 961/1553-54.

angīr in favor of Sultan Bolāgi, and the leaders of both sides entered into discussion that resulted in a peaceful settlement. Some of Šahryār's men dispersed; others began to make their way back to Lahore. Sultan Bolāgi rode at top speed to Lahore, without giving Šahryār time to regroup his men, and the latter retreated into the citadel. When Āṣaf Khan and Sultan Bolāgi entered Lahore, no one went to the assistance of Šahryār, and Sultan Bolāgi's men entered the citadel without difficulty. They seized Šahryār in his bed, and blinded him. So ended his ten-day reign at Lahore.

Sultan Korram had been the favorite son of Jahāngīr, who had bestowed on him the title of Shah Jahān. Jahāngīr had given him various duties in the Deccan, and had sent him to Borhānpūr.⁶ The Emperor had agreed to his request that he should take with him his elder brother Sultan Kosrow, who had been blinded, but Shah Jahān, without authority from his father, had had the temerity to put Sultan Kosrow to death. He had also behaved like a king in the Deccan, arrogating to himself certain privileges reserved to the Mogul Emperor alone. This behavior was the cause of the estrangement between father and son, and some of those who had the Emperor's ear accused Shah Jahān of rebellion. When Shah Jahān returned from Borhānpūr he was refused permission to go to court, but he took no notice of the ban and marched to Lahore in fine style.

Jahāngīr, by now thoroughly distrustful of his son, and urged on by mischief-makers at court, marched out to meet Shah Jahān and confronted him between Agra and Lahore. Some of Shah Jahān's emirs deserted and went over to the Emperor, and Shah Jahān, terrified, fled back to the Deccan, where he took refuge with the Qoṭbšāh. Later, he reemerged and invaded Bengal, defeated Ebrahim Khan Bangāla'ī, one of Jahāngīr's chief emirs and a relative of Āṣaf Khan, and seized control of the province. From Bengal, he marched to Allāhāpās. Jahāngīr then sent a punitive expedition against him led under the command of the prince Parvīz and Mahābat Khan, the governor of Kabul, another of his senior emirs. Shah Jahān, defeated near Allāhāpās, retreated through Bengal back to the Deccan. This time, he did not stay in the territory of the Qoṭbšāh, but took refuge with the Neẓāmšāh; at all events, the princes of the Deccan placed themselves at his service.

⁶A town in Madhya Pradesh. In 1025/1616, Shah Jahān made Borhānpūr his headquarters during his Deccan campaigns (see *EI*², Vol. I, pp. 1330-31, article BŪRHĀNPŪR by A. S. Bazmee Ansari).

Shah Jahān grew weary of the Deccan after a while, and tried to go to Iran and seek assistance from Shah 'Abbas. He reached the province of Thatta, and wanted to capture the fort there and seize control of the province of Sind, which was the Mogul province closest to the Iranian border. The commandant at Thatta defended the fort and Shah Jahān was unable to take it, and his officers prevented him from coming to Iran. So once more he retired to the territory of the Neẓāmšāh in the Deccan. His forces had become dispersed with all this marching to and fro, and he lived quietly in the Deccan with a mere handful of supporters. The Neẓāmšāh, afraid of the Emperor, now wanted to get him off his territory.

This was the situation when news arrived of the death of the prince Parvīz, and of a power struggle at court between Āṣaf Khan and Mahābat Khan. Mahābat Khan had not received the rewards for his services that he had expected because of the power and influence of Āṣaf Khan, the latter's connection with the royal harem, and his position as a confidant of the Emperor. Disappointed in his expectations, Mahābat Khan left the court and joined Shah Jahān. These two unexpected pieces of good fortune caused a sudden improvement in Shah Jahān's prospects, and he was on the point of emerging from the Deccan when he received the further news of the death of the Emperor himself. He at once marched toward Agra with a small body of followers. The princes of the Deccan lent generous support, and from all sides troops flocked to his side—Čaġatāys, Mongols, Afghans, and Rajputs.

Sultan Bolāġī's fortunes began correspondingly to decline, and his principal officers of state and the wisest heads among his military leaders saw no future for a grandson now that an ambitious natural son of the late Emperor was in the contest for the throne. Their loyalty to Sultan Bolāġī wavered, and they began to leave Lahore and go to Agra to join Shah Jahān, striving to outdo one another in the race to pledge their fealty and services. By the time Shah Jahān neared Agra, most of Sultan Bolāġī's nobles and troops had joined him. Āṣaf Khan and certain other nobles of the court also considered it expedient to send couriers to Shah Jahān indicating their support, and Shah Jahān entered Agra in triumph and assumed the throne.

Āṣaf Khan and his companions then set out for Agra, taking Sultan Bolāġī with them. Near the city, they put to death five princes on orders from Shah Jahān, and then hurried to prostrate themselves

before the new Emperor. The five princes thus done to death were Sultan Šahryār, who had been blinded; Dāvar Bağš b. Sultan Kosrow, known as Sultan Bolāgī and entitled Šīr Shah (as I just related, he came to the throne); one of his brothers, and two sons of prince Dānīāl, the brother of Jahāngīr, who had died during Akbar's lifetime. Thus Sultan Korram became emperor of India, with the title Shah Jahān, which had been conferred on him by his father, and "the second Šāheb-qerān" (Tīmūr). He made Āṣaf Khan his chief administrator, and Mahābat Khan his commander in chief, and dubbed him "my dear brother and faithful friend Mobārez al-Dīn Sepahsālār Kān-e Kānān." The old rivals buried the hatchet, treated each other civilly (at least in public) because they were ordered to do so by the Emperor, and busied themselves with the task of ordering the affairs of the realm. I obtained all this information from merchants who trade with India; the responsibility for the accuracy of the report lies with its transmitter!

2. Ebrahim 'Adelšāh, the ruler of Bījāpūr and Dābol. He surpassed all other rulers of the Deccan in the extent of his territory, the length of his reign, and the abundance of his treasures and the luxury items in his possession. Because of a blow he had received on the lower part of his body, he was unable to ride and even had difficulty standing. As a result, he always reclined on his throne or a couch. But his intelligence, judgment, and experience were such as to enable him to maintain his position during a long reign. Two of his court poets, Mowlānā Malek Qomī and Mowlānā Zāhūrī, composed a nine-hundred verse eulogy for their patron (each poet contributing four hundred and fifty verses) to form the preface to the *Ketāb-e Now-ras*, and received as a reward nine thousand rupees, the equivalent of nine hundred Iraqi *tomān*. Ebrahim 'Adelšāh considered himself to be skilled also in the composition of rounds, in music, and in the playing of various musical instruments. He died this year, and was succeeded by his elder son, who was twenty-two years of age.

3. Sultan Moḥammad Qoṭbšāh, the son of Moḥammad Amīn, who was the nephew of Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh and also his son-in-law. He died after a short reign. The succession of his son, Sultan 'Abdollāh, whose mother was a daughter of Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh, was disputed by various self-interested people on the ground that his descent from Moḥammadqolī Qoṭbšāh was in the female line. These people, urged on by the mother of a younger son of his, summoned Sultan 'Abdollāh to the harem, where they set upon him and blinded

him. The younger son, the seven-year-old 'Alī, was then placed on the throne with the title of Ebrahim 'Ādelšāh. His devotion and loyalty to the Safavid court were more sincere than those of his predecessors, and he sent one of his principal emirs, Ĥeyrāt Khan, as an ambassador to Shah 'Abbas.

The servants of the Safavid court who died this year were as follows:

4. Aqa Beg the *dīvānbegī*. He was a retainer of 'Alīqolī Khan Šamlū the *dīvānbegī*, and his abilities led him to be enrolled among the retainers of the court. He carried out the duties of the *dīvānbegī* during 'Alīqolī Khan's absence from court. In the Year of the Ox, when the Shah sent an army to Georgia under the command of the *qūrčībāši* to suppress the rebellion there, he took charge of 'Alīqolī Khan's troops, as the latter had recently died. Aqa Beg died at the beginning of the year on his way back from Georgia.

5. Seyyed Ĥoseyn Kamūna. He came from the Kamūna family of *seyyeds* who were *naqībs*⁷ of Najaf. This family had for generations been loyal supporters of the Safavid house, and its members had always been persons of substance and rank. Seyyed Ĥoseyn Kamūna had maintained his position at Najaf under the Ottoman administration. He had the honor of meeting the Shah during the latter's campaign in Arab Iraq, and his obvious merits and open nature recommended him to the Shah, who made him a member of his court. Seyyed Ĥoseyn was a regular banqueting companion of the Shah. Seyyed Ĥoseyn died this year, and his son, Seyyed Nāser, was enrolled in his place among the attendants at court.

6. Yūtam Sultan Gorjī, a *golām* of the royal household and protégé of Shah 'Abbas. He was appointed governor of Darband, but died this year while still a young man. His governorship was given to Farroḡ Sultan, also a *golām* of the royal household, who was commander of the Rostamdārī regiment of musketeers.

7. Holow Khan Ardalān. He was one of Shah Tahmasp's emirs. As I have previously reported, his hereditary territory was conferred on Khan Aḥmad Khan, his son, and he himself at the Shah's order resided at Isfahan, where he lived to be more than ninety. He died this year of a stroke, without any previous illness. His son Khan Aḥmad

⁷See *TM*, pp. 81, 83, 148.

Khan is still governor of Ardalān, ruler of his hereditary domains, and *beglerbeg* of Šahrezūl.⁸

8. Yādegār 'Alī Sultan Kolaḡā, of the tribe of Ṭāleš. He was a descendant of Kalīfat al-Kolaḡā,⁹ who was governor of Baghdad during the reign of Shah Esma'il I. Yādegār 'Alī was one of the great emirs and held the office of *kalīfat al-kolaḡā*.¹⁰ He died this year at Ardabīl on his way back from Georgia. He was a benevolent and God-fearing man who performed many good works in the course of his life, including the construction of mosques, theological seminaries, and other buildings. The office of *kalīfat al-kolaḡā* was conferred on Šahqolī Kalīfa.

9. Ḥakīm Seyf al-Dīn Moẓaffar Kāšī, a physician on the staff of the royal household. He was very close to the Shah. In his old age, he was responsible for the medical care of the personnel of the court, and most of the nobles, if they became ill, followed courses of treatment prescribed by him because of his reputation as a skillful and successful physician. Advancing age finally forced him to curtail his practice, and his son, who was a physician at the hospital, began to practice at court. Ḥakīm Seyf al-Dīn died this year at Solṭānīya, and his son, Šamsā Moḥammad, whose medical skill as a young man equaled that of many practitioners with years of experience, was enrolled among the physicians of the royal household and treated patients at court.

10. Šāhroḡ Beg, the vizier of the *qūrčīs*. He was born at Dezmar and was a member of the Qarādāglū tribe. He wrote a fine hand in the *nasta'liq* script. Because of the service rendered by his family to the Safavid house, the Shah regarded him and his brothers with great favor, and one of his brothers, Ḥeydar Beg, is presently a centurion of the Qarādāglū *qūrčīs*. Šāhroḡ Beg's first post was *mošref-e qūškāna* (superintendent of the royal aviary), a post to which he was appointed in succession to his brother Bāyandor Beg, who was killed by a musketball while guarding a breastwork at the siege of Abīvard. Later on, Šāhroḡ Beg was appointed *mostowfi-ye qūrčīān* (comptroller of the *qūrčīs*). After the death of Malek Beg, the vizier of the *qūrčīs*, he was appointed to that office. He died at Solṭānīya this year. He had quite a capable son, but it was thought that he could not manage a post as important as that of vizier of the *qūrčīs*, which was consequently given to Emir Abū 'Alī, a kinsman of Mīr Abu'l-Ma'ālī.

⁸I.e., Šahrezūr.

⁹Kādem Beg Ṭālcī, appointed governor of Baghdad in 914/1508.

¹⁰See Savory, "The Office of *Khalīfat al-Khulafā* under the Safawids," pp. 497-502.

11

Events of That Melancholy Year, the Year of the Dragon, Corresponding to the Muslim Year 1037/1627-28, the Forty-second Year of the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

New Year's Day this year fell on Monday,¹ 13 Rajab 1037/19 March 1628, and the new year officially began at 2:20 a.m. The beauty and color of spring this year did not seem to bring its usual quota of joy and gladness; it was as though nature was aware of the as yet hidden tragedy which was to befall.

The Shah celebrated the New Year in Māzandarān, at Ašraf, which this year did not fill the heart with joy, in his pleasant residences and gardens and the palace of 'Abbāsābād, which this year were sad and comfortless. The Shah's companions during the Nowrūz festivities were the *moqarrabs* of the court, men like the *qūrčībāši*, recently recalled from duties in Azerbaijan and Āḡesqa. For three months, the Shah as usual spent his time in hunting and other pastimes, until the weather got uncomfortably hot. Reports kept coming in that Kosrow Pasha, the newly appointed Ottoman grand vizier and commander in chief, was marching on Erzerum with a large army, and that the Georgian rebel Morāv was with him.

Fearing another insurrection in Georgia, the Shah left Māzandarān in Šavvāl 1037/June 1628 and marched to Qazvin, where he issued orders for his troops to mobilize and rendezvous at Solṭānīya under the command of 'Isā Khan, the *qūrčībāši*. It appeared that the Shah had stayed too long in Māzandarān, and that the unhealthiness of the climate and the heat had affected him, because at Qazvin he developed a high fever. At times the fever would go away, but would return immediately if the Shah ate or drank something unsuitable; it passed through the stages of tertian fever and half-tertian, and finally became a quartan fever. Despite the fever, the Shah continued to attend to affairs of state and important policy and planning matters, and did not allow his illness to divert his attention for a moment from the concerns of religion and the state.

An event which occurred this year was the capture of Šamsī Khan Qazāqlar, the governor of Āḡesqa. A body of marauding Ottomans,

¹13 Rajab was a Sunday.

between fifteen hundred and two thousand strong, visited the area in search of plunder, but did not dare to attack the fort of Āḡesqa because of the strength of its defenses and its garrison; after ravaging the surrounding area, they retired. Šamsī Khan, a courageous officer, against the advice of his senior officers went in pursuit of them with three hundred Qazāqlar *gāzīs*, not realizing the strength of the enemy. He caught up with the Ottomans some four *farsaks* away, but he had ridden so rapidly that he had outdistanced most of his men, whose horses had stopped to graze the lush spring grass along the way and were consequently unfit for action. One troop of Ottomans had camped near the road, and two other troops in valleys flanking the road. Šamsī Khan reached the spot with only a hundred men, and some of the veteran Qazāqlar *gāzīs* urged him not to attack. But he refused to listen, and charged the Ottoman troop camped near the road, scattering them in all directions. Those who had time to reach their horses leaped into the saddle and fled. The other two Ottoman troops, however, mounted their horses and poured down upon Šamsī Khan and his small band and surrounded them. The *gāzīs* fought hard, but most of them were cut down as they tried to make their escape, because their horses foundered. Šamsī Khan was taken alive and carried off to Kosrow Pasha's camp.

Readers will recall that the Shah had told Abāza Pasha that, if he wanted his protestations of loyalty to the Safavid house to be believed, he must send to the court the Ottoman prisoners of war whom he had captured the previous year. Abāza had failed to comply, and so no assistance had been sent to him. This year, however, when Kosrow Pasha marched against him, Abāza sent some of his men to Erīvān to be under the protection of Safavid officers, and he forwarded to the Shah Bostān Pasha and 'Īsā Beg, two of the Ottoman prisoners of war. In his fear of the Janissaries, he had finally decided that he had no option but to turn to the Shah for assistance.

He therefore sent his brother, known as Küçük Abāza, to Qazvin, where he and his one hundred and fifty retainers were received in audience by the Shah. The Shah thought he was now honor-bound to assist Abāza, but the emirs he sent to Erzerum were all men who were under a cloud for some shortcoming—men like Moḥammadqolī Khan Zīād-oḡlū, Peykar Khan İḡirmī-dört, and Yūsuf Sultan the governor of Gaskar. The *qūrčubaşı* also marched from Solṭāniya toward Tabriz, but before he got there, Kosrow Pasha had appeared before the walls of Erzerum and was trying to conciliate Abāza Pasha

and win him back to his allegiance. He swore he would protect him from the vengeance of the Janissaries, and that no harm would come to him. With these assurances, Abāza Pasha came out of the fort and met Kosrow Pasha. The latter had a row with the *yeñiçeri-âqâsî* over Abāza Pasha, and decided to take Abāza Pasha under his personal protection; he returned with him to Istanbul. Kosrow Pasha's troops made no incursions onto Safavid territory. Following this, the Shah placed Yūsuf Sultan in charge of a regiment of musketeers and sent him to garrison the fort at Ākesqa. The *qūrçibāšî* returned to Tabriz, and the remainder of the Safavid troops were sent on leave.

Emāmqolī Khan's Expedition to Başra

Ever since the recapture of Baghdad, the Shah had aspired to subjugate Başra, which lies on the borders of Arab Iraq and Kūzestān and is, in point of fact, a dependency of Baghdad. This year, the Shah placed Emāmqolī Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Fārs, in command of an expedition to Başra. The latter marched to Baghdad, intending to follow the Tigris as far as his objective. In addition to the army of Fārs, he had at his disposal a detachment of musketeers of the royal stirrup, and contingents of Lurs and Kurds. As Emāmqolī Khan proceeded toward Başra, the Arab tribes along the route submitted to him and undertook to perform various useful services. The *beglerbeg* handed out cash grants, robes of honor, and other gifts in profusion as he went along. When he reached Başra, most of the tribes in the area submitted to him, and the Ottoman garrison asked for quarter. At this juncture, the news of the sudden death of Shah 'Abbas sent a tremor through the ranks of the *qezelbāš*, and the *beglerbeg* decided to postpone the occupation of Başra and to return.

Another event which occurred this year was the arrival at the Shah's court of Šīr Khan Afgān, the governor of Pūšang and the Kandahār region. He was received by the Shah at Qazvin, and obtained greater favors than he had anticipated. In return, the Shah requested him to see that the trade routes to India were safe for merchants and travelers.

The Shah, who had been weakened by the long duration of the quartan fever, rallied slightly; for several days at a time, there would be a remission of the fever. Then, as the result of indulging in some unsuitable activity, or of eating or drinking the wrong things, the fever would return, and the weakness persisted. The Shah talked of going to Māzandarān for the winter, but his physicians advised

against it, because of the dampness of the climate there. The Shah decided to take a prognostication from the Koran. It was not good, but the Shah badly wanted to go to Māzandarān, so he decided to wait a few days and try again. This time, the prognostication was not bad, and so the Shah decided to go.

Because of his weakness, he decided to march by easy stages, and to take twenty-four days over what was normally a twelve-day journey. However, once in the saddle the Shah could not wait to see the beautiful countryside of Māzandarān, and he covered the ground in eight or nine days! On the tenth day, he entered the town of Ašraf. On the days when the fever gripped him a change came over him, and his body was racked by a burning fever, but he still attended to the business of state, and indulged in his favorite sport, hunting. On such days, he would speak of the inconstancy and instability of this world, and he experienced dreams which he himself interpreted as a portent of his approaching death.

The Shah Nominates Abu'l-Naṣr Sām Mīrzā as His Heir-Apparent

The light of sainthood and spiritual guidance told the Shah that he had not long to live, and he decided to nominate Abu'l-Naṣr Sām Mīrzā, the son of Ṣafī Mīrzā, as his heir-apparent; Sām Mīrzā was then eighteen years of age, and had been brought up at Isfahān. The Shah gave orders that he should be escorted to Ašraf by trusted male and female staff of the royal harem, so that henceforth he would be under the Shah's personal supervision as heir-apparent. As it was the Shah's custom to consult the Word of God, even in minor matters, and not to embark on any course of action without ascertaining the divine will, he naturally would not take a step of such importance to religion and the state as the appointment of an heir-apparent without taking advice. He summoned for consultation Mowlānā Moḥammad Taqī, the son of Mowlānā Moẓaffar Jonābādī the astrologer; Mowlānā Moḥammad was one of the royal astrologers and the Shah had confidence in him.

The Shah now sent him to Mowlānā Morād Māzandarānī, one of the most learned and pious men of that region, to obtain his advice. Mowlānā Morād took a prognostication from the Koran, and hit upon the following verse: "Will it not suffice you that your Lord should help you with three thousand angels sent down from on high? Yea, if

you be steadfast and righteous, and they come upon you immediately in hot haste, your Lord will help you with five thousand angels, attacking vehemently."² It was clear from this verse that the Shah's decision to appoint an heir-apparent was most auspicious, but there was also an indication that he should exercise patience in regard to fetching Sām Mīrzā from Isfahan. And so the Shah delayed sending for him for several days. Subsequent events proved the rightness of this decision.

The Death of Shah 'Abbas

Alas for the instability of the revolving sphere, and the hostility of the perverse heavens! Never a hopeful sapling rises by a stream and bears fruit, but in the end is uprooted by the wind of fate. There is no star, shine it ever so brightly in the firmament of majesty and renown, but must eventually sink in the west. God alone is Unchanging, Undying. Death is the destiny of all men, even kings.

It is with a sorrowful pen that I record that one day Shah 'Abbas went hunting, and ate to excess. On his return, a fever occasioned by an overloaded stomach aggravated the weakness already caused by the original fever. The Shah was bedridden for three or four days, and was afflicted by vomiting and diarrhoea; he was unable to stand up or move about, his face became swollen, and cachexy became apparent. The treatments prescribed by the physicians had no effect, and the Shah grew weaker daily. The women of the royal household kept up an unceasing lamentation, and the principal officers of state and the *moqarrabs* of the court were out of their minds with fear and perturbation. Shah 'Abbas died on Wednesday,³ 24 Jomādā I, 1038/19 January 1629, just as the sun was rising.

How can I describe the feelings of those who were present, or how the *moqarrabs* of the court were affected? The women of the royal household tore their breasts, lamented bitterly, put on black garments, and heaped ashes on their heads. The world was plunged into mourning, and men's hearts were afflicted with deep sorrow. And why should they not be? A radiant sun, in the shadow of whose justice men had lived in tranquillity, had set; a bright star, which had shed security and well-being on all men, had sunk below the horizon.

²Koran, 3:125-26.

³24 Jomādā I was a Friday.

Wiser heads realized that this calamity had to be borne with patience. Putting their trust in God's assurance that "Those who endure patiently shall have reward without measure,"⁴ the principal officers of state, such as 'Isā Khan the *qūrčībāši* and the *e'temād al-dowla* Kalifa Sultan, both of whom were connected by marriage with Shah 'Abbas; Zeynal Khan *ešik-āqāsibāši* Šāmlū; and the other nobles who were at court, turning their attention to the needs of the state, issued a proclamation informing people that the late Shah had proclaimed Sām Mīrzā his heir-apparent. All the *kalifas*, Sufis and disciples and devotees of the Safavid house who were at court accepted the order of their supreme spiritual director unquestioningly. They drew up a statement to the effect that it had been the dying Shah's wish that kingship should be conferred on Sām Mīrzā, and 'Isā Khan, Zeynal Beg, and all the nobles and disciples of the Safavid house, in accordance with the covenant between spiritual director and disciple which is the basis of this dynasty, gave their assent and affixed their seals to this document, and dispatched it to Isfahan to Shah Šaftī (the title assumed by Sām Mīrzā) and his son. God be praised that Shah 'Abbas has such a worthy descendant to succeed him!

The courier bearing this document reached Isfahan in eight days, and informed the young prince of the death of his grandfather. Some of the senior officers of the Safavid household there, such as Abu'l-Qāsem Beg Ev-oğlū, the *ešik-āqāsibāši-ye haram*, and Kosrow Mīrzā the brother of Bagrāt Khan the ruler of Georgia, who was governor of Isfahan, in order to preserve the stability of the realm and to guard against possible mischief, because the capital was full of sorts and conditions of men, decided that proclamation of the accession of Shah Šaftī should take precedence over funeral rites for Shah 'Abbas. Without delay, therefore, they placed the prince on the throne, in accordance with the custom and practice of the Sufis of the Safavid house, and they laid out the rug of spiritual direction, an heirloom handed down in the Safavid family, and kissed the Shah's feet. The news of the accession of Shah Šaftī was then published throughout the Safavid empire.

When the learned men and astrologers looked into the matter, they discovered that the Shah's accession had taken place at a most auspicious moment; in fact, however much they studied their astrological tables and searched their almanacs, they were unable to find a more propitious moment, and people realized that this extraordinary chance

⁴Koran, 39:11.

was a portent of long life and stable rule for the new Shah. One of the princes who had been blinded and was resident at Isfahan, Emāmqolī Khan, who was a natural son of Shah 'Abbas, asserted that he could see, and claimed the throne. It turned out that a small portion of each pupil had not been affected by the hot iron, and so the Safavid officers, fearful of insurrection among the people, completed the process of blinding that foolish prince. The full implication of that verse from the Koran which had been taken as a prognostication by Shah 'Abbas now became apparent. I mean that portion of the verse which advised patience and steadfastness; for if the future Shah Ṣāfi had not been at the capital, Isfahan, when the news of the death of Shah 'Abbas was published, serious riots and insurrections might have resulted which would have caused untold injury to the common people. Large numbers of troops were stationed in Isfahan, some of them reliable and some not.

Shah 'Abbas's funeral cortege now set out from Māzandarān. It included Shah 'Abbas's aunt, the daughter of Shah Tahmasp, and the other women of the royal household, who transported the royal treasuries and workshops. Devoted Sufis shouldered the bier, and the cortege made its way to Kashan. There, the people came out to meet the funeral procession and demonstrated their great grief. The throng around the bier was so great that the emirs and other nobles could hardly make their way through the crowd. The bier was taken to the Imamzada Ḥabīb b. Mūsā, situated behind the burial ground outside the city. There, the body lay in state pending a decision as to its final resting place. Day and night, teams of persons who knew the Koran by heart recited passages from the sacred text, performing their duties according to a roster, so that the sound of the recitation of the Koran was always present. Incense was burned near the coffin, and the whole night long candles were burning. Every kind of meat and sweetmeat were provided for the Koran reciters, the attendants at the shrine, and the poor and needy. Mahdīqolī Beg, the son of Moḥammad Khan Zīād-oḡlū Qājār, who was descended from the emirs of that tribe and from Sufis of the Safavid house, was given the task of seeing to the burial of Shah 'Abbas. Having discharged this duty, he marched to Isfahan, which he entered on 23 Jomāda II 1038/17 February 1629.

On that day, in accordance with *qezelbāš* custom, all the principal officers of state and other nobles, the *moqarrabs* of the court, took their places according to their rank and station in the audience hall of

the royal palace of Naqš-e Jahān, to be received by Shah Šaft and to kiss his feet. The great khans were the recipients of the Shah's special favor. The sight of the Shah purged their hearts of grief, and they shouted with joy, "Shah Šaft!"

Poets vied with one another to produce chronograms to commemorate the death of Shah 'Abbas; through divine inspiration, no less than ten of them produced the same chronogram, "The Shadow of God"⁵—another clear indication that all men lived under the shadow of his felicity. Mowlānā Šarmī Qazvīnī devised an alternative chronogram: "Šaft set foot on the throne of kingship."⁶

An Obituary Notice on Shah 'Abbas

The praiseworthy qualities of Shah 'Abbas are too many to enumerate, and his admirable acts are more numerous than can possibly be imagined; both his qualities and his acts are models for the princes of the world. I mentioned some of these great achievements at the beginning of book I of this history, in twelve discourses. In sum, he was a king of unparalleled nobility of nature, and his subtle ideas were merely the reflection of his subtle mind. Through his justice and concern for the welfare of his people, his subjects lived in peace, and all lived in such fear of his wrath and punishment that the lion and the lamb could lie down together. His charitable benefactions, his public works, and his almsgiving were on a large scale. In Iran, they comprised tax relief for his subjects; the creation of orchards and gardens; the repair of pious foundations; and many other charitable works. Enemies and evildoers constantly felt the point of his sword and the thrust of his spear. His grandeur and majesty were incomparable, and the pomp and circumstance of his court surpassed the dreams of former kings. His faith in the family of the Prophet of 'Alī was unshakable, and so Sanjar Mīrzā, a descendant of Shah Ne'matollāh and the nephew of Shah Tahmasp, devised the following chronogram to mark his death: "May he rise again through 'Alī b. Abū Ṭālebi!"

The rulers of the world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, from the furthest reaches of Europe and Russia and Kāšgār and Tibet and India, established friendly relations with Shah 'Abbas, and were continually sending ambassadors to his court bringing gifts beyond computation from all parts of the world. Despite the vast distance between

⁵*Zell-e haqq* equals 1038/1629. This chronogram is particularly apt, of course, since the Safavid kings claimed to be the "Shadow of God upon earth" (*zellollāh fe'l-arte*).

⁶*Šaft pā bar owrang-e šāht nehād* equals 1038/1629.

them and the dangers of intervening oceans like the immense oceans between the Atlantic⁷ and the Sea of 'Oman, reports of his just and beneficent rule caused foreign and Christian rulers to send their ambassadors by land and sea. These rulers included the Christian rulers of the Lāz,⁸ Germany, France, England, Holland, Portugal, and Spain, as well as the Pope, who is the greatest of the Christian rulers, the caliph of the Christians, and is the exemplar of all Christian sects. The Shah's court was rarely without a foreign embassy.

Proof of what I am saying is afforded by a letter sent this year to Shah 'Abbas by a certain Pope named Urban VIII.⁹ Among the Christians, whoever holds the office of successor of Christ is termed Pope, and his seat is at Rome, in the land of the Greeks, which Christians believe is the place where Christ lived. I have reproduced this letter verbatim, so that envious persons may not accuse me of being a time-serving sycophant, and realize that I am not guilty of artificial elaboration such as secretaries indulge in. The text of the letter is as follows:

"O mighty king! Greetings from us to you, who are the refulgence of the infinite divine grace and the refuge of all mankind! You are a king who is the model and source of guidance for people throughout the world, and particularly for the Vicar of Christ Our Lord at Rome, who is the place of refuge for great and puissant princes. Since you are their superior in grandeur and majesty and dominion, it is incumbent upon all human beings to pray for the perpetuity of your reign, and especially it is incumbent upon my subjects, since I have regarded it as an obligatory duty that in my churches prayers should be offered for your long life and invoking God's assistance on your behalf. I trust that the protection of God's grace may never depart from you. Since your own clemency is boundless, some of your people who are in these parts are being treated by the Christians with the

⁷*Daryā-ye moḥīṭ*—lit., the circumambient ocean, thought by medieval Muslim geographers to enclose the world on all sides. In this context, however, it denotes simply the Atlantic (see *EI*², Vol. I, p. 934, s.v. AL-BAḤR AL-MUḤĪṬ).

⁸The Lāz are a people of south Caucasian stock living in the region bordering on the southeast corner of the Black Sea, the ancient Colchis. The reference here to the dispatch of ambassadors to the Safavid court is important evidence of the virtual autonomy of the ruler of the Lāz in the 17th century.

⁹This letter was written to Shah 'Abbas by Pope Urban VIII on 9 March 1624, in the first year of his pontificate. The Latin text is contained in *A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, II, p. 1294, and an English translation is to be found in the same work, I, pp. 271-72. Eskandar Monšī's version preserves the spirit of the original remarkably well.

greatest honor and respect. The theologians who are at your court disseminate knowledge just as in times gone by did the Greek philosophers, who taught knowledge and philosophy to the human race. The fame of your greatness and justice has surpassed that of the ancient Iranian kings, because you are the exemplar of the book of the Iranian kings. In Rome, which is a center for men of learning, all make your intellect and thought their pattern, and we have always received with gladness reports of your nobility. We have never had the slightest doubts on the matter; on the contrary, all Europeans have long held this opinion, because a long time has now passed since you gave a home to a group of Catholic fathers, that is to say European theologians, and treated them with the greatest honor and veneration.

"All the Imams of Rome, who are the Popes and the Vicars of Christ, are full of love for you because of your action in sending ambassadors to them, because these envoys are reminders of our solidarity and unity, just as the discalced Carmelite fathers and monks who are in your realm are overflowing with joy and happiness, and they are constantly sending me reports of your greatness and exalted status, because they are grateful for the favors they have received, and are not forgetful of them.

"Your conquests have made your name resound throughout the world; and your conquests have been achieved not only by the sword, for you have given the Carmelite fathers a place in your dominions, and they are able to worship in their own churches according to their own rites without the slightest interference from anyone. Therefore I, in mystical communion with the other Vicars of Christ, have supplicated Almighty God in His mercy to grant you reward for your actions and victory through their good offices, so that the luster of your realm may continue, like the moon, to shed light on all the world, and that you may continue steadfast in your obedience to God's commands, and may exercise dominion like Our Lord Jesus Christ, and may ever attain your object.

"Continue to send ambassadors to us Christians at Rome, so that we may see visible signs of your love and friendship, and so that the followers and servants of Christ may pray for you in all sincerity and peace of mind. The Carmelite fathers are especially honored by the favors you have lavished upon them, and it is for this reason that they are continually singing your praises in Rome, Christ's capital. My own

love and affection toward you is of long standing, because of the love which the Popes have borne for you. May the light of God's truth ever shine upon you."

This letter was written in some Frankish tongue, and arrived sealed. Some members of the foreign community in Isfahan translated it into Persian. It was not apparent from the contents of the letter whether its author was, in fact, the Pope. Inquiries were made of the foreign residents, and they replied that it was the custom among them, when persons of rank corresponded with one another, for the author not to make his identity obvious, and this was deemed a mark of courtesy and humility; the identity of the author was alluded to in a subtle manner. The Pope, they said, had therefore observed this polite convention and had concealed his identity; in the custom of the Franks, this is considered the ultimate in elegance. At all events, the greatness of Shah 'Abbas is too well known to require evidence of proof.

At the time of his death, Shah 'Abbas was sixty years of age. He had come to the throne when he was eighteen, and had reigned for forty-two years. He spent the whole of the period from the second year of his reign until his death, a period of forty years, in ceaseless journeyings to and fro in the cause of governing his empire. His Eṣnā 'Aṣarī faith was strong and pure. May God have mercy on him and his forefathers!

Deaths This Year among the Moqarrabs of the Court and Other Safavid Officers

1. Yūsuf Sultan, a *ḡolām* who was a protégé of Shah 'Abbas. He rose to the status of emir with the rank of sultan, and was appointed governor of Gaskar and chief of the Čapnī *ḡāzīs*.¹⁰ Last year he was charged with dereliction of duty and dismissed from his post, and replaced by Gorgīn Sultan, another *ḡolām*. As a punishment for this dereliction of duty, Yūsuf Sultan was ordered to go to Erzerum to support Abāza Pasha, but as I have already reported, that operation miscarried. He was then appointed commander of the musketeers at the fort of Āḡesqa, and was serving in that capacity when he died. He was a most humane and intelligent young man, destined for great things. His sons were enrolled among the *ḡolāms* like their father.

¹⁰The appointment of a *ḡolām* to be chief of a tribe in place of the hereditary leader was part of a very significant trend under Shah 'Abbas I designed to curb the power of the *qezelbaş* and the tribes generally.

2. 'Alī Khan Beg the *nāzer-e davābb* (superintendent of the animals), the son of Elāhī Beg *nāzer-e davābb*. When Allāhverdi Khan was alive, Elāhī Beg was the superintendent of his household, and his excellent performance in that post gained him the position of superintendent of animals in the royal stables. After his death, his office devolved upon his son, 'Alī Khan Beg. Subsequently, the latter was appointed *dārūga* of the Khorasan accounts, and went to Mašhad, where he had an epileptic fit and died. His brother, Yādegār Beg, now holds that post.

3. Mīr Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of the *ḡolāms*. He was the son of Abu'l-Ma'ālī Naṭanzī, and was appointed vizier of the *ḡolāms* and musketeers in recognition of his father's length of service. He fell ill this year at Qazvin, and on the journey to Māzandarān, the strain of the constant stops and starts precipitated his death. His office was given to Ḥasan Beg the son of Hāšem Beg Ardestānī, the vizier of 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū the *dīvānbegī*, but the latter had not officially taken office by performing the ceremony of kissing the Shah's foot when the Shah died.

4. Ḥakīm Šefā'i Šefāhānī, the poet-physician. He came from a medical family at Isfahan. In his youth he followed the usual courses of study and excelled at them all, but he specialized in medicine. He was a free-living, witty fellow who liked poetry and made a name for himself as a composer of poetry, too; indeed, he was the most famous poet of his time. His poetic works included odes, lyrics, *maṣnavīs*, occasional poems, and quatrains. The content of his poems was profound, and his style elegant. He had a biting tongue and was quick to take offense. He delighted in sticking subtle barbs into people, and his quick wit enabled him to satirize his critics. Although satire is generally frowned upon, one must admit that he was a master of the art. He was a favorite of Shah 'Abbas, but because of his dissolute style of life, he rarely accompanied the Shah on his expeditions. Nevertheless, the Shah made him poet-laureate (*malek al-šo'arā*) of Iran, although he sometimes reproved him for his satirical allusions to people. At the end of his life, he felt some contrition for the satires he had written, and wrote an occasional piece expressing his apologies. This year, he died at Isfahan.

Names of Officeholders

I thought I should add, as an appendix to my history of Shah 'Abbas, a list of the holders of high office during his reign: emirs, *şadrs*, and viziers. I shall begin with the emirs, since in this category are men of sound judgment and good counsel, men of military might, men who are the leaves and fruit of the tree of state, men who wield great authority; I shall list them all, khans and sultans alike.

Great Emirs of the time of Shah 'Abbas

Many of the great emirs died during Shah 'Abbas's lifetime, either of natural causes or in battle, and these I have already mentioned in the annual obituary notices. The number of emirs still alive at the time of Shah 'Abbas's death was ninety-two; I shall divide them into two categories: (A) *qezelbaş* emirs, and (B) *golām* emirs.

Category A: Emirs of the Major Qezelbaş Tribes and Tribes Subordinate to Them, Totaling Seventy-three Emirs, Listed by Tribes

Şeykāvand.

(1) 'Īsā Khan b. Seyyed Beg Şafavī b. Ma'şūm Beg the *vakīl al-saltāna* of Shah Tahmasp, 'Īsā Khan held the office of *qūrčībāši*, one of the highest offices of the Safavid state. By virtue of the fact that he was a *seyyed*, and was connected by marriage with Shah 'Abbas and extremely close to the Shah, he held a place of peculiar distinction above the other emirs.

Şāmlū. I will deal next with the *Şāmlūs*, because they are the chief of the *qezelbaş* tribes. Seven officers of this tribe held the rank of emir at the time of Shah 'Abbas's death:

(2) Zeynal Khan Begdīlū, who succeeded 'Alīqolī Khan Gerāmīl-lū as *eşik-âqāsībāši* and governor of Rayy. His excellent services led the Shah to take him under his wing.

(3) Hasan Khan b. Hoseyn Khan, of the 'Abdallū clan. One of the great emirs, he succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of Khorasan.

(4) Moḥammad Zamān Sultan, governor of Ġūr and some parts of Khorasan.

(5) Fazl 'Alī Sultan, governor of Balā Morgāb.

(6) *Ḥaqqverdi* Sultan 'Arabgīrlū, one of the emirs of Azerbaijan. At this time, the 'Arabgīrlū clan was part of the Šāmlū tribe.

(7) *Naqdi* Sultan *Nelqās*,¹ the chief of the *Nelqās* clan, included in the Šāmlū tribe.

(8) *Gündoğmūš* Sultan *Begdīlū*, who resided with his tribesmen in the *Ṭāuq* *Karkūk* district. At the time of Shah 'Abbas's first expedition to Baghdad, he declared his "love of the Shah," was received in audience by the Shah, and granted the rank of sultan and various fiefs in Azerbaijan.

Ostājīlū. Three members of this tribe had the status of emir.

(9) *Moḥebb* 'Alī Sultan b. *Bektāš* Khan, the governor of *Nesā* in *Khorasan*.

(10) *Maqšūd* Sultan *Kangarlū*, the governor of *Naḳčevān*.

(11) *Abu'l-Qāsem* Sultan b. *Pīr Ğeyb* Khan *Šaraflū*, the governor of *Ḥella* in Arab Iraq.

Zu'l-Qadar. Of this great tribe, the following held the status of emir.

(12) *Emir* Khan the *mohrdār* (keeper of the seal), the governor of *Kerman*. He was the son of *Rostam* Sultan *Söklen*.

(13) *Ebrahim* Sultan *Qorūğlū*, the governor of *Saraḳs* in *Khorasan*.

(14) *Dargāhqolī* Sultan *Qorūğlū*, the grandson of *Šāhqolī* *Ḳalīfa* the *mohrdār* and also, on his mother's side, the grandson of *Nadr* Khan the *mohrdār*. He was governor of various districts in *Fārs*.

(15) *Salīm* Khan *Šams al-Dīnlū*, formerly one of the emirs of *Qarābāğ* and now governor of *Āḳesqa*.

(16) *Ḳalīl* Sultan b. *Kalb* 'Alī Sultan *İmūr*, an emir of *Qarābāğ*.

(17) *Mostadām* Sultan *Ḥājīlār*, the governor of *Kabūd* *Jāma* in the province of *Astarābād*.

¹*TM*, p. 16, gives *Nelqās*.

Qājār. Two members of this tribe had the status of emir.

(18) Ṭahmāspqolī Khan b. Emir Gūna Khan, who succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of Čokūr-e Sa'd; he was one of the great emirs.

(19) Peykar Khan İğirmī-dört, one of the emirs of Qarābāğ and governor of Barda'.

Afšār. Three members of this tribe held the status of emir.

(20) Kalb 'Alī Sultan, b. Qāsem Khan Imānlū, the governor of Orūmī.

(21) Ordūğdī Khan Āplū, the governor of Farāh and Esfēzār in Khorasan.

(22) Emāmqolī Sultan Ūsāllū, the governor of Gāvrūd.

Turkman. Two emirs.

(23) Pīr Būdāq Khan Pornāk b. Šāhbanda Khan, who succeeded his father as governor of Tabriz and *beglerbeg* of Azerbaijan.

(24) Ḥasan Sultan Ordaklū, the governor of Qapānāt.

Esperlū.² One emir.

(25) Šekārī Sultan, the governor of Ardabīl and Sarāb.

Rūmlū. One emir.

(26) Ḥeydar Sultan Qūyla-Ḥeşārlū, the governor of Tonakābon in Gilān.

Qarādāğlū. One emir.

(27) Borhān al-Dīn Kalīfa b. Elyās Kalīfa, the governor of Qarā-ja-dāğ.

Bayāt. Three emirs.

²TM, p. 16, gives Esperlū. However, Don Juan's *Relaciones*, quoted by TM, p. 193, has the form Ispyrhlu, which seems closer to the Persian *e. s. p. r. h. l. a*.

(28) Yār 'Alī Sultan, the governor of Qal'a-ye Bāyazīd.

(29) Gedā 'Alī Sultan, the governor of Mākū.

(30) Badr Sultan, the governor of various places in Čokūr-e Sa'd.

Ṭāleš. Two emirs.

(31) Sārū Khan, grandson of Bāyandor Khan and governor of Āstārā.

(32) Badr Khan Sultan, who succeeded Yādegār 'Alī Sultan in the office of *kalīfat al-kolafā*, and was governor of various places in Ṭāleš.

Alpā'ūt. One emir.

(33) Maṣṣūr Sultan, who has a fief in Šīrvān.

Jāgīrlū. One emir.

(34) Moḥammad Sultan, governor of Šakkī.

Qazāqlar. One emir.

(35) Šamsī Khan, governor of Dārābjerd and subsequently of Ākesqa.

Bāybordlū. One emir.

(36) Morād Khan Sultan, governor of Arasbār.

Kurds and Lors. Seventeen emirs with the rank of khan or sultan.

(37) Hoseyn Khan 'Abbāsī of Lor-e Feyli,³ the *beglerbeg* of Lorestān and an emir especially favored by the Shah.

(38) Khan Aḥmad Khan Ardalān b. Holow Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Šahrezūr and one of the great emirs.

(39) Kalīl Khan b. Jahāngīr Khan, governor of Lor-e Baḡtārī.

³Formerly Lor-e Kūček; see *TM*, p. 172.

(40) 'Āšūr Khan Čeganī, the governor of Marv-e Šāhījān and a trusted emir.

(41) Aḥmad Sultan Čeganī b. Jāmī Sultan, governor of Sabzavār.

(42) Salmān Khan the *sūbāšī* Donbolī, governor of Čors and Salmās.

(43) Emāmqolī Sultan Siāh-manšūr, governor of Esfarā'īn in Khorasan.

(44) Reżāqolī Sultan Siāh-manšūr, the governor of the fortress of Bost in Zamīn-dāvar.

(45) Beyrām 'Alī Sultan Šūfī, the governor of the Deylamān region of Gīlān; he is an emir of one of the Kurdish tribes.

(46) 'Alī Mardān Khan b. Ganj 'Alī Khan Zīg, one of the great emirs; he succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of the province of Kandahar.

(47) Maqšūd Sultan Donbolī, governor of Bargošā.

(48) 'Alī Jān Sultan Šaqāqī, the chief of the Šaqāqī tribe.

(49) Šojā' al-Dīn Sultan Sūrla, one of the emirs of Šīrvān.

(50) Nafas Sultan Garrūs, the governor of the fortress of Lak in the Baghdad region, a dependency of Dar-e Tang.

(51) Gedā'ī Sultan Kūlānī,⁴ the governor of Zenjān.

(52) Qalandar Sultan Kala-gīr, chief of that tribe and an emir of Azerbaijan.

(53) Mošṭafā Sultan Jastānī, nicknamed Abdāl 'Alī, the governor of Jastān, a dependency of Baghdad.

⁴Possibly the tribe listed by *TM*, p. 16, as Kolyā'ī.

Various Čaġatāy Tribes and Chiefs of the Šā'en-kānī Yaqqā Turkmans and Others Who Are Included in the Category Čaġatāy. There are twelve emirs.

(54) Beyrām 'Alī Sultan Qarā-bayāt, the governor of Nishapur, a member of the Bābā Elyās family.

(55) 'Alyār Khan Gerāyli, chief of the Gerāyli tribe and one of the great emirs and chief of the Gerāyli tribe living in the Astarābād region of Khorasan.

(56) Aḥmad Sultan Močakī, governor of Toršīz in Khorasan.

(57) Farīdūn Ḥoseyn Sultan, the grandson of Ebn Ḥoseyn Khan Fīrūzjang, the governor of Torbat-e Ḥeydariya in Khorasan.

(58) Qalandar Sultan Tükeli, governor of the province of Jām.

(59) Ṭahmāspqolī Sultan b. Moḥammad Sultan Qarā-bayāt, governor of Šūštar and Dezful in Kūzestān.

(60) Šāhvalī Sultan Jalā'er, governor of Pasākūh in the district of Mašhad.

(61) Šāhqolī Sultan Qamarī, governor of Jahān-Argtān in Khorasan.

(62) Oġūrlū Sultan Jalā'er.

(63) Raḥmānqolī Sultan Qarābāš.

(64) Mīr Moḥammad Sultan Ġūrī b. Mīr Šadī Sultan, the chief of one of the tribes in the Herat region.

(65) Mīr Ḥeydar Sultan Jamšīdī, the governor of Karok in the district of Herat.

Miscellaneous Non-Qezelbāš Tribes Which Have a Member Enrolled among the Great Emirs. In Azerbaijan, eight emirs.

(66) Aqa Khan Mīr Moqaddam, of the Otūz-İki federation of tribes in Qarābāġ, governor of Marāġa;

(67) Sārū Khan Sultan Salmāsī, chief of the Lak tribe of Salmās.

(68) Kalb Reżā Sultan Zonūzī, one of the Azerbaijan emirs.

From the *Sil-süpür* tribe, one emir. The *Sil-süpür* consisted of scattered tribes living in Ottoman territory whose way of life was plundering and looting; they gave themselves the name *Sil-süpür*, meaning "those who make a clean sweep." As I indicated earlier during my account of the Safavid reconquest of Azerbaijan, two thousand families of this tribe came over to the Safavid side, and some of them were enrolled among the *qūrčīs* and placed under the command of Kalīl Sultan.

(69) Kalīl Sultan.

From the *Turkman* tribes of Šīrvān, one emir.

(70) Nūr al-Dīn Sultan Pāydār; he is subordinate to the governor of Tiflis and carries out various duties at his orders.

In Khorasan, three emirs.

(71) Malek Jalāl al-Dīn b. Malek Maḥmūd, the governor of Sīstān; he is descended from the Šaffārids.⁵

(72) Šīr Khan Afgān, governor of Pūšang (Fūšanj), a dependency of Kandahar.

(73) Maqdūd Sultan Afgān, subordinate to the governor of Kandahar.

Category B: Ġolām Emirs Who Held the Rank of Khan or Sultan

A considerable number of persons in this category embraced Islam and became *golāms* during the reign of Shah 'Abbas, and most of them were brought up from boyhood at court, under the supervision of the Shah. Those who showed talent were promoted to the rank of khan or sultan. When a *qezelbaş* emir or a provincial governor died and there was no one in his tribe suitable for promotion to the rank of emir, one of the *golāms* of the royal household who had distinguished himself by his justice, skill, bravery, initiative, and devotion

⁵A local dynasty of extraordinary tenacity (see Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties*, pp. 103-106.

to his benefactor was made emir of that tribe, placed in command of those tribal forces, or made governor of that region. As a result of this policy, by the time of the death of Shah 'Abbas, twenty-one *ğolāms* had been raised to the status of emir with the rank of khan or sultan. Among them were these:

(74) Emāmqolī Khan b. Allāhverdi Khan, who succeeded his father as *beglerbeg* of Fārs, Kūh Gīlūya, Lār, Bahrain, and Jarūn. Since the *beglerbeg* had full authority over the appointment and dismissal of subordinate governors in the areas under his jurisdiction, I have not been able to discover their names. Emāmqolī Khan was succeeded by his son, Şafīqolī Sultan.

(75) Şafīqolī Sultan, who is also one of the great emirs.

(76) Dā'ūd Khan, the brother of Emāmqolī Khan, was appointed *beglerbeg* of Qarābāğ and chief of the Qājār tribe. He succeeded Moḥammadqolī Khan Qājār, who had been dismissed from his position as *amīr al-omarā* of Qarābāğ because of dereliction of duty during operations in Georgia.

(77) Şafīqolī Khan Gorjī, who had the sobriquet of Şīr 'Alī, who held the posts of *beglerbeg* of Arab Iraq and commander of the *qūrčīs* and warden of the Shi'ite shrines in Arab Iraq. As already related, he served with great distinction during the siege of Baghdad by Hāfez Aḥmad Pasha and thoroughly deserved the promotion he received.

(78) Kosrow Khan, the *beglerbeg* of Astarābād and officer in command of the armed forces there.

(79) Manūčehr Khan b. Qarčaqāy Khan the commander in chief of Iran, who succeeded his father as governor of Mašhad.

(80) Qazāq Khan Čerkes, who replaced Zu'l-Faqār Khan and Yūsuf Khan as *beglerbeg* of Şīrvān; he was also appointed commander of the Qarāmānlū and Keñeslū *qezelbaş* troops.

(81) Farroḡ Sultan, who replaced Yūtam Sultan as governor of Darband and Şābarān in Şīrvān, and was appointed chief of the Bayāt, Rūmlū, and other *ğāzīs*.

(82) GorgĪn Sultan, chief of the Čameš-gezek tribe and governor of Kabūšān in Khorasan.

(83) Jamšīd Sultan Gorjī, chief of the Eydelū clan of the Afšār tribe, and governor of Abivard in Khorasan.

(84) Oğūrlū Sultan known as Dastkaš (mettlesome), governor of the district of Darūn in Khorasan.

(85) Ūtār Sultan, chief of the Pāzūkī tribe and governor of Kār, Semnān, Damāvand, and Fīrūzkūh.

(86) Nowrūz Sultan, chief of the Javānšīr tribe of the Otūz-īkī federation; he was one of the emirs of Qarābāg.

(87) Kosrow Sultan, governor of Mārūčāq and Morğāb, and commander of a regiment of Šāmlū gāzīs.

Šadrs, Viziers, and Comptrollers of Finance under Shah 'Abbas

Although I have noted administrative appointments in the course of my history and may therefore be accused of repetition by mentioning them again, I have decided that it is not inappropriate to do so. I will begin with the *šadrs*, of whom seven held office under Shah 'Abbas:

(1) When Shah 'Abbas came to the throne, Emir Abu'l-Valī Enjū Šīrāzī was the incumbent in the office of *šadr* (I gave some information on him in book I, under the *seyyeds* of the reign of Shah Tahmasp). He had been promoted to the office of *šadr* from that of *qāzī-ye 'askar* during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah, at the time when the pro-Abū Ṭāleb Mīrā faction was in the ascendant at Qazvin. At the accession of Shah 'Abbas, he, in common with most other officials appointed by the previous regime, was dismissed from office. However, he was so much more fitted for the office than the other *seyyeds* and scholars of the time that he was reappointed after a short interval and held office as sole *šadr* for twenty years.

(2) Qāzī Khan b. Mīrā Borhān, who was a Seyfī *seyyed* from Qazvin and a descendant of the vizier Qāzī Jahān.

(3) Mīr Jalāl al-Dīn Šalā'ī, who came from the Šahrestān *seyyed* family and was a descendant of Mīr Faẓlollāh. He was a learned and capable *seyyed*, and was appointed to the office of *šadr*, but was killed at the siege of Šamāḳī in Šīrvān.

(4) Mīrzā Raẓī, the nephew of the above, replaced him in the office of *šadr*. Mīrzā Raẓī was connected by marriage with the Shah himself, and was made warden of the properties held in mortmain by the royal household administration on behalf of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones. In addition to the office of *šadr*, he held that of *mohrdārī-ye towqī'āt-e mobāraka-ye ḥazarāt-e 'āliyāt*.⁶ He fell ill and died on a journey to Azerbaijan in 1026/1617. The same year, Qāẓī Khan was dismissed from the *šadārat* because of his audacity in making certain disbursements from the *owqāf* which the Shah did not approve of. Mīrzā Raẓī's post was conferred on his son, Mīr Šadr al-Dīn Moḥammad, however, was an infant not yet weaned, and so his cousin,

(5) Mīrzā Rafī', was appointed as his deputy to discharge the functions of *šadr*. Qāẓī Khan's share of the *šadārat* was given to

(6) Qāẓī Sultan Torbatī Mūsavī, the warden of the Reẓavī shrine at Mašhad. However, Qāẓī Sultan died at Ardabīl a few days after his appointment. After Qāẓī Sultan's death,

(7) Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḳalīfa, the son of the late Mīr Šojā' al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ešfahānī, who belonged to the family known at Isfahan as the Māzandarānī *seyyeds*, was appointed *šadr* (I had a notice on him earlier); Mīrzā Rafī', also honored by a marriage bond with the royal house, continued to issue orders and documents embellished with his signature, in his own right, as Mīrzā Raẓī had before him. In 1034/1624-25, when Mīr Rafī' al-Dīn Moḥammad Ḳalīfa died, Mīrzā Rafī' assumed the office of sole *šadr* with full independence, and held this office concurrently with the posts of warden and keeper of the seal of the trust of the Fourteen Immaculate Ones; at the time of writing, he still holds these posts.

Viziers Who Held Office under Shah 'Abbas

The number of viziers who held office under Shah 'Abbas was also seven:

⁶Not listed in *TM*. It almost certainly refers to the right to affix one's seal to documents relating to the administration of the lands held in mortmain just mentioned.

(1) Mīrzā Šāhvalī b. Mīrzā Aḥmad b. Mīrzā 'Aḡā'ollāh. Mīrzā 'Aḡā'ollāh was appointed vizier by Shah Tahmasp, and I have therefore said something about him already. His son, Mīrzā Aḥmad, was unequaled in the arts of writing the *nasta'liq* script and of elegant literary composition. Because of a dispute between him and the vizier, Mīrzā Salmān, Mīrzā 'Aḡā'ollāh elected to go to Khorasan during the reign of Sultan Moḥammad Shah and become vizier to Moršedqolī Khan. In Khorasan, he played his part in the pro-'Abbas Mīrzā uprising. In the year that Sultan Moḥammad Shah led the army of Iraq to Khorasan to suppress the revolt and laid siege to Moršedqolī Khan at Torbat-e Ḥeydarīya, Mīrzā Aḥmad's nephew, Baḡtam Beg, at the instigation of Mīrzā Salmān, insinuated himself into the fort, murdered his uncle, and got away. In gratitude for Mīrzā Aḥmad's devoted service, Moršedqolī Khan made his as yet infant son, Mīrzā Šāhvalī, his vizier, and the latter accompanied 'Abbas Mīrzā when he marched west to Iraq to assume the throne. Moršedqolī Khan was instrumental in securing for Mīrzā Šāhvalī the post of vizier of the central administration.

(2) Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī. On his mother's side, he was a Kojojī *seyyed* of Tabriz, and a kinsman of Mīrzā Kebriā. After the murder of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā (994/1586), he was appointed vizier and *e'temād al-dowla* by the emirs of the Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā faction. On the accession of Shah 'Abbas he was arrested and fined, but subsequently accompanied Shah 'Abbas on his expedition to Khorasan. He was a party to the conspiracy to murder Moršedqolī Khan, and was in secret communication with Shah 'Abbas with a view to achieving this end. In return for his services, Shah 'Abbas promised him the office of vizier. After the murder of Moršedqolī Khan, the Shah kept his promise and appointed Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī vizier. However, the latter was ambitious and self-willed, and guilty of extorting money in a manner which displeased the Shah; further, he had been responsible for the upbringing of Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā. Six months after he had taken office, he was arrested at the instigation of the great emirs at Dūḡābād, a village in the Zāva and Moḥavvalāt region, and put to death a few days later.

(3) Mīrzā Loṭfollāh Šīrāzī, who had been the vizier of Sultan Ḥamza Mīrzā. After the murder of Ḥamza Mīrzā, he had been dismissed and, as already stated, Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī became vizier. On the accession of Shah 'Abbas, Mīrzā Loṭfollāh was also arrested and fined, and also accompanied the Shah on his expedition

to Khorasan. After the execution of Moršedqolī Khan, Mīrzā Loṭ-follāh became the vizier of Zeynab Begom, the Shah's aunt, and through her efforts, became *vazīr-e a'zam* and *e'temād al-dowla* after the death of Mīrzā Moḥammad Kermānī. A governorship was added to this post, and he became possessor of troops, drum, and banner, and held the office of vizier for two years with full independence. At the end of that period he was dismissed from office because his son, Mīrzā Moḥammad Zamān, in the arrogance and ignorance of youth, had been guilty of acts which displeased the Shah.

(4) Ḥātem Beg b. Bahrām Ordūbādī. As a reward for devoted service (one of his brothers, Abū Ṭāleb Beg, who had been sent as an envoy to 'Abdollāh Khan by 'Alīqolī Khan Šāmlū during the Uzbek siege of Herat, was blown from the mouth of a cannon), Shah 'Abbas took him under his wing and appointed him comptroller in chief of finance; shortly afterward (999/1591), on the dismissal of Mīrzā Loṭī, he was appointed *vazīr-e a'zam*, a post which he held for about twenty years, until his death before the walls of the fort of Orūmīya, as previously related.

(5) Mīrzā Abū Ṭāleb, son of the above. I have given some details on Abū Ṭāleb Mīrzā at the beginning of book I. He was appointed vizier while still a young man, in recognition of his father's services to the state, and held this office for ten years. He was then dismissed as the result of committing various acts inevitable in a young man and inseparable from the arrogance of office and position,⁷ so that he might be refined by the experience of having closer acquaintance with the rough as well as the smooth side of life.

(6) Salmān Khan, the son of Shah 'Alī Mīrzā b. 'Abdollāh Khan Ostājīlū. An officer of great talent, he held the office of vizier of the supreme *dīvān* for five years,⁷ at the end of which time he fell ill at Isfahan and died.

(7) Sultan al-'Olamā'ī and Dastūr al-Vozarā'ī Kalīfa Sultan the son of Mīr Raft' al-Dīn Moḥammad the *šadr*. He assumed the office of vizier with full authority. He was a *seyyed* of high rank and a scholar of fine character. From early youth until his promotion to this high office, he had devoted his life to study and scholarship. He had acquired great competence in accountancy, and his sound judgment enabled him to make great progress in the office of vizier. His

⁷Just possible if one takes the extreme dates of 1620 and 1624.

mastery of accountancy was such that the records kept during his incumbency are free from error. He has brought distinction to the office of vizier, which he still holds. May he live long and continue to enjoy it!

Comptrollers of Finance

The number of comptrollers of finance who held office under Shah 'Abbas was also seven:

(1) **Ķāja Šokrollāh Dīnānī Ešfahānī**, who was in the service of 'Abbas in Khorasan before he became Shah. He accompanied 'Abbas to Iraq and held the post of comptroller of finance for three years. He was a man of austere habit and great integrity, and a skilled accountant. He was fond of all forms of hunting, and especially hunting with dogs. About halfway through the Year of the Tiger (999/1591), he was dismissed and replaced by

(2) **Ḥatem Beg Ordūbādī**, the vizier of Bektāš Khan. Ḥatem Beg held the office for only six months, before being appointed vizier of the supreme *divān* at the beginning of the Year of the Hare (1000/1591-92).

(3) **Aqa Shah 'Alī Dowlatābādī Ešfahānī** achieved great distinction in office and was awarded the gold pen, which was not ordinarily awarded to comptrollers of finance. He was a master accountant in bookkeeping and clerical work, and was a skilled and honest accountant. He held office with full authority for six years, until his death in 1006/1597-98. He was succeeded in office by his brother,

(4) **Aqa Mīrzā 'Alī**, who was awarded the gold pen and inkhorn, was an experienced administrator with an excellent record, sober and honest. The ledger which enabled a check to be made on the total revenue and expenditure of the Safavid empire was completed during his term of office; this ledger had been started by Ḥatem Beg, and is used today by the royal secretariat as its model and canon. He held office for five years, when he was dismissed as the result of accusations made against him by his enemies, who complained of his austere manner, his parsimony, and his excessive powers.

(5) **Mo'ezzā Ebrāhīm Šīrāzī**, one of those who had made these accusations against Aqa Mīrzā 'Alī, succeeded him in office, but was dismissed after only a year and a half. His extravagance and his

ill treatment of his colleagues and other members of the bureaucracy caused the latter to turn against him and start criticizing him. He, guilty of the sort of negligence and stupidity that arises from the arrogance bred of power in office, allowed a number of errors involving substantial sums due to the *dīvān* to go undetected in the Gilān accounts. This was reported to the Shah by Mirzā-ye 'Ālamīān, who had himself paid in some of the accounts in question.

(6) At the beginning of the Year of the Serpent, Mirzā Qevām al-Dīn b. Mirzā Ḥasan Kafrānī Eṣfahānī, the vizier of Ḥoseyn Khan Šāmlū the *amīr al-omarā* of Khorasan, who had studied bookkeeping and clerical work under Aqa Shah 'Alī's son, was appointed comptroller of finance. He was a man of fine character who, despite all the power and prestige of his office, remained a person of simple habits. He was charitable and generous, noted for his benefactions to the poor and needy, ascetics and the pious. He died in his sixteenth year of office, and was succeeded by

(7) Mirzā Sa'īd, the grandson of Kāja Qāsem, who held the office of comptroller of finance until the death of Shah 'Abbas and is still in office.

Provincial Viziers during the Reign of Shah 'Abbas

(1) Mirzā Moḥammad Šafi', vizier of Gilān, Māzandarān, and Khorasan; he was known as Mirzā-ye 'Ālamīān.

(2) Kāja Moḥammad Reżā, the vizier of Azerbaijan, who had the title of *fadaḡīyat* (devoted service). There were other notable provincial viziers of Isfahan, Kashan, and elsewhere, all of whom are dead. Of those still in office at the time of the death of Shah 'Abbas, two in particular stand out as deserving of mention:

(3) Mirzā Taqī, known as Sārū Taqī, the grandson of Kāja 'Enāyat who was the vizier of the centurion Ḥasan Beg in the time of Shah Tahmasp. In 1025/1616-17, when Shah 'Abbas was in winter quarters at Dāneqī, Sārū Taqī, who was at that time the vizier of the *beglerbeg* of Qarābāg, caught his attention, and the Shah appointed him *vazīr-e koll* of the province of Ṭabarestān, comprising Māzandarān and Rostamdār. Sārū Taqī rendered notable service in this office in regard to the erection of buildings, the maintenance of law and order throughout the province, the widening of roads, and so on, and his record caused the Shah to regard him with even greater

favor than before—to such a degree, in fact, that Sārū Taqī became an object of envy among his peers, and particularly among the *moqarrabs* and others close to the Shah. Sārū Taqī retained both this office and the Shah's favor until the Shah's death.

(4) Kāja Jalāl al-Dīn Akbar Ġūrānī, the vizier of Khorasan. He came from a distinguished family of the Ġūrān district of Herat. During the Uzbek occupation of Khorasan, he was charged with being a partisan of the *qezelbaş*, and suffered all sorts of injustices and harassment. After the Safavid reconquest of Khorasan, the Shah rewarded him for his loyalty by putting him in charge of various *dīvān* affairs. He performed these duties so well that he was appointed *vazīr-e koll* of the province of Khorasan, where he was the owner of large estates and properties, both inherited and acquired. He eventually became totally blind, but Shah 'Abbas, in gratitude for his past services, allowed him to remain in office for a further twelve years—an unparalleled act of humanity and magnanimity on the part of a ruler.

There is no point in my making mention of other provincial viziers.

Peroration

God be praised that I have been permitted to finish this section of the *Tārīk-e 'Ālam-ārā*. It is quite possible that I may have included some extraneous material in this history (which I regard as intrinsic to it) and may be criticized for this by interfering busybodies.

The time has now come to restrain my pen from idle babbling and direct it to a more worthy end, namely, a prayer for the long life of Shah Šaft and for the stability of his realm, and I hereby dedicate this work to him. May God grant him many years on the throne of his illustrious grandfather and render him, like his grandfather, triumphant over the enemies of religion and the state. May the trusted officers and *moqarrabs* of the court, nobles and commoners, and all men, enjoy the benefits of his rule. Amen, O Lord of the Worlds!

In the preamble to book I of my history, I indicated that after completing this *Tārīk-e 'Ālam-ārā*, if I were spared and if I had no worries about making a livelihood (an unavoidable necessity for all mortals which takes so much of their precious time), I would compile an anthology of rare and choice anecdotes and strange tales, which would be drawn from the works of both the ancients and the moderns—works such as the *Jāme' al-Ḥekāyāt*, the *'Ajā'eb al-Maḥlūqāt*, the *Ḥayāt al-Ḥeyvān*, the *Ketāb-e Farāj ba'd al-Šedda*, the *Golestān*, the *Negārestān*, the *Aḵlāq-e Nāserī*¹, the *Aḵlāq-e Moḥsenī*, the *Aḵlāq-e Jalālī*, and so on, each of which is a treasury in itself. I also planned to draw on my own experiences during the course of the seventy years of my life, what I have seen with my own eyes and what I have heard from persons of years and experience. From each source I would pluck some choice fruit until, like the beggars squatting in the streets, my lap would be full.

This anthology was planned as an appendix to this history, and my hope was that, having completed it through the patronage of the Shah, the two volumes might be judged worthy of inclusion in the royal library and would remain as a memorial to your humble servant. However, my preoccupation with the writing of this history has so far given me no opportunity. For the compilation of the anthology I needed a mind free from all other preoccupations and

¹Translated into English under the title *The Nasirean Ethics* by my colleague, G. M. Wickens, and published in 1964 in the *Persian Heritage Series*, No. 2.

worries, so that I could assemble the necessary materials and set to work. I had also hoped to conclude my history with a few quotations from some of the poets who wrote during the reign of Shah 'Abbas, but by the time I finished writing the history, I had not collected this material either, and so this project too must be postponed until another time. If I have health and strength to carry it out, well and good; if not, my readers will realize how little is produced by a tired brain, and how little water is left in a broken glass, and I beg them to excuse me. "Many a hope lies buried in the earth." The opening verse of one of my poems is not inappropriate here:

The Beloved made me a hundred promises, and did not keep
one of them;

There was no act of tyranny which that faithless one did not
commit against me.

It is my hope that this history will be spared the carping criticism of envious meddlers; it is also my hope that my readers will correct any slips and errors which they come across, and not censure me for them.

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Glossary

ābdārbašī: keeper of the royal pantry.

aḥdās: night watch; officer under jurisdiction of the *dārūḡa* (see *TM* 82, 149).

ahl-e ektešās: seven chosen companions who guarded Esma'il I.

amīr āḡorbāšī: master of the royal stables.

amīr-e dīvān: an emir with administrative responsibilities in the central government.

amīr al-omarā:

(1) commander-in-chief of the *qezelbāš* troops;

(2) military governor of a frontier province.

andarūn: women's quarters of a house.

ʿasāsbašī: commander of the watch.

atālīq: tutor, guardian.

avāraja-nevīs: keeper of the registers of individual tax accounts.

bast: a Persian technical term denoting "sanctuary." Various locations were declared to constitute *bast* at various times (*EI*, s.v.), and sanctuary at such places was sought especially by those who had incurred the wrath of the political or religious authorities of the day.

beg: lowest of the three Safavid military ranks.

beglerbeg: military governor-general of a major province.

bokāvol: steward.

čālejbāšī: master of the royal musicians.

čarḡčībāšī: commander of the skirmishers.

čāšnīgīrbāšī: chief taster.

čūpānbegī: levy on flocks.

daftarḡāna: secretariat.

dār al-eslām (Abode of Islam): territory under Muslim rule.

dārūḡa: (1) town governor; (2) a police officer; (3) an official whose functions overlapped those of the *moḡtaseb*, particularly as a superintendent of weights and measures and as guardian of public morals.

davātdār: keeper of the royal inkhorn.

dīvān-e a'lā, *dīvān-e ʿālī*: the supreme Divan; the chancery.

dīvānbegī: highest civil magistrate; from time of ʿAbbas I onward, one of the seven members of the supreme council of emirs.

dīvānḡāna: court of justice.

dowlatḡāna: royal residence.

emir: a Safavid officer of the highest rank.

ešk-āqāsibāšī (of the Supreme *dīvān*): the holder of this office, called by Kaempfer *supremus aulae Mareschallus*, is first mentioned during the reign of Esma'il II; under 'Abbas I he became one of the six principal officers of the state.

ešk-āqāsibāšī-ye ḥaram: an officer of lesser rank who was in charge of the various categories of officials whose duties lay at the entrance to, or outside, the *ḥaram*.

e'temād al-dowla (trusted support of the state): a title, not a rank; commonly conferred on viziers from time of Shah Tahmasp onward.

farmān: an order issuable only by the shah.

fathnāma: a letter announcing a victory.

fatvā: a legal opinion issued by a *moftī* or other legal expert.

gāzī(s): "fighters for the (Islamic) faith" against the (Christian) infidel.

gerek-yarāqān: purveyors.

golām (lit., "slave"): in Safavid times used as a technical term to denote a person of non-Muslim origin who entered either the Safavid military or civil establishment. The *golāms* were mainly Armenians, Georgians, and Circassians.

hama-sāla: a form of draft (*barāt*) permanently assigned on the same source of revenue.

ḥaram: the women's quarters of a house.

Imam (in Sunni usage): leader, especially in prayer; (in Shi'ite usage): a descendant from 'Alī in the male line, endowed with unique characteristics such as infallibility, etc.

imamzada: shrine or mausoleum erected over grave of some local šaikh or holy man.

jabbadār: director of the arsenal.

jārčībāšī: chief herald.

jelowdārbāšī: an officer under the orders of the *amīr-aḡorbāšī*.

jenn: genies or spirits, not necessarily malevolent.

kādembāšī: comptroller of the attendants of the shrine of Imam Reżā.

kaftān: a quilted vest worn under armor.

Ḳāja: title of respect accorded to members of the religious classes, men of letters, etc.

kalāntar: mayor.

kalīfa(s): 'successor' to the Prophet Moḥammad; (in Sufi usage): 'commissar' for Sufi affairs.

kalīfat al-kolafā (in Sufi terminology): 'chief commissar' for Sufi affairs.

ḵāneqāh: Sufi convent.

- kāṣṣa:** belonging to the crown, coming under the jurisdiction of the crown.
- kaṭīb:** the official charged with delivering the *koṭba*, or formal address, on Fridays in the mosque.
- kerqa:** Sufi mantle.
- khan:** (1) the highest of three regular ranks in the Safavid army; (2) tribal chief.
- koṭba:** address delivered in mosques on Fridays.
- lala:** guardian, mentor.
- laškar-nevīs:** an officer concerned with army records.
- madad-e karj:** technical term for a specific type of *soyūrgāl*, immunity from tax or special privilege of a financial nature (see *TM*, p. 183).
- majles-nevīs:** secretary of state.
- maṣnavī:** a poem of indefinite length composed in rhyming couplets.
- mehmāndār:** officer responsible for the care of state visitors, official guests, etc.
- meydān:** square, piazza.
- mīr-šekār:** huntsman.
- mohrdār:** keeper of the seal.
- moḥtaseb:** an official charged with the supervision of weights and measures, the maintenance of public morals, etc.
- moḥtaseb al-mamālek:** an official subordinate to the superintendent of the royal workshops.
- mojtahed:** Shi'ite theologian of the highest rank.
- moḥtār al-salṭana:** occasionally used as a title of the *vakīl-e dīvān-e 'ālī*.
- momayyez:** auditor.
- monšī:** secretary.
- monšī al-mamālek:** state scribe.
- moqarrab:** a title of two categories of officials distinguished by their close proximity to the throne. (1) *moqarrab al-kāqān*, including palace eunuchs, royal physicians and astrologers, the controller of assay, etc.; (2) *moqarrab al-ḥaẓrat*, including the *eštīk-āqāsī-ye ḥaram*, the heads of departments of the royal household, court ushers, etc. (see *TM*, pp. 56ff.).
- moršed, moršed-e kāmel:** spiritual director of Sufis.
- mošref-e boyūtāt:** overseer of the royal workshops.
- mostowfī al-baqāyā:** comptroller of the arrears.
- mostowfī-ye māl:** see *zābeṭ-nevīs*.
- mostowfī al-mamālek:** chief accountant, comptroller of finance.
- mostowfī-ye qūrčān:** accountant of the household troops.
- motaferreqabāši:** commander of the couriers known as *motaferreqa*.

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motavallī: warden of a shrine.

naqīb: a municipal official subordinate to the *kalāntar*.

naqīb al-noqabā: chief *naqīb*.

nāẓer: superintendent.

nāẓer-e boyūtāt: superintendent of the royal workshops.

nāẓer-e daftar-kāna-ye homāyūn: superintendent of the royal secretariat.

nešān: letter of appointment.

owlād: "stakes" or "pillars." The five *owlād* and the *abdāl* "substitutes" (their number is variously given as 7, 40, and 300), take the third and fifth places, respectively, in the hierarchy of saints who, "unknown to the masses, participate by means of their powerful influence in the preservation of the order of the universe" (I. Goldziher, *ABDĀL* in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, 1954, pp. 94-5).

pādešāh: king.

pasha: Ottoman military title borne by officers of high rank.

qabaq-andāzī: the pastime of shooting at a ring or other target placed on top of a pole.

qapūčībāšī (Ottoman: *qapıçıbaşı*): chief doorkeeper.

qāzī-ye aḥdāṣ: the magistrate who adjudicated in litigation arising from the activities of the *aḥdāṣ*.

qāzī-ye mo'askar, *qāzī 'askar*: military chaplain.

qezelbāš (Turkish 'redhead'): pejorative term used by the Ottomans to denote supporters of the Safavid cause, subsequently adopted by the latter as a mark of pride. The term referred to the distinctive scarlet headgear worn by Safavid supporters.

qollar-āqāsī: Safavid usage, commander in chief of the *golāms* (*qollar*); Ottoman usage, officer in charge of the *qollar* ("slaves") of the Sultan.

qūrčīs: the cream of the *qezelbāš* troops, often used as royal bodyguards.

qūrčībāšī: commander in chief of the *qūrčīs*.

šadārat: the office of *šadr* [*q.v.*].

šadr: head of the religious institution.

šāheb-towjīh: keeper of the ledgers, an official in the department of the chief accountant.

šāhī-sevan: those who love the Shah.

šamḡāl: title of local ruler of Tarki near modern Petrovsk.

sanjaq-beys: Ottoman governors-general of the provinces.

sar-kešīk: officer of the watch at the Mašhad shrine.

šarbatdār: official in charge of sherbets, wines, and other drinks.

sārūqčībāšī: head keeper of the royal turban.

- sepahsālār*: commander in chief of the armed forces of Iran.
- šeyḵ al-eslām*: a leading authority on the religious law with juridical functions overlapping those of the *qāẓī*.
- seyyed*: a person claiming descent from the Prophet Moḥammad.
- stāda*: seyyedship.
- širajībāši*: master of the wine cellar.
- sofračībāši*: chief sewer.
- soyūrgāl, soyūrgālāt*: grant of land or its revenue in lieu of salary or pension.
- sūbāši*: Ottoman military title (see H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I/1, Oxford University Press 1950, index under *şū-başı*).
- šūfiḡarī*: conduct appropriate to a Sufi.
- sultan*: (1) *qezelbāš* officer of the rank below khan; (2) title of Muslim rulers, especially the Ottoman sultans.
- tabarrā'i*: member of a special corps whose duty it was to walk through the streets calling down curses on the "rightly-guided" caliphs and other enemies of the Shi'ites, and to discipline those who failed to respond.
- tāj*: the distinctive red hat, with twelve pleats or gores denoting the twelve Shi'ite Imams, devised by Ḥeydar as the distinguishing badge of the followers of the Safavid House.
- teyūl*: an assignment on the revenue in lieu of salary.
- toṵāčībāši*: chief army inspector.
- tūpčībāši*: commander in chief of artillery.
- Turkman(s)*: generic name for Turkish tribes.
- tūšmālbāši*: superintendent of the royal kitchens.
- vakīl*: deputy, viceregent.
- vakīl al-saltāna* (see *vakīl-e dīwān-e 'ālī*).
- vakīl-e dīwān-e a'lā ('ālī)*: the term usually used to denote the head of the bureaucracy if this official was a *qezelbāš* officer.
- vālī*: ruler of a frontier province who acknowledged the suzerainty of the Safavid shah but enjoyed a large degree of independence.
- vaqf, owqāf*: charitable endowments, in cash or in kind, made by a benefactor for the upkeep of mosques, shrines, and the like, and for the support of the staff, both lay and ecclesiastical, of such places.
- vazīr-e dīwān-e a'lā*: head of the bureaucracy; vizier.
- viziers*: see *vazīr-e dīwān-e a'lā*.
- yašāqī*: levies providing their own arms and equipment.
- yašāvol*: aide-de-camp, court usher.
- yašāvolān-e majles*: ushers.

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yasāvolān-e šohbat: gentlemen-in-waiting.

yasāvolbāši: chief *yasāvol*.

yenīçeri-āqāsi: Aga of the Janissaries.

yūzbāši: centurion.

zābet-nevīs: an official in the revenue department of the chief
accountant's office.

zarbzān: light cannon.

zargarbāši: head goldsmith.

